CHAPTER 9

CRUMBLING RESISTANC E

APAN'S three-pronged thrust into Malaya was succeeding on all fronts J by 13th December . British hopes of halting the enemy near the frontie r were rapidly diminishing. Concern increased lest part or the whole of th e British forces in northern Malaya be cut off, and thus divorced from thei r primary task of protecting the Naval Base . l Close relationship became necessary between these forces, both east an d west of the main range, to avoid isolation from each other and from th e forces in the south. Thus they became increasingly committed to a con- tinuous process of retreat, accompanied by delaying actions to gain time during which, it was hoped, sufficient reinforcements would arrive to tur n the tide of battle . General Heath's recommendation—reinforced by wha t was happening at Jitra—that the 8th Brigade be withdrawn from , was accepted by General Percival at their conference on 12th December . It was approved by Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham with the provis o that the enemy must be prevented from using the railway . On the night of the 12th-13th Percival placed his reserve, the 12th Indian Brigade, a t the disposal of the III Indian Corps and sent it forward by rail to , where the leading , 2/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders , arrived on the afternoon of the 13th . Heavy fighting occurred on the 12th and 13th at , 25 miles south of , and the junction of a road to the east coast . The Japanese were sufficiently checked to enable the withdrawal to the railhead at to be continued with - out serious interference . A.I.F. Headquarters in Malaya had followed the course of operation s with growing concern . As senior staff officer, Colonel Thyer had come t o the conclusion that the Japanese would move towards from Kuan- tan, and that any landings from the sea in eastern Johore would be at Endau rather than . Assuming, as was extremely likely, that the Japanese were aware of the strong defence system established by the Aus- tralians in the Mersing area, it certainly was not improbable that th e enemy would seek an alternative to head-on encounter where it wa s strongest. At any rate, Thyer recommended that the detachment at Endau be strengthened, and that a company be placed at Bukit to pre - vent a thrust down the Sungei Endau which might cut the road fro m westward to . In this Brigadier Callaghan, in charge of the Australian division during General Bennett's absence in the Middle East, concurred, and he redisposed his troops accordingly .

I Brooke-Popham received from the Chiefs of Staff in the latter part of December a cable stating : "His Majesty 's Government agree your conception that vital issue is to ensure security o f Naval Base . They emphasise that no other consideration must compete with this . "

154 CRUMBLING RESISTANCE 10-16 Dec General Bennett, who had returned to Malaya on 10th December, toure d his units on the 12th . When he found that his dispositions had been altere d he was emphatic in his disapproval, on the ground that the effect was t o commit units to definite roles and areas before the enemy intentions were known. In particular he was adamant that the 2/30th Battalion shoul d be retained intact for counter-attack in the event of the Japanese reaching Jemaluang, or (a hint perhaps of the direction in which his thoughts were turning) for action elsewhere with the , instead of being committed in part to forward positions . Thus he ordered the former posi- tions to be resumed . On 13th December Bennett wrote to the Australian Minister for th e Army : "The third brigade of division would have been a godsen d to us now. As you know, it has been repeatedly asked for, and m y requests have been repeatedly refused. However, we will have to do the best with what we have. . . ."2 In a letter to Headquar- ters he wrote that "the morale of our men has never been higher", but , referring to there being insufficient air cover for the defending troops, h e said "I fear a repetition of Crete" . Anticipation of a Japanese landing in the south was sharpened when on the same day a message was received from that a large convoy was moving from the southern tip of Indo-China towards the south-east coast of Malaya. Percival called next day on Bennett, who recorded : He is anticipating a possible attack on Singapore Island direct from the sea, an d asks what would be the position of the A .I.F. if such an attack developed and hel p from the A.I.F. were required . I replied that the A.I.F . were here to defend Singapore and that if the troops on the island needed help, the A .I.F . would certainly go to their assistance. He realises that there are insufficient troops on the island to defen d it effectively and is very perturbed at the danger . I told him that I needed more troops to defend Johore effectively, implying that the Mersing front should not b e weakened unless the emergency were grave .3 Although the anticipated landing did not occur, it further emphasised the insecurity of the forces on the mainland of Malaya, and reinforced the policy of withdrawal . At this time also, with the prospect of congestion of airfields on Singapore Island resulting from progressive evacuation of those in the north, Air Headquarters ordered that stocks of bombs with refuelling and rearming parties be withdrawn to Sumatra, so that facilitie s might be developed there for the transit of reinforcing aircraft and th e operation of bombers . On the 16th, referring to the situation in northern Malaya, Bennett wrote to Army Headquarters in Melbourne : I have seen a total absence of the offensive spirit, which after all is the one grea t remedy for the methods adopted by the Japanese . Counter-attacks would put a stop to this penetration . . . . The position has arrived when something must be done —urgently. I strongly urge that, should the request be made, at least one divisio n of the A.I.F. from the Middle East be transferred to Malaya .

2 H. G . Bennett, Why Singapore Fell, p . 69. 2 Bennett, p. 70.

Dec 1941 TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS 155 Bennett also sent a letter to be read to all ranks of his command, in which he said : The recent operations in northern Malaya have revealed the tactics adopted b y the Japanese in their offensive movements. It is simply that they endeavour to infiltrate between posts, or if that is difficult, to move small parties via the flan k to threaten the flank or the rear of our position. . . . This is not a new system ; it is as old as war itself. . Our training during the past twelve months has been t o outflank any enemy position which is being held ; similarly in any attack, the mai n attack should come from the flanking party . All units in defence will hold a small reserve in hand which will have the duty of moving around the enemy flanks and creating despondency and alarm by firing into their rear elements . Should it be possible for a small party of the enemy to penetrate between two posts and open fire on the rear of posts, arrangements must be made for alternate sections in a post to face the rear and deal with this enemy party by fire. At the same time a patrol must be sent forward to capture or destroy the enemy which has been successful in penetrating the position . It is imperative that the offensive spirit b e maintained . . . . There will be no withdrawal; counter-attack methods, even by small parties, will be adopted. A few days later, in an instruction on tactics to be employed, Perciva l also emphasised that enemy outflanking and infiltration tactics must not lead to withdrawals, which, he said, should take place only on order o f higher authority . The enemy could not be defeated by sitting in prepare d positions and letting the Japanese walk round them . "We must play th e enemy at his own game and attack on every occasion, " he declared, addin g that the efficiency, cunning and alertness of the individual were of primar y importance. 4 An example of the kind of jungle warfare in which the Japanese ha d been schooled was provided on 18th December, when four carriers of the 2/ 12th Frontier Force Regiment were ambushed by troops wh o dropped grenades into them from the branches of trees they had climbed . This simple ruse might have been suggested by falling coconuts, but it was far removed from the training which most of the British forces had bee n given. Nevertheless, the 8th Brigade's withdrawal was well controlled, an d losses of men and materials were relatively light. Evacuation by rail from Krai of stores and equipment was carried out so successfully under th e direction of Lieut-Colonel Trott, 5 the senior administrative officer of th e (an Australian who had transferred from the A .I.F. to the in January 1918) that of the 600 motor vehicles with th e force only sixty were lost in Kelantan. Forty casualties occurred whe n the railway station was bombed during the morning of 19th December, but the railhead had been evacuated by the end of the day . The brigade's strength had been reduced by 553 all ranks who had been either kille d or wounded, or were missing . Its losses of machine-guns, mortars, and anti- tank rifles had been heavy . In the area -Jerantut in which the brigade was next concentrated, it was centrally situated, with access b y road to either the east or west of the peninsula .

* Percival, Despatch on Operations of Malaya Command, Appendix "D " . *Brig W. A . Trott, MC . (1st AIF : Pte to Capt 2 Bn 1914-17 ; and Indian Army.) AA&QMG 9 Indian Div 1941-42 ; Comd 8 Indian Bde 1942 . Regular soldier ; b. Newtown, NSW, 17 May 1894.

156 CRUMBLING RESISTANCE 8-14 De c Meanwhile, the 3/16th Punjab on the front to the west had bee n attacked at dawn on 12th December, and the Japanese had begun to by- pass its position. Then, as the 3/16th was about to be withdrawn, it wa s again attacked, and shelled by heavy artillery . Spare drivers of the 2/3rd Australian Reserve Motor Transport Company fought as infantry in th e endeavour to extricate the force. Although the withdrawal was accom- plished, the battalion's determined resistance since its first encounter wit h the enemy had cost it half its strength by the time it passed throug h the 5/14th Punjab north-east of Betong, and reached a position thre e miles west of Kroh on the road to Baling . The 5/14th, now the coverin g troops, withstood a further attack early on the 13th until its flanks were endangered. 6 It then fell back to Betong, where it destroyed the road bridge, and by dusk had joined the 3/16th . The road southward fro m Kroh to Grik, and thence to the main west coast road at , was thus uncovered . Although north of Grik it was little better than a mountain track, there was a danger that the Japanese would use it as a means of striking at the lines of communications of the Indian Corps , farther to the south . Heath therefore decided on 13th December to sen d a company of the 2/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and som e armoured cars 7 from Ipoh to Grik, and the rest of the battalion to Balin g in support of Krohcol . On 14th December he handed over command o f the column to Brigadier Paris of the 12th Brigade, and instructed him t o hold the Kroh-Baling road. Paris ordered Krohcol to withdraw during the night of 14th-15th December, leaving the Argylls to defend Baling. The first mass slaughter of civilians in Malaya had occurred on 11t h December, when after daily air raids on airfield from 8th Decem- ber, Georgetown was raided . Thronging the streets to watch the aircraft , thousands of the inhabitants of this principal town on Penang Island, of f the coast of north-west Malaya, were bombed and machine-gunned by the raiders. In the absence of anti-aircraft defences and British fighter aircraft , about 2,000 casualties were inflicted. Smaller raids occurred on the tw o following days . In the panic which these raids caused, so many civilian s fled from the town that essential services broke down . Corpses were left in the streets, and ferry transport between the island and the mainland ha d to be taken over progressively by the military (including some members of the 2/3rd Australian Reserve M.T. Company) . The military importance of Penang Island8 lay principally in its port facilities, its stocks of ammunition and stores, and the fact that it was a terminal of two overseas cables . The intention had been to hold the island ,

"A section of 2/3 Anst Reserve MT Coy was used on 13 Dec to guard a golf course area a t Kroh, as it was thought that the enemy might land paratroops there . 7 Some members of the 2/3 Aust Reserve MT Coy manned the cars. Finding the machine-guns useless they fired from open turrets with Lewis guns. The garrison of Penang comprised Fortress Headquarters and Signals; 11th Coast Regiment, Hon g Kong and Singapore (two 6-inch batteries) ; 36th Fortress Company ; a company of 5/14th Punjab ; an Independent Company ; a detachment of 3rd Indian Cavalry; the 3rd Battalion, Volunteer Force ; a mixed reinforcement camp ; and administrative detachments.

12-14 Dec WITHDRAWAL FROM PENANG 15 7 but on 12th December the Fortress Commander (Brigadier Lyon9) and the British Resident Counsellor decided to evacuate all European service families, all civilian European women and children, and inmates of th e military hospital. Departure of most of the Europeans on the night of th e 13th, and the haste with which it was done, shocked the Asian inhabitant s of Malaya generally, and indeed many Europeans also . Few civilians had means of knowing the overall military situation, and how the Japanes e were compelling withdrawals . What they did know was that the protectio n on which, as a subject people, the Asians of Penang Island had learned to rely, was abruptly withdrawn, ties of loyalty and economic bonds were severed, and the Asians were left to whatever fate might befall them . Rather than thus abandon them, a few European civilians stayed behind . The Europeans on the island at the time of the attack were few in num- ber compared with the Asian population, whose evacuation was not con- sidered feasible even had they elected to leave their homes. It was not easy, however, for the simple people of Malaya to distinguish betwee n the practical limits of what could be done, and racial discrimination . On the other hand Japanese propagandists had been urging the Asians i n pamphlets and radio broadcasts to "burn up the whites in a blaze o f victory", thus indicating that they intended violent discrimination agains t the Europeans, but suggesting that the non-European inhabitants of Malaya might expect friendly treatment. Had they been withdrawn they would have been divorced from their homes, and their safety still could not hav e been assured. However, the effect at the time, when the enemy was deliver- ing so many other successful blows, was particularly damaging to Britis h prestige . At a meeting on 14th December the War Council decided that unless the Japanese on the mainland could be halted, the island must b e abandoned militarily also . Apart from military necessity, withdrawal of the garrison would remove the likelihood of the civilian population bein g exposed to further air raids . The withdrawal from Jitra to an area south of the Sungei by the 11th Indian Division on 12th-13th December gained little respite for its weary troops, or for reorganisation of its depleted units. Intermittent firing , and penetration by Japanese troops to the south bank of the river, fro m which they were expelled in a counter-attack by the 2/9th Gurkha, in- dicated that further pressure was accumulating . Eight carriers of the 2/Eas t Surrey were cut off when a bridge was prematurely demolished . Murray- Lyon decided that the withdrawal must be continued . In heavy rain, and with many mishaps, a badly congested stream of traffic moved on durin g the night of the 13th-14th to Gurun. The Gurun position, 19 miles south of Alor Star—the junction of a large, flat, rice-growing area with undulating country thickly covered b y rubber plantations—was regarded by Percival as perhaps the best natura l defensive position in Malaya . The plantations, on either side of the mai n road and the railway, were served by a network of roads . Kedah Peak,

9 Brig C . A . Lyon, DSO . Comd Penang Fortress Troops 1941 . Regular soldier ; b. 11 Aug 1880.

~Sungei Patan i 16 Dec ---'-T –T-' Batu Pekaka o, 1,5 4.17 De c Titi Karanga n

Japanese lin e of advance

The withdrawal across the

14-15 Dec ENEMY ADVANCE CONTINUES 15 9 a 3,978-foot jungle-clad mountain, stood between the road and the coast. The position had not, however, been prepared before the war for defence . This task therefore faced the fatigued and disconcerted troops . Disposi- tions taken up on 14th December were : right sector, 28th Brigade, recon- stituted under Brigadier Carpendale (Brigadier Garrett having resumed command of 15th Brigade) ; left, 6th Brigade, astride road and railway and to Kedah Peak ; in reserve, 15th Brigade, now only about 600 strong, astride the road a mile south of Gurun . The 6th Brigade's position wa s about four miles north of the village of Gurun, and three-quarters of a mile south of where a road from the west coast joined the main road . The 2/16th Punjab were on the railway, with the 2/East Surrey on their left and the 1/8th Punjab astride the main road. The brigade reserve com- prised the carrier platoon of 2/16th Punjab . A Japanese patrol quickly approached the crossroads, and at 2 p .m. three tanks, followed by troops in lorries, came into action . Although one tank was hit and the others withdrew, the enemy infantry forced back the defending patrol and gained control of the road junction . A counter- attack led by Brigadier Lay checked further penetration, but when Heath visited the 11th Division's headquarters during the afternoon, Murray - Lyon said he considered his troops unfit for quick successive encounters , and emphasised the danger that the enemy would cut in on his rear by using the Grik road. He recommended that any further withdrawals should be such as to provide sufficient time for rest and concentration . Although Heath replied that the division must hold the Japanese for the time bein g at Gurun, he told Percival by telephone during the evening that he con- sidered it should be withdrawn to the Sungei Perak, with an intermediat e stand at the Sungei Muda to allow Penang to be evacuated . From 10 p.m. until 1 a.m. on 15th December, the 1/8th Punjab wa s under heavy mortar fire. Then, as Lay was organising a further counter - attack to regain the crossroads, the Japanese thrust through the battalion and infiltrated the 6th Brigade area . Having seen Japanese passing his right flank, the battalion commander concluded that it had been isolated . He withdrew what remained of it, and a company of 2/East Surrey unde r his command, towards the coast . The enemy thereupon overwhelmed th e headquarters of the East Surreys, killing the commanding officer and five others, and broke into brigade headquarters . There they killed all its occupants, including seven officers but not Lay . Carpendale redisposed 28th Brigade in an endeavour to stem the enemy advance, but in the hazardous situation which had developed Murray-Lyo n decided early on 15th December to make a further immediate withdrawal . He ordered his division to a position on the Sungei Lalang, seven mile s south of Gurun . Later in the day, as reports indicated how badly th e division had been disrupted, he decided that it should continue durin g the night to behind the Sungei Muda . Helped largely by supporting fir e from the 88th Field Regiment, contact with the enemy was soon broken , and next morning the division was south of the Muda ; but losses o f vehicles and equipment were again heavy.

160 CRUMBLING RESISTANCE 16-17 Dec Any prospect of more than a brief stand at the Muda was slight, an d an outbreak of cholera and typhoid on Penang Island, off the coast a littl e to the south, appeared likely in the rapidly worsening conditions the n existing there. Heath therefore ordered that the small garrison now lef t on the island be evacuated by daylight' on 17th December. Hurried steps were taken to destroy and demolish everything likely to be of value t o the enemy, but the result showed serious shortcomings . Although little effort was required to wreck the broadcasting station, it was left virtuall y intact. Many small craft such as would be valuable to the enemy in coasta l operations remained in the harbour after the garrison had gone—a fac t for which the circumstances offered insufficient excuse . About 500 Asians of the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force who eventually were offered evacuation elected to remain to protect their families. A complex situation now faced Heath and his commanders while 11t h Division paused at the Muda. Day and night alternation of fighting an d retreat, accompanied by the frequent isolation of units ; deficiencies an d losses in leadership, upon which the Indians were especially dependent ; and rapid decrease in the means of resistance, had severely strained th e stamina and resources of the 11th Division. Lack of suitable and adequate training and equipment had been a severe handicap . The road from Kro h through Baling linked with the road system in the Muda area ; and the route from Kroh southward through Grik reached the trunk road an d the railway west of Kuala Kangsar. How long could the enemy forc e which had captured Kroh be kept from the division 's present right flank and rear? How long was it safe to keep the division west of the Pera k in all the circumstances ? Heath decided on the morning of 16th December to place it behind the Sungei Krian, which was flanked by swamps and presented the prin- cipal natural obstacle between the Muda and the Perak. He ordered the 6th and 15th Brigades to Taiping, between the Krian and Kuala Kangsar , to rest and refit; and the 28th Brigade, in relatively good condition, t o occupy a position covering the Krian, from the road and rail bridge a t Nibong Tebal westward to the sea. Krohcol having been disbanded, th e 5/14th Punjab was withdrawn to Taiping and the 3/16th Punjab, with th e 10th Mountain Battery, was ordered to hold a crossing of the Krian a t Selama, 15 miles east of Nibong Tebal. The 12th Brigade Group (Brigadier Paris) was ordered to cover the withdrawal by fighting a rearguard action through Titi Karangan, where the Baling road linked with the road system south of the Muda, to Selama. There it was to pass through the 3/ 16th Punjab to Taiping . In an endeavour to make good the losses on the west coast, Brooke- Popham asked, also on 16th December, that a brigade group and reinforce- ments from India for III Corps be dispatched immediately . In the upshot, it was arranged that the 45th Brigade Group of the 17th Indian Division, due to sail from Bombay on 22nd December for Burma, would be diverted

16-17 Dec ARGYLLS IN ACTION 16 1 to Singapore, and that reinforcements for the 9th and 11th Divisions would be sent from India as quickly as possible . Meanwhile Paris, realising that continued withdrawal of 11th Divisio n might expose his troops to attack from the west, had ordered the 5/2n d Punjab to hold a bridge over the Muda at Batu Pekaka, north of Tit i Karangan, and moved the Argylls from Baling to Kupang, six miles west - ward. His concern was soon justified, and it became apparent that th e Japanese had not been deterred by the nature of the route from Kroh t o Grik. The company of Argylls, with armoured cars, was attacked on th e 16th a little north of Grik, and fell back under the impact to a poin t where they were joined by two Volunteer Force platoons . On the same day a Japanese force which had swung inland from the main road con- fronted the 5/2nd Punjab. Led by infantry in Malay clothes, the enemy attempted to rush the Batu Pekaka bridge . They were driven off, however, and the bridge was destroyed . Early next day the 5/2nd Punjab wa s withdrawn . Despite destruction of the bridge the Japanese quickly ad- vanced, and by 10 a .m. were in contact with the main body of th e Argylls, who had been moved meanwhile to Titi Karangan as ordered b y Heath . The ensuing action was of special interest, for the enemy force was now opposed by a battalion which had received realistic training in jungle warfare. The Argylls' layout was in keeping with their normal tactics of fighting in self-contained, dispersed company groups of varying composition, con - trolled by directives rather than by detailed orders, each company grou p ready to form a firm base if attacked, or if not engaged to strike at an y enemy attacking another group . The position, however, was an unfavour- able one for a delaying action, and the battalion was handicapped b y having been engaged in a succession of sudden moves since 10th Decem- ber. Both an attack and a withdrawal plan were prepared, with an ambus h to fix the Japanese frontally astride the road half a mile north of Titi Karangan . Apparently the fact that the leading Japanese were in native dress ha d not been conveyed to the Argylls, for this caused surprise . The enemy opened fire first, and the ambush failed . They quickly developed the "fix- encircle" tactics in which the Argylls also had been trained. Although the latter brought withering machine-gun fire to bear upon an enemy group which moved off the road into rubber trees, the enemy light mortar fire was highly effective . As the engagement progressed it became apparen t that there was no choice other than a costly counter-attack or with- drawal. The battalion commander, Lieut-Colonel Stewart,' under orders to hold Titi Karangan until noon, chose to attack, and was about to give the order when he received permission to withdraw at his discretion . Deciding that the hazards of attack would now be unwarranted, he reverse d his decision.

i Brig I . MacA. Stewart, DSO, OBE, MC . CO 2/A&SH 1940-42; Comd 12 Indian Bde 1942. Regular soldier ; b . 17 Oct 1895 .

162 CRUMBLING RESISTANCE 17-18 Dec As it happened, the Argylls almost succeeded in causing the prescribe d delay, for the rear parties during the withdrawal did not pass throug h Titi Karangan until 11 .55 a.m. So swift was the Japanese pursuit that five minutes later a rearguard armoured car near the village ambushed a leading group of fifteen Japanese and killed them. Another enemy party which emerged from a forest road nearly a mile to the rear, after a wide encircling movement, was met by Argyll armoured cars and carriers, an d held until the battalion was clear . The Jap tactics were constant [wrote Stewart afterwards]—frontal fixing and loca l encirclement, perhaps to a depth of 1,000 yards, by the leading battalion com- mander, while the regimental commander, without waiting for the situation t o develop, launched a wide and deep (perhaps to four miles) encircling attack wit h a reserve battalion to cut the road in rear. If that attack ever got established the British situation was bound to become an intensely critical one . Fortunately, it never succeeded against the Argylls, but the very careful and close timings and the grea t speed of action necessary for jungle fighting will be noted . Had the battalion been asked to delay another quarter of an hour, its counter-attack would have had t o go in. . . . By that time too the wide Jap encircling move would have got establishe d across the road behind, and what had been a most successful action would withi n a few moments have turned into a disastrous defeat . 2 Reaching Selama, south-east of the Sungei Krian, on 17th December , the 12th Brigade (less the Argyll company on the Grik road) came unde r command of the 11th Division, which by dawn on 18th December was south of the river . The road from Kroh through Baling was now no longer a potentia l danger to the British communications ; but events on the Grik road showe d that another was swiftly developing . In fact, as it later transpired, the Japanese 42nd Infantry Regiment had taken the more ambitious cours e offered by this route. Although they had left their light tank battalio n behind because of the state of the surface between Kroh and Grik they quickly forged ahead, and under their pressure the small force which stood in their way withdrew to Sumpitan, south-east of Selama. Meanwhile Heath had decided to send the 1st Independent Company 3 to its aid; and he now resolved again to use the 12th Brigade as a means of halting thi s further enemy advance towards the 11th Division's rear . He had in min d that unless these moves were successful, the division would have to be .pulled back to the Sungei Perak or even farther . Impressed by the aggression of the enemy, and lacking adequate Intelli- gence, Percival concluded that the Japanese were employing one divisio n along the trunk road, one on the Patani-Kroh-Grik road, and one i n Kelantan, with reserves at call in Indo-China, as against his two India n brigades on the east of the Malayan Peninsula and the equivalent of a divi- sion on the west. He considered relieving the 11th Indian Division with the 8th Australian, but decided against it on the ground that piecemea l employment of the Australian force would be undesirable, and its remova l

9 I . M . Stewart, History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Battalion (1947), pp. 25-26. 2 This unit, comprised of a headquarters and one British and three Indian platoons, had been formed in April 1941 for action behind the enemy lines .

15-18 Dec LINE OF THE PERAK 163 as a whole from Johore would leave the State weakly held by troop s unfamiliar with the ground . With their command of the seas, the Japanes e would be free to launch landings at Mersing or elsewhere on its easter n coast. On the other hand, the necessity of holding the airfields of centra l Malaya, from which otherwise the enemy could the more readily attack the naval base and reinforcement convoys approaching Singapore, dictated that the Japanese must be kept as far north as possible . The upshot of Percival's deliberations was that he decided against any major redisposi- tion of his forces for the time being, but authorised a withdrawal by th e weakened 11th Division to the line of the Perak if necessary . By this time only about a hundred aircraft were available in Malay a for the defence of the base, protection of convoys, and any other dutie s for which they could be spared . The latter included little action to check the enemy advance . The main weakness of the Perak as an obstacle was that it ran not across the north-south communications, but more or les s parallel with them, during the greater part of its course from Kuala Kang- sar. On 18th December, after conferring with Heath, Percival issued a series of further orders, which required principally that a flotilla com- prising a sloop and some light craft be formed to oppose enemy movement by sea between the mouths of the Krian and the Perak; that delaying positions be prepared east and south-east of the Perak, at Ipoh and Tan- jong Malim; that the 9th Indian Division be retained on the east coas t to prevent enemy use of the airfield at and penetration from tha t quarter; that what became known as "Roseforce" be formed to rai d Japanese communications west of the Perak ; that the 6th and 15th Indian Brigades be amalgamated as the 6th/15th Brigade ; and that the 12th Brigade be incorporated with them in the 11th Division. Percival's resolve to limit losses of strength in northern Malaya wa s in line with a direction which had been given by Mr Churchill on 15t h December . In a cable to General Ismay for the Chiefs of Staff Committee , Churchill, then on his way to the United States to confer with Roosevelt , urged them to beware lest troops required for the defence of Singapore Island were used up or cut off on the Malayan Peninsula . "Nothing," he said, "compares in importance with the fortress ."4 Indeed, this had now so impressed itself upon him that he required, after consultation wit h General Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, and the Aus- tralian Government, that consideration be given to moving the I Australian Corps from Palestine to Singapore . On the same day Mr Duff Coope r had disclosed to Mr Bowden, 's representative in Singapore , misgivings about the military situation, and said he saw the probability of a gradual withdrawal to a line approximately covering the souther n half of Johore, to be held pending arrival of reinforcements about a mont h hence. On 18th December a conference was held in Singapore, attende d by representatives of Great Britain, the United States, Holland, Australia 5

*Churchill, Vol III, p . 565. *The Australian representatives were General Bennett, Captain J . A . Collins (navy) and Group Captain J . P . J. McCauley (air) .

164 CRUMBLING RESISTANCE 18-23 De c and New Zealand, as a result of which a report was sent to the Britis h Chiefs of Staff. In this it was held that the additional forces needed t o meet Malaya's needs must include four fighter and four bomber squadron s with reserves, and aircraft to complete squadrons already in Malaya an d their reserves ; an infantry division and a brigade group, three light an d two heavy anti-aircraft regiments, an anti-tank regiment and fifty light tanks, and reinforcements for the III Indian Corps . The conference endorsed Percival's policy of holding the enemy as far north as possible . On 19th December, however, Churchill said in a further cable to Ismay that Duf f Cooper had conveyed to him anxieties similar to his own. He added : "The Commander-in-Chief (Far East) should now be told to confine himself to defence of Johore and Singapore, and that nothing must compet e with maximum defence of Singapore. This should not preclude his employ- ing delaying tactics and demolitions on the way south and making a n orderly retreat." To the pleas for reinforcements were added those of General Northcott , the commander of the recently-formed Armoured Division, then visitin g Malaya, and General Bennett, cabling on 18th December to the Chief o f the Australian General Staff, General Sturdee. Northcott strongly recom- mended that all possible reinforcements be sent, including a machine-gun battalion to be dispatched immediately . Bennett said : "In my opinio n retreat through Kedah into Perak (State) is grave. Situation will grow worse unless troops of quality are available to intervene . My force not yet engaged but cannot leave present location without grave risk and can- not be split as it is already dangerously thin. I consider Australian divisio n from Middle East by fastest means essential to save situation . . . ." On 19th December, in a cable to the Department of External Affairs, Bowden raised an issue particularly significant in the light of later events . "I feel strongly," he declared, "that before further Australian troop s are committed every possible guarantee should be taken that they wil l not be abandoned with those already here ." Bowden added that in hi s view the real defensive strength of Malaya fell far short of previous publicity ; and that assurances should be sought immediately from Great Britain that Malaya would not continue to be regarded as a secondary theatre o f war, but that reinforcements and supplies of modern arms and equipmen t would be rushed to Malaya even at the cost of slowing down the Africa n offensive. On the same day he received an assurance from his departmen t that the Australian Government was far from satisfied with the results of the policy of subordinating the requirements of the Malayan theatre of war; that despite the assurances given by Brooke-Popham during hi s visit to Australia that all was well with the Malayan defences, there wa s anxiety in Australia about the position . On 23rd December the depart- ment received through the British High Commissioner in Australia a message from Duff Cooper referring to the appointment of Bowden t o

'Churchill, Vol III, pp . 565-66.

19-21 Dec JAPANESE AMBUSHED 165 the Far Eastern War Council and saying "We are glad to have him with us, and share your confidence in the soundness of his views ."

Saddled with the task of defending the Grik road, Paris sent Stewar t with the Argylls who had fought at Titi Karangan, and a troop of fiel d guns, to , about midway between Kuala Kangsar and Grik. Behind them, at Kota Tampan where the Sungei Perak ran close t o the road, he stationed a company of the 5/2nd Punjab . Seeking room for manoeuvre, Stewart sought on 19th December to gain control of the roa d north of Sumpitan, where it entered a jungle defile . As however the Independent Company, now under his command, lost heavily in the en- deavour, it was withdrawn, and the Argylls, after a brisk engagement, took up positions at dusk along the road between Sumpitan and Lenggong . There ensued a lull until, at 4 .15 p.m. next day, a Chinese from Temelong on the Perak (described by Stewart as "one of that gallant race for whom all Argylls have affection " ) reported that four hours previously h e had seen a Japanese force moving down the river in boats and on foot . They were forcing local Asians to carry what were evidently mortars , and were demanding direction to Kota Tampan . If this force gained the causeway across a swamp south of Kota Tampan, Stewart recorded , "it was the end, not only of the Argylls but of Kuala Kangsar and muc h of the 11th Division as well . . . . The testing time of the Argylls' speed had indeed come ." With the aid of the 2/3rd Australian Motor Transpor t Company, a detachment raced back down the road and repulsed a Japanes e thrust along a track from the river. ? It was found that the Japanese wer e calling "Punjabi, Punjabi " , in an attempt to pass for members of a platoon of the 5/2nd Punjab which had been stationed at the river and which they had dispersed at the outset of their attack . Although the thrust had been checked, the possibility of further encir- cling moves was obvious. The withdrawal of the rest of the battalion to Kota Tampan was therefore commenced . It was quickly followed up by the Japanese, who ran into a series of ambushes and lost heavily . By 10 p.m., having covered Kota Tampan until dark as required, the battalio n was behind the causeway, which was then demolished . Next morning (th e 21st December) when the withdrawal had been completed, the Argyll s were again attacked, but the enemy withdrew after close fighting. Instruc- tions were later received for the battalion to retire at night through th e rest of 5/2nd Punjab, who were moving up to cover the western and southern shores of Chenderoh Lake . Stewart decided, however, to dispos e of a further attack then developing . This occurred during the afternoon , was again resolutely met, and the enemy was dispersed .

7 In his unit's history Stewart recalled that the 2/3 MT Coy had been closely associated with the 2/Argylls during all the fighting on the mainland . He added : "It is difficult to find words to express the excellence of their quality . They would take on any job, at any time, and under any conditions with a coolness and a quick practical efficiency that was indeed an inspiratio n to a weary unit coming out of battle. In the foolish and usually unjust recriminations that have in places followed the Malayan campaign, we Argylls hope that our Australian cousins, many of them Scots, will read and accept this genuine and heartfelt tribute . "—History of th e Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Battalion, pp. 42-3 .

166 CRUMBLING RESISTANCE 20-27 De c The Argylls then moved back through the 5/2nd Punjab, who wer e concentrated at Sauk, south-west of Chenderoh Lake and 11 miles fro m the junction of the Grik road with the trunk road west of Kuala Kangsar . The 4/ 19th Hyderabad, withdrawn from Kelantan, was posted to protect the main road at Sungei Siput, east of the Iskandor and Enggor bridges by which the main road and the railway respectively crossed th e Perak. Japanese who tried to cross the Krian at Selama on 20th December were repulsed by the 3/16th Punjab ; but because of the growing threat to the vital crossings of the Perak, the 11th Division, includin g the 12th Brigade, had been withdrawn behind that river by the early morn- ing of 23rd December . The Iskandor and Enggor bridges were destroyed , and during the following night a pontoon bridge at Blanja, south of Kual a Kangsar, was sunk. The 12th Brigade was now at Sungei Siput, and 28th Brigade at Siputeh, at a junction of the road from Blanja . Extensive changes of commanders were made on the same day . With the commanders of all three original brigades of 11th Division in hospital, Stewart of the Argylls was appointed commander of the 12th Brigade , Lieut-Colonel Moorhead (3/16th Punjab) of the 15th Brigade, and Lieut - Colonel Selby8 (2/9th Gurkha Rifles) of 28th Brigade . On the ground that an officer with the widest possible experience of bush warfare was neede d to command the division in the situation which had developed, Murray- Lyon was replaced by Brigadier Paris of the 12th Brigade . On this day too Lieut-General Sir Henry Pownall 9 reached Singapore . The Chiefs of Staff had decided some weeks before war with Japa n broke out, but when the importance of the role which would have to b e fulfilled by the army in Malaya was increasingly apparent, that an arm y officer with up-to-date experience should replace Air Chief Marsha l Brooke-Popham as Commander-in-Chief Far East ; and on 27th Decembe r Pownall took over this command . l Pownall, a cool, clear-headed soldier, had been a student at the Imperial Defence College under Brooke-Popham , and Chief of Staff to General Gort, 2 commander of the British Expedi- tionary Force in France in 1939-40 . The fact that this decision became generally known in Malaya soon after it was made could hardly hav e strengthened Brooke-Popham's authority thenceforward . Reviewing the situation as it existed on 23rd December, Percival wa s to record : It was now clear that we were faced by an enemy who had made a special stud y of bush warfare on a grand scale and whose troops had been specially trained in

2 Brig W. R . Selby, DSO. CO 2/9 Gurkha Rifles; Comd 28 hid Inf Bde. Regular soldier ; b . Doncaster, Yorkshire, England, 31 Aug 1897. o Lt-Gen Sir Henry Pownall, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC . CGS Brit Exped Force 1939-40; Vice CIG S 1941 ; C-in-C Far East Dec 1941 to Jan 1942 ; Ch of Staff ABDA Comd Jan-Feb 1942 ; GO C Ceylon 1942-43 ; C-in-C Persia-Iraq 1943; Ch of Staff to Supreme Allied Comd SEAC 1943 . Regular soldier; b. 19 Nov 1887 . l Brooke-Popham pointed out in a report to the Chiefs of Staff that at this stage the land force s which they had agreed were the minimum required had not been supplied ; and that the aircraft in the Far East were 370 short of the accepted estimate, and largely obsolescent . 2 Field Marshal Viscount Gort, VC, GCB, CBE, DSO, MVO, MC . CIGS War Office 1937-39; GOC-in-C BEF 1939-40 ; Governor and C-in-C Gibraltar 1941-42; C-in-C Malta 1942-44 . B. 1 0 Jul 1886 . Died 31 Mar 1946 .

19-21 Dec NEED FOR MOBILITY 167 those tactics. He relied in the main on outflanking movements and on infiltratio n by small parties into and behind our lines . For support of his forward troops he relied on the mortar and the infantry gun rather than on longer range weapons . His snipers operated from trees . He exploited the use of fireworks. For mobilit y he made a wide use of civilian bicycles seized in the country . His tanks he had up to date operated mainly on the roads . His infantry had displayed an ability to cros s obstacles—rivers, swamps, jungles, etc.—more rapidly than had previously been thought possible . Finally, speed was obviously of vital importance to him and he was prepared to press his attacks without elaborate preparations .3 As has been mentioned much of the information now emerging fro m Japanese operations in Malaya had been available from various sources before the war; but a gap had existed between this and the realisation which, as Percival's review showed, was now being forced upon leader s in Malaya. Bennett had sent one of his staff officers, Major Dawkins, to III India n Corps headquarters on 19th December to make personal inquiries int o the cause of the retreat . In the course of his report Dawkins said that outflanking moves by the Japanese had taken place through all types o f country. Either the enemy was well supplied with guides—voluntary or enforced—or he had a trained corps of scouts capable of using th e compass and leading companies with accuracy and speed . There is no terrain which is impassable to infantry suitably equipped and traine d (he said) . Jungle, forest and rubber areas are par excellence infantry country— every move is screened from air and ground observation, the value of fire of weapons of all natures is very limited, and troops on the offensive can close to withi n assaulting distance unmolested. The force which has the initiative will have so grea t an advantage over the enemy that securing and retaining the initiative must b e the prime aim of every commander irrespective of grade . Operations so far, Dawkins continued, had confirmed the suitability of the tactical training carried out by the A .I.F. in Malaya. The enemy had clearly demonstrated reluctance to stand when offensive action wa s taken against him . He did not press his attacks where they did not attai n initial success. The statement that the Japanese were fighting with "fanatica l courage" was a gross exaggeration. Well-trained troops of high morale and suitably equipped should easily wrest the initiative from him. Referrin g to the desirability of "travelling light" in the jungle, Dawkins recommende d that the scales of clothing, equipment, ammunition and transport shoul d be reviewed and drastic reductions made to ensure mobility . Deciding that the time might be near when the A .I.F. would be called upon to defend Johore, Bennett also on 19th December sent some of his staff and Brigadier Maxwell (27th Brigade) to Gemas, on the trunk road just before it entered the State from the north-west, to reconnoitre in detail a suitable defensive position . To the Australian Minister fo r the Army he wrote a letter giving his views on what he considered to be "the incompetence of higher commanders " in Malaya.4 He decid'd on the 21st to withdraw the 2/ 10th Australian General Hospital from Malacc a

s Percival, Despatch, p . 1280 . a Entry in General Bennett's diary .

168 CRUMBLING .RESISTANCE 13-23 Dec and the Convalescent Depot from Batu Pahat before 3rd January . On the 23rd, at Jemaluang, he held a conference of commanders of brigades , and ancillary units at which he reviewed the campaign to date, described the methods used by the Japanese, and indicated those to b e employed in operations by the Australians. They were not to withdraw, he said, merely because their flanks were threatened, but to send out stron g counter-attacking parties . Units must concentrate on practising the attack and adopt ruses to defeat fifth column activity .

The British commanders in Singapore were now concerned by th e threat offered by the road across Malaya from Kuantan on the east through Jerantut and Kuala Lipis to Kuala Kubu, on the trunk road in the west . If the Japanese drive down the west coast passed Kuala Kubu while th e 9th Division was still in its position on the east of Malaya, the divisio n would be cut off. After consultation, Brooke-Popham, Percival and Ai r Vice-Marshal Pulford decided to withdraw the division if and when this danger made it expedient . On the 23rd December Percival took the firs t precautionary steps for the defence of north Johore and Singapore Island , when he ordered Bennett to make preliminary arrangements to deal wit h an enemy advance down the main road from , capital of the , towards Singapore and also with landings b y "small enemy forces" on the west coast .5 He ordered the Commander of Singapore Fortress to arrange for reconnaissance of the north shore of Singapore Island to select defensive positions in the event of enemy land- ings—an order which, issued at this stage, indicated how little that possi- bility had entered into previous planning and preparation .

Reconnaissances and attacks on enemy transport had been carried out from 13th December by Norgroup, a small operational air formation asso- ciated with the III Corps headquarters, and based on Ipoh . By 19th December, however, this airfield had been so heavily bombed that it wa s abandoned, and the supporting craft were back at Kuala Lumpur . The Japanese quickly used the airfields they captured, especially as in the circumstances of their evacuation efforts to wreck them had been in - adequate. Even stocks of aviation spirit had been left intact, and pile s of road metal were readily available to repair what damage had been don e to the runways . On 21st and 22nd December increasingly heavy Japanes e air raids were made on the Kuala Lumpur airfield, where the Buffaloe s of No. 453 Squadron R.A.A.F. were stationed. Despite valiant efforts by the pilots, the superiority in numbers and performance of the enem y craft told heavily against them. By nightfall on the 22nd, only four o f the squadron's sixteen Buffaloes remained in operational condition . To conserve strength for protection of the naval base and reinforcement con- voys, Air Vice-Marshal Pulford ordered the remnants of the squadro n back to Singapore, and evacuation of the field to begin early next day.

6 Percival, Despatch, Appendix " C".

13-24 Dec CHURCHILL TO WASHINGTON 169 Thus the air force had been swept out of northern Malaya, except tha t a composite fighter squadron (Nos . 21 and 453) was formed to cooperate with III Corps, using Kuala Lumpur as an advanced landing ground . There had meanwhile been little activity by Malaya 's bomber aircraft, for the report on 13th December that a large convoy was steaming toward s south-eastern Malaya had caused most of them to be held in readines s to help oppose a landing. Daily seaward reconnaissances were made to determine the convoy 's destination, and it was not until 24th Decembe r that it was concluded that this had been British Borneo . Other reconnais- sances were flown to obtain warning of any movements by Japanese force s in coastal craft along Malay a's east and west coasts. The first air reinforce- ments, comprising eight Hudson light bombers, were manned at Darwin by Australian crews from Singapore, and delivered on 23rd December. Hopes which had been pinned on route-ing planes through Burma t o Malaya vanished, however, when after Japanese air raids on the airfiel d at Victoria Point in southern Burma, the field was evacuated on 13t h December, and occupied by Japanese troops two days later . Thereafter such planes as had sufficient range were to be flown from Rangoon to Sabang, off northern Sumatra, and thence to Singapore. Fighter planes had to be sent by sea, with consequent delay in their arrival . It was arranged by the British Air Ministry on 17th December that 51 Hurricane fighters , in crates due to reach Durban in convoy next day, should then b e trans-shipped and sent to Singapore with pilots and ground staff for on e squadron. Arrangements also were made for 52 Hudsons to be sent, bu t as these would take several weeks to reach Malaya endeavours were mad e to have flown there or to the Netherlands East Indies a number o f American four-engined bombers then in Australia . At the political level in the conduct of the war, a rapidly mounting sense of urgency was shown in cables to the Australian Prime Ministe r (Mr Curtin) by the Australian Minister in London (Sir Earle Page) and the High Commissioner (Mr Bruce) . They were disturbed by a feelin g that the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, though greatly concerned and endeavouring to provide substantial reinforcements for the Far East, wer e not sufficiently seized with the necessity of meeting swiftly the immediat e needs of the situation . "We might only have three or four weeks to save the position, and immediate action might save us five or six years of war, " said Page . He noted in his diary on 19th December, after attending a meeting of the Imperial Defence Committee, that "there was a great ten- dency to emphasise the importance of the Libyan campaign to the detri- ment of reinforcements to the Far East" . Mr Churchill had been pondering the issue during his vovac e t o America for discussions with President Roosevelt. He landed at Washing- ton airport after dark on 22nd December, and "clasped his strong han d with comfort and pleasure" .6

Churchill, Vol III, p. 587.