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Hallyu as Sports Diplomacy and Prestige Building J.N. Porteux, Kansai Gaidai University Kyong Jun Choi, Seoul National University
To cite this article: J.N. Porteux and Kyong Jun Choi. 2018. “Hallyu as Sports Diplomacy and Prestige Building.” Culture and Empathy 1(1-4): 75-92.
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https://culturenempathy.org/terms-and-conditions CULTURE AND EMPATHY Vol. 1, No. 1-4, pp. 75-92 https://doi.org/xx.xxxx/xxxxxxxx.2018.xxxxxx
Hallyu as Sports Diplomacy and Prestige Building
Jonson N. Porteux, Kansai Gaidai University Kyong Jun Choi, Seoul National University
Abstract
If one looks up “sports diplomacy” and Korea, the immediate results returned are overwhelmingly about T’aegwŏndo and inter- Korean relations. What is more difficult to find however, despite ARTICLE HISTORY being demonstrably more politically consequential, is Korea`s Received 10 August 2018 strategic utilization and spread of Korean or Koreanesque martial Revised 24 September 2018 arts such as T’aegwŏndo, hapkido, and kumdo, in targeted Accepted 30 September 2018 countries beyond the East Asian region. Similar to the diffusion of Japanese martial arts to the West, Korean martial arts from the 1960s and 70s have acted as a cultural ambassador from Eurasia to KEYWORDS the Americas and elsewhere. In particular, with the advent of Cultural Dissemination, T’aegwŏndo as a demonstration sport in the 1988 Olympics, and Hallyu, Soft Power, South as an official event since the Sydney Olympiad in 2000, the sport`s Korea, Sports Diplomacy popularity has expanded. This study argues and provides evidence to the fact, that the spread of specifically T’aegwŏndo has been carried out as part of a larger government sponsored soft-power program and has proven especially politically profitable in terms of increasing the profile of the Republic of Korea.
Introduction
Scholars of Korean history popularly trace its roots back to ancient Chosǒn (Kojosŏn) (c. 2333 BC– c. 108 BC). In terms of the classic Weberian conception of a state however, i.e. “...a human community that (successfully) claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, 78), we can safely mark the advent of modern Korea as beginning with the Koryǒ dynasty (918– 1392), where the peninsula witnessed the full-own bureaucratic development and rationalization of the state. Following the Koryǒ dynasty, the Chosǒn period (1392– 1910) emerged and governed the peninsula, until it began to slowly implode. Chosǒn`s decline intersected with Japan`s industrial and military ascent, and from 1910 to 1945, the peninsula was uninvitingly governed as a colony within the Japanese sphere of influence (Kang 1980). Across the 36-year colonial period, much
CONTACT Jonson Porteux � [email protected] © 2018 Culture and Empathy
76 Jonson Porteux and Kyung Jun Choi of Korea`s identity and culture had been decimated, necessitating a re-invention of modern Korea and stabilizing cultural narrative, for which a manufactured form of nationalism and related prestige building set of mantras and policies would serve as the fulcrum (Shin 1997, 15–19).
This article looks at but one of the observable manifestations of South Korea’s (from hereon, Korea) post-war emergence and concentrated efforts to move out of the shadow long cast by Japanese colonialism—the successful development and state- sponsored domestic and international proselytization of T’aegwŏndo. Although a focus on T’aegwŏndo is to be sure not within the traditional locus of political or other social science inquiries, we argue that the phenomenon is worthy of academic illumination as it is within the broader scope of Korea`s aforementioned attempt at building its independent domestic identity and international reputation and soft-power prowess. Indeed, with the early policy-based and government funding stemming from the post-colonial period, T’aegwŏndo has quickly become one of the most recognized and practiced martial arts/sports with an East Asian historical background. T’aegwŏndo in turn has received boosts in its visibility and popularity, with its inclusion as an official Olympic sport in the 2000 Olympiad. The puzzle we thus seek to solve in this essay, in part, is why was T’aegwŏndo so ostensibly successful?
Whilst studies of cultural dissemination related to Korea (i.e. hallyu, or the “Korean wave”) predominately center upon the international export of “k-pop,” dramas, movies, etc., we argue, perhaps with the benefit of a generous definition of hallyu, that T’aegwŏndo should be considered within this wider diffusion of Korean or Koreanesque cultural activities, or at least be deemed an elder sibling. In this paper, we present that very point, as well as posit that T’aegwŏndo is one of the most successful and potentially consequential soft-power and/or national prestige building policies carried out in the post-Korean War period (1950–1953).
Our methodology consists of a “within-case” study which traces the processes of the creation, evolution, and observable outcomes of Korea`s attempts at increasing the international visibility and prominence of T’aegwŏndo. Given that T’aegwŏndo has been provided limited coverage in both the hallyu specific, and more general, social science literature, this phenomenon is decidedly under-theorized. We thus seek to contribute to the academic discourse by making an initial cut at publishing and describing the available, least biased, verifiable (i.e. triangulated) data, gathered from governmental and non-governmental agencies in Korea and outside the peninsula. We then employ the empirics and narrative to engage in the process of theory generation, as opposed to latter, future goal, of theory confirmation.
The following section delves into the case by explaining the process of how the nationalization of T’aegwŏndo empirically unfolded. Subsequently, we will discuss the Korean government`s dissemination of the sport. As part of this investigation, we describe and analyze the major institutional developments and
CULTURE AND EMPATHY 77 milestones, as well as provide an empirical overview. In the last substantive section, we cover some of the issues which potentially threaten the rate(s) of return on the Korean government`s substantial investment in T’aegwŏndo. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our findings, and discussing areas for further research on this topic.
On the Nationalization of T’aegwŏndo
Holding aside the effect of “nature” in terms of potential causality, nationalism can at least in part be explained as being a function of some synthetic, manufactured, even evangelized process (i.e. “nurture”), which can prove especially consequential in the state-building and state-maintaining process (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). In the case of post-colonial Korea, the push towards the development of a nationalist, independent Korean identity, entailed differentiating it from its closest regional neighbors—mainly Japan and China (Shin 2006, 22). The nationalization of T’aegwŏndo was demonstrably no different, and importantly, laid the groundwork for this sport to eventually be disseminated successfully at the domestic and international level.
Although coming to a definitive conclusion as to the precise origins of T’aegwŏndo is outside the scope of this article, given the similarity with martial practices, arts, and customs in at least China, Okinawa, and Japan, coupled with the available evidence, we can certainly qualify the multi-directional and multifaceted trans-cultural influence thereof in the immediate, and arguably expansive regional sphere beyond Asia (see Capener 2016). The common, government sponsored narrative in Korea however is that the embryotic origins of T’aegwŏndo go back to its antiquity, being a separate indigenous practice with cross-temporal corollaries to the peninsula’s ancient martial pursuits (Moenig 2013, 321). This widespread quasi- solipsist understanding in turn fits in well with the myth of an ethnic people with a shared, distinct genealogy descended from Tan`gun (Shin 2006, 4). Both myths however are transparently problematic when viewed through the twin-lenses and logic of Darwinian biological and cultural evolution. In short, culturally and genetically, we’re all mixed—an empirical fact which presents a challenge to nationalist campaigns.
Regardless of the genesis, the diverse tapestry of practices which make-up T’aegwŏndo’s uniqueness, if not distinctly Korean, has certainly become Korean in the modern sense. The transformation or perhaps even post-colonial re-transformation of what has come to be known as T’aegwŏndo into a separate Korean entity began in part with the introduction of the practice into the standard training of soldiers in the 1950s by General Choi Hong Hui (Moenig 2013, 332–333, 337). General Choi was further one of the progenitors of the name T’aegwŏndo, along with being among the founders of the Korea T’aegwŏndo Association (KTA) in 1959, which helped to unify the various competing schools under its institutional umbrella. (ibid, 335).
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In conjunction with the (re)branding of T’aegwŏndo, political decision makers increasingly became involved with the direct promotion of its `native` martial art turned athletic endeavor. As previously noted, the KTA was formed and provided support by the Rhee Syngman administration (1948–1960), along with the recognition of the Korea Amateur Sports Association (KASA) and the Ministry of Education. The KTA would survive (in various forms) the turmoil of predicable political infighting coeval with Rhee’s forced resignation and Park Chung Hee’s 1961 led coup d’état. One of the observable outcomes of the institutionalization of T’aegwŏndo was the increased spread of the activity through domestic tournaments, demonstrations, and its introduction into the public education system (see Moenig and Kim 2017). T’aegwŏndo additionally received a polity-wide boost in notoriety and legitimacy with its designation as Korea’s “national sport” in 1971 (Kim, Lee, and Kwak 2001, 1193).
Table 1. System of Cooperation for T’aegwŏndo Promotion
Level 1 Political Leadership Presidents
△▽ △▽ △▽ Level 2 Government Ministries Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism
Ministry of Foreign Affairs △▽ △▽ △▽ Level 3 Associations Kukkiwon, WTF, Korean Sports and Olympic Committee, Korean T’aegwŏndo Association
In addition to the designation of T’aegwŏndo as the national sport, in 1973 Korea’s central T’aegwŏndo training center, the Kukkiwon (Gymnasium of the National Sport), was established and granted donated land (Moenig and Kim 2017, 1331). As well as being the central training gym, it was given the tasks of standardizing the system, educating and training coaches (sabŏm), being in charge of rank examinations (both junior and senior and black-belt gradations), promotions, certifications, and research and development. The Kukkiwon furthermore has a highly active demonstration team (Kim and Chung 2014, 610; Kim and Kwak 2011, 34–35). As to be discussed in the following section, the Kukkiwon, in conjunction with other government recognized and funded institutions, would play a significant role in globalizing the sport. Furthermore, the development of the Kukkiwon led to the differentiation of its T’aegwŏndo, frequently referred to as “Kukki T’aegwŏndo,” from
CULTURE AND EMPATHY 79 that of non-government recognized variants. With the advent of the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF), also to be discussed in the subsequent section, along with its inclusion in the Olympic games as an official sport in 2000, Korea’s officially sponsored brand of T’aegwŏndo is popularly coined as WTF or “Olympic style” T’aegwŏndo.
On the Dissemination of T’aegwŏndo
While T’aegwŏndo was in the early phases of gaining its nationalist credentials and support system, the Korean government began the process of popularizing the sport both domestically and globally. In this section, we describe and analyze the major institutional developments and milestones of this process, as well as provide an empirical overview.
Between 1950 and 1965 T’aegwŏndo’s propagation was principally carried out by individuals who independently lived and taught the sport in foreign countries. Starting in 1966 however, the Korean government became involved by sponsoring and dispatching instructors following requests from foreign governments, including Germany, the United States, and interestingly, throughout the African continent. Since that period, the Korean government has actively supported the dissemination of T’aegwŏndo across the world (Yoon 2005, 139; Kim and Kim 2003, 228).
The promotion of T’aegwŏndo as a global sport by the Korean government has been based on the cooperation among political leaders, government ministries, and government-sponsored associations, as Table 1 illustrates. These three parties formed cooperative relations for the dissemination of T’aegwŏndo at the global level.
Level 1: Political Leadership
The Park Chung-Hee government actively supported the internationalization T’aegwŏndo. Government policies covered the unification of small studios, creation of military T’aegwŏndo teams, and inclusion of T’aegwŏndo in the school curriculum as noted in the previous section. The Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1988) government tried to hold onto its tenuous political legitimacy and induce regime stability by utilizing T’aegwŏndo as non-governmental diplomatic tools. The government succeeded in being designated as the host of both the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympiad, where the T’aegwŏndo exhibition teams were utilized to advertise the international sporting events, as well as being a demonstration sport for the first time. T’aegwŏndo would be featured as a demonstration sport again in the 1992 games, and gained official sport status beginning with the 2000 Sydney Olympiad (Kwon and Lee 2015, 519). Not insignificantly, the number of internationally registered poom (junior black-belt grade) and dan (senior black-belt grade) holders increased from 7,531 to 35,589 between 1988 and 2001 (Kukkiwon 2012, 240–241).
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The Roh Moo-Hyun administration implemented the “Five Year Plan of National Sports Promotion” (2003–2007) (Kungminch'eyukchinhŭng 5kaenyŏn kyehoek), which attempted to amplify the international image of Korea by dispatching exhibition teams and providing equipment support at the international level. It was framed as a policy of sports diplomacy and international cooperation. The Lee Myong-Bak government (2008-2013) proposed and implemented the “Culture Vision” (2008–2012) (Munhwabijŏn) as its sports policy, which also pursued the globalization of T’aegwŏndo by supporting T’aegwŏndo exhibitions, dispatching of instructors, and provision of T’aegwŏndo equipment. In 2008, the Lee government promulgated September 4th as the “day of T’aegwŏndo (T'aegwŏndoŭi nal).” The government also announced the “Basic Plan for T’aegwŏndo Promotion” (T'aegwŏndojinhŭng kibon'gyehoek). The Park Geun-Hye government (2013-2017) included a specified T’aegwŏndo promotion policy in the “Cultural Prosperity” (Munhwayungsŏng) policy. In this plan, T’aegwŏndo was selected along with Korean language (Han'gŭl) and Arirang as major items for special advertisement (Kwon and Lee 2015, 516–517).
Level 2: Government Ministry
Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense, which took a prominent role in the nationalization of T’aegwŏndo by disseminating it across the country, further engaged in the process of introducing T’aegwŏndo to other countries, especially at the initial period of T’aegwŏndo dissemination at the global level. Ironically, the outbreak of Vietnam War ignited the international expansion of T’aegwŏndo. Korean T’aegwŏndo instructors were dispatched along with the Korean military to the Vietnam conflict. Furthermore, in 1969, the Ministry of Defense created the T’aegwŏndo exhibition team (Han'gukt'aegwŏndoshibŏmdan), with the majority of their activities taking place throughout Asian countries, including Vietnam and Taiwan. The Ministry of Defense continues to promote the globalization of T’aegwŏndo by exchanging T’aegwŏndo instructors with foreign countries (Yoon 2005, 140).
Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism
The Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism is the main government apparatus responsible for taking charge of sports promotion, including T’aegwŏndo. The ministry employs National Sports Promotion Fund (Kungminch'eyukchinhŭnggigŭm) for the promotion of sports by the government. T’aegwŏndo occupies its own categories in the budget of the fund, unlike other sports. This signifies that T’aegwŏndo enjoys a special position as a national sport in the government plan for sport promotion. Table 2 shows the categories and amounts of the T’aegwŏndo budget in National Sports Promotion Fund between 2012 to 2017.
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In 2008, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism established and implemented the T’aegwŏndo Promotion Basic Plan (T'aegwŏndojinhŭnggibon'gyehoek) as a mid and long-term plan (5 years: 2009–2013) for the promotion of T’aegwŏndo. As Table 3 illustrates the categories and budget allotments for the plan, the Korean government attempted to promote T’aegwŏndo not only as a national sport but also as a global one by supporting T’aegwŏndo events and the construction of T’aegwŏndo facilities.
Table 2. T’aegwŏndo Budget in National Sports Promotion Fund (Unit: million won)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 T’aegwŏndo 4,450 5,450 6,805 - - - Globalization (0.4%) (0.5%) (0.5%) Projects T’aegwŏndo - - - 10,220 10,520 15,459 Promotion (0.7%) (0.6%) (0.9%) Aid to 6,784 12,077 19,439 19,200 21,266 25,239 T’aegwŏndo (0.7%) (1.2%) (1.6%) (1.4%) (1.2%) (1.5%) Promotion Foundation Construction 82,733 50,796 - - - - of (8.7%) (5.1%) T’aegwŏndo Park Permanent 4,711 - - - - - T’aegwŏndo (0.4%) Auditorium Total Fund 948,203 979,881 1,201,324 1,285,711 1,650,891 1,597,810 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) Source: Department of Sports in the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (2013– 2017).
Table 3. T’aegwŏndo Promotion Basic Plan (Mid and Long-term Plan (5 years: 09- 13) by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism
Four Main Promotion Project Names Budget (million won) Strategies Globalization of Network Construction for 12,500 T’aegwŏndo the Maintenance of Olympic Core Event Support System 1,000 Maintenance for T’aegwŏndo as the Global
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Sports Strategic Enlargement of 10,000 T’aegwŏndo in Foreign Countries Foundation Construction Identification of 550 of T’aegwŏndo as a T’aegwŏndo’s human and National Sport cultural values and identity Roles and Cooperation 1,000 System Construction among T’aegwŏndo Organizations Advancement of Poon and 130 Dan Review and Contest Systems Construction of 500 T’aegwŏndo “Cyber World” T’aegwŏndo Enjoyed by Popularization of 500 all People T’aegwŏndo as a Daily Sport for Adults and Families Spread of T’aegwŏndo to 850 Schools and Alienated Social Groups Development of 500 T’aegwŏndo’s Practical Uses Activation of Managing 1,000 T’aegwŏndo Studios Global Industry of Culture Enlargement of Base 276,040 and Making Brand for Facilities for T’aegwŏndo Tourism Hallyu Tourism Developing T’aegwŏndo 10,000 Festival and Tourism Goods for World People Support for Developing 4,000 Cultural Industry of T’aegwŏndo and Arts Source: Lee (2014), p. 30.
The Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism has also supported T’aegwŏndo exchange activities for the dissemination of T’aegwŏndo at the global level. As Table 4 shows T’aegwŏndo exhibition teams and instructors have been dispatched to foreign
CULTURE AND EMPATHY 83
countries in Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America through government support. T’aegwŏndo instructors and players have been also invited to Korea by the Korean government for the dissemination of T’aegwŏndo.
Table 4. T’aegwŏndo Exchange Activity Supported by the Korean Government
Year Activity Country/Number of Persons Budget (million won) 1998 Dispatch of Exhibition Teams 6 countries - Invitation of Foreign 36 persons - Instructors and Players 1999 Dispatch of Exhibition Teams 11 countries - Dispatch of Instructors Lebanon/1 person - Invitation of Foreign 5 countries/40 persons - Instructors and Players 2000 Dispatch of Exhibition Teams 4 countries (Swiss, Libya, Chile, 176 Mexico) Dispatch of Instructors 3 countries (Lebanon, Laos, 82 Czech)/ 3 persons Dispatch of Player Teams 2 countries (Mongolia, Australia)/ 20 persons Invitation of Foreign 1 region (former Soviet Union), 2 Instructors and Players countries (Vietnam, Syria)/ 37 persons 2001 Dispatch of Exhibition Teams 7 countries (Sweden, Poland, 139 Hungary, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Cuba)/ 38 persons Dispatch of Instructors 2 countries (Czech, Morocco)/ 2 17 persons 2002/ Dispatch of Exhibition Teams 9 countries (Vietnam, Philippine, 457 China, Gabon, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 2003 U.S., India, Pakistan)/ 141 persons Dispatch of Instructors 2 countries (Kenya, Algeria)/ 2 22 persons Invitation of Foreign 2 countries (Greece, Jordan, 33 Instructors and Players Israel)/32 persons 2004 Dispatch of Exhibition Teams 10 countries (Russia, Portugal, 165 Italy, Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, etc.)/30 persons Dispatch of Instructors No Invitation of Foreign 1 country (Lebanon)/14 persons 17 Instructors and Players Source: The Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2004), pp. 630–31.
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In 1998, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism reported to the President on the special plan of the “Construction of T’aegwŏndo Park (T'aegwŏndogongwŏn)” for the “Promotion of National Image and Building Tourism Infrastructure through T’aegwŏndo.” One year later, the government officially announced that it will construct the “T’aegwŏndo Park” with the central and provincial governments’ budget (Kim, Lee, and Kwak 2001, 1198).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also been taking charge of T’aegwŏndo promotion and support. As Table 5 illustrates, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has dispatched T’aegwŏndo instructors to foreign countries since 1972 (Yoon 2005, 138).
Level 3: Associations
Taekwondo Promotion Foundation (T'aegwŏndo Chinhŭngjaedan)
The Foundation was established in 2007 with a budget of 300 million Korean won. However, as the government decided the creation of T’aegwŏndowon as a master brand of Korea, its budget increased to 952 billion Korean won (The Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism 2012, 89). The purpose of the T’aegwŏndo Promotion Foundation is to play a key role in establishing T’aegwŏndo parks, T’aegwŏndo training, and general T’aegwŏndo promotion (Kim and Chung 2014, 614).
Korean Sports and Olympic Committee (Taehanch'eyuk'oe)
The Korean Sports and Olympic Committee, which is responsible for the general management of amateur sports in Korea and representing Korea in international sports organizations, has also engaged in the promotion of T’aegwŏndo as a global sport. As Table 6 illustrates, the committee has constantly dispatched T’aegwŏndo exhibition teams to foreign countries.
Table 5. The Dispatch of T’aegwŏndo Instructors (Sabŏm) by the Government (By the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Total 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Number of 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 Countries 7 8 7 2 2 2 3 3 0 4 5 5 9 0 9 9 7 Number of 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 Instructors 0 0 8 4 3 4 6 6 3 4 5 5 9 0 9 9 65 Newly 3 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 2
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Dispatched 3 Instructors Source: Chung (2008), p. 137.
Table 6. The Dispatch of T’aegwŏndo Exhibition Teams by the Korean Sports and Olympic Committee (Taehanch'eyuk'oe)
Year 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 Count 6 - 1 3 1 8 4 - 5 7 7 9 8 1 8 8 4 7 7 4 ries 2 2 2 Source: Yang (2006), pp. 177–179.
Kukkiwon
As already introduced in a previous section, the Kukkiwon was promulgated in 1972 as Korea`s central gymnasium and locus of research and development, coupled with promotion. On September 6, 1974, the first T’aegwŏndo exhibition team of the Kukkiwon was formed, which has continued to conduct expeditions not only in Korea but also in foreign countries to advertise T’aegwŏndo (Kim and Kwak 2011, 34–35). Table 7 shows the recent efforts of the Kukkiwon for the globalization of T’aegwŏndo through the dispatch of T’aegwŏndo exhibition teams, instructors, training of foreign players and instructors, and T’aegwŏndo equipment support.
Table 7. The Globalization of T’aegwŏndo Projects (by Kukkiwon)
Project 200 200 201 201 201 Name 8 9 0 1 2 T’aegwŏndo 6 5 5 14 18 Exhibition countries countries countries countries countries Team Dispatch T’aegwŏndo - 12 12 12 12 Instructor countries countries countries countries Dispatch (12 (309 (12 (12 persons) persons) persons) persons) T’aegwŏndo - 36 -44 41 39 Peace countries countries countries countries Service (146 (309 (272 (215 Team persons) persons) persons) persons) Dispatch Tal World - - - 9 115 Tour countries countries Training of 21 23 28 31 33
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T’aegwŏndo countries countries countries countries countries Players and (26 (29 (59 (64 (86 Instructors persons) persons) persons) persons) persons) T’aegwŏndo 19 26 24 24 13 Equipment countries countries countries countries countries Support Source: Lee, Kim and Shin (2014), p. 187.
World Taekwondo (WTF/WT) (Segyet'aegwŏndoyŏnmaeng)
Korea Taekwondo Association (Taehant'aegwŏndohyŏp'oe)
The KTA was established on June 25, 1962. According to its covenants, its main goals are to disseminate T’aegwŏndo to people for the purpose of intensifying people’s health, soundness of society and national images of Korea (Yang 2010, 18).
The WTF emerged out of the KTA, and was formally recognized and supported by the Korean government in 1973. It led the major push towards IOC recognition, official received in 1980. It evolved largely under the politically influential Dr. Kim Un Yong (Head of KTA; WTF; Vice President of IOC until 2004). The WTF was established on May 28, 1973 in Seoul. France, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the U.S., Malaysia, Singapore, etc. were the founding members of the WTF (Yoon 2005, 140). The WTF is focused on governing sparring matches. However, in recent years, it has expanded its role to regulating poomsae (set form patterns) and demonstrations (Kim and Chung 2014, 614).
T’aegwŏndo’s Status
As can be easily be extrapolated from the previous sections, the Korean government has engaged in a massive T’aegwŏndo branding and promoting campaign, beginning in principally in the 1960s. Without such an investment, in both the domestic and international levels, the status of T’aegwŏndo would certainly be less visible than it is. Indeed, T’aegwŏndo is arguably one of, if not the most recognized martial art from East Asia. That it is directly associated with Korea in turn, is clear. How stable this situation is, however, is decidedly less conclusive.
The main issue threatening the future status of T’aegwŏndo is decidedly corruption. Although sports and corruption frequently go hand in hand, given T’aegwŏndo`s minor (Olympic) sport status such scandals are especially problematic. The following section describes a some of the main instances.
On December 5, 2003, the president of KTA was arrested by the prosecutor’s office, eventually being forced to resign. During the election of the president, he had mobilized gangsters to prevent supporters of his rival candidate from voting. The
CULTURE AND EMPATHY 87 employed gangsters blocked the gates of voting venues in order to prevent supports of the other candidate from entering the booths. The advisor of the association was also arrested because he was suspected to have received bribes from sellers of T’aegwŏndo equipment (Munhwa Ilbo, 6 December 2003).
Shortly after the well-covered KTA scandal, in 2004, Kim Un Yong, Vice President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and main sponsor of T’aegwŏndo’s Olympic entry (and former head of the KTA and WTF) was implicated in a bribery and embezzlement case, in which he was forced to resign. He had been earlier given an official warning in 1999, in a similar case, surrounding the Salt Lake City Olympic host bidding process (The Guardian, 10 January 2004)
More recently, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism established the Center for Sports Corruption Report in 2014. During the period of its establishment in 2014 to August 2017, the total number of reported corruption charges was 742. Among these reported instances, T’aegwŏndo-related corruption constituted the largest portion at 14.2% (106 reported cases)—substantially higher than the usual suspects (e.g. boxing, baseball, soccer, horse racing, etc.) (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 18 October, 2017). In addition to finance and bribery related crimes, instances of match and team fixing as well were common features of malfeasance (Chung, Kwon, and Kim 2016, 372). Although we allow for multi-causality, such corruption scandals have had a significant effect on the overall poom (ranks under 16) and dan (blackbelt degrees) holders within the Kukkiwon, as illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 1. Poom and Dan Holders Officially Authorized by Kukkiwon (1962–2012)
WTF Poom & Dan Holders 600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0 1962 1969 1976 1983 1990 1997 2004 2011
Domestic (Korea) International (Foreign Countries)
Source: Kukkiwon (2012), pp. 240–241.
88 Jonson Porteux and Kyung Jun Choi
Table 8. Reported USTU/USAT Members and Registered Clubs
Year Members Clubs 2001 (USTU) 30,000 Not reported 2002 (USTU) 30,000 Not reported 2003 (USTU) 30,000 Not reported 2004 (USTU) 30,000 Not reported 2005 (USAT) 14,800 Not reported 2006 (USAT) 12,000 Not reported 2007 (USAT) 13,000 Not reported 2008 (USAT) 13,062 Not reported 2009 (USAT) 13,062 Not reported 2010 (USAT) 15,000 Not reported 2011 (USAT) 15,000 695 2012 (USAT) 15,000 500 2013 (USAT) 15,000 500 2014 (USAT) 15,000 500 2015 (USAT) 15,000 500 2016 (USAT) 14,000 550 2017 (USAT) 14,000 550 Source: USTU/USAT 990 Forms https://www.teamusa.org/usa-T’aegwŏndo/v2- resources/board-of-directors
Similar to the scandals that have plagued the Korea side of the equation, T’aegwŏndo in the United States has had its bouts of scandals which have threatened its initial popularity momentum. Owing much to the efforts of Dr. Ken Min, “Korean Karate” has been replaced in the American lexicon with T’aegwŏndo proper, and officially became recognized by the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) in 1974. Again under Dr. Min`s guidance, T’aegwŏndo received recognition by the US Olympic Committee in 1978. Having shifted away from the AAU, a new organization called the United States Taekwondo Union (USTU) guided the growth of the sport in the US (Min 2000). In 2004 however, mirroring the scandal in Korea, the USTU`s president, Mr. Sang Lee was forced to resign in the wake of fraud charges, whereby the USTU was de-recognized by the USOC (Korea Joongang Daily, 29 February 2004). Under new leadership, the USA Taekwondo (USAT) emerged and gained USOC recognition. Despite the changes however, the USAT has had difficulty regaining its pre-scandal membership figures, listed in the following table.
To dramatically multiply the insult and further damage the reputation of the sport in the US context, the USAT along with the USOC are in the midst of a lawsuit in which both organizations are charged with covering up a sex trafficking ring among at least two of its most prominent athletes and coaches, something the two
CULTURE AND EMPATHY 89 officiating bodies were allegedly aware of as early as 2006, but failed to act on until conveniently after the 2016 Summer Games (Chicago Tribune, 7 May 2018).
In summary, despite T’aegwŏndo’s emergence and global visibility, the most recent evidence suggests that its stability has become increasingly tenuous following scandals both within and outside of the peninsula. Such scandals in turn could affect its status as an Olympic sport, which again shown by the evidence listed in Figure 1, was the one of the key catalysts of the sport`s international growth and popularity.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to shed some theoretical and verifiable empirical light to the question surrounding the creation and evolution of modern T’aegwŏndo into one of the most recognizable combat-oriented sports from the East Asian region. T’aegwŏndo`s official origins (as propagated by the Korean government) link it back to its ancient history. This is an empirically tenuous claim, but arguably consequential for its legitimization and proliferation. Indeed, at the very least, modern T’aegwŏndo was born out of the post-colonial period in which Korea engaged in a massive process of imagining, re-inventing, and differentiating itself. Korea dramatically and impressively moved from an undeveloped, chaotic society, which was barely in the international consciousness, to one which as of 2018, boasts one of the most technologically advanced economies and polities in the world. In addition to reaching developed, democratic status, Korea`s international influence and visibility punches with far higher impact than one would predict based on its size and location, and again, very recent history of subjugation. The nationalization and promotion of T’aegwŏndo, was, and remains to be, part of the answer as to why Korea has achieved such a remarkable status. Whether T’aegwŏndo will continue to play this role is in part a function of its ability to maintain its status as an Olympic sport—a status which is potentially threatened by the twin cancers of corruption and mismanagement highlighted in the previous section.
As documented throughout this modest article, the Korean government played an extensive role in the development and promotion of T’aegwŏndo. The intended audience was not simply outside the peninsula, but within it as well. In this sense, we can potentially differentiate the promotion of T’aegwŏndo, from that of other soft- power building activities that are typically associated with Hallyu. It may also be more accurate to say that the creation and spread of T’aegwŏndo falls more in line with the state-building category, rather than under the soft-power generating umbrella. That being said, T’aegwŏndo`s role in increasing Korea`s international visibility and prestige is undeniable.
Lastly, despite T’aegwŏndo’s role in Korea`s development process, it is admittedly difficult to quantifiably and accurately measure the actual size of the effect. This of course is more generally a problem when it comes to isolating and measuring
90 Jonson Porteux and Kyung Jun Choi the rates of return on such investments as nation-building and soft-power. We know it`s important, but to what extent? The fact however that nation-building, coupled with the development of soft-power, can both bring about higher probabilities of cooperative environments, at both the domestic and international levels, means that more, not less research is needed in these two critical areas of inquiry. This study has thus sought to engage that very debate in an area that has received less coverage than is empirically warranted.
Jonson N. Porteux: Dr. Porteux received his PhD from the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) in 2013, with a focus on political economy, comparative politics, and international relations, with a concentrated use of East Asian based cases. He publishes most extensively on the economic and political causes and consequences of violence and democratization. Dr. Porteux is an assistant professor at Kansai Gaidai University, in Osaka, Japan.
Kyong Jun Choi: Dr. Choi received his PhD from the University of Washington (Seattle) in 2015. His primary academic interests have been comparative politics, international relations, and political sociology with a particular focus on law enforcement and the rule of law in new democracies and East Asian regional politics. He has published books and articles on policing and the state coercion in new democracies. Dr. Choi is a senior research fellow at Seoul National University, in Seoul, Korea.
Notes on Romanization:
The Romanization of Korean words was carried out utilizing the McCune- Reishchauer system. The spelling of well-known individuals such as Rhee Syngnman was left according to the most oft-used spelling. Additionally, for official spellings of organizations, such as the World Taekwondo Federation, we kept as is, rather than modify the spelling.
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