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United Nations A/50/40 United Nations Report of the Human Rights Committee Volume I General Assembly Official Records · Fiftieth Session Supplement No. 40 (A/50/40) A/50/40 Report of the Human Rights Committee Volume I General Assembly Official Records · Fiftieth Session Supplement No. 40 (A/50/40) United Nations · New York, 1996 NOTE Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. ISSN 0255-2353 [Original: English] [4 February 1996]* CONTENTS Chapter Paragraphs Page I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OTHER MATTERS ...................... 1 - 27 1 A. States parties to the Covenant .................... 1 - 4 1 B. Sessions and agenda ............................... 5 1 C. Election, membership and attendance ............... 6 - 7 1 D. Solemn declaration ................................ 8 2 E. Election of officers .............................. 9 - 10 2 F. Working groups .................................... 11 - 13 2 G. Other matters ..................................... 14 - 18 3 H. Staff resources ................................... 19 4 I. Publicity for the work of the Committee ........... 20 5 J. Publications relating to the work of the Committee 21 - 24 5 K. Facilities ........................................ 25 5 L. Future meetings of the Committee .................. 26 5 M. Adoption of the report ............................ 27 6 II. ACTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS FORTY-NINTH SESSION AND BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT ITS FIFTY-FIRST SESSION ................................... 28 - 34 7 III. METHODS OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT: OVERVIEW OF PRESENT WORKING METHODS .... 35 - 45 9 A. The Committee’s procedures in dealing with emergency situations and in cases of reports that have been overdue for a very long period .......... 36 - 39 9 B. Participation by the specialized agencies and other United Nations organs in the Committee’s work ..... 40 - 42 9 C. Equality and human rights of women ................ 43 - 45 10 * Originally issued in an advance version as document A/50/40 of 3 October 1995. -iii- CONTENTS (continued) Chapter Paragraphs Page IV. SUBMISSION OF REPORTS BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT ............................ 46 - 56 12 A. Reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant during the period under review ...................................... 49 - 54 12 B. Special decisions by the Human Rights Committee concerning reports of particular States ........... 55 14 C. Reports submitted by States parties in accordance with a special decision of the Human Rights Committee ......................................... 56 14 V. STATES THAT HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 40 ...................................... 57 - 58 15 VI. CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT ...................... 59 - 476 17 A. Nepal ............................................. 60 - 78 17 B. Tunisia ........................................... 79 - 98 20 C. Morocco ........................................... 99 - 122 23 D. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ............................ 123 - 143 27 E. Argentina ......................................... 144 - 165 30 F. New Zealand ....................................... 166 - 191 33 G. Paraguay .......................................... 192 - 223 36 H. Haiti ............................................. 224 - 241 40 I. Yemen ............................................. 242 - 265 43 J. United States of America .......................... 266 - 304 46 K. Ukraine ........................................... 305 - 333 51 L. Latvia ............................................ 334 - 361 56 M. Russian Federation ................................ 362 - 407 60 N. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .................................. 408 - 435 66 O. Sri Lanka ......................................... 436 - 476 70 VII. GENERAL COMMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE ..................... 477 - 481 76 -iv- CONTENTS (continued) Chapter Paragraphs Page VIII. CONSIDERATION OF COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL .............................................. 482 - 543 77 A. Progress of work .................................. 484 - 490 77 B. Growth of the Committee’s caseload under the Optional Protocol ................................. 491 78 C. Approaches to examining communications under the Optional Protocol ................................. 492 - 494 79 D. Individual opinions ............................... 495 - 496 79 E. Issues considered by the Committee ................ 497 - 541 80 F. Remedies called for under the Committee’s Views ... 542 90 G. Non-cooperation by States parties ................. 543 90 IX. FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ...... 544 - 565 91 Annexes I. States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to the Optional Protocols and States which have made the declaration under article 41 of the Covenant as at 28 July 1995 ... 99 A. States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .............................................. 99 B. States parties to the Optional Protocol ....................... 102 C. Status of the Second Optional Protocol aiming at the abolition of the death penalty .......................................... 105 D. States which have made the declaration under article 41 of the Covenant .................................................. 106 II. Members and officers of the Human Rights Committee (1995-1996) .... 108 A. Membership .................................................... 108 B. Officers ...................................................... 108 III. Submission of reports and additional information by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant during the period under review ... 109 IV. Status of reports considered during the period under review and of reports still pending before the Committee ..................... 116 -v- CONTENTS (continued) Page V. General comments adopted under article 40, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .............. 119 General comment No. 24 (52) on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant ........................................ 119 VI. Observations of States parties under article 40, paragraph 5, of the Covenant ...................................................... 126 A. United States of America ...................................... 126 B. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .......... 130 VII. Revised guidelines regarding the form and contents of reports from States parties ............................................... 135 A. Guidelines regarding the form and contents of reports from States parties under article 40 (1) (a) of the Covenant ....... 135 B. General guidelines regarding the form and contents of periodic reports from States parties .......................... 136 VIII. Letter dated 13 July 1995 from the Chairman of the Committee to the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva ............................... 139 IX. List of States parties’ delegations that participated in consideration of their respective reports by the Human Rights Committee at its fifty-second, fifty-third and fifty-fourth sessions .......................................................... 140 X. Observations of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* ........................... 147 A. Communication No. 386/1989; Famara Koné v. Senegal (Views adopted on 21 October 1994, fifty-second session) B. Communication No. 400/1990; Darwinia R. Mónaco de Gallichio v. Argentina (Views adopted on 3 April 1995, fifty-third session) C. Communication No. 447/1991; Leroy Shalto v. Trinidad and Tobago (Views adopted on 4 April 1995, fifty-third session) * To be issued subsequently in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/50/40), vol. II. -vi- CONTENTS (continued) Page D. Communication No. 453/1991; A. R. and M. A. R. Coeriel v. the Netherlands (Views adopted on 31 October 1994, fifty-second session) Appendix E. Communication Nos. 464/1991 and 482/1991; G. Peart and A. Peart v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 19 July 1995, fifty-fourth session) F. Communication No. 473/1991; Isadora Barroso v. Panama (Views adopted on 19 July 1995, fifty-fourth session) G. Communication No. 493/1992; Gerald J. Griffin v. Spain (Views adopted on 4 April 1995, fifty-third session) H. Communication No. 500/1992; Joszef Debreczeny v. the Netherlands (Views adopted on 3 April 1995, fifty-third session) I. Communication No. 511/1992; Limari Länsman et al. v. Finland (Views adopted on 26 October 1994, fifty-second session) J. Communication No. 514/1992; Sandra Fei v. Colombia (Views adopted on 4 April 1995, fifty-third session) K. Communication No. 516/1992; Alina Simunek et al.v.the Czech Republic (Views adopted on 19 July 1995, fifty-fourth session) L. Communication No. 518/1992; Jong-Kyu Sohn v. the Republic of Korea (Views adopted on 19 July 1995, fifty-fourth session) M. Communication No. 539/1993; Keith Cox v. Canada (Views adopted on 31 October 1994, fifty-second session)
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