The Entertainment Software Association Attack on Video Game Regulation

Follow the Money 1

Running Head: FOLLOW THE MONEY

Follow the Money: The Entertainment Software Association Attack on Video Game Regulation

Jennifer M. Proffitt, Ph.D. and Margot A. Susca, Ph.D. The Florida State University College of Communication and Information University Center C, Room 3100 Tallahassee, Florida 32306 USA Email: [email protected] Telephone: (850) 329-7854

Follow the Money 2

Abstract

This paper explores the political and economic realities of the video game industry in light of the defeat of regulations aimed to protect children from violent video games, including the 2011

Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, et al. that overturned a California law regulating the sale of violent video games to minors. One of the key players fighting legislation across the United States is the video game industry’s influential trade association, Entertainment Software Association (ESA). The paper analyzes campaign finance records, federal and state lobbying reports, court documents, and media reports related to ESA and finds that ESA uses its political economic power to flex its muscle in all parts of the legal and legislative process.

Follow the Money 3

Follow the Money: The Entertainment Software Association Attack on Video Game

Regulation

The television advertisement for the 2010 Electronic Arts (EA) PlayStation and Xbox video game Dead Space 2 shows horrified mothers watching excessively gory scenes from this first-person shooter game. One mother states, “Why would they even make something like this?”

The narrator tells us: “It’s revolting. It’s violent. It’s everything you love in a game. And your mom’s going to hate it,” referring viewers to the website, YourMomHatesThis.com. The game is rated M for Mature—that is, for teens 17 and older, not the young boys the ad targets. And the ad highlights the frequently criticized focus of contemporary video games: extreme violence.

In 1994, the Interactive Digital Software Association, renamed Entertainment Software

Association (ESA) in 2003, was created after politicians expressed concerns about violent video game content and its potential negative effects on children (Lubin, 2006). ESA, the $60.4 billion

(Takahashi, 2010) video game industry’s largest and most powerful trade organization and lobbying group, also owns and operates the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB), the industry panel that oversees its voluntary video game ratings. This panel and its ratings system were created as a result of similar political and social pressure related to violent video games

(Lubin, 2006). ESA represents 90% of video game manufacturers including divisions of massive conglomerates like Disney, Time Warner, and Sony and spends millions of dollars annually lobbying Congress and other federal agencies that influence, enforce, or create media policy.1

ESA also contributes directly to political candidates; between 2004 and September 2011, ESA spent $23.2 million lobbying the government and nearly $1.3 million on direct campaign

1 This paper reviews hundreds of pages of campaign finance records including lobbying reports and lists of campaign contributions from 2004 through September 2011. All of these reports are publicly available through The National Institute on Money in State Politics website found at http://www.followthemoney.org/Institute/ index.phtml and The Center for Responsive Politics website found at http://www.opensecrets.org. Where appropriate, in text- citations from specific reports and records are provided.

Follow the Money 4 contributions, much of that money devoted to politicians in states where video game regulation had been proposed.

In 2003, a Wall Street Journal reporter wrote that proposed restrictions on gaming companies that included labeling content had failed due in large part to “heavy lobbying, lawsuits and threats of legal action by the videogame industry” (Pereira, 2003, para. 1). In 2011, the Center for Responsive Politics identified 28 lobbyists working on behalf of ESA, including former members of Congress, previous lawyers for federal agencies, others with ties to the White

House, and a former clerk from the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Lobbying,” 2011).

ESA lobbyists’ revolving-door ties to industry are troubling when one considers that video game violence and regulation have been the subject of municipal laws, federal reports, and, most recently, a U.S. Supreme Court case. In June 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v.

Entertainment Merchants Association [herein Brown] ruled that a California law that sought to regulate the sale of violent video games to minors was unconstitutional.

While much research has concentrated on First Amendment concerns regarding video game regulation and its effectiveness (Calvert & Richards, 2005; 2006; Carey, 2004-05; Day &

Hall, 2010; Dolan, 2006; Williams, 2006-07), ESA’s powerful reach into state and national politics and legislative issues combined with its controlling corporate influence are often overlooked. As Nichols (2010) noted, researchers must understand that the video game industry

“exists within a capitalist framework” (p. 3) in which profit is the primary goal. And certainly the profitability of video games rivals other cultural industries; for example, “The best-selling video game of 2007, ‘Halo 3,’ took in more revenue ($170 million) on its first day of sales than the opening weekend receipts of ‘Spider Man 3,’ ($151 million) the highest-grossing movie opening ever” (“ESA Members,” 2011, para. 1). Indeed, as the video game industry grows,

Follow the Money 5 garners more revenues, and extends its political influence, video games have become more graphic and more controversial, increasingly including “extensive violence, nudity, and drug use” (Collier, Liddell & Liddell, 2008, p. 107), which in part led the U.S. Supreme Court during its 2010 session to hear the case regarding the California statute enacted to protect children from such material. The availability of such games has raised concerns for parents, and politicians have attempted to enact legislation at the state and federal levels since 2003. But as the industry becomes more powerful and profitable, lawmakers’ efforts to curb the accessibility of this media to children and adolescents are met with the full force of video game manufacturers’ political economic influence. This paper sets out to explain the political and economic realities of the video game industry through an analysis of campaign finance records, federal and state lobbying reports, court documents, and media reports related to the ESA.

Consolidation of the Video Game Industry’s Political Economic Power

As Wasko (2005) explained, “Political economy focuse[s] on the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of wealth and the consequences for the welfare of individuals and society” (p. 26). Political economy of media emphasizes theoretical and methodological concerns regarding “how media and communication systems and content reinforce, challenge or influence existing class and social relations” and how structural factors such as “ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. advertising) and government policies influence media behavior and content” (McChesney, 2000a, p. 110). The logic of capitalism, neoliberal policies, and deregulation have led to oligopolistic markets in an ever-globalized system in which transindustrial media corporations transcend geographical boundaries. Mosco (2009) stated that political economic work highlights the commodification of both the media and their content with an emphasis on who holds the power in such a structure; in the United States, this power lies

Follow the Money 6 with large media corporations that have increased political and economic power via interlocking directorates, campaign donations, lobbying, revolving door relationships, and trade associations, among other strategies. The fact that the structure is not challenged—it is actually accepted and promoted—by government leaders only furthers and enhances corporate media power while simultaneously allowing the government to avoid the criticism one would and should expect in a democratic system (McChesney, 2008).

Concentration of ownership in the newspaper, movie, television, and radio industries has been well-documented in political economic research (e.g., Bagdikian, 2004; Bettig & Hall,

2003; Croteau & Hoynes, 2006; Kunz, 2006; McChesney, 2000b; 2004; 2008; Meehan, 2005;

Meehan, Mosco, & Wasko, 1994; Mosco, 2009; Wasko 2005) and suggests that such concentration leads to barriers to entry for competitors, less diversity, more sensational content, and increased political power. The video game industry has followed the same consolidation path. In 2002, Williams wrote that there were early signs of video game consolidation and integration, mirroring other media companies’ trends. For example, Nintendo controlled 99% of the handheld video game market, and Sony controlled more than half (55%) of console manufacturing. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter (2009) explained that video game conglomerates including EA, an ESA member, marked a new era for video game software and hardware development just as the console market became dominated by Microsoft, Sony, and Nintendo, companies that belong to ESA as well. The authors described this era as “favoring the biggest studios” (p. 40). Mansell (2004) suggested that although new media industries may appear to be competitive as they promote ideas of open access, the reality is a structure similar to traditional media industries.

For example, the video game industry is marked by vertical and horizontal integration

Follow the Money 7 and rapid consolidation (Caron, 2008; Gil & Warzynsky, 2010; Williams, 2002). In fact, video games have become an integral part of the big media conglomerates’ portfolios, and as such, these conglomerates can use their subsidiaries to boost the success of their games. However, many of these blockbuster games, as evaluated by Gil and Warzynski (2010), may actually be

“inherently worse” (p. 24) than those produced by independents. Nonetheless, in 2004, Warner

Interactive, a subsidiary of Time Warner, changed company policy to better integrate its film division with its animation and gaming division to increase profits (Gaudiosi, 2004). Kerr

(2006) explained the consequences of conglomeration: “It can also mean that larger and larger companies are content to build brands, produce sequels and license properties between their different media operations while smaller independents struggle to compete” (p. 19). Although retailers like Best Buy and Wal-Mart are responsible for much of the in-person sales of video games, the introduction of online services like Xbox Live means companies can control the distribution—as well as production and exhibition—and further increase revenues and barriers to entry.

Gil and Warzynski (2010), using data from 2000 to 2007, explained that vertical integration in the video game console industry led to larger profits for the biggest companies, mainly Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo. These companies have their own publishing divisions and often control distribution, resulting in overwhelming commercial success. In December

2007, the public spent $500 million on Microsoft’s Xbox 360 games—with about one third

($150 million) of that spent on just two games (Gil &Warzynski, 2010). The authors “found that vertically integrated games produce higher revenues, sell more units and sell at higher prices than independently developed and published games” (p. 10). And consumer spending keeps increasing: ESA reported that in 2010, “Consumers spent $25.1 billion on video games,

Follow the Money 8 hardware and accessories” (“Industry Facts,” 2011, para. 2). Kerr (2006) explained that the global games industry profits outpaced the film industry when one includes profits associated with hardware, software, and accessories sales and the recent development of online video game sales. Domestic video game sales now outnumber those of the music industry as major corporate game manufacturers have worked to exploit tax loopholes and government incentive programs to make more money (Kocieniewski, 2011).

According to Nichols (2010), the video game industry is consolidated in not only software but also in distribution and production of technologies used to play video games. He explained that video games can cost upwards of $20 million to produce. In the early part of the last decade, the high cost of production meant larger corporate firms were able to buy smaller companies or push them out of competition entirely (Suzuki, 2003). Microsoft, the maker of the

Xbox console, in 2003 purchased for $375 million a 49% share of Rare Ltd., the maker of

Donkey Kong. In 2011, Sony bought inFamous, a Washington-based game company, for an undisclosed sum, prompting a Reuters reporter to write: “The video game industry has been rife with consolidation in recent months” (Baker, 2011, para. 3). Often that consolidation represents multi-million dollar—and in some cases multi-billion dollar—deals. A 2007 deal worth $9.85 billion merged Vivendi and Activision, the maker of Call of Duty, a first-person shooter game.

In 2002, an EA spokesperson told The San Francisco Chronicle that the company at that time had “more than $1 billion on hand in cash and reserves, so it stands to reason that we’re considering strategic investments” (Kirby, 2002, para. 6). By the end of 2008, EA had acquired or opened studios across the United States, as well as Australia, Canada, China, Germany, India,

Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Caron, 2008). Game companies have also acquired smaller firms to expand and to cross-promote video games on

Follow the Money 9 mobile and social media platforms. In 2011, EA struck a deal to purchase a mobile game maker worth $1.3 billion in stock and cash and spent hundreds of millions more purchasing companies that make games played on social media sites like Facebook (Pham, 2011).

Mosco (2009) wrote that political economy “asks us to concentrate on a specific set of social relations organized around power or the ability to control other people, processes, and things, even in the face of resistance” (p. 24). In this way, political economy lends itself to any study of markets or rules that govern markets, including regulatory mechanisms or bureaucratic realities that result from lobbying of government officials by corporations and trade associations.

The importance of the culture industries and their influence is summed by Kellner (2009) who stated that the media “are an essential economic force, helping to manage and promote consumer demand, constructing needs and fantasies through advertising and entertainment,” and at the same time, “the media are key instruments of political power” (p. 95). Though Kellner referred to the media’s political power in terms of “a terrain upon which political battles are fought” and as “instruments for political manipulation and domination” (p. 95), it is also the case that the media industries, including the video game industry, hold political power and influence through their formidable trade associations. As Hesmondhalgh (2007) stated, owners and executives of the cultural industries work to protect their interests in not only their own businesses, but also in the interests of competitors and business interests as a whole. He wrote:

There is a deeply rooted tendency in advanced capitalism for oligopolies of large companies to form in nearly all industries. These oligopolies are particularly effective at forming lobbying groups, campaigning against what they see as obtrusive government legislation and regulation—much of it, in fact, intended to protect workers and consumers. (p. 63)

This is certainly demonstrated through the history and strategies of ESA as it used its size and political and economic influence to hinder legislation regarding video game violence.

Follow the Money 10

History and Current Practices of the Entertainment Software Association

In April 1994, corporations involved with video game production worked to create the

Interactive Digital Software Association (IDSA) to address Congressional concerns about video game violence (“Ratings Body,” 1994). An April 1994 Billboard article about the formation of the IDSA belies the importance the organization eventually would have in legal and legislative matters nationwide. At that time, Doug Lowenstein, then the group’s spokesman, explained that the creation of the board would address matters of intellectual property, piracy, and legislation.

He was quoted saying: “We think it ought to have a body to speak with one voice on these issues” (“Ratings Body,” 1994, p. 84). Even in its earliest stages—with members that included

Sony, Viacom, Virgin, EA, and Sega—the group wanted to self-regulate to avoid Congressional pressure (Huebner, 2000; “Ratings Body,” 1994). The ESRB ratings system created in 1994 was supposed to inform parents about video game content, assuage Congressional leaders, and stop criticism of the industry regarding mature products that contained themes of hyper-violence and sex. Five years after its creation, the game industry, once again, faced legislative criticism about the content of its games and minors’ ability to access them, especially in the wake of the

Columbine High School shootings in 1999 (“Games,” 1999; Melillo, 1999). In 1999, 2001, 2003, and again in 2006, Congressional committees addressed concerns about content and the ratings system. By 2003, the industry faced state and national laws meant to keep those games out of minors’ hands as annual video game sales surged above $10 billion (Dunphy, 2003). In an interview with trade magazine Video Business (VB), Lowenstein, by that time the group’s president, described the industry’s strength to Sweeting (2002):

VB: Where do games fit now within the media industrial complex? For a long time, it was a big business but didn’t get a lot of respect. Is that changing? Lowenstein: Anyone who doesn’t take the videogame industry seriously is an idiot. (para. 11, 12)

Follow the Money 11

In July 2003, IDSA changed its name to ESA, a move Alpert (2007) claimed was done for marketing purposes but passed with little fanfare in the trade media.

Today, ESA represents diverse corporate interests of a $60 billion industry that creates and sells software, hardware, mobile, and computer-based products for customers worldwide

(Takahashi, 2010). ESA members include EA, Disney Interactive Studios, Microsoft, Nintendo,

Ubisoft, Sega, Sony Computer Entertainment America, Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment, and Take-Two Interactive Software Inc., the maker of the controversial and profitable Grand

Theft Auto franchise that has been the subject of legislative and legal concerns (“ESA Members,”

2011). The FPS video game Halo generated $2 billion in sales for its maker, Microsoft, a signal of how profitable individual corporations are that comprise ESA (Bass, 2010). One of the primary advantages of trade associations is that the corporations involved can work together to benefit the industry as a whole without the threat of anti-trust concerns. Graham Hopper, chairman of ESA, also serves as senior vice president at Disney Interactive Studios, the Disney

Corporation’s gaming business. Responding to the number of legislative efforts to curb video game violence, Hopper said: “It’s more important than ever for the industry to be able to speak with a clear voice on those issues” (as quoted in Pham, 2008, para. 6). Carless (2007), a video game columnist, framed the corporate influence of ESA members a different way, explaining that the ESA uses that influence to fight against what he called “arbitrary” laws:

But, though the ESA and Lowenstein seem to care deeply about games’ right to free speech and to not be censored, the fact is that the association is funded at the highest level by corporate interests who essentially care about their profits. There’s nothing wrong with this, of course, but compare it to an organization like the American Civil Liberties Union, which gets a great deal of its income from individual membership dues. (para. 5)

Follow the Money 12

ESA uses that corporate power to generate media attention for its reports and philanthropic work, and also to provide its members with the tools necessary to influence the political process.

Presidents of several major media corporations that are already represented by ESA lobbyists—including Nintendo, Ubisoft, Epic Games, and EA—also are members of a political action committee (PAC) formed in 2008, and in that same year gave the maximum contribution

($5,000) allowed by law to ESA’s PAC. In a 2008 New York Times article, Michael Gallagher, current president and CEO of ESA, said of the PAC: “We will be writing checks to campaigns by the end of this quarter…This is an important step in the political maturation process of the industry that we are ready to take now” (Reisinger, 2008, para. 3). Gallagher defended his organization’s lobbying and political efforts to a Los Angeles Times reporter in 2008 (Pham,

2008). In 2007, 33 state or federal bills were introduced to regulate video games or the game industry. Just one year later, that number dropped to 12. In 2007, Gallagher took over as head of ESA from Lowenstein, a key figure in the start and expansion of the trade organization and its political influence.

At a Las Vegas gaming convention in March 2007, Lowenstein delivered remarks regarding how he believed that by fighting regulation, ESA upheld key First Amendment freedoms related to artistic expression and free speech. But he also was critical of individual

ESA game companies to take on similar battles fought by the trade group: “If you want the right to make what you want, if you want to push the envelope, I’m out there defending your right to do it” (Sheffield & Cifaldi, 2007, para. 3). While ESA is seen as the champion of game companies’ and game publishers’ rights, it often takes the brunt of the criticism when politicians or media stories target violent or sexual content in games. The article explained that Lowenstein

Follow the Money 13 was angry about individual companies and publishers not taking enough of a stand. Lowenstein said:

It’s very easy on the keyboard to type up a bunch of criticisms about how ESA isn’t doing this or that right. Then you look and where are these people? Are they getting in the fight? Are they making political contributions? Are they going to their senators? No, they’re sitting on their hands. I’m sick and tired of people sitting on their hands. (para. 5)

However, as will be shown, the money put forth by ESA appears to have paid off.

Entertainment Software Association, Court Battles, and Paying for Political Influence

ESA’s influence is, perhaps, best revealed through an analysis of its efforts in the courtroom and halls of Congress. In November 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association (now known as Brown due to the gubernatorial administrative change), a lawsuit that began with action by

ESA to stop regulation of the sale of violent video games to minors or labeling video game content that minors may purchase in California. California’s law “borrows” (Calvert &

Richards, 2005, p. 24) from the sexual obscenity statute in making its definition of a violent video game, a definition that Justice Samuel Alito explained in the June 2011 opinion was too vague to pass Constitutional muster. The California law, Assembly Bill (AB) 1179, signed into law in October 2005 and scheduled to take effect in January 2006, also required the labeling of video games, and prohibited the sale of such a game to anyone age 17 and under. It sought to penalize with a $1,000 fine any merchant that sold a violent video game to a minor. Democratic

California House member Leland Yee, now a state senator running for mayor of San Francisco

(as of October 2011), sponsored the bill. Yee has a Ph.D. in child psychology from the

University of Hawaii and served eight years on the San Francisco School Board (Calvert &

Richards, 2005). After the success of his legislation, Yee referred repeatedly in interviews to the

Follow the Money 14 increasing level of violence in some games, including the online video game JFK Reloaded, which allows players to assassinate President John F. Kennedy from Lee Harvey Oswald’s perspective by shooting Kennedy in the head, as the reason for his legislative attempts (Calvert

& Richards, 2005).

Since its founding, ESA has been dedicated to stopping any regulation of the video game medium or the multi-billion-dollar industry that makes and distributes games and gaming software regardless of content. Carless (2007) explained ESA’s power this way:

If it weren’t for the ESA, we’d all be screwed in the North America game business. For one, there would be practically arbitrary state-based laws, which would mean video games were banned, differently rated, or differently handled at retail in any number of different parts of the U.S. For another, we could see an influx of politicians who might otherwise stay out of the debate, drafting more games-as-porn bills due to their successes in other states or floating the idea of pressing criminal charges against clerks selling M-rated games to underage buyers. (para. 4)

In an interview in the early days of legislative restriction, Lowenstein said, “we will challenge any and all restrictions on content and access” (as quoted in Calvert & Richards, 2005, p. 36).

Lowenstein was quoted in a 2005 article reiterating that position: “We can use things like the

American Constitution’s guarantee of free speech as a shield to legitimize virtually any content”

(Davidson, 2005, para. 17). In fact, the June 2011 Brown decision is perhaps most notable not just for striking down the California law as unconstitutional but for recognizing that video games are a medium that should be granted First Amendment protection in the same way that books, magazines, and film already are.

But, prior to that landmark decision, several states and municipalities attempted to regulate—much in the same way that pornography is—the sale of violent video games to minors, and it is in this way that ESA revealed part of its organizational strength. In 2000, St. Louis

County (Missouri) attempted to criminalize selling or renting a violent video game to minors; the

Follow the Money 15

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down in 2003 the St. Louis County ordinance after ESA

(then IDSA) filed suit. St. Louis County modeled its ordinance after one passed in Indianapolis.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in March 2001 struck down that Indianapolis law that sought to limit minors’ access to violent video games (Calvert & Richards, 2006). ESA fought similar laws in Michigan, Illinois, and Washington with similar effects (Calvert & Richards,

2005; 2006; Collier, Liddell, & Liddell, 2008; Dolan, 2006; Williams, 2006-07) just as

Oklahoma did in 2006 (Rabe, 2006). Collier, Liddell, and Liddell (2008) explained: “The government has not been able to show a compelling reason for its action, and the remedies proposed have been held to be unreasonably restrictive under the circumstances” (p. 108). As noted, in 2005, California enacted the Yee-sponsored law. In an amicus curiae brief in the Brown case, the state attorneys general of 11 states supported the California law under review, claiming that it protects adult speech as it requires that parents make purchasing decisions for their children. The brief, referring to the California law, says:

It simply restricts minors’ unmediated commercial access to certain graphically violent video games. But it prevents no adult from buying or renting such games. It does not even stop minors from playing them. Rather, the law helps ensure that parents—and not the marketplace—ultimately decide whether their children play a game, such as Postal 2, in which players are encouraged to urinate on their victims before burning them alive. (Brief No. 08-1448, 2010, p. 6)

However, the public never had the opportunity to see the effects of that law or any other.

ESA with the Entertainment Merchants Association, a lobbying group representing game retailers, joined to immediately file suit against California in the case that ultimately was argued before the Supreme Court. The court action halted the prohibition of the sale of video games to minors in California and in several other states, a delay that allowed ESA the opportunity to pay cash to influence politicians in places legislation had been proposed or was being debated. For

Follow the Money 16 example, in 2006, Florida Republican State Senator Alex Diaz de la Portilla proposed video game legislation, Senate Bill (SB) 492, based on California’s law (Bennett, 2006). A legal blog dedicated to video games described SB 492 this way: “Considering that the continued efforts of the Entertainment Software Association have so far resulted in the prevention of similar laws in

Indianapolis, Michigan, and Illinois, actual implementation of Bill 492 might never occur”

(Bennett, 2006, para. 3). On May 5, 2006, that bill died in committee (S.B. 0492, 2006).

Between 2003 and 2005, the years before that legislative move, ESA recorded no campaign contributions in Florida and had no registered lobbyists working there. In 2006, the year of de la Portilla’s bill, ESA targeted politicians and political parties in Florida with $52,300 in contributions, the most money spent by ESA in one state that year (“Entertainment Software

Association,” 2006). Between 2006 and 2010, ESA spent $275,300 on campaign contributions in

Florida, second only to California. No bills have since been introduced in Florida, but ESA claimed that it has created 2,377 jobs in the state since 2008 (“Florida,” 2010). Thus, ESA also extends its political influence through the promise of job creation and the threat of withholding jobs. For example, after a Louisiana law was passed-–a law based on the Miller v. California sexual obscenity standard found constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1973—an ESA spokesperson was reported to have said that the legislation was a good way to keep its members from creating jobs there. Cohen (2006) wrote:

What’s more, said the ESA, it also sends a strong message to video game developers to stay out of Louisiana, less than a year after legislators passed a bill that offers tax credits to such companies who want to set up shop in the state. (para. 9)

Florida and Louisiana were not the only states to attempt regulation.

Legislators in states across the country attempted to regulate the sale of violent video games to minors and met the force of ESA’s political power. Outcomes of the bills differed;

Follow the Money 17 some never made it out of committee, others passed through legislative bodies only to be vetoed, and others found their way to the courts. In Utah, then-Governor Jon Hunstman (as of October

2011 a Republican candidate for president) vetoed House Bill (HB) 353 in 2009 that sought to penalize the sale of violent games to minors. Cohen (2009) explained Huntsman’s position:

In rejecting HB353, Huntsman writes, ‘While protecting children from inappropriate materials is a laudable goal, the language of this bill is so broad that it likely will be struck down by the courts as an unconstitutional violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and/or the First Amendment.’ Huntsman’s opinion mirrors that previously made by the Entertainment Software Association (ESA), a video game industry group which has successfully overturned every other state law that’s been put into effect to regulate the sale of video games. (paras. 4, 5)

Also in Utah, Attorney General Mark Shurtleff claimed that the government should not be involved in video game regulation. In 2006, both Huntsman and Shurtleff received campaign contributions from ESA (“Entertainment Software Association,” 2011). In 2010, ESA spent

$32,500 on direct campaign contributions in Utah. In a 2011 news article written after the Brown decision, Michael Morley, a Utah lawmaker who had sponsored the vetoed Utah bill, said he would not make further attempts at regulation. The article explained: “Morley said he feels his bill would have been deemed constitutional, but added he does not plan on moving forward with trying to get it put in the law books. ‘It’s not on my radar to fight that fight’” (Fattah, 2011, para.

7).

In New York, former Democratic Gov. Elliot Spitzer wanted to fine stores that sold violent video games to minors (Mahoney, 2007). The New York Times reported: “The New York bill has been phrased in an attempt to pass constitutional muster, but it will almost surely be challenged by the same game-industry legal team that has successfully opposed game regulations around the country” (Schiesel, 2007, para. 6). The year after the New York House of

Representatives passed its version of violent video game legislation, ESA spent $67,350 on

Follow the Money 18 direct campaign contributions there. In 2007, ESA had 14 lobbyists working on its behalf in New

York, where its video game law “barks, [but] doesn’t bite” (McCauley, 2008, para. 1).

Fifteen different bills targeting violent video games/computer games were introduced in more than 12 states just in the first two months of 2005 (Calvert & Richards, 2005; 2006; Carey,

2004-05). Those states with legislative actions included: Alabama, California, Connecticut,

Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and

Washington. Between 2003 and 2011, ESA contributed almost $1.3 million to political candidates nationwide, according to analyses by the National Institute on Money in State Politics

(“Entertainment Software Association,” 2011). The majority of that money went to politicians in states where regulation had been proposed. These states include: California ($338,219), Florida

($275,300), New York ($183,450), Washington ($96,100), Utah ($42,500), and Missouri

($15,025), (“Entertainment Software Association,” 2011). To date, none of the laws has taken effect.

In addition to funding individual candidates, ESA also contributes to political parties.

Between 2006 and 2010, ESA gave $76,000 to the Republican Party of New York. It gave another $57,500 to the California Republican Party and $50,000 to the California Democratic

Party between 2008 and 2010, the years after the Yee legislation was passed and before the matter was argued in court, further evidence of its ability and desire to influence the political process. It gave more than half (54.1%) of its political contributions to Republicans with 45.8% targeted at Democratic politicians. Nearly all (89.2%) of its political dollars supporting candidates between 2004 and 2011 targeted incumbents at the state and federal levels. Another

9.7% of ESA political contributions were directed at legislative open seats. Of those candidates

ESA supported, nearly three-quarters (73.9%) won election. During the period from 2004-2011,

Follow the Money 19

ESA targeted California with most of its money: 181 records of political contributions were made totaling $338,219 including two contributions to that state’s top 2010 gubernatorial candidates. ESA contributed $24,391 to candidate Jerry Brown (now governor) and another

$23,000 to former eBay CEO Meg Whitman’s failed campaign. Other states with legislative initiatives to curb the sale of violent video games to minors or to label violent video game content also appear on the list of ESA’s largest political contributions during the period 2004 to

2011. Illinois, Missouri, and Washington appear in the top 14 states where legislators reaped financial benefits from ESA contributions. Fox and Rothenberg (2009) explained that the direct influence of campaign contributions on policymaking needs to be explored integrating the role of incumbent policy choices and donations. They wrote: “We should assume that donations are aimed principally to enhance or to reduce the electoral prospects of existing allies or enemies”

(p. 2).

Lobbying Efforts Pay Off

When former U.S. Department of Commerce’s Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and gamer Michael Gallagher took over as head of ESA in 2007, he often discussed increasing the presence of video game manufacturers in Washington D.C. A game blogger wrote this about his lobbying plans: “Although the ESA’s $20 million budget is small compared to other Washington lobbying firms, [Gallagher] sees participation in the federal electorate process as one way in which to influence these issues, and has stated that he believes contribution in these areas to be ‘a very important part of our success going forward’” (Hruska,

2007, para. 4). Under the “Public Policy” section of ESA’s website, it reads: “The association proudly represents these industry leaders in Washington, across the nation and around the world,

Follow the Money 20 protecting their legal rights and legislative interests” (The ESA, 2011). Explaining its position on

“Federal Issues,” the ESA website states:

ESA’s Federal Government Affairs (FGA) staff works with the government at all levels to make the voice of its members heard on a wide range of important legislative and public policy issues. ESA meets with Members of Congress and congressional staff, as well as with Administrative officials to advocate our industry’s position on issues ranging from copyright and intellectual property concerns to First Amendment protection.

Since 2004, ESA spent $23.2 million lobbying federal agencies and Congress, often directing its financial resources against legislation and toward influencing federal agencies that make or enforce media policy (“Lobbying,” 2004-2011).

Although complete figures for 2011 were not available at the time of this writing, each year from 2004 through 2010, ESA spent more money than the one prior on lobbying. In 2010,

ESA spent $4.6 million on lobbying, more than Intel, IBM, or Yahoo!. An analysis of federal financial disclosures by the Center for Responsive Politics (“Lobbying,” 2004-2011) shows that only four companies from the computer/internet business sector —Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard,

Google, and Oracle—spent more to win political influence. ESA’s $4.6 million targeted

Congress, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Federal Trade Commission

(FTC), among other federal agencies, on issues including media regulation and entertainment industry ratings. As another measure of comparison, ESA spent about a third as much on lobbying in 2010 as did the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the broadcasting industry’s powerful and long standing trade association. In 2009, a California congressman introduced HB 231, which would have required warning labels on excessively violent video games. Lobbying reports for the ESA show that HR 231 is one of five pieces of legislation that were the subject of its multi-million lobbying efforts. Like many before it, the bill died in a subcommittee (Library of Congress, 2010).

Follow the Money 21

Lobbying reports from 2004-2011 outline how much ESA has spent and also explain further to which federal agencies and offices that money has gone. The legislative and federal agencies that have most frequently been the subject of the ESA’s lobbying efforts include: the

U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S Senate, the FCC, and the FTC. In 2010, ESA lobbied the

National Security Council, the Office of the Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Environmental Protection Agency, the

National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the U.S. Customs Service, the Department of Homeland Security, the Consumer

Product Safety Commission, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. In 2008, the ESA spent roughly $3 million lobbying Congress and federal agencies. In 2007, records from the

Center for Responsive Politics reveal similar patterns of multi-million dollar lobbying by ESA.

That year, ESA spent $2.8 million lobbying Congress and all of the aforementioned named federal agencies and departments including the FTC. In 2005 and 2006, the years of substantial legislative action and Congressional inquiries into violent games, ESA spent more than $4.3 million combined lobbying Congress and other federal agencies and employed 38 lobbyists working on its behalf.

The money is not the only sign of ESA attempting to win political influence. Its registered lobbyists reveal a revolving door between their workers and the agencies tasked with protecting the public. Registered lobbyists for ESA in 2007 included Ken Inouye, son of U.S.

Senator Daniel Inouye from Hawaii. Ken Inouye also has worked on behalf of News Corp. and the Motion Picture Association of America. In 2011, ESA lobbyists include Mark Heilbrun and

Ryan Triplette, both former lawyers from the Senate Judiciary Committee; Jane Alonso, a former legislative director for Maine Senator Susan Collins; Jessica Flanigan, a past senior lawyer at the

Follow the Money 22

Department of Justice; and Timothy Punke, a former clerk at the Ninth District Court of Appeals and one time lawyer with the Senate Finance Committee. The power and influence that comes with the revolving door is quite evident, especially considering Gallagher’s government experience. In fact, on the ESA website, a profile of Gallagher stated: “Mr. Gallagher also manages the ESA’s work with state officials, helping to foster a welcoming operating environment for the high-paying jobs in the video game industry” (“ESA Leadership,” 2011, para. 4). This suggests that even legislators can be commodified by the industry outside of substantive contributions; politicians friendly to the video game manufacturers and dealers can find themselves in a lucrative position within the industry once they leave office.

The lobbying reports require groups to explain “specific lobbying issues.” In 2004, the

ESA spent $1.7 million on lobbying. Included in its specific lobbying issues that year is the

“FTC reports on entertainment industry marketing practices and media violence and children”

(“Lobbying,” 2004). The FTC reports often are cited as evidence of how well ESA members are doing policing themselves with their ESRB. The amount of time and money ESA has spent on lobbying related to these matters should raise serious concerns about the objective content provided in those government reports. Researchers (Garry & Spurlin, 2007; Gentile, 2008;

Thompson & Haninger, 2001) have studied industry voluntary ratings systems including ESA’s

ESRB. Garry and Spurlin (2007) wrote: “The results of this empirical study indicate that children are indeed being exposed to various media products that, according to the rating system, are inappropriate for those children,” (p. 235). Time after time, studies have shown that the

ESRB ratings failed to prevent children’s exposure to sexually explicit and violent content. In

2006, The Washington Post reported that members of Congress wanted to take the voluntary ratings system away from the ESRB because of concerns about mislabeling and shoddy self-

Follow the Money 23 enforcement (Musgrove, 2006). Legislators wanted to give control over content ratings to the

FTC. Musgrove (2006) wrote: “Not surprisingly, the game industry would rather not have the government get involved” (para. 19). Although it may not want the government involved in its ratings, ESA does want to control the government on matters of enforcement and legislation. As demonstrated, it spends heavily to win that influence.

The effectiveness of ESA’s lobbying efforts leading up to the Supreme Court decision likely meant parents found themselves with less effective information about video game ratings.

Content of these products includes games that allow players to reenact the Columbine High

School shootings or to rape Native Americans and kill ethnic minorities (Barnes, 2011).

Williams (2006-07) explained that despite the increasing violence and sex present in video games, the ESRB had labeled just 23 games out of 10,000 as AO, or Adults Only, a rating that can hurt sales by the millions of dollars. The FTC issues each year a report analyzing the effectiveness of video game ratings created and enforced by the ESRB. An ESA news release written after the Brown case helps to explain the cozy relationship: “The ESRB independently rates computer and video games and was lauded by the Federal Trade Commission as the gold standard of entertainment ratings systems and recognized again for its integrity and effectiveness” (States News Service, 2011, para. 5). ESRB ratings are considered so effective that Justice Antonin Scalia wrote about them in Brown:

The Video Software Dealers Association encourages retailers to prominently display information about the ESRB system in their stores; to refrain from renting or selling adults-only games to minors; and to rent or sell “M” rated games to minors only with parental consent…This system does much to ensure that minors cannot purchase seriously violent games on their own, and that parents who care about the matter can readily evaluate the games their children bring home. (pp. 15-16)

Follow the Money 24

Yet, concerns were brought up after the Brown decision that the ruling may do little to ensure more effective labeling or self-enforcement. Justice Stephen Breyer, one of the two dissenters in the case, explained that the ruling “reduces the industry’s incentive to police itself” (p. 18).

These extensive lobbying efforts raise questions concerning whether the FTC will objectively address problems with ratings or the sale of violet video games to minors in the years ahead.

Conclusions

While campaign donations and lobbying expenditures do not tell the whole story regarding video game regulation, they do demonstrate the political power of the video game industry’s trade association in the policymaking and legal process. Through intense lobbying and targeted campaign money, ESA is able to do what ordinary citizens are likely unable to do: get a seat at the proverbial table. ESA’s political economic power gives the organization the opportunity to have its voice heard by lawmakers, to influence decision-making, to fight legal battles, and to push for an agenda that meets its business interests. ESA had the money and clout to successfully fight legislation in California, Illinois, Indiana, Washington, Florida, Missouri, and Utah that aimed to help parents as consumers make informed decisions. However, for the industry, information that helps consumers can hurt profit margins. The video game industry, as the Dead Space 2 advertisement demonstrates, continues to target children for games rated M despite concerns raised by parents and politicians in the last decade. In this way, the industry is able to attract a wider consumer base and at the same time claim that it is following its voluntary ratings system. As such, parents, rather than the industry, are to blame.

ESA has the power to flex its political muscle in all parts of the legislative process. In

2005, as state legislation in Illinois and Michigan was passed attempting to curb the sale of violent video games to minors, Hillary Clinton, then a New York senator, with Connecticut

Follow the Money 25

Senator Joseph Lieberman proposed the Family Entertainment Protection Act, SB 2126, in

December. The federal law was intended to stop the sale of explicit games to minors, yet again, because of concerns about content and the ratings system. In a political move, Lowenstein and

Steve Schnurr, an EA executive, hosted a $1,000-a-plate fundraiser for Clinton the year she and

Lieberman crafted SB 2126 (“ESA Promotes,” 2008; Zeller, 2005). By early 2006, ESA had devoted $120,000 toward lobbying against the bill (“Lobbying,” 2006). In 2006, one year after the industry dinner, Clinton, with Lieberman, appeared with Lowenstein to announce a plan to keep the ratings system voluntary. One industry watcher said: “It’s a fascinating turnabout for these two politicians, who have previously criticized the video game industry for making it too easy for minors to get Mature-rated games” (Cohen, 2006, para. 5). In 2008, Schnurr gave

$4,800 to Clinton’s presidential campaign (“ESA Promotes,” 2008). SB 2126 died in committee.

ESA has another ally in the Supreme Court. In analyses of the 2010 Supreme Court term, the Court members are referred to by several legal experts as pro-business. A University of

Buffalo Law School professor explained to the Daily Record of Rochester: “I think it’s pretty clear that the court has a preference for not just big business, but I think the powerful over the weak across the board” (“High Court’s,” 2011, para. 18). Despite evidence from social scientists that violent video games have societal costs, the Court decided in favor of the industry. Yee, who knows first-hand the power of the industry to defeat legislation, also expressed concerns with the Supreme Court decision: “the Supreme Court once again put the interests of corporate

America before the interests of our children” (as quoted in Liptak, 2011, para. 14). Further, the legitimization of First Amendment rights for video games allows the industry to use the

Constitution as a shield to continue to make and market physically and sexually violent games for profit without recourse for those affected by such violence.

Follow the Money 26

In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Samuel Alito wrote that although he believed that the California law regarding violent video games was unconstitutional, he would not necessarily reject all legislation. Alito wrote: “I would not squelch legislative efforts to deal with what is perceived by some to be a significant and developing social problem. If differently framed statutes are enacted by the States or by the Federal Government, we can consider the constitutionality of those laws when cases challenging them are presented to us” (Brown, 2011, p. 17). What this analysis has demonstrated, however, is that it seems unlikely that, based on its powerful lobbying abilities and seemingly endless corporate bankroll to candidates and incumbents, ESA would allow any legislation regulating violent video games. Furthermore, ESA has successfully sued several municipalities to recoup legal fees. The day after the Supreme

Court ruling in Brown, ESA filed notice it wanted $1.1 million from California taxpayers to recoup its losses (“Video Game Industry,” 2011). In a 2010 document, ESA explained its position: “$2,158, 916: Total amount state and local taxpayers have repaid the entertainment software industry for its legal fees” (para. 1). It seems unlikely that cash-strapped municipalities would, as the Utah lawmaker said in 2011, continue trying to “fight that fight.” Once again, the billion-dollar industry put profits above the welfare of children.

Future study of ESA may want to consider its power to influence other areas of government including labor, environmental protection, consumer safety, and advertising to children. ESA’s 2011 lobbying reports show that the 28 lobbyists working on its behalf are focused on issues related not just to media and telecommunications but others including customs, national security, patent law, immigration, and free trade agreements. Its mandated lobbying reports show agencies being targeted include the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.

ESA is lobbying also for a “high skilled workforce” and changes to visas for foreign workers just

Follow the Money 27 as it makes claims about its status on domestic job creation. Two other bills, HB 654 and HR

1895, seek to regulate companies’ use and tracking of personal data online, including that of children (Court & Simpson, 2011; Eggerton, 2011). ESA filed lobbying reports related to both of those bills, bills that ask the FTC, another of its favorite lobbying targets, to enforce rules regulating corporate behavior. If the video game issue from the last decade is any sign, children and parents should, again, take caution.

Follow the Money 28

References

Alpert, F. (2007). Entertainment software: Suddenly huge, little understood. Asia Pacific Journal

of Marketing and Logistics, 19(1), 87-100. doi:10.1108/13555850710720920

Bagdikian, B. H. (2004). The new media monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press.

Baker, L. B. (2011, August 2). Sony buys Bellevue-based video game studio. Reuters. Retrieved

from http://www.q13fox.com/news/kcpq-sony-buys-bellevuebased-video-game-

company-20110802,0,5818930.story

Barnes, R. (2011, June 27). Supreme Court strikes Calif. Law banning sale of violent video

games to minors. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com

Bass, D. (2010, August 26). The Halo effect of Microsoft’s Halo. Bloomberg Businessweek.

Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/

10_36/b4193032898394.htm

Bennett, C. (2006, January 20). Florida’s violent videogames legislation passes Senate

hearing committee [Web log post]. Video Game Law Blog. Retrieved from

http://www.davis.ca/en/blog/Video-Game-Law/2006/01/20/Floridas-Violent-

Videogames-Legislation-Passes-Senate-Hearing-Committee

Bettig, R. V., & Hall, J. L. (2003). Big media, big money: Cultural texts and political

economics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Brief of Amici Curiae Louisiana, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,

Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, Brown v. Entertainment

Merchants Association et al., 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (No. 08-1448).

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association et al. 564 U.S. 1 (2011).

Calvert, C., & Richards, R. D. (2005). Free speech & the Entertainment Software

Follow the Money 29

Association: An inside look at the censorship assault on the video game industry. Journal

of Legislation, 32(1), 22-49. Retrieved from https://litigation-

essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app? action=

DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&doctype=cite&docid

=32+J.+Legis.+22&key=38b5bbe9a48f105a5d3972f529bb790f

Calvert, C., & Richards, R. D. (2006). Precedent be damned—it’s all about good

politics & sensational sound bites: The video game censorship saga of 2005. Texas

Review of Entertainment & Sports Law, 6(1), 79-155. Retrieved from

http://comm.psu.edu/about/centers/first/videogame.pdf

Carey, C. (2004-05). THE BLAME GAME: Analyzing constitutional limitations

imposed on legislation restricting violent video game sales to minors after St.

Louis. Pace Law Review, 25, 127-156. Retrieved from

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/pace25&div=10&g_sent=1

&collection=journals

Carless, S. (2007). Serving duty. Game Developer,14(3), 3. Retrieved from

http://docs4.chomikuj.pl/383300468,0,0,gamedeveloper200703-dl.pdf

Caron, R. (2008). A look at the studios EA has bought and shuttered. Opposable Thumbs.

Retrieved from http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2008/02/aretrospective-look-

at-the-studios-ea-has-bought-and-broke.ars

Cohen, P. (2006, June 19). Louisiana passes violent game law, ESA sues. Macworld.

Retrieved from http://www.macworld.com/article/51421/2006/06/louisiana.html

Cohen, P. (2006, December 7). Former foes ally to raise awareness on game ratings.

Follow the Money 30

Macworld. Retrieved from http://www.macworld.com/article/54285/2006/12/

ratings.html

Cohen, P. (2009, March 26). Utah governor vetoes video game bill. PCWorld. Retrieved

from http://www.pcworld.com/article/162065/utah_governor_vetoes_

video_game_bill.html

Collier, J. E., Liddell, P., Jr., & Liddell, G. J. (2008). Exposure of violent video

games to children and public policy implications. Journal of Public Policy &

Marketing, 27(1), 107-112. doi: 10.1509/jppm.27.1.107

Court, J., & Simpson, J. M. (2011, May 5). “Do Not Track” would protect online privacy.

The Sacramento Bee. Retrieved from http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.

lib.fsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?

Croteau, D., & Hoynes, W. (2006). The business of media: Corporate media and the

public interest, 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Davidson, J. (2005). Pop culture pariah: Why are videogames the favorite demon of

mainstream media. Computer Gaming World, 255, 17-19. Retrieved from

http://www.1up.com/do/feature?cId=3143349

Day, T. R., & Hall, R. C. W. (2010). Déjà vu: From comic books to video games: Legislative

reliance on ‘soft science’ to protect against uncertain societal harm linked to violence v.

the First Amendment. Oregon Law Review, 89(2), 415-504. Retrieved from

http://hdl.handle.net/1794/10954

Dolan, B. J. (2006). “Mortal Kombat”: Illinois violent video games law versus First

Follow the Money 31

Amendment. Children’s Legal Rights Journal, 26(1), 75- 90. Retrieved from

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/clrj26&div=6&g_sent=1&collecti

on=journals

Dunphy, L. (2003). Videogames' final score: $10.3 bil. Video Business, 23(5), p. 38. Retrieved

from http://search.proquest.com/docview/223904122?accountid=4840

Dyer-Witheford, N., & de Peuter, G. (2009). Games of empire: Global capitalism and video

games. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Eggerton, J. (2011, October 5). House subcommittee vets FTC COPPA proposals. Broadcasting

& Cable. Retrieved from http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/474807-

House_Subcommittee_Vets_FTC_COPPA_Proposals.php

Entertainment Software Association. (2011). The National Institute on Money in State Politics.

Retrieved from http://www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=

100434

ESA Leadership. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.theesa.com/about/leadership.asp

ESA Members. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.theesa.com/about/members.asp

ESA promotes two. (2008, February 14). Retrieved from http://rpd6beta.ecasitebuild.com/

category/topics/esa?page=8

Essential facts about video games and court rulings. (2010). Report by Entertainment

Software Association. Retrieved from http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/

EFCourtsandRulings 2010.pdf

Fattah, G, (2011, June 28). Lawmaker says he won’t pursue video game bill. The Deseret News.

Retrieved from http://www.thedeseretnews.com

Florida. (2010). Video games in the 21st Century: The 2010 report. Economic contributions in

Follow the Money 32

of the US Entertainment Software Industry. Retrieved from

http://www.theesa.com/facts/state_reports 2010 /Florida.pdf

Fox, J., & Rothenberg, L. (2009). Influence without bribes: A non-contracting model of

campaign giving and policymaking. (Working Paper). Retrieved from

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396976#

Games: Game makers, taking hits, try to shield kids. (1999, May 25). Wall Street Journal, p.

B1. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/398736594?accountid=4840

Garry, P. M., & Spurlin, C. J. (2007). The effectiveness of media rating systems in preventing

children’s exposure to violent and sexually explicit media content: An empirical study.

Oklahoma City Law Journal, 32, 215-236.

Gaudiosi, J. (2004, July 19). Warner Interactive aims for better film-game synergy. Home Media

Magazine, 26(29). Retrieved from http://www.homemediamagazine.com/news/warner-

interactive-aims-better-film-game-synergy-6420

Gentile, D. (2008). The rating systems for media products. In S. Calvert & B. J. Wilson (Eds.),

The Handbook of Children, Media, and Development (pp. 527-551). Oxford, England:

Blackwell Publishing.

Gil, R., & Warzynski, F. (2010). Vertical integration, exclusivity, and game sales performance in

the US video game industry (NET Institute Working Paper No. 10-06). Retrieved from

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694311

Hesmondhalgh, D. (2007). The cultural industries, 2nd edition. Los Angeles, CA: Sage

Publications.

High Court's latest term: An analysis of key cases from the U.S. Supreme Court's 2010 session.

The Daily Record (Rochester, NY). Retrieved from http://www.nydailyrecord.com

Follow the Money 33

Hruska, J. (2007). The New York Times interviews new ESA president. Retrieved from

http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2007/07/the-new-york-times-interviews-new-esa-

president.ars

Huebner, D. (2000). Videogame ad ratings. Game Developer, 7(1), 10-10. Retrieved from

http://search.proquest.com/docview/219088763?accountid=4840

Industry Facts. (2011). The Entertainment Software Association. Retrieved from

http://www.theesa.com/facts/index.asp

Kellner, D. (2009). Media industries, political economy, and media/cultural studies: An

articulation. In J. Holt, & A. Perren (Eds.), Media industries: History, theory, and method

(pp. 95-107). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Kerr, A. (2006). The business of making games (pre-publication version). In J. Rutter, & J. Bryce

(Eds.), Understanding digital games (pp. 36-57). London: Sage. Retrieved from

http://eprints.nuim.ie/1992/1/Kerr_The_Business__pre-pub.pdf

Kirby, C. (2002, August 26). Video game industry in consolidation phase. The San Francisco

Chronicle. Retrieved from http://articles.sfgate.com/2002-08-

26/business/17556910_1_redwood-city-s-electronic-arts-xbox-charles-bellfield-sega

Kocieniewski, D. (2011, September 10). Rich tax breaks bolster makers of video games. The

New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com

Kunz, W. M. (2006). Culture conglomerates: Consolidation in the motion picture and television

industries. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Library of Congress. (2010). Bill summary and status H.R. 231. Retrieved from

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR00231:@@@X

Liptak, A. (2011, June 28). Minors can buy violent games, justices decide. The New York Times,

Follow the Money 34

p. A1.

Lobbying: Entertainment Software Association. (2004). Center for Responsive Politics.