or its international partners. international its or government Malian the either from attention little received has process decentralisation the through reform governance efforts, counterterrorism ongoing to Yet, in contrast decentralisation. through authorities state and central of northern representatives select between relations improve to aimed Agreement, Algiers the as known of 2015, agreement peace Malian The 1 1 Introduction the in populations of representation enhanced 2015 Algiers Agreement, Article 6 calls for for 6calls Article Agreement, 2015 Algiers influence of the other over territorial control in northern regions. northern in control territorial over other the of influence the hamper to trying each of representation, logic this reinforcing have been and signatories authorities state Central regions. in northern and communities tribes of marginalised and interests needs the before precedence takes signatories of armed representation the in which control, of territorial in alogic captured remains Decentralisation signatories. and armed authorities state central between of contestation an issue become has Mali in northern decentralisation how illustrating in by Mali decentralisation on debate the to contributes brief policy This in time. point this at limited remains regions in northern decentralisation effective aconsequence, As partners. international its or government Malian the either from attention little received has process decentralisation the through reform governance efforts, counterterrorism ongoing to Yet, in contrast decentralisation. through authorities state and central Mali of northern representatives select between relations improve to aimed Agreement, Algiers of 2015, the as agreement known peace Malian The national assembly. The case of northern Mali hybrid governance Decentralisation amidst 2020 JUNE 1

2 Agreement Algiers the to signatories armed 2015, Since in time. point this at limited remains regions in northern decentralisation effective aconsequence, As subsided. groups Tuareg-led armed of northern threat military the once momentum lost quickly governance decentralise to however, efforts In practice, uprisings. northern repeated to in response strategy co-optation areflexive become has decentralisation rebellion, 1990s the Since Modern African Studies African Modern Mali’. in threat Tuareg the coopting Seely, J. 2001. ‘A political analysis of decentralisation: decentralisation: of analysis 2001. ‘A J. political Seely, 499-524. 499-524. p. , 39:3, The Journal of of Journal The 2

Anna Schmauder CRU Policy Brief CRU Policy Brief

– specifically the former rebel coalition For historically subordinated groups, CMA3 – have pushed for the decentralisation this provided an opportunity to contest of governance. Yet, implementation of new societal hierarchies.6 Decentralisation decentralised regions following the peace thereby became both a tool for increased agreement has been slow. This is because representation of the north and a tool to the Malian government has diverging challenge the hierarchical order of northern priorities – pushing for the return of state societies.7 security forces and DDR4 in northern territories instead.5 To this day, division lines of local politics run along autochthonous (first-arrivers) and This policy brief contributes to the debate allochthonous (late-arrivers) members of a on decentralisation in Mali by illustrating community.8 Whereas village and fraction how decentralisation in northern Mali chiefs are customarily representatives has become an issue of contestation of the families of first-arrivers, so-called between central state authorities and late-arrivers to a particular area have armed signatories. It outlines the extent to had to fit into confined power structures. which decentralisation in the north of the Local hierarchies are further structured country has reproduced existing governance around historically defined categories problems, in which the interests of both of ‘nobles’, ‘vassals’ and ‘slaves’.9 When signatory armed groups and customary decentralisation formally concentrated elites take precedence over those of financial power in the hands of the mayor, marginalised communities. Since the 2012 the creation of electoral offices at municipal crisis, governance in northern Mali has been level provided a channel for challenging the determined more by a logic of territorial socio-economic and socio-political authority control than by decentralised structures. of these customary elites.10 In this sense, In that sense, armed actors define the scope the electoral competition introduced through of administrative governance. decentralisation is intertwined with both inter- and intra-community contestation, as members of historically subordinated 2 Democratising fractions could formally compete for office representation? with members of historically dominant fractions.

Recurring uprisings in northern Mali were centred around demands for both increased electoral representation and more autonomous territorial governance. Since the 1990s, decentralisation has been considered the necessary response 6 Pezard, S. and Shurkin, M. 2015. Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past agreements, local conflicts, to these demands – in the creation of and the prospects for a durable settlement. Santa new territorial units and new electoral Monica, California, RAND Corporation. p. 32. positions. Starting with the first municipal 7 Hagberg et al. 2019. ‘Intervention local, élites elections in 1999, governance in Mali politiques et décentralisation de l’état au Mali’. formally shifted from centrally appointed 8 Hetland, Ø. 2007. ‘The politics of decentralisation in state representatives to locally elected Mali: the prospects for local democracy’, Forum for civil authorities. Development Studies, 34:1, p. 142. 9 Molenaar, F., Tossel, J., Schmauder, A., Idrissa, A. and Lyammouri, R., August 2019, The Status Quo Defied: The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya, 3 Coalition for Movements. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. 4 Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration. 10 Lecocq, B. 2003. ‘This country is your country: 5 The Carter Center April 2020. Rapport de territory, borders and decentralisation in Tuareg l’Observateur independent Observations sur la mise politics’. Itinerario-international journal on the history en œuvre de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation of european expansion and global interaction, 27:1, au Mali, issu du processus d’Alger. p. 60.

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As electoral office promised not only public most powerful.15 At both local level as mayors authority but also access to state resources, and district level as members of parliament, electoral contestation introduced through they have in many instances successfully decentralisation effectively fuelled tensions in cemented their influence.16 tribal hierarchies, as customary elites at the highest echelons of traditional authority were This logic of elite capture is best illustrated challenged. Rather than institutionalising in the region of Ménaka, where the position channels of contestation between the of member of parliament was consecutively central state and northern peripheries, in the hands of customary elites. Oullimiden decentralisation has instead increased local amenokal Bajan Ag Hamatou is an example and regional contestation. of this dynamic, holding the position of both member of parliament and customary leader Yet the ability to capture elected office of Ménaka for more than two decades. is closely linked to both financial status This combination of hereditary and electoral and control of resources. This logic also capital facilitated the continuation of tribe- holds in central Mali, where subordinated based representation in which customary groups have a similarly poor chance of leaders are elected based on the hereditary being elected.11 Electoral mobilisation position they hold within the most numerous requires both social and economic capital.12 tribal communities.17 The prevailing logic of decentralisation is more one of particular interests based on This dynamic illustrates how decentralisation the logic of kinship and tribal fractions, than processes are ill-equipped to deal with of representation of community interests.13 situations of hybrid governance in which The institutional position of member of non-state actors play key governance roles. parliament reproduces the political and As a result, customary actors are able to social inequalities that exist among tribal capture newly created electoral positions to fractions. maintain and stabilise their existing positions of power. As a consequence, customary elites14 have skilfully been able to capture electoral office across the territory, where their fractions are

11 Jourde, C., Brossier, M. and Cissé, MG. 2019. ‘Predation and violence in Mali: Fulani statutory elites and logic of domination in the Mopti region’. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue and economic power that comes with the title. canadienne des études africaines, 53:3, p. 431-445. Lecocq, B. 2003. ‘This country is your country: 12 Vliet, M. 2014. ‘Weak legislatures, failing MPs, and territory, borders and decentralisation in Tuareg the collapse of democracy in Mali’. African Affairs, politics’. Itinerario-international journal on the history 113, p. 45-66. NIMD 2019. Etude Nationale sur le of european expansion and global interaction, 27:1, coût financier des campagnes electorales et des p. 60. mandats electifs au Mali. 15 De Bruijn, M. and Pelckmans, L. 2005. ‘Facing 13 Vliet, M. 2014, op. cit. dilemmas: training Fulbe slaves in modern Mali’. 14 As administrators of territory since pre-colonial Canadian Journal of African Studies / La Revue times, customary elites have remained powerful canadienne des études africaines, 39:1, p. 69-95. in the face of absent state capacity, especially 16 Nonetheless, the 2013 deputy elections in the in northern Mali. Customary governance actors district of Kidal can be considered proof that this play key roles in local conflict resolution and power also has its limits. land management. See Molenaar, F. et. al. 2019. 17 Similarly in Mopti, the electoral arena has The Status Quo Defied: The legitimacy of traditional consolidated the status of dominant Fulani elites. authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, See Jourde, C., Brossier, M. and Cissé, M.G. 2019. Niger and Libya, The Hague: Clingendael Institute. ‘Predation and violence in Mali: Fulani statutory p. 96. The title of the highest echelon of customary elites and logic of domination in the Mopti region’. authority – amenokal – signifies him as ‘owner Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue of the land’, highlighting the combined political canadienne des études africaines, 53:3, p. 431-445.

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3 Decentralisation and Central state authorities lacking willingness redistricting to engage with these issues have left the decentralisation process stalled, even in areas where it has already Next to the logic of territorial representation, been implemented. In January 2016, an essential part of Malian decentralisation decentralisation increased the number of lies in the re-ordering of territory into newly regions in Mali to ten, transforming the defined boundaries – called ‘redistricting’. previous northern districts of Ménaka and In northern Mali, this essentially means Taoudéni into distinct regions and thereby transforming existing districts into increasing the number of elected positions regions and the consequent changing of for northern communities.19 Four years municipalities into districts. This territorial after its implementation, operationalisation aspect of decentralisation is further fuelling of these new regions had not yet been tensions – with regard to potential access completed on all administrative levels, and to central state resources in , and decentralisation in northern Mali is therefore to existing resources and infrastructure in a effectively lacking a proper foundation. given territory. As a result, central state authorities did not take the new regions into account in the The 2019 regional consultation processes legislative elections of March and April 2020. on decentralisation in Mali’s northern regions has illustrated this pattern. As voting This move has been interpreted by some for members of parliament takes place at as a disregard of existing decentralisation. district level, the greater the number of As one interviewee argued, the decision districts the better the representation of has further alienated civilians, who have a a given population in Bamako, and hence hard time comprehending such disregard of the higher the likelihood of having access legally recognised regions.20 In this sense, to central state resources. In the process while recognition of existing decentralised of redistricting in Kidal, communities that structures would have effectively increased were consulted proposed the creation of institutional representation of candidates up to 19 districts in the existing region, affiliated with the former rebel alliance with each powerful fraction attempting to CMA, its blatant disregard risks adding to establish their own district. Districting has an already pervasive sense of inequality in become synonymous with holding power northern regions. and resources.

As seen in Ménaka, territorial redistricting 4 Armed actors and changing exacerbates grievances around access to power relations essential resources. In a region characterised by repeated episodes of severe drought, decentralisation in northern Mali has, in In the absence of reliable state apparatus some instances, increased grievances capable of governing its entire territory, around access to water, education Malian central state authorities have relied and justice. For example, in early 2018 on a dual governance strategy in which historically marginalised communities in officially implemented decentralisation Ménaka protested against the proposed is accompanied by strategic alliances redistricting.18 with regional elites – both customary and armed. Rather than co-optation attempts

19 République du Mali. 2012. Loi N°2012-018 portant création des Cercles et Arrondissements des 18 Yattara, Inamoud – unpublished transcript. Régions de Tombouctou, Taoudénit, , Ménaka Note Techniques: Analyse de la déclaration des et Kidal. Communautés lésées du cercle de Ménaka relative 20 Interview AMM Representative, Bamako, Mali, au découpage communal (Région de Ménaka). February 2020.

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through decentralisation, state–society inclusive representation of constituencies. relations in northern Mali have instead been Through their reliance on local elites to shaped by a strategy of counterbalance counterbalance Ifoghas Tuareg, central state relying on establishing regional proxies as authorities ultimately profit from the elite an antithetical element to restive Ifoghas capture of democratic positions. Tuareg tribes. 21 In this sense, central state authorities’ governance relied more on a few Since the 2015 peace agreement, interim selected individuals and groups, rather than authorities installed in northern regions, in any attempt to ‘represent the full spectrum coordination between the signatory armed of society’ through the formal decentralised groups and central state authorities, have governance channels.22 contributed to a further blend of authority. While these interim authorities at regional In Ménaka, Bamako’s reliance extended to and district levels have been installed by both the aforementioned customary elites the state, they represent key personnel of cementing their influence in electoral office the signatory armed movements, making and the armed groups comprising the pro- a separation of power de facto impossible. government Platform, including the Imghad The position of interim authorities is thus Self-Defence Group GATIA and its ally MSA, an additional example in which armed led by Daoussahak Tuareg. This dual reliance territorial control has become congruent on customary and armed actors favoured with administrative power. As such, interim counterbalancing rather than integrating authorities in Ménaka – a former stronghold and co-opting rebellious Ifoghas Tuaregs,23 of the Platform coalition – have been putting the decentralisation process at the nominated by Platform members GATIA/ end of the queue. MSA, whereas interim authorities in Kidal had been proposed by the ex-rebel coalition This dual position of customary leadership CMA. in Ménaka as proxy and de facto para- sovereign of the region24 is best expressed The strategy of counterbalancing, however, in the saying ‘If Bajan is strong, the state failed most recently with regard to Bamako’s is strong.’25 In this sense, customary elites non-state armed allies of the Platform operate on the same clientelism pattern – GATIA/MSA. As partners in French employed by the state, with both central counterterrorism operations, they had been state authorities and their regional proxies increasingly targeted by radical actors, which relying on particular interests rather than on weakened the alliance and resulted in splits within the Platform. The ex-rebel coalition CMA stepped into this chasm of territorial control, further expanding into northern 21 Boone, C. 2003. Political Topographies of the African regions including Ménaka. This change in State: Territorial authority and institutional choice. power relations has led the aforementioned Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. customary elites – long-acting as proxy The strategy of counter-balance was also deployed to influence in-group dynamics of the Ifoghas. for Bamako – to adapt through renewed 22 Pezard, S. and Shurkin, M. 2015. Achieving Peace alliances with the CMA. At the November in Northern Mali: Past agreements, local conflicts, 2019 summit of Ifoghas-dominated HCUA, and the prospects for a durable settlement. Santa arguably the CMA’s most influential bloc, Monica, California, RAND Corporation, p. 26. Oullimiden aménokal Bajan Ag Hamatou 23 Nonetheless, the CMA cooperated by securing officially declared his alliance to the group.26 northern Mali during the 2018 presidential elections This switch of allegiance was similarly that led to the re-election of President Ibrahim observed across various tribal fractions, Boubacar Keita. formally announcing their shift to the CMA, 24 Sandor, A. 2017. Insecurity, the Breakdown of social trust, and armed actor governance in central and northern Mali. A Stabilizing Mali Project Report. August, p. 23. 26 United Nations 2020. Letter dated 28 February 2020 25 Grémont, C. 2004. Les liens sociaux au Nord- from the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Mali: entre fleuve et dunes: récits et témoignages. Resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali addressed to the Karthala Editions. President of the Security Council.

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thereby adapting to the armed group most of Ménaka as a district of Gao region, would capable of extending at least a fragile form have increased the number of national of protection.27 representatives of this territory by a factor of four. Instead of one member of parliament for In the increasingly fragmented conflict the district of Ménaka – as in previous years, landscape of Mali, this switching of alliances amenokal Bajan Ag Hamatou was elected is indicative of the necessity for customary with 75% – the new region of Ménaka could central state proxies to align to new have elected four members of parliament for power balances. it similarly underlines the each of the respective districts of the newly continued dependency of both central state created region. and armed actors on selected influential customary leaders. As local strongmen, Governance dynamics in northern Mali are their ability to mobilise large numbers of therefore characterised by the competing the population makes them an attractive logic of both formal and informal peripheral cooperation partner for both governments governance arrangements deployed by and non-state armed actors.28 In this sense, the central state. As such, the formal customary actors remain intermediaries decentralisation process has been in between state and society,29 a function competition with a logic of armed territorial that further allows them to cement local control, on which both the ex-rebel coalition power hierarchies, to the disadvantage of CMA and the central state through its subordinated groups. proxy armed Platform coalition relied. In this sense, the predominant form of While it is difficult to distinguish the degree governance has so far been shaped to which territorial control will correspond by selective reliance on customary with political power in Ménaka, the latest elites and pro-state armed groups to legislative elections demonstrate the counterbalance the ex-rebel CMA coalition. CMA’s ability to attain electoral dominance.30 As a consequence, decentralisation in the This ambition has similarly translated to the northern region of Ménaka has contributed region of Ménaka. Their capacity as veto little to democratising representation and has players on the national level has once again instead empowered selected ethnic groups become visible ahead of the 2020 legislative to the detriment of subordinated fractions. elections, for which CMA advocated the taking into account of increased representation of northern populations by 5 Conclusion including the region of Ménaka created in 2016. Accounting for the new region of Five years since the signing of the 2015 Ménaka, with its distinct districts – instead Peace Agreement, governance in northern Mali is characterised by overlapping spheres of customary, armed and administrative authority,31 in which the separation of power 27 Interview HCUA Representative, Bamako, Mali, eludes set categories. As authority waxes 32 March 2020. and wanes, signatory armed groups hold 28 Raleigh, C. and De Bruijne, K. 2017. ‘Where rebels administrative positions through the interim dare to tread: A study of conflict geography and authorities, but also shape the latitude co-option of local power in Sierra Leone’. Journal of of administrative actors through their Conflict Resolution, 61:6, p. 1230-1260. 29 Molenaar, F. et al. 2019, The Status Quo Defied: The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya. Clingendael Institute. Chapter 2; Leonardi, C. 2019. 31 Raleigh, C. and De Bruijne, K., 2017. ‘Where rebels Making Order Out of Disorder: Customary authority dare to tread: A study of conflict geography and in South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. co-option of local power in Sierra Leone’. Journal of 30 Thurston, A. ‘Mali: Analysing the Legislative Conflict Resolution, 61:6, p. 1230-1260. Results from Kidal’. Sahel Blog. Available here: 32 Hagmann, T. and Péclard, D. 2010. ‘Negotiating https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2020/05/01/mali- statehood: dynamics of power and domination in analyzing-the-legislative-results-from-kidal/. Africa’. Development and Change, 41(4), 539-562.

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role as key military powers. In this sense, In addition, decentralised structures have military force accompanies political power been a marginalised channel of contestation. – a recognition to which even pro-state Instead, most power plays still take place customary leaders such as the amenokal in at macro level through the problem of Ménaka have to submit. armed territorial control and the implicit political influence it implies. Changing power In the aftermath of the 2015 Algiers relations in northern Mali, following the Agreement, decentralisation has become implosion of the Platform coalition in 2019,34 conceptualised as both a tool to increase could therefore provide renewed impetus to relations between northern Mali and central focus on institutionalised decentralisation authorities and a means to transform armed instead of selective informal decentralised governance into institutionally accepted arrangements. channels of contestation. This has been more aspiration than reality, a fact that has The current decentralisation process is been most recently underlined in the context captured in a logic of territorial control of legislative elections held on 29 March that remains dominated by the armed 2020, in which the failure to implement signatories, whose representation takes decentralisation in Ménaka region led precedence before the needs and interests to renewed contestation by the ex-rebel of marginalised tribes and communities in coalition CMA. northern regions. Central state authorities and signatories have been reinforcing These ramifications of decentralisation this logic of representation, each trying do not depend on the institutional to hamper the influence of the other over creation of decentralised structures, but territorial control in northern regions. In on the governance dynamics in which the present context of changed power decentralisation takes place.33 While relations, implementing decentralisation at decentralisation has in some cases enabled district and municipality levels in the newly the population to challenge historical created region of Ménaka will likely lead to hierarchies, the decentralisation process in greater representation of CMA interests in the aftermath of the 2015 peace agreement the national assembly. But the integration continues to play out between elites. The of former rebels follows institutionalisation, signatory armed groups – presenting strong be it in the security sector or governance. but marginal fractions such as those within In this regard, Mali’s international partners CMA, and representing numerous tribes should not shy away from holding central such as within the Platform – have installed state authorities accountable: the fact that interim authorities, while customary elites criticism of the stalled decentralisation proved able to secure their positions as process has come from the ex-rebel CMA deputies through flexible alliances. bloc does not render it any less valuable.

34 The Carter Center. January 2020. Rapport de l’Observateur independent Observations sur la mise en œuvre de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d’Alger. Significant splits within the armed groups composing the signatory 33 See Boone, C. 2003. Political Topographies of the Platform coalition – both within the Arab Movement African State: Territorial authority and institutional of Azawad (MAA) and the GATIA (Tuareg Self- choice. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Defence Group and Allies), weakened the politico- Press. military power of the Platform coalition.

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About the author

Anna Schmauder is a Junior Researcher at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. In this capacity, she focuses on hybrid governance in peacebuilding contexts and their intersection with security dynamics in the Sahel region.