Barriers Or Opportunities? the Causes of Contingent and Part-Time Work Among People with Disabilities

Barriers or Opportunities? The Causes of Contingent and Part-Time Work Among People with Disabilities

LISA A. SCHUR*

Why are workers with disabilities about twice as likely as nondisabled workers to be in contingent and part-time jobs? This study ﬁnds that disability income program earnings limits and employer discrimination play relatively minor roles, whereas the primary explanation is health problems that make traditional full-time jobs difﬁcult or impossible for many people with disabilities. Despite the lower pay and other drawbacks of many nonstandard jobs, they enable many people with disabilities to work who otherwise would not be employed. Policy implications are discussed.

DO CONTINGENT AND PART-TIME JOBS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE EMPLOYMENT of people with disabilities? If so, why? Nonstandard jobs may help people with disabilities enter and remain in the workforce, providing ﬂexibility that accommodates health problems and other personal concerns. On the other hand, people with disabilities may be channeled into contingent and part-time work due to labor market barriers, such as earnings limits imposed by public disability income programs or reluctance on the part of employers to hire them in traditional full-time jobs. The employment of people with disabilities has become a major focus of research and policy initiatives over the past 15 years (e.g., Mashaw et al. 1996; West 1996; Thomason, Burton, and Hyatt 1998; Blanck 2000; Blanck and Schartz 2001; Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003). The low employment and high poverty rates of people with disabilities have spurred the passage of several laws designed to increase their job opportunities, such as the 1990

* Department of Labor Studies and Employment Relations, Rutgers University. E-mail: [email protected]. The work presented here was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Disability Research Institute. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the federal government. Paula Voos, Douglas Kruse, Adrienne Eaton, David Bensman, John Burton, Steven Director, Barbara Lee, and Rebecca Blank provided valuable advice and comments that contributed to this article. Gina Damasco provided valuable research assistance early in this project. I am fully responsible for all analysis and conclusions. I R, Vol. 42, No. 4 (October 2003). © 2003 Regents of the University of California Published by Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK.

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590 / L A. S Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the 1999 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA). There also has been growing attention paid to contingent workers in the U.S. labor market (e.g., Belous 1998; Barker and Christensen 1998; Carre et al. 2001). Contingent work encompasses a variety of conditional and transitory employment arrangements that provide little or no job security for workers and generally provide low pay and few benefits. It is usually considered to include temporary help agency employment, on-call and day labor, independent contracting, and other jobs with limited tenure. In combination with rising displacement rates, the growth of contingent work has been taken as an indication of general weakening of employee-employer attachments and the decline of long-term, stable jobs. Despite the growing interest in contingent work and in employment of people with disabilities, little attention has been paid to their overlap, and there are no systematic studies of contingent work among people with disabilities. As will be seen, workers with disabilities are more likely than those without disabilities to be in contingent or part-time jobs. There are three major potential explanations: 1. Many people with disabilities have health or mobility problems and may choose jobs with flexible schedules to accommodate these problems or shorter work weeks that make fewer demands on their time or energy. 2. The most common government disability income programs—Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—have earnings limits that effectively keep recipients from working permanent full-time jobs if they want to receive their full benefits and health insurance. 3. Employer discrimination may limit access to permanent full-time jobs among people with disabilities, channeling those who want to work into contingent or part-time jobs. This study examines the relative importance of these explanations with a variety of analyses using three sources of quantitative data—the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and a special national household survey of people with disabilities—supplemented by qualitative data from interviews with contingent and part-time workers with disabilities. The first explanation is addressed using health measures from SIPP, seeing how doctor and hospital visits, sick days, and self-reported health status are linked to contingent and part-time work. The potential effect of earnings limitations is examined in two ways: by

Barriers or Opportunities? / 591 using disability income recipiency to predict work arrangements and by comparing earnings distributions in a natural experiment when the SSDI earnings limit was raised from $500 to $700 per month in July 1999. While there is no direct way to measure employer discrimination, it should decrease as labor markets tighten and employers try harder to attract workers. This study examines the potential role of discrimination by using state- level unemployment data to predict changes in work arrangements as labor markets tightened in the late 1990s. Further data come from a national random household survey in 2000 in which respondents were asked to report and describe any instances of disability discrimination in the past 5 years. Additional evidence on all three explanations comes from qualitative follow-up interviews of individuals from the 2000 national sample.

Literature Review Disability and Employment. Employment and earnings levels are generally low among people with disabilities in the United States. Using a broad definition based on activity limitations and functional impairments, 18 percent of working-age people have a disability, of whom about half (50.2 percent) are employed in a given month compared with over four-fifths (84.4 percent) of working-age people without disabilities (McNeil 2000). The figure is much lower among those with severe disabilities, of whom one- fourth (24.2 percent) are employed. Among those who are employed, a number of studies have estimated that people with disabilities earn significantly less on average than otherwise comparable people without disabilities1 (Baldwin and Johnson 1998, 2000). Negative effects of disability on employment and earnings have been found not just in cross-sectional comparisons but also in longitudinal comparisons before and after the onset of a disability (Krueger and Kruse 1995). [For recent analyses of employment levels and trends among people with disabilities, see Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003).] While a portion of the employment and earnings gaps may reflect lower productivity associated with many disabilities, prejudice and discrimination also appear to play a role, as suggested by the finding that wage gaps are higher for people who have disabilities that elicit the most negative social attitudes (Baldwin and Johnson 1998, 2000). Discrimination can operate in

1 Similarly, evidence from the United Kingdom ﬁnds lower employment levels among people with disabilities and earnings gaps between people with and without disabilities that do not appear to be explained by productivity differences (Kidd et al. 2000).

592 / L A. S a variety of ways to reinforce traditional organizational cultures and limit the job opportunities of people with disabilities. Harlan and Robert (1998:426) found that “employers offer substantial resistance to keep employees from requesting reasonable accommodation and to avoid grant- ing their request,” although employers may perceive that some requested accommodations would be disruptive and impose unreasonable costs on the business [also see Colella (1994) and Colella and Varma (1999) for reviews of workplace attitudinal barriers]. Employers appear most likely to deny requests for work schedule changes (Harlan and Robert 1998:421), which may cause workers requiring ﬂexibility for health reasons to take nonstandard jobs. While workers can respond to perceived employment discrimination by ﬁling claims under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act or Title I of the ADA, plaintiffs lose in a large majority of the cases most often because they cannot establish that they have a legally recognized disability2 (Colker 1999; Lee 2001, 2003).

Contingent and Part-Time Work. Contingent employment as used here refers to all temporary employees (temporary agency workers, contract workers, on-call and day laborers, and other employees in temporary jobs) and independent contractors. DiNatale (2001) found that such workers constituted 9.3 percent of the workforce in 1999. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has developed more restricted measures of contingent work based on how long the current employment arrangement is expected to last, producing estimates that between 1.9 percent and 4.3 percent of workers were contingent workers in 1999 (Hipple 2001). Temporary agency employment is the type of contingent work that has received the most research attention. The temporary help services industry grew from 0.5 percent of all employment in 1982 to almost 2.0 percent of employment in 1996 according to employer records, although only 0.9 percent of workers reported working through temporary help agencies as of 1999 (the difference due to some workers signing up with more than one agency) (Blank 1998:272; DiNatale 2001:29). Temporary agencies can greatly assist employers in finding qualified workers and in providing workers to be screened for permanent positions (Houseman 2001). Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek (2001) find that temporary agency employment grew even in the tight labor markets of the late 1990s, allowing employers

2 Two studies have found that employment of people reporting work disabilities dropped following the passage of the ADA, which the authors attribute to employer concerns about costs of accommodations and potential lawsuits (DeLeire 2000; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). Kruse and Schur (2003), however, ﬁnd that employment increased when using alternative measures of disability.

Barriers or Opportunities? / 593 to avoid raising wages for regular workers in high-skilled occupations and facilitating the use of more “risky” workers in low-skilled occupations. Researchers of nonstandard work arrangements often have combined analyses of contingent and part-time employment because many part-time workers, like temporary workers, would prefer full-time jobs and part-time workers have less job security, lower average pay, and less access to benefits than traditional full-time workers (Belous 1998; Blank 1998). Over the 1968–1996 period, the share of part-time workers increased among men (from 8.4 to 12.4 percent of all male workers) and did not generally increase among women (fluctuating between 26 and 30 percent of all female workers) (Blank 1998:265). Combined with temporary help service workers and independent contractors, Blank estimates that 22 percent of the workforce was in some sort of contingent or part-time job as of 1995. Contingent and part-time workers are disproportionately female, young, and from poor families; they earn 20 to 30 percent less on average than standard full-time workers and are less likely to receive health insurance, pensions, and other benefits through work (Hipple 2001; Blank 1998:266– 7). Between 55 and 60 percent of contingent workers under the BLS definitions would prefer noncontingent jobs. Blank uses such data to estimate the extent of “problem” contingent employment, counting workers who would prefer other employment arrangements. She finds that between 4.6 and 8.5 percent of workers were in “problem” contingent jobs in 1995. The extent to which these are in fact “problem” jobs or provide valuable opportunities for people with disabilities is the focus of this article.

Disability and NonStandard Work Arrangements. Contingent and part- time jobs offer special advantages to many people with disabilities. In particular, they can give workers some discretion over when to work. Many people with disabilities experience fatigue and other health problems, making it difficult to work a full 40-hour work week on a regular, predictable basis. Those with mobility impairments may have transportation problems, making flexible contingent work more attractive. Also, for people who have been out of the workforce for a long time or have never been employed, temporary and part-time work arrangements can be a way to make the transition from unemployment to full-time work, allowing them to test their abilities and interests in alternative work environments. In addition to contingent and part-time work, other nonstandard work arrangements also may provide flexibility that can be of special benefit to people with disabilities. People with disabilities appear more likely than their nondisabled counterparts to do home-based work (Schur and Kruse 2002) but not to work nontraditional schedules (Presser and Altman 2002).

594 / L A. S Apart from health problems, the constraints imposed by disability income programs and employer behavior also may lead individuals with disabilities into contingent and part-time jobs. Earnings limits in the SSI and SSDI disability income programs (addressed in part by the 1999 TWWIIA) may limit the number of hours that people work because they risk losing disability income and health benefits if they exceed a monthly earnings threshold. Consistent with this idea, Stapleton and Tucker (2000) found that the small minority of SSI participants who were employed adjusted their earnings in response to changes in the income threshold in a work incentive program, but there were no changes in employment status among the majority of SSI recipients who were not employed. Other recent research has found that the availability of SSDI has a strong influence on labor force participation among people with disabilities (Bound and Waidmann 2002; Goodman and Waidmann 2003; Autor and Duggan 2003). [For a detailed examination of the use of SSDI and other income sources by older workers with disabilities and government policy options, see Johnson, Bartels, and White (2002).] Employer behavior also may constrain individuals. If employers do not hire people with disabilities into traditional full-time jobs (due to either personal prejudice and/or a fear of accommodation costs), those who want to work may be forced to take and remain in contingent and part-time jobs. In addition, employers often hire workers on a temporary or part-time basis to assess their potential for permanent full-time employment (Christensen 1998:114; Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2001). This may be more common for workers with disabilities who often are seen as “risky” workers, given that employers may hold stereotypes or be uncertain about their abilities (Colella 1994; Colella and Varma 1999) and feel more comfortable initially hiring them on a temporary or part-time basis. Examining the relative importance of the three explanations is important both for assessing the labor market position of people with disabilities and for public-policy initiatives to increase their employment opportunities. If the data show that nonstandard work arrangements do not reflect external barriers and generally meet the needs and preferences of many people with disabilities who otherwise would not be employed, then policy initiatives should encourage such arrangements (while also attempting to increase the pay and benefits associated with nonstandard work). If, on the other hand, people are being forced into such jobs due to earnings limitations or employer discrimination, then policies should focus more on securing traditional full-time jobs for people with disabilities. As noted, there has been very little research on contingent workers with disabilities. In a companion study, I find that contingent and part-time

Barriers or Opportunities? / 595 workers with disabilities receive lower pay and fewer benefits due both to the types of jobs they hold and disability gaps within job types (Schur 2002). Other evidence comes from Blanck (1998), who reports case studies of 10 employees with disabilities working through the large temporary agency Manpower, Inc. He finds that they generally had positive experiences with their training and temporary employment arrangements and that 6 of the 10 moved to permanent employment. In a related study of self- employment among people with disabilities (which raises many of the same issues as contingent work), Blanck et al. (2000) find that both the desire for flexibility and experiences of discrimination led individuals with disabilities to participate in an entrepreneurship program.

Data To analyze the role that contingent and part-time work play in the employment of people with disabilities, data were collected from several nationally representative surveys. Data on work arrangements and disability come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The only disability measure available in the CPS is the work disability measure, based on the question “Does . . . have a health condition that limits the kind or amount of work . . . can do?” While the CPS does not provide information about the types of respondents’ disabilities, such data are available from SIPP, which along with the work disability measure also has questions regarding individual impairments, functional limitations, and limitations in activities of daily living. The SIPP provides a broader measure of disability that is closer to the deﬁnition used in the ADA, which is likely to provide a lower estimate of the percentage of people with disabilities in contingent and part-time jobs.3 The CPS dataset comes from the February and March datasets in 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001. The February CPS in those years included a contingent work supplement asking a variety of questions about work arrangements (DiNatale 2001; Hipple 2001). For this project, the February records

3 The work disability measure has been criticized for confounding a measure with labor market outcomes being studied (Kirchner 1996). In this article, the CPS deﬁnition of disability as a limitation in the kind or amount of work one can do may lead to an overestimate of the percentage of people with disabilities who are in nonstandard jobs. This is so because traditional full-time workers may be less likely than nonstandard workers with similar impairments to say that they have a work disability (in part because underemployed people may tend to rationalize their status by citing a work disability). This makes it important to supplement the CPS results by using a broader measure of disability, as done in Tables 3 and 4 with SIPP data.

596 / L A. S were matched with work disability data recorded in the March CPS files.4 These individual-level data are matched with state-level data on unemployment rates to shed light on the possible role of discrimination in accounting for contingent and part-time work among people with disabilities. The SIPP data used here come from the 1990–1994 and 1999 disability supplements.5 SIPP does not contain the detailed contingent work data available from the CPS supplement but does include information identifying part-time employees and those working in the temporary help agency industry. It also has health measures and data on monthly income and SSDI recipiency to provide tests of the role of health problems and SSDI earnings limits in the decision to work in temporary and part-time jobs. The CPS and SIPP data are supplemented with information from a 2000 nationally representative household survey of people with and without disabilities conducted by the Rutgers Center for Public Interest Polling. The 1002 respondents include 432 people with disabilities (identified using questions based on the 2000 Census), reflecting an oversampling of people with disabilities. The sample appears representative of the disability population, based on comparisons with SIPP. Using a question based on the sex and race discrimination questions from the 1990 American Citizen Participation Study,6 all respondents were asked whether they had faced any disability- based discrimination in the past 5 years, and if so, what type. While self- reported discrimination may be an imperfect guide to actual discrimination (as discussed in Hallock, Hendricks, and Broadbent 1998), a comparison of such reports among workers in different employment arrangements nonetheless can shed further light on whether perceived employer discrimination influences contingent and part-time work choices among people with disabilities. While the survey did not focus on nonstandard work, it identified temporary and part-time workers with disabilities, of whom 12 were recon- tacted 1 year later for semistructured qualitative interviews about their work experiences, health status, disability income, and experiences of discrimination.

4 Households are interviewed in the CPS for four consecutive months, so that three-fourths of the households interviewed in February are also interviewed in March. Records were matched by household identiﬁcation number, person line number, sex, and race. 5 The 1990–1994 dataset used here combines waves 3 and 6 of the 1990 panel, wave 3 of the 1991 panel, waves 6 and 9 of the 1992 panel, and waves 3 and 6 of the 1993 panel. The 1999 dataset is based on waves 10 to 12 of the 1996 panel, with the disability supplement in wave 11. There were data integrity problems in waves 5 through 8 of the 1996 panel, so the Census Bureau did not release information on the reasons given for Social Security income recipiency. These problems did not appear to infect the data in waves 10 through 12, so this information was released. 6 ICPSR 6635, available at Intercollegiate Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan. The words health problems and disability were substituted for the words sex and gender in question 5 of section 25 of the survey.

Barriers or Opportunities? / 597 The combination of several quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the three main explanations for the prevalence of nonstandard work arrangements among people with disabilities (an example of method- ologic triangulation) provides cross-data validity checks (Patton 1990:187). This approach is consistent with the view of Blanck and Schartz (2001) that research on employment policies for people with disabilities is best conducted using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. As noted, contingent employment is deﬁned here to include all temporary employees and independent contractors. Part-time employees are deﬁned as those working fewer than 35 hours in a typical work week. All analyses are restricted to working-age people (18 to 64 years old).

Results Prevalence and Reported Reasons for Contingent and Part-Time Work. Workers who report work disabilities are more likely than nondisabled workers to be in each of the contingent and part-time work arrangements, as shown by the CPS data presented in Table 1. In 2001, one-tenth (10.4 percent) were temporary employees, one-tenth (10.3 percent) were independent contractors, and over one-fourth (29.8 percent) were part-time employees (column 9). These rates were about twice those of workers without disabilities (column 4). Overall, over two-fifths (44.4 percent) of workers with disabilities were in some form of contingent or part-time job, whereas nondisabled workers were only half as likely to be in any of these nonstandard jobs (21.9 percent). This pattern exists for 1995, 1997, and 1999 as well. In the tightening labor markets of the late 1990s, the percentage who were part-time or contingent workers fell significantly among workers without disabilities (−1.6 percent, in column 5) but rose among workers with disabilities (5.4 percent, in column 10). These divergent trends provide the first indication that the reasons for contingent and part-time work may be very different between people with and without disabilities. How many contingent and part-time workers would prefer more standard work arrangements, and what reasons do people report for taking these jobs? As seen in Table 2, over half of temporary employees say that they would prefer permanent jobs, whereas one-tenth to one-sixth of independent contractors would prefer to be employees, and one-fourth to one-third of part-time employees would prefer full-time jobs. All three types of workers with disabilities are more likely than their nondisabled counterparts to desire more standard work arrangements. They are not, however, more likely to report job market reasons for being in such jobs. The distribution

598 / L A. S (5) 1.3%** 1.6%** 1.2%** 0.7%** 0.2% 0.5%** 0.8%** 0.1% Change 1995–2001 (4) 2001 1995–2001 , ,  S (3) 1999 ithout Work Disability ithout Work W  D  (2) W 1997 1

ABLE T (1) 1995    A  W  -T  P   C ers expecting job to last for “limited time” job to last for ers expecting contract ﬁrms by ers provided 4.0% 3.7% 0.5% 3.6% 0.6% 3.3% 0.6% – 0.5% 0.0% rk rk emporary help agency workersemporary help agency 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% – On-call and day laborersOn-call and day 1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.6% 0.1% Wo T Wo emporary employees 5.6% 5.5% 5.4% 5.1% – manent full-time employees 71.1% 71.9% 73.4% 74.0% 2.8%** r Independent contractorsT 6.3% 6.4% 6.0% 6.0% – art-time employees and contingent workersart-time employees art-time employees 23.5% 23.3% 22.2% 14.2% 21.9% 13.7% – 13.1% 13.0% – Pe not independent contractorsSelf-employed, 5.4% 4.8% 4.4% 4.1% – All working-ageEmployed 49,711 38,196 43,886 34,134 43,911 34,613 43,660 34,202 P P Contingent workers 11.8% 11.9% 11.4% 11.1% – Employed employed are Among those who 100.0% 100.0% 78.2% 100.0% 78.9% 100.0% 79.8% 79.8% 1.5%** Sample size

Barriers or Opportunities? / 599 (10) 2.4%* 0.6% 4.8%** 5.4%* 3.9% 2.7% 0.8% 1.9% 1.4% 0.1% 0.7% Change – – 1995–2001 ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^ 849 (9) 2.0% 3.4% 4.7% – 7.2%

2001 23.5% 50.9% 44.4% 29.8% 20.8% 10.3% 10.4% ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ 866 (8) 7.8% 9.8% 8.1% 6.5% 1.3% 2.1%

1999 23.6% 52.0% 40.2% 28.0% 17.9% ith Work Disability ith Work W ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^^ (7) 6.1% 9.8% 9.2% 5.0% 2.1% 3.1% 1997 25.7% 51.6% 42.9% 29.0% 19.0% ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^ < 0.05.

p ABLE 1 (cont.) (6) 5.8% 2.6% 9.5% 9.5% 8.5% 1995 T 51.5% 39.0% 25.9% 18.0% 25.8% < 0.05.

p ers expecting job to last for “limited time” job to last for ers expecting contract ﬁrms by ers provided 0.7% 1.1% 0.8% 0.7% 0.0% rk rk emporary help agency workersemporary help agency 1.9% On-call and day laborers On-call and day Wo T Wo Based on February–March CPS matched datasets. CPS matched Based on February–March emporary employees

manent full-time employees : r Independent contractors T < 0.01. art-time employees art-time employees and contingent workers art-time employees

< 0.01.

P Contingent workers working-ageAll Employed 4,479 1,072 4,134 1,023 3,825 3,725 Pe not independent contractors Self-employed, P p  p Difference between disability and nondisability figures for this year is significant at disability and nondisability figures for this year between Difference Sample size N All figures limited to working-age population (age 18–64), (age population limited to working-age All figures using CPS weights. weighted *1995–2001 change is significant at ** Among those who are employed are Among those who 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%^ ^^ 100.0% Employed 600 / L A. S ith 9.4% 9.5% (6) 11.0% 29.1% 37.1% 15.3% – W – Disabilities Disabilities , 1995–2001 ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ (5) ithout 6.1%** 7.2%** 1.8% W 24.5% 33.1% 33.7% – Disabilities Disabilities  R ith  (4) 7.2% 0.3% na na 0.4% – I W 15.3% 12.6% 12.0%23.1% na na na na – Disabilities Disabilities   ^^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^ D (3) ithout 0.4% 9.3% 3.5% 1.5% 0.7% 17.4% 28.9% – W Disabilities Disabilities ,  , Jo ith 2

(2) 6.9%1.7% 0.4% 4.5% 0.9% 5.2% 3.6% – 7.4% W 64.5% 67.2% 8.8% 16.2% 21.0%13.9% 21.6% – Disabilities Disabilities ABLE - - T N ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ (1) emporary Employees Independent Contractors Employees Part-time ithout 2.5% 4.9% T 50.0% 17.5% 13.1%** 13.7%** 56.4% W Disabilities Disabilities   , R  J    S   P  R 19952001 In school/training 63.1% 63.6% 10.3% 15.9% 27.1% 32.6% Change from 1995 to 2001Change from – ofFlexibility scheduleHealth limitations Money is better short period of to work wanted Only time or personal obligations family Child care/other 1.9% 15.8% 2.4% 13.5% 2.3% 25.2% 2.2% 25.1% na na 19952001 1995 to 2001Change from type ofOnly could ﬁnd work Hope job leads to permanent employment laid offEmployer back as temp worker and hired 1.5% 8.8% – 1.2% 22.8% 12.2% 25.6% 0.7% 46.8% 33.1% 2.6% 47.9% 1.5% 40.5% 4.6% 9.2% na 8.8% 9.3% 13.1% 5.9% na 19.7% 10.0% 12.5% 20.1% 10.7% ob market reasonsob market 40.0% 43.0% 9.2% 11.2% 16.1% 16.6% Most common personal reasons: J reasons: Most common job market eported reasons for contingent and part-time jobs for eported reasons R Preference for permanent or full-time work for Preference Barriers or Opportunities? / 601 ith (6) 27.1% 17.6% 15.7% W Disabilities Disabilities ^^ ^^ ^^ (5) ithout 1.9% 0.5% 1.5% W Disabilities Disabilities ith (4) 9.0% 5.2% W 12.9% Disabilities Disabilities ^^ ^^ ^^ (3) ithout 0.7% 0.5% 0.1% W Disabilities Disabilities ith (2) (cont.) W 17.6% 10.8% 10.6%

Disabilities Disabilities ABLE ^^ ^^ ^^ T (1) emporary Employees Independent Contractors Employees Part-time ithout 1.1% 1.0% 0.2% T < 0.05.

W p Disabilities Disabilities < 0.05.

p eceived SSDI eceived SSI eceived : Based on CPS February–March matched datasets, combined for 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 except as noted. 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 except combined for datasets, matched : Based on CPS February–March R R eceived SSDI or SSI income last year eceived < 0.01.

< 0.01.

R p OTE p Difference between disability and nondisability figures is significant at between Difference Disability income recipiency Disability N using CPS weights. 18–64), weighted (age population limited to working-age All figures significant at 1995 to 2001 is statistically *Change from ** ^ ^^ Sample sizeSample 6,866 314 8,884 383 17,728 1,013 602 / L A. S of reasons is generally similar between workers with and without disabilities in each of the job arrangements, although those with disabilities are (not surprisingly) more likely to cite health limitations and those without disabilities are more likely to cite being in school or training as their primary reason for such work. Only 13 to 27 percent of workers with disabilities in these nonstandard jobs report receiving SSDI or SSI income in the previous year, so earnings limitations from these programs are not a factor in the work arrangements for about three-fourths of the workers with disabilities. While these data provide a useful picture of stated reasons for nonstandard work arrangements, they cannot adequately explain the higher rates among people with disabilities. Those who cite “health limitations,” for example, may be referring to health problems that necessitate flexible or part-time schedules or to disabilities that cause employers to discriminate against them. Similarly, those saying that this is the “only type of work” they could find may be constrained by health problems, employer discrimination, or both. Therefore, this study uses a variety of quantitative tests, supplemented by qualitative interview data, to help disentangle the motives of people with disabilities who are in nonstandard work arrangements. Apart from the three primary explanations for the higher prevalence of people with disabilities in nonstandard jobs, another possible explanation is that as a group they are less likely to have the education and skills required for many standard full-time jobs. While people with disabilities do have lower educational attainment on average, they continue to have much higher rates of nonstandard work after controlling for education (according to regression results with both CPS and SIPP data, in appendix tables available on request). While it remains possible that their skills are lower even controlling for education, this explanation is unlikely because it turns out that people with disabilities who have graduate degrees are still much more likely than high school dropouts without disabilities to be contingent or part-time workers.7

Health Problems and Nonstandard Work. People with disabilities are more likely to have health problems, which can make ﬂexible or part-time schedules more desirable. The qualitative interviews provide a number of relevant examples. One woman who survived a lightning strike said that the resulting ongoing pain was the major reason that she initially worked part time and now has her own home-based business, giving her more ﬂexibility

7 The probit regressions indicate that workers with disabilities who have graduate degrees are 8.5 percentage points more likely than high school dropouts without disabilities to be in nonstandard jobs. This difference is significant at the p < 0.05 level. Barriers or Opportunities? / 603 to deal with pain and short-term memory loss. A respondent who was born with a balance disorder works in a local grocery store for only 10 hours per week due to fatigue (“I couldn’t work a bunch more hours. I’m pretty exhausted when I get home from work”). Another man with schizophrenia said that the pressure in his prior full-time computer job brought on schizophrenic episodes and that his current part-time job as a gas station cashier allows him to avoid stress and control the effects of his illness. Contingent and part-time work also helps some people make the transition to traditional full-time employment as they recover from serious injuries or ill- nesses. This is illustrated by a respondent who broke his back in a work accident and said that he eventually was able to return to a full-time man- agerial job because his employer gave him a part-time schedule when he first came back to work: “Part time work was a good way to make the transition. If I worked for another type of employer, they wouldn’t have taken me back. There’s a good chance that I’d [still] be out on disability.” To investigate the role of health problems in contingent and part-time work, this analysis uses 1990–1994 SIPP data because the disability supplements at this time were accompanied by health care supplements. Tables 3 and 4 also contain data on disability income that will be addressed in the next section. As seen in Table 3, which uses the SIPP’s broad measure of disability, only half of people with disabilities and one-fourth of people with severe disabilities were employed in the 1990–1994 period, compared with four-fifths of people without disabilities. Overall, employed people with disabilities were more likely than those without disabilities to be part-time employees, whereas employed people with severe disabilities were more likely to be both temporary agency employees and part-time employees. The top half of Table 4 provides further breakdowns, showing that those needing help with daily activities or getting around outside the home or who have mental impairments are significantly more likely than nondisabled workers to be temporary agency and part-time employees. Not surprisingly, Table 3 shows that people with disabilities were more likely to report health problems, such as more frequent doctor and hospital visits, more nights spent in the hospital, and more sick days.8 In addition, they have more negative

8 These ﬁgures exclude those without health insurance, to control for effects of insurance on doctor and hospital visits. Excluding this group slightly understates the overall prevalence of contingent and part-time work because these jobs typically do not provide health insurance. Including those without health insurance raises the percentage in part-time jobs from 14.1 to 15.5 percent among workers without disabilities, 17.1 to 19.0 percent among workers with disabilities, and 22.7 to 24.8 percent among workers with severe disabilities. It also raises the percentage in temporary agency jobs from 0.6 to 0.7 percent among workers without disabilities, 0.7 to 0.9 percent among workers with disabilities, and 0.9 to 1.0 percent among workers with severe disabilities. 604 / L A. S

TABLE 3 H, I,  W A

Severe No Disability Disability^ Disability^ (1) (2) (3) Employed last month 81.5% 53.1% 23.9%** Among those who are employed Temporary agency employees 0.6% 0.7% 0.9%* Part-time employees 14.1% 17.1%** 22.7%** All other employees 76.6% 70.5%** 63.0%** Self-employed 8.8% 12.0%** 13.9%** Health measures Any doctor visit 70.0% 81.5%** 86.4%** No. of doctor visits in past year (mean) 2.8 6.7** 9.6** Any hospital stay in past year 4.9% 11.8%** 19.0%** No. of nights in hospital (mean) 0.2 0.9** 1.9** No. of sick days in past 4 mos. (mean) 0.9 2.7** 5.8** Self-assessed health Excellent 38.1% 13.5%** 7.7%** Very good 38.9% 26.4%** 16.6%** Good 20.4% 35.9%** 32.1%** Fair 2.4% 19.5%** 30.5%** Poor 0.1% 4.7%** 13.0%** Impairments and activity limitations Need help with any daily activities^^ 0.0% 5.3% 26.7% Need help getting around outside home 0.0% 1.9% 9.9% Sensory impairment 0.0% 33.6% 28.7% Mobility impairment 0.0% 33.0% 70.2% Mental impairment 0.0% 14.6% 16.9% Work disability 0.0% 50.6% 64.0% Receiving SSDI or SSI 0.0% 2.7% 13.7% If temporary agency employee 0.0% 10.8% 42.9% If part-time employee 0.0% 8.7% 33.4% If other employee 0.0% 1.3% 7.5% If self-employed 0.0% 2.1% 9.3% Sample size All 139,979 30,884 13,509 Employed 114,058 16,394 3,227

N: Based on combined SIPP disability supplements for 1990–1994. Limited to those age 18–64 with health insurance (to control for effects of insurance on health measures). *Signiﬁcant difference from those without disabilities at p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ^Disability includes any reported work disability, functional or activity limitation, use of mobility devices, receipt of SSI or SSDI, or serious mental or emotional condition (McNeil 1993). Severe disability includes any inability to do functional activities, need for help with daily activities, inability to work, use of mobility devices, or receipt of SSI or SSDI. ^^Daily activities include getting around inside the home, bathing, dressing, eating, getting in or out of bed, using the toilet, preparing meals, keeping track of money, and doing light housework. Barriers or Opportunities? / 605

TABLE 4 W A  H, D S,  D I

Among Employed, Percent of Those at Left Who Are Temp Agcy. Part-Time Other Self- Employees Employees Employees Employed (1) (2) (3) (4) Overall pattern No disability 0.6% 14.1% 76.6% 8.8% With disability^ 0.7% 17.1%** 70.5%** 12.0%** With severe disability^ 0.9%* 22.7%** 63.0%** 13.9%** Among those with disabilities Need help getting around outside home 3.1%** 29.2%** 52.7%** 17.2%** Need help with daily activities 1.6%** 28.8%** 58.4%** 12.3%** Sensory impairment 0.5% 12.5%** 75.3%* 11.9%** Mobility impairment 0.7% 18.7%** 67.5%** 13.3%** Mental impairment 1.1%** 25.7%** 64.7%** 9.1%** Reported work disability 0.8% 20.5%** 65.0%** 14.0%** No SSDI or SSI 0.6% 16.0%** 71.5%** 12.1%** Receive SSDI or SSI 2.7%** 55.3%** 34.5%** 9.5% Predicted patterns from multinomial logits^^ Adjusted for demographic characteristics No disability 0.6% 13.9% 76.6% 9.0% With disability 0.7% 18.0% 70.2% 11.1% Difference 0.2%** 4.1%** –6.4%** 2.2%** Adjusted for demog. chars., health measures, and disability income “Excellent” health No disability 0.6% 14.8% 75.5% 9.1% With disability 0.9% 17.5% 73.3% 8.3% Difference 0.3% 2.7%** –2.2%* –0.8% “Fair” health No disability 0.5% 14.6% 76.8% 8.2% With disability 0.9% 18.6% 69.8% 10.8% Difference 0.3% 4.0%** –6.9%** 2.6%* By disability income No SSDI or SSI 0.6% 14.3% 75.9% 9.2% Receive SSDI or SSI 2.5%** 48.8%** 38.8%** 9.9%

N: Based on combined SIPP disability supplements for 1990–1994. Limited to those age 18–64 with health insurance (to control for effects of insurance on health measures). See Table 3 for descriptive data. *Significant difference from those without disabilities at p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ∧See note in Table 3 for definitions of disability and severe disability. ∧∧Based on multinomial logits that include the four job categories and non-employment. Demographic characteristics include gender, race, age, education, and marital status. Health measures include those listed in Table 3, plus their interactions with disability status. Full results available on request. 606 / L A. S self-assessments of their health: Only 13.5 percent of all workers with disabilities and 7.7 percent of workers with severe disabilities reported being in “excellent” health, compared with almost 40 percent of workers without disabilities. Do health problems help explain work arrangements? The bottom half of Table 4 reports summary results from five-category multinomial logits that use disability status, demographic characteristics, health measures, and disability income to predict work arrangements (with full results in appendix tables available on request). As can be seen, people with disabilities are significantly more likely than those without disabilities to be temporary agency and part-time employees after controlling just for demographic characteristics.9 In examining the role of health measures, the regressions show that there are strong interactions between most of the health measures and disability status in predicting work arrangements. In particular, greater use of the health care system (doctor visits and nights in the hospital) and worse self-assessed health generally are stronger predictors of part-time employment among workers with disabilities than among workers without disabilities. This probably indicates that the health measures are associated with more serious medical conditions among people with disabilities—that, for example, the condition responsible for a doctor’s visit generally has more severe consequences for a person with a disability than for one without a disability. The disability gap in part-time employment narrows when comparing people with and without disabilities who say they are in “excellent” health, as shown in Table 4. There is a larger disability gap in part-time employment when comparing those reporting “fair” health. This suggests that reports of “fair” health may mean different things to people with and without disabilities and that those with disabilities base their reports of only “fair” health on more serious conditions that restrict their activities more severely. The fact that both the objective and subjective health measures are such strong predictors of work arrangements is a clear indication that health problems contribute to the high rates of nonstandard work among people with disabilities. While controlling for these health measures does not elim- inate the disability gap in part-time employment, the strong role played by these incomplete measures of health status means that it is likely that more complete measures would more fully explain work arrangements. While

9 These comparisons of work patterns are based on the average characteristics of the entire sample, representing the average predicted probabilities from the model across the sample when the disability status variable is either 0 or 1. Barriers or Opportunities? / 607 these results control for disability income recipiency, it should be cautioned that these health measures may be proxies for more stigmatized conditions that are the basis for employer discrimination. Before addressing tests of discrimination, the role of disability income will be examined.

Disability Income and Contingent/Part-Time Work. Individuals are eligible for federal disability income (SSDI and SSI) only if they can establish that they have a disability that prevents them from engaging in “substantial gainful activity.”10 The severity of their disabilities and low skill levels help account for the very low employment rates among SSDI and SSI recipients (only 9.5 percent of SSDI and SSI recipients are employed, according to the SIPP data analyzed here), but the program rules also may discourage employment. Among employed recipients, the potential loss of disability income and health insurance (Medicare or Medicaid) creates a substantial disincentive for them to work more than a minimal amount—they may be constrained to work part time or in temporary jobs in order to avoid going over the monthly earnings limits. The incentives in these programs and the low employment rates among recipients have been a focus both of research (e.g., Mashaw et al. 1996; Rupp and Stapleton 1998, Stapleton and Tucker 2000) and of policy (the 1999 TWWIIA). Earnings limits clearly do make a difference in the employment behavior of some individuals. For example, a man with quadriplegia who provides technical support for a computer company said that he would like to work more hours but works only 20 hours per week because higher earnings would cause him to lose his Medicare health insurance that pays for his home health aides (although TWWIIA extended Medicare eligibility for those who return to work and no longer receive SSDI). Earnings limits do not, however, constrain the behavior of all recipients: The man with a balance disorder reported that he receives disability income, but the earnings limit makes no difference because he is simply not able to work more than 10 hours per week, and his doctor says he cannot work a full-time schedule. It is apparent that earnings limits in disability programs do not fully explain the high rates of part-time work among people with disabilities since Table 3 shows that nonrecipients with disabilities are more likely than those without disabilities to be part-time employees (both in the simple tabulations and in the multinomial logits that control for disability income). Do earnings limits nonetheless contribute to the high rates of part-time

10 “Substantial gainful activity” is measured in terms of a monthly earnings level. Currently, the standard is set at $780 per month. If an individual consistently earns more than this amount (after subtracting impairment-related work expenses), he or she loses eligibility for SSDI. 608 / L A. S employment? Accurately estimating the effect of earnings limitations on work arrangements requires comparing recipients and nonrecipients who are otherwise similar, which is difficult given that disability benefits are targeted to those with the most severe impairments. One approach is to control for health measures: As shown at the bottom of Table 4, employed disability income recipients are much more likely than employed nonrecipients to be temporary or part-time employees after controlling for demographic and health measures. These gaps almost certainly overstate the effects of disability income, given that disability income recipients are likely to have more severe health problems that are not captured by the health measures. A natural experiment in analyzing the role of earnings limitations was created by the rise in the SSDI earnings limitation level from $500 to $700 per month on July 1, 1999. If earnings limitations constrain the hours worked by disability income recipients, we should see a change in the earnings distribution of recipients as they adjusted to the new limit. Unlike the CPS, the SIPP dataset has month-by-month information on disability income recipiency in 1999 that allows such a comparison. Table 5 reports an analysis of earnings distributions with monthly data from December 1998 to February 2000 on a fixed sample of individuals using nonrecipients with work disabilities as a comparison group.11 There was a significant decline in the percentage of recipients earning $301 to 500 per month as the limit was raised from $500 to $700. Among employed recipients, the percentage earning this amount declined from 19.7 to 15.3 percent. Interestingly, however, there was an increase in both the percentage earning just under the new limit of $700 and the percentage earning more than $700 per month. Recipients may earn more than $700 per month during trial work periods or if they have impairment-related work expenses, and it is possible that the expense-adjusted earnings of those in this group increased after July 1999 but remained below $700 per month. (While the possibility of temporarily earning more than $700 per month muddies the comparison somewhat, the analysis of movement among earnings categories should still reflect earnings changes in response to the new earnings limit. The pre/post comparison should remain valid as long as the likelihood of temporarily exceeding the earnings limit did not change after the earnings limit was raised.) In contrast, the earnings distribution did not

11 This analysis excludes those who receive SSI because SSI can offset some of the losses of SSDI as recipients exceed the monthly earnings limit. SSI recipients are also subject to earnings limits, which did not change over this period. For analysis of the response of SSI earnings to changes in income thresholds, see Stapleton and Tucker (2000). Barriers or Opportunities? / 609

TABLE 5 SSDI E L  E D

Nonrecipients of SSDI Recipients of SSDI with Work Disability A. Monthly earnings Before Jul-99 Change Before Jul-99 Change Distribution Jul-99 and After Jul-99 and After Any earnings 11.74% 11.42% −0.32% 42.7% 43.58% 0.88% Earned $1–300 2.89% 2.53% −0.36% 3.50% 3.65% 0.15% Earned $301–500 2.29% 1.76% −0.53%* 2.81% 2.64% −0.17% Earned $501–700 1.52% 1.80% 0.28% 2.10% 2.38% 0.28% Earned $701+∧ 5.04% 5.33% 0.29% 34.29% 34.90% 0.61% If employed Earned $1–300 24.19% 21.95% −2.24% 7.94% 8.22% 0.28% Earned $301–500 19.72% 15.33% −4.39%* 6.53% 6.07% −0.46% Earned $501–700 13.03% 15.89% 2.86% 4.92% 5.46% 0.54% Earned $701+∧ 43.06% 46.83% 3.77% 80.60% 80.25% −0.35% Sample size (person-months) 6,286 7,607 11,535 14,566

B. Individual earnings Avg. Earnings Avg. Earnings Mobility before Jul-99 before Jul-99 Avg. earnings Jul-99 and after $1–300 $301–500 $1–300 $301–500 Earned $1–300 52.00% 11.76% 40.77% 20.00% Earned $301–500 10.00% 35.29% 13.08% 24.29% Earned $501–700 4.00% 20.59% 6.92% 17.14% Earned $701+∧ 6.00% 11.76% 12.31% 21.43% Sample size (persons) 50 34 130 70

N: Figures represent monthly earnings distributions before and after the increase in the SSDI earnings limit from $500 to $700 on July 1, 1999. Based on SIPP data from waves 10–12 of 1996 panel, with reports for Dec. 1998 to February 2000. Only those who reported across full period are included. SSI recipients are excluded. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ∧SSDI recipients normally may not have average earnings greater than the earnings limit. They can, however, deduct impairment-related work expenses from earnings, and are not subject to the limit during trial work periods, helping account for reports of earnings that exceed the limits.

change signiﬁcantly among nonrecipients with work disabilities. Consistent evidence is shown at the bottom of Table 5, which tracks individuals over time and ﬁnds that among those with average earnings of $301 to 500 before July 1999, there appears to be a greater movement to the $501 to 700 category after July among SSDI recipients than among nonrecipients with a work disability (although this is based on small samples in the $301 to 500 category). There could be greater effects over time as respondents learn about or adjust to the raised limit. Figure 1 provides a month-by-month picture of 610 / L A. S

FIGURE 1 E  E SSDI R B  A R  SSDI E L

changes in the distribution, showing that the percentage of employed recipients earning just under the old limit ($301 to 500) sharply dropped in July and continued to decline, whereas the percentage earning just under the new limit ($501 to 700) increased in July and appeared to be increasing at the end of the year. The overall magnitude of the shift, however, is quite modest. Therefore, it appears that the earnings distribution did change as the limit was increased, but only a small portion of recipients appear directly constrained by the limits because only about 5 percent of employed recipients increased their earnings in response to the raised earnings limit. To what extent can the earnings limits account for the higher rate of part- time employment among people with disabilities? The CPS data show that only 12.5 percent of employed people with work disabilities received disability income in the previous year, and the SIPP data show that 2.7 percent of employed people with disabilities received disability income in the previous month. If, as Table 5 and Figure 1 indicate, only 4 to 5 percent of employed recipients changed their work hours in response to the change in earnings limits, this implies that only 0.1 to 0.6 percent of all employed people with disabilities have their work hours directly constrained by the Barriers or Opportunities? / 611 earnings limitations.12 While this may be understated because some people may not have been able to change work hours as the earnings limit rose, the tiny percentage who appear to be directly constrained is much smaller than the overall disability gaps in part-time work (15 percentage points from Table 1 and 5 percentage points using the broader SIPP disability measure in Table 3). Therefore, while earnings limitations undoubtedly constrain the work hours of some disability income recipients, this appears to account for only a small portion of the higher rates of contingent and part-time work among people with disabilities.

Employer Discrimination and Nonstandard Work. The third major explanation for high rates of contingent and part-time work among people with disabilities is that employer discrimination may limit their access to traditional full-time jobs. A number of interviewees gave examples of how discrimination contributed to their decision to work in nonstandard jobs. For example, one respondent with mental illness said that harassment by coworkers and the lack of response from supervisors at his previous full-time job contributed to some schizophrenic episodes, leading him to quit and take a less stressful part-time job. (This also shows that aside from its direct effect on employment, discrimination may exacerbate health problems that make it difficult to work in traditional full-time jobs.) Two other people said that they had not been seriously considered for jobs because of their disabilities. For example, a woman with a Ph.D. in nutrition said: “They want a doctor’s certificate that you can work and then it’s still ‘don’t call us, we’ll call you,’ and all of a sudden the job is filled.” These respondents nonetheless said that health problems are the main reason they are currently working in part-time or contingent jobs. Employers are more easily able to indulge prejudicial views when they have many applicants to choose among, so discrimination should be more prevalent when unemployment rates are high. As labor markets tighten and it becomes more difficult for employers to fill job vacancies, prejudicial views are more costly to indulge in, and applicants who previously would have been rejected will be hired more readily. As stated by Reimers, “It has long been observed that tight labor markets especially benefit groups that are subject to discrimination, for discrimination places them at the prover- bial head of the queue for layoffs and at the end of the queue when equally

12 While it is possible that earnings limits discourage some recipients from any employment at all (due to fixed costs of being employed), the comparison in Table 5 shows a nonsignificant decline in the percentage employed after the limit was raised. This is similar to the finding of Stapleton and Tucker (2000) regarding the effect of income thresholds on employment status. 612 / L A. S qualified job applicants are considered by employers” (2000:6). This may help to explain the especially procyclic employment patterns of African- Americans, whose employment levels are especially low in recessions and helped by a booming economy (Cherry and Rodgers 2000). The evidence of especially procyclic employment from Reimers and others is supported by findings that African-Americans are more likely than whites to be laid off (Elvira and Zatzick 2002) and that employers become more likely to hire blacks when unemployment rates are low13 (Moss and Tilly 2000). A similar dynamic may operate in the case of people with disabilities (although, unlike the case for African-Americans, some people with disabilities have impairments that limit the types of jobs they are able to perform). If, as labor markets tighten, people with disabilities take fewer contingent and part-time jobs and more permanent full-time jobs, this is consistent with the idea that employer discrimination is limiting their access to traditional full- time work. If, on the other hand, contingent and part-time jobs increase among people with disabilities as labor markets tighten and employers increasingly accommodate worker preferences, this supports the idea that these work arrangements are preferred by many people by disabilities. To examine this hypothesis, state-level unemployment data were added to the combined CPS 1995–2001 datasets, and multinomial logits were run to predict changes in the pattern of work arrangements as the unemployment rate changes. Along with state unemployment rates, other predictors of work arrangements include demographic characteristics and dummy vari- ables for state of residence. By controlling for state of residence, the unemployment coefficients reflect the effects of within-state changes in unemployment levels over the 1995–2001 period. To control for the effects of disability income, the logits are run both including and excluding SSDI and SSI recipients. Given that African-Americans have a history of labor market discrimination that may help to account for the extra sensitivity of their employment rates to the business cycle, the results also include the predicted employment changes for African-Americans as labor markets tighten. This analysis uses the CPS work disability measure, consisting of people who report health-related limitations in the kind or amount of work they can do. It should be cautioned that the patterns probably would be different for people with non-work-limiting disabilities, who are more likely to be able to work full-time jobs as they become available.

13 For other evidence on the procyclic employment of African-Americans, see Freeman and Rodgers (2000) and the literature review in Reimers (2000). See also Mason (1999) and Blackaby et al. (2002) on the effect of discrimination on the employment patterns of black workers in the United Kingdom and Holzer (1998) on employer discrimination against African-Americans in the United States. Barriers or Opportunities? / 613

FIGURE 2 E C  L M T

Table 6 reports summary results from the logits, showing predicted employment patterns when the unemployment rate is 5.5 percent or, alter- natively, 4.5 percent (close to the national rates in 1995 and 2001). The principal ﬁndings are illustrated in Figure 2 (with full results in appendix tables available on request). As can be seen, employment rates increase as labor markets tighten but increase less strongly among people with work disabilities. As the unemployment rate drops 1 point, the employment rate increases by 1.09 percent among people without work disabilities but only by 0.15 percent among those with work disabilities. African-Americans appear especially helped by lower unemployment rates, with an increase of 1.84 percent in their overall employment rate. Disability income is a major factor: When SSDI/SSI recipients are excluded, the employment rate of people with work disabilities goes up by 0.87 percent. While the lower effect when recipients are included could be partly due to work disincentives in the disability income programs, it also reﬂects the fact that many recipients have more severe disabilities and are unable to work even when employer demand is high. Do types of jobs change as labor markets tighten? As the unemployment rate drops 1 point, there are especially strong increases in permanent 614 / L A. S (12) Diff. Diff. 0.05% 0.25%* 0.03% 0.21%* − − − − (11) 4.5% king-age population in each population king-age r wo f (10) 5.5% ge 12, urban  a yment rate drops from 5.5% to 4.5%. from drops yment rate

yment and black* unemployment interactions. unemployment yment and black* o T (6) Diff. Diff. 0.02%0.29%* 2.18% 1.72% 2.29% 1.47% 0.10% 0.23% 1.45% 1.24% − − −     L (5) 4.5%   E (4) 5.5% ABLE 6 T   (3) M Diff. Diff. 0.13%**0.04% 2.56%0.44%** 6.59% 2.54% 2.19% 6.98% 1.90% 0.35%** 0.38%**0.16%** 14.95%0.13%** 4.85%0.06% 3.72% 15.50% 3.66% 4.90%0.44%** 3.76% 0.55%** 7.57% 3.76% 2.86% 0.06% 0.04% 11.13% 7.97% 0.10% 2.63% 11.24% 0.41%* 3.76% 2.06% 0.11% 3.72% 5.31% 2.18% 5.34% 0.12% 0.03% 0.34%**0.16%** 11.94% 2.79% 12.32% 2.81% 0.38%** 0.02% 10.50% 10.61% 3.47% 0.11% 3.42% − − − − − − − − − − = 198,324 for full sample, and 188,728 for sample excluding SSDI/SSI recipients. sample excluding and 188,728 for full sample, = 198,324 for

n  L (2) 4.5%  No Work DisabilityNo Work Disability Work Black T Unemp. RateUnemp. Rate Unemp. Rate Unemp. (1) 5.5%   E < 0.05.

p Based on multinomial logits using February–March CPS matched datasets for 1995–2001. Figures represent predicted percentages o percentages predicted represent 1995–2001. Figures for datasets CPS matched using February–March logits Based on multinomial

: < 0.01. emporary employee 4.18% 4.02% emporary employee 4.13% 3.97% art-time employee 8.77% 8.73% art-time employee 8.81% 8.75% manent full-time employees 54.68% 56.60% 1.92%** 21.06% 21.62% 0.56%** 61.47% 63.68% 2.21%** manent full-time employees 54.06% 55.93% 1.87%** 13.79% 13.84% 0.05% 61.14% 63.13% 1.98%**

r r Indep. contractorIndep. P 4.92%T 4.79% contractorIndep. P 4.96% 4.83% T arrangement, given the state unemployment rate. “Diff.” represents estimated within-state change over time as a state’s unemplo time as a state’s change over within-state estimated represents “Diff.” rate. unemployment the state given arrangement, p Other covariates include age, age-squared, and dummies for gender, race, educational attainment, marital status, children under children marital status, attainment, educational race, gender, and dummies for age-squared, include age, Other covariates Total on request. of available Full results and state residence. status,  The figures above reflect predicted percentages based on coefficients on the unemployment rate, disability, and disability* unempl and disability* disability, rate, on the unemployment based on coefficients percentages predicted reflect above The figures *Difference is significant at is significant at *Difference ** ∧ Other self-employed workersOther self-employed SSDI/SSI recipients Excluding employmentAny Pe 4.23% contingent or part-time workAny 3.79% 17.96% 17.60% workersOther self-employed 76.91%N 78.04% 1.12%** 4.27% 38.87% 3.83% 39.74% 0.87%* 74.05% 76.16% 2.11%** All working-age employmentAny Pe contingent or part-time workAny 17.83% 17.49% 76.12% 77.22% 1.09%** 27.92% 28.07% 0.15% 73.37% 75.20% 1.84%** Barriers or Opportunities? / 615 full-time jobs among people without work disabilities (1.87 percent) and African-Americans (1.98 percent), whereas contingent and part-time jobs change relatively little among these groups (by −0.34 and 0.11 percent, respectively). In contrast, there is significant growth in part-time work among all people with disabilities (0.38 percent) and a larger growth in contingent and part-time employment among those not receiving disability income (0.55 percent, almost identical to their 0.56 percent growth in permanent full-time employment). It is noteworthy that the pattern is very different from that of African-Americans. While this is clearly not definitive evidence on the role of discrimination, the different pattern indicates that other factors are operating, and it appears unlikely that the high rate of contingent and part-time work among people with disabilities is primarily due to labor market discrimination constraining access to permanent full- time jobs. Rather, given that people with disabilities are more likely to take these jobs as labor markets tighten and job opportunities expand, it appears that part-time jobs are attractive options for a large number of people with disabilities. Finally, self-reports of discrimination may shed light on the potential role played by disability discrimination in work arrangements. Table 7 reports results from the 2000 national household survey that asked respondents whether they had experienced any disability discrimination in the past 5 years.14 As can be seen, 10 to 13 percent of part-time, temporary, and full-time permanent employees with disabilities reported instances of job discrimination, mostly from being denied or losing a job. Twice as many (26 percent) of the currently self-employed workers with disabilities reported job discrimination, predominantly from being denied jobs. While these breakdowns do not have large samples and do not allow for strong gener- alizations, the similar results among different types of employees are consistent with the preceding conclusion that employer discrimination is not a major cause of contingent and part-time work among people with disabilities. However, the results from the self-employed indicate that discrimination may be more important in explaining high self-employment levels among

14 The question wording was: “There is much talk these days about discrimination on the basis of health problems or disabilities with regard to jobs, or school admissions, or housing, or other important things. In the last 5 years, have you yourself been discriminated against on the basis of a health problem or disability?” People without disabilities also were asked this question, and 1.8 percent of them said “Yes.” This question is based on the sex discrimination question in the 1990 American Citizen Partici- pation Study (ICPSR 6635), substituting health problems or disabilities for sex or gender. While answers to this question may not accurately reﬂect actual discrimination (Hallock, Hendricks, and Broadbent 1998), the comparisons among the job categories will control for any general over- or underreporting of discrimination. 616 / L A. S (7) Self- Employed Employed (6) emporary crimination on the basis ofcrimination health Employees Employees T perience?” with answers coded verbatim. with answers perience?” have you yourself against you been discriminated have

s, (5) art-Time P Employees Employees  E   T (4) Full-Time Employees Employees Nontemporary ABLE 7 T    D (3) Not Employed Employed < 0.05.

  p D (2)  Employed Employed R (1) All 18.1% 19.5% 17.5% 17.1% 13.8% 25.0% 34.8% Based on national telephone survey in November–December 2000. Respondents were asked, “There is much talk these days about dis about talk these days is much “There asked, were 2000. Respondents in November–December telephone survey Based on national

: job or nonjob) Denied jobLost jobOther( 4.4% 3.0% 9.4%* 1.4% 3.1% 1.6% 2.3% 3.0% 1.3% 8.6% 0.0% 2.9% 3.4% 6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 21.7% 4.3% 0.0% problems or disabilities with regard to jobs, or school admissions, or housing, or other important things. In the last five year In the last five or housing, other important things. or school admissions, to jobs, with regard or disabilities problems kind of ex “What did you then asked, discrimination were respondents Ifon the basis of “yes,” or disability?” a health problem Census. as determined questions based on 2000 U.S. by with a disability, based on respondents are Numbers above  ob discrimination 9.3% 14.8%* 6.9% 12.9% 10.3% 12.5% 26.1% *Significant difference between employed and nonemployed at at and nonemployed employed between *Significant difference J discrimination Any Sample sizeN 431 128 303 70 29 8 23 Barriers or Opportunities? / 617 workers with disabilities (consistent with the high reports of discrimination among participants in an entrepreneurs with disabilities program) (Blanck et al. 2001).

Conclusion Over two-fifths of workers with disabilities are in some form of nonstandard job—almost twice the rate of workers without disabilities. The primary explanation for this high rate appears to be health problems. Health measures, including doctor and hospital visits and self-reported health status, are very strong predictors of work arrangements, and several interviewees confirmed that health problems were the major reason for their temporary or part-time jobs. It is possible that these health measures may function as proxies for more severe and stigmatized conditions that are associated with discrimination. However, an additional finding is that people with disabilities are more likely to take contingent and part-time jobs as labor markets tighten and employers increasingly cater to worker needs and preferences. This supports the idea that it is not discrimination but the way in which these jobs can accommodate health concerns that primarily explains the high rates of nonstandard work among people with disabilities. In addition, the findings that only a minority of people with disabilities receive disability income and only a small percentage of recipients increased their earnings after the 1999 increase in earnings limits indicate that earnings limits explain only a small portion of the higher rate of nonstandard work among people with disabilities. What do these results imply for policies to increase employment of people with disabilities? In line with the ADA’s emphasis on individualized assessments and case-by-case analyses, policies clearly need to recognize that different arrangements are appropriate for different people at different times. Disability is not a static either/or category but can be very fluid, changing over time and with different circumstances. Contingent and part-time work arrangements seem to meet the needs of many people with disabilities who could not work otherwise. In addition, these arrangements may play important roles in transitions to traditional full-time employment. Contingent and part-time jobs often do not provide health insurance or enough money to raise people out of poverty. While this may cause some analysts and policymakers to dismiss these jobs as inadequate, this evidence indicates that such jobs should be recognized as very helpful and as often the most appropriate arrangements for many people with disabilities. These jobs not only provide income and training, but they also can help overcome 618 / L A. S the social isolation that often accompanies disability (in fact, when asked what they most liked about their jobs, a number of interviewees said “socializing” or “getting out of the house and meeting new people”). In addition, employment can help foster community and political involvement. Several respondents said that their coworkers or employers had recruited them for charitable or political activities and that their jobs had increased their confidence and skills for such participation.15 Given these benefits of employment, what specific policies may be warranted? The 1999 TWWIIA, which reduces work disincentives and provides new training opportunities and access to health insurance, has excellent promise for improving the employment of disability income recipients. It will not affect the majority of people with disabilities, however, who do not receive disability income. There have been a number of proposals to improve the position of contingent and part-time workers in general, such as by extend- ing the protections of employment law and revising labor law to make it easier for these workers to unionize (e.g., DuRivage, Carre, and Tilly 1998; Carnevale, Jennings, and Eisenmann 1998), although some would argue that increasing their pay levels and employment protections will make employers less willing to hire nonstandard workers (Autor 2003). To the extent that such policies improve the status of part-time and contingent workers, they could help bring many people with disabilities out of poverty. Are there specific ways that policymakers and employers can better help contingent and part-time—as well as permanent full-time—workers with disabilities? As expressed in a number of interviews, the need for a flexible schedule is what draws many people with disabilities into contingent and part-time jobs, and such flexibility enables them to keep working despite various health problems. Clearly, many people with disabilities are not able to work in permanent full-time jobs. Many others, however, would prefer to do so but require flexibility in those jobs. Since people who work full time generally earn more money than part-time workers, making full-time jobs more flexible may be the best way for many people with disabilities to become economically self-sufficient. Sick leave policies already exist in most workplaces, showing that employers expect to accommodate some unexpected absences. In addition, many employers have already made their workplaces more flexible in order to respond more quickly to demand fluctuations and increase competitiveness. Job rotation and multiskilling programs, which

15 For example, one woman with a history of depression talked about being involved in a United Way campaign at work and how she and several coworkers participated in a community “potato bake-off” for charity. Another respondent with a back injury joined the board of an industry association through his job and attends annual meetings in Washington, D.C., to promote the group’s agenda. Barriers or Opportunities? / 619 many employers have adopted in recent years, can greatly increase an employer’s ability to adapt to unexpected absences. In addition to standard sick leave, a reasonable accommodation for employees with extra health- related concerns could be additional sick leave that may be taken either as unpaid leave or as flextime to be made up later. These practices could be encouraged by public policy (e.g., tax credits for more generous sick leave policies to accommodate workers with disabilities). Disability organizations also could work more closely with employers to design flextime programs that would help workers with disabilities remain employed, whether in contingent, part-time, or full-time jobs. Employers may be particularly reluctant to make accommodations for part-time and contingent workers with disabilities, as noted earlier. Many may perceive that the benefits are less likely to exceed the costs when compared with accommodations for full-time and permanent workers (although the ADA does not permit such a cost-benefit analysis of accommodations). A number of low-cost accommodations should continue to be developed and promoted by disability groups and other organizations. In addition to government-sponsored research and demonstration projects, educational programs such as the Job Accommodations Network should be expanded so that more employers are made aware of the low cost of most accommodations and the fact that many of them (such as ramps and voice-activated computer programs) can have wider benefits for other current and future employees and customers. Increasing health insurance coverage for nonstandard workers with disabilities is another important policy goal. The TWWIIA provides extended Medicare coverage for disability income recipients who return to work and allows states to implement a Medicaid buy-in option. TWWIIA also has a pilot program that offers Medicaid coverage to employed people with disabilities who are not receiving SSI who might otherwise become unemployed because they lack health insurance. One policy option is to expand Medi- care and Medicaid availability to uninsured nonrecipients with disabilities, perhaps on a cost-sharing basis with a sliding scale. Contingent and part-time work can play a vital role in increasing economic opportunities for many people with disabilities and should be addressed in any policies designed to increase their employment levels. Fur- ther research would be valuable on the causes and consequences of contingent and part-time employment, the role of employer discrimination, pay and benefit disparities, transitions into and out of these jobs, the types and costs of accommodations, and policies to ensure that contingent and part- time work arrangements create opportunities rather than barriers for people with disabilities. 620 / L A. S R Acemoglu, Daron, and Joshua Angrist. 2001. “Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Journal of Political Economy 109(October):915–57. 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