Political Protest in Poland After Solidarity Years 1989-2010

EUROPA-UNIVERSITÄT VIADRINA UNIWERSYTET IM. ADAMA MICKIEWICZA POZNAN

Master Thesis Political Protest in Poland after Solidarity Years 1989-2010

Author: Naemi Schadagies Matr. No. 35068 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M.A. European Studies / Politologia

First Supervisor:

Prof. Timm Beichelt

Second Supervisor:

Dr. Jarosław Jańczak

Outline

Abstract ...... 0

I. Introduction ...... 1

A. Some preliminary Thoughts ...... 1

B. State of the Art ...... 3

C. Aim and Scope ...... 4

II. Political Protest ...... 6

A. Protest Potential ...... 8

B. Conditions for Eruption ...... 9

1. The macro-level: Political Opportunity Structures ...... 9

2. The micro-level: Incentives ...... 12

a) The macro-micro Relationship ...... 12

b) Social and Norm-driven Incentives ...... 12

3. The meso-level: Social Networks, Collective Identity, Framing ...... 14

a) Network dynamics: Framing processes...... 15

b) The missing link: Collective Identity ...... 16

4. Mobilization ...... 18

C. The Formation of Movements ...... 21

III. Protest in Poland ...... 23

A. Transition Period: 1989-1997 ...... 24

1. 1st Phase: 1989-1993 ...... 25

2. 2nd Phase: 1993-1997 ...... 29

B. Consolidated Democracy: 1997 – 2004 ...... 31

C. Poland in the EU: 2004 – 2010 ...... 34 D. The Smoleńsk Tragedy 2010 and its Aftermath ...... 38

E. Characteristics of Protest 1989-2010 ...... 40

IV. Explaining the Peace ...... 42

A. Protest Potential ...... 42

1. Grievances...... 43

2. Polarization ...... 48

B. Conditions ...... 49

1. The macro-level: POS ...... 49

a) 1989-1997...... 50

b) 1997-2004...... 52

c) 2004-2010...... 53

2. The micro-level: Incentives ...... 55

a) Consequences of changing POS ...... 56

b) Norms and Values ...... 57

3. The meso-level: Networks ...... 59

V. Conclusion ...... 63

VI. Annex ...... 68

A. Situation in the Country ...... 68

B. Political Situation...... 69

C. Economic Situation ...... 70

D. Quality of Living ...... 71

VII. References ...... 72

Abstract

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie sich politischer Protest in Polen seit dem Zusammenbruch des Sozialismus darstellt und welche Theorien kollektiven Handelns geeignet sind, diese Entwicklungen zu erklären. Daher werden auf den folgenden Seiten zwei unterschiedliche Aspekte beleuchtet. Zum einen wird die Frage beantwortet, wie sich politischer Protest seit 1989 entwickelt hat und welche Charakteristika sich ausmachen lassen. Zum zweiten werden die Beobachtungen mittels Anwendung der einschlägigen Theorien eingeordnet und erklärt.

Insbesondere die Theorie kollektiven Handelns von Mancur Olson nimmt in der Betrachtung eine zentrale Rolle ein, welche auf dem Rational Choice Ansatz beruht. Darüber hinaus werden Theorien aus dem Konstruktivismus heran gezogen. Die Möglichkeit, diese verschiedenen Ansätze zu integrieren wird in Kapitel zwei der vorliegenden Arbeit besprochen.

Im darauffolgenden Abschnitt wird auf den politischen Protest in Polen wie er sich seit 1989 darstellt eingegangen. Dabei fällt vor allem auf, dass seit dem Zusammenbruch des sozialistischen Systems der Protest zu jeder Zeit sowohl in Hinblick auf Teilnehmerzahlen als auch in Hinblick auf Dauer und Intensität weit hinter dem zurück geblieben ist, was Polen vor 1989 erlebte. Auch im Vergleich mit westlichen Demokratien ist die Protestrate in Polen gering geblieben.

In Kapitel vier wird daher aufgezeigt, in wie weit die anfangs präsentierten Theorien diese Beobachtungen erklären können und in wie fern es nötig ist, sowohl Rational Choice als auch konstruktivistische Ansätze anzuwenden. Dadurch wird es möglich, ein vollständiges Bild zu zeichnen.

Politischer Protest in Polen ist demnach vornehmlich abhängig von sozialen Faktoren, da die Menschen bei einer Abwägung von Kosten und Nutzen diese höher werten als andere Aspekte. Der spezifische Charakter der polnischen Gesellschaft führt dabei dazu, dass Anreize zum Protest sehr stark sein müssen, damit kollektives Handeln entsteht.

I. Introduction

Poland today is a fundamentally different country from what the world saw when it was witness to a mass movement that would eventually bring down the state socialist system that had dominated most of Central and Eastern Europe for more than 40 years. During the 1980s, society engaged in masses in political protests and other collective action voicing its dissatisfaction with the current state of society and economy and demanding fundamental changes. Still under this impression, one might ask whether Poland could possibly serve as a trouble spot again. Especially in connection to today’s financial and economic crisis, this question seems relevant. This paper will therefore attempt to assess the development of political protest activity since the collapse of the communist system and conclude from the available evidence what the state of civil society and the prospects for large scale protest are today. To this end, the existing theories of collective and protest action will be applied which will lead to an explanation of the developments since 1989.

A. Some preliminary Thoughts

Poland is special in that sense that national consciousness has developed although during large parts of its history, no Polish state existed, let alone a nation-state. The national momentum was indeed formed in close relation to some and by strict separation from other neighbors (Kenney 2007: 138). In this sense, a case study of recent Polish history will have to draw on experiences before regaining independence and most importantly on the process of building a Polish nation-state.

Compared with all other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Poland had by far the most active citizens and the most intense experiences with protest until 1989 (Kubik 1998: 142). Not the least, Solidarity was created in Poland and like no other movement or organization contributed to the collapse of state socialism in the area (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 91). Furthermore, no other CEE country experienced a civil mass movement the way Poland did. Solidarity was a unique phenomenon, created by spontaneous civil society activism and was unexpectedly successful (Krzemiński 2009: 348). It poses a

1 great challenge to examine what happened to this strong activity after the system collapsed in 1989, as there can be no doubt that its significance waned after that year. Contrary to what could have been expected after 1989, civil society has not been playing a visible role, neither during transformation nor afterwards (Krzemiński 2009: 349). Therefore, an analysis of Polish public life after Solidarity lost its influence and disintegrated will yield interesting results in need of interpretation.

What makes Poland the ideal subject of study is firstly the availability of data. Like no other country in Central and Eastern Europe, sociological research looks back on a rich tradition and therefore, data collection has been conducted fairly thoroughly throughout the years (Sokolowski 2002: 3sq.). Results from this study may also serve to shed light on other countries that rid themselves of socialism in 1989 and 1990 and could also be the starting point for inter-CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) analyses.

In the field of protest research, movements and organizations play an important role. In Poland, organizations of civil life such as NGOs have been working in union with political parties (Krzemiński 2009: 349), making a distinction between the civil and political sectors difficult. Even today, there is doubt about the sheer existence of civil society in Poland, let alone its activeness (Krzemiński 2009: 347).

When democracy was introduced in Poland, beginning in 1989, society was confronted with a completely new situation. Solidarity, for ten years the uniting factor for Poles, lost its momentum and power almost instantly. The mere fact that today, Poles do not believe Solidarity to be of benefit anymore (Beyer 2010: 2) shows how tremendously the society’s and individuals’ attitude towards protest and activism has changed. Therefore, Polish civil society has undergone a remarkable change since 1989, not only in the area of non-governmental organizations, but also in local self-government, in the area of informal movements and groupings, as well as in the area of civil activities (Gliński 01-15-2008: 2). An analysis of this development over a time-span of 20 years will bring new insights and may help clear up doubts.

B. State of the Art

Research on social movements and protest has been rich and publications concerning movement theory are manifold. Regarding rational choice theory, the seminal book on the theory of collective action by Mancur Olson has been relevant for movement scholars. In recent years, constructivist approaches have also gained influence, namely in the areas of identity and framing theories. This paper will therefore not introduce new theoretical aspects but rather provide an assessment of the effectiveness rational choice still has in today’s Poland.

Research on protest in Poland, on the other hand, has been scarce. In general, research on civil society’s activities, which would encompass protest action, has for the time since 1989 been very rare (cf. for this assessment Kubik 1998: 132). Some publications deal with the transition period, the authors do however not always agree on the time span this entails. Jan Kubik and Grzegorz Ekiert for example have examined the years 1989 to 1993, whereas Pieter Vanhuysse goes further in also classifying 1993-1997 as transition phase (Ekiert, Kubik 1998; Kubik 1998; Vanhuysse 2006). This leads to the situation that broad evaluations can be found only for very few years after the collapse of the socialist system in Poland. After that, reports and analyses have seen a sharp decline the later the publication date. For the time after 1997, only individual articles on protest events have been published (e.g. Fuchs 2000), but no comprehensive studies can be found on protest action.

The Smoleńsk tragedy of 2010 led to a new wave of articles published on Poland, but these were mainly concerned with the implications of the incident for international, mostly Polish-Russian, relations. Newspapers in Poland covered the protest waves triggered by decisions taken in the aftermath of the plane crash, but outside of the country not much was heard about the social mood. Therefore, also scholarly publications have been rare. Few reports on the general impact of the incident on Polish society can be found in some magazines and periodicals (Gnauck 09-21-2010; Hinsey 2011; Najder 2010), but an in-depth evaluation of protests in the days after the incident is yet to be published. As the plane crash happened only in April 2010, research on its long-term implications might still be in progress however.

In summary, the field of protest research in Poland after 1989 and especially after 1993 is still very open and leaves ample room for generating knowledge. The paper at hand will try to provide a first step into this direction but is by no means aiming at an in- depth assessment of all protest evens since 1989.

C. Aim and Scope

This paper will provide an overview over the main developments of political protest in Poland over the 20 years between June 1989 and April 2010. There has been considerable talk about Polish protest affinity, especially about violent farmers’ protests who seem to be strongest in voicing dissatisfaction by protest (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 97; Castle, Taras 2002: 154). The following analysis will attempt to shed new light on this assumption by evaluating the main protest events since 1989 and providing an overview over the participants. In the following chapters, an assessment will be provided as to under which circumstances for Poles protest today and how this decision can be explained by the presented theories. If rational choice in its basic form cannot provide a thorough explanation, constructivist ideas will also be included and an attempt will be made to provide a possible enlargement of the theory of collective action that is able to illustrate the complex reasons behind the unexpectedly calm society after 1989. In order to provide an outlook on future developments, the probability of an eruption of fierce protest in the near future will be assessed in the concluding chapter.

The following analysis will start with an overview over theories of collective action and protest behavior. The basis for this is the pertinent theory of collective action introduced by Mancur Olson. This choice was taken as protest is a form of collective action and as Olson has proven to be the reference point for most research in this field. In order to be able to fully assess the reasons behind Poles’ behavior, this theory resting on rational choice needs to be expanded, however. It will become clear that only in the time immediately following the collapse of the state socialist system, rational choice unfolds high explanatory power. Later this does not hold anymore. Therefore, the political opportunity structures approach will be incorporated in the theory. Also theories of framing and identity will be presented which will further help explain the developments.

The protest analyzed in this paper can take on different forms, and be either disruptive or non-disruptive. The former can be strikes, illegal demonstrations and violent forms such as riots. The latter forms of protest are legal demonstrations, voting, open letters and statements. As disruptive forms of protest tend to be covered more thoroughly by the media as well as other forms of publications, the information available on protest is richer in the area of disruptive forms as all of these usually receive public attention whereas in the non-disruptive forms only legal demonstrations and, in the case of obvious dissatisfaction voiced by the electorate, national voting behavior are usually covered. As the analysis provided here is ultimately directed at assessing the distortion of political life by political protest and the existence of a hot spot in Poland, the data used here will also be concentrating on the named forms of protest.

History always plays a role in today’s life. Especially the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have to deal with dominant legacies that have strong influences on society today (Kubik 1998: 131). Even if this paper deals with the time after the collapse of the state socialist system, it is therefore necessary to look back to the time before 1989 and consider the factors relevant for the situation today.

Chapter two of this paper will provide the theoretical basis for the subsequent evaluation and will give an insight into the theories enumerated above. A focus will be lying on rational choice theory, but other relevant approaches stemming from the constructivist school of thought will also be presented in order to include them into an encompassing theory.

In chapter three, protest events and –waves will be presented and an attempt at categorizing will be undertaken. To this end, the time span dealt with in this paper will be divided into several periods coinciding with important political developments. For each period, the most important protest events will be presented and their specifics such as numbers of participants, reasons for protesting as well as the outcome be evaluated. In a subsequent chapter, the provided evidence will be analyzed and put into context within the frame of the theory presented in the first chapter. Here, an explanation of protest in Poland will be attempted. The conclusion will finally summarize the findings and try to provide an outlook to further developments.

II. Political Protest

Generally speaking, it is difficult to determine what exactly is meant by “protest”. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 5) use the expression “contentious politics” to describe

“episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”

This definition already includes the most important aspect of protest – its collectiveness. However, it is rather narrow in scope and leaves room also for government to engage in such actions. In this paper, the focus is on civil action; therefore a definition with a slightly different character is needed. Other authors1 agree that protest needs to have some kind of adversary, be it a person, government action or a law. Further criteria of a definition that can be found in literature include the notions that protest is an irregular behavior expressing objection to decisions of a target. The protesters cannot achieve their goal to alter the decision or decisions in question by themselves and move to exert influence on third parties. The target of a protest action, therefore, is “the person, institution, or organization that the protesters want to respond or react to their demands or grievances” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 109). As McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 5) point out, this action is “episodic rather than continuous, [and] occurs in public”. In this paper, we will therefore define “protest” as irregular activity that is collectively carried out in public and opposed to one or more decisions of a certain target with the aim to influence this target’s behavior and decisions either retrospectively or in the future.

Protest can have different aims and targets and needs not in all cases be political. A demonstration against a company’s decision to close a factory would be classified as protest but not necessarily as political. Therefore, a definition of the term “political protest” needs to encompass also a notion of “political”. In order not to narrow the

1 E.g. Turner (1969), Zald; Ash (1966), McAdam et al. (2001). For details see Opp 2009: 35sq.

6 scope too much, it will simply be assumed that “political” protest is aimed at a decision taken within the political system regardless of the actual person taking the decision including his or her position within the system. Purely economic decisions about wages and working conditions of state-employees will however be excluded as the state is not acting politically, but in the role of a normal employer here.

Protest can also take on different forms and may be legal or illegal, violent or not and can take place on a regular basis (the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig and other cities in the former GDR were very regular for example) or can happen spontaneously and highly irregularly or even only once. In the following, a look will thus firstly be taken at the emergence of protest as the action itself and then the focus will be narrowed down and a more detailed look at protest movements will be provided.

As McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 72) point out, protest rarely happens with a defined beginning and a definite end. The processes of mobilization and demobilization are complex, interdependent and happen simultaneously. The authors therefore suggest a dynamic model to assess the interdependence of protests in episodes in which the mobilization dynamics are explicitly evaluated and their reasons examined. This is an important notion and should not be forgotten whenever protest action is examined. As has been suggested in the introduction, however, this paper is concerned with protest action and its frequency, and the focus does not lie on the processes of mobilization. Rather, it is concerned with individual and collective decisions whether or not to engage in protest action. Therefore, the presented argument will be following the rather static approach suggested by rational choice theory.

The biggest group of people within a society is made up of those who can be mobilized under favorable conditions on important issues to them if the organizers put in enough effort (Meyer 2004: 140). Consequently, it is feasible to consider the factors providing for protest action as such first before the discussion turns to movements that can and most often do serve as organizers of protest action.

A. Protest Potential

In order to take part in political protest, a person firstly needs to feel some grievance, due to a lack of supply with public goods. (Opp 2009: 109). Public goods are defined as being non-exclusive in consumption, meaning that consumption by one person automatically makes it accessible for all others (Olson 1971: 14). Put differently, a public good is one, that cannot be distributed by the market but need to be delivered by agencies that do not aim at making profit such as the government (Sokolowski 2002: 8). Grievances occur when a person or a group of people feel deprived of a certain good. What needs to be considered in this context, is preferences. The individual or the group will have certain preferences and therefore, will voice demands for specific goods (Opp 2009: 47). If Poles will protest for a certain good, it does thus not mean that Germans or Brits will do the same.

A recent example of the relevance of grievances as the basis for protest was the nuclear accident in Fukushima, which triggered protests against nuclear power all over the world. The protests emerged due to people’s fear from such accidents happening elsewhere. The public good in question here is public security, which the governments failed to provide. In Germany, protests subsided as soon as exit from nuclear power supply was decided. It is important to note that grievances are relevant for protest potential in cases where no prospects for improvement exist. This means that people feeling such grievances also need to expect no change of the situation in the future without their personal engagement.

Aggregation of existing grievances will therefore provide a fairly good idea of the potential for protest in a society, as high levels of grievances provide for a high potential. In a subsequent chapter in which the theoretical overview will be applied to Poland aggregate data provided by public opinion polls will therefore be drawn on in order to assess the overall level of grievances in the society.

A second factor that contributes to the existing potential for protest is polarization (McAdam et al. 2001: 322). This means that arguments are radicalized and society is divided sharply along the lines of argument. Especially in Poland this is important, as the following chapter will show. With moderate positions emptying and opinions

8 shifting to the extremes, steps taken by one side can much more likely lead to fierce protest by the other side. Especially in cases where one side is taken by members of the political system, their steps are publicly followed and perceived.

B. Conditions for Eruption

The most basic assumption of rational choice theory is that people’s behavior is governed by a calculation of costs and benefits (Opp 2009: 46). Therefore, the benefits of protesting need to outweigh its costs. Protest then emerges due to dissatisfaction of the people with the current distribution of public goods and the expectations to improve the situation by protesting. These circumstances on the societal, i.e. the macro-, level provide a person’s environment and can have direct influences on the probability of the individual engaging in protest. However, it is necessary to understand the link between the macro- and the micro-level in order to assess the link between changes in the environment and individual action. Moreover, individuals do rarely act on their own and are usually influenced by their social networks, which provide for a meso-level environment that also influences the individuals decision. In the following sections all three levels will therefore be examined and links between them will be established in order to be able to fully understand individual as well as collective action.

1. The macro-level: Political Opportunity Structures

Studies over the past more than 30 years have shown the importance of the political context for the analysis of social movements (Meyer 2004: 134). This focus on polity has in literature become known as the Political Opportunitiy Structures (POS) concept. It rests on the assumption that the political environment provides variables favorable or unfavorable for the emergence of protest. These variables depend on evolution of the system over time, making change the most important factor in the assessment of opportunities. Success or failure of any social movement is consequently dependent on external factors provided by the socio-political context of the relevant society at a given time (Meyer 2004: 126). Opportunity structures therefore are developments “that render

9 the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge” (McAdam et al. 1996: 8). In other words, if the system introduces changes that make it easier for challengers to gain access and to put through their claims, a POS has opened. Political Opportunities Theory is based on the assumption that the structure provides bigger or smaller chances for success of a social movement, depending on the specific claims the movement is making, and its aim is to “predict the emergence, actions and successes of social movements, focusing on the interaction between activists as agents and the polity as structure” (Meyer 2004: 127sq.). What makes the theory relevant at this point is the focus on structure, or the polity, which shapes the opportunities for success or failure of protest behavior.

McAdam et al. (1996: 3) explain “that social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded.” Following this line of thought, it is possible to conclude that the setting determines the outcome, or more precise, that protest action and movements are unique to and specifically shaped by the environment they act in. Therefore, a specific kind of protest action will emerge due to the specific opportunities provided by its surroundings. In a later section movements will also be discussed more closely, and it will be examined under what circumstances the formation of a movement is likely.

Doug McAdam (1996: 26) has formulated four categories of variables that Political Opportunity Structures consist of:

I. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, II. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, III. The presence or absence of elite allies, IV. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.

All changes in the political system can thus be classified as POS if they fall into one of these categories. Variables that are taken into account for the research in question furthermore need to be linked to the aims of potential protest, and they need to actually change the chances of success. If it is made possible to directly address the person in

10 charge but the concerns voiced through this channel still do not reach the person in question due to technical or other reasons, the chances obviously are not enhanced. Whether the people know about these variables is however unimportant at this level; Opportunity structures are assessed objectively. The entry of many members of the political elite in the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s2 was therefore a relevant variable of the third category and thus opened a POS for the movement.

Different authors, among them Sidney Tarrow (1996: 54) have pointed out that opening opportunity structures alone do not in all circumstances lead to more political protest. In a system that already provides for easy access, more opportunities can also lead to less protest. This is true insofar as protest is defined as irregular behavior. If the opportunities for regular action are great, then there does not seem to be much need for irregular behavior. Put differently,

“Protest occurs when there is a space of toleration by a polity and when claimants are neither sufficiently advantaged to obviate the need to use dramatic means to express their interests nor so completely repressed to prevent them from trying to get what they want.” (Meyer 2004: 128).

As this argument suggests, the polity needs to take on a certain shape in order to support protest action. Overall, protests happen much more often in democracies than in other forms of government. Whereas strikes have happened about three times less often in autocratic regimes than in democracies, demonstrations and riots have taken place about twice as often in democracies than in other regimes during the course of the 20th century (Vanhuysse 2006: 1). In democracies, a general openness of the system can be assumed, which aligns with the “space of toleration” required for protest according to Meyer. Relative closeness on the other hand varies, but also in democracies laws that restrict freedoms such as the freedom of assembly can be passed. Therefore, “partially opened access” (Tarrow 1996: 54) provides for the strongest incentives to protest in the case of opening opportunities. This will become even clearer when the interdependence of factors will be discussed.

2 During that time, many political office-bearers also joined Solidarity, which opened a POS of the third category, but also lessened the system’s potential for repression, a category IV POS.

2. The micro-level: Incentives

The crucial notion is that behavior is influenced by incentives. Individuals need to be personally affected in order to react. Therefore, in the following section the relationship between the macro-level providing POS and the individual level will be examined. In a subsequent section, the focus will furthermore be directed at other sources of incentives affecting the individual directly.

a) The macro-micro Relationship

Objectively existing chances for success do not suffice for a person to engage in protest action; Incentives always occur on the micro level. Therefore, there is a need to translate the macro-level circumstances into factors affecting the individual directly. Changing Opportunity Structures lead to a change in the individuals’ expectations for success or failure. The higher the perceived chances for success are, the more likely protest is to emerge, as individuals are more willing to take part in action that promises success.

These individual calculations then transform into collective action (Opp 2009: 198). Consequently, changing POS are more likely to invoke protest behavior in those cases where they are recognized by the people and perceived as making protesting worthwhile in the sense that it furthers reaching the goal. Conversely, closing Opportunity Structures make protest less likely. For example, if repression is enhanced in a society, protests will generally become less likely as it increases the costs of participation for the individual and success becomes less likely.

b) Social and Norm-driven Incentives

One way to directly take influence on individuals’ behavior has been called “selective incentives” (Olson 1971: 51). These are incentives that afflict directly on the individual, instead of all members of the society in the way POS do. Olson introduces these as a means for an organization to mobilize members. When taking part in a collective action does not only lead to the creation of the desired public good, but does also bring

12 personal advantages such as preferential access to the organization’s resources, and the individual has a preference for this access, a positive selective incentive is invoked and engagement of the individual in the protest action becomes more likely. Conversely, negative selective incentives may also be created such as exclusion from certain membership benefits for failure to comply. As Opp (2009: 50) puts it:

“The stronger the positive selective incentives for contributing and the stronger the negative selective incentives for not contributing, the more likely individuals contribute to the provision of the public good.”

The focus here lies on the possibilities organizations and movements have for mobilizing their members. It is, however, possible to take the argument one step further by looking at the individual level. Although rational choice theory has suggested that people only act out of economic interest, it is more plausible to include norm-driven behavior into the picture. Empirical evidence has shown that non-material incentives in many cases have an even bigger impact than material incentives such as higher wages of better access to supply of certain goods. Olson (1971: 60sq.) recognizes this and suggests “social incentives” which stem from the interaction between individuals in a society to be added. In this sense, disapproval from peers will be categorized as a negative social incentive, as this can lead to an increase in the costs of protesting. The strength on this incentive is however dependent on the individual and his or her preferences. This idea will be further developed in the following section on social networks.

Moral concepts and norms do also contribute to the weighing of costs and benefits. For every person, this scheme of ideas is different; therefore, they can also be seen as selective incentives (Olson 1971: 61). The more internalized a norm to participate or a norm not to rely on the work of others is in a person, the more likely he or she will be to take part in protest action.

Individuals do not act in isolation. In the following sub-chapter, the already mentioned influence of an individual’s social environment will be therefore be analyzed.

3. The meso-level: Social Networks, Collective Identity, Framing

As has been noted before, protest under normal circumstances is a joint action. Therefore, it is only plausible that social networks and collective cognitive processes play an important role in its emergence. As Opp (2009: 110) notes, networks favorable for protest behavior provide encouragement for their members to engage in protest action. On the other hand, networks adverse towards public engagement discourage their members.

What has been said about the individual level can generally be applied to groups as well. Social networks consist of members who share at least some common ideas and goals (Opp 2009: 198). Therefore it is feasible to take a look at goals of groups and their influences. If chances for achievement of the groups’ goals become more likely, its members will engage in protest.

These suggestions include however the free rider problem: if other members of the group or network engage in protest and achieve the desired change, the individual might even feel less inclined towards taking part in the protest action (Olson 1971: 16; Opp 2009: 198). Yet what needs not be forgotten is social interaction within a group. Such dynamics as peer pressure and social control can lead to participation in the protest action even if the individual’s own considerations would not incline him to do so (Olson 1971: 60 sq.). Collective action is therefore influenced by the individuals’ identification with the group. This identification is greatest in cases where a strong common identity can be discerned.

Membership in a network alone however does not by itself constitute a common identity. The biggest influence of network membership on the individuals’ behavior can be expected if the individuals feel a strong affiliation to the group and the group has become a sponsor of identity to its members (Opp 2009: 218). This mechanism is most efficient in close networks. Furthermore, goal intensity plays a role. The more desirable the achievement of the goal becomes, the more likely any member of the group or network is to take part in collective action (Opp 2009: 61). Thirdly, “perceived personal influence” (Opp 2009: 198, italics in the original) is important. If individuals feel their own role in the action makes a difference, they are much more likely to take part. This

14 is of course a matter of communication and interaction and shaped decisively by peers. This deliberation does not propose a complete solution to the free rider problem, it however shows a trend. In case of a close network with a high goal intensity and high perceived influence of each individual, free riding will less likely occur than in other cases.

a) Network dynamics: Framing processes

Social networks have specific dynamics that differentiate them from other groups of people. The interrelatedness of members of social networks leads to a certain uniformity in behavior. This thought has also been suggested by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, who note the importance of “signaling”, i.e. members of the same network reacting to signals of their peers to either continue in or abort the action. The same can be assumed to happen before the protest action takes place. Members of networks signal each other whether to take part. Thus it can be said that protest reproduces by social interaction. In a society that is already experiencing much protest, the individual will consequently probably be a member of a social network encouraging protest, whereas a society with little or no protest behavior will not provide strong societal incentives for protest. These processes whereby circumstances are collectively interpreted have become known as “framing processes” (McAdam et al. 1996: 2).

The notion of “framing” rests on the acknowledgement of “the central importance of ideas and cultural elements in understanding the […] participation in social movements” (Zald 1996: 261). It is a process by which different interpretations of a single issue are open for contention within a movement, network, or even society. The argument often develops along the lines whether to act, emphasizing either the possible gains or the possible losses of protest action (Gamson, Meyer 1996: 283, 285). Framing often happens as initiatives by social movement leaders (Zald 1996: 261), who put forward a proposition for the interpretation of a certain question. These interpretations are contested within the movement until a common stance is reached.

Ways and methods for protesting are also defined by framing processes. If a certain protest measure such as peaceful demonstrations fit the social norm, a network will much more likely see it adequate for the solution of a certain problem than in a society where protest is only accepted if it is violent (Zald 1996: 267). Consequently, the organization of a protest event will be successful in gathering people in a situation where framing has led to a common understanding of a need for action. The type of protest action chosen thus depends on the political environment. Strategies followed by social movements become more or less attractive depending on the polity itself as well as on the role actors play in it (Meyer 2004: 128).

This stresses the importance of social construction of reality. If a change in the political environment is collectively perceived as an opening opportunity structure and chances of success are expected to have risen, protest becomes more likely. Even though rational choice and constructivism have traditionally been considered incompatible, it is possible to incorporate the framing perspective into the logic of collective action by acknowledging the influence of these processes on the individual’s calculations. In a network that is agreeing on abstaining from protest, social costs in the case of defecting from this rule are high and need to be taken into account when trying to understand people’s behavior.

b) The missing link: Collective Identity

Collective identity has been presented as the missing perspective on rational choice (Opp 2009: 222). The idea is that people do engage in actions that do not seem logical or based on a weighing of costs and benefits. These actions can, such is the argument, only be explained by looking at identity. In the following, this approach will be described and its relevance explained. Then a possible way of incorporating the identity approach into the logic of collective action and thus into the rational choice theory will be introduced.

“A collective identity exists, by definition, if there is a group (i.e. individuals with at least one common goal) with common beliefs, with common normative

convictions, that is connected by social relationships (i.e. there is a social network) and by emotional bonds.” (Opp 2009: 210)

Collective identity is then identification with a group. It is important to note that collective identity deals with emotions or rather feelings of attachment to given individual experiences. This has an influence on collective action in the sense that a strong collective identity will compel the individual to act in favor of the group he or she is identifying with. Therefore, the stronger the collective identity of a group favoring protest action is, the more likely its members will take part.

The decisive notion is that individuals feel attached to different groups, therefore have different collective identities. Opp (2009: 215) mentions the examples of categories such as man or woman, roles and statuses such as professions, and group memberships such as in movements. Therefore, collective identity is relevant to protest behavior if individuals feel attached to relevant groups like movements or protest organizations (Opp 2009: 219). In cases where these identities conflict, the individual’s preferences determine the outcome, i.e. the behavior. A strong collective identity of a social movement or other network supporting protest will make it more likely that this identity will prevail in the case of conflict. Success strengthens collective identity as members experience a feeling of collective achievement which amplifies the social connections within the group (Opp 2009: 228), conversely failure will lead to a loosening of ties.

Rational choice assumes that all actions by an individual are based on the calculation of costs and benefits. By applying a broad view on the idea of rationality, it can be assumed that a strong identification is a solid base for expecting benefits or rewards. Complying with group action will render rewards for the individual such as social acceptance and respect, whereas non-compliance will trigger negative feedback from the other members of the group. The higher personal identification with the group gets, the higher the costs of non-compliance and the bigger the personal feeling of reward when being accepted in the group. Therefore, if people engage in seemingly irrational behavior, an implicit weighing of social costs and benefits is likely.

4. Mobilization

Generally speaking, Opp’s (2009: 200) conclusion that “the political environment may trigger protest behavior” by providing changes that can transform into incentives seems to be highly relevant. It has become clear that incentives rarely ever exist on their own but occur at the same time and are interrelated. An individual confronted with a multitude of incentives will have to weigh their importance and to decide which ones to follow. Taking rational choice theory as the basis for analysis, the assumption is made that people calculate and weigh their existing resources such as time and social acceptance and decide on the way to best utilize them (Opp 2009: 180). Lipset argues that revolts only happen when people are not afraid of a loss in power, status or goods (Lipset 1968: 92), thus confirming the assumption of a weighing of costs and benefits. In this case, the costs of further bearing the situation and the grievances are weighed against the costs and possible benefits of protesting. If the benefits of eliminating the grievances outweigh the costs of protesting, the eruption of protest becomes more probable. This also counts for the structure, i.e. the relative openness, of systems. If a system is very closed, repression is more likely in the case of protest, thus protesting bears high costs. In a very open system, access to the decisions is very easy even by regular means. Protesting in this case bears high costs in the sense that irregular behavior leads to higher opportunity costs. Protesting therefore takes place in such situations when it is the best possible way to achieve the goal.

Consequently, high potential for protest does not alone determine also a high level of protest engagement in a society. There also needs to be a perceived chance of success, regardless of the actual probability determined by the opportunity structures. If the chances for success are high, but the people affected by grievances do not note the favorable situation, they will still not protest (Opp 2009: 109). Thus, existing opportunities that can be discerned on the macro-level are only relevant if there is a link to the micro-level by which these opportunities are made known to people with grievances. This bears two distinct features. Firstly, potential protesters need to notice the change that opened an opportunity. Secondly, this opportunity needs to be recognized by the individuals as such (McAdam et al. 2001: 43). A further development of the POS model takes this condition into account and concentrates on the “expectation

18 of success” and thus links the macro- to the micro-level (Opp 2009: 169). Protest action will therefore only take place if the individuals taking part in it expect their chances of success to be sufficiently high, or in other words, that their actions do make a difference.

Social movements put forward their interpretation of reality which has been reached by an internal framing process. This may or may not be accepted by unmobilized people (Opp 2009: 234), resulting in them taking part in the proposed protest action or abstaining from it. So framing is not only a way of developing a common understanding of protesting or not protesting but also of mobilizing more people to take part in protests.

Framing processes are therefore dependent on the larger cultural context they happen in. Only if a meaningful background of common understanding is given, these processes can take place. This is due to them resting on a common understanding of right and wrong and basic norms of social life (Zald 1996: 266). In this context, events and circumstances are “framed” so they fit in the picture and connect to familiar images. Mobilization can consequently happen when and if a certain number of people agree on an interpretation of reality as giving the opportunity and justification of protest, i.e. when a shared feeling of injustice exists and a shared perception of opportunity structures (Opp 2009: 253).

Collective identity and framing processes therefore influence the cost calculations of the individual. High costs exist in an environment that is generally protest-averse. Framing processes change this social environment of an individual. If changes occur in the political environment, social networks collectively interpret these changes as favorable or unfavorable for protesting. The individual may either actively take part in this process or can adopt the final interpretation of the situation. Either way will the established frame have an influence on the individual’s behavior. If there is a strong emotional bond towards the group or network, he or she will only in cases where personal cost-benefit calculations differ much from the group’s calculations defect from the collectively established decision. Thus collective identity plays an important role in the question of engagement in or abstaining from protesting.

Consequently, the individual sees itself confronted with incentives stemming from different societal levels. Firstly, macro-level factors rarely affect the decision directly. Rather they influence incentives working on the individual level such as perceived personal influence. The same is valid for meso-level factors. Changing opportunity structures on the macro-level for example change the expectations for success on the individual as well as on the group level. Changes in the social environment in turn also affect incentives on the individual level which by changing the individuals’ behavior again lead to changed group dynamics. Only if by recognizing that the individual’s decision is not only influenced by different and often contradicting factors but also that these factors influence, change, and sometimes eliminate each other, it will be possible to understand the evolution of protest and protest movements in Poland since 1989.

This link between the macro- and micro-levels becomes even clearer when reconsidering the protest potential mentioned earlier. Protest potential is dependent on the aggregated grievances in a society, which is made up of individual feelings. Therefore, the connection between both levels is a crucial aspect of the assessment of protest behavior in a society. Only if the macro- and micro-level conditions are favorable to the emergence of protest, will people engage in protest activities.

To evaluate whether protest will or will not erupt at a given time and in a given society, an assessment of the political environment and changes that have been made is necessary. This way it becomes possible to explain why certain changes have provoked protest and others have not, and why protest emerged at one point and not at another. Especially when it comes to explaining protest movements and -waves, an evaluation of changed circumstances is crucial. One important connection has been shown by Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 7), by pointing out the link between turnout at elections and engagement in protest behavior. As shown above, protest reproduces. Furthermore, people who vote are more likely to protest and generally take part in political activity. This notion suggests that people are overall more or less politically active but rarely do engage only in one type of political activity.

C. The Formation of Movements

In the previous part, the emergence of political protest as such has been evaluated. In the following, the argument will be taken one step further by assessing the circumstances necessary for the emergence of protest movements. This is relevant as collective action mostly happens in those cases where all the conditions for protest are fulfilled and people are “sufficiently organized to act” (McAdam et al. 1996: 8). Consequently, movements serve as the basis for protest in so far as they constitute the organizational frame that makes protest action likely.

It needs to be mentioned that research on the emergence of movements is rare. It rather seems as if scholars tend to assume them as given when elaborating on protest (cf. for an overview Opp 2009: 360). This chapter will therefore point out variables that seem to be relevant as they are mentioned in various publications.

Protest action rarely happens spontaneously but most often is organized by some kind of movement or organization. These associations have become known as mobilizing structures (McAdam et al. 1996: 3), which are a necessary precondition for collective action. Although mobilizing structures do not necessarily consist only of movements, but also of unorganized social networks, the existence of a formal organization aids in the mobilization process. Strong organizational ties will amplify social incentives including the framing process (McAdam et al. 1996: 9); therefore, it seems sensible to assume that in a society where movements are a normalcy, protest action will happen more often. Moreover, movements can also create new POSs that in turn lead to the creation of new protest and eventually movements (McAdam 1996: 35). This happens in those cases when movements achieve some of their goals, which often lead to changes in the polity. Furthermore, success by one movement can also induce others to follow suit.

There is considerable disagreement in literature when it comes to define “movement”. Sidney Tarrow and David S. Meyer (1998: 4) define it as “collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities”. This definition is very detailed and includes interaction processes which in this paper will not

21 be dealt with. Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the view and exclude such details. Gamson and Meyer (1996: 283) characterize movements as “sustained and self- conscious challenge[s] to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors”. This emphasizes the collectivity of the movement, but leaves out the for this paper expendable facets of the previous definition. Furthermore, it stresses that a movement is not uniform but a collectivity of multiple actors. Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 18) also point out that a movement is “generally composed of a number of organizations and affiliated organizations cooperating – to some degree – to advance political claims”. This shows one important characteristic, namely that movements can be and often are networks of smaller groups. Olson (1971: 5) mentions the purpose of “organization”, which is “the furtherance of the interests of their members, without the requisite of success. He points out, however, that in case of complete failure, the movement will most likely not be able to persist.

A minimal definition that many scholars can agree on includes a group of people with at least a nominal level of organization who have a common goal (Opp 2009: 36sq.). Consent exists on the prerequisite of a certain number of people – one person alone is not a movement. Furthermore, the movement needs to have an “antagonist” and cannot reach their target on their own but want to achieve their goal by influencing the antagonist. It is important to note that a movement is only given when its members are active over a certain period of time. Therefore a protest movement will in this paper be defined as a group of people with at least a minimal degree of organization who share the goal to influence the actions of others whose decisions they want to reverse, prevent, or advance and take action on a recurring basis.

A movement emerges when protesters unite and their protest becomes more frequent. They are created under the impression of the specific political circumstances a society offers at a given time (McAdam et al. 1996: 11) and emerge usually to further the common interest of their members. Where individual interests are concerned, and unorganized protest is more promising, movements are not likely to form. On the other hand, they will most likely be called into existence where a number of people share a common goal (Olson 1971: 7), and where organized protest is necessary to achieve this goal. McAdam et al. (1996: 11) also note that the form or type of movement is

22 dependent on the possibilities, or rather opportunities, available to the protesters. In a society that has prohibited the formation of formal organizations, and that suddenly allows registration of unions, the opportunity will most probably be seized and unions will be created; whereas a society that has enjoyed a general freedom of association for a long time will probably see the registration of different types of organizations on an irregular basis.

In addition, movements are based on interaction between individuals. A society that already records close interpersonal ties is therefore more apt to see movements forming. Opp (2009: 125) refers to a case study on a Spanish mining village and points out the “relatively dense network of inhabitants” as a relevant factor in the explanation of the emergence of mass protest. It is therefore possible to conclude that the stronger the ties between individuals in a society are the more likely movements form that are actively involved in the political process of this society.

What is more, movements influence each other much in the same way as individuals do. If a number of movements have formed, others are more likely to follow than in the case of a single movement as pioneer. Additionally, they are more likely to organize protest in such cases, where other movements have already engaged in protest action (Tarrow 1996: 60). Protest will therefore most likely happen in a society with many active movements where the factors named in the previous chapter are favorable.

III. Protest in Poland

In the preceding chapter, a theoretic look at the emergence of protest and protest movements has been presented. With this background, the situation in Poland and its development after the successes of the Solidarity movement will be examined. In general, different phases of political development according to political reforms will be examined and the protest intensity during these phases will be evaluated. During the transition years, protest behavior of Polish citizens was different from today when Poland is a consolidated democracy. The time span since 1989 will therefore be divided into two rough periods. The transition period, which lased more or less until 1997, when

23 today’s constitution was introduced, will thus be examined first. The frequency of protest was higher in the first years of transition; therefore, a division will be made after 1993. The subsequent section will then turn to Poland as a consolidated democracy. As entering the European Union had a significant impact on Polish citizens’ behavior, a separate look at the time after 2004 will be provided. Lastly, the events of 2010 when the tragedy of Smolensk hit Poland will be evaluated.

A general characteristic of protest in Poland is the struggle of “well-defined social groups” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 102) for economic benefits. This is not surprising as grievances, which we have defined in the preceding chapter as prerequisites for protest, are per definition mostly economic in nature. Trade unions and federations have been the most actively involved in protest have, as they constitute the best-organized groups and have the largest membership base (Korkut 2005: 151). Furthermore, union membership has since the time of Solidarity been rather a matter of political involvement (Zaborowski 1993: 65), not so much of civic action. Apart from these, until today, no influential protest movements have emerged in Poland. Therefore, the distinction between political and other forms of protest is often unclear. The most used form of protest was striking (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 104), sometimes supported by demonstrations. This makes a distinction between political and purely economic protest further difficult. The following analysis will therefore concentrate on those protest actions that are decidedly political and try to omit those that are only economic in character. This approach is sensible insofar as the target of protest is most often easily identifiable as either being the bearer of a political function or not. Where state institutions and agencies are affected, protest is per definition political. However, there are cases that cannot be classified as either but have characteristics of both. These will be used for illustration purposes where applicable.

A. Transition Period: 1989-1997

During the transition years Poland experienced a very low strike rate in general. Only in the years 1992 and 1993, the participants in strikes exceeded 10 per thousand (or 1%)

24 working-aged people (3% and 1.5% respectively). This was due to a short-lived strike wave led by Solidarity, which waned after 1993 (Vanhuysse 2006: 18).

Scholars disagree on how to interpret the transition phase in terms of the named protest waves. Jan Kubik and Grzegorz Ekiert argue that protest has become “institutionalized” and that citizens were active during transition (Kubik 1998; Ekiert, Kubik 1998). Others tend to see protest action as rather spontaneous and infrequent (Korkut 2005; Vanhuysse 2006). Nevertheless, all authors agree that protest rates were much lower than expected. Korkut for example speaks of “passive tolerance [...] for the reform policies” (2005: 152) by the citizenry, and Ekiert and Kubik mention “relative social quiescence” (1998: 93). Therefore, even those authors that see protest as an integral part of Polish transition can agree on a significant break of protest behavior after 1989.

1. 1st Phase: 1989-1993

The years between 1989 and 1993 saw by far the most protest events during transition. Polish citizens engaged in popular protest much more frequent in the years following the collapse of communism than in other CEE countries. However, protest frequency was still lower than in most Western democracies (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 92sq.) and much lower than in the years preceding the collapse of the state socialist system. The targets of protest actions during the first transition years were practically always state institutions (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 100sq.), consequently the protest action needs to be classified as political even in cases where striking for economic benefits was the only action taken. More specifically, strikes in the first years of transformation were directed mainly at the restructuring of the country’s economy and the worsening labor conditions, expressing disputes between employees and the state. These strikes usually happened spontaneously and were not organized by unions, but were often supported by them after being set up (Stegemann 2009: 320). Strikes in the mining industry, for example, were conducted in order to ease national income restrictions and to cut the debts of state-owned enterprises.

Participation in political life in general was declining after 1989. Ekiert and Kubik note that “collective protest emerged as one of the most important forms of participation in public life” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998). Considering what has been said earlier about the relative social peace, and the notion that protest itself was not widely spread, it will be shown that it was not very desirable for Poles to become actively involved. Instead of protesting, many workers chose the “silent non-exit option” (Vanhuysse 2006: 60). This means that they chose to go into informal employment, if they had not been in it even before the fall of communism. This way, they escaped from the state’s influence and detached themselves from the labor policies others protested against.

In 1989, the outcomes of the Round Table talks paved the way for political involvement of Solidarity and its successor parties. The semi-free elections of 1989 guaranteed 65% of seats in the Sejm for the ruling party, 35% of the seats as well as all seats in the Senate were to be openly contested (Tworzecki 1996: 50). During these elections, Solidarity won all seats for contention. This event led to a politicization of the organization and reformed it from a protest movement to a political movement (Korkut 2005: 163). Thus, the most influential civil organization lost its leaders to politics. By definition, they could, and eventually did, hereafter serve as antagonists for protest.

Immediately after the collapse of the old system, fights within the civil society elites began on how to interpret history and on spheres of influence. These leaders becoming the new political elite led to a paralysis on the civil level, where suddenly leaders were missing (Rode 2009: 418). As a result, civil society became increasingly powerless in the face of inner-elite struggles on the political level (Korkut 2005: 161). Already during this period, the Solidarity movement began to fall apart. Its members in the government were without exception members of the intelligentsia, which led to allegations of elitism of the ruling Solidarity circles (Tworzecki 1996: 51). In 1990, differences among these high-ranked Solidarity members broke out and eventually led to Lech Wałęsas declaration of the “war at the top” (Beyer 2010: 30). This period caused a deep chasm within the movement and polarized Polish society further. As a result, unions saw a sharp decline in membership during these years (Korkut 2005: 155). Until 1990, Solidarity had been the uniting mass movement for all political protest

26 in Poland. After its split, protest did not fade away at once, but manifested itself in various small parties and other groupings (Millard 2009: 783).

In 1991, a threshold of 5% of votes for parties and 8% for coalitions was introduced, 3 and consequently parliamentary representation of organized protest diminished in 1993. Most of those protest movements that still gained seats in the Sejm in 19934 lost some of their deputies over time due to resignation. Especially Solidarity and its successor parties suffered from this development (Millard 2009: 785sqq.). This shows the falling degree of organization that has been dropping steadily since 1989.

After Solidarity’s split in 1990, several areas of civil society experienced a dynamic development to fill the existing gap between government and its citizens. The first area where civil society became apparent was the local level, especially in local self- government structures. Secondly, ad hoc and other barely formalized groups were installed in Poland, such as youth movements and subcultural milieus. Lastly, NGOs started to be instituted in Poland (Gliński 01-15-2008: 3). However, this cannot veil the fact that protest movements were weak or virtually nonexistent after Solidarity had entered politics. Local organizations are neither instituted not fit to engage in large-scale collective action needed for protest against national government politics. Furthermore, these organizations were usually formed around one or more charismatic leaders (Szczerbiak 2001: 101), thereby depending on this person or group of persons to keep the organization alive. In 1993, several NGOs had been founded in Poland in various fields. Most of them were not descendants of the Solidarity movement but instead founded by professionals (Sokolowski 2002: 10). These groups only rarely engaged in political protest but were mostly occupied with specific aspects of the founder’s profession. Furthermore, quasi-NGOs were instituted by politicians who used these organizations to further their own goals and political career (Gliński 01-15-2008: 3). Contrary to what might have been expected, no new protest organizations were created during the first transition years. Instead, existing groups such as Solidarity split, and as a result a rise in the overall number of organizations can be observed (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 102).

3 This was a result of the 1991 elections which had resulted in a highly diverse Sejm. It could not efficiently work as too many parties and groupings had gained seats. 4 The first election carried out under the new regulations.

Between 1989 and 1993, the number of people involved in any given protest action nevertheless increased (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 98). In 1990 and 1991, most protests were organized by farmers’ unions demanding increases in subsidies on agricultural products and resorting mostly to demonstrations and street blockades (Pleines 2006: 17). In February 1991, various branches experienced strikes and demonstrations by workers, protesting against the popiwek, a tax that was levered on wage growth in order to limit inflation (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 97). During 1992 and 1993, the peak years for protest, miners and other workers in the state-owned mining sector were responsible for most protests. Their demands covered a range of issues, mostly economic but also political.

Starting in summer 1992, protests took on a nationwide scale. The demands raised by protesters were explicit and combined economic as well as political aspects, such as changes in the privatization law and a restriction on foreign investment. The actions started on a local level, but were incorporated into a nationwide campaign by unions establishing a national coordinating committee. Among the organizers of the campaign were Solidarity ’80, a militant splinter of Solidarity and Samoobrona,5 the strongest farmers’ union. Through this establishment and the issuing of a list of 21 demands, they drew on the national experience with Solidarity’s success (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 106). In mid-December 1992, Solidarity organized a nation-wide strike against the rising costs of living, which transformed into a general strike of all mines in Upper Silesia (Stegemann 2009: 332). During the first half of 1993, a number of other sectors, including the public sector, were involved in the protest wave, involving at most 300,000 workers in a strike lasting for one month (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 97). In spring of that year, the demand to relax economic policies led to a protest campaign organized by Solidarity. The protesters were successful in inducing a vote of non-confidence in parliament which led to the incumbent government being voted out of office (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 113). This, however, was only possible due to Solidarity’s representation in parliament, leading to a blurred line between civil protest and parliamentary procedures.

5 Samoobrona and its leader Andrzej Lepper also played a decisive rule in the farmers’ protests of the late 1990s; see subsequent section.

The biggest protests did not occur in the regions that were affected most by the economic and social reforms, but in those regions where the degree of organization was the highest, namely Warsaw, Silesia, Gdańsk, Cracow, Szczecin and Lodz (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 98). The concerns of protesters were most often connected to their local community or workplace; only about 30% of protests concerned matters that the national institutions were actually responsible for (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 109).

In summary, the years between 1989 and 1993 were characterized by increasing protest frequency and magnitude, but still with considerably lower levels of protest than the preceding years. Protest activities were mostly carried out by “members of ‘mainstream’ social categories” (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 113), who had been privileged under socialism and lost their privileges after 1989. These protesters were generally organized in labor unions, and new organizations were not widely founded.

Protest action was diverse and uncoordinated. Organization of protest by more than one movement was the exception rather than the rule (Castle, Taras 2002: 178). Therefore, strikes organized by a union were usually the means of choice for protesters, who protested mostly against state institutions (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 114). Thus, protest during the first transitions years was political protest carried out in a labor-related environment. Success was however scarce, especially in the field of macro-economic policies (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 114), i.e. the reforms that made transition to a market economy possible. Only on local issues or in specific questions did protest yield some results.

2. 2nd Phase: 1993-1997

During the second half of the 1990s, farmers started to become the most active protest group, replacing workers. Their standard of living had fallen even more than that of the former group and they started to feel increasingly marginalized in the modernizing state (Castle, Taras 2002: 180). Their unionization rate was still high, and as unions played a noticeable role in the reformulation of Polish labor law during the years 1989 to 1997 (Stegemann 2009: 369), their influence should not be forgotten. However, after 1993,

29 strike rates dropped impressively (Stegemann 2009: 369; Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 93), and after 1995 strikes became relatively rare, never exceeding 42 in total in any given year with a maximum of 40,000 participants. Compared even with Western countries this is rather peaceful (Castle, Taras 2002: 178). Even with farmers becoming more active, this development did not replace the subsiding engagement of workers after 1993.

To contest this waning activism, Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc, AWS) was formed in 1996 and incorporated more than 30 center-right political parties and movements (Szczerbiak 2001: 95). It was an attempt to reunite the anti-Communist protest under the old Solidarity label, but could also be seen to be a reaction to the problem caused by civil elites becoming active in the political sphere. This union of splinter parties was far from being a cooperation of protest movements. Instead they had transformed into real parties that became members of the political system – a situation that bans them per definition from being part of the protest. As Korkut (2005: 152) observes, “it was not the citizenry that shaped the post-communist political order, but the citizenry was obliged to accept this order”. The divide between politics and the civil sphere could not be bridged by this attempt and AWS soon lost its significance. Having gained more than 30% in the elections in 1997, already in the next round they could not pass the 8% threshold (Alexander 2005: 382).

Even in the case of protest, the attitude towards the reform process was positive and the participants supported the changes as such (Korkut 2005: 152). More specifically, protests were never directed against the new system, instead their aim was to participate in the reform process and correct specifics (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 107). These protests mostly led to minor policy changes (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 111); however, their influence was low. The years after 1993 were thus remarkably peaceful.

What is more, protest during transformation was very much a matter of self-interest of those involved, missing the unique feature of Solidarity as an encompassing solidary action (Castle, Taras 2002: 182). The short-lived attempt of the AWS did not prove to be successful and social engagement settled at a very low level.

In summary, the transition phase proved not to be very beneficial for political protest on a large scale, as the civil society elites who had initiated protest during the Solidarity

30 years moved to politics. However, the levels of protest during the transition years were still surprisingly low considering the hardships stemming from transition combined with expanding opportunities for protest (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 93). The process that made politicians out of Solidarity members also changed these individuals’ convictions and dedications (Korkut 2005: 156), leading to low responsiveness of the system to demands voiced by the citizenry and low efficacy of protests.

B. Consolidated Democracy: 1997 – 2004

The introduction of a new constitution happened only in 1997, due to polarization within Polish society and politics. Between 1992 and 1997, the basis for state action had been a “small constitution”, so that there would be time to work out the details of the final document. Polarization happened due to two main reasons. Firstly, the threshold to enter parliament was contested mostly by Solidarity successor parties who had gained less than 5% in the last parliamentary election and who were thus banned from taking part in the final vote on the constitution. A second issue that was fiercely debated was a reference to God in the preamble of the constitution. Especially the church voiced opposition to the compromise that mentions but does not put God exclusively as the source for right and wrong (Ziemer 2009: 147sq.). Surprisingly this situation did not result in intense protests when the final draft to be voted upon became public. Even turnout at the constitutional referendum in May was below 50% (Ziemer 2009: 149), whilst demonstrations or strikes did not happen at all in this context.

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, unionization levels dropped further. Between 2001 and 2005, Solidarity lost about 1/3 of their membership base. In 2005, the unionization rate was only 14%, compared to 80% in 1981. Today Poland is one of the countries in the EU with the lowest unionization rates (Rode 2009: 416). Furthermore, voters’ identification with Solidarity and its heritage waned over time. At the beginning of the 2000s, a sharp shift away from Solidarity successor parties was distinguishable in the presidential election (2000) and the following parliamentary election (2001) (Millard 2009: 792).

In 2001, the farmers’ union Samoobrona, being the last one to remain a movement without political engagement besides the already existing farmers’ party PSL, started running for election on a populist and nationalist agenda under the leadership of the infamous Andrzej Lepper (Korkut 2005: 156). A differentiation between social movements and political parties has thus become impossible as every movement now has its political branch.

1998 and 1999 saw a protest wave where the demands were rarely taken into account by politicians and the aims were never fully reached. Starting in July 1998, when 15,000 grain growers demonstrated in Warsaw, and continuing until May 1999, farmers, led by Lepper, fiercely protested and rioted against agrarian politics (Lange 06-15-2007: 17) and subsidized food imports from the EU. The system change of 1989 had already brought painful reforms for farmers when food subsidies were cut by 80% and input subsidies were also reduced by a high percentage (Kiereta 2001: 87). Furthermore, the transformation process as well as the opening of the Polish market led to a deterioration of real prices for agricultural goods (Kiereta 2001: 88). In 1998, a market depression for agricultural products further decreased farmers’ incomes, a process that continued in 1999. Farmers across Central and Eastern Europe were severely affected after Russia experienced an economic crisis during that period. This led to a decline in agricultural output of about 15% (Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 2003: 1). Furthermore, support to agriculture significantly dropped after 1999 and stayed on a low level afterwards (Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa 2003: 7). Protest did however not mobilize as many people as one would expect as only 12% of Polish farmers participated in the action.

The outcome of the so-called “farmers’ wars” was an agreement between the farmers’ unions and the government in which higher guaranteed prices for grain were secured. The protests were nevertheless not very successful as the government reduced subsidies the following year to the level they had been before the agreement came into power (Pleines 2006: 18). So the protesters were not able to reverse the downward trend of lower income nor to secure broader government support over time.

In February and July 1999, doctors, nurses and midwives demonstrated against the planned health care reform. It was to be the end of a reform process that had started in

1991. Until then, medical care had been organized by the state in a national health care service, which aimed at equalizing access to medical support for all citizens, but suffered greatly from inefficiency (Podzerek-Knop 2004: 3). The reform process was directed at reducing centralization, introducing health insurance and at privatizing the sector. From the beginning on it was characterized by great insecurity as different ideas were discussed at the same time and the final plan was not implemented in the end. Instead, it was supplanted by a series of ad hoc measures which led to a lack in transparency and high incentives for corruption (Podzerek-Knop 2004: 6, 10). The reform of 1999 aimed at putting an end to the precarious situation and introduced an internal market with competition between insurances and between providers of medical services, following a more individualized, market-oriented approach (Podzerek-Knop 2004: 21). Protest therefore demanded a continued involvement of the state and expressed dissatisfaction with the role of health insurances that were going to be responsible for paying for medical services (Podzerek-Knop 2004: 78) and as such could de facto decide upon the income of service providers. Nevertheless, the reform was introduced and the medical sector privatized as protest failed to reach its aims.

In the aftermath of the reform’s introduction, nurses continued their struggle for a pay raise and improved working conditions. However, the government took on a defensive stance as the reform had introduced privatization and thus transferred responsibilities to the public health insurances. After more than half a year of protesting by squatting ministries, demonstrating, which included a gathering of about 20,000-30,000 nurses in Warsaw in June, and a hunger strike later that month, an agreement between the government and the nurses’ union was reached. The agreement offered the nurses pay raises; however, in August not more than 10% of all nurses had received the promised money (Börzel 2010: 34). At the end of 2000, nurses again squatted the Ministry of Health in an attempt to obtain a wage rise of 125 Euro, but had to give up their action in December (Lange 06-15-2007: 16). Finally, the work situation of this occupational branch remains precarious and protest by different means has not been successful in the long run.

In September 1999 about 30,000 people demonstrated against the government, after a call to action by farmers’ unions, requesting the government to resign and calling for

33 snap elections (Lange 06-15-2007: 17). The number of participants, however, fell by far short of the 100,000 organizers had hoped for. In this sense, this incident seems to be symptomatic for protest in Poland since transformation (Castle, Taras 2002: 178). In 2002, Solidarity was successful in organizing demonstrations against the reforms of the Labor Law (Stegemann 2009: 396), but failed in reversing the process. At the beginning of 2004, strikes concerning the retirement law were launched by Solidarity, including a law initiative which was finally passed by the parliament in 2005 (Stegemann 2009: 369). All in all, only few protest actions were recorded during the years following 1999, and those that took place failed in reaching their goals in most cases.

C. Poland in the EU: 2004 – 2010

Before EU-accession, much protest was heard from the Polish farmers. 6 Their general skepticism towards the EU was based on a feeling of disinformation, but their fears were centered around soil sales to foreign investors and competition with subsidized products from other EU member states (Bachmann 2011: 127). Under Socialism there had been guaranteed prices for their products and no competition from other countries.

The shock of transition to a market economy was already forceful, and the prospects of being incorporated into an even larger market therefore not desirable. As rural population makes up about one third of the Polish population, their votes were however necessary for the accession referendum to pass (Kiereta 2001: 155). Polish peasants’ interests were secured through parliamentary representation. Firstly, the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) has been playing a decisive role in government formation in Poland. Secondly the radical Self-Defense (Samoobrona) also claimed to be supporting farmers’ interests (Bachmann 2011: 130). Before the accession referendum, the Polish peasants could thus be considered a veto player due to their high degree of organization as well as due to their influential parliamentary representation (Bachmann 2011: 131).

In the forerun to the accession referendum in Poland, political protest by farmers and rural population in general was thus higher than during the preceding years. However,

6 See section B for details. Although farmers’ protest of 1998 and 1999 was not solely protest against EU accession, it still forms one aspect of the collective action.

34 as intense struggle can only be accredited to farmers a nationwide protest wave cannot be discerned. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that by far not all farmers opposed EU accession and protested. Especially those farmers that do not produce for the market were not so concerned about competition (Pleines 2006: 15) and did not take part in protest as frequently as those fearing lower prices and higher competition.

During the first years of the 2000s, civil society in Poland had been growing, especially in the cities. About 32,000 different NGOs were active in those years, predominantly in the areas of education, health service and social activities (Garsztecki October 2001). Under the Kazcyński administration, starting in 2005, this development was halted.

Today Poland still shows the lowest participation rate in voluntary organizations of all EU countries with 2/3 of the whole citizenry being completely uninvolved in any kind of movement or organization in 2009 (Szawiel 2009: 498, see also table 1). Polish citizens also show very low readiness to participate in unpaid social work for the good of the community, and in 2010 less than 1/5 of Poles above the age of 18 participated in such activities (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznych 2010: 0, see table 1). Civil society thus experienced only a short phase of growth since 1989 and remains weak.

Table 1: Have you, during the course of last year, been working voluntarily and unpaid for your community, church, settlement, village, town, or for people in need?

(CBOS 2010: 12)

Between 2005 and 2007, public mockery of the government much like during Communist time was widespread in Poland. This behavior cannot, however, count as protest as the central part of our definition includes the aim to influence decisions. By

35 displaying politicians as unable or discrediting them otherwise, the decision to be influenced is less than clear in the best, and nonexistent in the worst cases. Curiously enough, public protest or even revolts were limited.

Under the Kaczyński government, weeks-long strikes by doctors and nurses became prominent even outside of Poland. Furthermore, teachers, mailmen and miners protested several times (Vetter 2008: 182). Even so, their protest was aiming at higher wages and better working conditions. Although these occupational groups are all state-employed, their protest aims do not fulfill the conditions for political protest. The state addressed by these protests was acting in the same way as any other employer and consequently the notion of “political” is missing here. Most public critique was heard from the intellectuals who accused the Kazcyńskis of undermining the rule of law in Poland. This critique did however not serve as a starting point for further protest (Vetter 2008: 11). Therefore, political protest against the Kazcyński government did not happen on a noticeable scale even though discontent was widespread.

Consequently, campaigning for the parliamentary election of fall 2007 was as fierce as it had never been before (Vetter 2008: 123) and reached a level of polarization unknown to this date. The governing PiS-party was trying hard to mobilize voters whilst the opposition parties tried to win former PiS supporters over. Voter turnout was the highest since 1989. Especially young people who had not been involved in political activity before, voted and reminded their peers to follow suit (Vetter 2008: 129). Finally, the moderate conservative party PO won the elections and Donald Tusk became prime minister.

Right after Tusk had stepped into office as prime minister in 2007, several occupational groups again voiced claims for higher wages. Firstly, teachers became active, later also doctors and nurses working in public hospitals as well as miners pressured the new government for wage increases (Vetter 2008: 147). This can be seen as a continuation of the protests under the former government as those had not been successful. Therefore, the same argument is valid here, that these collective actions do not fulfill the criteria of political protests.

Generally speaking, collective action, be it formal or informal, legal or illegal has been unpopular in Poland. In a survey conducted in 2006, for example, only 1.4% of those questioned had taken part in a public demonstration, and only 0.2% in illegal public protests (Gliński 01-15-2008: 4). The most activity in Polish civil society can be found in the NGO sector. Yet the establishment of Polish NGOs has effectively been a process initiated by the political elites, meaning that a growing of movements out of the citizenry has virtually not taken place (Gliński 01-15-2008: 6). In 2008, about 65,000 NGOs were registered in Poland, comprising mostly sports, tourism, recreation and hobby associations. Furthermore, cultural and arts as well education associations exist. Areas, in which the most activity by Poles takes place are local church activities and the engagement of parents in their children’s schools (Gliński 01-15-2008: 4). Engagement in political movements or organizations, by contrast, is uncommon.

Interest groups, in their nature most fit to organize protest action, are often either used by parties as their sphere of influence or they become parties themselves instead of protesting (Korkut 2005: 159). Still today unions are active in politics and can be identified as being of a rather “socio-political” (Korkut 2005: 164) character. Leaders often use their position within the union to advance to political positions or to receive political gains from it. Thereby unions cannot be classified as pure civil society organizations.

The biggest problem Polish NGOs, and civil society in general, have to face are meager finances. What is more, the gap between rich NGOs and those that operate on a very low budget has been widening (Gliński 01-15-2008: 5). Civil society has consequently been facing strong barriers to institutionalization and organization of public action. In combination with the matters of organizations rarely touching on political issues, it becomes obvious that political engagement must remain low.

Over the last years, general trust in effectiveness of protest measures such as strikes has been declining and with it membership in unions such as Solidarity. On the other hand, employers’ associations have been gaining influence (Vetter 2008: 34), and by the same token, civil society in Poland is not considered to be an equal partner by neither government nor business (Gliński 01-15-2008: 2). At the beginning of 2010, 28% of Polish citizens were active in civic organizations, which is the highest number since

1998 (Garsztecki 04-20-2010: 6), but still very low compared to unionization rates at the end of communism.

The dominant feature of Polish public life is increasingly the privatization of issues; people feel more attached to their local communities and families instead of the nation (Garsztecki 2010: 6). A mechanism of “muddling through” has prevailed over the past years as personal alliances continue to determine policy-making in Poland and institutionalized channels for voicing demands are rarely used (Korkut 2005: 158). Public protest on a large scale seems to become more unlikely, even if the proportion of people engaged in civic organizations may slowly be rising as the number from 2010 suggest. As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, the type of organization varies and is rarely even connected to political issues.

D. The Smoleńsk Tragedy 2010 and its Aftermath

On April 10, 2010, the biggest tragedy in contemporary Polish history took place. On their way to a joint memorial service in honor of the Polish officers who were killed by Russian soldiers at Katyń with the Russian president, the airplane carrying the Polish president Lech Kaczyński alongside his wife and 95 other important public figures7 crashed. All passengers died (Lesser 2010). Even if the event brought about a certain peace between the political parties who halted their controversies and fights for some months, decisions taken by officials triggered civil protest on a larger scale than ever since 1993. The general tone of these protests was a feeling that officials had not sufficiently honored the victims. In this context, conspiracy theories of murder became popular and further heated public mood (Najder 2010: 35). Two main incidents incited the protests.

The first issue that triggered protest was the question of the burial site for Lech Kaczyński and his wife Maria. Only a few days after the crash, hundreds of people took to the streets, voicing their discontent over the plan to lay them to rest in Cracow’s Wawel, the site where Polish kings and national heroes have traditionally been buried

7 Among them were the complete military leadership, several members of parliament and relatives of officers who had been killed in the Katyń massacre.

(Hinsey 2011: 143). Mainly young people were involved in these demonstrations, protesting against the “deification” (Hinsey 2011: 150) of the late president. The demonstrations subsided after a few weeks, especially after the funeral had taken place in Cracow on April 18 (Gnauck 09-21-2010: 5). If this was political protest matching the definition is at the least not completely clear. The decision in question was taken by Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz, who is not a member of the polity but a high-ranking church official. Yet the topic was of a highly political matter and the carrying out of a state funeral is in the hands of members of the system. So even if members of the political system did not take the decision about the site alone, they were part of it. The protests can therefore be classified as political.

The second issue had more impact on political life, although the numbers of protesters did not exceed a few hundreds. Shortly after the plane crash, scouts groups placed a wooden cross in front of the president’s palace in Warsaw. Before assuming office, the newly elected president Bronisław Komorowski planned to remove it, as a religious sign was not seen fit for a public place like the president’s palace and to place it in the church of St. Anna. This plan was met by public protest organized through a protest committee set up ad hoc by members of PiS and the public, which even resulted in public riots in front of the President’s Palace (Gnauck 09-21-2010: 5). The rioting public attacked priests and officers in charge of the removal of the cross (Krzemiński 2010: 41). In the end, the plan to transfer the cross was temporarily dismissed. As a result a counter demonstration was set up mostly by young people communicating via Facebook a few days after the planned transfer date (Majcherek 2010: 22). The organizers of the demonstration were successful in convening a few thousand participants in favor of the removal (Garsztecki 2010: 6). Finally, the cross was transferred to the chapel in the Palace in September (Gnauck 09-21-2010: 5). This was a quite exceptional case for Poland as the demonstration did not only lead to riots, but was also met by a counter demonstration. Moreover, its significance stems from religious Poles who wanted to keep the cross attacking church officials. This had been unthinkable until this incident in the traditionally catholic Poland.

E. Characteristics of Protest 1989-2010

It is now possible to pinpoint certain waves in the organization of protest since the collapse of the communist system in 1989. Firstly, transition provided fertile grounds for protest with its peak in 1993 and the following rapid decline. The second wave can be discerned in 1998 and 1999 with a number of sectors involved. Protest after 1999 was less encompassing so it is not possible to make out any more waves. The most intense protest action since the beginning of the millennium happened in 2010 after the Smoleńsk national tragedy. It is, however, not possible to link these waves directly with political developments. Neither the introduction of the current constitution in 1997 nor Poland’s accession to the European Union led directly to enhanced protest, even though the forerun to EU accession saw some protest events. It seems as if protest, however scarce, is rather linked to economic development than to political decisions, which might mean that only matters that affect the individual directly such as lower income or political decisions directly leading to a worsening of personal living conditions trigger protest.

During the first transition years, Polish citizens still engaged in collective action and tried to take part in the reconstruction of the nation state. However, not nearly as many people were mobilized as during the last years of communism. The means of choice for protesters remained striking, and 1993 saw by far the most strikes since the end of the communist system. The Central Statistical Office of Poland has recorded the number of strikes on a five-year-basis, showing that in 1990, 250 strikes occurred, while between 1995 and 2006 the numbers stayed below 100 every year. The same applies to the numbers of employees on strike, which did not exceed 100,000 in that time period. Only 2007 and 2008 saw a huge increase in the number of strikes – in 2007 almost 2,000 and just below 13,000 in 2008. However the number of employees on strike in 2007 was still below 60,000 whereas the 250 strikes in 1990 mobilized 116,000 people (Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Central Statistical Office) 2010: 44sq.). This is in congruence with the findings presented in the previous sections. At the end of the Kaczyński administration and at the beginning of the Tusk administration, public officials went on strike, but Poland in general did not experience much protest since the early 1990s.

As the once uniting movement Solidarity broke apart, and protest goals were only rarely reached, protests subsided. Even in the public discussion on the structure and content of the new constitution, public collective action was rare. Instead, people’s actions have been directed at the imminent personal environment such as schools, sports clubs and charity. These areas saw an increase in engagement and in number of organizations.

All in all a noticeable decline in the importance and influence of unions in society can be discerned. Even though NGOs have been forming in Poland and civil society has been developing, this has mostly happened in areas of personal matters. Movements concerned with political matters are still today usually unions or groups influenced by political parties.

Parties and movements in Poland have shallow roots in society. As actors such as trade unions and other societal groupings have been very active in the political arena, the distinction between political parties and other forms of organized voicing of opinion or protest is sometimes hard to make in Poland. This is also a result of elites shifting from the civil to the political sphere.

In summary, it is possible to conclude that public collective action has been stagnating on a low level. The hardships stemming from transition combined with expanding opportunities for protest led to a surprise in the low levels of protest during the transition years (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 93). After that, only in exceptional cases, before the passage of new and far-reaching laws and before EU accession, was protest initiated at all. Even then, fewer people than anticipated or even only one branch of workers participated. Instead, mass collective actions could be seen where state-employees demanded higher wages and better working conditions, a further confirmation that personal matters have become more important than political ones.

The plane crash in 2010 and the following protests did not prove to be a real exception. Even if hundreds of participants gathered to protest either in favor or against the burial of the Kaczyńskis in the Wawel or in favor of or against the wooden cross, the actions did not bring the masses to the streets that those protests of the 1980s had. Furthermore, the incident came unexpected and as a shock to Poland. In this sense it is comparable to other events that sparked protest. Moreover, religion is always a very personal issue and

41 the question whether a cross is fit to honor the victims cannot possibly be answered objectively. So the combination of a sudden, far-reaching incident and personal matters generating protest aligns well with the findings from the previous years.

Instead of protesting, Poles have rather voiced their dissatisfaction by boycotting elections. Turnout has been very low in national as well as local elections, with the result being lower the higher the level. Parliamentary and presidential elections usually have a turnout between 42 and 68% (Tworzecki 1996: 48; Garsztecki October 2001), which is lower than in most Western democracies. Those Poles that have not boycotted the elections have mostly voted for the opposition. Over the course of the last 20 years, not a single governing party in Poland has been able to win a second election (Bader, Zapart 2011: 260). Thus, Poland is far from being a host to unrest, protest, and possibly riots.

IV. Explaining the Peace

Over the last 200 years, Poland has been divided multiple times and struggled for its identity in fights against Russia and Germany (Garsztecki 2010: 2). Presumably, much of the existing potential for protest and fights for a common cause was eradicated once the country regained its independence. The following section will assess in how far this assumption is true and which other factors might have influenced the behavior of Poles since 1989. Applying and evaluating the model outlined in chapter two, it will be evaluated which factors really played a role in individuals’ behavior and why social movements and protest organizations have not been very popular in the country.

A. Protest Potential

It is not a lack of potential that has kept Poles from protesting. Grievances are and have been high in the Polish society. Communism left behind a large rural population, high unionization rates as well as many non-competitive farms and firms, all three favorable

42 preconditions for protest (Vanhuysse 2006: 44). Especially in the transition years, poverty skyrocketed (Beyer 2010: 5) and has been high ever since. The following chapter will show how high the levels of both factors leading to protest potential, namely grievances and polarization, are until today.

1. Grievances

Grievances are in general higher in Poland than in Western democracies as people tend to hold the state responsible for issues and benefits that is usually not the duty of a national government (Krzemiński 2009: 352). Poles are traditionally very distrustful of the government, holding it responsible for all deprivations and poverty (Beyer 2010: 38). During communist times, the state established itself as the only one responsible for the distribution of goods and services, which in turn led to citizens having high expectations and demanding supply of these to a high extent (Wnuk-Lipiński 1993: 74). Therefore, grievances develop quickly. Especially during transformation, they were high. After the state had been responsible for the general welfare of its people during communism, increasing unemployment and increasing costs of living – general deprivation, in short – led to high grievances in society (Castle, Taras 2002: 182). This deprivation also harmed the unions that had become politically active, as citizens who lost their jobs and saw a decline in their living standards accredited the developments to political decisions taken by union elites (Rode 2009: 419). Protest potential rose during the first years of transformation due to an increase in the perceived threat of unemployment, especially because the feeling of personal safety decreased during that time (Wnuk-Lipiński 1993: 91). The appliance of strikes, as the most successful method during communism, and its peak in 1993 becomes thus understandable.

Generally speaking, Poles have been very critical of the situation in their country and express a feeling of stagnation. Interviews confirm the assumption that protest potential in Poland still exists. 8 Since 1989, Poles have generally been rather dissatisfied with the

8 An analysis of the relevant data by CBOS can be found in the annex to this paper.

43 way the country develops, and have assessed the political as well as the economic 9 situation negatively.

Table 2: Generally speaking, is the situation in Poland heading in a good or bad direction?

Good Bad Difficult to say

(CBOS: Trends)

As expected, the fall of communism brought about a positive attitude in society, which changed quickly, and at the beginning of 1992, most Poles already noted a general negative development. What is more, negative assessment reached a new high at the beginning of 1999, a year of protest waves. Starting in December 1998, the Polish Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, CBOS) has registered predominantly the answer “negative” to the question whether the country in general was moving in a positive or negative direction. Furthermore, there have only been nine months between January 1999 and January 2011 in which the predominant answer to that question was “positive”. Even worse is the picture when asking for an assessment of the political or economic situation. In neither case has there ever been a majority of positive answers.

9 CBOS has surveyed social moods since 1807, so it is possible to get thorough data. However, research reports are only accessible online for the time span 1997 (using data from 1996) to 2011. For the time before that, only graphs are available, which are harder to interpret exactly.

The political situation as illustrated in table 3 was classified as “good” only in the beginning of the Third Republic, but “neither good nor bad” dominated as answer during most of the years 1996-1999. This changed afterwards and between July 1999 and December 2009, not even in ten months the answer was not mostly “bad”, marking a significant downwards turn in the overall assessment. Since the beginning of the Tusk administration, the assessment has mostly been ambivalent, although there has since 1996 not been a single month in which the dominant answer was “good”.

Table 3: How do you generally evaluate the current political situation in Poland? Is it:

good neither good nor bad bad

(CBOS: Trends)

In the economic sphere, as table 4 shows, the picture is not much different, although at the beginning of the 90s, due to the communist heritage, the assessment was much worse than in the years after 1995. Recently,10 the assessment was usually undecided. The assumption that dissatisfaction with public affairs is a general phenomenon in Polish society is therefore sensible. This general dissatisfaction does of course not translate directly into grievances, but it offers a fairly good idea that grievances have existed on a significant scale during all years between 1989 and 2010. As protests have

10 Since 2006.

45 been mostly for personal economic benefits, the survey data connected to the economic situation is especially important.

Table 4: How do you generally evaluate the current economic situation in Poland? Is it: good neither good nor bad bad

(CBOS: Trends)

Even if the public had supported economic and social reforms as such, their impacts led to rising grievances in society early during the 1990s (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 95). Those workers that protested were almost exclusively employed in state-owned industries or the public sector. Before communism collapsed, they therefore enjoyed privileges they now lost in the new system (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 100). Even though a decline in living standard had been anticipated by analysts before reforms were introduced, the hardships they produced were much bigger than predicted. Besides loss in income and skyrocketing unemployment rates, social benefits had to be cut and subsidies for basic goods were reduced to a minimum. In comparison with 1989, in 1993, average real income per capita in Poland was by 12% lower, and real wages had dropped by 25% and remained at that level the following years (Vanhuysse 2006: 10). When reforms sharply decreased job security, fears of losing employment skyrocketed in post- communist countries. In November 1990, 65% of Polish workers were willing to strike if in danger of losing their jobs (Vanhuysse 2006: 14–15).

In the 1990s, after an initial decline from 50% in 1990 to 34% in 1992 and 27% in 1994, satisfaction with democracy rose again. Yet in 2000, an even deeper dip is observable. Until 2006, this value only reached 38% again. So gradual improvements are visible, yet the leap above 50% has not happened so far. Still in 2009, 49% of Poles were dissatisfied with the way democracy worked in their country and 57% wished for far-reaching reforms in the system (Garsztecki 04-20-2010: 2). The assumption of existing grievances and thus existing protest potential is therefore feasible.

Table 5: Satisfaction with democracy

(Pollack 2008: 42)

Protest potential has been declining, however. In recent years, Poles have been voicing general satisfaction with the outcomes of the reforms of the transition period (Krzemiński 2010: 35). The declining potential seems to reflect the relative social peace – but does not explain the outburst of protest after the Smolensk tragedy in 2010.

What is important to note in this context, is the personal situation of Poles. In the interviews conducted by CBOS, the quality of life has every time but once11 been predominantly assessed as “neither good nor bad”; and since 2004, “good” has always received more assent than “bad”, and has had almost the same value as “neither nor” since 2009. We can thus assume that grievances are not as high as they could be if the overall assessment of the country’s situation were felt more intensely by citizens personally.

Table 6: How do you evaluate the quality of living of yourself and your family?

Good Neither good nor bad Bad

(CBOS: Trends)

2. Polarization

Polarization has been a dominant feature of Polish politics. Especially in matters of high national significance, it has been strong. Korkut (2005: 161) shows how this feature dominated elections in Poland, for example the presidential election of 1996 and the parliamentary elections of 1997 and argues that this is a common feature of post- socialist countries’ politics.

11 I.e. every month between 01/1996 and 01/2011. Only in September 2008, the answers “neither nor” and “positive” received the same amount of answers.

The most prominent example of polarization in Poland however is the constitution that was not introduced until 1997 – eight years after the communist system had collapsed. This delay happened due to polarization. A more recent example of high polarization was the debate about the burial site for the late president Kaczyński. Contrary to the time before the constitution was introduced, this time the contrasting positions even resulted in protest.12 These examples show clearly that in matters of national importance, polarization is the normal case rather than being an exception.

Therefore, protest potential exists and has been existing, but as has been noted before, it only unfolds when personal preferences are involved and when these are invoked by incentives. In the following sections the structural and societal developments observable in the time period under discussion will therefore be examined as well as their impacts on incentives for protest.

B. Conditions

The following chapter will provide a closer look at the three levels which influence individuals as well as groups in the decision whether to take protest action. The order in which these factors will be evaluated will follow the one in which the theoretical background was presented. Therefore, structural factors will be examined first before turning to individual incentives and network dynamics.

1. The macro-level: POS

Political opportunities for protest in former Eastern Bloc countries multiplied after the fall of the Berlin Wall and reforms burdened high social costs on the citizens of these countries, yet public protest was scarce (Vanhuysse 2006: 1). Moreover, even though opportunity structures opened in numbers after the collapse of the authoritarian system in 1989, they were not expanded farther in the following years. Instead, a number of laws were introduced after 1990 to hinder civic activities. In the following, an

12 See chapters III B and D for a detailed description.

49 examination of opening and closing opportunity during transition as well as later will be provided.

As the assessment of Political Opportunity Structures is always tied to change in the political system, a subdivision of the following analysis is necessary. The changes will therefore be analyzed according to the chronological division made in the preceding chapter.

a) 1989-1997

The collapse of communism brought about a situation in which, at first, responsibilities were unclear. The existing state and its structures had been delegitimized and were thus unable to perform their full functions. At the same time, new structures had not been built yet and neither democratic parties not social organizations were able to fill the gap. Instead, employees’ associations such as labor unions stepped in and played an active part in reforming the system. Especially the re-founded Solidarity played an active role in the transformation process and its members became politically involved (Stegemann 2009: 277sq.). This can be seen as closing opportunity structure for increasing uncertainty about responsibilities and the question who the right contact person is makes taking action difficult.

As soon as the old system was abolished, new opportunity structures nevertheless opened. In December 1989, the constitution was amended to pave the way for transition to a democratic system (Paczkowski 2009: 140). Censorship was eliminated and freedom of expression along with freedom of the press were introduced when the censorship authority was dismantled in May 1990 (Paczkowski 2009: 140). Solidarity elites soon occupied the political sphere and provided security who to address.

Already during the Round Table Talks, the basis for free elections was created. The recreation of the Senate as upper chamber of parliament brought about 100 seats which were to be openly contested. Furthermore, 35% of all deputies in the Sejm (the lower chamber) were to be freely elected (Banaszak 1999: 130). The first step towards

50 liberalization of the electoral system was thus taken, which opened new opportunities for citizens to channel their protest.

However, some of these new opportunity structures soon closed again. The “war at the top” showed Solidarity’s preoccupation with itself and left no room for meaningful protest. Responsive authorities proved to be scarce even among those that had been struggling to change the authoritarian system of the Peoples’ Republic.

After the fall of Communism, the legal framework for the establishment of local self- government was to be established in three steps. While the first step was introduced already in 1990, it was only nine years later that the second step was taken. The third step foresees complete financial independence of local self-government but has not been introduced to the present day (Gliński 01-15-2008: 3). Considering the relative popularity of locally organized associations noted earlier, that independence of local self-government therefore means a significant POS, as local organizations would have the possibility to address local officers. A non-introduction of the reform does not exactly mean a closing POS, however, the delay after promising such a reform is almost equal due to the fact that a mere announcement can lead to expectations and its non- fulfillment to further uncertainty on both sides.

In May 1991, after much discussion, a new law on trade unions was passed. It secured freedom of association as well as a guarantee of independence from the state for the unions (Stegemann 2009: 303). In a second law passed on the same day, freedom of associations was also granted to employers (Stegemann 2009: 308). Furthermore, the right to strike was codified in the law on trade disputes (Stegemann 2009: 316). Opportunity structures thus opened when a legal frame was introduced.

This legal framework for labor disputes was reformed in 1993 and supplemented by a pact on state-owned enterprises in transition, which included a deterioration of worker participation (Stegemann 2009: 339). These as well as all other reforms were undertaken by the new elites, leaving no possibility for active involvement of civil society (Korkut 2005: 150). Therefore, opportunities were withheld from the public in two ways. Firstly, some of those POS just recently introduced were abolished.

Secondly, civil society – that had mainly brought about the collapse of the old system – was banned from taking part in the creation of a new system.

In 1992, the so-called “small constitution” was passed in order to gain more time to work out the details of the constitution of the Third Republic. This document did not in itself provide for new POS, as it dealt only with the distribution of competencies between Parliament and president and provided a basis for the functioning of the state (Paczkowski 2009: 147). However, it replaced the old Socialist constitution and therefore abolished the repressive state system Poles had dealt with until that time. The structure of the polity has been identified as important aspect in connection with the likelihood of protest.13 Therefore at least in an indirect sense the introduction of the “small constitution” opened a POS.

b) 1997-2004

New POS were introduced when finally the new constitution of 1997 was passed. Firstly, it guarantees basic and human rights (Alexander 2005: 381). This is laid out in chapter II, entitled “The Freedoms, Rights, and Obligations of Persons and Citizens” (National Assembly of Poland 02/04/1997). Art. 31 includes the freedom of the person. Furthermore, Art. 41 guarantees legal proceedings in case of arrest. Therefore, arbitrary arrest and physical harm in case of protest is not legally possible, reducing possible costs for protesters. Compared with the legal uncertainty of communist times, this constitutes a clear opening of opportunity structures when the constitution was introduced.

What is more, the constitution finally fixed democracy as the only legitimate system (National Assembly of Poland 02/04/1997: Ch. I). This is an opening opportunity structure as the introduction of a democratic constitution abolished all uncertainty about the future political system and provided a basis for constant involvement of the public. Even though these provisions were only a further development of the small constitution of 1992, the document was final and therefore, an opening POS can be recognized. The

13 See chapter II B 1 in this paper.

52 freedom of association that had been codified by laws before also became part of the constitutional law (Stegemann 2009: 360), securing this opportunity.

On the other hand, many movement forms were banned from running in elections, as candidates were to be nominated by “parties or voters” (National Assembly of Poland 02/04/1997: Art. 100). Before, all kinds of movements were allowed to nominate candidates (Banaszak 1999: 139). The constitution thus reserves the right to stand in election exclusively for political parties and so-called elections committees, barring all other forms of movements from entering (Millard 2009: 784sq.). Opportunities for these were thus limited, making activity in political movements more difficult due to less potential influence.

All in all, the years between 1997 and 2004 were characterized by consolidation of democracy which brought about more stability and continuity in the question of who to address with which matters. Even though the governing party changed every period, administration and rules were established to deal with public demands.

c) 2004-2010

When Poland entered the European Union in 2004, the described development was fundamentally changed. Poland had to undergo several reforms before being admitted, which were imposed by EU authorities residing in Brussels. Participation even of the national parliament, let alone the public was very limited. Elites again played the decisive role in the accession negotiations (Korkut 2002: 297, 299). This development obviously implies a closing opportunity structure as those responsible for local changes were far away and not often easily accessible. Furthermore, the shift of policy decisions to the supranational level took some decisions out of local authorities’ hands and made it harder for citizens to influence the outcome. Even if the national government supports claims made by movements and groups, this does not guarantee their conversion into European politics.

On the other hand, involvement of citizens is a core EU concern in policy making (Korkut 2002: 299). Accession to the Union therefore also opened opportunity

53 structures for Polish citizens. Firstly, it is important to note that European Union administration already had been institutionalized and working for years before Poland entered the Union. Questions about responsibilities were thus not the rule, contrary to what Poles had experienced during transition. Furthermore, the European Union has installed mechanisms to involve the public, namely public consultations and the possibility of petitioning the parliament in matters the Union is responsible for (European Commission; European Parliament). With only two instruments, the opportunity structures for citizens to take influence on the European level is, however, limited. Therefore, the net balance of POS during and after EU accession has to be classified as negative.

Furthermore, in 2004, a collection of laws on the activity of NGOs were introduced, impeding especially small and medium-sized organization in their activities as it introduced a number of administrative requirements for an organization to be officially registered (Krzemiński 2009: 355). The legal basis for the works of civil society thus took on a rather unfavorable shape.

During transition, those elites that had been active in the Solidarity movement were surprisingly ineffective in implementing the ideals developed in the movement, including the creation of a favorable surrounding for the development of civil society. Consequently, the first Post-Socialist government did not provide for an encompassing change in the legal framework for civil participation in the political process. Only in 2005, the first public funds for civil initiatives were introduced (Gliński 01-15-2008: 6), which until today do not, however, provide enough support for efficient work as all civil society organization suffer from a lack in funds.

In October 2005, Lech Kazcyński was elected President of Poland and shortly after, in July 2006, installed his twin-brother Jarosław as Prime Minister. From that time, Polish politics were marked by populism and opposition to Western Europe and the EU (Vetter 2008: 9–10). This also brought about a break in political opportunities for civil society, as during the Kazcyński era, the state doctrine in Polish politics rested on the idea of the provident and paternalistic authoritarian state, which discouraged civil society action (Vetter 2008: 47). The positive development that had begun earlier was therefore

54 stopped and could only start again when Jarosław Kazcyński was replaced as prime minister in 2007.

Today, freedom house ranks Poland as “free”, with civil as well as political liberties receiving grade “1” (Freedom House 2011). Opportunities for influence therefore must exist for citizens and groups. However, political opportunity structures are still largely determined by personal alliances between elites, leaving not much room for civil society to address those responsible for alleviating grievances (Korkut 2005: 160). Those elites that have shifted from engagement in civil society to engagement in politics often show incomprehension of demands by the public (Korkut 2005: 170). Furthermore, corruption still hinders influence by official channels. Transparency international ranks Poland 41st of 178 countries evaluated in its 2010 corruption perceptions index (Transparency International 2010: 2–3). Opportunity structures, albeit given by the constitution, are therefore still not big as political elites do not regularly consider public demands.

Even existing opportunity structures are rarely used. Knowledge about them and about their correct exploitation, e.g. the formation of a movement, are not widely distributed and often concealed by the system (Krzemiński 2009: 352). POS have therefore been limited since 1989 and still are smaller than assumed at first glance. Opportunity structures are not only a matter of laws and institutions but also of practice of those responsible. In the case of Poland, this leads to a limitation of the legally existing opportunities.

2. The micro-level: Incentives

As noted before, incentives exist either due to a change in the political environment or as a consequence of a set of norms of an individual. In the following section therefore firstly the incentives created by changing opportunity structures will be examined before then turning to an assessment of dominant norms and values in Polish society.

a) Consequences of changing POS

Even if different phases of opportunities and waves of protest can be made out, “the overwhelming majority of Polish society ignored the new possibilities of political activity offered by the transformed system.” (Zaborowski 1993: 67) The example of the law on trade unions clarifies this. Most strikes conducted during the first years after the law had been passed were not in compliance with it (Stegemann 2009: 319). It seems thus as if the opening opportunity structure were not recognized as such which leads to the assumption that strike rates could have been higher if the POS had been known. Consequently, incentives produced by changing POS have been limited.

After the collapse of state socialism in Poland, a fierce debate on the path of transition emerged – including the question of the aim of transition. However, not one single plan succeeded and was carried out; the transition phase was rather a process of “muddling through” instead of following a coherent strategy (Sokolowski 2002: 7). This lead to a general feeling of helplessness facing the state and made the opening POS that were connected to e. g. the abolition of censorship or the introduction of free elections almost invisible to the public.

In the years 1997-2000, Solidarity, as member of the government, engaged intensely in the reform process, which was scorned upon by huge parts of the membership base (Stegemann 2009: 378). It seems as if this development led to further disillusionment of members as to their own personal influence. The less influence an individual feels it has on the political arena, the less he or she is likely to engage in political activity such as protest. Therefore, the changing political environment, already offering limited POS during those years, further discouraged citizens from protesting.

As noted above, the perceived individual influence is important in the decision whether to engage in protest activity or not. This perception of personal influence declined quickly after the collapse of the old system. As protest during the first years of the republic was not successful in most cases (Castle; Taras 2002: 179), people tended to expect less influence they could exert by protesting. This showed a survey outcome of 1997, where 76% of those surveyed agreed to the statement that “people like me do not have an influence on politics in our country” (Korkut 2005: 161). People thus tend to

56 see ordinary citizens as having very little or no influence at all (Beyer 2010: 51). Changing POS did not influence this perception, as they have not been noticed by the public. Therefore, the link between the macro- and micro-levels is weak, which leaves other factors with relatively more influence on Poles’ protest behavior. As noted before, if people do not feel their actions make a difference, even obviously opening opportunity structures will not lead to protest.

Due to the entanglement of elites and organizations in politics, citizens tend not to differentiate between the civil and the political society. Mistrust vis-à-vis either is high (Korkut 2005: 162), consequently incentives to engage in action organized by movements and organizations are low. There is a feeling that aims proclaimed by these groups are not to be taken for granted and that engagement in action therefore does not aid in bringing about desired change.

Negative incentives furthermore exist in connection with unionization. Those engaging in setting up a union in any company risk losing their jobs (Rode 2009: 427). In connection with the Poles’ conviction that any job is better than no job, the strength of this negative incentive becomes clear. “At a time of declining living standards, the unemployed and abnormal pensioners had stronger incentives to ‘exit’ into the informal economy, instead of pursuing public goods through political ‘voice’.” (Vanhuysse 2006: 5) Therefore, incentives to evade politics and collective action and instead find help through those trusted have remained high in Polish society.

b) Norms and Values

The most important preference Poles have internalized is the wish for freedom from occupation. After more than 100 years of division, followed by more than 40 years of Communist suppression, national sovereignty was on top of the list until 1989 (Beyer 2010: 41). No other public good has been able to be valued as highly after finally reaching the desired freedom in 1989. Therefore, incentives since then tend to stay far behind what Poles had experienced before.

A deeply internalized norm in Poland is the “us-versus-them” mentality in which the state is seen as the opponent responsible for the alleviation of all grievances in society (Ekiert; Kubik 1998: 110). Such mistrust against the state and its responsiveness to citizens’ demand has resulted in a desire for distance from the state instead of active participation and attempts to change the situation. The early polarizations during the presidential election campaign 1990 and the “war at the top” led to a further estrangement of society from politics. “Politics” became understood as negative and politicians as being preoccupied with their personal intrigues, benefits and differences (Krzemiński 2009: 351). Consequently, people have developed an attitude of rather evading the polity instead of tackling it directly. Politics have widely become considered a “dirty movement” by the Polish public (Korkut 2005: 168), that do not help to achieve justice or benefits for the public. People therefore consider engaging in protest as acting in vain. Opportunity costs are considered much higher than possible benefits.

This divide between the public and the civil sphere has been further nurtured during the years since transition. The lack of trust in political institutions today is also the result of numerous scandals as well as the intensity with which public discussions are conducted (Garsztecki 04-20-2010: 4). In 2002, a scandal had high impact on public life in Poland when the movie producer Lew Rywin was proven to be involved in bribery concerning the planned media law. He was alleged with trying to sell his services to the publishing house Agora, who wanted to take over the private TV station Polsat. In 2003, parliament installed a congressional investigation committee whose sessions were transmitted live on TV, and that in the end found Rywin guilty. He was sentenced to three years in prison. The public, however, took note mostly of the intense entanglement of politics, economic interests and the thin line between legal and illegal action including organized crime (Ziemer 2009: 159).

Similarly, in July 2004 another investigation committee was set up to investigate the involvement of (then) President Kwaśniewski in dubious proceedings in the context of privatization of the energy sector. The events in question happened in 2001 when a close acquaintance of Kwaśniewski’s tried to secure the takeover of the Gdańsk refinery by Russian investors. The Polish competitor was Orlen, the country’s biggest oil

58 company, whose boss was arrested by the Secret Service right before the decision whether to invest in the refinery (Raabe 2005: 2). The public’s attention also in this case was directed mainly towards the close ties between politics and crime, leading to further mistrust. The public broadcast of sessions of investigation committees has mostly been used by individual politicians to distinguish themselves from their colleagues (Ziemer 2009: 159; Raabe 2005: 2) instead of promoting democratic proceedings and the rule of law.

What was not internalized due to these events was a norm of discussion and compromise (Ekiert, Kubik 1998: 114). Therefore, the parliamentary routines have not enjoyed much trust by Poles. Consequently, even during consolidation of democracy and its acceptance as “the only game in town”,14 a general distance between society and politics remains and leads to negative incentives when individuals decide whether to protest. Instead, a feeling of disillusion has been dominating.

Most Poles today are tired of fundamental changes and wish for a society in which constant engagement and mobilization are unnecessary (Majcherek 2010: 23). Therefore, incentives to engage in actions with possibly far-reaching results need to be very strong in order to have any effect.

The influence of different incentives furthermore confirms what has been shown by other case studies before. Non-material incentives seem to play a much bigger role in Poland than material incentives. Especially negative incentives provided by society as well as by politics seem to have a higher impact than prospects for improvements of the economic situation through protests. The following section will confirm this assumption further as the strength of societal networks will be evaluated.

3. The meso-level: Networks

Social networks favoring protest action already became weak during the 1980s when many activists left Poland during martial law (Krzemiński 2009: 352), thus leaving the

14 Pollack (2008: 45) shows that even though Poles tend to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country, the vast majority of citizens is convinced of democracy as such.

59 existing movements with a lack of leadership. Beyer (2010: 37) furthermore emphasizes the Communist heritage that played a decisive role in the formation of social networks after 1989, which consists of mistrust and fear of repression. This socialization led to Poles mistrusting each other and developing close ties only in a small circle of family and very close friends. In Poland as in all CEE countries, participation in civil society was undesirable after the fall of Communism, as mistrust of communist organizations and disappointment with Post-Communist developments coincided with strong family ties and friendship networks (Vanhuysse 2006: 60). Such circumstances include high costs of breaking out and engaging in collective action outside the “circle of trust”. Most often, Poles have not engaged in protest when encountering difficulties but rather have tended to rely on their families and close friends for support, a behavior that is supported by the close circles existing in Polish society.

The predominant model of life strategy is closely connected to a lack in social trust. Only members of the closest family circles are unconditionally trusted, all others are seen as potential adversaries. The perception of social relations is thus that I can only win if others loose and vice versa (Krzemiński 2009: 354). Collective action and the support of the “common good” or even a “higher cause” is not desirable in these circles and met with non-acceptance (Beyer 2010: 51). Politics have become known as a game in which the stronger side, the one that is able to subordinate others, wins (Krzemiński 2009: 353). Loose, protest-averse networks lead to the decision to rather migrate than to support change at home (Rode 2009: 428). A survey conducted in 2005 showed that “conformist behavior” continues to be important in Polish society (Korkut 2005: 153). Collective political action and joint representation of interests is therefore undesirable as it would mean counteracting the perceived rules of politics and society which is costly and rarely promising.

Generally speaking, “Poles do not trust one another” (Szawiel 2009: 498). Mutual relationships and social trust have settled on a low level, especially in comparison with other European states (Gliński 01-15-2008: 4). Only in three other European countries was social trust lower in 2004 and 2006 (Szawiel 2009: 497). Poles still suffer from a perceived treason of the elites as Solidarity leaders gave up many claims the movements had fought for during the 1980s and instead followed their own agendas when they

60 entered politics (Gliński 01-15-2008: 6). It is therefore not surprising that NGOs and movements are only slowly forming and still enjoy only limited membership.

This division between the public and private sphere becomes clear when considering the following example. During transition, receiving unemployment benefits while informally working at the same time was a generally accepted practice in Poland with 2/3 of Poles agreeing to this still in 1998 whilst only 1/3 thought this was “cheating the government” (Vanhuysse 2006: 61). Thus the continued emphasis on the state as responsible for delivery of commodities and caring for its citizens becomes obvious.

Furthermore, Solidarity’s self-dissolution at the beginning of the 1990s led to an estrangement of its members from the activities of the movement. The network quickly lost its internal ties and started to dissolve and break apart. The polarized society was in no state to provide for stable networks that enhance protest behavior. Group identification was low or nonexistent, and incentives that can be concluded from the situation rather point away from collective action. Consequently, the basis for collective action was rather weak already at the beginning of the 1990s and became only less stable with Solidarity becoming politically active and at the same time splitting into various parties.

When unemployment hit the labor market and abnormal pensions were introduced, those falling in either of the two categories often left their unions (Vanhuysse 2006: 55), meaning that potential for protest diminished. Social networks, while being favorable for mobilization of employed persons, become unfavorable for those unemployed. The longer unemployment lasts, the more likely a network of unemployed emerges, which is not supporting social action (Vanhuysse 2006: 65), or, differently put, “the unemployed and abnormally retired were now likely to have a lower overall effectiveness in organizing disruptive protests because of decreasing levels of extra-household sociability” (Vanhuysse 2006: 67). For those unemployed or retired, their personal relationship with the state changed. Instead of convening regularly with others, identifying common interests and voicing them vis-à-vis the state, they now were dependent on welfare and had a rather individualized stance (Vanhuysse 2006: 64). This further supported the above mentioned estrangement of Solidarity members from the union and led to a society with protest-averse networks that made protesting socially

61 costly. Today, almost 19 out of 20 Poles avoid membership or activity within associations, even if they are not political (Zaborowski 1993: 67). The social norm therefore is to abstain from getting involved in public life. Reconsidering the idea of collective identity, it seems as if Poles have a collective identity that is attached to private circles such as family and shared identities as responsive members of a nation are weak.

On the other hand, mobilization for protest has been somewhat successful with workers in non-competitive sectors, which were also threatened most by unemployment, and whose social networks were tighter than on average. A second group likely to be mobilized consists of farmers who lost 2/3 of their income in comparison to non- agricultural workers between 1989 and 1991. Polish farmers were highly unionized with the Solidarity Farmers’ Union and Samoobrona being strong (Vanhuysse 2006: 34). As mentioned above, the farmers were especially successful in organizing protest before Polish EU-accession due to their high degree of organization (Bachmann 2011: 127). This shows once more the importance of networks in Polish society. Looking at the evidence presented in the preceding chapter, it is noticeable that the mobilization even in the mentioned groups has been low, however, as farmers who enjoyed the highest mobilization rates were still not engaged on a scale comparable with other EU countries or higher.

Regarding frames created within movements, they are more efficient in case they gain media attention. In Poland, the media has reported very little about movement activity, neither about protest action nor about press statements and opinions. This could be due to two factors. Either the media is averse to providing information on civil society or there is too little to talk about. Chances are high that the latter is the case. As Gamson and Meyer note “the media […] are more open to extrainstitutional than to institutional action” (1996: 288). These framing processes are often shaped by civil society elites. The “elite-drain” from civil society has therefore led to a vacuum that implies organizational problems as well as networks that are rather averse to protest. Today, with societal elites becoming engaged in politics, role models for civic action are missing. Considering the notion that protest reproduces when networks are supporting

62 such collective action, the conclusion needs to be drawn that missing elites will lead to weaker networks and therefore to less collective action.

The Catholic Church has played a vital role in Poland’s history. Still today, it plays an important role in family life. However, in recent years, the Polish Catholic church has been less involved in politics than its western counterparts. This role is the result of a process of fundamental change in Poland. During the 1980s, the church provided the place for civil mobilization where discussions and the making of plans were possible – ultimately the place that made resistance possible at all (Krzemiński 2010: 42). Today, Catholicism has a meaning of conservative attitudes and a scournful look on modernization (Krzemiński 2010: 41). Involvement in political processes since 1989 has at the same time often resulted in disgrace for the church and disapprovement from society (Krzemiński 2010: 40). Therefore, the church has not played a vital role in the initiation of protest since the beginning of the 1990s. It needs to be taken into account that its passiveness as regards politics provides a negative incentive for religious Poles, adding to what has been identified as discouraging factors before.

In summary, Polish civil society is characterized by great influence by elites and a strong focus on activities in connection to personal matters as well as the Catholic Church, but only little to no involvement in the political arena. Furthermore, quasi- NGOs, which have been founded by local political elites, have shown to be quite successful, as well as ad hoc groups and local para-political organizations (Gliński 01- 15-2008: 3). This combination provides for negative incentives on the individual level regarding involvement in political matters such as protesting. Polish society does not provide for a stable basis of involvement of the individual.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, Polish society has shown to be multifaceted. It has become clear that rational choice theory can only be applied to a limited extent, as especially after 1993 protest potential and behavior have not been in congruence. Grievances, measured as dissatisfaction with the situation in the country, have been high as has polarization on

63 national matters, but protest behavior has, apart from waves in 1993 and in 1999, been stagnating on a rather low level. An exception to this rule can be discerned in 2010, when the decisions taken in the aftermath of the national tragedy of Smoleńsk triggered protest in Warsaw that nevertheless subsided after some days. This incident is, however, not exceptional regarding the matters Poles have been protesting about. Much of the protest of 2010 had a background in religious feelings and national pride. In identifying protest during the 20 years under consideration here as mainly centered around personal matters, it is possible to categorize the matters of 2010 in the same way.

Abstract ideas such as democratic procedures and anti-corruption measures have on the other hand not led to protest. Neither have the prospects of accession to the European Union as such led to protest of demonstration of support. Only the farmers were involved when their fears of competing with subsidized products led to demonstrations and riots. However, their fears were also very real and related to their personal situation. Therefore, protest still only happened due to personal fears or real deprivations.

Those cases in which protest happened can be divided into two categories. Firstly, grievances reached a level that made the situation unbearable for those feeling them. This was especially the case for the protests during the transition years as well as the nurses’ protest in 1999. In other cases, a charismatic leader and a strong organizational base provided for a network favorable for protest. This was the case for the peasants’ protests during the 1990s and early 2000s, especially as in this case grievances about the current agrarian policy of the government only constituted part of the motivation whilst the other part was centered around fears about the future. In summary, grievances are significant for protest in Poland as long as they are perceived on a personal level instead of an abstract one. In those cases when deprivation reached a high level, protest was initiated. Protest did not happen, on the other hand, when dissatisfaction with the political or economic situation stayed on an abstract level.

The basic structures for protest engagement of Poles were set during the transition phase. A sharp decline in engagement in political activities can be seen in Poland since 1993, with some scarce peaks that nevertheless never exceed the events of 1993 in participants and days. Disillusionment and a perception of highly unlikely success led to decisions against protesting. Even if grievances have been and still are high, the choice

64 is to follow a strategy of “muddling through” by evading rules or bluntly breaking them instead of using the existing opportunity structures. A disagreement with the presumed significance of political opportunity structures can further be made out by looking at the times of big changes and at the times of protesting. In most cases, these have not been in congruence. Neither the abolishment of censorship and other repression measures in 1989 nor the introduction of the new constitution in 1997 brought about significant protest waves. Accession to the EU also opened POSs, however, the distance of Brussels decisions from national and local grievances also closed some, which makes the net outcome unclear. Nevertheless, protest action happened before, not after accession. So the significance of POS needs to be denied for the most cases of protest in Poland since 1989.

The influence of incentives, on the other hand, has been very high. Due to unsuccessful protest and unresponsive elites, the feeling of personal influence on the situation in the country has been very low, which in turn has led to low protest frequency. This feeling of low personal influence on political decisions is reinforced time and again also by unrealistic claims the people voice vis-à-vis the state. When these are not fulfilled, the impression of non-responsiveness is further given and citizens feel that their demands do not count. Therefore, incentives to actively engage are diminished, which is reflected in Polish abstention from protesting.

Moreover, internalized norms and values point away from engaging in public collective action. For Poles, it seems to be less costly to achieve personal aims by cheating the government, evading responsibilities and working around the rules instead of initiating protest. This behavior enjoys high acceptance in Polish society and constitutes the norm rather than the exception as the assumption rests in public perception that the state and politicians cannot be trusted and cheating them is legitimate. The Socialist heritage of an “us-versus-them” is still strong in Poland; and high-profile scandals have nurtured this feeling until today. The result is an evasion of public affairs, including not voting and abstaining from protesting even in cases in which the calculation of costs and benefits would usually lead to different behavior.

This feeling of mistrust also dominates social networks, as social trust in general is very low in Poland. Uniting for a common cause under such circumstances can only happen

65 when the situation is indeed exceptional. Close networks only exist in very small circles of family and very close friends. Within these circles, the division between the public and the private sphere is further supported with trust declining the deeper a person is involved in politics. The lack of leadership in social movements has also contributed to their weakness. Framing processes have been slowing down due to this lack of leadership potential within social movements, as no alternative frames exist to those supported by the general positioning of society against the political sphere. Neither irregular behavior such as protest nor regular behavior such as voting has enjoyed much support within social networks. As engagement in politics in general, including regular as well as irregular behavior, supports further engagement in politics, it needs to be noted that the societal environment in Poland does not provide for a stable basis of constant protest engagement. In summary, the meso-level has been very influential in Polish society and has provided for more explanatory power than economic or structural developments.

Two findings have become clear. Firstly, Polish society does not have a very high protest potential. People are rather indifferent towards changes in the political sphere and experience grievances only if they directly affect their personal life. Secondly, Poland is not exceptional in this regard. It seems perfectly normal that in a society where people are relatively satisfied with their personal life, only those that are either very concerned with politics or feel strong grievances engage in collective action. Protesting seems to be a means of last resort. Chances of Poles uniting for a common cause again seem dim under these conditions. As long as others are not seen as comrades but rather as competitors, less costly ways exist to achieve personal goals and as long as grievances do not reach a critical point at which the very existence of the individual is threatened, a new wave of protests seems highly unlikely. There has not been a “rebirth” of a civil society in Poland, and the antagonism between “the state” and “the people” remains.

Rational choice theory can only explain this situation to a limited extent. Only by including non-material incentives, the explanatory power rises. For the case of Poland, the inclusion of social incentives is crucial as Polish society reproduces feelings of distrust vis-à-vis others as well as vis-à-vis politics. As long as grievances do not

66 become threatening to personal survival, they are not addressed in Poland by means of protest. Even if it is congruent with rational choice theory that people calculate costs and benefits in order to decide, it needs to be noted that the perceived costs of engaging in protest action are high in Poland. Thus, grievances and incentives need to be quite powerful in Poland in order to move Poles enough to engage in collective action and so overcome their mistrust of each other and their feeling of low personal influence.

VI. Annex

A. Situation in the Country

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 96 + + o - - - - o - - - - 97 + + - + + + + + + + + - 98 - - - o + - o - + + + - 99 ------00 ------01 ------02 ------03 ------04 ------05 ------06 + ------07 ------+ + 08 + - + + + ------09 ------10 - - - + - - + - - - - - Source: CBOS

Relative answers to the question: “Generally speaking, is the situation in Poland heading in a good or bad direction?” + = most answers “positive” o = no value higher than “neither positive nor negative” - = most answers “negative”

B. Political Situation

Jan. Feb. Apr. Mar. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 96 o - o o o o o o o o o o 97 o o o o o o o o o o o o 98 o o o o o o o o o o o o 99 o o o o o o ------00 ------01 ------o o - 02 o ------03 o ------04 ------05 ------o 06 o ------07 ------o o 08 o 09 ------10 - - - o o o o - - - - o Source: CBOS (For 2008, only a graph was provided, not the individual data.)

Relative answers to the question: “How do you generally evaluate the current political situation in Poland?” + = most answers “good” o = no value higher than “neither good nor bad” - = most answers “bad”

C. Economic Situation

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 96 o o o o o o o o o - o o 97 o o - o o o o o o o o o 98 o o o o o o - - o o - - 99 ------00 ------01 ------02 ------03 ------04 ------05 ------06 o o o - - - o o o o o o 07 o o - o o o o o o o o o 08 o o o o o o o o o o o o 09 o - - - o - - o o o o o 10 o o o o o o o o o o o o Source: CBOS

Relative answers to the question: “How do you generally evaluate the current economic situation in Poland?” + = most answers “good” o = no value higher than “neither good nor bad” - = most answers “bad”

D. Quality of Living

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 96 o o o o o o o o o o o o 97 o o o o o o o o o o o o 98 o o o o o o o o o o o o 99 o o o o o o o o o o o o 00 o o o o o o o o o o o o 01 o o o o o o o o o o o o 02 o o o o o o o o o o o o 03 o o o o o o o o o o o o 04 o o o o o o o o o o o o 05 o o o o o o o o o o o o 06 o o o o o o o o o o o o 07 o o o o o o o o o o o o 08 o o o o o o o o o o o o 09 o o o o o o o o o o o o 10 o o o o + o + o + + o o Source: CBOS

Relative answers to the question: “How do you evaluate the quality of living of yourself and your family?” + = most answers “good” o = no value higher than “neither good nor bad” - = most answers “bad”

VII. References

Alexander, Manfred (2005): Kleine Geschichte Polens. Bonn: bpb (Schriftenreihe, 537).

Bachmann, Klaus (2011): Opposition lohnt sich. Die Europäisierung der polnischen Agrarpolitik. In Manfred Sapper, Volker Weichsel (Eds.): Denkfabrik Polen. Europäisch aus Erfahrung. Berlin: BWV Berliner Wiss.-Verl (Osteuropa, 61.2011, 5/6), pp. 125–140.

Bader, Katharina; Zapart, Tomasz (2011): Die Bürgerplattform. Von der Bürgerbewegung zur Mitgliederpartei. In Manfred Sapper, Volker Weichsel (Eds.): Denkfabrik Polen. Europäisch aus Erfahrung. Berlin: BWV Berliner Wiss.-Verl (Osteuropa, 61.2011,5/6), pp. 259–278.

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