Between Nazism and Opportunism

Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS

Master Thesis Holocaust and Genocide Studies University of Amsterdam June 2014

Name: Sarah Weber 10418636 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate Second Reader: Dr. Karel C. Berkhoff

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Contents

Abbreviations ...... 5 List of Figures ...... 7

1. Introduction ...... 9 1.1. Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS ...... 9 1.1.1. Current State of Research ...... 9 1.1.2. Research Questions ...... 15 1.1.3. Source Discussion ...... 16 1.1.4. Approach and Structure ...... 18 1.2. History of the Waffen-SS ...... 20 1.2.1. Establishment of the Waffen-SS ...... 20 1.2.2. Admission and Administration of Swiss Volunteers ...... 24 1.3. “Swiss Renewal Movement” and Frontismus ...... 28 1.3.1. Nationale Front, 1933-1940 ...... 30 1.3.2. Volksbund und SGAD (Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie, 1933-1944 ...... 31

2. Who were they? Background and Profile of the Swiss Volunteers ...... 34 2.1. On Work Hunt ...... 36 2.2. National Socialists ...... 41 2.3. Double Citizens ...... 48

3. Career Prospects ...... 52 3.1. The Bureaucrat Dr. Franz Riedweg ...... 54 3.2. The Idealist Dr. Heinrich Büeler ...... 58 3.3. The Military Man Heinrich Johann Hersche ...... 62 3.4. The Nazi Johann Eugen Corrodi ...... 67 3.5. The Instructor Alfred Nikles ...... 69 3.6. The War Correspondent Benno Schaeppi ...... 71

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4. Motivation and Ideological Commitment ...... 75 4.1. National Socialism and Anti-Semitism ...... 77 4.2. Anti-Bolshevism ...... 83 4.3. Dream of a Greater Germanic Reich ...... 86 4.4. Opportunism ...... 90

5. Postwar Punishment of the Swiss Volunteers ...... 95 5.1. Main Legal Bases for the Verdicts ...... 97 5.2. Military Court Sentences ...... 102 5.3. Treason Trial: Riedweg and Seventeen Co-Defendants ...... 109 5.4. The Swiss War Crime Trial: Stating an Example on Wipf Eugen...... 114

Conclusion ...... 120

Primary Sources ...... 130 Bibliography ...... 143 Internet Sources ...... 146

Appendix I ...... 149 Appendix II...... 150 Appendix III ...... 152

Acknowledgments ...... 153

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Abbreviations

AfZ Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich BAR Bundesarchiv Bern BArch Bundesarchiv Berlin BNSE Bund Nationalsozialistischer Eidgenossen BRB Bundesratsbeschluss BTE Bund Treuer Eidgenossen nationalsozialistischer Weltanschaung BSG Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland DSchV Datenschutzverordnung EF Eidgenössische Front ES Eidgenössische Sammlung ESAP Eidgenössische Soziale Arbeiter Partei Grekos Grenzpolizei Kommissariate GL Germanische Leitstelle MStGB Militärstrafgesetzbuch NBS Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz NF Nationale Front NJ Nationale Jugend NS National Sozialismus NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei RS-HA Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt RuSHA Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt SBA Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft SGAD Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer Autoritären Demokratie StGB Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch SS Schutzstaffel SS-HA SS-Hauptamt VB Volksbund

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List of Figures

Image Cover Page Photo of Swiss volunteers taken in Sennheim 1942

(BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2576, C.29/A116/42.1192)

Image 1 Portrait of Franz Riedweg 54 (Swiss.info Online: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/culture/A_Swiss_in_the_service_of_the_SS.html?cid=2941 9904 [19.11.2013])

Image 2 Portrait of Heinrich Johann Hersche 62 (BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 131)

Image 3 Hersche as Cavalry Major in Bern 63 (BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.)

Image 4 Portrait of Johann Eugen Corrodi 67 (The Axis Powers Online: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=28101&start=0 [19.11.2013])

Image 5 Portrait of Alfred Nikles 69 (BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511)

Image 6 Portrait of Benno Schaeppi 71 (BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713)

Image 7 Wipf Eugen leaving the Court in 1948 114 (BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11)

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1. Introduction

“An meine Eltern. Sollte ich aus Russland nicht zurück kehren, meine Lieben, so nehmt dies als letzten Gruss. Sorgt euch nicht, mein Tod sei umsonst gewesen oder verfrüht. Was sind wir als Blätter am Baum – was tut es, wenn eins welkt oder fällt? Wenn nur der Baum wächst. Wenn das Blatt ihm nur Wurzeln schlagen und blühen half. Denkt nicht, ich hätte das Schicksal herausgefordert, ich hätte kühn oder aussergewöhnlich gehandelt. Ich tat nur, was alle tun. Dass es nicht falsch war, nicht sinnlos, ist mein heiligster Glaube.“1

These words were expressed in a letter by a young Swiss volunteer to his parents written from the Eastern Front. This young man had taken the decision to participate in the war on the side of Germany and he must have felt sure that his sacrifice served a greater interest. However, Germany lost the war and what was idealized before was punished thereafter. So, his and many other volunteer’s story were forgotten and suppressed, as Switzerland did not want to be associated with Nazi Germany in any way. Hans-Rudolf Lehmann, a radio moderator, read his words for the public in a show dedicated to the history of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS in 1977. Yet, the topic did not attract attention, so it disappeared again from society and was only taken up recently by academic research.

1.1. Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS

1.1.1. Current State of Research The Holocaust and the Second World War is for the collective memory in Switzerland not of much relevance. In continuation of a long-standing national self-image, Switzerland saw itself after 1945 as a small neutral state, which because of its will to resist and a clever policy managed not to be drawn into the war. The notion, that Switzerland succeeded in preserving its institutional independence as a constitutional, democratic and federal state in midst of the Nazi sphere seems to prevail. The Bergier

1 Brief des Schweizer Kriegsfreiwilligen Johannes Mettler an seine Eltern kurz vor seinem Tod, gelesen durch Hans-Rudolf Lehman auf Ration DRS 1 in 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit. 9 report concluded in 2002 that today, Switzerland is faced with a past that has never been incorporated into the prevailing view of history.2 Switzerland’s role in World War II has been the subject of an increasingly heated debate since the 1970’s. Historians and publicists have published a whole series of economic, social and political analysis of various aspects of the period from 1939-1945. Nevertheless, in general, historical interest and enquiry in Switzerland on World War II has concentrated much more on the war and the war economy than on the Holocaust.3 In late 1996, the debate on the gold transactions between the Swiss National Bank and National Socialist Germany and the dormant assets of Jews in Swiss banks attracted global attention. That is why the Swiss Parliament and the Federal Council decided to investigate the accusations around the gold transactions. An Independent Commission of Experts (ICE), under the direction of Jacques Bergier, was mandated to conduct a historical investigation, bringing important, previously forgotten and suppressed issues but also unknown aspects to light. The Bergier report, however, did not include or mention Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS. Research on Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS remains a research gap. So far there is not much literature on the Swiss volunteers and the source basis remains unorganized. A standard reference with reliable numbers and conclusions is still missing. A Federal Assembly report to the Federal Convention in 1945, regarding antidemocratic activities of Swiss citizens in the Reich, approached the matters of Swiss volunteers. It recorded the numbers of Swiss in the Waffen-SS until the year 1944 as following: 755 in the Waffen-SS, thereof 86 died in combat or missing, 52 dismissed, and 617 in the Wehrmacht.4 The German lawyer and historian Hans Werner Neulen published a standard reference on international volunteers in the Waffen-SS and dedicated one chapter to the Swiss volunteers. He estimated that a number of 1500 Swiss and Liechtensteiner passed the Panoramaheim5 in total, whereby the majority arrived between summer and autumn

2 Bergier, J. (2002) (ed) “Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report“. In: Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War. Pendo Verlag: Zürich, pp. 10-25. 3 Ibid., pp. 40-45. 4 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit von Schweizern und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 1939-1945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember 1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945. 5 The Panoramaheim was a collection point for Swiss and Liechtenstein volunteers. Every Swiss man who crossed the border was eventually picked up by the border control and questioned by the Gestapo. The Gestapo in turn had orders to send the potential volunteers to the Panoramaheim, where they were either 10

1941. Neulen assessed that a number of 800 Swiss conscribed to Waffen-SS duty and 70 for the Wehrmacht, whereby an estimated number of 40 achieved the rank of an officer. He furthermore estimated that 300 Swiss died in combat.6 The Swiss military historian Vincenz Oertle published a voluminous source study on the Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS in 1997 with the long title “Sollte ich aus Russland nicht zurückkehren.” Schweizer Freiwillige an deutscher Seite 1939-1945. Eine Quellensuche.7 Oertle agreed on Neulen’s numbers, stating that around 800 Swiss were serving in the Waffen SS-alone. Yet, he claimed that the number of the Swiss expats joining the Wehrmacht were even higher.8 More precise Oertle recorded the numbers from a SS-Hauptamt, SS-HA report in 1944 as following: 755 in the Waffen-SS, thereof 33 in leading position, 86 killed in action and 52 dismissed.9 The Swiss historian Peter Mertens published an article on the Swiss volunteers in a book about the history of Swiss as mercenary soldiers. According his research, there are no exact numbers on the amount of Swiss volunteers within the Waffen-SS, since the sources seem to be deficient and not clear enough in order to establish an exact picture. Yet, he similarly estimated a number of 870 volunteers in the Waffen-SS, whereof 52 or 6.8% achieved the rank of an officer. Then again, this number only concerned Swiss men who were living in Switzerland and left the country illegally and did not include men with the Swiss citizenship living in Germany at that time. Furthermore, he estimated another 1100 Swiss citizens in the Wehrmacht, whereas their degree of gratuitousness was not clear, because of the matter of dual citizenship. The numbers did not include Swiss who were working in civil departments or healthcare.10 Martin Gutmann from the University of Lucerne estimated in his comparison of Danish, Swedish and Swiss Waffen- SS volunteers a number of 1300 Swiss volunteers but remarked that these numbers are hard to establish with certainty, since the estimates in various works and among the

conscribed to work service or Waffen-SS duty. The function of the Panoramaheim will be explained in chapter 1.2.2. Organization and administration of the Swiss volunteers 6 Neulen H. W. (1985) An deutscher Seite. Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS. Universitas: München, pp. 175f. 7 Oertle, V. (1997) Sollte Ich aus Russland nicht zurückkehren. Schweizer Freiwillige an deutscher Seite 1939-1945. Eine Quellensuche. Documenta Militaria Thesis Verlag: Zürich. 8 Ibid., pp. 12. 9 Ibid., pp. 557. 10 Mertens, P. (2006) „Schweizerische Freiwillige in der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1938- 1945.“ In: Fuhrer, H.R & Eyer, R. P. (Eds) Schweizer in Fremden Diensten. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Zürich, Pages 291-311, here pp. 295. 11 statistics of the SS vary widely. He pointed out that there may have in fact been many hundreds more than hitherto account for.11 The numbers of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS seems to be relatively small compared to other countries. Yet, relativizing these absolute numbers it is evident that there were less volunteers coming from France or Sweden, which was neutral as well and that the Swiss numbers therefore were quite high. Mertens explained the high rate with the cultural and linguistic proximity of Switzerland to Germany.12 Gutmann similarly concluded that the influence of the geographical factor was decisive, since the border between Switzerland and Germany was flat and densely populated which facilitated the illegal crossing.13 Another reason according to him was the political prosecution of right wing extremism in Switzerland in 1940, in which course many left Switzerland to Germany. Gutmann explained the lack of basic research on the topic with the fact that after the war, Switzerland developed a myth of resistance which he described as militarization of the popular memory. That memory highlighted the wartime experience to the preparedness to repel a German attack. Therefore, the Swiss soldiers who had guarded the borders became patriots and anti-Nazis, whilst the Waffen-SS volunteers were considered unrepresentative of their society.14 Mertens stated that the subject of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS long was seen as a taboo issue in Switzerland and it has attracted little interest in the writing of the historiography of Germanic volunteers in Germany itself.15 Oertle was the first Swiss historian who researched the history of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS extensively. In his standard reference, he chose an anecdotal approach, focusing on the motives of the broad group of Swiss men who joined the Waffen-SS, the Wehrmacht and the “Organisation Todt”. His study intended to encompass the entire history of the Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS, whereby his collection of source material offered an insight into the topic in general. Since there was no research done on that topic beforehand, his diligent work certainly laid the foundation for further research. Yet, Oertle’s analysis remained limited on a descriptive approach that

11 Gutmann, M. (2013) „Debunking the Myth of the Volunteers: Transnational Volunteering in the Nazi Waffen-SS Officer Corps during the Second World War,” In: Contemporary European History, 22(4), Pages 585-923, here pp. 590. 12 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 301. 13 Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 590. 14 Ibid., pp. 587. 15 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 294. 12 unfortunately did not link the single stories of the volunteers together. Oertle’s aim was to study the accounts objectively in order to contribute to a sophisticated perception of Switzerland during the Second World War. Unfortunately, his study is exactly lacking that objectivity. For instance, he excused the participation of Swiss soldiers with their sense for duty and long the standing tradition of the mercenary army, rather than ideological commitment. He did not assess his cases with the necessary thoughtfulness and trivialized their participation. Statements like: “Zunächst spielt der natürliche Drang des Schweizers mit, einmal ins Ausland zu gehen (…)“ only underline this judgment.16 Also, he did not treat the archive findings critically, since he accepted the volunteers’ excuses in the police interrogation protocols of not being politically engaged without relativizing it. He stated that “Gestandene Soldaten mit Prinzipien und Lebenserfahrung machten sich eben, ganz im Gegensatz zu den Verrätertypen, zwielichtige Figuren und der grossen Zahl jugendlich-grüner Kriegsfreiwilliger, schon Gedanken über die Konsequenzen (…)“17 His justifications for the Swiss volunteers could originate from his personal background, coming from a family with far reaching military background. Also, one of his ancestor was a volunteer in the Waffen-SS. Oertle concluded that ideological commitment or the enthusiasm to join Hitler in the fight against Stalin was not decisive. Overall, he stated that the Swiss Waffen-SS volunteers were mostly looking for working possibilities or adventure.18 The volunteers rather left because of personal reasons, such as unsuccessful marriages, liabilities, personal resentments against the Swiss army and government, as well as adventurism.19 Mertens did not entirely agree with Oertle. Admittedly, he stated the range of motivation was manifold but he assessed that Oertle underestimated the role of ideological commitment. Mertens concluded that the motivation reached from National Socialist and anti-Communist motives, private or professional problems, escape from federal justice, war fever, or mere thirst for adventure and that in many cases, it was the combination of these motivation sets that enabled participation.20

16 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 52. 17 Ibid., pp. 325. 18 Oertle, V. ( 2010) Ein Appenzeller in der Waffen-SS. Heinrich Johann Herrsche von Appenzell, Major der Schweizer Kavallerie und SS-Standartenführer, die Légion des Volontaires Français contre le bolchevisme und die 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Divison der SS „Charlemagne“ (franz. Nr. 1). Druckerei Appenzeller Volksfreund: Appenzell, pp. 10f. 19 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 12-20. 20 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 304. 13

Oertle and Mertens’ research included all the Swiss volunteers and they did hardly distinguish between higher ranking and lower ranking volunteers. Also, they did not put their findings into perspective by including a comparative approach. That is why Gutmann intended to offer a more nuanced assessment on the Germanic volunteers, by comparing the Swiss volunteers with Swedish and Danish volunteers in combat formations of the Waffen-SS. His main focus was not motivation per se, but he rather intended to challenge the long standing scholarly interpretation that the volunteers were of lower-class, social outsiders of criminal inclined or mentally unstable nature. He concluded that the research of neutral volunteers can help to formulate a more nuanced and demythologized history of the Waffen-SS. Switzerland was not occupied so there was no forced conscription into the Waffen-SS. Therefore, classical, pragmatic collaboration as motive can be ruled out as motif for joining. Also, recruitment and propaganda differed, since National Socialist organizations were more and more restricted and forbidden.21 Whilst the complexity of the Swiss volunteers as a collective received astonishingly little attention from the academic world, there are three bibliographies published. Oertle wrote a bibliography on the SS-Standartenführer Heinrich Johann Hersche, wherein he concentrated more on the battle history of the “33. Waffen-Grenadier-Divison der SS Charlemagne”.22 Another bibliography on one of the highest ranking Swiss volunteers was published by Marco Wyss on the person of Franz Riedweg. Wyss’s book Un Suisse au Service de la SS – Franz Riedweg 1907-2005, described his career by assessing his role within the “Germanische Leitstelle” (Germanic Guidance Office), GL.23 The historian François Wisard recounted in his book Un Major Biennois dans l’ordre Noir the biography of Johann Eugen Corrodi, who was the highest ranking Swiss volunteer.24 The two books are pleasant to read and offer background information on the history of the Waffen-SS, the organization of the Waffen-SS and the role of volunteers therein as well as on the NS organizations in Switzerland. However, they do not address the motivation at large, nor do they include lower ranking volunteers in their assessment. Yet, their references to archive material certainly are invaluable for further research. Lastly, Linus Reichlin, a Swiss journalist, published a book on the Swiss volunteers. The book Kriegsverbrecher

21 Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 585. 22 Oertle 2010, Appenzeller. 23 Wyss, M. (2010) Un Suisse au Service de la SS. Franz Riedweg (1907-2005). Éditions Alphil-Presses Universitaires Suisses: Neuchâtel. 24 Wisard, F. (1999) Un Major Biennois dans l’ordre Noir. Walter von Känel: Saint-Imier. 14

Wipf Eugen. Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, in Deutschen Fabriken und hinter den Schreibtischen des Dritten Reiches, cannot be considered academic research, since neither footnotes nor detailed references to the archive documents are indicated. However, the book is written in a narrative way and therefore certainly had the capacity to the open up the topic to a wider public.25

1.1.2. Research Questions No single assessment approached the question on motivation satisfyingly, by incorporating higher ranking and lower ranking volunteers equally, as well as giving ideological commitment the necessary attention. This thesis principal aim is to assess the motivation of the Swiss volunteers to leave Switzerland illegally and to join in the Waffen-SS. Motivation is defined as forces acting either on or within a person to initiate behavior. The term refers to the activating properties of the process involved in psychological motivation.26 Hence, motivation is a personal matter, influenced by the own situation which in turn is characterized by the personal background. That said it has to be clear that motivation is a multifaceted characteristic that is not equally applicable for a whole group of men. In contrary, it has to be assessed individually and by doing so, it is possible to work out similarities or divergences. Therefore, a biographical approach was chosen. The thesis also focuses on the personal background, socialization, socioeconomic factors as well as the Swiss volunteers’ admission and careers within the Waffen-SS and the role of ideological commitment as a motivation. Moreover, the post war punishment will receive consideration. However, this thesis does not include the military history or military actions at the front. The following research questions will be addressed:

 Who were the Swiss volunteers and under what conditions were they socialized? Where did they come from, how old where they when they left Switzerland and what was their family situation and educational background?

25 Reichlin, L. (1994) Kriegsverbrecher Wipf, Eugen. Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, in deutschen Fabriken und an den Schreibtischen des Dritten Reiches, Weltwoche ABC Verlag: Zürich. 26 Petri, L. H. (2008) „Definition Motivation“, In: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/394212/motivation [23.05.2014]. 15

 What careers and ranks did the higher ranking volunteers achieve? What were their qualifications that enabled their careers and to what positions where they assigned?  What different values of National Socialism were expressed by the ideological committed volunteers?  How did the Swiss authorities judged on the returning volunteers and what legal bases were applied in their conviction? Which courts were dealing with the returnees and where there differences in their jurisdiction? Did the Swiss courts impose severe punishment on the returnees and how did the society at large perceive the Swiss volunteers?

1.1.3. Source Discussion To acquire the source basis for this research, various archives were visited. For the most part, the source basis was collected in the Bundesarchiv Bern (BAR). Since Switzerland remained independent during the war, the national police and military intelligence was able to keep records on the Swiss volunteers. These documents from the “Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft”, SBA (Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland), the “Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement” (Federal Justice and Police Department) and the “Departement für Justiz und Polizeiwesen” (Departement for Justice and Law Enforcement) delivered the foundation for my research. The interrogation protocols from the various police stations or from the SBA contained personal statements on their motivation to leave Switzerland. Mostly, in the following of their prosecution after they returned to Switzerland, the volunteers had to write down their curriculum vitae, which in turn gave information on their personal background. Also, the SBA collected personal letters from the volunteers to their families and friends. The higher ranking, committed volunteers generally already engaged in NS organizations in Switzerland, whereby their mail and correspondence often were monitored by the authorities. Furthermore, a visit to the former US-Document Center in Berlin, which is now renamed Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArch) was instructive. The personal files of the Swiss volunteers gave insight on their date of admission, ranks and career advances within the Waffen-SS. Also, Himmler issued the “Heiratsbefehl” in 1931, which ordered a screening

16 of the SS men and their fiancées by the the “Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt”, RuSHA.27 As a result, the SS members had to apply for a permission to get married. Next to physical examination, the applicant had to write curriculum vitae which had to prove their “einwandfreie Weltanschauung” (proper ideology). In the case of the Swiss volunteers, they mostly indicated why they left Switzerland, in order to prove their ideological commitment. Luckily, most of the files were accessible. However, there are still files that are not accessible and therefore could not be used for this research. Article 5 paragraph 2 of the “Bundesarchivgesetz” stated that personal archive files can only be viewed 30 years after that person has died.28 That is why Vincenz Oertle was not able to have insight in all those files. Some of the files are still kept under lock and key. However, the accessibility was already facilitated. Unfortunately, the volunteers can only be searched by their full name and the volunteers are not classified by nationality. That complicates the archive search considerably, since it requires previous knowledge about the volunteers. Lastly, further documents on three higher ranking Swiss volunteers were collected in the “Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich” (AfZ). The archive material on Franz Riedweg, Benno Schaeppi, and Heinrich Büeler contained personal letters, newspaper articles as well as court files. These documents were used to write their biographies and assess their postwar punishment. Also, the archive offered extensive information on the administration of the Swiss volunteers in the “Germanische Leitstelle” in the “SS- Hauptamt”, as well as the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart, which was the collection point for the Swiss who were picked up at the border. In this thesis a total amount of seventeen Swiss volunteers was analyzed, whereof ten were higher ranking and one was said to have committed war crimes. Twelve out of seventeen were ideologically committed. In the assessment on motivation there is always a risk of oversimplification, since it tends to freezes the motives of the perpetrators. To find evidence on motives is problematic since it has to be relied on interpretations. It has to be pointed out that it is of substantial importance to treat the

27 SS-Befehl-A-Nr.65 Verlobungs- und Heiratsbefehl durch den Reichsführer-SS, München 31. Dezember 1931, In: Schlüsseldokumente zur Deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Online: http://www.1000dokumente.de/?c=dokument_de&dokument=0127_hei&object=context&l=de [18.12.2013]. 28 §5 Abs. 2 Bundesarchivgesetzes: „Archivgut des Bundes, das sich auf natürliche Personen bezieht, darf erst 30 Jahre nach dem Tode der Betroffenen durch Dritte benutzt werden. Ist das Todesjahr nicht oder nur mit unvertretbarem Aufwand festzustellen, endet die Schutzfrist 110 Jahre nach der Geburt des Betroffenen.“ 17 documents critically, because of the problematic involved in the objectivity of the material. The personal statements have to be taken literally, however it has to be kept in mind that those statements were given with the knowledge that their deeds where crimes. Therefore the accused denied or downplayed the ideological commitment in order to reject the accusation of treason and the interrogations by authorities created an incentive to exonerate oneself. So, it is likely that the men were not completely honest about the feelings and motivation they actually had. Judging on motivation and emotions in retrospect leaves a lot of room for interpretation, since the memory on feelings is influenced by a contemporary self understanding. This certainly altered the picture the men had of themselves. So, the personal statements taken from interrogation protocols are not sufficient to explain their motivation for collaboration. As a matter of fact, they have to be complemented with additional statements originating from letters to friends and family. These statements indicate more about the true nature of their motivation or ideological commitment. Records of the “Bundesstrafgericht” (Federal Criminal Court) could have given more detailed insight. Unfortunately, these records were still under a blocking period during Oertle’s research. The files would have been available for the research of this thesis. However, its existence was only discovered later on in the research period and therefore not consulted.

1.1.4. Approach and Structure This thesis can be seen as a collection of individual cases attempting to create an overall picture. However, the main focus is the assessment of the volunteers’ motivation to leave Switzerland illegally and join the Waffen-SS. Special attention will be given to the ideological committed volunteers, since previous research underestimated the role thereof. National Socialism and Nazism have a unique usage of language and wording. That is why the personal statements remain untranslated. The choice of words can indicate a certain ideological commitment and give additional information on the person. Motivation is a personal matter an in order to understand the Swiss volunteers’ decision, it is important to introduce the individuals used this case study. Each of these men was influenced by a different context. That is why chapter two assesses their background, socioeconomic properties, family situation, as well as age by reference to a

18 biographical approach. In assessing the various backgrounds of the Swiss volunteers in the interrogation protocols by the SBA or in letters, it turned out there were basically two main motivation traits that served as guidelines in this chapter, namely work hunt and National Socialism. Oertle and Neulen divided the volunteers’ motivation into different groups according percentage. However, it is clear that a person did not only belong to one category and that the division is an oversimplification, since they possessed various aspects that overlapped. This chapter proves that the men possessed additional motivational aspects from other categories used by Neulen and Oertle. Also, Oertle and Neulen did not include dual citizens, because according to them, their motivation was not clear. That is why two double citizens will be incorporated in the study. Chapter two shows that there are differences distinguishable between the group National Socialist and the other ones. It seems that the ideological committed volunteers were able to have a certain career within the Waffen-SS. That is why in chapter three a special attention will be given to the career development of six Swiss volunteers. In this chapter, I will argue that the possibility for these Swiss volunteers to gain a career within the Waffen-SS was thanks to their ideological commitment to National Socialism and their engagement in NS organizations in Switzerland. Another factor is that most of them were already militarily educated in Switzerland. Additionally, their language abilities, made them well respected and desired manpower. However, there were certain types of careers and each man selected for this chapter represents a different career type. Two of them were able to have a career within the bureaucracy of the GL, whilst two others had an impressive career within the army. One person was engaged as an instructor and leader of the Panoramaheim and the one other was involved in the creation of propaganda material, as war correspondent. Chapter two and three indicate that there was a difference between lower ranking volunteers and higher ranking volunteers and that their motivation varied. However, the assessment of the various career types in chapter three additionally indicates that motivation also varied amongst the ideologically committed volunteers. That is why chapter four further distinguishes ideological commitment as a motivation. Race struggle and anti-Semitism are crucial aspects of German Nazism. Therefore, it will be assessed if these matters were equally important for the Swiss volunteers. Consequently, anti-bolshevism has to be included in the assessment as it was perceived

19 as National Socialism’s enemy ideology. Additionally, Hitler aspired a Greater Germanic Reich in which all Germanic people would live together. Did that vision for a greater Reich excite and influence the Swiss volunteers? Lastly, chapter three established that the higher ranking volunteers were driven by opportunistic considerations. This is an aspect that was not discussed by academic research so far. That is why special attention will be given to that aspect of motivation. The last chapter’s intention of this chapter is to assess how the Swiss authorities judged on the returnees and on what legal base they convicted the volunteers. To understand the sentences imposed on the volunteers, the different legal violations will be addressed. As will be established, the Swiss volunteers were not all judged on the same base or in the same court, since the authorities’ distinguished between the sole violation of military law or criminal law. Therefore the various trials will be assessed. The “common” Waffen-SS soldiers were mostly tried on the base of military law, whilst, the higher ranking Swiss were tried separately in criminal trials for endangerment of the Swiss neutrality and treason. Both trials will be elucidated with specific accounts from the case studies. The question whether the Swiss authorities imposed severe punishment is of crucial interest. Thus, it is necessary to put the findings into perspective. Hence, in the conclusion a comparison will be drawn to the punishment practice of other Germanic countries. Also, the criminal trials in Switzerland did not address the question of war crimes or criminal activities of the volunteers in the Waffen- SS. That is why one specific account of a potential Swiss war criminal will be given. Chapter five furthermore intends to assess the post war perception of the returned Swiss volunteers and how the society reacted on these men. This will be examined through various newsletter articles.

1.2. History of the Waffen-SS

1.2.1. Establishment of the Waffen-SS The Waffen-SS was an armed and specialized unit which emerged from the Allgemeine SS. Bernd Wegner, a German historian and author of a standard reference on the SS, stated that the Waffen-SS cannot be considered in isolation from the history of the SS as a whole.29 The “Schutzstaffel” (Protection Squad) evolved within the National Socialist

29 Wegner, B. (1982) Hitlers Politische Soldaten. Die Waffen-SS, 1933-1945. Ferdinand Schöningh: Paderborn, pp. 16. 20 movement in the Third Reich as one of the most powerful instruments of the leadership. It was created in the early 1920s as a small unit to serve as a bodyguard for Hitler and other important Nazi members.30 In 1927, it became highly centralized by the SS leader Heinrich Himmler and from 1930 on, specialized divisions of the SS were formed.31 On December 14, 1934, Himmler ordered the consolidation of the “Politische Bereitschaften” of the SS with the “SS-Leibesstandarte Adolf Hitler” into the “SS- Verfügungstruppe”, which can be seen as the ancestor of the Waffen-SS.32 The “SS- Verfügungstruppe” was to become a fully militarized formation, intended to serve as the nucleus of an SS division.33 It now looked increasingly like an alternative army with a program based on rigorous military training, physical fitness, and political indoctrination. These values later became the corner stone of the Waffen-SS and determined recruitment standards.34 In 1939, Himmler persuaded Hitler to establish a new type of elite SS formation – the Waffen-SS. In fact, Hitler created a separate military force alongside the regular state security organs, detached from the Wehrmacht and the police that was allowed to use heavy weaponry.35 The mobilization for the Waffen-SS started in August 1939. In the beginning of the war, the conception of the Waffen-SS was not based on the recruitment of new SS men but on the consolidation of the various SS units and police battalions. Himmler’s idea was to unite the various SS with different origin, equipment and standard of education into an efficient military elite troop.36 In June 1940, the title Waffen-SS became official and it applied to the “SS-Leibestandarte Adolf Hitler”, the “SS-Verfügungsdivision” and the “SS-Totenkopfdivision”, which were responsible for the concentration camp guards, the “SS-Polizeidivision”, the “SS-Junkerschulen” and all their replacement and training units.37

30 Pollmar, N. & Allen, T. B. (1996) World War II. The Encyclopedia of the War Years 1941-1945”. Randomhouse: New York, pp. 759. 31 Speer, A. (2002). “SS Schutzstaffel”. In: Benz, W. (ed) Lexikon des Holocaust. C.H. Beck: München, pp. 222f. 32 Dingel, F. (2007) „Waffen-SS“. In: Benz, W. & Graml, H. & Weiss, H. (eds) Enzyklopädie des National Sozialismus. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag: München, pp. 862. 33 Stein, G.H. (1966) The Waffen SS. Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1933-1945. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, pp. 8. 34 Holmes, R. (2001) (ed) The Oxford Companion of Military History. Oxford University Press: New York pp. 867. 35 Ibid. pp. xxxi. Cf. Knopp, G. (2003) (ed) Die SS. Eine Warnung der Geschichte. Goldmann Verlag: München, pp. 266. 36 Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 127. 37 Höhne H. (1967) Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS. Sigbert Mohn Verlag: Gütersloh, pp. 407. 21

The members of the Waffen-SS joined on voluntary basis, but recruitment standards were strict.38 The draft boards of the SS had to make sure that the racial quality of the recruits remained guaranteed. Only tall, “racially excellent”, young volunteers were accepted. They had to undergo extensive medical examination, whereas the racial quality of the applicant was judged on a five-point scale.39 The scale reached from “pure Nordic” to “presumption of non-European blood line influence” (Vermutung aussereuropäischen Bluteinschlags).40 The restrictions on the physical standard were even more rigorous. The applicants had to be younger than 23 years old, having a body size of at least 1.74 meters and were not allowed to carry classes. Moreover, they had to complete extensive athletic tests.41 A nine point scale was used to evaluate the physical conditions. This scale was supplemented with additional exercises, judging the force, endurance, nimbleness, velocity, and courage. Additionally, the recruits had to pass an intelligence test, which however was not very demanding in content. Also, it was important that the applicant was not married and that he did not have a criminal record.42 The Waffen-SS man was not just a simple soldier, but rather a political soldier and representative of the National Socialist world view.43 The SS ideology was rooted in the racist ideal known in Hitler’s Germany as “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil). The SS was seen as the living embodiment of the National Socialist doctrine of the superiority of Nordic blood. So, the Waffen-SS was intended to be a fighting force, bound by ideological oaths, whose fighters were selected from the best Aryan stock. However, according to Stein, for the Waffen-SS soldier the racial struggle did not take the form it did for the SS men who ran the extermination camps or who staffed the execution squads of the Einsatzgruppen.44 Then again, Cüppers assessed in his analysis on the German volunteers that the younger age groups of the Waffen-SS, who composed half of his sample, were mostly accustomed to NS educational institutions and therefore used to anti-Semitic propaganda, as well as the aggressive state measures against the Jews. He

38 Dingel 2007, Waffen SS, pp. 862. 39 Knopp 2003, Die SS, pp. 270. 40 Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 135f. 41 Knopp 2003, Die SS, pp. 270. 42 Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 135f. 43 Dingel 2007, Waffen SS, pp. 862. 44 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 122f, 125. 22 concluded that the German Waffen-SS soldiers indeed were highly ideologically motivated45 Given time and progression of the war, the Waffen-SS was increasingly experiencing a lack of man power.46 Therefore, recruitment was more and more disseminated to the occupied Germanic countries, applying an active style of conscription. .47 In the early summer of 1940, the SS started a recruitment campaign in the conquered Germanic countries which initiated the transformation of the Waffen-SS into an international military organization.48 As a result, chief of the “SS-Hauptamt”, SS- HA49 Gottlob Berger,50 founded the GL in March 1940. The GL was a department of the “SS-Hauptamt”, SS-HA or also called “Ergänzungsamt”, which was one of twelve central offices of the “Gesamt-SS”.51 The SS-HA was responsible for the recruitment and acquisition of SS personnel and ideological training for both German SS and Germanic SS.52 However, with the progression of the war, the tasks for the SS-HA grew considerably, so that new offices were created in order to disburden the SS-HA. The goal of the GL was to turn the Waffen-SS into a truly Germanic and European order, by finding new recruits, first amongst the youthful generations of rural Germany, secondly amongst the ethnic Germans and lastly among the Germanic countries.53 Finally, about half of the Waffen-SS divisions were made up of foreign volunteers, meeting Himmler’s

45 Cüppers, M. (2005) Wegbereiter der Shoa. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer SS und die Judenvernichtung 1939-1945. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, pp. 77. 46 Koehl, R. L. (1983) The Black Corps. The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS. The University of Wisconsin Press: Wisconsin, pp. 193f. 47 Hein, B. (2011) „Himmlers Orden. Das Auslese- und Beitrittsverfahren der Allgemeinen SS.“ In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 59(2), Pages 263-280, here pp. 270, 276. 48 Gingerich, M. P. (2007) “Waffen SS Recruitment in the „Germanic Lands“, 1940-1941.” In: Historian, 59(4), Pages 815-830, here 6ff. 49 The SS-HA was also called “Ergänzungsstelle” and was the central command office of the SS until 1940. It served as headquarter for the administration of staff. However, with progression of the war the duties became too numerous. Therefore, it was split in twelve departments. Yet, it remained the central office for administrative matters such as recruitment and promotions. Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15.1.1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 50 Gottlob Berger was chief of the SS-HA since 1941 and was promoted general of the Waffen-SS in 1943. Berger also functioned as personal representative of the Reichsführer-SS Himmler in the Ostministerium. Berger’s career started early. He joined the NSDAP in 1922 and from 1930 on he was active in the SA. After he left the SA in 1933 he joined the SS in 1936, starting immediately with the rank of an SS- Oberführer. Preradovich, N. (1985) Die Generäle der Waffen-SS. Kurt Vowinckel-Verlag: Berg am See, pp. 19f. 51 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 300. 52 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15.1.1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 53 Koehl 1983, Black Corps, pp. 193f. 23 desire for an international organization composed of Nordic blood. The Germanic countries were identified by special color insignia while others had national insignia.54 The Waffen-SS sought to work with indigenous and national socialist groups, in order to incorporate the conquered lands into the Greater Germanic Reich.55 Thus, the voluntary duty of foreign volunteers in the Waffen-SS can be seen as collaboration, according to Neulen. He defined collaboration as cooperative work with the enemy, whereas the actions of the volunteers were against the interests of the own country. Neulen remarked that the collaborators were convinced that they were not acting against their nation’s interest but in contrary that they served their country with good intentions.56 He concluded that around 60% of the volunteers were members of National Socialist parties in their own countries before joining the Waffen-SS. Only 38% were not member before and only one person stated that adventurism or material considerations played a role in his decision to join the Waffen-SS.57 The deterioration of the war situation on the eastern front and the high losses there demanded a dissemination of recruitment even outside of the Germanic lands. Therefore, the Waffen-SS was forced to create military formations from races that were decidedly non Aryan and accept recruits without Nazi leanings or any understanding of the SS mystique.58 As a consequence, the Waffen-SS was even allowed to draft recruits under duress from 1943 on.59

1.2.2. Admission and Administration of Swiss Volunteers The occupation of France in 1940 manifested the potential of a German supremacy in a new European order. It was with this background that the Federal Council of Switzerland, Marcel Pitet-Golaz,60 announced that the Swiss people might have to become comfortable with the thought of certain assimilation with Germany. At the same time, the first Swiss “Schwarzgänger” (illegal border crossers) arrived at the border. Those first individuals did not precisely know what to expect in Germany and the

54 Pollmar & Allen 1996, Encyclopedia, pp. 870f. 55 Gingerich 2007, Recruitment, 6ff. 56 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 39. 57 Ibid., pp. 379-382. 58 Pollmar & Allen 1996, Encyclopedia, pp. 870f. 59 Hein 2011, Himmlers Orden, 270, 276. 60 Marcel Pilet-Golaz was a Swiss FDP (Free Democratic Party) politician and elected as Swiss Federal Council in 1928 until 1944. Pilet-Golaz became well known in the World War II context, because he met with a NSB delegation whilst he was Swiss Federal President in 1940. Favez, J. C. (2010) „Marcel Pilet- Golaz“, In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D4641.php [28.08.2013]. 24

“Grenzpolizei Kommisariate, Grekos left it to them, whether they wanted to apply for work or join the Waffen-SS on a voluntary base.61 Thus, as early as 1940, there was already a small number of Swiss volunteers serving in the Waffen-SS.62 Therefore, Himmler commanded the SS-HA to verify the matters, as soon as the reports of Swiss border crossers increased. Thereupon, the responsibility was transferred to the GL.63 GL Chief of office was Franz Riedweg, a Swiss SS-Obersturmführer, who will be introduced in chapter three in this thesis. The main task of the GL was the recruitment of additional man power within the Germanic countries and the deployment of a Germanic “Sturmbanne”. It also encompassed the volunteers’ ideological training and it was structured by education, political connections, as well as press and propaganda. Since Switzerland was perceived as a Germanic country, its volunteers logically fell under the responsibility of the GL. The “Referat Schweiz” (department Switzerland) was responsible for the administration of the Swiss volunteers.64 The main task concerning Switzerland was to facilitate recruitment conditions and prepare for a time when Switzerland would have been incorporated into the Reich. However, since Switzerland was not occupied yet, a collection point had to be established in Germany.65 The “Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt”, RS-HA (Reich Security Head Office) was mainly dealing with refugees, whereas the “Leitabschnitt” Stuttgart, as part of the RS-HA was tasked with the supervision of the Swiss NS movement. Therefore, the collection point for the Swiss border crossers was founded in Stuttgart in January 1941. Also, Stuttgart is in proximity of the Swiss and Liechtenstein’s border, and was therefore easy reachable for the volunteers. The city of Stuttgart allocated a property on the Panoramastrasse 11. Hence, the collection point was named “Panoramaheim”. As soon as the Panoramaheim was prepared, the Grekos and the Gestapo had order to transfer all the border crossers from Switzerland and Lichtenstein to the new collection

61 Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz, März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4. Germanische Leitstelle. 62 Williamson, G. (1994) The SS. Hitler’s Instrument of Terror. The full Story from Street fighters to the Waffen-SS. Sidgwick & Jackson: London. pp. 108. 63 Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz, März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4. Germanische Leistelle. 64 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 65 Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg an den SS-Oberabschnitt Süd-West betreffend der Schweizerischen Auffangstelle, Berlin 1. April 1941, In: BArch NS 31/237. 25 point.66 Alfred Nikles, who will be introduced in chapter three of this thesis, was the first Panoramaheim leader.67 The Panoramaheim was located in Stuttgart until 1943 and thereafter transferred to Strasbourg. Because of heaving bombing it was once more relocated to Bregenz until 1945.68 The Panoramaheim had the following purposes: on one hand it functioned as collection point including acquisition of data, consulting of the volunteers in regard of a possible accession into the Waffen-SS, representation of the Swiss in front of authorities also after they left the home, and lastly support of ex- volunteers in regard of applications for leave.69 The Swiss authorities assumed that the Panoramaheim additionally functioned as espionage center, since all the newcomers were questioned about their knowledge on military facilities in Switzerland, as well as their personal political stance and opinion on the army in general.70 In case that the Swiss volunteers displayed leadership qualities, they were transferred to the SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz, where they received a special education for leadership positions.71 The SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz was only attended by Germanic volunteers, who were holding the rank of an officer. The education lasted four months and was more or less an infantry education with intense training on machine guns and shells, as well as tactics. The course intended to retrain the foreigners to German military standards and prepare them for ideological and political education of volunteers.72 Ultimately, the trained officer corps originating from the special training would have been installed as district leaders of their countries in the new Reich. This was considered important for the future political tasks within these countries. So the GL

66 Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz, März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4. Germanische Leistelle. 67 Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg an den SS-Oberabschnitt Süd-West betreffend der Schweizerischen Auffangstelle, Berlin 1. April 1941, In: BArch NS 31/237. 68 Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz, März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4. Germanische Leistelle. 69 Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz, März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4. Germanische Leistelle. 70 Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. 71 Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg betreffend Germanische Führerausbildung in Bad Tölz, SS-Hauptamt, Amt IV an den Reichsführer—SS, Berlin 24. August 1942, In: BArch NS 31/375. 72 Abhörungsprotokoll von Kurt Brüderlin durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 8. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 26 already made plans for the administration of the Germanic lands after the war.73 The plans also encompassed Switzerland, whereas an altering of the Swiss border was intended. The canton Wallis for example would have been integrated to the “Gau Savoyen” and just like in the Netherlands, a Reichskommissar would have been appointed.74 Moreover, there were already lists available, annotating the desirables and undesirables, Jews and unionists.75 The GL also already made plans for an establishment of a “Germanische SS Schweiz”. These plans had the codename “Aktion S”.76 The Regulations for admission concerning the Swiss volunteers did not differ from other Germanic countries. The conditions for admission were the same ones as for all the SS members. However, there were two phases within the mustering process. The first Swiss, who arrived between 1940 and 1941, still had the choice whether they wanted to join the Waffen-SS on a voluntary base, or if they wanted to apply for work. This, however, changed from 1942 on. As soon as the war on the Eastern Front did not go in Germanys’ favor, it became more and more difficult to find new recruits. The Swiss volunteers arriving in those years many times did not have the choice anymore but were persuaded in the Panoramaheim to join the Waffen-SS.77 From 1943 on the numbers of volunteers were declining whilst attempts of desertion were augmenting.78 The Swiss did not have an own division, probably because their number was too small. Neulen assumed that another reason was that the Swiss neutrality was essential to Germany and that therefore political provocations were avoided.79 In the first war years, the Swiss were mainly allocated in the motorized infantry regiments “Der Führer” and “Deutschland” as part of the “SS-Verfügungsdivision”. By the end of 1940, the “SS- Verfügungsdivision” was renamed in “2. SS-Division Das Reich” and was mainly appointed to the eastern front. In 1943, this division was transformed into a Panzer grenadier division that became the elite formation of the Waffen-SS. Another division composing a higher number of Swiss volunteers was the “6. SS -mountain division

73 Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg an den SS-Oberabschnitt Süd-West betreffend der Schweizerischen Auffangstelle, Berlin 1. April 1941, In: BArch NS 31/237. 74 Zeitungsartikel, Die Germanische Leitstelle der SS. Die Urteilsverkündung des Bundesstrafgerichts, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 2511, 12 Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 75 Zeitungsartikel, Das Panoramaheim. Eine Schweizerische SS Zentrale in Stuttgart, In: Stuttgarter Zeitung, 31. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 76 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit von Schweizern und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 1939-1945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember 1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945. 77 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 144. 78 Zeitungsartikel, Das Panoramaheim, eine Schweizerische SS Zentrale in Stuttgart, In: Stuttgarter Zeitung, 31 Dezember 1947, In BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 79 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 176. 27

Nord”, mainly stationed in Finland. An estimated number of 290 Swiss men were fighting in that division. Since the Swiss were highly experienced with mountain areas, it is no surprise that they were chosen for that division.80

1.3. “Swiss Renewal Movement” and Frontismus Peter Gilg and Erich Gruner, both Swiss historians and political scientists, claimed in their essay, that the Swiss by nature do not tend to extremism, so that extreme left as well as right wing movements admittedly do exist, however, are only temporarily of influence and only affect limited layers of society. According to them, this is also true for the time of Fascism and National Socialism in Switzerland.81 The emergence of nationalistic organizations in the prewar years in Switzerland is generally called “Schweizerische Erneuerungsbewegung” (Swiss renewal movement), since these groups aspired a restructuring of the political, economical and social conditions in Switzerland and Europe.82 The movement is also named “Frontismus”, because the word front, meaning border, appeared in most of these organization’s names. Gilg and Gruner observed four common postulates: enforcement of governmental authority, corporate structure of the economy, emphasis on nationalism and the reinvigoration of the federalist principle.83 However, there was not one uniform nationwide right extremist party but a variety of parties and movements; at points collaborating at other points standing in concurrence with each other.84 The “Frontismus” in Switzerland was initially mostly an academic movement and in its first stage rather insignificant.85 Hence, from 1933 onward, the “Schweizerische Erneuerungsbewegung” was booming. The phenomenon of sudden intensification of this movement in Switzerland is called “Frontenfrühling” (Front Spring).86 Walter Wolf, Swiss historian and author of a standard reference on Fascism in Switzerland, named four motives for the emergence of the movement, namely a foreign

80 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 302ff. 81 Gilg, P. & Gruner, E. (1966) „Nationale Erneuerungsbewegung in der Schweiz 1925-1940.“ In: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 14(1), Pages 1-25, here 1. 82Arber, C. (2003) “Frontismus und Nationalsozialismus in der Stadt Bern. Viel Lärm, aber wenig Erfolg.“ In: Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Heimatkunde, 65(1), Pages 1-57, here 3. 83 Gilg/Gruner 1966, Erneuerungsbewegung, pp. 3. 84 Arber 2003, Frontismus, pp. 6. 85 Zöberlein, K.L. (1970) Die Anfänge des deutsch schweizerischen Frontismus. Die Entwicklung der politischen Vereinigungen NEUE FRONT und NATIONALE FRONT bis zu ihrem Zusammenschluss im Frühjahr 1933. Verlag Anton Hein: Meisenheim am Glan, pp. 9 86 Glaus, B. (1969) Die Nationale Front. Eine Schweizer faschistische Bewegung 1930-1940. Benziger Verlag: Zürich, pp. 96. 28 political, a domestic political, an economical and a psychological dimension.87 1. The happenings in Germany in the year 1933 and Hitler becoming Chancellor had its impact on the development. The Swiss politics with its readiness to compromise appeared lax in comparison to the impressive dynamic, discipline and order in Italy and Germany. The turnaround in Germany seemed electrifying and had its impact on the already existing “Kampfgemeinschaften” (action groups) and fronts, so that new formations were dashing forward like mushrooms from the ground.88 2. The domestic policy was characterized by opposition between the left and right wing of the political spectrum. There was a constant struggle between bourgeoisie and socialism.89 3. The economical crisis in the thirties, the altered social structure of society, and the events in Germany were main factors that underlined the growth of the movement. The economical crisis resulted in a weakening of the banking system, and export economy, as well as more unemployment, which in turn created an atmosphere of mental protectionism, fear of foreign infiltration and a general doubt on the system. Therefore, the conservative bourgeoisie was able to gain influence with their party stances, by holding the Bolshevism to account. It was mainly the younger generation of Switzerland that assembled in either independent or party-relied organizations to unite their common values of anti modernism and anti-bolshevism.90 4. The Frontists were primarily recruiting from the younger generations, men between twenty and forty. The younger generation was frustrated that the politicians who decided over the country’s fate were mostly old. They demanded more opportunities for political participation, since they felt that they did more for the country than the older generations, as they were working and serving in the army. To put it in Wolf’s words: this younger generation was rebelling against the “supremacy of the senile indolence”.91 The landscape of the right wing organizations in Switzerland was very fragmented, as there were a lot of different groups with own organizations. Ideologically however, they were similar. In order to gain more political influence it was necessary to create a

87 Wolf, W. (1969) Faschismus in der Schweiz. Die Geschichte der Frontenbewegung in der deutschen Schweiz 1930-1945. Flamberg Verlag: Zürich, pp. 16. 88 Rüthemann, W. (1979) Volksbund und SGAD. Nationalsozialistische Schweizerische Arbeiter Partei, Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Erneuerungsbewegung in der Schweiz 1933-1944. Juris Druck + Verlag: Zürich, pp. 5 89 Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 18. 90 Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 96-98. 91 Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 21f. 29 bigger movement. That is why some groups had the desire to unite under one major party.

1.3.1. Nationale Front, 1933-1940 The party “Nationale Front”, henceforth NF was created in 1933, by consolidation of two smaller organizations; the “Neue Front” (New Front) and a previous “Nationale Front”. Both organizations were based on nationalistic principles and anti-Semitic ideals. The party was first called “Kampfbund Neue und Nationale Front” (Battle League New and National Front), which was more an interim solution and therefore renamed Nationale Front in the spring of 1933. National Socialism, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism remained the corner stone of the party program. The party grew enormously in its previous stage after the consolidation.92 However, the growth stagnated between 1935 until 1938, with little exceptions of rare growth moments. The war furthermore influenced the disbanding, so that the party dissolved in 1940. Hence, it was replaced by the “Eidgenössische Sammlung”, ES (Confederate Collection) which in turn was forbidden by the Swiss authorities in 1943.93 The party relied ideologically on the German NSDAP. From 1936 onward, they identified openly with the National Socialistic world view of Nazi Germany. Yet, the party proclaimed a separate path for Switzerland. Beat Glaus, a Swiss historian and author of a standard work on the NF described their ideology as a “fascistic world view in a distinct Swiss form”.94 Furthermore, the party had a military stance in its style of organization and behavior. The NF believed in a racial superiority of the Aryan race and blamed the Jews for the economical crisis. The party depicted itself as savior in the apocalyptical struggle against Jewish world conspiracy and proclaimed their messianism.95 The intention was to fight against bolshevism and the class struggle, which according the movement threatened the national economy.96 In contrast to the German National Socialism, the Swiss NF emphasized the Christian believes and values. Additionally, the party popularized the confederate

92 Zöberlein 1970, Anfänge, pp. 241f, 246. 93 Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 107f. 94 Ibid. pp. 201. 95 Ibid. pp. 203ff. 96 Tobler, R. (1933) “Wesen und Ziele der Nationalen Bewegung.” In: Schriften der Nationalen Front. Sonderdruck aus Schweizer Monatsheften, 4(6), Pages 1-38, here pp. 10. 30 history of Switzerland, working with pictures and tales of the Rütli oath,97 to define Swiss identity and redefine the heroic and unique conception of Swiss history.98 However, their most important message was that Germany will win the war in any case. Insisting on an “organic solution”, the party expected that Switzerland would receive a special position in the new Reich, in which they could help refashion Europe in an independent, federalist manner.99 The party was not only relying on the German NSDAP considering ideology and visions but were fashioning themselves in the same style. They were using a battle cry “Harrus” whilst simultaneously lifting the right arm in Nazi fashion.100 Also, the use of national socialistic terminologies was common. The party leaders of a certain regional branches for instance were also called Gauleiter. The NF had an own newspaper “Eiserner Besen” (iron broom), later renamed in “die Front”, in which the political and ideological ideals were proclaimed for propaganda means. The newspaper was published for the first time in November 1931. Initially, the newspaper was published every two weeks, soon however on a weekly base. In the first three years of its existence, the edition increased from 4.000 pieces to 25.000. Propaganda tools formed the content of the newspaper and their way of writing was characterized by fascist terminology. According to Glaus, the newspaper was clearly comparable with the German national socialist newspaper “Stürmer”.101

1.3.2. Volksbund und SGAD (Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie, 1933-1944 The “Volksbund,” henceforth VB, was a dissociation of the organization Nationale Front. The VB was detached from the NF, because of ideological differences.102 It distanced itself from the NF as of differences in perception in the Jewish and Freemason matters, but also as of a disagreement on the participation of political elections, since the VB did not want to participate in it. Another reason was the contention between the NF leader

97 The Rütli oath is a legendary oath of the old Swiss Confederacy, taken on the Rütli meadow above the Lake Lucerne. It took place in 1291 when the leaders of the three regions Uri, Schwyz and Niedwalden united under the term Eidgenossen against the German landlords. Kaiser, P. (2009) “Befreiungstradition”, In: Historisches Lexikon Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D17474.php [23.08.2013]. 98 Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 203ff. 99 Meyer, A. (2010) Anpassung oder Widerstand. Die Schweiz zur Zeit des deutschen Nationalsozialismus. Verlag Huber: Frauenfeld, Stuttgart, Wien, pp.155f 100 Feldmann, M. (1933) Nationale Bewegungen der Schweiz. Eine Vorläufige Übersicht. Verbandsdruckerei A.-G.: Bern, pp. 42. 101 Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 82-85. 102 Ibid., pp. 108. 31

Dr. Alfred Zander and Ernst Leonhardt, who became the charismatic and most driving leader of the VB. The content of the fight was about letters, which were published in a newsletter that tried to prove the illegal connection of NF members to National Socialistic branches in Germany. NF leader Zander decided that the NF should remain independent from the German movement. Leonhardt did not agree with this stance, so he distanced himself from the NF and created an own organization, the VB. Furthermore, the NF was more academically oriented and organized whilst the VB tended to rely on the social class of farmers and therefore did not approve of the intellectual stance of the party. As a result, the VB attracted people who were unemployed, as they had a special program for their support.103 The most influential reason, however, was the difference in perception on the Jewish matter. The NF wanted to distinguish between “Swiss Jews” and Jews from the East, by implementing a numerus clausus for occupations where mainly Jews were working. The “Swiss Jews” would have benefited from this and Leonhardt suspected that the NF tried to get power and influence from the wealthy and well assimilated “Swiss Jews”.104 In 1938, the VB was officially banned and forbidden. As a reaction, Leonhardt founded three other organizations, among them the “Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie” (Swiss association of friends of an authoritarian democracy), henceforth SGAD. The new organization used the same political vocabulary as the VB and can be seen as a concealed continuation of the forbidden VB. In its statute, it indicated the three following purposes: gathering of all friends of an authoritarian democracy, enlightenment of the people through word und writing on the political, economical and cultural advantages of an authoritarian democracy, as well as preparation and implementation of an initiative for a complete revision of the federal constitution. The SGAD aimed for an NS Führer state according the German model.105 The association was mainly producing propaganda material with the purpose of a preparation for a National Socialist turn in Switzerland. The propaganda material contained publications against the Jewish world conspiracy, Marxists and Freemasons and furthermore displayed Hitler speeches.106 Switzerland was in a difficult position regarding the foreign affairs, surrounded by the axis powers, never sure when Germany would challenge their neutrality. With the annexation of Austria, and after the German

103 Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp. 14-19, 23. 104 Ibid., pp. 23f. 105 Ibid., pp. 200-203. 106 Ibid., pp. 224. 32 invasion of Norway, and the capitulation of the Netherlands and France, the propaganda activities of the SGAB reached its peak. The SGAD was sure that Germany would win the war and was therefore fighting for an annexation of Switzerland into the German Reich, in order to keep a privileged position. Leonhardt stated that the Swiss nationalists wanted to avow themselves to the German folk and Hitler as its Führer. So, the mission was to incorporate Switzerland completely and implicitly into the German Reich.107 By the end of 1941 Leonhardt aimed for the creation of a Swiss volunteer corps of the Swiss Army that should support the fight on the eastern front against the Soviet Union. The plan was to set up a Swiss corps with the help of Franz Riedweg. However, after the initial dismissal of the idea by the German authorities, there was a change of mind in august 1941. Gottlob Berger was enthusiastic about the idea. In fact he stated that he did not wish active propaganda, but that he would support the idea and its implementation. Leonhard started recruitment with the aid of illegal propaganda literature from Germany and was planning to join himself. Whilst Leonhardt had an independent unit in mind, Riedweg wanted to incorporate the legion into the Waffen-SS. He demanded a margin of 150 to 200 volunteers for the creation of an own Swiss unit.108 The SGAB leadership, however, did not mention that the Swiss volunteer corps would be incorporated into the Waffen-SS. With the slogan: “Schweizer Freiwillige! An die Ostfront!” they were putting the emphasis on the fight against the red terror and not on the annexation into the German Reich. In January 1942, Leonhardt informed Riedweg that the minimum amount of 150 volunteers was achieved. Berger answered that the Reichsführer-SS Himmler agreed on incorporating a Swiss unit into the Waffen-SS. Yet, the arising critics in Switzerland from other front organizations derailed the plan. Thus, the volunteers were asked to register independently. At the end, only twenty or thirty out of 150 men were estimated to have joined the Waffen-SS.109

107 Ibid., pp. 236-240. 108 Ibid., pp. 258-261. 109 Ibid., pp. 262f. 33

2. Who were they? Background and Profile of the Swiss Volunteers

One is left to wonder, why some Swiss men left the safe haven of Switzerland and joined the Waffen-SS, whilst many foreigners and refugees tried to get into the country but where rejected. Switzerland was not drawn into the Second World War and it conserved its neutrality successfully. Thus, the theorem of a threatened identity and pragmatic collaboration as a motif for joining does not succeed to explain participation in the Swiss case. Nevertheless, there had been a transition in Switzerland already in the interwar years that altered the daily life of many Swiss citizens. As pointed out in the introduction, discussing the uprising of the renewal movement, the economic situation had changed drastically and the Great Depression had left its marks on the Swiss economy so that unemployment kept on rising. The outbreak of the Second World War only worsened the situation. Furthermore, the political landscape changed and the NS rhetoric and ideals found their way into Swiss right extreme parties. Especially young people were caught up in the fever of the transition; in their view an exciting time with changes ahead. Moreover, the German war success in the first years reinforced the fear of a German occupation of Switzerland, which may have influenced the perception on Nazi Germany in general.110 The Swiss military historian Oertle evaluated 240 Swiss volunteers in his basic research and pictured them as following. “They were workers, employees, craftsmen, tradesmen, teachers, academics and military men.” In short, they were representing the Swiss population and resembled much more ordinary men than convinced Nazis. Moreover, he described the Swiss volunteers as mavericks, separatists and underdogs in comparison with the other Germanic volunteers.111 This, however, is a typical Swiss perception, always emphasizing Switzerland’s special status, which does not offer a sufficient explanation. Oertle divided their motivation into different profile groups according percentage: namely National Socialists (38%), job searchers (18%), criminals (10%), anti-Communists (9%), men who were having problems with parents, friends or the wife (9%), aviation and motor enthusiast (5%), adventurers and soldiership (5%) escapers from a penitentiary (4%) and finally young men with problems with their

110 Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 16. 111 Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, pp. 9. 34 teachers(2%).112 Mertens advocated the opinion that there certainly was not a uniform motive for the Swiss volunteers, but rather a bundle of individual reasons. Then again he similarly divided the motivation into a national socialist worldview or an anti- communist attitude, private and vocational problems, escape from prosecution, enthusiasm for the war, as well as adventurism.113 Oertle’s classification extended a study committed by Neulen who divided the Swiss volunteers into three groups: political activists, adventurers and criminals whereas he further particularized the group political activists in 40% anti-communist, 60% National Socialist and 70% “grossgermanisch”.114 The term “grossgermanisch” referred to the desire to establish a Greater Germanic Reich on the basis of a federalist structure. Also, Neulen concluded that there were only few criminals accepted in the Waffen-SS, since they were rejected and immediately sent back.115 Oertle applied more subgroups, whilst Neulen assessed the term political activity more detailed. With this division of motivation into percentage, Neulen and Oertle both created a sort of profile groups for the Swiss volunteers. However, the allocation of motivation into different groups according percentage is an oversimplified bias that does not succeed to give a satisfactory answer to the question of motivation. As will be shown in this assessment, a person was not only driven by one motivation type, but possessed various aspects that overlapped. Since Oertle’s and Neulen’s division in profile groups were problematic, this chapter attempts to prove that the research on motivation requires more flexibility. The personal background of those young men and their stories mattered and took influence on their decision to leave Switzerland. Therefore, as Semelin had proposed, the historical enquiry of describing how in order to understand why was applied.116 We have to understand in what conditions they lived, what their values were, how they were socialized and what circumstances influenced their life at that point, in order to understand why the border crossing became attractive to them. A decision is always a personal matter. Hence, it is necessary to introduce the individuals in this case study. That is why this chapter attempts to assess the background of the Swiss volunteers and to create an outline on common characteristics and personal details. Who were they and

112 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 53-61. 113 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 304. 114 Neulen 1985, deutsche Seite, pp. 175ff. 115 Ibid., pp. 176. 116 Semelin, J. (2007) Purify and Destroy. The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. Columbia University Press: New York, pp. 182. 35 under what conditions were they socialized? Where did they come from, how old were they when they left Switzerland and what was their family situation and educational background? In order to answer the question of their derivation and socialization, a biographical approach was applied, focusing on the socioeconomic properties, family situation, as well as age. In this chapter, the biographies of ten men were evaluated and recounted. The lower ranking Swiss volunteers seem to have left Switzerland out of economical considerations and were influenced and partly persuaded to join the Waffen-SS after they arrived in the Panoramaheim. Then again, Mertens assessed that economical considerations were only a secondary motive, since the salary in the German forces was not especially high.117 Therefore, the first paragraph assesses three men on a work hunt. The second paragraph focuses on five National Socialists. Oertle and Neulen both stated that there were double citizens in the Waffen-SS but they did not include them in the study, because their motivation could not be assessed. This argumentation is not convincing so additionally, two accounts of double citizens will be incorporated in this analysis.

2.1. On Work Hunt The Swiss economy was left in a vulnerable position after the Wall Street crash of 1929. The resulting protective duties and the ban of imports in other countries led to the crash of the Swiss export economy in 1930. This crisis had an impact on the unemployment rate in Switzerland. As early as 1928, the Swiss agriculture was already suffering and now the commercial middle class felt the crisis as well.118 By 1936, 125.000 people were unemployed in Switzerland which corresponded to 4.8% of the population.119 These numbers were still in range compared to other European countries. However, the Swiss citizens were influenced by the thought and reality of the Swiss crisis.120 Moreover, rumors circulated that life in Germany would be much better, that there was enough work for everybody and that the Germans were still drinking real coffee. The rumors sometimes resembled tales of a land of Cockaigne.121

117 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 304. 118 Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp 3f. 119 Degen, B (2013) „Arbeitslose und Arbeitslosenquote 1929-2000.“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D13924.php [28.05.2014]. 120 Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp 3f. 121 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 20. 36

The desire to find work and living a prosperous life was especially strong for young men. Otto Alfons Aichle, (15. May 1923, St. Gallen) had crossed the border to Germany illegally several times; the first time in November 1941, at the age of eighteen. He was recruited for the Waffen-SS immediately after he had crossed the border.122 In the interrogation by the SBA, Aichle stated that he was arrested by the Gestapo immediately after the border crossing and that he was interrogated about military information on Switzerland. He explained the Gestapo that he knew nothing in these matters and that he simply was looking for working possibilities. The Gestapo sent him to Stuttgart to the Panoramaheim, where he was persuaded to join the Waffen-SS.123 Hence, in December 1941 he was enlisted in the casern of Stralsund. Once there, forced to go through the hard training, Aichle quickly realized that the Waffen-SS was not what he had imagined how his life in Germany would be like. As a consequence, he deserted two months later in February 1942. He was immediately imprisoned after he made his way back to Switzerland.124 In the interrogation by the SBA, Aichle described himself as a simple person, just on the search for work and being caught up in the web of circumstances. However, he had a criminal background and was arrested in Switzerland for theft several times.125 Thus, even if he was mainly on work hunt, he also tried to escape his unfavorable personal circumstances, with the desire to start all over again. The archive documents did not contain further information on his family background or profession. However, his conviction to find work in Germany went so far, that he even returned immediately after the war. Aichle crossed the Swiss border once more in February 1946. He tried to find work in the American, British and Russian sector and profited from the chaos of the time by receiving different identification papers in every sector. He managed to find work in Bremen in a mine and later on as a lumberjack. He stayed in Germany until March 1947.126

122 Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192. 123 Abhörungsprotokoll von Otto Alfons Aichle durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundessanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 4. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192. 124 Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192. 125 Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192. 126 Abhörungsprotokoll von Otto Alfons Aichle durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundessanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 4. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192. 37

Aichle could also belong to the profile group of criminals. Then again, the desire to find work was more decisive. Aichle was very young when he crossed the border and did not have a clear idea of what would await him once he arrived in Germany. He was quite naïve and realized his mistake soon after joining the Waffen-SS. It can be assumed that his financial background in Switzerland was so bad, that the alternative Germany became more and more attractive. Alfons Straub (3. August 1921, St. Gallen) also left to Germany with the intention to find work. His background, however, varied from the previous one. Straub was a Swiss citizen but his grandfather was of German origin. Straub worked in a garage and had problems with his work colleagues because of his pro-German attitude. He therefore left Switzerland illegally in June 1942, at the age of twenty-one. He traveled with his friend August Kobelt, and soon after crossing the border, they were picked up by the Gestapo and sent to the Panoramaheim. Straub joined the Waffen-SS but his friend Kobelt refused and returned to Switzerland shortly thereafter. Yet, before Straub joined the Waffen-SS, he initially worked for the company Meissner & Wurst in Stuttgart.127 A police report indicated that Straub was not saying the truth entirely, considering his motivation to leave Switzerland illegally. Straub’s former chief informed the authorities, that Straub did not have troubles because of his pro-German attitude, but because he was not reliable. He described Straub as “minderwertiges Subjekt” (inferior person) who had problems to find his place in society. This term related to the racial theory and expressed that a person possessed negative hereditary factors. Also, the Swiss army dismissed him from the obligatory military service in September 1940, because he did not fulfill the requirements.128 So, Straub was clearly having problems to get a grip on his life and he was perceived as an undesirable citizen. What aggravated his situation was the fact, that his parents had died early in his life and that he therefore was under custodial care. The only family left was a brother, living in Zürich, who was said of having a pro-German attitude as well.129 It can be assumed that Straub grew up with the awareness of the pride of the German nation and with that a certain sense of belonging and responsibility, which in turn was an influential factor to leave. However, that alone

127 Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 18. August 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A 116/42.629. 128 Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 18. August 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A 116/42.629. 129 Abschrift der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 6. Juni 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A 116/42.629. 38 was certainly not reason enough for him to leave and risk his life in a war. The problems at work and the unfavorable position in Swiss society, as well as dismissal from the army were reinforcing factors in his desire to find a good job in Germany. One of the work hunters in this sample was accustomed to the NS worldview. Josef Jakob Breitenmoser (17. April 1922, St. Gallen) was born in a big family as the youngest of six children. Since his parents did not possess over the necessary financial background, Breitenmoser was not in the position to enjoy further education after his official school years. Typically for the lower classes, he had to start working right away, in order to support his family financially. He was working in different companies, amongst others in a company for agricultural machinery and furthermore as chauffeur and laborer. In 1940, Breitenmoser moved to Zürich to live with his older brother. Breitenmoser only had a meager regular income in Zürich, which contributed to a feeling of dissatisfaction. As a result, he became dissolute and choleric. In the following, he was arrested by the police because of theft and illegal possession of a weapon. So like Aichle, Breitenmoser could be allocated to the category of criminals. Also, he joined the ES in the beginning of 1941, which again brought him into conflict with the authorities. In a police interrogation, Breitenmoser stated that these conflicts heightened the tensions with his parents. Consequently, he left to Germany in order to escape the problems and find work in the Reich. He was convinced that he would be forced to develop a respectable lifestyle, for which he lacked the will in Switzerland.130 Breitenmoser stated in the interrogation by the police that his main motivation to leave Switzerland was to find work. He left Switzerland in April 1942, at the age of twenty. He crossed the Swiss border in company of a friend, who was also a member of the ES. After the border crossing, the two young men were picked up by German border guards and sent to Stuttgart, after they stated that they were on a job hunt. The head of the Panoramaheim tried to persuade Breitenmoser and his friend to join the Waffen-SS. However, he refused and started working in a beverage manufactory in Stuttgart instead. In the following he was consistently influenced by propaganda material and persuaded to join the Waffen-SS, which he eventually did in October 1942. 131 In fact, Breitenmoser’s family background and financial situation contributed to the motivation to leave Switzerland. Even if he also featured characteristics from other profile groups

130 Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124. 131 Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124. 39 like National Socialist and criminal, his desire to find work in the Reich was the most important factor. After crossing the border, he preferred to work instead of joining the Waffen-SS. Only the ongoing interference made him join eventually. Like Aichle and Straub, Breitenmoser too arrived in Germany in the second period of recruitment. Men like Breitenmoser were intensely persuaded by the Panoramaheim leaders to conscribe. However, it has to be kept in mind that Breitenmoser most likely downplayed his motivation and exaggerated the circumstances in retrospect. Breitenmoser was clearly influenced by the National Socialist ideology, as he hoped for better times in Switzerland under a national socialistic rule.132 In a letter to his friend Otto, he fulminated against the Jews in Switzerland and stated that he was proud to be transferred to Serbia where he would be able to fight the Eastern hordes.133 His friend Otto furthermore confirmed in a police interrogation that Breitenmoser apparently was praising Hitler as a leader and he was convinced that he would earn more money once Hitler would be in power in Switzerland.134 Hence, it can be concluded that Breitenmoser did not leave Switzerland because of ideological commitment, as earning money was the decisive desire. However, it certainly was a contributing factor to join the Waffen-SS. Also, he had problems with the Swiss police because of theft and illegal possession of a weapon. In the police interrogation Breitenmoser stated that he was hoping to be able change his life and become a respectable person.135 So, the prospect of wearing a uniform and become a soldier, representing the proud Aryan, must have excited Breitenmoser. The overall category “work hunt” connected the individual stories and motivational patterns of the volunteers in this sample. Apparently, other factors such as unstable life conditions, problems at home or with the police, as well as sympathy for Germany or National Socialism, and linked to that, the desire to start a new life were further important driving factors. It is striking that all three men grew up in St. Gallen. This could only be a coincidence and of course the quantity of three in a case study is statistically not significant for the whole group. However, we can note that the Eastern

132 Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Josef Breitenmoser, Will 8. Juli 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124. 133 Brief von Josef Breitenmoser an seinen Freund Otto, Ort unbekannt 18. August 1943, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124. 134 Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Otto Ehrenzeller über Josef Breitenmoser, Ort unbekannt 27. Mai 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124. 135 Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124. 40 part of Switzerland might have been more open to the renewal movement than other parts. Also, St. Gallen is at the border of Switzerland, so it could be that the early refugee influx was influential. However, Wolf stated that the renewal movement was not influential in St. Gallen. He explained that with the rural structure of the canton, since the conservative rural population opposed the ideas for a reorganization of society.136 Also, Oertle assessed that in total only 7% of the Swiss volunteers originated from St. Gallen.137

2.2. National Socialists In the interwar years, the conservative bourgeoisie of Switzerland was able to gain influence with their National Socialist party stances. It was mainly the younger generation of Switzerland that congregated in either independent or NSDAP related organizations to unite their common values of anti modernism and anti-bolshevism.138 On party assemblies they heard heroic speeches about Nazi Germany and the inciting words may have motivated the young men to join the Waffen-SS. As will be shown in this paragraph, there were various types of “Swiss Nazis”. It can be noted that for the National Socialist volunteers the decision to leave Switzerland was mostly the same as to join the Waffen-SS, as they left with that exact intention. Othmar Maag (17. July 1917, Zürich) was a Swiss Nazi par excellence, combining ideological commitment with soldiership and a strong sense for nationalism. He was truly committed and already actively engaged as a party leader in NS organizations before he left to Germany. Also, he had a strong sense for anti-Semitism. In various letters to his parent he expressed his obsession with the Jewish conspiracy, as will be shown in chapter four. Additionally, he was convinced that the Jews, as well as the Communists had infiltrated the Swiss government and politics. Maag joined the Waffen- SS in April 1942, at the age of twenty five. He was immediately appointed SS-- Untersturmführer and served in the cavalry. Since he was of German origin, Maag received the German citizenship in 1943.139 In 1944 he was promoted to SS- Obersturmführer.140

136 Wolf, Faschismus, pp. 121. 137 Oertle, Russland, pp. 565. 138 Glaus 1969, Front, pp. 96-98. 139 The Führer’s edict of May 19, 1943 said that all foreigners of German origin acquired the German citizenship by joining the Waffen-SS, Wehrmacht or the Organisation Todt. Reichsgesetzblatt, Teil 1, Nr. 53, Führererlass, Berlin 25. Mai 1943. Online: 41

Maag was born in Winterthur in a middle class family. His father was an official in the “Schweizerische Bankverein” and his mother was German. The family Maag had spent most of their holidays in Germany and Othmar had good memories of those years. As a child, he was in possession of the German citizenship but did not renew the passport after it expired in 1936. After finishing his official school years, Maag decided to study at the commercial school and graduated in 1937. As every Swiss man, he attended the military training and absolved it in an infantry unit. After the official military training, Maag decided to attend the sergeant school and thereafter the officer candidate school, so he kept on working for the Swiss Army.141 In a letter to his friend Fritz, Maag stated that he was a downright nationalist and a convinced militarist.142 He had joined the cadet corps with twelve and in his interrogation by the SBA, he stated without hesitation that he was a fanatic soldier.143 In addition, from correspondence with his family and friends it became apparent that the family Maag was clearly anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevist. Thus, it can be assumed that Anti-Semitism indeed played a strong role in Maag’s life.144 Furthermore, Maag was already politically active from an early stage. With sixteen, he was member of the “Nationale Jugend”, NJ (national youth organization) of which he became the “Ortsgruppenführer” (local group leader) and a year later “Bezirksführer” (district leader). In 1936, he joined the NF and in 1940, he affiliated to the NBS (Nationale Bewegung Schweiz) where he also held the function of an “Ortsgruppenführer”.145 In 1941, he founded the ”Sportschule Maag” (sport school) in Zürich, which served as an organization for Swiss Nazis. The sport school copied the Nazi youth organizations in the sense that they attempted to represent the racial ideal Aryan. They organized sport events, hikes and gatherings in which they exchanged their political ideas. The Swiss authorities later labeled the Sportschule Maag as a recruitment site for potential

http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dns/RGBl_1943_I_315_EF_Erwerb_deutscher_Staatsangehoerigkeit_Einstellu ng_deutsche_Wehrmacht_Waffen-SS_deutsche_Polizei_Organistation_Todt.pdf [7.12.2013] 140 Personalakte Othmar Maag, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 287 A) 287 – A Maag, Fritz – Madecker. 141 Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag aus der Untersuchungshaft, Zürich 10. Juni 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 142 Brief von Othmar Maag an seinen Freund Fritz, Winterthur 21. August 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 143 Abhörungsprotokoll von Othmar Maag durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Aarau 13. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 144 Brief von Othmar Maag an einen Verwandten in Deutschland, Name unbekannt, Schweinfurt 11. Oktober 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 145 Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt, Berlin 30. Dezember 1943, In: BArch RS D 5229/243. 42

Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS and as an attempt to establish a Swiss Waffen-SS.146 Maag was arrested in the summer of 1941, because of his political activities. He was held in custody for three months and after his release, he decided to leave Switzerland in September 1941.147 Dr. Kurt Brüderlin (12. June 1914, Bern) was another Swiss Nazi, who conscribed to the Waffen-SS. Dr. Brüderlin was a committed National Socialist and a military man. He furthermore was an intellectual who espoused for the propagation of the NS world view and the affiliation of Switzerland to the German Reich. Brüderlin was politically active in Switzerland since 1933 and functioned as an “Ortsgruppenführer” of the “Bund Nationalsozialistischer Eidgenossen”, BNSE (association of National Socialist Swiss confederates) and later the NBS in Bern. Additionally, he was engaging in the ES as trainings manager and maintained contact with important members of the Swiss renewal movement.148 Dr. Brüderlin can be labeled Nazi, since he called himself accordingly.149 He left Switzerland in March 1943, at the age of twenty-eight and joined the Waffen-SS right away where he was promoted to SS-Obersturmführer. His conscription was determined for the whole war time.150 After completing his education in the Junkerschule Bad Tölz, he was promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer and sent to the Eastern front thereafter.151 He kept on being politically active in Germany and joined the “Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland”, BSG (association of Swiss in Greater Germany) and engaged actively in propaganda matters.152 In 1944, he was relocated to Finland, where he was in charge of a unit. He was taken prisoner by the Soviets in October 1944 and was extradited to Switzerland a year thereafter.153

146 Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement an den Regierungsrat des Kantons Zürich, Bern 31. Juli 1944, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 147 Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt, Berlin 30. Dezember 1943, In: BArch RS D 5229/243. 148 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Hohl, Bern 3. Juli 1944, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 149 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an den Chef des Eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 9. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 150 Einvernahme von Kurt Brüderlin aus der Haft vorgeführt, Protokoll an das Polizeikommando des Kantons Baselland z. H. der Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 151 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. des Herrn Dr. Hohl, Bern 3. Juli 1944, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 152 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an den Chef des Eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 9. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 153 Einvernahme von Kurt Brüderlin aus der Haft vorgeführt, Protokoll an das Polizeikommando des Kantons Baselland z.H. der Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 43

His brother in law, Prof. Keller154, described Dr. Brüderlin in an interview with the federal war industry and employment office as an incommunicative, unsocial and unhappy man and confirmed that Brüderlin had joined the NF out of ideological commitment.155 Brüderlin furthermore had absolved his military training in Switzerland and achieved the rank of a senior lieutenant.156 There is not much information on his family background in the archive documents. What is known is that he graduated at university with a doctoral degree in economy and political science. However, the topic of is PhD is not known either.157 The two men described so far can be labeled Swiss Nazis. However, there were other political activists with a different background and mindset. Paul Diebold (25. April 1908, Thurgovia) for example was working as a primary school teacher prior to his departure to Germany. Diebold was arrested for sexual harassment of some of his female underage students in 1938 and was sentenced to four months in prison. He always denied that he was guilty; but his wife as a result got a divorce. To cap it all, he was excluded from the Swiss army and lost his rank as a lieutenant. From that moment on, Diebold’s life changed drastically. He was struggling to find a job and his ex-wife complicated it even further by imposing a financial burden on him, since he had to pay a monthly rent to her and their child. His financial situation worsened so badly, that there were days without food. In his curriculum vitae he stated that he was about to end his life when he once more got arrested, this time on suspicion for espionage because of his involvement in NS organizations. The police however was not able to find proof for the suspicion and released him out of custody shortly thereafter.158 Diebold was able to find a job in a factory where he worked as laborer. Unfortunately, he lost his job quickly after his boss found out that Diebold was member of the National Socialistic party “Nationale Gemeinschaft” in Schaffhausen.159 This was a National Socialist party that belonged to the renewal movement in Switzerland. It consisted of only 100 members. It had an antiliberal, anti-Semite and anti-Bolshevist

154 No indication of his full name in the archive document. 155 Bericht des Eidgenössischen Volkswirtschaftsdepartements der Kriegsindustrie und Arbeitsamt an den Chef der Bundespolizei der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 26. August 1942, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 156 Bericht von Dr. H. Matty, Advokat an die Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 6. Juni 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 157 Bericht der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Armeekommando, Abteilung Sicherheitsdienst, Bern 4. Juli 1941, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 158 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 159 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27 April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147 Dickten – Diekmeier. 44 stance and was banned by the Swiss authorities in 1943160 Diebold stated in his resume, that he always had had a pro-German political bearing and that he was a committed frontist.161 He believed in the new order but at the same time, he was convinced that Switzerland would not be incorporated into the Reich and would be able to keep its political neutrality.162 Diebold left Switzerland in March 1942, at the age of thirty-four.163 Since he was excluded from military service in Switzerland, he did not think that he was acting against existing Swiss laws. He had even asked for readmission into the Swiss army after the mobilization in Switzerland, but his request was rejected. After he crossed the border, he was taken into custody by the German border police and shortly thereafter transferred to the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart where he joined the Waffen-SS. During his stay in Stuttgart, he attended some meetings of the BSG, where he became even more convinced that he had to fight bolshevism for a better future of mankind. Yet, he refused to join the party, since he did not want to engage politically against his homeland. He asked for permission only to be stationed as a soldier on the Eastern front. Diebold was appointed SS-Obersturmführer according his previous rank of a lieutenant in the Swiss army, promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer thereafter and ordered to the front. Diebold claimed in a later resume that he was not politically active but only served as a “simple” soldier. He certainly downplayed the facts since his rank of an SS-Obersturmführer indicated that he was ideologically committed. Also, he admitted in his resume that his validations for the Waffen-SS on his character and military skills were always outstanding.164 Diebold’s view was very naive. He was influenced by the “Nationale Gemeinschaft” in Switzerland where he might have found replacement for his family. At that point, Diebold had lost everything and was almost starving. It could be that there he found support and affiliation for the first time in a long time. He left Switzerland already with a certain ideological commitment. Diebold’s profile fits to three categories. He hoped to find more work in Germany since he failed to find a job in Switzerland because of his previous conviction. But he was also a criminal who suffered under repression of his

160 Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 110,207. 161 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27 April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147 Dickten – Diekmeier. 162 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 163 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27 April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147 Dickten – Diekmeier. 164 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 45 previous deeds and lastly he was a convinced National Socialist who wanted to engage in the fight against the Red Terror. So, even if Diebold was a political activist, his unstable life conditions were marking as well. The case of Hermann Huber (24. March 1909, St. Gallen) was similar. He was born in a farmer’s family. His father provided for the family as farmer and shoemaker, his mother was of German origin. After finishing his official school years, Huber started an apprenticeship in his father’s business. Yet, he did not succeed in finishing with a degree. His family was having severe financial problems and father Huber left his family after his business went bankrupt. Hermann, only seventeen at that time, stayed behind with his mother and was forced to accept different jobs as laborer, all of them poorly paid, since he had no qualifications. So, he decided to open an own shoemakers business. He did not experience much luck, as the owner of the building was having financial problems as well. Huber felt like he could lose everything from one moment to the other. As a result, he decided to close his business in September 1939. Additionally, Huber got married in 1933, so his responsibilities had grown enormously. He had two children with his wife for which he had to provide. Thus, Huber started farming after closing his own business. Unfortunately, the situation worsened, since the surrounding war took its influence on the Swiss economy.165 Huber always had a keen interest in politics. Before 1936, he visited gatherings and speeches of all sorts of political groups. However, he found the renewal movement organizations the most convincing ones, since he was having a nationalist and anti- internationalist stance.166 He joined the VB already in 1936 and enrolled to the SGAD after its resolution. Huber was an active member, who was engaging in the distribution of propaganda material for the SGAD in St. Gallen but he never had a leading position within the movement. Due to the prosecution, as of his political activities, plus his financial problems and difficulties to find work, he decided to leave to Germany.167 Huber finally crossed the Swiss border illegally in February 1942, at the age of thirty- three. Huber served in the Waffen-SS until the end of the war and was imprisoned as a

165 Abhörungsprotokoll von Hermann Huber durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Oberriet 26. Oktober 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333. 166 Abhörungsprotokoll von Hermann Huber durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Oberriet 26. Oktober 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333.. 167 Zeitungsartikel, Nachzügler des Leonhardt-Prozesses, In: Vorwärts Nr. 129, Ort unbekannt 20. August 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333. 46

POW thereafter.168 A newspaper article indicated that Huber returned to Switzerland after the war and that he had to stand trial in the criminal court Basel.169 The sources unfortunately did not give information on the sentence, or on the rank he held in the Waffen-SS. Huber’s background is that of an ordinary man, without a good education or a fabulous career within the Swiss army and although he engaged in the National Socialist movement in Switzerland, his financial situation was certainly also influential in his decision making process. So, like Diebold, Huber cannot be labeled as true Nazi, even when he was ideologically committed. His frustration not being able to provide for his family with all the hard work could explain his fascination for National Socialism, since this gave him perspective and a sense of belonging. Thus, he could also be assigned to the category job search. However, his political activities showed that he was committed to the National Socialist world view. In 1941, Huber requested rest and recreation of military service and he applied for the renewal of his passport.170 It can be assumed that he had planned to leave to Germany with the intention to join the Waffen-SS. A newspaper report confirmed that Huber’s work situation forced him to leave Switzerland and that he left to Germany with the intention to join the Wehrmacht but that he had been assigned to the Waffen-SS instead.171 The fewest Swiss volunteers were solely ideologically committed. However, they were clearly having a pro-German attitude, but that does not necessarily imply that they were true Nazis. Dr. Ernst Schneider (20. May 1912, Bern) had a pro-German stance because of his ancestry. Schneider was born in Bern but his family bloodline featured German origin since the 16th century. Moreover, his brother was a SA-Oberführer and his two sisters were both married to citizens of the German Reich (Reichsdeutsche). Dr. Schneider attended his school education in Riga and studied twelve semesters Romance philology, linguistic, indology, philosophy and art history at the University of Paris and Munich, graduating in 1937 as doctor of philosophy. After his graduation, he continued

168 Anklageschrift von Herman Huber durch den Auditor Major Popp des Divisionsgerichts 7A, St. Gallen 5. Juli 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333. 169 Zeitungsartikel, Nachzügler des Leonhardt-Prozesses, In: Vorwärts Nr. 129, Ort unbekannt 20. August 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333. 170 Bericht des Polizeikommando St. Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, St. Gallen, 10. Februar 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333. 171 Zeitungsartikel, Nachzügler des Leonhardt-Prozesses, In: Vorwärts Nr. 129, Ort unbekannt 20. August 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333. 47 working as assistant in the department for Aryan culture and linguistic at the University of Munich.172 Dr. Schneider joined the Waffen-SS in March 1941, at the age of 29, where he was trained initially in the “2. and 3. SS Ersatz Battalion Deutschland”. Thereafter, he was transferred to the SS Company “Das Reich” as SS-Schütze at the front in Russia in the summer of 1941. At the front, he was wounded and brought to a field hospital. After his recovery, he was serving as a translator in the regiment “Das Reich”. Next to his job as translator, he was also involved with the ideological training of the Waffen-SS soldiers in the regiment.173 Schneider was promoted to SS-Untersturmführer in April 1942 and once more to SS-Obersturmführer in November 1944.174 Schneider was well respected within the Waffen-SS and thanks to his language abilities he was able to be assigned to organizational positions. He was a brilliant mind, speaking next to German and French also Russian, Spanish and Italian and he intended to learn the Scandinavian languages. 175 Schneider stated that he never had been politically active and that he wanted to avoid prosecution in Switzerland.176 This claim however was rather doubtful. His high rank in the Waffen-SS, his involvement in the ideological training of the soldiers and his work in the department for Aryan culture and linguistic at the University of Munich indicated that he that he shared in the National Socialist world view. In spite of his National Socialist stance, his pro-German attitude and his ideological commitment, he cannot be labeled Nazi. The men in this group were all around thirty years old when they left Switzerland. Their family background however varied. It is interesting to note that the ideologically committed volunteers all achieved higher ranks in the Waffen-SS. This feature will be discussed in the next chapter, dealing with Swiss careerists in the Waffen-SS.

2.3. Double Citizens Most of the Swiss volunteers in this case study engaged in NS organizations in Switzerland prior to their departure to Germany. However, not all of them were politically active. Others were simply on a work hunt because of an unstable financial

172 Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7. 173 Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7. 174 Dienstlaufbahn Dr. Ernst Schneider, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SS0 091 B9) 91 – B Schnabel, Erich – Schneider, Erich. 175 Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7. 176 Lebenslauf Dr. Ernst Schneider, München 25. Mai 1943, In: BArch RS F 0491/7. 48 background. There were also men, who do not fit in those groups after all. Neulen would probably assign them to the profile group of adventurism and soldiership. Guttmann described them as stereotypical young, impressionable and adventurous types.177 Several volunteers where dual citizens, possessing the German and Swiss citizenship or were having parents originating from Germany. However, neither Neulen nor Oertle incorporated them into their profile categories. For those men, the war situation might have caused a conflict of conscience, as they felt they had to take a side. The desire to fight for their father country could have posed a substantial basis for their later decision to join the Waffen SS. Fritz Arnold’s (10. August 1919, Basel) father for example was a German citizen, who escaped to Switzerland during the First World War. Arnold spent his whole youth in Basel and was conscripted to the Swiss army in 1939. During his military service, Arnold decided to leave Switzerland illegally. In his curriculum vitae for the Waffen-SS, he stated that he left because of political and family reasons. As soon as he crossed the border, he was picked up by immigration officers and had to spend 14 days in custody. After his release, he went to his German relatives and worked as a brewer in Schwenningen. On January 12, 1942, Arnold joined the Waffen-SS at the age of twenty three.178 He started as SS-Rottenführer in November 1943 and was promoted to SS- Unterscharführer in April 1944.179 Arnold most probably left Switzerland because of a conflict of conscience. However, the sources do not indicate why Arnold finally decided to join the Waffen-SS. It can be assumed that a certain excitement for militarism played a role as well. He left Switzerland in the middle of his military education, which in turn indicated that he might have wanted to apply the learnt skills to reality. Also, Arnold stated that he left because of family reason. Maybe he blamed his father for escaping Germany during the last war and therefore betrayed his country. Maybe, Arnold felt that it his responsibility to make up for his father’s past wrong. Unfortunately, the archive documents do not succeed to give a satisfying answer and it has to be relied on assumptions and interpretations. However, it can be assumed that he was not ideologically committed, since he was not active in NS organizations. Possibly he referred to the adverse climate

177 Guttmann 2013, Myth, pp. 591. 178 Lebenslauf aus der Personalakte von Fritz Arnold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch RS A 0116/593. 179 Dienstlaufbahn Fritz Arnold, Ort und Datum unbekannt In: BArch RS A0116/593. 49 for people with a German citizenship in Switzerland when he gave information on his motivation by stating that he left because of political reasons. Swiss volunteers with a German citizenship were not all born or raised in Switzerland. Ernst Krauel (11. December 1907) was born in Hamburg but had the Swiss citizenship, since his great grandfather immigrated to Switzerland in 1861. At the age of fifteen, Krauel also moved to Switzerland and finished his official school years in Lausanne. He returned to Hamburg in 1927, where he completed his high school education. He started to sympathize with National Socialism and joined the NSDAP in 1930. In the same year, Krauel returned to Switzerland to attend the obligatory military service in the Swiss army. After fulfilling his service in the army, Krauel moved to Lausanne where he helped building up a foreign organization of the NSDAP. He had to terminate his German membership, because of his Swiss nationality in April 1932, so he joined the NF instead.180 Krauel was confronted with the Swiss authorities because of his political activities in 1937. The conviction for political activity in turn resulted in difficulties to find a job, since nobody wanted to hire a German Nazi in Switzerland. Therefore, he had to leave the country once more in 1938. He joined the Waffen-SS in October 1941 at the age of thirty-four and was appointed to the “SS-Ersatz Battalion Der Führer”. 181 In Germany, he applied for the renewal of his membership in the NSDAP in 1942. Yet, the application initially was turned down because of his Swiss citizenship and because there was a gap in his membership fees. However, after Leonhard182 confirmed his loyalty to the National Socialistic ideology, he was finally accepted in September 1942 and received the German citizenship.183 Krauel could also be allocated to the category National Socialist and to a certain extent to job hunt. However, since he did not grow up in Switzerland, his dual citizenship is the more decisive feature that must have influenced him in his decision to leave Switzerland. His socialization varied considerably from the other volunteers and it can be assumed that he experienced director propaganda in his

180 Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Ernst Krauel an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt, Berlin 28. Januar 1943, In: BArch RS D 0230/799. 181 Antrag für die Eheschliessung, Lebenslauf von Ernst Krauel an das Rassen- und Siedlungshauptamt, Berlin 28. Januar 1943, In: BArch RS D 0230/799. 182 Ernst Leonhard was the founder of the SGAD. More information on his person is to be found in chapter 1.3.2. 183 Brief von Ernst Leonhardt, Leitung der Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP an den Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP, Ort unbekannt 2. September 1942, In: BArch PK G 0241/1809. 50 school years in Germany. Unfortunately, the sources do not indicate what happened to Krauel after the war. Yet, it can be assumed that he stated in Germany. What is striking about the findings in this chapter is that the Swiss volunteers were clearly better educated volunteers, either in military matters, as well as intellectually. Two of the volunteers from the category National Socialist even possessed a doctoral degree. Also, it seems that the ideological committed volunteers were able to have a certain career within the Waffen-SS. Did they have that career because of their ideological commitment or because of their educational background, army training and language abilities or was their ideological commitment the main factor for them to join the Waffen-SS? In order to shed light on these questions, a special attendance will be given to the career development of several Swiss volunteers in the next chapter.

51

3. Career Prospects

As concluded in the previous chapter, the Swiss volunteers were all very different in their profile and background although at the same time resembling and representing ordinary men who partly shared a similar social origin, personality traits and ideological tendencies. However, some of the Swiss volunteers were able to achieve higher ranking positions and respectable positions within the Waffen-SS. Mertens concluded that at least 52 Swiss achieved the rank of an officer, which corresponds to a percentage of 6.8. This number was relatively high in comparison with the entire Waffen-SS were only 2.6% achieved a higher rank and the Wehrmacht with only 2.6% of officer corps. Mertens explained this high number with the high technical and professional qualification of the Swiss volunteers.184 Mertens did not elaborate on what he precisely meant by technical and professional qualifications but taken from chapter two, it can be assumed that language qualifications, as well an excellent military education contributed to their career. Gutmann emphasized in his comparison of Swiss, Danish and Swedish officer corps volunteers, that whilst the neutral regular soldiers may have been uneducated social “losers” and deviants, drawn by naivety and greed – the higher ranking volunteers were well-integrated and educated men.185 Although, his statement on the simple soldiers certainly needs further relativization, his judgment on the officer corps volunteer’s education is an interesting factor. The higher education seemed to be a special feature of the neutrals and might have contributed in an active interest to aid the Nazi project intellectually. Then again, if they were well integrated in Swiss society, why did they not deploy their talents for a change back home? After all, the NS organizations mostly displayed a strong sense for nationalism and Swiss pride. Also, Gutmann left it out to consider, that the politically active Swiss were prosecuted in Switzerland for their membership in NS organizations and therefore far from being well integrated into society. Neulen claimed that Swiss intellectuals joining the Waffen-SS were rather exceptional, dividing the Swiss volunteers in three groups, namely political activists,

184 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 306. 185 Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 591. 52 adventurers and criminals.186 However, the volunteers selected in this chapter all had an excellent educational background either in the Swiss army or intellectually, four of them even possessing a doctoral degrees. This might be an exceptional feature of the Swiss volunteers and therefore will be taken into consideration. In this chapter, the career development of several Swiss volunteers will be investigated through detailed biographical examination, concentrating on six men; two with commander positions within Germanic battalions, two involved in the administration of the GL, one holding an instructor position as camp leader and one war correspondent. The aim of this chapter is to assess what careers and ranks thy achieved, to what positions they were assigned and what which qualifications that enabled their careers. The Swiss volunteers were perceived as Germanic volunteers. However, they were not summarized in a national unit unlike the Dutch or the French. In this chapter, I will argue that the possibility for these Swiss volunteers to gain a career within the Waffen-SS was thanks to their ideological commitment to National Socialism and their engagement in NS organizations in Switzerland. Another factor is that most of them were already militarily educated in Switzerland. Additionally, their perception of being “German like”, and being truly Germanic, plus their language abilities, made them well respected and desired manpower. In order to understand their achievement of position within the Waffen-SS, a short biography will be created, including their life conditions before the war. The chapter is structured according these biographies and accounts. Since this chapter deals with careers within the Waffen-SS, it goes without saying that the Swiss men described here were committed National Socialists. Lastly their socioeconomic factors and personal backgrounds will be described, trying to compare the findings with the previous chapter. This will help to clarify their motivation to join the Waffen-SS, which will be subject of the following chapter.

186 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 176. 53

3.1. The Bureaucrat Dr. Franz Riedweg Although Franz Riedweg was not the highest ranking Swiss volunteer, he was the one with the most impressive career of all Swiss who joined the Waffen-SS. Riedweg was a protégé of Heinrich Himmler, only standing two ranks below his mentor in the SS-HA, the central administration of the SS. Riedweg had a remarkable desk career as SS-

Obersturmbannführer and “Stabsführer” of Image 1 Franz Riedweg, In: Swiss.info Online: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/culture/A_Swiss_in_ the GL, where he was involved in the the_service_of_the_SS.html?cid=29419904 organization and decision making process [13.11.2013] concerning the Germanic volunteers.187 He truly believed in the idea of the Germanic Empire in which he saw Switzerland playing an important role. He was an advocate for a united Europe with a federalist structure in which Germany would be given the leading position whilst all other Germanic countries were equal. Dr. Med. Franz Riedweg (10. April 1907, Lucerne) grew up with his older brother and sister in a prosperous family home. Since his father was a successful hotelier, Franz enjoyed a good lifestyle in his youth and was able to study medicine at the University of Bern. He studied four semesters in Germany188 and graduated eventually as doctor in medicine at the University of Bern in 1933.189 In 1934, after his graduation, he worked in the gynecological clinic as a PhD candidate in Berlin. Thereafter, he continued to work in various Swiss clinics.190 Riedweg already engaged in politics as a student, convinced that communism posed a considerable threat to Europe. He believed that only a united Europe on the base of anti-communism with total equality under its members could protect the civilized world from the Red Terror. He longed for a new order in which all the

187 According to Marco Wyss, a Swiss historian who published a biography on Riedweg, Riedweg can be seen as brains behind the idea of the Waffen-SS as a military and political elite in a Europe ruled by the Nazis. Interview mit Marco Wyss durch Kuenzi Renate auf Swiss.info,4. Februar 2011. Online: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/culture/A_Swiss_in_the_service_of_the_SS.html?cid=29419904 [16.11.2013]. However, Wyss’ assessment certainly is an exaggeration. 188 He studied 3 semesters in Berlin and one in Rostock. 189 Lebenslauf Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Berlin 11. Juni 1938, In: BArch SS-Führerpersonalakten, (SSO 030B) 30-B Riedl-Rieger, Max. 190 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 54

European states would be equal under the leading of Germany.191 In his curriculum vitae for the Waffen-SS, Riedweg indicated that he started to engage actively in politics in 1937.192 However, he already joined the NF in 1933 where he remained member until 1935.193 Additionally, he was leading the “Zentralbüro der Schweizerischen Nationalen Rechten” and he was cofounder of the Swiss action against communism and served as cabinet minister and secretary of Federal Council Jean-Marie Musy,194 who was chief of the campaign.195 Riedweg started to distance himself soon from the movement, since he felt that it became more and more the copy of the NSDAP, which according to him was undesirable. He was advocated the opinion that National Socialism could not be an export article but that every country had to establish an own dynamic and form. However, thanks to his function in the Swiss movement against communism, Riedweg was able to establish important connections with leading personalities in Germany, especially within the circle of the Anti-Comintern196 and SS.197 In 1937, Riedweg attended a “Reichsparteitag” in Nuremberg as a special guest of the Anti-Comintern. There, he had the possibility to meet Himmler in person and they established a personal connection so that they continued to meet on various occasions. Motivated and influenced from this event, Riedweg returned to Switzerland where he filmed the movie “Die Rote Pest” (the red pest). The movie was shown in Switzerland several times, however banned at a later point out of considerations for the communist

191 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 192 Lebenslauf Franz Riedweg, Berlin 11. Juni 1938, In: BArch SS-Führerpersonalakten (SSO 030B) 30-B Riedl-Rieger, Max. 193 Quadri, P. (2010) „Riedweg, Franz“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs- dss.ch/textes/d/D42138.php [06.11.2013] 194 Jean-Marie Musy was a Swiss Federal Council from 1919 until 1934, affiliated with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP). Musy was conservative, antisocial and acquainted with Himmler. However, by the end of World War II, Musy engaged in negotiations with the Nazis to rescue large numbers of Jews from the concentration camp Theresienstadt. Sebastiani, D. (2009) „Jean Mary Musy“, In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D3938.php [13.11.2013] 195 Lebenslauf Franz Riedweg, Berlin 11. Juni 1938, In: BArch SS-Führerpersonalakten (SSO 030B) 30-B Riedl-Rieger, Max. 196 Anti-Comintern was a special agency within the Propaganda Ministry under Joseph Goebbels and charged with administering anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns. Waddington, L. L. (2007) „The Anti- Komintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda in the 1930s”, In: Journal of Contemporary History, 42(4), Pages 573-594, here 573. 197 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 55 parties in Switzerland.198 Riedweg obviously was a multi-talented man, devoted to help creating a better world according his beliefs. In 1938, Riedweg decided to leave Switzerland illegally and migrate to Germany, at the age of thirty-one. He stated in his postwar trial in Hiddesen near Bielefeld, that he left Switzerland because of the adverse political climate, in which his ideas where condemned, whereas in Germany they were highly welcomed. Once in Germany, he kept on attending important meetings of the political elite and on one of these occasions he got to know the General Field Marshal of the Wehrmacht, Werner von Blomberg. Riedweg married his daughter Sybille von Blomberg in Munich shortly thereafter. With this marriage he ensured his position in the political elite of Germany. This tie was not the only reason for his career but was proved to be a fruitful basis to establish further important connections. In the same year Riedweg received the German nationality, being a dual citizen henceforth. Although he could have conscribed to the Wehrmacht now, Riedweg decided to join the Waffen-SS on July 1th, 1938. Initially, he got a position as a medical in the “Sanitätsstaffel der SS-Verfügungstruppe”, starting immediately with the rank of a SS-Hauptsturmführer. He got promoted to SS-Sturmbannführer a year thereafter and to SS-Obersturmbannführer in 1942.199 Riedweg’s remarkable desk career started in 1941, after he was appointed “Stabsführer” (chief of staff) of the GL in the SS-HA. The Swiss authorities assessed in Riedweg’s postwar trial, that he and the Reichsführer-SS shared in their belief that the Waffen-SS should become an organ of power within the Germanic Reich and that there should be an organic solution for Switzerland, meaning that Switzerland should become incorporated in the new Germanic order as an equal member. Thus, Riedweg was working and preparing for the National Socialist accession of power in Switzerland. Riedweg was on a list200 from the SS-HA that recorded Swiss personalities with potential to become a leader in the future incorporated Switzerland.201 The archive documents

198 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 199 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 200 The list was named „Liste der für den politischen Einsatz in der Schweiz vorgesehene Schweizerische SS-Führer“. It listed several higher ranking Swiss volunteers, such as Riedweg, Büeler, Herrsche, Schaeppi and many others. Bericht an die Anklagekammer des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes Lausanne, Luzern, 23. Juni 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 201 Bericht an die Anklagekammer des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes Lausanne, Luzern, 23. Juni 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 56 indicated that Riedweg believed that Switzerland would play an important role in the new structure.202 However, it is questionable to what extent Himmler actually planned Switzerland in. It is more likely that the promise of equality in the new Reich served to keep the Germanic allies in the boat. Riedweg was truly convinced that the SS would be the foundation and the political elite in the new Reich. He therefore set up plans to establish a “Germanische SS- Sturmbanne Schweiz”, based in Switzerland for which 300 chosen men were designated. However, the plan never succeeded. The authorities assumed that the Sportschule Maag, which was described in the previous chapter, served as a recruitment basis to accomplish the “Plan-S”. Riedweg as Stabschef of the GL had an important function in the SS-HA, being in charge of the Germanic volunteers but he also played an important role for the Swiss volunteers. His area of responsibility encompassed an advisory function in the GL for Himmler and Gottlob Berger concerning “Swiss questions”. Also, he was involved in the construction of the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart, for which he held supervision. Riedweg made sure that the Panoramaheim was working closely with the “Staatspolizei Leitstelle Stuttgart” (state police) and the “militärische Abwehrstelle” (military defense agency), and that in turn made the Swiss authorities believe that the Panoramaheim indeed was an espionage center. Additionally, Riedweg initiated the observation of potential men in the NS movements in Switzerland and he supported training courses and political seminars for the BSG.203 Thus, Riedweg was moving in the higher ranks of the Waffen-SS hierarchy. His success resembled a meteoric rise and it seemed that he had a bright future. However, Riedweg’s success and luck did not last. There are two periods distinguishable in Riedweg’s career; the first period in which he started his career in the leading position of the GL and a second period where he was removed from his post and relocated to the front in 1943. Riedweg was relocated to the “3. Germanische Panzerkorps”, because of a fundamental disagreement with Himmler and chief of the SS-HA, Gottlob Berger.204 Heinrich Büeler, who replaced Riedweg, stated that there were people in the SS-HA that

202 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 203 Bericht an die Anklagekammer des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes Lausanne, Luzern, 23. Juni 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 204 Bericht an die Anklagekammer des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes Lausanne, Luzern, 23. Juni 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 57 were against the “Verschweizerung” (becoming Swiss) of the GL.205 Another explanation of Büeler was, that the imperialistic forces in the SS-HA and GL took over so that the representatives of the federalist idea were removed from their post.206 In Switzerland, Riedweg was expatriated in September 1944 and summoned to appear in court in 1947, which he never did. However, he was convicted by a tribunal in Hiddesen, Germany where he was convicted to a penalty of 2000 DM, the same year he was supposed to appear in court in Switzerland. This matter will be discussed in chapter five dealing with the post war punishment of the Swiss Waffen-SS volunteers. Riedweg never returned to Switzerland but lived in Germany until his death in 2005.207 Riedweg can be described as full-fledged Nazi. He was probably well informed about the Holocaust, since he was moving in the highest Nazi circles.208Yet, he never expressed guilt or remorse nor did he distance himself from the Nazi worldview.209

3.2. The Idealist Dr. Heinrich Büeler Dr. Heinrich Büeler was Franz Riedweg’s right hand in the GL. He does not seem to have been a brave man, striving for soldiership and heroism. He was a man of books, admiring the National Socialism for its use of big words and dreams. He is called an idealist, because he perceived the National Socialism as a sort of remedy and he was convinced that he acted in the best interest of Europe and Switzerland without thinking that the Nazi ideology would cause any harm. At some time, he commiserated the National Socialists misunderstanding of true National Socialism. His daughter stated that he was not an anti-Semite but that he was furious about Jewish dominance in finance.210 Heinrich Büeler (12. December 1901) was born in British India. With the age of six, he returned with his two younger siblings to Switzerland where they lived with their grandfather in Winterthur. Büeler always had been very studious as a child, so he decided to study law at the University of Zürich, eventually graduating with a PhD in law

205 Büeler used the word „Verschweizerung“, which did not only refer to Riedweg. There were more Swiss volunteers working in the GL. Riedweg and Büeler are the only Swiss volunteers discussed in the course of this research. 206 Büeler‘s Stellungnahme zu den Anschuldigungen während der Strafuntersuchung und der Anklage vor Bundesgericht in der Einvernahme, Ort unbekannt 1947, In AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, 10.2 Schriftsätze Heinrich Büeler zu seiner Verteidigung. 207 Quadri, P. (2010) „Riedweg, Franz“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs- dss.ch/textes/d/D42138.php [06.11.2013] 208 Schweizerische Hauptvertretung für die Britische Zone an das Eidgenössisch Poltische Departement, Politische Angelegenheiten, Frankfurt M. 3. August 1949, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 209 Wyss 2010, Un Suisse, pp. 168. 210 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 162ff. 58 in 1924. During his time as a student, Büeler spent one semester at the University of Hamburg and after his graduation he spent some time in Paris to deepen his French knowledge. He finally opened his own chancery in Zürich in 1930. In the same year he had to travel to The Hague for business purposes, where he met his future wife Johanna Elisabeth de Vries. They got married in The Hague in 1931 and moved to Zürich thereafter. They had three daughters.211 His family had close ties to Germany, since his father was honorary consul of Germany between 1912 and 1914. So Büeler had already spent a lot of time in Germany in the thirties when he visited his father. He maintained a close tie to Germany and German friends, and therefore came to the belief, that the National Socialism could restore Germany’s relevance in Europe and protect the civilized world against the Bolshevist threat. As a result, he decided to join the Swiss renewal movement in 1932. From that time on, Büeler started to network with the German Nazis but also with leading personalities within NS organizations in Switzerland. Hence, the Swiss authorities soon started to monitor Büeler because of his political activities. He was put in custody in May 1941, from which he was released five months thereafter. However, his reputation was damaged and that in turn affected his chancery. Confronted with the resulting financial problems and an adverse political climate in Switzerland, Büeler decided to emigrate to Germany. He stated in his curriculum vitae that he was in deep consternation about the accusations by the Swiss authorities with regard to endangerment of the Swiss independence, since he was convinced that he acted in Switzerland’s best interest.212 Büeler left Switzerland illegally in November 1941, at the age of forty. He left Switzerland with the intention to join the Waffen-SS. Thanks to his engagement in NS organizations and his excellent connection to Riedweg, Büeler was appointed SS- Untersturmführer right away and was appointed to SS-Sturmbannführer thereafter. He initially arrived in the SS training camp Sennheim213 in January 1942 where he joined the Waffen-SS. Afterwards, he attained the “Germanische Offizierslehrgang” in Bad Tölz from October 1942 until March 1943. Büeler settled well in Germany and continued to

211 Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, Biographische Materialien, 1.2. Lebenslauf. 212 Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, Biographische Materialien, 1.2. Lebenslauf. 213 The SS-Ausbildungslager Sennheim served as a training camp for the officer corps of mainly French battalions. Mounine, H. (1999) Cernay 40-45. Le SS-Ausbildungslager de Sennheim. Edition de Polygone: Ostwald, pp. 12. 59 speak High German only, refusing to speak Swiss German from that point on. He got an authentic German pseudonym and called himself Dr. Schmitt.214 Büeler enjoyed his stay in Germany very much and in a letter to his wife Johanna, Büeler expressed his feelings in a poetic manner, swarming about the peace and recreation he found there.215 Büeler as a convinced National Socialist must have felt exhilarated now that he was in Germany, feeling that he could help making a change and make the world a better place, protected from the red pest and the antisocial forces. In his first letter to his wife Johanna he did not ask her how she was doing and if she was coping without him. He started the letter by saying how beautiful and good it was in Germany and then going on about politics straight away. It is likely that Johanna did not understand her husband at that point anymore. Later she divorced him and they never met each other again.216 In April 1942, Büeler was ordered to deputize the Panoramaheim for three weeks. This indicates that he belonged to the higher circle of Swiss volunteers and moreover, that some leadership capabilities were recognized. Between Mai 1942 and September 1943, he was responsible for the department for press and propaganda, in the GL. He had a respectable career within the GL, as person in charge for the “Referat Schweiz” (department Switzerland), functioning as Riedweg’s right hand.217 His task was to supervise and support the Swiss volunteers and their relatives. Büeler regarded the SS- HA as “mental-ideological-political leadership medium” but denied that the Waffen-SS ever engaged in politics towards Europe or that there had been plans for a future incorporated Switzerland. He claimed only the “Führerhauptquartier” was in charge of political considerations. He concluded that the fact that Berger was not convicted in Nuremberg was proof enough that the SS-HA never played a role in foreign politics.218 Thus, Büeler was either very naive or he clearly downplayed the matters in front of the authorities in order to clear his name and deeds in retrospect. Similar as Riedweg, Büeler was not able to stay in office during the whole wartime. Thanks to his fluency in French, he was transferred with the order to inspect the French

214 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 215 Brief von Heinrich Büeler an seine Frau Johanna Elisabeth de Vries, Sennheim 20. Januar 1942, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, 17.9 Korrespondenzen und Personendossiers. 216 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 77f. 217 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 218 Büeler‘s Stellungnahme zu den Anschuldigungen während der Strafuntersuchung und der Anklage vor Bundesgericht in der Einvernahme, Ort unbekannt 1947, In AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, 10.2 Schriftsätze Heinrich Büeler zu seiner Verteidigung. 60

Waffen-SS in April 1944. As education officer and company commander he was assigned to the “Ersatzbattailon of the Waffen-SS Grenadier Division Charlemagne” in Sennheim, where he came under Hersche’s command.219 He stayed as company commander at the front until the end of the war and was engaged in defense battles in West Prussia and Pomerania. 220 By the end of the war, Büeler and his company were taken prisoner by American troops; however he was able to flee. Whilst he was fleeing in direction south he was picked up once more, this time from French troops. The French did not recognize him as a Waffen-SS member, since Büeler did not have the tattoo on his arm. They probably assumed that he was a Wehrmacht soldier and they soon realized his utility and released him under the condition that he worked for them as a translator. So, once more his language abilities helped him further. In July 1945 Büeler tried to return to Switzerland. However, he the Swiss authorities denied him access to the country. He was sent to the Swiss consulate with the remark that his documents were not sufficiently in order and that he had to apply for a new passport. In reality, Büeler was already expatriated; the customs official just neglected to inform him properly. So, he had no other choice than to return and keep on working for the French troops. His luck did not last for long, as he was arrested once more in February 1946. The French had found out about his membership in the Waffen-SS and transferred him to the detention camp Balingen in April 1946. He was released in the autumn of the same year and was asked to function as translator once more. Büeler however decided to return to Switzerland in October 1946 with the wish to confront the authorities and clear his name. He did not succeed, as will be explained in chapter five.221 Büeler was an idealist who was dreaming of a new European order, in which Switzerland and moreover he himself would play an important role. He stated in April 1942, that the Swiss volunteers of the Waffen-SS would free Switzerland and that he himself would play an important role as leader in the future of Switzerland. Therefore, he observed the renewal movement and its members in Switzerland carefully, preparing himself for the time after the war, when Switzerland and Europe would be

219 Heinrich Johann Hersche was another Swiss volunteer who will be described later in this chapter. 220 Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, Biographische Materialien, 1.2. Lebenslauf. 221 Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, Biographische Materialien, 1.2. Lebenslauf. 61 reorganized.222 Büeler clearly identified himself with the National Socialist utopia. However, he can be seen as an opportunist at the same time. He believed in a German victory and therefore tried to ensure a powerful position for the future. It is doubtful, that he would have left the country if the Swiss authorities would not have prosecuted him for his political activity. The fact that somebody loves to talk and lecture about political utopias, does not automatically mean that he is ready to fight and die for his ideas.

3.3. The Military Man Heinrich Johann Hersche Major of the cavalry, Heinrich Johann Hersche was a well disciplined military army man, known to be a fanatic National Socialist from the early days.223 His brother in law was Otto Reimann, who was executed by the Swiss authorities for treason.224 His army career was very important to him but he was declared unfit for military service in December 1939. In Germany, he was able to regain a respectable position in the army and run free his perceptions of soldiership and heroism.225 Image 2 Heinrich Johann Hersche, In: BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 131 Heinrich Johann Hersche (30. November 1889, Appenzell) was raised in a respectable family in St. Gallen. So, once more, there is a volunteer who was socialized in St. Gallen. His father was hotelier. Hersche was not a very studious person but more a person of practical matters. He left school when he was seventeen, graduating with only a high school diploma. After his graduation, Hersche started an apprenticeship in a bank. However, after he finished his apprenticeship, he decided to stay in the army. He absolved the officer candidate school and became lieutenant in 1909. Hersche felt salvaged in the military circle and decided to stay on a volunteer basis. He had an impressive career within the Swiss army, lastly holding the

222 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 223 Bericht des Polizeikommando des Kanton Aargaus an das Eidgenössische Militärdepartement, Aarau, 29. April 1939, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 224 Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, pp. 41. 225 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Locarno 11. Juni 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 62

rank of a major of the cavalry in Bern. Yet, by the end of 1935, Heinrich was officially retired from active service. The Swiss army did not indicate a reason for the forced retirement but it can be assumed that his political activities and his membership in NS organizations, as well as his financial problems could have been the decisive factor for

226 the decision. Hersche was politically active from an early stage on. He joined the NF in 1935 and visited gatherings on a regular basis but also engaged in smaller renewal movement organizations such as the “Eidgenössische Soziale Arbeiter Partei”, E.S.A.P (Federal Social Working Party), the “Eidgenössische Front”, EF (Federal Front) and had connections to the VB. He was planning to create a new national movement, which would unite the other Image 3 Hersche as Cavalry Major in Bern, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670. C.02-1562. organizations under one big party. The aim of the desired movement was the renunciation of the liberal democracy and the rapprochement with the authoritarian states. After his retirement from the Swiss army, he started to function within the local NF group Bern in a leading position in November 1935 and in 1936 he became their “Obergruppenführer” (chief group leader).227 Hersche even run for a post in the National Council but was not elected. He left the NF by the end of 1936, because of his financial problems and the realization that his political activities minimized his chances to get a sufficient income. Hersche did not find a good job and maybe he was unsatisfied not being politically active, so he decided to rejoin the ESAP in 1939. The ESAP only accepted pure Swiss men fulfilling the Aryan ideal and the party resembled their German brother NSDAP in structure and ideals. After the ESAP was banned by the Swiss authorities in 1940, Hersche helped founding the NBS where he again belonged to the leadership circle.228

226 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Locarno 11. Juni 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 227 Bericht der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Divisionsgericht IV, Untersuchungsrichter Hauptmann Schibli, Bern 26. August 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 228 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Locarno 11. Juni 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 63

The Swiss authorities started to supervise him, because of his involvement in these NS organizations and the spreading of Nazi propaganda material. They monitored his mail and observed his meetings. Hersche was outraged and offended about the fact that the Swiss authorities perceived him as a traitor of the country, since he too believed that he was acting in the best interest of Switzerland. In an interrogation by the police he expressed his outrage about the fact that the freedom of press and speech was not respected in the case of the renewal movement members.229 He even blamed the Swiss authorities for his financial problems, since he said they resulted out of the permanent police surveillance.230 However, since his political activities were seen as endangerment of the Swiss neutrality, the authorities advance was justified. Hersche perceived himself as a victim of a government that did not read the signs of the time adequately.231 He was convinced that Germany would win the war and that Switzerland at some point had to join the new order anyway. That is why he was convinced that his political beliefs would be rewarded one day.232 Hersche was arrested in July 1941 and spent fourteen days in custody. This must have aroused him even more, so that he sent a letter to the minister of the German embassy in Bern, asking for the German nationality with the comment that he wanted to renounce his Swiss citizenship.233 Hersche was married and had two children; his son however had died in 1940 of cancer.234 However, the family was sticking together, so that his wife and daughter followed him to Germany.235 His financial problems, his desire to live heroism and soldiership and the animosity of the Swiss authorities against his political ideals contributed to his desire to leave for a greater future. In Germany he saw the country

229 Korrespondenz Heinrich Johann Hersche an Erich Teuchgraber aus der Postsperre, Polizeikommando Bern im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Thun 30. November 1939, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 230 Schweizerisches Armeekommando an die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 4. Mai 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 231 Brief über Politische Massnahmen von Heinrich Johann Hersche an den Führerkreis der Nationalen Bewegung Schweiz, Basel 22. Juli 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 232 Brief von Major Heinrich Johann Hersche an den Redaktor des Oltener Tagblatt W. R. Amman, als Reaktion auf einen über ihn erschienenen Artikel im Oltener Tagblatt, Nr. 150 vom 29. Juni 1940, Basel 4. Juli 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 233 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den Chef des eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 234 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Locarno 11. Juni 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 235 Aktennotiz zum Vorsprechen von Heinrich Johann Hersche beim Schweizerischen Generalkonsulat, München 28. Juli 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 64 where all his dreams had to become true, where he could earn enough money, where he and his ideas would be respected and where he could start all over again. Hersche decided to leave Switzerland illegally on December 13, 1941.236 Hersche stated in the interrogation by the investigative judge Gloor in 1947, that he left Switzerland, because of a job prospect in a leading position in an armament concern in Gablonz but that he finally did not accept the job as of a misunderstanding on the position and salary. However, in the letter to the German ambassador in Bern concerning his application for the German nationality, he expressed his desire to join the Wehrmacht as volunteer right away.237 Moreover, Büeler confirmed in an interrogation by Gloor on the person of Hersche, that they signed in at the same time in December 1941.238 That would mean that Hersche indeed joined the Waffen-SS immediately. Hersche was directly appointed SS-Stumbannführer, corresponding to his rank of a major in the Swiss army, was promoted to SS-Obersturmbannführer in 1944 and lastly SS-Standartenführer in the spring of 1945.239 In his interrogation by the SBA in 1947, Hersche indicated that he was not truly a SS member, since he never got sworn in, that he never got the blood group tattoo and that he only was hired to support the education of the Germanic volunteers. He stated that he initially was hired as a civil riding instructor in Munich in 1942. Moreover, he claimed that he only was ordered to wear the SS uniform as of disciplinary reasons and considerations in regard with the other volunteers in 1943. Allegedly, he only agreed under the condition that he never had to engage against Switzerland.240 Then again, Büeler stated that Hersche was dismissed from the Waffen-SS in 1943, because of an internal intrigue. Hersche was said to have been very disappointed and that he was hoping for a job in the propaganda department. Apparently, Hersche was able to stay in the Waffen-SS with the help of his friend Riedweg.241 However, it is very likely that again, Hersche dramatized his dismissal. He was suffering of pulmonary tuberculosis

236 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 237 Bericht des Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den Chef des eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 238 Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend Heinrich Johann Hersche, durch den Eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter O. Gloor, Zürich 3. November 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 239 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 240 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 241 Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend Heinrich Johann Hersche, durch den Eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter O. Gloor, Zürich 3. November 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 65 and had already spent some time in various sanatoria. His personal file of the Waffen-SS remarked that he was dismissed because of his health issues. The dismissal was repealed in December 1943.242 So, Hersche was transferred to Sennheim where he was ordered to educate a French battalion. He remained there until October 1944, training French243 and a Dutch volunteer corps for which he received the “Kriegsverdienstkreuz 2. Klasse” (War Merit Cross).244 He held the position of a deputy commander in Sennheim and the SBA reported that in the course of his tasks he held political lectures and wrote articles for the BSG. By the end of October 1944, the battalion was transferred to Creifenburg in Pomerania, since the French troops were approaching and Hersche, as well as the SS-HA wanted to avoid a battle between the French troops and the French Waffen-SS volunteers. Hersche and his French battalion were fighting a rearguard battle against the Russians instead until February 1945.245 Afterwards, Hersche claimed that his duty was only of a military nature and that he was not involved in the ideological education of the volunteers.246 It is hard to believe that he stated the truth and it can be assumed that he downplayed the facts in order to escape severe. A career in the Waffen-SS was only possible with the respective ideological commitment and achieving the rank of a SS-Standartenführer indicates that he fulfilled this requirement. Furthermore, his previous political activities in Switzerland clearly show that he was a convinced National Socialist, already involved in ideological programs and party organization in Switzerland.247 Why should he not continue with that in Germany, especially since he could satisfy his desire for recognition and success? Hersche furthermore maintained good relations with the SS-HA and he was on the list for potential leaders in Switzerland. Herrsche was said to have met Berger and Riedweg on various occasions, discussing the possibilities of Hersche in a leading position. Moreover, he engaged in activities of the BSG, helping with the organization

242 Dienstlaufbahn von Heinrich Johann Hersche, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 092 A) 92 – A Hermann, Fritz – Hertel, Harald. 243 The here said battalion was the French „Ersatz-Battalion der 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division SS Charlemagne“. Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, pp. 20. 244 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 245 Verfügung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft über Heinrich Johann Hersche, Bern 17. Oktober 1947, In: E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 246 Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 247 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den Chef des eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 66 and implementation of “Sonderlehrgänge” (special courses) for the propaganda of the Waffen-SS. The SBA suspected that Hersche’s position in “Hitler Germany” and the Waffen-SS were not only of military nature but of political character and that he clearly shared the National Socialistic ideology which he also aspired for Switzerland. In regard of these findings, the SBA prepared a treason trial, which will be discussed in chapter five.248 Socially marginalized, Hersche died in poor conditions in Hergiswil Switzerland in 1971.249

3.4. The Nazi Johann Eugen Corrodi Johann Eugen Corrodi (18. August 1897, Zürich) was the most highly decorated amongst the Swiss volunteers. He already engaged in the Swiss renewal moment in the interwar years and he was a convinced Nazi and anti- Semite. Corrodi did not have a desk career, nor was he dealing with the ideological idea of a Germanic Reich. Corrodi was a true military man.250 Unfortunately, the archive material could not give information about his youth or the family he grew up in. What is known from the sources is that he was the owner of a fashion store in Zürich in the interwar years and that he was successful in the Swiss Army, holding the rank of a Image 4 Johann Eugen Corrodi, In: major of the infantry. Furthermore, he was a convinced http://forum.axishistory.com/viewto

pic.php?f=38&t=28101&start=0 Frontist. Hence, in the course of the criminal prosecutions [19.11.2013] because of his engagement in NS organizations, Corrodi left Switzerland in July 1941 and joined the Waffen-SS immediately under the pseudonym of Von Elfenau.251 He named himself after his former villa in Biel; “zur Elfenau” and it can be assumed that he chose the pseudonym to have a true German name, indicating his membership in the supreme

248 Verfügung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft über Heinrich Johann Hersche, Bern 17. Oktober 1947, In: E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 249 Oertle 2010, Appenzeller, 152. 250 Wisard 1999, Major biennois, pp. 99-103. 251 Bericht des Bundesrates betreffend Beschwerde von Corrodi gegen eine Verfügung des Eidgenössischen. Militärdepartements betreffend bedingte Entlassung, Bern 3. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1832 105, C.08.15. 67

Aryan race.252 Paul Diebold, who was introduced in the previous chapter, described Corrodi as a very arrogant person, who treated others condescending. Corrodi apparently only spoke in High German whilst other Swiss were glad to be able to speak Swiss German once in a while.253 Previously, Corrodi had served as major and commander of an infantry battalion in the Swiss Army. Therefore, he was appointed SS-Standartenführer in the German Waffen-SS right away and he eventually achieved the rank of a SS-Oberführer of the 8.. SS cavalry division. Between November 1941 and April 1942, he was in the Junkerschule Bad Tölz where he was educated in the norms of the Waffen-SS. Thereafter, he became an instructor at the “Panzerschule” in Lorraine, France. Thereafter Corrodi was appointed to oversee the creation of an Italian SS brigade, since he spoke Italian.254 After the war, Corrodi returned to Switzerland where he was sentenced to thirty months in prison. After finishing his sentence, Corrodi stayed in Switzerland and reopened a fashion store in Basel. Corrodi died on February 19, 1980 in Basel. During his lifetime, he never expressed any remorse, nor did he ever distance himself from National Socialism. He remained a convinced Nazi his whole lifetime and kept on using his SS rank and pseudonym in Switzerland.255 Moreover, Corrodi is said to have taken part in various “Säuberungsaktionen” in Poland and the Soviet Union and in 1944 Corrodi was on the hunt of partisans in Italy with the “29. SS division”.256 Unfortunately, there are no personal statements or further information to be found on these matters.257

252 Bericht von Dr. Jezler über Johann Eugen Corrodi, Bern 6. September 1948, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753. 253 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 254 Croisier, G. M. (2002) “Informationen über Johann Eugen Corrodi”, In: The Axis History Forum Online: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=28101&start=0 [19.11.2013]. 255 Zeitungsartikel, Untragbar und Unerwünscht. Der Schweizer Brigadier-SS General im Grand Hotel, In: Israelisches Wochenblatt, Zürich 10. September 1948, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753. 256 Cantini, C. (2004) “Corrodi, Johann Eugen“, In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D45271.php [19.11.2013]. 257 There is surprisingly little information on Corrodi, neither in the Bundesarchiv Berlin nor in the Bundesarchiv Bern. One explanation could be that Corrodi for the most part lived in the French part of Switzerland and that therefore the archives in Geneva and Biel could have more information. Secondly, I estimate that the military archive in Bern would have more information on him as well. The fact that Corrodi was never part of a treason trial, fails to explain why there is almost no information on him in the Bundesarchiv Bern. Furthermore, I did not find his personal files in Berlin either. The reason for this could be that I was searching with his full name rather than his pseudonym. I do estimate that he could be found under his pseudonym Von Elfenau. I chose to include him in this chapter since he was the highest ranking Swiss volunteer in the Waffen-SS. 68

3.5. The Instructor Alfred Nikles Alfred Nikles (4. January 1907, Bern) absolved an apprenticeship as businessman in Switzerland without following a higher education thereafter. This was not atypical, since Nikles decided to follow a higher military education. He was serving in the Swiss army where he eventually was appointed lieutenant. Before his emigration to Germany, Nikles engaged actively in the NF in Switzerland, where he had an important function in the local group of Interlaken. Divergences in the NF Image 5 Alfred Nikles, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. resulted in the establishment of the “Bund treuer Eidgenossen nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung” BTE (Association of faithful Confederates of the National Socialist worldview), where Nikles affiliated shortly thereafter. Nikles was appointed head of this organization and commissioned with the creation of a “Schutz-Korps” (Protection Corps) which had the character of an intelligence service.258 The Swiss Federal Criminal Court convicted Nikles in 1939 to six months in prison, because of his engagement in NS organizations and espionage activities.259 A year later, Nikles was expelled from the army.260 Nikles stated that he left Switzerland illegally in 1939, because it was clear to him that there would be a war and he simply did not want to be in jail once the war broke out. After crossing the border, he immediately joined the Waffen-SS on his own request on January 1, 1940 at the age of thirty-three.261 Thanks to the connections he had from the NF, he was appointed SS-Obersturmführer right away.262 In 1941 he was promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer.263

258 Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1.Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. 259 The sentence was based on “Zuwiderhandlung gegen Art. 2 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 21. Juni 1935 betreffend den Schutz der Sicherheit der Eidgenossenschaft“. 260 Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1.Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. 261 SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfred Nikles an den Kommandeur des Ersatzkommandos Frankreich, betreffend Anfrage für den Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer, Paris 5. Juli 1944, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C02-511. 262 Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1.Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. 263 Beurteilung von Nikles Alfred durch die Germanische Leitstelle, Berlin 25. September 1943, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus. 69

Initially, he was serving in the SS regiment Germania, where he was active in combat in the Netherlands and in France in the course of the western campaign.264 An assessment report on his performance within the regiment Germania concluded that Nikles was not yet ready to be in a leadership position as instructor in the field, as his military knowledge and experience were not seen as sufficient. However, because of his profound National Socialist worldview, he was recommended for an exceptional political position.265 Therefore, he was entrusted with the leading of the Panoramaheim. He renamed himself to Dr. Hutten and refused to speak Swiss German from that moment on. Like Riedweg, Büeler, and Corrodi, Nikles also wanted to be perceived as German. Several Swiss volunteers gave testimony on the person of Nikles and claimed that he tried to convince every Swiss man by force and pressure to join the Waffen-SS. Also, he interrogated the newcomers on military matters.266 Nikles did not remain the leader of the Panoramaheim until the end of the war but was transferred to the “SS Ergänzungsstab Frankreich” in Paris where he was promoted to deputy head of office.267 Nikles was able to start a modest career within the Waffen-SS right away, because of his active engagement in NS organizations in Switzerland. Although he was not perceived as skilled enough for a military career in the field, the Waffen-SS recognized his potential and deployed him for political positions instead. It can be assumed that Nikles, who spoke German, French and English fluently, was suitable for leading positions, regarding the education of foreign volunteers, mainly Swiss and French. So, his Swiss background, including a previous higher position in the Swiss army, certainly was beneficial to his career in the Waffen-SS. However, without his strong NS ideology and previous engagement in Switzerland in NS organizations, he probably would not have achieved the rank of a SS-Hauptsturmführer.

264 Dienstlaufbahn von Nikles Alfred, Ort und Datum unbekannt, BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus. 265 Abschrift der Beurteilung von SS-Obersturmführer Nikles Alfred, Hamburg-Langenhorn 13.2.1940, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus. 266 Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1.Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. 267 Beurteilung von Nikles Alfred durch die Germanische Leitstelle, Berlin 25. September 1943, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus. 70

3.6. The War Correspondent Benno Schaeppi Benno Schaeppi’s (24. November 1911, St. Gallen) career was different. He had the rank of a SS-Untersturmführer. He was not involved in the bureaucratic apparatus, nor did he have a career as a soldier. His vocation was of a different nature. He made a name as a war correspondent, reporting about the events at the front, combining his articles with political statements. Schaeppi is one of the Swiss volunteers, who engaged in the propaganda work, helping to shape the impeccable and heroic image of the Waffen-SS soldier by glorifying the war. In his articles for “Das Schwarze Korps”,268 he was Image 6 Benno Schaeppi, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713 railing against Switzerland and its neutrality. However, the aim of the articles was to increase recruitment of new volunteers.269 Benno Schaeppi was born in St. Gallen as son of a businessman. Schaeppi is the fifth volunteer in this case study with that particular background. However, the family moved to Davos in the mountains, because his mother was suffering from a lung disease. She died when Benno was two years old. Four years later, Benno’s father married for the second time, however, Benno and his older sister refused to accept the new wife. Benno’s dream always was to follow a university education, but since his father lost his money in speculations, Benno had to be content with a commercial apprenticeship. This increased the family problems and the teenager Benno continued to rebel until his father sent him to an “Erziehungsanstalt”. It is possible that Schaeppi found a way to project his frustrations onto political topics. After he became more calm, he joined the NF in 1933 and from 1938 on the BTE, where he completely felt being in the right place. He himself stated that from that moment on, he was only living for Swiss National

268 „Das Schwarze Korps“ (The Black Corps) was the official newsletter of the SS and was published for the first time in 1935. It contained foreign News reports, theoretical essays on Nazi policies, and most importantly propaganda advertisements for admission into the SS. Each member was supposed to read the publication and motivate others to do the same. It was published on a weekly base and free of charge. Zeck, M. (2002) Das Schwarze Korps. Geschichte und Gestalt des Organs der Reichsführung SS. Niemeyer: Tübingen, pp. 75. 269 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 71

Socialism. From 1936 until 1938 he was the propaganda leader of the NF.270 However, like Riedweg and Büeler, Schaeppi believed in a German Reich in which Switzerland would have an independent position, so that he was against an annexation of Switzerland by Germany.271 Schaeppi was already working as a journalist in Zürich before he decided to join the Nazis in their so-called struggle for a new European order. Since 1935, he was writing for numerous NS newspapers.272 He furthermore functioned as a courier for secret letters amongst leading Frontists in Germany and Switzerland between 1940 and 1941.273 Just like the other higher ranking volunteers in this chapter, Benno also experienced prosecution prior to his escape to Germany. Initially, Schaeppi had been convicted by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court because of his political activities and membership in the NSDAP to four months in prison in July 1939. Immediately after his sentence, Schaeppi decided to leave Switzerland with his wife Elisabeth. Since he did not report to the army after the first and second mobilization, Schaeppi was once more convicted, this time by the military court “Divisionsgericht 8” in absentia to three years in prison in September 1941. Two years later, he was convicted once more for having joined a foreign army. 274 He found a job as foreign correspondent in the company Milei G.m.b.H but did not stay for long. In the spring of 1941, he joined the Waffen-SS and was immediately ordered to a propaganda unit at the Eastern Front. He received the “Eiserne Kreuz” and a “Panzersturmabzeichen” for his military service.275 The Swiss authorities were well informed about Schaeppi’s activities in Germany. They knew that he had joined the Waffen-SS, that he held the rank of a SS- Oberscharführer and that he was working as war correspondent, being involved in

270 Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit. Cf. Lebenslauf Benno Schaeppi, Bad Tölz 28. Januar 1944, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 068 B) 68 – B Schaefer – Schaettiger. 271 Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundeanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938, In: BAR E 4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 272 NSZ Rheinfront, Bodensee-Rundschau, Der Führer Karlsruhe, Schwarz-Wälder-Tageblatt, Hessische Landeszeitung, NS Kurier Stuttgart, Die Front, Schweizervolk, Schweizerdegen und Nationale Hefte. Abhörungsprotoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 20. Januar 1939, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 273 Abschrift aus der Abhörung des Dr. Hügel durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Ort unbekannt 28. Januar bis 5. Februar 1946, In: E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 274 Bericht des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartement bezüglich Ausbürgerung von Benno Schaeppi, Bern 3. Dezember 1943, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16. 275 Auskunft des Schweizerischen Konsulates über Benno Schaeppi, Stuttgart 18. August 1941, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16. 72 propaganda work. They furthermore knew that Schaeppi and his wife were members of the BSG.276 So the authorities were aware of his ideological commitment to the Reich. In a letter to Schaeppi, they asked him to continue to support his own father, who was left indigent in Zürich. The authorities therefore ask him not to let out his frustration political on the “Armenpflege” Zürich. They reminded him that it might be easier to hide behind his ideology but that he nonetheless was having obligations towards his mother country. They urged him to take his responsibilities towards his family as serious as his fight against bolshevism and they requested to pay 40 RM each month.277 Whilst in Switzerland his reputation was damaged, Germany he and his wife were both perceived as capable, striving and reliable people.278 In 1942, Schaeppi was promoted to SS-Untersturmführer and Riedweg ordered him to the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart.279 So, Benno took over Nikles’ position as new Panoramaheim leader. In his function as author for the Black Corps, he had proven to be the ideal person for recruitment and persuasion of new Waffen-SS volunteers. From that point on, it seems that the recruitment style in the Panoramaheim became more drastic, because Schaeppi was leading a stricter regime. The Swiss Federal Justice and Police department concluded in a report on Schaeppi, that he was influencing the Swiss men politically. Apparently, Schaeppi engaged in the interrogations of the so-called “Schwarzgänger” (Swiss men who crossed the Swiss border illegally) by the Gestapo. It seems that Schaeppi wanted to be involved in the selection of the potential volunteers’ right from the start.280 Also, Schaeppi was said to have been more diligent than Nikles. Apparently, Schaeppi was striving for every single volunteer within the Panoramaheim, whilst Nikles delegated a lot to his secretary.281

276 Bericht des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartement bezüglich Ausbürgerung von Benno Schaeppi, Bern 3. Dezember 1943, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16. 277 “Wir ersuchen Sie dringend, Ihre Empörung über die Schweiz. Regierung nun nicht ausgerechnet an der Armenpflege der Stadt Zürich auszulassen, die seit Jahren für Ihren mittellosen Vater sorgt. Denken Sie doch in erster Linie an Ihre Pflichten als Sohn, wenn Sie schon die Pflichten Ihrem Vaterland gegenüber nicht erfüllen wollen.“ Brief des Fürsorgeamtes Zürich an Benno Schaeppi, Zürich 15. Dezember 1941, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16. 278 Auskunft des Schweizerischen Konsulates über Benno Schaeppi, Stuttgart 18. August 1941, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16. 279 Lebenslauf Benno Schaeppi, Bad Tölz 28. Januar 1944, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 068 B) 68 – B Schaefer – Schaettiger. 280 Bericht des Schweizerischen Konsul an das Eidgenössische Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Ort unbekannt 1943, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16. 281 Abschrift aus der Abhörung des Dr. Hügel durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Ort unbekannt 28. Januar bis 5. Februar 1946, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 73

Like Büeler, Corrodi and Nikles, Schaeppi also decided to use a pseudonym and named himself Bernd Schäfer. Schaeppi was a very ambitious man, involved in many different tasks. Between spring and autumn 1942, Benno was engaged in the GL, where he was responsible for “Schweizerfragen” and press activities. Schaeppi remained leader of the Panoramaheim until March 1944. Until that time, he also gave training courses in the Germanic officer school Junkerschule Bad Tölz and he was involved in the erection of a Germanic SS Switzerland.282 By the end of the war, Schaeppi was appointed leader of the “Kriegsberichter Kompanie” (war correspondent company) in the “III. SS Panzerkorps”. There he witnessed the collapse of Berlin and was taken POW by the Americans. During his imprisonment, Schaeppi too was able to secure a position as translator in the SS-Sonderlager Darmstadt, thus enjoyed a good position and the respect of the American camp commander.283 Although Schaeppi did not achieve a higher rank in the Waffen-SS, he was nonetheless involved in the propaganda activities of the Waffen-SS and he played an important role in the Swiss matters especially. He can be seen as a linking person, who connected the interests of the Swiss National Socialists with the Nazi authorities. Like Riedweg and Büeler, Schaeppi was convicted in the treason trial in 1947, which will be subject of chapter five. In 1955, Schaeppi received the German citizenship and after he had been dismissed from prison in 1956, he decided to live in Germany and Paris. Schaeppi died in 1988 in Eckernförde, Germany.284

282 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 283 Antrag auf Amnestie an den Präsidenten des ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht, Strafanstalt Regensdorf Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 284 Wolf, W. (2011) „Schaeppi, Benno Heinrich“. In: Schweizerisches Lexikon Online: http://www.hls-dhs- dss.ch/textes/d/D43428.php [3.12.2013]. 74

4. Motivation and Ideological Commitment

The SS called themselves elite troop of the Führer and a community of ideological committed National Socialists. According to Jean-Luc Leleu, the Waffen-SS was increasingly perceived as a social model of a society in war times and as an ideal for the ethnic community.285 The Waffen-SS man was not just a simple soldier, but rather a political soldier and representative of the National Socialist world view.286 In spite of this, Stein remarked in his study that the SS ideology in theory and the Waffen-SS ideology in practice were not always identical. Although the Waffen-SS had a distinct ideology, it served more as a manipulative device than as a true ideology. Yet, he underlined that the recruits joining the Waffen-SS before 1943287 were all volunteers, who hardly could have failed to recognize the uniqueness and ideology of the formation they were conscribing to.288 However, this does not necessarily imply that all the volunteers joined out of ideological commitment. Yet, Thomas Casagrande stated in his study on the SS-division “Prinz Eugen”, that the motivation of the Germanic volunteers originated from a political motive, combining the Germanic idea, as well as the considerable commitment to National Socialism, which in turn signified the desire to fight bolshevism and to stand on the side of the victorious German troop.289 Gutmann pointed out that the Swiss officer corps volunteers had developed a longing for a radical reorganization of the European political, social and economical conditions before joining the Waffen-SS and that this longing was amplified by what these men perceived as threat to the core of European civilization. He furthermore assessed that there was a significant number of well-integrated and educated men, who left for Germany with an active interest in contributing to the Nazi project. He concluded that the officer corps volunteers had an ideological inclination towards fascism with an

285 Tagungsbericht Vergemeinschaftung und Ausgrenzung. Neue Forschungen zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS. 02.12.2010-04.12.2011, Dresden, in: H-Soz-u-Kult, 11.03.2011, Online: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu- berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=3573 [16.04.2014]. 286 Dingel 2007, Waffen-SS, pp. 862. 287 From 1943 on, the Waffen-SS was allowed to draft recruits under duress. Hein 2011, Himmlers Orden, 276. 288 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 122, 125. 289 Casagrande, T. (2003) Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division „Prinz Eugen“. Die Banater Schwaben und die Nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrechen. Campus Verlag: Frankfurt, New York, pp.323. 75 imbedded pan-Europeanist tension.290 Oertle on the other hand, claimed that anti- bolshevism and ideological commitment was not a main factor in the motivation and therefore, only of little significance. He assessed that the young volunteers mostly became ideologically committed, because of the special training and “Weltanschauungs Unterricht”.291 Oertle admitted that the motivation was manifold. At the same time, he explained the phenomenon of Swiss participation in the war as a surrogate for the mercenary army and by doing so, using an old image of the Swiss confederate soldier. This explanation certainly is obsolete and does not explain why the Swiss chose for Germany, since they could have joined the Allies instead. Lastly, Oertle concluded that the Swiss renewal movement did not succeed to influence the volunteers, as the movement was too fragmented and estranged and therefore insignificant.292 However, twelve out of seventeen men in this case study were member of NS organizations prior to their conscription to the Waffen-SS. Oertle clearly underestimated the influence of ideological commitment, as well as the importance of the renewal movement in Switzerland. This chapter focuses on the ideological committed volunteers in this case study. Similar as the different NS organizations, the volunteers in this case study also disposed different values. They all had a strong sense for National Socialism but at the same time, they were not all equally motivated or driven by the same convictions. As a consequence, even ideological commitment as a motivation has to be differentiated. The renewal movement in Switzerland was not a uniform movement but rather composed of many different NS organizations. As a result, the ideologically committed volunteers were all National Socialist in character but stressed different values. Some advocated an own Swiss National Socialism, others longed for an affiliation and incorporation to the German Reich. However, they all aspired a restructuring of the political, economical and social conditions in Switzerland and Europe. The question is what different values of National Socialism were expressed by the ideological committed volunteers? Thus, the different aspects of National Socialism have to be addressed and linked to personal statements from the volunteers. Race struggle and anti-Semitism were the crucial aspects of German Nazism. So it has to be assessed, if these matters were equally important for the Swiss volunteers. Furthermore,

290 Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 585, 591f. 291 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 47ff. 292 Ibid. 76

Bolshevism was perceived as the main threat against National Socialism and certainly served as a good excuse for conscription in the post war trials. Additionally, Hitler aspired a Greater Germanic Reich in which all Germanic people would live together. Did that vision for a greater Reich excite and influence the Swiss volunteers? Lastly, as established in chapter three, the higher ranking volunteers were driven by opportunistic considerations. That is why special attention will be given to that aspect of motivation.

4.1. National Socialism and Anti-Semitism The German National Socialism or Nazism incorporated scientific racism, anti-Semitism and asserted the superiority of the Aryan race.293 As a consequence, the rhetoric of race struggle was adopted by the renewal movements in Switzerland. The Swiss NS volunteers, like Franz Riedweg, openly expressed their desire for a return to traditional values like Volk and homeland.294 However, the understanding of the term Volk was not just restricted to the Swiss nationality. In contrary, the NS volunteers felt that they belonged to the German Volk, since the Swiss language and culture were believed to originate from Germany. As a consequence, they perceived the German struggle as their very personal struggle. Schaeppi for example expressed his conviction accordingly:

„Wir sind Fanatiker. Wir bekennen uns zum Nationalsozialismus. Wir sehen, dass es in unseren Tagen nur ein Volk gibt auf dieser ganzen Erde, dass den Sinn allen Seins verstanden hat und darnach handelt: Deutschland. Wir gehören zu diesem Volke. Wir Schweizer Nationalsozialisten stehen heute noch mitten im Kampf um die Seele dieses Volkes.“295

The volunteers adopted the NS vocabulary, by expressing their pride for “Volk und Rasse”, as can be noticed in Othmar Maag’s letter to his friend and fellow soldier Fritz:

293 Definition National Socialism, In: Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated 7.1.2014. Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405414/National-Socialism# [18.05.2014]. 294 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 295 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 77

“(…) Bei deinem Spaziergang über Land hätte ich dich gerne begleitet, gibt es doch nichts Schöneres als Volk und Land kennen zu lernen. Dass man dabei die Feststellung machen muss, dass viel von der Bodenständigkeit verloren gegangen ist, ist ansich nicht erstaunlich. Denn dank dem Liberalismus der uns den „Segen“ dieser gegenwärtigen Demokratie und „Menschenwürde“ gebracht hat, haben sich rassenfremde Leute angesiedelt und unsere bodenverwachsene Bauern vertrieben. (…)296

The ideologically driven volunteers were convinced that they had to contribute to the spread of National Socialism in Switzerland. Ten out of seventeen volunteers in this case study engaged actively in NS organizations, either as active members, in leading positions, or were involved in the spread of propaganda material. Benno Schaeppi for example worked as a journalist in Switzerland and was writing for several NS newspapers. He propagated the NS ideology with a lot of passion and conviction. In an interrogation by the SBA regarding his political activities Schaeppi stated that:

“Unter Deutscher Propaganda verstehe ich die Propagierung des nationalsozialistischen Gedankengutes. Es ist mir selbstverständlich daran gelegen, dieses Gedankengut hier zu verbreiten, (…). (…) es ist Gewähr geboten, dass keine Möglichkeit ausser Acht gelassen wird, den Nationalsozialismus in allen seinen Bezirken und Erscheinungsformen nach und nach hier zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen, zum Allermindesten aber zu Verständnis für unsere Weltanschauung zu führen.“297

The detailed examination of the personal statements revealed that the struggle of the Aryan was not a primary consideration for the Swiss volunteers. For most of them National Socialism was attractive, since it was an extreme form of nationalism. Although they adopted the NS rhetoric and fancied the notion of the Volk, they were more concerned with the restructuring of Europe. It can be assumed that the discourse of race struggle was not central for the Germanic volunteers in general. Stein remarked that already the recruiting pamphlet issued to all potential Germanic volunteers, suggested

296 Brief von Othmar Maag an Leutnant Fritz Steiner, Winterthur 21. August 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 297 Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 78 that the race struggle was not the primary emphasis. On the contrary, comradeship, heroism and brotherhood were the more noticeable slogans.298 However, there is another aspect of race struggle that cannot be left out in the assessment and that is anti- Semitism. Anti-Semitism was a crucial part of the Swiss NS party programs. As a result, the rumor on Jewish world conspiracy, especially in the financial sector, found its way into the political discourse of these movements. Yet, not all the Swiss who were National Socialists were anti-Semitic at the same time. Nonetheless, the volunteers accepted anti- Semitism as part of the party program and did not question its relevance. Schaeppi answered the question on the role of anti-Semitism in the radio interview:

“Ich habe an sich mit Juden nie Kontakt gehabt und, jedenfalls bewusst nicht, und ich konnte also nicht etwa aus Hassgefühlen von innen heraus Antisemit werden. Auf der anderen Seite gab es damals in der Schweiz eine beträchtliche Arbeitslosigkeit und wir wurden darauf aufmerksam gemacht, und wir sahen das ja auch, dass z.B. der Mittelstand zugrundeging, wegen der Warenhäuser, die doch im wesentlichen in jüdischen Händen waren.“299

Although Schaeppi claimed that anti-Semitism was not influential in his decision, this statements underlines that he clearly was influenced by anti-Semitic feelings. The emphasis on the destruction of the middle class through Jewish stores represents the typical NS rhetoric. Most of the volunteers did not mention anti-Semitism explicitly in their statements. It could be possible that they did not mention it in the interrogation, since they were aware that this would not be helpful to lower their degree of penalty. However, it can be assumed that they all displayed a form of anti-Semitism, the same way they adopted the other aspects of National Socialism. For Othmar Maag for example, anti-Semitism indeed

298 The pamphlet issued the following: „if you answer the call of the Waffen-SS and volunteer to join the ranks of the great front of SS divisions, you will belong to a corps which from the very beginning has been associated with outstanding achievements, and therefore has developed an especially deep feeling of comradeship. You will be bearing arms with a corps that embraces the most valuable element of the young German generation. Above all, you will be especially bound top the National Socialist ideology.” In: Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 125. 299 Schweizer in der Waffen-SS. Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit. 79 was a motivational factor to leave to Germany and join the Waffen-SS. In various letters to his parents he expressed his obsession with the Jewish conspiracy:

“Liebe Eltern, es tut mir schrecklich leid, dass ich Euch diesen schrecklichen Schmerz verursachen musste, dass ich ohne Euch etwas zu sagen, das Land verlassen habe. Wir taten es nicht aus Feigheit oder aus Fahnenflucht, sondern weil wir genau wussten, was uns durch jüdisch-freimaurerische Gerichte alles getan worden wäre. (…) Wenn auch die Presse schreibt, wir würden von hier aus gegen unser Vaterland arbeiten, so ist das wieder eine ganz gemeine Lüge. Gegen unser Vaterland und Volk haben wir nie gearbeitet und werden es auch nie tun, sondern gerade das Gegenteil.“300

A year later in another letter to his parents Maag rhapsodized on Germany’s wealth and pride. However, he did not miss out to blame the Jews for all the negative things in Switzerland at the same time:

“(…) Es ist ein Skandal! Aber auch diese verdammten Juden- und Freimaurerbrut in der Schweiz wird einmal sein Bündel packen müssen und das gelobte Land verlassen. Wohin sie dann noch ziehen wollen, ist mir allerdings nicht ganz klar. Amerika’s Boden dürfte diesem Übel der Menschheit auch langsam zu heiss werden. Nun, dann sollen sie zur Hölle fahren, diese verdammte Lügenbrut, die die ganze Menschheit in Krieg und Elend stürzen nur um sich das Reich Zion aufzubauen. Auch in unserem Vaterlande, in der Schweiz, wird einst das scharf geschliffene Schwert des germanischen Schweizervolkes Ordnung schaffen. Einst kommt auch der Tag, in dem auch unser Volk von den Fesseln des Judentums und seiner Helfershelfer befreit wird. (…)“301

In another letter to his parents he went on saying:

“(…) Es ist klar, dass die Juden versuchen, unser Volk durch jüdisches Blut zu versauen, aber es wird ihnen nicht gelingen; obschon der Hass gegen diese

300 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 25. Dezember 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 301 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 6. Dezember 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2- 5358. 80

Blutsauger aller Völker durch die gemeinsamen Hetzen und Lügen langsam verblasst ist, so ist trotzdem die grosse Abneigung in beinahe allen Volksschichten gegen die jüdische Blutvermischung gross. Und dieses saubere, urdeutsche, rein germanische Blut wird einst auch wieder in der Schweiz reden und handeln dürfen. Dann müssen die Grenzen zum grossen Deutschen Vaterland fallen, dann wird unser geliebtes Volk wieder dorthin zurückkehren, wohin es gehört, nämlich ins Reich, ins Reich aller Deutschen! (…)302

Maag was a true Nazi and obsessed with the Jews. In every letter he wrote to his parents he displayed anti-Semitism and his impressions from the Eastern Front only underlined his previous stance. In 1942, he was transferred to Cholm in Poland.303 He described his impressions in another letter to his parents:

“(…) Wie so eine Ostpolnische Stadt aussieht, könnt Ihr euch bestimmt nicht vorstellen. (…) Die Polen selbst sind schmutzig. Was aber das schlimmste ist, sind die Juden. Unheimlich viele leben hier im Dreck und Gestank. Es gibt Orte wo mehr Juden als Polen leben. Hier in Cholm hausen heute noch ungefähr 14‘ 000 Judenschweine, und wie die aussehen. Wenn ich früher so Judenbilder im Stürmer sah, glaubte ich, das sei übertrieben. Habe jetzt aber tatsächlich die Feststellung zu machen, dass die Kerle in Wirklichkeit noch viel schlimmer aussehen. (…)“304

„(…) Das mit Obergruppenführer Heydrich ist doch allerhand. Aber so sind die meisten Völker im Osten. Feig und verschlagen. Man muss nur mal unter den Kerlen gelebt haben, da hat man so leicht einen Begriff davon. Ihr könnt es euch gar nicht vorstellen, dass Menschen so vertiert sein können. Ein Leben führen die, wie wir es nicht einmal den Hunden zumuten, denn die werden wenigstens noch gewaschen und gebürstet. Diese Ostvölker aber scheuen sich vor Wasser, Luft und Sonne. Dann diese Verschlagenheit, Falschheit und Hinterlist in den Gesichtern. Doch die werden schon noch klein beigeben. Dieser gemeine Anschlag in Prag wird

302 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 18. Januar 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2- 5358. 303 Maag indicated the city of Cholm in his letters. He referred to the city of Chelm in Poland but used the Russian pronunciation instead. 304 Abschrift, Brief von Untersturmführer Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Cholm 30. April 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 81

bestimmt bitter gerächt werden. Es ist tatsächlich so, dass man alles niederschlagen sollte, denn hier im Osten hat sich der Auswurf der Menschheit niedergelassen. (…)“305

What Maag referred in his letter to the assassination attempt in Prague, in which course Reinhard Heydrich was deadly wounded. Heydrich’s death caused a storm of outrage in Nazi Germany. Gestapo officials retailed for his death by executing hundreds of Czechs and wiping out entire villages.306 Maag signed every letter with “Heil Hitler”, as was right and proper for a Nazi. More importantly, Maag felt a flush of victory. The realization that history was changing and that he was a part of that change may have even been more influential in his decision making process. Maag was sure that Germany would win the war and he wanted to be part of it. In another letter to his parents Maag wrote:

“(…) Der Schweizer ist ein Germane und gehört zum Deutschen Vaterlande. Wir sind es die schon vor Jahren die Zeit richtig erkannt haben. Nicht Untertanen oder blöde Nachäffer wollen wir sein, sonder wertvolle und geschätzte Mitarbeiter am (…) Europas. Eine herrliche Zeit, in der wir leben und für die wir auch jederzeit mit stolzem und tapferem Herzen in den Tod gehen. (…) Wunderbar diese Siegeszuversicht bei allen Schichten der Bevölkerung, dieser Stolz, dabei sein zu dürfen und teilhaben zu dürfen an diesem grössten geschichtlichen Ereignis der Menschheit. (…)“307

He was ready to sacrifice his life for what he believed a better future:

“(…) Aber das Volk muss so erzogen sein, alle ihm schädlichen Elemente auszurotten und wenn nötig auch bereit sein, mit der Waffe in der Hand um seine Lebensrechte und Lebensnotwendigkeiten zu kämpfen. Nur wer kämpfen kann,

305 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 4. Juni 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2- 5358. 306 Reinhard Heydrich, In: Encyclopedia Britannica, last updated 3.3.2014. Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/264683/Reinhard-Heydrich [01.06.2014]. 307 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 25. Dezember 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 82

kann auch leben. Wer zu feige zum kämpfen ist, vegetiert so lange daher, solange es seinem Gegenspieler passt. (…)“308 „(…) Europa wird und muss neugestaltet werden, nicht durch Worte, sondern durch die blanke Waffe. Humanitätsduselei darf man dabei nicht kennen, wenn es um die Reinhaltung unserer Germanischen Rasse geht, die allein berechtigt ist, Europa und damit die Welt zu führen. (…)“309

As mentioned in chapter two, Maag was a downright nationalist and a convinced militarist.310. In Switzerland, he had joined the cadet corps with twelve and in his interrogation by the SBA he stated without hesitation that he was a fanatic soldier.311 Evidently, commitment to National Socialism also signified the desire to fight bolshevism.

4.2. Anti-Bolshevism Hitler regarded Bolshevism as the inevitable ideological enemy of the Nazi new order in Europe. The fight against Bolshevism was inextricably entwined with the ideology and political immortality of National Socialism. Consequentially, the invocation to fight the red threat found its way into the Waffen-SS rhetoric and posed a core argument in recruitment. For the ideologically indoctrinated soldier of the Waffen-SS, the battle against the Red Army was a holy crusade. In the East, the Waffen-SS fought the hardest, the longest and the most fanatically.312 The Swiss volunteers in this assessment were not all stationed at the Easter front. However, most of them indicated their desire to fight Bolshevism in their motivation to join the Waffen-SS. Diebold for example asked the Waffen-SS for permission only to be stationed as a soldier on the Eastern front.313 A German newspaper article dating from 1952 concluded that about 800 Swiss risked their lives for their fight against bolshevism. The article stated that the Swiss joined at the time when the campaign in the East started and praised them as saviors. It

308 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 8. Juli 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2- 5358. 309 Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 1. August 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 310 Brief von Othmar Maag an seinen Freund Fritz, Winterthur 21. August 1941, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 311 Abhörungsprotokoll von Othmar Maag durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Aarau 13. September 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 312 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 121f. 313 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 83 underlined that the Swiss volunteers mostly were not fascists or National Socialists but idealists who wanted to protect their own country from the Eastern hordes. “Rund 800 Schweizer kämpften im letzten Weltkrieg im deutschen Osten – und nur dort! Sie kamen vor allem in dem Augenblick, als die Front zu wanken begann, denn sie wollten die bolschewistische Flut aufhalten. (…)“314 The newspaper article certainly exalted the Swiss volunteers’ role in the war. However, the archive findings revealed that the fight against bolshevism indeed was the most often mentioned motivation to join the Waffen-SS, which matched with the idea of protecting civilized Europe. That is why they claimed not to understand the accusation of treason, as they were convinced that their fight also served the interests of Switzerland. Kurt Brüderlin rejected the accusation as following:

“Ich erklärte dem betreffenden Beamten, dass ich nach Deutschland gekommen sei, um gegen Russland Militärdienst zu leisten und nicht um mein eigenes Land zu verraten.“315

Diebold similarly stated in his curriculum vitae:

“(…) Als dann im Juni 1941 der Krieg mit Russland ausbrach, war ich der festen Überzeugung, dass diese Auseinandersetzung mit dem Bolschewismus nicht nur eine rein deutsche, sondern eine europäische Schicksalsfrage werde. Ich gebe offen zu, dass ich diesbezüglich sehr stark beeinflusst wurde. (…) Ich glaubte damals noch an ein neues Europa, ohne dass damit die politische Selbständigkeit der Schweiz angetastet würde. (…)“316

In a letter to his wife Johanna, Büeler explained his decision to leave without notifying her:

314 Zeitungsartikel von Dr. Hans –Otto Meissner, Schweizer Infanterie vor Moskau. Eidgenössische Freiwillige bezahlten ihren Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus mit Gefängnis und Zuchthaus, In: Die Zeit, Nr. 10, Baden Baden 7. März 1952, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C02-713. 315 Abhörungsprotokoll von Kurt Brüderlin durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, , Liestal 8. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 316 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 84

“(…) Das Reich und Europa werden nicht untergehen trotz aller Widerwertigkeiten. Jeder von uns müssen (…) alles einzusetzen, schon unseren Kindern wegen. Wenn die asozialen Horden niedergeschlagen sind, dann wird das Schlimmste beseitigt sein. Wie es wohl in der Schweiz aussehen mag? Ich hatte Gelegenheit die N.Z.Z [Neue Zürcher Zeitung] und die Weltwoche zu lesen. Es ist einfach erschütternd festzustellen, wie diese Leute weiterhin mit dem Schicksal unseres Landes spielen, wie diese Leute nach wie vor jenen internationalen Kreisen Vorschub leisten, die weder sozial noch (…) unserem Land geholfen haben, (…).“317

Another factor involved with the desire to fight bolshevism was the desire to fight after all. The Swiss volunteers mostly were well trained soldiers; some of them with respectable positions in the army. After they realized that Switzerland would not participate in the war, they probably chose to join the Waffen-SS in order to experience a war after all. Nikles stated that he left Switzerland illegally in 1939, because it was clear to him that there would be a war and he simply did not want to be in jail once the war broke out.318 Similarly Kurt Brüderlin; he answered the question why he went to Germany the following:

“(…) Nach dem Zusammenbruch der deutschen Armee bei Stalingrad und der darauf erfolgten Proklamation des totalen Krieges, sowie in der Erwägung, dass mit einer kriegerischen Verwicklung mit der Schweiz nicht mehr zu rechnen sei, hielt ich es für meine Pflicht, die aus meiner Gesinnung hervorgehenden Konsequenz zu ziehen und mich für die Entscheidung persönlich einzusetzen. (…)“319

Benno Schaeppi expressed himself in the radio interview in a similar way:

“Ich habe die Affinität zum Soldatentum schon zuvor angedeutet, dass ich das Soldatische in der Geschichte der Schweiz immer wieder gefunden habe und sehr

317 Brief van Heinrich Büeler an seine Frau Johanna de Vries, Sennheim 20. Januar 1942, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, 17.9 Korrespondenzen und Personendossiers. 318 SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfred Nikles an den Kommandeur des Ersatzkommandos Frankreich, Betreffend Anfrage für den Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer, Paris 5. Juli 1944, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C02-511. 319 Einvernahme von Kurt Brüderlin aus der Haft vorgeführt, Protokoll an das Polizeikommando des Kantons Basselland zu Handen der Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 85

hoch geachtet habe. Für einen überzeugten Nationalsozialisten, war es klar, dass die Entwicklung des Krieges nur noch zur Ausweitung des Kampfes gegen die Sowjetunion führen konnte. Und bei diesem Krieg nun allerdings wollte ich von Anfang an nach Möglichkeit dabei sein.“320

And in a letter to his wife he justified his motivation to participate in Nazi Germany as following:

“Du fragst mich, warum ich ging. Warum ich aus freiem Willen den grauen Rock anzog und ohne Befehl den Marsch antrat, von dem wir beide, Du und ich, nicht wissen, wo er enden wird, und ob ein Tag kommt, an dem wir uns wiedersehen. Fünfmal habe ich gebeten und zum erstenmal in meinem Leben gar gebettelt: Nehmt mich auf! Und als mir der Bote den Einberufungsbefehl überreichte, zitterte meine Hand. Verzeih mir, das war und ist und bleibt die Stunde meines höchsten Glücks: ich bin deutscher Soldat! Germaniens Stämme nehmen teil am Aufbau einer neuen Welt und einen neuen Sinn erhält das Menschsein. Das ist der Grund weshalb ich hier bin, und nicht dort, bei dir.“321

Apparently, the Swiss volunteers mentioned the desire to fight Bolshevism as a main factor to join the Waffen-SS. However, that claim most likely was exaggerated in retrospect. They justified their participation in Nazi Germany with the desire for a safe Europe. The returnees were charged with treason accusations and they were labeled as “Landesverräter”. In order to correct that picture they probably justified themselves with visions of a free and unified Europe which was worth fighting for - also in the interest of Switzerland.

4.3. Dream of a Greater Germanic Reich Hitler’s Nazism was widely influenced by pan-Germanic expansionism, as well as the intention to create a bulwark against communism.322 The ideologically committed

320 Schweizer in der Waffen-SS. Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit. 321 Brief von Benno Schaeppi an seine Frau, gelesen durch Hans-Rudolf Lehmann in der Sendung Schweizer in der Waffen-SS auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit. 322 Definition National Socialism, In: Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated 7.1.2014. Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405414/National-Socialism# [18.05.2014] 86 volunteers strongly felt responsible to contribute in the establishment of National Socialism in Switzerland and the creation of the Greater Germanic Reich.323 At the same time they were frustrated with the political situation in Switzerland, because the Swiss politics with its readiness to compromise appeared lax in comparison to the impressive dynamic, discipline and order in Italy and Germany. The turnaround in Germany seemed electrifying and change was in the air.324 However, the Swiss volunteers had their own ideals and visions for the new order. Riedweg for instance started to engage actively in politics already as a student. He was convinced that communism posed the biggest threat to Europe and according to him, only a unified Europe on the base of equality of the member countries could meet that threat. As soon as Hitler rose to power, Riedweg increasingly perceived the Swiss democracy and neutrality as a “dangerous ignorance”.325 He longed for a new order in which all the European states would be equal whilst organized by Germany’s chairmanship.326 He advocated his utopia as following:

“(…) Der grosse Gedanke der germanischen Gemeinschaft, der antiimperialen Charakter trägt, hat mit Eindeutschung nichts zu tun, ferner, dass nach dem deutschen Endsieg das grossgermanische Reich im neuen, geeinten Europa vermeintlich organisch, ja sogar im Sinn der Gleichberechtigung zustandekommen solle, d.h. in freier Zustimmung der unter deutschen Führung eine gewisse Autonomie und Eigenständigkeit behaltenden Gliedstaaten, welche, schwerlich ernst zu nehmende, „organische Lösung“ auch der vorwiegend nordisch bestimmten Schweiz durch Volksabstimmung zukomme.“327

With the expression of an organic solution for Switzerland, Riedweg was advocating that Switzerland should become incorporated in the new Germanic order as an equal and independent member. Büeler had a similar understanding for the new Reich. He justified

323 Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 324 Rüthemann 1979, Volksbund, pp. 5. 325 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 326 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 327 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 87 his decision to join the Waffen-SS in his curriculum vitae, written in the prison of Regensdorf in 1951:

“(…) Die schwere Anschuldigung der Gefährdung der Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossenschaft hatte mich seelisch zutiefst getroffen, (…) Meine Freunde in der Schweiz und Deutschland rieten mir, nach Deutschland überzusiedeln. Am 21.11.41 begab ich mich illegal nach Deutschland, in der Absicht, später meine Familie nachkommen zu lassen. (…) Im Dezember 1941 meldete ich mich als Freiwilliger zur Waffen-SS, da ich in diesem Wehrmachtsteil den europäischen Gedanken wenigstens im Rahmen der soldatischen Gemeinschaft in seinen Anfängen verwirklicht sah. (…)“328

The Swiss typically were influenced by the federalist ideal. Therefore, they hoped and believed in a Germanic Reich, based on a federalist principle. As a result, they all believed in a Germanic Reich in which Switzerland would have had an independent position. Paul Diebold for example stated that he believed in the new order but that he was convinced that Switzerland would not be incorporated into the Reich and would be able to keep its political neutrality.329 Likewise, Kurt Brüderlin who stated in his interrogation by the SBA, that he imagined the new Reich as a European federation in the model of the League of Nations.

“Ich dachte mir einen Staatenbund ähnlich des Völkerbundes. Ich habe dabei die Eigenstaatlichkeit der Schweiz nie aufgeben wollen.“330 „Die Grenzen innerhalb unseres Kontinenten spielen keine Rolle, es sei denn als Hindernis für die Verteidigungskraft dieses selben Menschen.“331

Büeler had a similar understanding and explained his conviction:

328 Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, Biographische Materialien, 1.2. Lebenslauf. 329 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 330 Abhörungsprotokoll von Kurt Brüderlin durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 8. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 331 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an den Chef des Eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 9. September 1946, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 88

“Weder unsere Bewegung, noch ich persönlich sind der Auffassung, dass einer mehrheitlich nationalsozialistischen Schweiz nur noch der Anschluss an das Deutsche Reich übrig bliebe. Genauso wie heute die Schweiz sehr stark im Einflusskreis des liberalistisch-marxistischen Frankreich steht, kann auch eine staatspolitisch unabhängige Schweiz im Einflusskreis des Deutschen Reiches ihre Existenz behaupten. Der Nationalsozialismus ist ja gerade die völkische Weltanschauung und es ist keinem von uns je eingefallen, das Schweizervolk als eigenständige Substanz zu verneinen.“332

Apparently, many volunteers were driven by a pan-European sense. However, is it realistic to assume that the soldiers at the front where still thinking in such heroic terms or is it rather possible that they glorified their decision after the war? The sources certainly have to be treated critically. Particularly striking in their statements is their apologetic and justifying style of reasoning. Diebold for example stated in his curriculum vitae:

“(…) Ich habe mir immer Mühe gegeben meine Pflicht zu erfüllen, tapfer zu sein vor dem Feinde, besorgt zu sein für meine mir unterstellten Männer. Ich glaubte durch gute Pflichterfüllung auch für unser Land Ehre einzulegen. (…)“333

Others like Hersche however, already glorified his decision during the war. In a letter to his daughter he assured her that everything was just fine:

“(…) Das Leben hier ist sehr interessant. Man sieht viele Soldaten, junge prachtvolle Menschen, die einen ausgezeichneten Eindruck machen und man kann es ihnen nicht genug danken, dass sie die Welt gegen die russische Tiere verteidigen. Überall wird tüchtig gearbeitet und die Menschen hier sind glücklich und zufrieden. Neulich war ein ziemlich starker Schneefall hier und am andern Tage, sah man französische Gefangene überall den Schnee wegschaffen. Lachend

332 Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 333 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618. 89

und mit einer Zigarette im Munde machten sie ihre Arbeit und sahen wohlgenährt und zufrieden aus. (…)“334

The vision of a Greater Germanic can be seen as a basis for their future decision making to join the Waffen-SS but it certainly was not the tipping point consideration. Hence, it can be assumed that the volunteers idealized their motivation in retrospect, as the dream of a new order certainly was not the reason for them to Switzerland. It can be concluded that the ideological committed Swiss volunteers were strongly influenced by the political discourse of National Socialism and that their desire for a new Europe facilitated their conscription to the Waffen-SS. Yet, it does not explain, why they were willing to risk their life in a war. Most of the Swiss volunteers certainly combined an ideological factor with self interest. Also, the decision making process was made step by step and as their political activities had negative effects on their life, the illegal border crossing became more and more attractive. The so far described considerations in their motivation certainly all contributed to their decision to leave Switzerland and to join the Waffen-SS. However, the crucial consideration and the straw to break the camel’s back certainly was opportunism.

4.4. Opportunism Even if the volunteers were driven by ideological commitment, the last decisive factor in the decision was an opportunistic consideration, either out of financial problems resulting out of the previous criminal prosecution because of political activities, career aspirations or finally simply because they believed that Germany certainly would win the war and they wanted to secure their place in the sun. Therefore, they considered to join from the beginning in order to avoid a loser position in the new Reich. Diebold justified his participation with the following words:

“(…) Es erübrigt sich bestimmt hier zu begründen was mich zur illegalen Ausreise nach Deutschland bewog, aber immerhin möchte ich feststellen, dass ich nie gegen meine Heimat agierte; im Gegenteil bin ich der Auffassung, dass ich für meine Heimat kämpfe, kein Landesverräter bin, wie das in der Schweiz ausgelegt wird.

334 Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an seine Tochter Brigitte, Berlin 13. Januar 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 90

Der Krieg ist heute eine europäische Angelegenheit und schlussendlich steht oder fällt die Schweiz mit dem Deutschen Reich. (…)“335

So, according Diebold’s understanding, Switzerland’s future and therefore his very own, were closely connected to Germany’s destiny. Schaeppi too was convinced that Germany will win the war:

“Das geeinte Europa unter dem Führer aller Germanen wird eines Tages doch den Sieg davontragen. Wir drohen nicht für diesen Zeitpunkt. Fest steht aber, dass die heutigen Machthaber sich einmal zu verantworten haben.“336

Another important consideration for the ideological committed volunteers was the adverse political climate in Switzerland and their legal prosecution by the authorities. They were monitored and prosecuted for their political activities which resulted in a loss of status. Diebold for example stated in his curriculum vitae for the Waffen-SS that he left Switzerland as a political refugee with the intention to join the Waffen-SS.337 In another curriculum vitae he explained his decision to leave Switzerland:

“(…) Meine politische Einstellung galt immer als sehr deutschfreundlich und ich war bis zuletzt Mitglied der Nationalen Gemeinschaft Schaffhausen. (…) Diese Einstellung trug mir beruflich und gesellschaftlich nur Nachteiliges ein und ich entschloss mich, um einer zweiten Verhaftung wegen „Nationalsozialistischer Propaganda“ und wegen Spionageverdacht zu Gunsten Deutschlands zu entgehen, am 11.3.42 die Landesgrenze illegal zu überschreiten um hier als Freiwilliger in der Waffen-SS Dienst zu leisten. (…)“338

Alfred Nikles too left Switzerland in order to avoid another arrest as of “Nachrichtendiest zu Deutschlands Gunsten”. Franz Riedweg supported Nikles application and stated that Nikles as a “Volksdeutsche” would fit perfectly in the

335 Brief von Paul Diebold an Herrn Dr. jur. Ferdinand Elsener, SS-Standortlazarett München-Dachau 21. Mai 1943, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 3148, C.29/A116-44.006. 336 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 337 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BArch RS A5475/1503. 338 Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Stuttgart 27. April 1942, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147 Dickten – Diekmeier. 91

“Totenkopf Verbände”.339 However, in the following it turned out that Nikles was militarily not enough qualified for a leading position in the army. Yet, because of his ideological commitment and excellent “Weltanschauung” it was decided to entrust him with the leading of the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart.340 It can be noted that the driving motivation for Nikles was to escape another prison sentence. However, he probably knew that in Germany his attitude would be appreciated. In a request for the “Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer”, Nikles described his political activities in Switzerland and complained about the resulting prosecution and justified his decision to leave Switzerland:

“(…) Nach einer Untersuchungshaft von 3 ½ Monaten wurde ich vorübergehend freigelassen, um dann durch das Schweizerische Bundesgericht zu 6 Monaten Gefängnis verurteilt zu werden. Dies war Juli/August 1939. Da zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon erkennbar war, dass ein Krieg in nächster Zeit ausbrechen werde, wollte ich nicht festgesetzt werden und überschritt schwarz die Grenze zum Reich. (…)“341

It has to be kept in mind that he most likely exaggerated his wish to join in the war, since the statement was taken out of his application for a military decoration. Once prosecuted it became more difficult for the volunteers to find a job and to make a decent living. Their reputation in society suffered under the accusations made by the authorities’. They were labeled Swiss Nazis and most of the people did not want to be associated with them. That in turn resulted in financial problems because they were not hired anymore or even fired. Heinrich Hersche complained in a letter to his friend Teuchgraber:

“(…) Wir Nationalisten aber wissen besser als alle Bundesräte und Parlamentarismus, dass es für uns doch ein Meinungsdelikt gib. Wir haben es

339 Gesuch des schweizerischen Oberleutnants d.R. Alfred Nikles um Aufnahme in die bewaffnete SS durch Franz Riedweg, Berlin 9. November 1939, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus. 340 Beurteilung von Nikles Alfred durch die Germanische Leitstelle, Berlin 25. November 1943, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 350 A) 350 – A, Niedra – Nikolaus. 341 Antrag von Alfred Nikles um den Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer an den Kommandeur des Ersatzkommando Frankreichs der Waffen-SS, Paris 5. Juli 1944, In: BArch SS Führerpersonalakten (SSO 147) 147 Dickten – Diekmeier. 92

erfahren müssen, dass wir bespitzelt und um unsere Existenz gebracht werden dürfen. (…)“342

Hersche stated that he lost his existence and his position within the army because of his political conviction. In a letter to Brüderlin, a friend and fellow volunteer, he stated that he felt that there was a targeted campaign directed against the nationalist officer corps and he suggested to fight back or to leave Switzerland.343 Thus, the threatened existence in Switzerland gave them reason to leave. All the more because they knew that in Nazi Germany they were desired and well respected man power. Also, they were all militarily well educated and mostly multilingual, whereby they could expect career opportunities. As was shown in chapter three, that assumption was clearly justified. Benno Schaeppi stated in a request for appeal in 1947 that he left because his existence was not secure as of his involvement in NS organizations.

“(…) bin am 1. April 1939 nach Deutschland übergesiedelt, weil ich in der Heimat keine ausreichende Existenz mehr finden konnte. (…)“344

Also, he answered the question on his motivation to leave Switzerland and to join the Waffen-SS in a radio interview the following:

“Oh, das ist sehr einfach zu erklären. Ich bin 1938, 39, wiederholt verhaftet worden wegen meiner politischen Betätigung, zunächst in der „Front“, später im „Bund treuer Eidgenossen nationalsozialistischer Weltanschauung (BTE)“ und vor allen Dingen auch wegen meiner Presseberichterstattung für deutsche Zeitungen. Diese Arbeit ist mir praktisch unmöglich gemacht worden, und da ich ja schliesslich keine Löffel stehlen konnte, um diese wieder zu verkaufen und davon zu leben, bin ich nach Deutschland gegangen.“345

342 Korrespondenz Heinrich Johann Hersche an Erich Teuchgraber aus der Postsperre, Polizeikommando Bern im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Thun 30. November 1939, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 343 Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an Artillerie Oberst Brüderlin, Basel 25. April 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 344 Revisionsgesuch des Bundesstrafgerichtsurteils vom 20. Dezember 1947 von Benno Schaeppi an den Präsidenten des Ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht Lausanne, Strafanstalt Regensburg Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 345 Schweizer in der Waffen-SS. Sendung von Hans-Rudolf Lehmann auf Radio DRS 1, 1977, In: AfZ Nachlass Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.5. Tätigkeit. 93

For Schaeppi, Büeler, Riedweg, Corrodi, Hersche and Schneider career considerations certainly played the decisive role. Riedweg stated in his postwar trial in Hiddesen, that he left Switzerland because of the adverse political climate, in which his ideas where condemned, whereas in Germany they were highly welcomed.346 Büeler too combined different aspects in his motivation to join the Waffen-SS. His prosecution was pivotal for him to leave. His sense for careerism and his intellect certainly told him, that in Switzerland his chances to achieve a respectable position in society were small. Some of them like Schaeppi and Büeler aspired more intellectual and political positions whilst others like Hersche, Corrodi and Maag longed for a military career. In Switzerland, their political convictions as well as their prosecution certainly were not promising traits for a career. Hence, an escape to Germany and the conscription to the Waffen-SS enabled them a career in a shiny uniform. The volunteers’ personal opportunism was mostly combined with the sense and frustration that the Swiss government was too weak and ignorant. In addition, they were frustrated that they were monitored whilst the so called Internationalists were allowed to go on with their conspiracy. According them, unlike Germany, Switzerland was too hesitant and tended to wait instead of acting. The government many times was justifying its passive role with the maintenance of the Swiss neutrality. Othmar Maag for example took on the government as following:

“(…) Und unsere Regierung hat nicht den Mut, gegen diese traurigen Gestalten aufzutreten, hat nicht den Mut, diese angegriffenen, vaterlandstreuen Offizieren zu schützen, nein, diese Regierung hilft dieser Saubande noch und führt ihren Willen aus. (...)“347

The personal statements that shed light on their motivation to join Switzerland clearly have to be treated critically. It is striking that they all justified their decision to leave Switzerland with heroic ideals. They felt that they had to reject the accusation of being “Landesverräter”. Therefore, the postwar punishment practice and societies perception on the Swiss volunteers is the central attention in the next chapter.

346 Urteil der 20. Spruchkammer des Spruchgerichts Hiddesen gegen Dr. med. Franz Riedweg, Hiddesen, 4. September 1948, In: AfZ Nachlas Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg. Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 347 Brief von Othmar Maag an Leutnant Fritz Steiner, Winterthur 21. August 1940, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 94

5. Postwar Punishment of the Swiss Volunteers

The assessment on postwar treatment of the Swiss volunteers offers enough material to be discussed in a thesis on its own. Therefore, only the most representative examples in the case study will be described. That is to say, cases who might epitomize the authorities’ attitude and the publics’ perception towards the Swiss volunteers. The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg declared the Waffen-SS a criminal organization due to evidence that it was responsible for war crimes. However, only the most responsible and higher ranking members were convicted. The Waffen-SS argued, that it was purely a military organization no different from any other component of the Wehrmacht and had no connection with the crimes committed by other branches of the SS. The prosecution at Nuremberg rejected this claim and concluded that the Waffen-SS was in theory and practice as much an integral part of the SS organization as any other branch of the SS. However, the proceedings were designed only to identify and condemn the organizations and the declaration of criminality did not empower the Tribunal to impose sentence upon them or to convict any individual merely because of membership. Members of the Waffen-SS had to be tried in separate trials before Allied military courts, by German denazification courts, or in their home countries.348 The involvement of Swiss citizens in the Waffen-SS put the Swiss authorities in a difficult situation, as they had to decide how to deal with the returning volunteers. Neulen remarked that the Swiss authorities decided on harsh sentences but only out of general policy considerations. He concluded that the stigmatization of some scapegoats in political trials served as a cover up for the economic collaboration of Switzerland with the Reich. Accordingly, the criminal law had to enhance the reputation of Switzerland.349 However, the Swiss reputation was not yet affected, since that discourse only came up in the 1970’s. Additionally, Switzerland already prosecuted members of NS organizations from 1940 on and expatriated Swiss, who collaborated with the Reich from May 1943. Altogether, thirty-three men were convicted to death sentences as of treason and espionage, whereof seventeen were executed between 1942 and 1944.350 Then again,

348 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 250f. 349 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 180. 350 Ibid., pp. 180. 95 the Swiss death sentenced, were not Waffen-SS members. Mertens agreed that the Swiss authorities decided on a harsh punishment of the returning volunteers. Nonetheless, he pointed out that their approach was not consequent, as the extradition of higher ranking volunteers was not requested actively. In contrary, the accused sometimes had to apply for the entry ban to be annulled several times, which Mertens interpreted as a “calculated action pattern” and labeled it “legal procrastination”.351 The intention of this chapter is to assess how the Swiss authorities judged on the returnees and on what legal base they convicted the volunteers. Therefore, the different legal violations will be addressed. The Swiss volunteers were not all judged on the same base or in the same court, since the authorities’ distinguished between the sole violation of military law or criminal law. The “common” Waffen-SS soldiers were mostly tried on the base of military law, whilst, the higher ranking Swiss were tried separately in criminal trials for endangerment of the Swiss neutrality and treason. Therefore, both trials will be addressed and elucidated with specific accounts. The criminal trials are represented by the cases of Riedweg, Büeler and Schaeppi as well as Nikles and Maag. The military courts will be described through the accounts of Hersche, Corrodi and Breitenmoser. The question whether the Swiss authorities imposed severe punishment is of crucial interest. Thus, it is necessary to put the findings into perspective. Hence, a comparison will be drawn in the conclusion to the punishment practice of other Germanic countries that had to deal with returning volunteers. Stein remarked that no study of the Waffen-SS would be complete without a close look at the question of its criminal activities.352 However, the criminal trials did not address the question of war crimes or criminal activities of the volunteers in the Waffen- SS. That is why one specific account of a potential Swiss war criminal will be introduced. Oertle addressed the question of war crimes committed by the Waffen-SS and stated that only a minority was involved in war crimes. He claimed that the relevance of the Waffen-SS lied in its involvement in the great battles in the defense of Hitler’s Europe. So, in regard of the Swiss volunteers, he assessed that they were rather committed soldiers than criminals, only fulfilling their duty as soldiers. He did not see the membership in the Waffen-SS as a sufficient factor for their conviction as criminals. According to his study, there was no single Swiss front-line soldier, who was involved in

351 Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 308, 310. 352 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 272. 96 violations of martial law.353 The assessment of Wipf Eugen’s case in this chapter however indicated, that Oertle once more chose for an excusing perspective. He claimed that Wipf only was guilty of crimes against humanity, which clearly had to be distinguished from war crimes, as Wipf had committed the crimes as a civilian.354 This chapter furthermore includes some newsletter articles, reporting on the case of Wipf Eugen, in order to approach Switzerland’s post war perception and how society reacted on the case of Wipf Eugen. Also, it has to be noted, that the Swiss volunteers were already convicted in absentia by various military trials beforehand, on the base of leaving the country illegally, and joining a foreign army. Moreover, the highly motivated Swiss right extremists mostly had left Switzerland exactly because of their prosecution based on their political activities in NS organizations. Therefore, there has to be a distinction between the political trials in the years of 1940 regarding political activity in the renewal movement, then in 1943 because of leaving the country illegally and eventual expatriation, and lastly the postwar trials from 1945 onward.

5.1. Main Legal Bases for the Verdicts The Swiss soldiers used to be famous in Europe for their military skills and were popular mercenaries. With the foundation of the federal state in 1948, the Swiss Federal Council started to increasingly restrict foreign military service. Ultimately, a new military law prohibited the foreign military service under penalty in 1927 and prohibited the involvement in foreign wars.355 The new military law of 1927, Article 94 “Eintritt in fremden Kriegsdienst” (admission into foreign military service) declared it a criminal act to join a foreign army, as well as the recruitment there for. The offence against the law was punished with a prison or penitentiary sentence of up to three years. This, however, did not apply to dual citizens, who lived in the country of the military service. This degree of penalty is comparable with offences such as theft according article 139 StGB, criminal property damage according article 144 StGB and evading payment of a bill according article 149 StGB, as well as physical injury resulting from negligence according article 125 StGB. These offences were all punished with a sentence

353 Oertle, Russland, pp. 451-456. 354 Ibid., pp. 456. 355 Eggenberger, P. (2012) “Ein düsteres Kapitel. Schweizer in der Waffen SS.“ In: Der Soldat, Nr. 4, Pages 46-47, here 46. 97 of maximum three years.356 The full article 94 of the „Militärstrafgesetz“, MStGB (military law) said:

„1. Der Schweizer, der ohne Erlaubnis des Bundesrates in fremden Militärdienst eintritt, wird mit Gefängnis bis zu drei Jahren oder Geldstrafe bestraft. 2. Der Schweizer, der noch eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt, im andern Staate niedergelassen ist und dort Militärdienst leistet, bleibt straflos. 3. Wer einen Schweizer für fremden Militärdienst anwirbt oder der Anwerbung Vorschub leistet, wird mit Gefängnis bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe nicht unter 30 Tagessätzen bestraft. 4. In Kriegszeiten kann auf Zuchthaus erkannt werden.“ 357

The article 94 MStGB was the main legal item used in the conviction of the Swiss volunteers. However, it was not the only offence for which they were sentenced. The charges included furthermore illegal border crossing as violation of the “Bundesratsbeschluss”, BRB (Swiss Federal Council decision) regarding “Teilweise Schliessung der Grenze” (partial closure of the border) of December 13, 1940 respectively September 25, 1942. The Swiss Federal Council decided to close the borders for the first time on September 26, 1938. It was decided that it was forbidden to cross the border alongside the official roads. The regulations were extended in 1940, declaring that the crossing of the border with evasion of the border control was to be punished with a prison sentence. Henceforth, the crossing of the border with horses, horse-drawn vehicles as well as motor vehicles became restricted.358 In addition, the Swiss Federal Council decided to expatriate Swiss citizens, who collaborated with the Reich on May 18, 1943.359 This resolution, however, only applied to Swiss citizens, who lived abroad and who committed crimes that compromised the Swiss neutrality or the country’s security. The resolution did not include the wife or

356 Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch vom 21. Dezember 1937 (Stand am 1. Januar 2014). Online: http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html [31.05.2014]. 357Militärstrafgesetz vom 13. Juli 1927 (Stand am 1. Januar 2014), Artikel 94. Online: http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19270018/201401010000/321.0.pdf [02.03.2014]. 358 Ludwig, C. (1966) Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz in den Jahren 1933 bis 1955. Bericht an den Bundesrat zuhanden der Eidgenössischen Räte. Bundeskanzlei: Bern, pp. 94, 187. 359 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 180. 98 children.360 The validity period of the resolution was designated for two years.361 However, it was prolonged in May 1945 for another two years and finally expired on May 18, 1947.362 The full article had the following wording:

“1. Das Schweizerbürgerrecht kann einem sich im Ausland aufhaltenden Schweizer, der sich, im Inland oder im Ausland, schwer gegen die Sicherheit oder die politische Unabhängigkeit des Landes vergangen und sich dadurch des Schweizerbürgerrechts unwürdig erwiesen hat, entzogen werden. Von dieser Massnahme werden die Ehefrau und die Kinder nicht betroffen, sofern der Entzug des Bürgerrechts nicht auch ihnen gegenüber ausdrücklich ausgesprochen wird. 2. Der Entscheid über den Entzug des Bürgerrechts steht dem eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartement zu. Zuvor ist die Stellungnahme des Heimatkantons einzuholen. 3. Der Entscheid wird dem Betroffenen, dem Heimatkanton und der Heimatgemeinde eröffnet. Wo die Zustellung an den Betroffenen durch das schweizerische Konsulat nicht möglich ist, wird das Dispositiv des Entscheides im Bundesblatt und im Amtsblatt des Heimatkantons veröffentlicht.“363

By the end of 1943, only four Swiss citizens had been expatriated, whereof two had served in the Waffen-SS. Twenty cases were still pending, amongst them Benno Schaeppi and Alfred Nikles.364 Oertle concluded that in total forty-nine men and two women were expatriated until May 1947. He furthermore summarized that ten of those men were additionally sentenced to death in absentia. Yet, none of the death sentenced had been member of the Waffen-SS.365 The Swiss volunteers were mostly judged upon military law. However, it mattered whether they had engaged actively in ideological functions or not. The volunteers, who were solely seen as soldiers were sentenced by military trials, where consideration of

360 Bundesratsbeschluss über Ausbürgerung, gestützt auf Art. 3 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 30. August 1939 über Massnahmen zum Schutze des Landes und zur Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität, Bern 18.Mai, 1943 In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2. 361 Bundesratsbeschluss über Ausbürgerung, gestützt auf Art. 3 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 30. August 1939 über Massnahmen zum Schutze des Landes und zur Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität, Bern 18.Mai 1943, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2. 362 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 489. 363 Bundesratsbeschluss über Ausbürgerung, gestützt auf Art. 3 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 30. August 1939 über Massnahmen zum Schutze des Landes und zur Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität, Bern 18.Mai 1943, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2. 364 Übersicht über den Stand der Ausbürgerungsfälle auf 1. November 1943, Bern 1. November 1943, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2. 365 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 495. 99 military nature played a decisive role. The offences included “Ungehorsam gegen allgemeine Anordnung” (disobedience of general ordinance), Article 107 MStGB, “Schwächung der Wehrkraft” (weakening of the military strength), “Dienstverletzung” (violations of service regulations) according article 72 MStGB, as well as “Dienstversäumnis” (negligence of duty) according article 82 MStGB.366 The higher ranking Swiss volunteers, in so far as they were involved in ideological functions in the Third Reich, were seen as traitors of the country and were considered to have endangered the Swiss neutrality. These men were judged on different legal bases, namely on article 266 “Strafgesetzbuch”, StGB (criminal law) “Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossenschaft” (Attack on the independence of the Swiss Confederation) and “Landesverrat” (treason):367

“(Abs. 1) Wer eine Handlung vornimmt, die darauf gerichtet ist, die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossenschaft zu verletzen oder zu gefährden (Abs. 2) insbesondere eine die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossenschaft gefährdende Einmischung einer fremden Macht in die Angelegenheit der Eidgenossenschaft herbeizuführen (Abs. 3), wird mit einer Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter einem Jahr bestraft.368

The charges furthermore included Staatsgefährliche Unternehmen“ (subversive actions) according article 1, paragraph. 1 and 2, „Datenschutzverordnung“ (data protection ordinance), DSchV I and DSchV II:369

„Nach Artikel 1 des BRB vom 5. Dezember 1938 betreffend Massnahmen gegen staatsgefährliche Umtriebe und zum Schutze der Demokratie ist strafbar, wer es unternimmt, die verfassungsmässige Ordnung der Eidgenossenschaft oder der Kantone rechtswidrig beseitigen oder zu gefährden (Abs. 1), wer insbesondere

366 Anklageschrift Divisionsgericht 7A von Huber Hermann, St. Gallen 5. Juli 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333. 367 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 368 Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch vom 21. Dezember 1937 (Stand 1. Januar 2014), Artikel 266. Online: http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19370083/index.htm [25.02.2014]. 369 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 100

einer Propaganda des Auslandes Vorschub leistet, die auf die Änderung der politischen Einrichtungen der Schweiz abzielt (Abs. 2).

The article was replaced with the article 1 of the BRB of February 27, 1945 “betreffend Massnahmen zum Schutze der verfassungsmässigen Ordnung und die Aufhebung der Parteiverbote“ (sanctions for the protection of the constitutional order and the suspension of the party ban), DSchV II:370

„Darnach wird bestraft, wer eine Handlung vornimmt, die darauf gerichtet ist, die verfassungsmässige Ordnung der Eidgenossenschaft oder der Kantone in rechtswidriger Weise zu ändern oder zu gefährden (Abs. 1), wer eine Propaganda betreibt, die darauf gerichtet ist, die verfassungsmässige Ordnung der Eidgenossenschaft oder der Kantone in rechtswidriger Weise zu ändern oder zu gefährden (Abs. 2), oder wer einer so gearteten Propaganda, insbesondere des Auslandes , Vorschub leistet (Abs. 3).

Yet, since the violations were committed before 1945, both of the articles were applied in court. The third base of the verdict was: „Beteiligung an einer rechtswidrigen Vereinigung” (involvement in an illegal association) according article 275 StGB“:371

„Nach Art. 275 StGB ist strafbar, wer eine Vereinigung gründet, die bezweckt oder deren Tätigkeit darauf gerichtet ist, unter Art. 266 StGB fallende Handlungen vorzunehmen, ferner wer einer solchen Vereinigung beitritt oder sich an ihren Bestrebungen beteiligt oder wer zur Bildung solcher Vereinigungen auffordert oder deren Weisungen befolgt.“372

Article 275 StGB was applied to the Swiss volunteers who were engaged in the „Germanische SS-Sturmbanne Schweiz“, or in the NS organizations in Switzerland.

370 Art. 1, Abs. 1 und 2, DSchV I and DSchV II. Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 371 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 372 Art. 275 StGB. Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 101

Additionally, they were convicted for “Verbotener Nachrichtendienst” according article 272 StGB:373

“1. Wer im Interesse eines fremden Staats oder einer ausländischen Partei oder einer anderen Organisation des Auslandes zum Nachteil der Schweiz oder ihren Angehörigen, Einwohner oder Organisationen politischen Nachrichtendienst betreibt oder einen solchen Dienst einrichtet, wer für solchen Dienst anwirbt oder ihnen Vorschub leistet wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder Geldstrafe bestraft. 2. In schweren Fällen ist die Strafe Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter einem Jahr. Als schwerer Fall gilt es insbesondere, wenn der Täter zu Handlungen aufreizt oder falsche Berichte erstattet, die geeignet sind, die innere oder äussere Sicherheit der Eidgenossenschaft zu gefährden.”374

5.2. Military Court Sentences Swiss volunteers who had not engaged actively in NS organizations in Germany were accused by the Swiss military courts “Divisionsgericht” or “Territorialgericht”, both belonging to the military judicature. The military courts did not deal with the political and ideological dimension of the crimes committed by joining the Waffen-SS, but concentrated merely on the deeds that had violated existing military law. The sole membership in the Waffen-SS was not perceived as a threat against the neutrality, but as an offence against military law and therefore judged differently. François Wisard remarked in his biography on Eugen Corrodi, that the volunteers who were not engaged in political functions were sentenced at most to three years in prison, which was the maximum penalty for foreign military service.375 Reichlin claimed that the Swiss volunteers mostly received a penalty between fifteen and eighteen months in prison.376 Oertle estimated that the majority was sentenced between one and two years in prison.377

373 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 374 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 375 Wisard 1999, Major biennois, pp. 71. 376 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 242. 377 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 518. 102

As previously mentioned, all the volunteers were already sentenced before the end of the war. Therefore, the returnees most of the time had to serve their sentences immediately after their return to Switzerland. Aichle for example, was convicted by a military court to eighteen months in prison in 1942 and had to serve that sentence in the prison of St. Gallen immediately after his return.378 Whilst serving his sentence, he was often surveyed by the police of the SBA regarding other Swiss volunteers and his involvement in espionage activities.379 Dr. Brüderlin was sentenced to four years in prison by the military court “Territorialgericht 3A” in July 1943. He too had to serve the sentence immediately in 1946.380 However, in some cases, the situation had to be validated once more, as the volunteers did not accept their punishment and appealed. Heinrich Hersche for instance, was taken POW by the Americans in May 1945, and in the following imprisoned in fourteen different camps. After two years in captivity, the Americans released him, because of his severe tuberculosis and because the German civilian courts handling denazification were not interested in the case Hersche. Hence, Hersche reported to the Swiss embassy in Munich, expressing his wish to return to Switzerland. He appealed against his verdict imposed by the “Territorialgericht 2B” of October 1943, as it was unjustified according to his opinion. The verdict worded as follow: three years in prison, suspension of active civil rights for five years, exclusion from the Swiss army and degradation of his rank as major.381 Although the Swiss authorities had known that Hersche was a POW, they refused to file an extradition request, since they were not interested in his criminal prosecution. Thus, Hersche returned on his own initiative in September 1947 and was put in prison immediately thereafter. After his return, Hersche asked for a revision of his case, so that the military court “Divisionsgericht 7A” in St. Gallen had to roll up his indictment.382 The trial finally took place in the courthouse of St. Gallen on November 29, 1947. The court found Hersche guilty and sentenced him to twelve months in prison with the suspension of active civil rights for two years, based on foreign military service and the disobeying

378 Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192. 379 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, St. Gallen 6. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192. 380 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Hohl, Bern 3. Juli 1944, In: BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933. 381 Abhörungsprotokoll des Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 382 Bericht des eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter der Militärjustiz der Schweizerischen Armee an Herrn Dr. Lüthy der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 1. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 103 of general orders. Yet, he was allowed to keep his military rank as a major, because he had been declared unfit for service in 1939.383 The military court decided that Hersche’s involvement in Hitler’s Germany was solely of military nature. It came to this conclusion, by acknowledging that Hersche was not involved in any party activities in Germany, that he was not sworn in and that he had declared upon oath that he would not fight against Switzerland. Mitigating factors furthermore were his good reputation, that he had not been previously convicted, as well as his excellent military qualifications. The court additionally acknowledged that Hersche was denied military service in Switzerland, although he had assigned for it various times after his forced retirement. Also, his financial problems were accredited as mitigating factor.384 Next to his military trial, the SBA had initiated a federal criminal procedure based on “landesverräterische Umtriebe” (treasonable activities). Yet, they decided to drop the charges as of a lack of proof. Although the authorities acknowledged Hersche’s NS worldview, his relation to the SS-HA, and his involvement in ideological training courses in Sennheim, they nonetheless rejected further prosecution.385 The SBA concluded, that there was no proof that Hersche indeed had entertained closer contacts to the SS-HA, although Büeler had confirmed in his interrogation on the person of Hersche, that he indeed had attended meetings in the SS-HA, but that he had distanced himself from further political activities.386 Also, Hersche’s pension of the “Eidgenössische Versicherungskasse” (Federal Insurance Fund) was denied exactly because of the fact that Hersche as SS-Standartenführer certainly was involved in ideological training of his regiment and therefore had acted against the neutrality of Switzerland.387 The public reacted outraged that Hersche had the insolence to ask for a pension and all the major newspapers discussed this in length, condemning him as a Nazi and traitor of his

383 Bericht des eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter der Militärjustiz der Schweizerischen Armee an Herrn Dr. Lüthy der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 1. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 384 Urteil des Divisionsgericht 7A, St. Gallen 29. November 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02- 1562. 385 Verfügung der Bundesanwaltschaft über Rücktritt von der Verfolgung im Bundesstrafverfahren gegen Hersche Heinrich, der Stellvertreter des Bundesanwaltes Lüthi, Bern 24. Februar 1948, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 386 Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend Heinrich Hersche durch den Eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter O. Gloor, Zürich 3. November 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 387 Stellungnahme des Stellvertreters des Bundesanwaltes an die Eidgenössische Justizabteilung, Bern 6. Dezember 1948, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 104 country.388 Hersche’s justification of having insisted not to be forced to act against his country, his refusal to join NS organizations in Germany and his high military rank obviously were reason enough to spare him of further criminal prosecution. The case Hersche is indeed an inconsistent one, since it seems that the authorities themselves were not sure how to proceed with him. On one hand, they knew about the person of Hersche and they knew that he was a high ranking Swiss Waffen-SS member, who was on the list for potential leaders for Switzerland in the new Reich and who was tasked with the training of volunteers. On the other hand, they refused to request his extradition from the Americans whilst he still was a POW. Furthermore, he was wanted in Switzerland for “Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit” which entailed a political dimension of crime.389 Yet, the criminal prosecution was rejected and he only had to stand trial in front of a military court, where he received a lower penalty in comparison to his previous one and other high ranking Swiss volunteers. Corrodi is another higher ranking volunteer who was only sentenced based on military offences. Prior to his return to Switzerland, Corrodi was convicted in absentia by the military court “Territorialgericht 2A” to three years in prison, degradation of his military rank, expulsion from the army and suspension of active civil rights for ten years in December 1943. The sentence was based on violations of military secrets, violations of official instructions and incitement of these violations. The same court convicted him once more in absentia in April 1945 for an additional sentence of two years in prison because of foreign military service. Hence, Corrodi had to serve a sentence of five years in total. Corrodi returned to Switzerland in Mai 1945 and since he had not been expatriated, his return was not denied. He was immediately arrested and jailed but he appealed against the verdicts.390 After his request of revision, the previous two sentences were reversed and a new court proceeding was initiated. The “Territorialgericht 2A” finally sentenced him to thirty months in prison, degradation of his military rank, expulsion from the army and suspension of active civil rights for five years in December 1945. The sentence was based on foreign military service, noncompliance of military orders as well as

388 Zeitungsartikel, Aus dem Bundesgericht. Der Nazi und sein Pensionsanspruch, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 2503, 21. November 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562. 389 Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das eidgenössische Politische Departement, Politische Angelegenheiten, Bern 4. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02- 1562. 390 Bericht an die Redaktion des Landboten, Verfasser unbekannt, Bern Oktober 1948, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753. 105 disobedience of general orders. The accusation of espionage was considered not proven. Corrodi started serving his sentence immediately after the trial in the prison Witzwil in Bern.391 However, he still did not agree with the sentence and asked for a conditional release in December 1946. The Swiss army department dismissed his request on the grounds of “Zweifel am Wohlverhalten des Verurteilten” (doubt on the good conduct of the convicted in society). Corrodi was persistent and asked for conditional release once more in April 1947, which was again dismissed, this time definitely. Corrodi was finally released in November 1947.392 It is striking that two such high ranking Swiss volunteers were not indicted by a criminal court and that their revalidated sentences were lower than the previous ones. It was expected, that the higher ranking volunteers, engaging in NS organizations in Switzerland prior to their escape and involved in the training of volunteers, would have been accused of treason and therefore sentenced harsher. An explanation could be that their high Swiss military rank and their refusal to participate in NS organizations protected them, since they were solely perceived as soldiers. The case of Breitenmoser supports this presumption. On May 2, 1945 Breitenmoser and his company were taken prisoner by the Russians whilst defending Berlin. He initially was interned in a camp in Berdychiv, Ukraine. Thereafter, he was transferred to a transit camp in Odessa. He managed to flee in July 1950 and returned to Switzerland on an adventurous way home.393 Breitenmoser surrendered to the police in Buchs, St. Gallen in August 1950. Thereafter, he spent ten days in military jail. He was interrogated by the police and he reported that he had suffered under harsh interrogations and physical abuse during his detention in the Russian POW camp. The police interrogation did not focus on his deeds in the Waffen-SS, but on his time and experiences in the Russian POW camp. After the police made sure that Breitenmoser was not “infected” by Communism, their tone in the interrogation changed considerably, insinuating sympathy and understanding. They described Breitenmoser’s experiences with the following words:

391 Bericht an die Redaktion des Landboten, Verfasser unbekannt, Bern Oktober 1948, In: BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753. 392 Bericht des Bundesrates betreffend Beschwerde von Corrodi gegen eine Verfügung des Eidgenössischen Militärdepartements betreffend bedingte Entlassung, Bern 3. Juni 1947, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1832 105, C.08.15. 393 Aussage Josef Breitenmoser vorgeführt in der Kantonalen Strafanstalt Saxerriet, Saxerriet 18. Januar 1951, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124. 106

“(...) Seine Erlebnisse in der Russischen Kriegsgefangenschaft und die Flucht aus derselben würden ein ganzes Buch füllen. Trotzdem seine Darstellung über die Flucht aus dem Gefangenenlager in Odessa, den Fluchtweg, die erlittenen Strapazen und überwundenen Hindernissen fast unglaublich klingt, darf ihr m.E [meines Erachtens] Glauben geschenkt werden. Die teilweise unmenschliche Behandlung in der Gefangenschaft, das Ungewisse über den Zeitpunkt der Entlassung und der Drang, nach mehr als 5-jähriger Gefangenschaft endlich wieder Mensch zu sein, dürfte ihm und seinem Kameraden den Willen und die Ausdauer gegeben haben alles zu versuchen, um durchzukommen. (…)“394

Breitenmoser was already sentenced to three years in prison in absentia in 1943, because of foreign military service and “Ungehorsam gegen allgemeine Anordnung”.395 After his return to Switzerland, he appealed against the sentence.396 Breitenmoser finally stood trial in the military court “Divisionsgericht 7a” on November 10, 1950. He was sentenced to one year in prison without probation. His military defense lawyer Mr. Baumgartner however, intended to request for a pardon after a couple of months.397 Hence, Breitenmoser’s sentence too was lowered after his return. It is striking that the post war military court sentences were lower than the previous ones. It appears that a strong sense for soldiership and heroism was a mitigating factor for the military courts. However, the Swiss volunteers received similar high sentences in comparison to other Germanic countries. Neulen concluded that almost all the countries decided on a severe punishment. However, there were differences. The Netherlands had introduced two new criminal acts reactively and special courts were dealing with the returnees, collaborators and war criminals. Waffen-SS volunteers received mostly prison sentences between four to eight years and some of them were expatriated. However, expatriated Dutch had the possibility of reintegration after 1951. War criminals and collaborators received sentences between five and ten years.398

394 Bericht des Spezialdienstes der Kantonspolizei St. Gallen an das Kantonale Polizeikommando, 19. St. Gallen, 19. Januar 1951, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124. 395 Schreiben des Polizeikommandos des Kantons St. Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 14. August 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124. 396 Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1950, In: BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124. 397 Notiz vom Adjunkt der Kantonalen Fremdenpolizei Herr Baumgartner an den Spezialdienst des Polizeikommandos St. Gallen Herr Rüthemann, 11. Januar 1951, In: E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116- 43.124. 398 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 65f. 107

The Belgium authorities initially were stricter. The volunteers for the most part received lifelong prison sentences or were executed by shooting. Even “simple” volunteers received the maximum penalties. Yet, the prisoners were released mostly after a short time. So the Flemish authorities decided on extreme harsh sentences that were not executed accordingly.399 Differently in France, where a surge of retaliation was practiced including extrajudicial killings and illegal revenge methods. For many returnees the only solution was the escape into the Foreign Legion.400 Denmark too had a strong legal response and added supplementary provisions to the legal code, and reintroduced the death penalty. The volunteers mostly received a prison sentence between two and five years, depending on their Waffen-SS rank. Yet, most of them were released after halftime of their sentence.401 Norway also practiced a cleansing justice, by imposing prison sentences between seven to eight years for the volunteers of the first days. The later volunteers received lower prison sentences between three to four years varying on their period of service. The Norwegian Waffen-SS members were tried for treason but never for war crimes. Many volunteers lost their civic rights and the death penalty was reintroduced. However, a decree was established in 1948 that allowed the prisoners to remit their sentences after having served half of it.402 Sweden, the only independent country in the comparison, interestingly did not impose any legal sanctions nor did they criminalize the volunteers.403 The Swedish volunteers were admittedly not very numerous. Guttmann estimated a number of 300 Swedish volunteers in the Waffen-SS. He explained this low number with the great difficulty of border crossing to Norway or Finland without being caught by the border police, rather than a lack of interest for the service in the Waffen-SS. He estimated that there was no doubt a higher number of aborted crossings by potential volunteers.404 Sweden is the only neutral country in comparison and had a remarkable different postwar punishment practice than Switzerland, since they had none.

399 Ibid., pp. 78f. 400 Ibid., pp. 112f. 401 Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 147. 402 Ibid., pp. 160. 403 Ibid., pp. 167. 404 Guttmann 2014, Myth, pp. 590. 108

5.3. Treason Trial: Riedweg and Seventeen Co-Defendants Swiss citizens who had endangered the Swiss neutrality, who were involved in espionage activities or who were engaged ideologically in the Third Reich were prosecuted by criminal trials. The proceedings were mainly about involvement in foreign agencies, parties or organizations that intervened in the internal affairs of Switzerland.405 However, there was a differentiation, as some crimes were perceived as especially grave. These crimes were judged in treason trials through Federal criminal courts. In total, six treason trials were conducted between 1946 und 1948. However, only one treason trial was directed against Swiss Waffen-SS members. The Swiss Federal Council decided to conduct criminal procedures against former Swiss military and civil staff members of the SS-HA in July 1945.406 The proceedings were directed against Franz Riedweg and seventeen other higher ranking Swiss Waffen- SS volunteers, amongst them Büeler and Schaeppi. They were standing trial in the Federal Criminal Court, which took place in the former city hall in Lucerne from the 4th until the 20th of December 1947.407 The court was mainly interested in Nazi Germany’s future plans to annex Switzerland and the role the higher ranking Swiss volunteers played therein. The indictment was based on attack on the independence of the Swiss Confederation, subversive undertaking, establishment of an illegal association, illegal intelligence service as well as foreign military service. Thereby, the SS-HA, the GL and its Swiss “Referat” as well as the Panoramaheim received special attention in the hearings.408 Not all the accused appeared in court. Some of them were indisposed because they were still in Allied war captivity, others simply decided to stay in Germany in order to elude penitentiary. Most of the accused were already expatriated beforehand and therefore they encountered difficulties to return to Switzerland. Ultimately, the Federal Criminal Court sentenced them all to long prison terms.409 Franz Riedweg was the main defendant in the trial. Yet, he did not appear in court, since he was a witness in Gottlob Berger’s trial in Nuremberg at the same time. Riedweg

405 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 501. 406 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Verfahren gegen nationalsozialistische Schweizer wegen Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossen, 30. November 1948, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945. 407 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 520. 408 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 409 Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 520f. 109 initially intended to appear in court to justify himself.410 However, at first, he was denied entry into the country because of his expatriation. After the Swiss authorities lifted the entry ban, Riedweg in the meantime had changed his mind and refused to attend the hearings after all.411 His lawyer Dr. Korner apparently had advised him to stay away from the trial because he expected a harsh verdict and severe punishment.412 It can be assumed that Dr. Korner had given him this advice, in order to retain the possibility for an appeal, which was only likely in case Riedweg could prove that he could not attend. Riedweg furthermore profited from the fact that the SBA and the chief prosecutor were not interested in Riedweg’s presence in court after all. Ultimately, the British authorities demanded an extradition request by the Swiss Federal Justice Department. Because the Swiss authorities were not interested in the appearance of Riedweg, an extradition request was never submitted.413 Riedweg was sentenced in absentia to sixteen years in prison, as he was the “Stabsführer” of the GL and therefore able to influence Himmler’s plans for Switzerland within the Greater Germanic Reich. The judges convicted him because of his decisive role in the future annexation plans, as well as for a takeover of National Socialism in Switzerland. Riedweg had ordered Büeler to set up a Swiss SS, as basis for the new order in Switzerland, and he founded the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart as collection point, recruitment site, as well as intelligent service headquarter.414 In addition, Riedweg stood trial in a denazification court in Hiddesen near Bielefeld, the same year he was supposed to appear in court in Switzerland. That court concluded that Riedweg was well aware of the criminal character of the SS and that he had been informed about the murder of the Jews. However, he was not sentenced to prison but only convicted for a penalty of 2000 DM, which he never had to pay, since it had been settled with his previous detention.415 The court justified the mild verdict with the fact that Riedweg had supported Germany’s struggle in times of need and as a result

410 Brief von Franz Riedweg an das Schweizerische Generalkonsulat, Nürnberg 4. April 1947, In: BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 176. 411 Rechtsanwalt Dr. Siegfried Wille an das Schweizerische Generalkonsulat, München 30. August 1947, In: BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 176. 412 Brief des Generalkonsulates an das Eidgenössisch Politische Departement für juristische Angelegenheiten, München 9. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 176. 413 Aktennotiz Schweizerisches Generalkonsulat, München 9. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 176. 414 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 415 Urteil im Spruchgerichtsverfahren Franz Riedweg durch das Spruchgericht Hiddesen, Hiddesen 20. Juni 1948, In: AfZ Nachlass Riedweg Franz, 3. Personalakten Franz Riedweg, Nürnberger Dokumente und Akten aus Riedwegs Privatarchiv (1938-1948). 110 lost his Swiss citizenship.416 After the trial, Riedweg decided to stay in Germany, because he was expatriated in Switzerland and in possession of the German citizenship. Moreover, the German verdict was way lower than the Swiss one. Heinrich Büeler was accused on the same base like Riedweg and was finally sentenced to eight years in prison by the same court. Büeler returned to Switzerland on his own initiative in order to confront the authorities and clear his name. Initially, his return was denied in July 1945 because of his expatriation. He appealed against his expatriation, which was denied. He finally returned to Switzerland in October 1946. Hence, Büeler had taken quite some efforts to return to Switzerland.417 The Federal Criminal Court in Lucerne decided that Büeler was guilty of treason, as he had engaged in the ideological training of a French battalion, and since he was the leader of the Panoramaheim for several weeks. The judges furthermore labeled him as Riedweg’s right hand, being charged with press and propaganda matters in the GL, as well as entrusted with the support, care and recruitment of Germanic volunteers. Also, he had acted against the Swiss neutrality by preparing the National Socialist takeover in Switzerland.418 Additional to the sentence imposed by the Federal Criminal Court, he also had to serve the sentence of four years, which he had received in absentia in March 1944. Büeler served his sentence in the prison of Regensdorf in Zürich and was released in 1954. Thereafter he moved to Germany.419 Schaeppi was the fifth accused in the Federal Criminal court. However, he was unable to attend, as he was still a POW. Schaeppi was already expatriated in 1943. Like Riedweg, Schaeppi was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. He was found guilty because of his front duty, as well as his activities as war correspondent and his function as Panoramaheim leader. He had actively tried to convince Swiss men to join the Waffen-SS, rather than to volunteer for work. Moreover, he had influenced and trained the volunteers in Sennheim ideologically. Furthermore, Schaeppi, like Büeler, worked in the GL for several months, tasked with press and propaganda matters and he was involved in the attempt to found a Germanic SS-Schweiz. The main reason for his high sentence however, was his espionage activity for the SD in Stuttgart, functioning as a

416 Zeitungsartikel, Mitleid mit einem Hochverräter, In: Der Tagesspiegel, Nr. 1127, 26. Juni 1949, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 417 Curriculum Vitae Heinrich Büeler, Regensdorf 6. Juni 1951, In: AfZ Nachlass Heinrich Büeler, Biographische Materialien, 1.2. Lebenslauf. 418 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419. 419 Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 214. 111 courier between NS organizations in Switzerland and Germany.420 Schaeppi returned to Switzerland after the trial, with the intention to appeal. Yet, he had to serve his sentence imposed by the Federal Criminal Court as well as his previous sentence of four years imposed by a military court. Schaeppi was released in 1956. After his release he decided to live in Germany and Paris.421 The trial attracted a lot of media attention. All the newspapers in Switzerland were reporting in a harsh and denouncing manner, calling them disloyal and treacherous Swiss Nazis.422 Other Swiss volunteers were not involved in the treason trial but still convicted on the base of treason. Not unlike the others, Maag was also already sentenced to three years in prison in absentia in May 1943. The military court “Territorialgericht 3A” based the sentence on foreign military service, disobedience of general orders and noncompliance of military regulations. In addition, his rank of lieutenant was revoked and he was expelled from the Swiss army. His case was once more judged by the federal criminal court in March 1944 and he was sentenced in absentia to another three years in prison, based on attack of the independence and “Zuwiderhandlung” against article 1 of the BRB of December 5, 1938 regarding “Massnahmen gegen staatsgefährliche Umtriebe und zum Schutze der Demokratie” (measures against activities that endanger the state and protection of the Democracy). Maag was expatriated in 1943.423 His father had appealed against that decision, stating that the expatriation of his son could not be based on a political disagreement and that his son definitely was not guilty of treason. The Federal Council rejected the complaint in May 1945.424 Thus, Maag had to serve his sentence of two times three years in prison after his return to Switzerland. He started his first sentence imposed by the federal criminal court in September 1945 and was released in September 1947, because of his good behavior, as well as his promise that he would never engage in political activities again.425 Thereafter, he started his second sentence pronounced by the military court, in the

420 Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947, In: BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713. 421 Biographie Benno Schaeppi, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Nachlass von Benno H. Schaeppi, 2.1. Biographie 422 Zeitungsartikel, Schweizer SS Leute verurteilt, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 104, 29. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. Zeitungsartikel, Mitleid mit einem Hochverräter, In: Der Tagesspiegel, Nr. 1127, 26. Juni 1949, In: E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch. 423 Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates bezüglich Othmar Maag, Bern 1. Mai 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 424 Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates bezüglich Othmar Maag, Bern 1. Mai 1945, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 425 Die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an den Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartementes, Bern 29. August 1947, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 112 prison Regensdorf in September 1947 and was once more released on parole for good behavior in September 1949.426 Since Maag had lost the Swiss citizenship, it can be assumed that he had to leave the country after having served his prison sentences. Unfortunately the sources do not tell where Maag went thereafter but it can be assumed that he went to Germany. One can wonder why Maag returned to Switzerland anyway, since he would have escaped a conviction in Germany. It can be assumed that he returned because of his family. After all, his father campaigned strongly for the revision of his expatriation. Riedweg, Büeler, Schaeppi and presumably Maag were certainly not the only Swiss volunteers who chose to move away from Switzerland and settle in Germany. There were other Swiss volunteers who did not return to Switzerland, since they expected harsh punishment. In Germany they did not have to fear legal prosecution, since, the sole membership in the Waffen-SS was not punished unless they were involved in war crimes427. Alfred Nikles, for example, was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison and a fine of 200 Swiss Francs in 1943 because of continuing weakening of the military strength. He furthermore lost his civil rights for five years.428 The Swiss Justice and Police department stated in a final report in 1946, that they did not know where Nikles was. The Swiss authorities assumed that he was in Allied war captivity. They only found out about the grave violations Nikles committed in Sennheim because returning Swiss volunteers mentioned him in their interrogations. Hereafter he was expatriated in November 1946.429 The analysis on the criminal trial indicates that some volunteers were sentenced exceptionally harsh. However, the trials only dealt with activities that had violated Swiss law and endangered the Swiss neutrality. Mostly, the crimes committed in the Waffen-SS were not subject of the proceedings. The authorities at that time were often very unaware of the war crimes committed at the Eastern Europe. However, there are rare

426 Bedingte Entlassung Othmar Maag, Eidgenössisches Militärdepartement, Bern 29. Juli 1949, In: BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358. 427 The occupation powers USA, England, France and Russia had installed the “Kontrollratsgesetz” as a legal base for postwar Germany from 1945-1948. However, in 1946 they recommended the establishment of a new German court for the trial of German war criminals. Members of the Waffen-SS who were not involved in war crimes were not tried. Broszat, M (1981) “Siegerjustiz oder Strafrechtliche Selbstreinigung. Aspekte der Vergangenheitsbewältigung der Deutschen Justiz während der Besatzungszeit 1945-1949“, In: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 29(4), Pages 477-544, here 480. 428 Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. 429 Entwurf Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement, Bern 30. November 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511. 113 cases where the authorities had to assess potential war crimes. This is especially true for the case of Eugen Wipf, who was convicted in Switzerland’s only war crime trial.

5.4. The Swiss War Crime Trial: Stating an Example on Wipf Eugen The indictment of Swiss volunteers who were said to have committed war crimes in the service of the Waffen-SS posed a number of problems for the Swiss courts. The term war crimes did not exist in Swiss law and the authorities had to consider whether the Swiss courts should bring Swiss citizens to trial, who had committed crimes outside the country. Furthermore, they had to reflect on whether the Swiss courts should be responsible for the indictment of criminal military acts committed in a foreign military service.430 The most famous case of such a trial was the inglorious case of Eugen Wipf (12 December 1916, Zürich). He became known in Switzerland as the Swiss war criminal “par excellence”. Wipf was imprisoned as a civilian in the SS-Sonderlager Hinzert in Tier,431 where he managed to get promoted “Oberkapo”. Thereafter he was enrolled in the “SS-Sonderstab Dirlewanger”, as SS-Unterscharführer.432 Wipf came from a simple background. His father was farmer and the family Wipf had a low income. Wipf himself worked as laborer and blacksmith and later on served in the army, where he signed up for voluntary Image 7 Wipf Eugen leaving the Court in 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 border service. Wipf was a notorious drinker and came 1571, B.53.31.11 into contact with the law several times, because of theft and alcoholism. After escaping the military prison, where he was imprisoned for violation of the military discipline, he

430 Bericht des Oberauditors in der Verwaltung der Militärjustiz im Eidgenössischen Militärdepartements an das Eidgenössische Justiz- und Militärdepartement, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: BAR E4110 A 1000/1831 1372, F.07. 431 The SS Sonderlager Hinzert was a German concentration and detention camp in Trier. It existed with various changes of function between 1939 until 1945. Homepage Gedenkstätte SS Sonderlager/KZ Hinzert. Online: http://www.gedenkstaette-hinzert-rlp.de/ [18.05.2014] 432 Schneider, V. (2003) „Oberkapo Wipf. Ein Scheusal in Menschengestalt. Zu einem KZ Verfahren in der Schweiz im Zusammenhang mit dem ehemaligen Konzertrationslager „SS Sonderlager Hinzert“.“ In: Online Publikation. Pages 1-132: http://www.gymherm.de/web/07_angebote/Projekte/hinzert/downloads_hinzert/OberkapoWipf.pdf [15.12.2013]. 114 left Switzerland illegally in August 1940. Wipf stated in the interrogation by the SBA, that his escape to Germany had nothing to do with ideological commitment and that he never engaged in a political organization in Switzerland. He simply escaped because he did not see any other solution to avoid criminal prosecution by the Swiss army.433 After crossing the border, Wipf was arrested by the Gestapo and brought to the Panoramaheim, where he assigned to labor service. However, he was still an alcoholic and therefore not a reliable worker. Consequently, he was arrested several times by the Gestapo and finally, after complaining about Nazi Germany in public in a drunken state, he was imprisoned in the SS-Sonderlager Hinzert in 1941. After some time, Wipf managed to get a confidential post, as of his good conduct. He was promoted “Oberkapo” in mid 1942.434 His duty was to arrange the labor battalions, ensure order in the barracks and help as an interpreter and translator in German and French. Wipf himself stated later on, that he was not comfortable with his tasks and that he requested for release in 1944. The SS camp commander decided that Wipf could be released, but only if he joined the Waffen-SS, which he gladly did.435 Wipf was assigned to the “SS-Sonderstab Dirlewanger”. This infamous unit was established by Gottlob Berger during the summer of 1940 as a result of his creative search for additional manpower. The special formation utilized the many convicted, serving sentences in the SS-controlled prisons and concentration camps. The unit committed numerous atrocities, most notably in the Warsaw uprising in August 1944 and was involved in operations against civilians and partisans. The formation committed so many atrocities that even SS officials were led to complain about its activities. Toward the end of the war, political prisoners from the concentration camps were assigned to the unit. The formation was said to have been extremely violent and brutal against civilians. Beating with clubs and shooting out of hand seemed to have been common practice.436 After the war, Wipf returned to Switzerland, where he was immediately imprisoned for fifteen months, due to his sentence for “Nichtbefolgung von

433 Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 5. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P. 434 Wipf did not remember the exact date or time himself. He estimated that he was promoted either in mid or by the end of 1942. Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 5. September 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.- 02313 P. 435 Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 5. September 1946, In : BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P, pp. 3f 436 Stein 1966, Waffen SS, pp. 264, 266ff. 115

Dienstvorschriften”, illegal border crossing and foreign military service. He was serving his sentence in the prison of Regensdorf in Zürich, when the Swiss authorities were informed by former concentration camp inmates from Hinzert, that Wipf had been a sadistic camp guard there and that he was responsible for several deaths. The Swiss authorities initially believed that it had to be a misunderstanding and confusion, since they did not believe that a Swiss citizen would be able to commit such crimes. However, their investigations soon proved their assumptions wrong.437 As a result, the Swiss authorities decided that he had to be tried by a federal court, based on criminal law as of war crimes, even though he had committed the murders in the German SS-Sonderlager. According to German law, article 211, he would have been sentenced to death for murder.438 However, the Swiss authorities were not willing to expatriate or extradite him. As a result he was tried according Swiss law.439 Luckily for him had the death sentence for civil offences been abandoned in January 1943.440 The criminal trial in Zürich started in July, 1948 and lasted one week. The prosecution was based on various witness accounts from camp inmates, testifying on Wipf’s sadistic personality. He was accused for being responsible for various deaths of prisoners, as a result of his brutal behavior. Wipf repeatedly had beaten prisoners so heavily that they suffered from severe injuries, eventually leading to their death. He furthermore forced prisoners to take cold showers for such a long time, that the already exhausted and weak prisoners died. Also, he deprived the prisoners of food. Some witness stated that Wipf was regularly drunk when he attacked the prisoners and Wipf himself admitted that he always had an alcohol stock in the camp. 441 Initially Wipf denied that he was involved in any killings. However, with time, he admitted that he had drowned at least two prisoners in a washing tray and that he was partially responsible for the murder of several Flemish and Polish prisoners. Taken from the interrogation file, Wipf confessed the following:

437 Auszug aus dem Bericht Nr. 82 der Bundespolizei, Geheim, Ort unbekannt August 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 438 Artikel 211, Satz 1, Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Recht [RStGB] Schneider 2003, Oberkapo, pp.8. 439 Art. 6, Satz 1 StBG of 21, December 1937 stated the following: „Verbrechen oder Vergehen von Schweizern im Ausland. 1. Der Schweizer, der im Ausland ein Verbrechen oder ein Vergehen verübt, für welches das schweizerische Recht die Auslieferung zulässt, ist, sofern die Tat auch am Begehungsort strafbar ist, diesem Gesetz unterworfen, wenn er sich in der Schweiz befindet oder der Eidgenossenschaft wegen dieser Tat ausgeliefert wird. Ist das Gesetz des Begehungsortes für den Täter das mildere, so ist dieses anzuwenden. (…)“ Schneider 2003, Oberkapo, pp.52. 440 Schneider 2003, Oberkapo, pp.8. 441 Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 5. September 1946, In : BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P. 116

“(…) Die erste Prozedur erhielt Hanau von mir in Form von 20 Min. kalte Dusche im Auftrag von Schaaf. Nachher befahl Schaaf 3 Tage ohne Nahrung, was ich zu beaufsichtigen hatte. Dann musste ich Hanau 4 Gamellen Suppe aufzwingen, Schaaf war dabei. Der Endzweck hätte sein sollen, Platzen des Magens, was aber nicht eintraf. (…) Von Windisch wurde ich nachträglich gerufen um dem Hanau eine kalte Dusche zu verabfolgen, deutsch gesagt um ihn „fertig“ zu machen. In der Waschküche war bereits ein Pole, welcher den Hanau im nackten Zustand mit kaltem Wasser mit einem Schlauch bespritzte bis er zusammenbrach und zwar bewusstlos. (…) Im Auftrag meiner Vorgesetzten habe ich mitgeholfen den Juden Hanau zu beseitigen und ich fühle mich deshalb an seinem Tode mitschuldig.“442

One of the witnesses was a doctor in the camp and he described Wipf as a true sadist, who fully enjoyed the violence connected to his position.

“Vom medizinischen Standpunkt kann ich bezeugen, dass Wipf anlässlich seiner Schlägereien wirklich sadistisch veranlagt war. Bei diesen Ekzessen bekamen seine Augen speziell einen ganz grauen Ausdruck. Wipf schlug bei jeder sich bietenden Gelegenheit Tag und Nacht von sich aus um sich selbst zu gefallen und um seinen Posten der SS gegenüber zu behalten. (…)“443

Wipf claimed during his trial that he was not directly and solely responsible for these deaths but that he was only partially responsible. Although Wipf stated that he had only acted upon orders by death treat, the judges were not willing to accept his claim of putative duress.444 The Criminal Court sentenced him to life imprisonment, based on repeated murder in fourteen cases, aiding and abetting in intentional homicide, grievous bodily harm and repeated abandonment in July 1948.445 However, he was not sentenced for war crimes. Unfortunately, the sources do not indicate why the sentence was solely

442 Fortsetzung der Abhörung von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 23. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P. 443 Fortsetzung der Abhörung von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 23. Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P. 444 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement, Politische Angelegenheiten, Bern 12. August 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 445 Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement, Politische Angelegenheiten, Bern 12. August 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 117 on murder and not on war crimes. It can be assumed, that the reason therefore was that he committed the crimes as a prisoner and not as a Waffen-SS solider, and therefore the term war crimes could not be applied. However, his deeds in the SS-Sonderstab Dirlewanger were not assessed. Wipf joined the unit in 1944, so he was probably involved in atrocities committed in the Warsaw uprising. Hence, it can be assumed that Wipf committed further crimes; this time in a Waffen-SS uniform. Wipf Eugen had committed gruesome deeds including murder in the concentration camp Hinzert. Almost every newspaper of Switzerland reported about the trial, calling Hinzert an inferno of agonies for the victims, a regnum of infernal joys, and bestial pleasures for Wipf.446 Common for the time, the articles were mostly written in a very dramatic manner, not succeeding in describing Wipf at all. The newspaper depicted him as a monster, rather than an alcoholic with sadistic tendencies. However, it was the first time in history that a Swiss person was accused of war crimes and the journalists sensation-seekingly blew it out of proportions and cannibalized it in detail. The newsletters reacted diversely on the verdict itself. The “Neue Berner Zeitung” for example stated that a verdict of life in prison was way to gentle, since this could mean a release after fifteen years.447 The Neue Zürcher Zeitung expressed the opinion that Wipf was lucky that Switzerland did not extradite him, although he would deserve nothing less than that.448 The “Schweizerische Metall- und Uhren Arbeiter Zeitung” was even demanding the death penalty for Wipf was a true monster, who did not deserve to walk on earth anymore.449 However, they all expressed their shocked about the fact that a Swiss person was involved in the crimes of Nazi Germany and capable of such brutal deeds. The newsletter “Freies Volk” was basically worried about how Switzerland could be perceived as a country thereafter, since the world judged brutally on Germany because of World War II:

“Mit Tränen in den Augen haben Französische Offiziere geklagt, dass sie diese Behandlung von Deutschen hätten verstehen können, nicht aber von einem

446 Zeitungsartikel, Nach dem Zürcher Kriegsverbrecherprozess, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 1440, 7. Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 447 Zeitungsartikel, Nur ein Bruchteil der grauenhaften Taten. Anklage und Verteidigung im Prozess Wipf, In: Neue Berner Zeitung, /. Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 448 Zeitungsartikel, Nach dem Zürcher Kriegsverbrecher Prozess, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 1440, 7. Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 449 Zeitungsausartikel, Recht soll Recht bleiben, In: Schweizerische Metall- und Uhren Arbeiter Zeitung, Nr. 28, Bern 14. Juli 1948. In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 118

Schweizer, dessen Heimat sie als Hort anständiger Menschen schätzten. Wir können nur wünschen und hoffen, dass diese Überlebenden die Verallgemeinerung nicht mitmachen und dass sie in diesem Capo Suisse eben den Einzelmenschen, und zwar einen Asozialen sehen.“450

The realization that a “monster” like Wipf was a Swiss citizen had a profound impact on Swiss society and the newsletters did not leave out one singularity of his monstrous deeds. It seem to have been difficult to process the fact that the Holocaust did involve Switzerland to a certain extent and that every nation could bear monsters and what was even worse; that they looked so ordinary and inauspicious that you would not recognize them on the street.451 The trial of Wipf can be seen as an example trial, in which Switzerland tried to show that they were judging hard on such crimes and that Wipf himself was not representative for Switzerland at all. Wipf’s trial certainly was a shock, since the Swiss society suddenly was directly confronted with the Second World War and the Holocaust. The traitors’ trials were not perceived in the same way, as the defendants were only punished for the fact of betraying and weakening the country. Wipf however, was perceived the embodiment of true Nazism and barbarity.

450 Zeitungsausartikel, Der Fall Wipf von der andern Seite gesehen, In: Freies Volk, Bern 9. Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 451 Zeitungsartikel, Capo Wipf, ein Nachspiel des Grauens in der Schweiz, In: National Zeitung, Nr. 310, Basel 8. Juli 1948, In: BAR E2001 E 1000/1571 1571, B.53.31.11. 119

Conclusion

Why did the Swiss volunteers leave the safe haven of Switzerland and why did they decide to join the Waffen-SS? The theorem of a threatened identity and pragmatic collaboration as a motif for joining does not succeed to explain participation in the Swiss case. Hence, this thesis principal aim was to introduce Swiss volunteers and assess their motivation to join the Waffen-SS. Therefore, the background and socialization of seventeen Swiss volunteers, as well as their admission, ranks and careers were the central focus in this work. In addition, the post war punishment practice in Switzerland was included in the assessment. It was argued, that since motivation is a multifaceted characteristic, a biographical approach with an assessment of personal statements had to be applied. Only the implementation of case studies offered the possibility to assess the motivation individually in order to work out similarities or divergences, which in turn enabled a certain generalization. Motivation is a personal matter which is influenced by the own personal situation. That is why the individuals in this case study were presented in chapter two and tree. In chapter two, the category work hunt was exemplified through the accounts of Josef Jakob Breitenmoser, Otto Alfons Aichle and Alfons Straub. The three men were all very young. Aichle, who was the oldest, was only twenty one when he crossed the border. They were not married and their family and life situation was unstable. They all descended from a lower income class. Straub had lost his parents early and was under guardianship and Breitenmoser’s parents were too poor to support him financially. So, he was not able to finish an apprenticeship which resulted in lower income jobs. In general, young men like the described ones were more likely to leave everything behind, since they were not responsible for a family yet. Thus, they were easily influenced by the stories of war success and prosperity in Germany. It has to be noted that for the three men in this paragraph the motivation to leave Switzerland was not the same as to join the Waffen-SS. Breitenmoser and Aichle could both also be allocated to the category of criminals. Aichle had been arrested in Switzerland for theft several times. Breitenmoser was arrested by the police because of theft and illegal possession of a weapon and his membership in the ES brought him in conflict with the authorities. Breitenmoser himself

120 stated that these conflicts heightened the tensions with his parents, which in turn contributed to the motivation to leave Switzerland. However, since they both stated in the police interrogation that their main motivation to leave Switzerland was to find work, it was decided to allocate them to work hunt. Also, all the higher ranking volunteers were previously convicted as of their political activities, so the description criminal would need further differentiation. That is why it was decided not to use “criminal” as a category, since it would be insufficient as explanation. Straub did not have a criminal background but he had a pro-German attitude, because of his German origin. However, the Swiss army and his employer both perceived him as unreliable. So, Straub was clearly having problems to get a grip on his life. The assessment on volunteers who were basically on work hunt proved, that they were not intending to conscribe to the Waffen-SS in the first place. After they crossed the border, they were picked up by the border control and thereafter questioned by the Gestapo. The Gestapo had orders to forward the volunteers to the Panoramaheim, where they were mostly persuaded to join the Waffen-SS. The archive documents revealed that the work hunters all conscribed in late 1941 or 1942. Aichle joined by the end of 1941 and Breitenmoser in October 1942. Straub’s precise date of accession is unknown but it can be estimated around autumn 1942. As established, these were the years where the volunteers many times did not have the option anymore to choose between work service and Waffen-SS duty. The Waffen-SS had lowered their requirement standards for recruitment out of an urgent lack of man power and increasingly started to force conscription. As a matter of fact, the work hunters mostly were drawn into the war, without fully knowing what they were fighting for. Although Breitenmoser, Aichle and Straub mainly were on work hunt, they also tried to escape their unfavorable personal circumstances. Evidently, difficult life conditions and problems at home were among the driving factors for the volunteers to leave Switzerland in order to find work and linked to that, the desire to start a new life. The category of National Socialist was outlined through the accounts of Othmar Maag, Dr. Kurt Brüderlin, Paul Diebold, Hermann Huber and Dr. Ernst Schneider. The men in this profile category were all ideologically committed and mostly already politically active in the renewal moment in Switzerland, with the exception of Dr. Schneider. Yet, Dr. Schneider was involved in the department for Aryan culture and linguistic at the University of Munich. Maag and Brüderlin had engaged in leading

121 positions and Huber in the distribution of propaganda material. Diebold was not having a leading position, yet he was an active member. However, it has to be pointed out, that all men in this profile group combined an ideological factor with self interest. Maag, Dr. Brüderlin and Dr. Schneider clearly wanted to achieve a career which was impossible in Switzerland. Diebold and Huber acted out of financial considerations. Although political activity was not always the sole characteristic, it was the most striking feature. Diebold and Huber could also be assigned to the group of job search. Their financial situation certainly took its influence on the decision making process. Yet, it does not explain exclusively why they engaged in these organizations, and why they decided to join the Waffen-SS instead of just searching for work. Also, Maag and Dr. Brüderlin could be allocated with soldiership. Diebold furthermore had a criminal background. Regarding their social status it can be noted that Dr. Brüderlin, Dr. Schneider and Maag were of a middle or upper class upbringing, well educated and integrated into the society. Diebold and Huber on the other hand were of a lower class upbringing, struggling to get a grip on their life. In comparison with the category job search, the men in this group were already older when they left Switzerland. They were all around thirty years old. Maag is with twenty-five years the youngest of them. Their family background however varied. Whilst Diebold and Huber were having an unstable background, Brüderlin and Schneider were both intellectuals with a doctoral degree. Moreover, Maag and Dr. Schneider both had German ancestry, which might have contributed to the sympathy for Nazi Germany. It is furthermore interesting to note that they all had a career within the Waffen-SS. Dr. Brüderlin as Hauptsturmführer was the highest ranking amongst them, followed by Dr. Schneider as SS-Untersturmführer and lastly Maag and Diebold as SS-Obersturmführer. It is striking that two of them had a doctoral degree; Dr. Brüderlin had a PhD in economy and political science and Dr. Schneider in philosophy. Dr. Brüderlin additionally held the rank of a senior lieutenant, in the Swiss army. Maag and Diebold were holding the rank of a lieutenant. The only exception is Huber, without a good education or a fabulous career. The last group of double citizens was exemplified through the accounts of Fritz Arnold and Ernst Krauel. They both possessed the Swiss citizenship. However, Arnold’s father was naturalized during the World War I. Krauel was born in Hamburg but had the Swiss citizenship, since his great grandfather immigrated to Switzerland. For them the

122 war situation caused a conflict of conscience, as they felt that they had to take a side. The desire to fight for their father country certainly contributed in their later decision to join the Waffen-SS. However, Krauel sympathized with National Socialism and displayed ideological commitment. Maag would also fit in this category, since he too had a German origin and relatives in Switzerland. Chapter two indicated that the group of National Socialists was able to have a certain career within the Waffen-SS. That is why chapter three focused on the career development of six volunteers. The six volunteers described in this chapter, were all deployed according their talents; Franz Riedweg as politician and bureaucrat, Heinrich Büeler as official in the GL, Johann Eugen Corrodi and Heinrich Hersche in military, Alfred Nikles as instructor and Benno Schaeppi as war correspondent. Corrodi as SS- Oberführer was the highest ranking among them but Riedweg as Stabsführer of the GL had a more influential position. He achieved the rank of an SS-Obersturmbannführer. Hersche was promoted SS-Standartenführer shortly before the end of the war, followed by Büeler as SS-Sturmbannführer, Nikles as SS-Hauptsturmführer and lastly Schaeppi as SS-Untersturmführer. What they had in common were their career aspirations. The intellectuals like Riedweg and Büeler were fluent in French and German and thanks to their ideological commitment to National Socialism – they were given positions responsible for training and education of the Germanic volunteers. However, we can recognize a shift after 1943. Prior to 1943, the federalist idea about the Germanic Reich supported the career of these men. However, after 1943, the Swiss volunteers lost their positions and were mostly transferred to the front, since the Waffen-SS leadership was in need of soldiers at the front rather than intellectuals in the bureaucracy. Additionally, the Swiss higher ranking volunteers were very well educated in the military matters with higher ranks in the Swiss army. Therefore, the Swiss officer corps volunteers all started with a higher rank in the Waffen-SS, corresponding with their rank in the Swiss army. Hersche’s and Corrodi’s military education for instance turned out to be beneficial for their position within the Waffen-SS. They were installed as commanders of battalions at the front and additionally used for practical training of the volunteers. The language abilities of the Swiss were highly welcomed, with Hersche being fluent in French and Corrodi in both Italian and French. The Swiss officer corps volunteers where all already engaged in NS organizations in Switzerland. They were all ideologically committed, however not for the same

123 reasons. Riedweg and Büeler believed in an organic solution in which Switzerland would play an important role in the new order for Europe. Hersche on the other hand did not specifically account on what exactly convinced him about the NS ideology. His motivation was a more opportunistic one and the same applies to Büeler. These two men were politically prosecuted in Switzerland and both had a desire for a career. Where could they better fit in than in Nazi Germany where the willing and fit Aryan was welcome anytime? In comparison to the lower ranking volunteers, they were all very well educated, already a bit older and they all came from middle and upper class families. Furthermore, they all believed that Germany would win the war and set up a new order in Europe. Since they did not want to be too late, they decided to join the Waffen-SS to ensure themselves a future position in the new order. Additionally, they also wanted to ensure that Switzerland would not have to join as a loser country, but as an equal Germanic country that deserved a special position within the Reich. This stance was quiet idealistic and very much opportunistic at the same time. This, however, also led them to feel offended by their treatment back in Switzerland. Especially the accusation of being guilty of treason shocked them deeply, since they were convinced that they had only acted in the best interest for their country. Chapter three proved that all the higher ranking volunteers were ideologically committed. However, it was established that they were not equally motivated. It is clear that a person was not only driven by one motivation type but that he in contrary possessed various aspects that overlapped. That is why chapter four further differentiated the motivation of the ideologically committed Swiss volunteers. Twelve out of seventeen volunteers in this case study were ideologically committed and driven by a sense for nationalism. However, the renewal movement in Switzerland was not a uniform movement but rather composed of many different NS organizations. So as a result, the ideologically committed volunteers were all convinced National Socialists but they highlighted different values within National Socialism. Some advocated for an own Swiss National Socialism, others longed for an affiliation and incorporation to the German Reich. However, they all aspired a restructuring of the political, economical and social conditions in Switzerland and Europe. The Swiss NS volunteer, like Franz Riedweg, openly expressed his desire for a return to traditional values like Volk and homeland. However, the understanding of the term Volk was not

124 limited on the Swiss nationality. In contrary, the NS volunteers felt that they belonged to the German people. As a result, the volunteers felt that they had to contribute to the spread of National Socialism. The detailed examination of the personal statements revealed that the struggle of the Aryan was not a primary consideration for the Swiss volunteers. Nonetheless, the volunteers accepted anti-Semitism as part of the party program and did not question its relevance. However, most of the volunteers avoided anti-Semitism in their personal statements. What was more important is that they felt a flush of victory as they were convinced that Germany would win the war. So the decision to leave for Germany entailed a desire to be on the winner side. Commitment to National Socialism also entailed the desire to fight bolshevism. As a consequence, the battle against the Red Army was a holy crusade. All of them indicated their desire to fight the red threat in their motivation to join the Waffen-SS. The fight against Bolshevism was the most often remarked motivation to join the Waffen-SS and matched with their idea of protecting civilized Europe. Consequently, another factor involved in the desire to fight bolshevism was the desire to fight after all. The military highly educated Swiss volunteers realized that Switzerland would not participate in the war, so they chose for the Waffen-SS in order to experience a battle after all. Apparently, the desire to fight was an important motivational factor. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that anti-Bolshevism most probably was exaggerated in retrospect by the volunteers in order to serve as an excuse and lower the degree of punishment. The ideologically committed Swiss volunteers claimed that they strongly felt responsible to contribute in the establishment of National Socialism in Switzerland and the creation of the Greater Germanic Reich. However, the Swiss volunteers typically were influenced by the federalist ideal. As a result, they all believed in a Germanic Reich in which Switzerland would have had an independent position. The vision of a Greater Germanic can be seen as a basis for their future decision making to join the Waffen-SS. Yet, it was not the tipping point consideration. Most of the Swiss volunteers certainly combined an ideological factor with self interest. Their political activities had negative effects on their life so that the illegal border crossing became more and more attractive. The last decisive factor in the decision was an opportunistic consideration, either out of financial problems resulting out of the previous criminal prosecution because of political activities, career aspirations or finally simply because they believed that

125

Germany certainly would win the war and they wanted to secure their place in the sun. Also, their personal opportunism was mostly combined with the sense and frustration that the Swiss government was too weak and ignorant. The last chapter’s focus was the post war punishment of the Swiss volunteers. Therefore, the legal bases as well as the various trials were the center of attention. The Swiss volunteers were all sentenced on the base of article 94 MStGB for foreign military service. The charges included furthermore illegal border crossing as violation of the BRB regarding “Teilweise Schliessung der Grenze”. Moreover, the Swiss Federal Council decided in 1943, to expatriate Swiss citizens who were collaborating with the Reich. The sentences based on military law additionally included offenses as “Ungehorsam gegen allgemeine Anordnung”, article 107 MStGB, which included violations of the “BRB betreffend teilweise Schliessung der Grenze”, “Dienstverletzung” according article 72 MStGB, as well as “Dienstversäumnis” according article 82 MStGB. Hence, the Swiss volunteers were all already convicted by military courts before the end of the war. The men in my sample had to serve their sentences immediately after their return. Some of the volunteers like Hersche, Corrodi and Breitenmoser appealed and interestingly received lower sentences than the previous ones. Consulting the archive documents in regard with the various trials of the Swiss volunteers, it was established that the Swiss authorities were mainly interested in the volunteers’ activities that endangered the Swiss neutrality. As a result, the higher ranking Swiss volunteers, who were ideologically involved in the Third Reich, were sentenced separately by criminal trials. Riedweg, Büeler and Schaeppi additionally were tried in a special treason trial based on attack on the independence of the Swiss Confederation, subversive undertaking, establishment of an illegal association, illegal intelligence service, as well as foreign military service. Riedweg and Schaeppi both received very high prison sentences of sixteen years and Büeler was sentenced in total to twelve years in prison. An analysis of the results showed, that the criminal trial verdicts were way harsher in comparison with the ones imposed by military courts. This cannot be explained with the presumption that the criminal courts sentenced harsher than the military courts. Maag received the same sentence in both courts, namely twice three years. The difference in the evaluation of volunteers involved in political activities next to volunteers who were merely soldiers is the most striking. Corrodi and Hersche were

126 both ideologically committed. However, that commitment was combined by a high sense of soldiership. That implies that they had a strong sense for duty and honor. The Swiss authorities seemed to have been more understanding with that mindset. It appears that a strong sense for soldiership and duty was a mitigating factor for the military courts. Riedweg, Büeler and Schaeppi, who were soldiers and somehow politicians at the same time, were sentenced much harsher. As announced in chapter five, the sentences had to be compared to the punishment practice of other European countries that had to deal with their returnees, in order to put the findings into perspective. Compared to the Netherlands, the Swiss higher ranking volunteers received higher sentences and the Swiss did not have the possibility of reintegration once they were expatriated. The Belgian authorities imposed higher sentences but did not execute them accordingly. So, once more the Swiss were worse off. The most striking comparison is Sweden. It is the only neutral country in the comparison and unlike Switzerland they did not impose any legal sanctions on the volunteers. Overall, the higher ranking Swiss received very high sentences in comparison. The lower ranking volunteers, however, seem to have been punished comparably or less severe. The comparison to the punishment practice in other countries was included in order to put the Swiss sentences into perspective. The topic Swiss volunteers is still representing a research gap and the source basis remind unorganized. Oertle’s standard work on the Swiss volunteers offered a basis for research on the topic and the references on archive material were invaluable. His assessment unfortunately lacked the necessary in depth, as he only offered superficial and obsolete explanations. To explain collaboration with the tradition of the Swiss mercenary army or the natural curiosity of the Swiss for traveling only underline this conclusion. Oertle’s and Neulen’s distinction of different motivation categories facilitated the assessment of motivation. Yet, their division into percentage is not overall convincing. Since most of the volunteers were featuring more than one profile characteristic, the calculation in percentage distort the understanding on motivation. The various Swiss men were as diverse as possible, yet they shared similarities. There were motivation patterns, linking that specific group of Swiss volunteers together. Although the background differed, the war context with its political and economical consequences influenced their decisions as well as their personal situation, regarding money, freedom and chances. So what emerged upon detailed study of their biographies

127 is not one unifying characteristic but a multitude of individual stories of diverse men, who partly shared a similar social origin, personality traits and ideological tendencies. Oertle claimed that anti-bolshevism and ideological commitment was not a main factor in the motivation and therefore, only of little significance. He assessed that the young volunteers mostly became ideologically committed, because of the special training and “Weltanschauungs Unterricht”. Also, he Oertle concluded that the Swiss renewal movement did not succeed to influence the volunteers, as the movement was too fragmented and estranged and therefore insignificant. However, twelve out of seventeen men in this case study were member of NS organizations prior to their conscription to the Waffen-SS. Oertle clearly underestimated the influence of ideological commitment, as well as the importance of the renewal movement in Switzerland. The archives findings supports Guttmann’s evaluation that the Swiss officer corps volunteers had developed a longing for a radical reorganization of the European political, social and economical landscape before joining the Waffen-SS and that this longing was amplified by what these men perceived as threat to the core of European civilization. However, he did not combine that longing with a desire for a career at all. He left the factor of opportunism out and therefore missed an important factor. Ideological commitment and opportunism cannot be assessed separately as they belong together. Mertens assessed that economical considerations were only a secondary motive. The archive findings, however, suggest that Mertens underestimated that dimension of motivation. The financial motives were equally important to the officer corps as well as the lower ranking volunteers. However, Mertens also advocated the opinion that there certainly was not a uniform motive, but rather a bundle of individual reasons. This included a national socialist worldview or an anti-communist attitude, private and vocational problems, escape from prosecution, enthusiasm for the war, as well as adventurism. The emphasis on vocational and private problems according this case study clearly is justified and certainly played a major role in the motivation to leave Switzerland illegally. The findings on the treason verdicts underlined Neulen’s presumption of the stigmatization of some scapegoats in political trials. However, Neulen claimed that the Swiss authorities only decided on harsh punishment out of general policy considerations. Then again, Switzerland had prosecuted the volunteers already during the war and retained the harsh punishment in general. So, the argument that it served as

128 a cover up for economical collaboration does not succeed to explain the authority’s stance sufficiently. The archive findings are in agreement with Mertens, that the authorities’ approach was not overall consistent. However, not as Mertens stated because of refusal to request extradition. The authorities did not request extradition at all but once the person concerned was standing trial they decided on strict punishment. However, Mertens has a point by calling it “legal procrastination”. Unlike him, I would not label it “calculated action pattern” but rather typical Swiss political nature. That said the Swiss system prefers it to assess single cases, rather than formulating an overall rule. This strategy always allows keeping a backdoor open, which in turn offers flexibility. This stance is typical for the Swiss federalist structure and a good legal system. Although a sample of seventeen men does not qualify an overall statement, it is still possible to point out tendencies. The personal statements can be seen as little mosaic stones that eventually form a picture. The picture of the Swiss volunteers is as colorful and diverse as one can imagine but it nonetheless forms an image. It is a picture of personal problems, search for chances, idealism, fanaticism and opportunism.

129

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BAR E 4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2, Bundesratsbeschluss über Ausbürgerung, 18.Mai 1943, gestützt auf Art. 3 des Bundesbeschlusses vom 30. August 1939 über Massnahen zum Schutze des Landes und zur Aufrechterhaltung der Neutralität.

BAR E4001 C 1000/783 1486, 0073.2, Übersicht über den Stand der Ausbürgerungsfälle auf 1. November 1943, Bern 1. November 1943.

BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753, Bericht von Dr. Jezler über Johann Eugen Corrodi, Bern 6. September 1948.

BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753, Zeitungsartikel, Untragbar und Unerwünscht. Der Schweizer Brigadier-SS General im Grand Hotel, In: Israelisches Wochenblatt, Zürich 10. September 1948.

BAR E4001 C 1000/783 3315, 1753, Bericht an die Redaktion des Landboten, Verfasser unbekannt, Bern Oktober 1948.

BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16, Auskunft des Schweizerischen Konsulates über Benno Schaeppi, Stuttgart 18. August 1941.

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BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16, Brief des Fürsorgeamtes Zürich an Benno Schaeppi, Zürich 15. Dezember 1941.

BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16, Bericht des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartement bezüglich Ausbürgerung von Benno Schaeppi, Bern 3. Dezember 1943.

BAR E4110 A 1000/1826 109, C.16, Bericht des Schweizerischen Konsul an das Eidgenössische Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Ort unbekannt 1943.

BAR E4110 A 1000/1831 1372, F.07, Bericht des Oberauditors in der Verwaltung der Militärjustiz im Eidgenössischen Militärdepartements an das Eidgenössische Justiz- und Militärdepartement, Ort und Datum unbekannt.

BAR E4110 A 1000/1832 105, C.08.15, Bericht des Bundesrates betreffend Beschwerde von Corrodi gegen eine Verfügung des Eidgenössischen. Militärdepartements betreffend bedingte Entlassung, Bern 3. Juni 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, SS-Hauptsturmführer Alfred Nikles an den Kommandeur des Ersatzkommandos Frankreich, betreffend Anfrage für den Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer, Paris 5. Juli 1944.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1. Oktober 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1. Oktober 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511, Entwurf Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement, Bern 30. November 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Abhörungsprotokoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 8. Dezember 1938.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Abhörungsprotoll von Benno Schaeppi durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 20. Januar 1939.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Abschrift aus der Abhörung des Dr. Hügel durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Ort unbekannt 28. Januar bis 5. Februar 1946.

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BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Einvernahme von Kurt Brüderlin aus der Haft vorgeführt, Protokoll an das Polizeikommando des Kantons Basselland z.H. der Militärbehörden und der Bundesanwaltschaft, Liestal 5. September 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Zeitungsartikel von Dr. Hans –Otto Meissner, Schweizer Infanterie vor Moskau. Eidgenössische Freiwillige bezahlten ihren Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus mit Gefängnis und Zuchthaus, In: Die Zeit, Nr. 10, Baden Baden 7. März 1952.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Revisionsgesuch des Bundesstrafgerichtsurteils vom 20. Dezember 1947 von Benno Schaeppi an den Präsidenten des Ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht Lausanne, Strafanstalt Regensburg Datum unbekannt.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 419, C.02-713, Antrag auf Amnestie an den Präsidenten des ausserordentlichen Kassationshofes am Schweizerischen Bundesgericht, Strafanstalt Regensdorf Datum unbekannt.

BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Bericht der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Armeekommando, Abteilung Sicherheitsdienst, Bern 4. Juli 1941.

BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Bericht des Eidgenössischen Volkswirtschaftsdepartements der Kriegsindustrie und Arbeitsamt an den Chef der Bundespolizei der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 26. August 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an die Eidgenössische Polizeiabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Hohl, Bern 3. Juli 1944.

BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Bericht von Dr. H. Matty, Advokat an die Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 6. Juni 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 504, Abhörungsprotokoll von Kurt Brüderlin durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Polizeidienst, Liestal 8. September 1946.

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BAR 4320 B 1970/25 504, C.02-933, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an den Chef des Eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 9. September 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht des Polizeikommando des Kanton Aargaus an das Eidgenössische Militärdepartement, Aarau, 29. April 1939.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Korrespondenz Heinrich Johan Hersche an Erich Teuchgraber aus der Postsperre, Polizeikommando Bern im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Thun 30. November 1939.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an Artillerie Oberst Brüderlin, Basel 25. April 1940.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Schweizerisches Armeekommando an die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 4. Mai 1940.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief von Major Heinrich Johann Hersche an den Redaktor des Oltener Tagblatt W. R. Amman, als Reaktion auf einen über ihn erschienenen Artikel im Oltener Tagblatt, Nr. 150 vom 29. Juni 1940, Basel 4. Juli 1940.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief über Politische Massnahmen von Heinrich Johan Hersche an den Führerkreis der Nationalen Bewegung Schweiz, Basel 22. Juli 1940.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Divisionsgericht IV, Untersuchungsrichter Hauptmann Schibli, Bern 26. August 1940.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Abhörungsprotokoll von Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Locarno 11. Juni 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Brief von Heinrich Johann Hersche an seine Tochter Brigitte, Berlin 13. Januar 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft durch Inspektor Eberle an den Chef des eidgenössischen Polizeidienstes in Bern, Bern 10. September 1945. 137

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das eidgenössische Politische Departement, Politische Angelegenheiten, Bern 4. September 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Aktennotiz zum Vorsprechen von Heinrich Johann Hersche beim Schweizerischen Generalkonsulat, München 28. Juli 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Abhörungsprotokoll des Heinrich Johann Hersche durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Bern 3. Oktober 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Verfügung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft über Heinrich Johann Hersche, Bern 17. Oktober 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Befragung von Heinrich Büeler betreffend Heinrich Johann Hersche, durch den Eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter O. Gloor, Zürich 3. November 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Urteil des Divisionsgericht 7A, St. Gallen 29. November 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Bericht des eidgenössischen Untersuchungsrichter der Militärjustiz der Schweizerischen Armee an Herrn Dr. Lüthy der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 1. Dezember 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Verfügung der Bundesanwaltschaft über Rücktritt von der Verfolgung im Bundesstrafverfahren gegen Hersche Heinrich, der Stellvertreter des Bundesanwaltes Lüthi, Bern 24. Februar 1948.

BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Stellungnahme des Stellvertreters des Bundesanwaltes an die Eidgenössische Justizabteilung, Bern 6. Dezember 1948.

E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562, Zeitungsartikel, Aus dem Bundesgericht. Der Nazi und sein Pensionsanspruch, In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 2503, 21. November 1950.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an Leutnant Fritz Steiner, Winterthur 21. August 1940.

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BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 18. Januar 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Lebenslauf von Othmar Maag aus der Untersuchungshaft, Zürich 10. Juni 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seinen Freund Fritz, Winterthur 21. August 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an einen Verwandten in Deutschland, Name unbekannt, Schweinefurt 11. Oktober 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 25. Dezember 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Abschrift, Brief von Untersturmführer Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Cholm 30. April 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 4. Juni 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 8. Juli 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Ort unbekannt 1. August 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Brief von Othmar Maag an seine Eltern, Weimar 6. Dezember 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement an den Regierungsrat des Kantons Zürich, Bern 31. Juli 1944.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrates bezüglich Othmar Maag, Bern 1. Mai 1945.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Abhörungsprotokoll von Othmar Maag durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Aarau 13. September 1945.

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BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft an den Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartementes, Bern 29. August 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1971/78 916, C.2-5358, Bedingte Entlassung Othmar Maag, Eidgenössisches Militärdepartement, Bern 29. Juli 1949.

BAR E4320 B 1973/17 158, C.02-7618, Lebenslauf Paul Diebold, Ort und Datum unbekannt.

BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P, Abhörungsprotokoll von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 5. September 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1990/266 2426, C16.-02313 P, Fortsetzung der Abhörung von Wipf Eugen durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, Zürich 23. Oktober 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Abhörungsprotokoll von Hermann Huber durch die Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft, Oberriet 26. Oktober 1940.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Bericht des Polizeikommando St. Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, St. Gallen, 10. Februar 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Anklageschrift von Hermann Huber durch den Auditor Major Popp des Divisionsgerichts 7A, St. Gallen 5. Juli 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Anklageschrift Divisionsgericht 7A von Huber Hermann, St. Gallen 5. Juli 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 1661, C.29/A116-41.333, Zeitungsartikel, Nachzügler des Leonhardt-Prozesses, In Vorwärts Nr. 129, Ort unbekannt 20. August 1946.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A116/42.629, Abschrift der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 6. Juni 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2192, C.29/A116/42.629, Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 18. August 1942.

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BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192, Polizeirapport des Kantonalen Polizei Kommandos Schaffhausen, Schaffhausen 19. Februar 1942.

E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192, Abhörungsprotokoll von Otto Alfons Aichle durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundessanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 4. Juni 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/42.1192, Bericht des Polizeidienstes der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, St. Gallen 6. Juni 1947.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2567, C.29/A116/43.124, Notiz vom Adjunkt der Kantonalen Fremdenpolizei Herr Baumgartner an den Spezialdienst des Polizeikommando St. Gallen Herr Rüthemann, 11. Januar 1951.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124, Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Otto Ehrenzeller über Josef Breitenmoser, Ort unbekannt 27. Mai 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124, Polizeiliche Einvernahme von Josef Breitenmoser, Will 8. Juli 1941.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Abschrift der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 6. Juni 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Bericht der Politischen Abteilung der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft an das Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen, Bern 18. August 1942.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Brief von Breitenmoser an seinen Freund, Ort unbekannt 18. August 1943.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116/43.124, Polizeiliche Einvernahme des Josef Breitenmoser, St. Gallen 7. August 1950.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Schreiben des Polizeikommando des Kantons St. Gallen an den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft, St. Gallen 14. August 1950.

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BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Notiz vom Adjunkt der Kantonalen Fremdenpolizei Herr Baumgartner an den Spezialdienst des Polizeikommando St. Gallen Herr Rüthemann, 11. Januar 1951.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Aussage Josef Breitenmoser vorgeführt in der Kantonalen Strafanstalt Saxerriet, Saxerriet 18. Januar 1951.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2701, C.29/A116-43.124, Bericht des Spezialdienstes der Kantonspolizei St. Gallen an das Kantonale Polizeikommando, St. Gallen 19. Januar 1951.

BAR E4320 B 1993/214 3148, C.29/A116-44.006, Brief von Paul Diebold an Herrn Dr. jur. Ferdinand Elsener, SS-Standortlazarett München-Dachau 21. Mai 1943.

Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit von Schweizern und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 1939- 1945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember 1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.

Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Verfahren gegen nationalsozialistische Schweizer wegen Angriff auf die Unabhängigkeit der Eidgenossen, 30. November 1948, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.

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Appendix I

Rank Overview in Comparison, 1939-1945

Waffen-SS Schweizerische Armee

Schütze, Grenadier Schütze, Grenadier

Oberschütze, Obergrenadier -

Sturmmann Gefreiter Rottenführer -

Unterscharführer Korporal

Scharführer Wachtmeister Oberscharführer Feldweibel/Fourier

Hauptscharführer -

Sturmscharführer Adjutant-Unteroffizier

Junker - Standartenjunker -

Standartenoberjunker -

Untersturmführer Leutnant Obersturmführer Oberleutnant

Hauptsturmführer Hauptmann Sturmbannführer Major

Obersturmbannführer Oberleutnant Standartenführer Oberst

Oberführer -

Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen SS Oberbrigadier Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen SS Oberdivisionär

Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS Oberkorpskommandant Oberstgruppenführer und

Generaloberst der Waffen SS General

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Appendix II

Overview of the Men in this case study

Name Position in the Year of Motivation Post War Trial Waffen-SS Admissio Sentence n into the Waffen- SS 1 Otto Alfons Nov 1941 Work 18 months Aichle hunt/criminal prison 2 Alfons 1942 Work hunt/pro unknown Straub German attitude/ problems at work 3 Josef Jakob SS-Sturmann Oct 1942 Work hunt/ 1 year in prison Breitenmose NS/criminal without r probation 4 Othmar SS- Apr 1942 NS/soldiership Twice 3 years Maag Obersturmführer /anti-Semitism prison (total 6), released both times after one year/ expatriated 5 Dr. Kurt SS- March NS/soldiership 4 years prison, Brüderlin Hauptsturmführer 1943 expatriated 6 Paul Diebold SS- March NS/ work 18 Hauptsturmführer 1942 hunt/criminal months/postwar sentence unknown 7 Hermann unknown Feb 1942 NS/work hunt unknown Huber 8 Dr. Ernst SS- March NS/pro unknown Schneider Obersturmführer 1941 German 9 Fritz Arnold SS- Jan 1942 Double unknown Unterscharführer citizen/pro German 10 Ernst Krauel SS-Sturmann Oct 1941 NS/Double unknown citizen 11 Dr. Franz SS-Obersturmbann- July 1938 NS/opportunis 16 years prison Riedweg führer m in absentia/ expatriated

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12 Dr. Heinrich SS- Nov 1941 NS/ 4 years plus 8 Büeler Sturmbannführer opportunism years prison (total 12y), released in 1954/ expatriated

13 Heinrich SS- Dec 1941 NS/soldiership 1 year prison Hersche Standartenführer 14 Johann SS-Oberführer July 1941 NS/anti- 2,5 years prison, Eugen Semitism/ released in 1947 Corrodi soldiership 15 Alfred Nikles SS- Jan 1940 NS 2 years prison in Hauptsturmführer absentia/ expatriated 16 Benno SS- Spring NS 16 years in Schaeppi Untersturmführer 1941 prison, released 1956/ expatriated 17 Eugen Wipf SS- 1944 criminal Lifelong (he died Unterscharführer shortly after the trial)

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Appendix III

List of National Socialist Organizations in Switzerland

BSG Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland

BTE Bund treuer Eidgenossen

ES Eidgenössische Sammlung

ESAP Eidgenössische Soziale Arbeiterpartei

Germanische SS-Schweiz

MNS Movement National Suisse

NBS Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz

NF Nationale Front

NSBidS Nationalsozialistische Bewegung in der Schweiz

NSSAO Nationalsozialistische Schweizer Arbeiter Organisation

NSSAP Nationalsozialistische Schweizerische Arbeiter Partei (Volbsbund)

NSSB Nationalsozialistischer Schweizerbund

SGAD Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie

VB Volksbund

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Acknowledgments

Several people provided guidance and support whilst writing this thesis. Without them I certainly would not have accomplished this work. I would like to express my special thanks and gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate who guided me along the whole process of writing. His critical comments and his supportive communication helped me to shape the outlines of this thesis. There is not much written on the topic “Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS”, whereby the risk of getting absorbed by the fast amount of archive material was very high. He helped me to select my cases and create the overview. Also, he certainly helped me to grow as a writer and researcher. My thanks also belongs to the second reader Dr. Karel Berkhoff who takes the time to read and evaluate my work. Secondly, I would like to thank the staff of the “Bundesarchiv Bern”, the “Bundesarchiv Berlin” and the “Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich”. They were helpful and open for my questions any time, as they guided me through the dense forest of archive material. Their explanations on how to use the search engines and how to commit the research certainly were invaluable and priceless. I would also like to thank Marleen Hoffmann, Sandra von Euw and Jonas Kyburz who took the time to read and edit my chapters. Their critiques on my early drafts improved the chapters and their valuable suggestions for additional corrections enriched the assessment in a fundamental way. Also, special thank goes to my fellow students. Our fruitful discussions during coffee breaks contributed to a creative exchange of ideas and insights which in turn made this master education such an enriching experience. Their comments on my research were helpful for my further approach. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents and my sister. Without their support and patience I would not have had the endurance to carry out this research.

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