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The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare
LIBRARY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries http://www.archive.org/details/generalizedtheorOObhag 7 working paper department of economics THE GENERALIZED THEORY OF DISTORTIONS AND WELFARE Jagdish N. Bhagwatl Number 39 May 1969 massachusetts institute of technology 50 memorial drive Cambridge, mass. 02139 THE GENERALIZED THEORY OF DISTORTIONS AND WELFARE by Jagdish N. Bhagwati Number 39 May 1969 The views expressed in this paper are the author's sole responsibility, and do not reflect those of the Department of Economics, nor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. : The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare The theory of trade and welfare has recently developed independently in seven areas which have apparently little analytical relationship among themselves (a) Sub-Optimality of Laissez-faire Under Market Imperfections : It has been shown that, when market imperfections exist, laissez-faire (other- wise described as "a policy of unified exchange rates" [5]) will not be the optimal policy. Among the market imperfections for which the sub-optimality of laissez-faire has been demonstrated are four key types: (i) factor mar- 2 ket imperfection: a wage differential between sectors; (ii) product mar- 3 ket imperfection: a production externality; (iii) consumption imperfection: This paper is the result of thinking and research over a period of many years, originating in my 1958 paper on immiserizing growth [1] and developing considerably since my joint paper with Ramaswami in 1963 [2] on domestic distortions. Since 1965, T. N. Srinivasan and I have col- laborated on research in related matters, pertaining to the theory of optimal policy intervention when non-economic objectives are present [7]: a sub- ject pioneered by Max Corden's brilliant work [12]. -
International Political Economy: Perspectives, Structures & Global
اﻟﻣﺟﻠﺔ اﻟﻌراﻗﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوم اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﯾﺔ /Iraqi Journal for Economic Sciences اﻟﺳﻧﺔ اﻟﺗﺎﺳﻌﺔ –اﻟﻌدد اﻟﺛﺎﻣن واﻟﻌﺷرون/٢٠١١ International Political Economy: Perspectives, Structures & Global Problems Dr. Hanaa A. HAMMOOD Abstract This essay focuses on contemporary International Political Economy IPE science. IPE today widely appreciated and the subject of much theoretical research and applied policy analysis. The political actions of nation-states clearly affect international trade and monetary flows, which in turn affect the environment in which nation-states make political choices and entrepreneurs, make economic choices. It seems impossible to consider important questions of International Politics or International Economics without taking these mutual influences and effects into account .Both economic (market) and political (state) forces shape outcomes in international economic affairs. The interplay of these and their importance has increased as “globalization” has proceeded in recent years. Today’s Iraq faces many political, economic and social complex challenges, thus its openness and its integration into the global economy are necessary to overcome political and economic transition’s obstacles. This required an analysis within the frame of IPE to help economists, policy makers and civil society understand how economic and political conditions around the world impact present and future development in Iraq. The nature of dynamic interaction between state ( power-politic) and market ( wealth- economy) in changing globalized world will led in Iraq post – conflict country that their parallel existence often create tensions and greater economic and social role for the state. Iraq’s today face three main challenges; political challenge, financial resources challenge, and finally economic reforms challenges. Mixed economy for Iraq is perfect to move into a liberal economic system open to the global market conflict. -
Economic Liberalization and Its Impact on Human Development: a Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Azerbaijan Mayis G
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENCE EDUCATION 2016, VOL. 11, NO. 17, 9753-9771 OPEN ACCESS Economic liberalization and its impact on human development: A Comparative analysis of Turkey and Azerbaijan Mayis G. Gulaliyeva, Nuri I. Okb, Fargana Q. Musayevaa, Rufat J. Efendiyeva, Jamila Q. Musayevac, and Samira R. Agayevaa aThe Institute of Economics of Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, Baku, AZERBAIJAN; bIbrahim Chechen University, Agri, TURKEY; cMingachevir State University, Mingachevir, AZERBAIJAN. ABSTRACT The aim of the article is to study the nature of liberalization as a specific economic process, which is formed and developed under the influence of the changing conditions of the globalization and integration processes in the society, as well as to identify the characteristic differences in the processes of liberalization of Turkey and Azerbaijan economies (using the method of comparative analysis of these countries' development indices). The objectives of this study: the characterization of the liberalization process as a specific economic process; a comparative analysis of the Turkey and Azerbaijan economic development conditions; the improvement of the theoretical justification of influence the process of economic liberalization on the development of society. The article presents the comparative analysis of the Turkey and Azerbaijan economic development conditions by using new research method as index of leftness (rightness) of economy. It was revealed that the Azerbaijan economy compared with the economy of Turkey is using more “right” methods of economy regulation. The Turkish economy is more prone to fluctuations in the studied parameters, at the same time, a main way of Turkish economy development is the direction towards increased liberalization, while the simultaneous growth of indicators of the human development. -
Market Socialism As a Distinct Socioeconomic Formation Internal to the Modern Mode of Production
New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2012) Pp. 20-50 Market Socialism as a Distinct Socioeconomic Formation Internal to the Modern Mode of Production Alberto Gabriele UNCTAD Francesco Schettino University of Rome ABSTRACT: This paper argues that, during the present historical period, only one mode of production is sustainable, which we call the modern mode of production. Nevertheless, there can be (both in theory and in practice) enough differences among the specific forms of modern mode of production prevailing in different countries to justify the identification of distinct socioeconomic formations, one of them being market socialism. In its present stage of evolution, market socialism in China and Vietnam allows for a rapid development of productive forces, but it is seriously flawed from other points of view. We argue that the development of a radically reformed and improved form of market social- ism is far from being an inevitable historical necessity, but constitutes a theoretically plausible and auspicable possibility. KEYWORDS: Marx, Marxism, Mode of Production, Socioeconomic Formation, Socialism, Communism, China, Vietnam Introduction o our view, the correct interpretation of the the most advanced mode of production, capitalism, presently existing market socialism system (MS) was still prevailing only in a few countries. Yet, Marx Tin China and Vietnam requires a new and partly confidently predicted that, thanks to its intrinsic modified utilization of one of Marx’s fundamental superiority and to its inbuilt tendency towards inces- categories, that of mode of production. According to sant expansion, capitalism would eventually embrace Marx, different Modes of Production (MPs) and dif- the whole world. -
The Fallacies of Distributism
NOVEMBER 2003 The Fallacies of Distributism by Thomas E. Woods, Jr. n certain disaffected pockets of the politi- A family possessed of the means of pro- cal left and right, more and more voices duction—the simplest form of which is can be heard on behalf of an economic and the possession of land and of the imple- Isocial system known as distributism. ments and capital for working the land— According to the celebrated Catholic writers cannot be controlled by others. Of course, G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, who various producers specialize, and through popularized the idea in the early twentieth exchange one with the other they become century, that social system is best in which more or less interdependent, but still, “productive property” is widely dispersed each one can live “on his own”: each one rather than concentrated. They contend that can stand out, if necessary, from pressure the market order undermines community life exercised against him by another. He can and introduces an intolerable level of insecu- say: “If you will not take my surplus as rity and anxiety into the economic life of the against your surplus I shall be the poorer; ordinary person. They would, therefore, but at least I can live.”1 limit business competition and implement a system of punitive taxation against firms For Belloc, then, the great advantage of dis- that had attained what these writers consid- tributism is that it gives the household a sig- ered excessive economic concentration. nificant measure of independence. A new I do not for a moment doubt the good will introduction to his Essay on the Restoration and pure intentions of those who support of Property describes his view of “economic distributism, and indeed I count some of freedom” as something that “comes from the them among my friends. -
The Tragedy of the Locals
Research Paper 41 | 2016 ENERGY, TRADE, AND INNOVATION: THE TRAGEDY OF THE LOCALS Chiara RAVETTI, Tania THEODULOZ, Giulia VALACCHI ENERGY,TRADE AND INNOVATION: THE TRAGEDY OF THE LOCALS∗ Chiara Ravettiy Tania Theoduloz z Giulia Valacchix January 20, 2016 Abstract This paper analyses the use of different energy sources in a dynamic trade model with endoge- nous innovation. We consider two countries, North and South, the first with high environmental concerns and the second endowed with abundant fossil fuel resources. In this asymmetric setting, the South specializes in energy production using fossil fuels, causing local and global environmental damages. The North, instead, specializes in other manufacturing and imports energy inputs from the South. Endogenous innovation reinforces this pattern of specialization over time. We show that the North can unilaterally stop the use of fossil fuels and avoid a global climate disaster with two dif- ferent strategies: either redirecting the comparative advantage of the South towards manufacturing, relocating the production of energy to the North, or buying fossil fuel deposits in the South. These two policies have different implications in terms of monetary costs and environmental outcomes for the North. The choice between the two depends on the valuation of the environment, the energy requirements of final goods’ production, the starting time of the policy and the time preferences of the North. Overall, however, there is no costless way for the North to stop unilaterally the use of fossil fuels. Keywords: Energy, technical change, international trade, comparative advantage, fossil fuels JEL Classification: F18, O32, O38 ∗The research leading to these results was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under the Swiss South African Joint Research Programme (SSAJRP). -
Political Mobilization and the Institutional Origins of National Developmentalist States: the Cases of Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt
Political Mobilization and the Institutional Origins of National Developmentalist States: the Cases of Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Berk Esen January 2015 © 2015 Berk Esen Political Mobilization and the Institutional Origins of National Developmentalist States: the Cases of Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, and Egypt Berk Esen, Ph.D. Cornell University 2015 My dissertation examines why the common challenge of late development has generated starkly different responses in the Global South. I focus in particular on a cluster of cases that reacted to trade imbalances and political turmoil at the international stage with a combined agenda of economic nationalism, social progress and state-led industrialization, establishing what I term national developmentalist states. Why then, despite facing similar adaptive pressures, did these regimes markedly differ in terms of their durability and socio-economic policies? Through a careful study of such regimes in Turkey, Mexico, Argentina and Egypt during the middle third of the twentieth century, the dissertation specifies four variants of the national-developmentalist state and articulates how each type produced a distinct policy set with varying redistributive implications and political outcomes. I argue that where leaders invested heavily in building cohesive ruling-party and/or state organizations, regimes proved durable even with only moderate levels of economic redistribution. Where such institutions were weak, leaders could expand their popularity through excessive redistribution and risk elite polarization or establish a limited base but remain vulnerable to elite defections and popular opposition. -
American Capitalism
AC/No.7/June 2017 American Capitalism PURSUING PROSPERITY, 1953-1961 Louis Galambos Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and Study of Business Enterprise Pursuing Prosperity, 1953-1961 By Louis Galambos Co-Director, Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise, The Johns Hopkins University About the Series The American Capitalism series is under the general direction of Prof. Steve H. Hanke, Co-Director of The Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise ([email protected]). About the Author Louis Galambos is a Research Professor of History; Editor of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower; and a Co-Director of the Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise at The Johns Hopkins University. His major interest in recent years has been innovation and, in particular, the interactions between individuals and organizations in the private, public, and nonprofit sectors that foster entrepreneurship in America. 237 This chapter is from Louis Galambos’ Eisenhower: Leadership, Identity, and the Middle Way, forthcoming at the Johns Hopkins University Press. CHAPTER TEN PURSUING PROSPERITY, 1953-1961 In January 1953, Dwight Eisenhower became the leader of an American economy that faced three major challenges. One stemmed from a postwar settlement that had laid the foundation for a second globalization of the world economy. The first, British-led globalization of the late nineteenth century had been destroyed long ago by the First World War and the retreat in the 1920s and 1930s to nationalism, then to autarky, and finally to war again. -
Competition Policy in Transition Economies: the Role of Competition Advocacy A
Brooklyn Journal of International Law Volume 23 Issue 2 Symposium: Article 3 Creating Competition Policy for Transition Economies 12-1-1997 Competition Policy in Transition Economies: The Role of Competition Advocacy A. E. Rodrigeuz Malcom B. Coate Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil Recommended Citation A. E. Rodrigeuz & Malcom B. Coate, Competition Policy in Transition Economies: The Role of Competition Advocacy, 23 Brook. J. Int'l L. 365 (1997). Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol23/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks. COMPETITION POLICY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: THE ROLE OF COMPETITION ADVOCACY' A.E. Rodriguez and Malcolm B. Coate* Table of Contents I. Introduction .......................... 367 II. Overview of the Reform Problem .......... 375 III. The Legacy of Protectionism and the Formation of Transition Rigidities ......... 378 A. Historical Background ............... 378 B. The Consequences of the ISI Industrial Policy ................... 382 IV. Transition Rigidities & Protectionism ....... 389 A. A Geometric Exposition .............. 394 B. Implications for Policy ............... 397 V. Concluding Comments .................. 400 t An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Bar Asso- ciation Antitrust and Economic Regulation Section's discussion on Creating Compe- tition Policy for Transition Economies, held at the Association of American Law Schools Conference Washington DC, January 3-7, 1997. * Rodriguez is a Senior Manager with Price Waterhouse LLP in Houston, Texas; B.S. Texas 1981; Ph.D. Economics, Texas 1991. Coate is a Deputy Assistant Director in the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, Washing- ton D.C.; B.S., William & Mary 1977; M-A. -
The Economic Crisis of Autarky in Spain, 1939-1959
05-barciela_173_200_05-barciela_173_200 30/06/16 11:25 Pagina 175 The Disasters of Leviathan: The Economic Crisis of Autarky in Spain, 1939-1959 Carlos Barciela University of Alicante ABSTRACT This article reflects on the causes of the acute crisis suffered by Spain during the decades following the victory of General Franco in the Civil War. It emphasises the incoherence of the totalitarian eco- nomic model that was imposed, particularly with respect to the ob- jective of autarky. It also highlights the insufficient economic training of the bureaucrats and the active role of military commanders in the design of economic policy, including General Franco, who lacked any sort of economic or historical knowledge. Je sais qu’il importe que les hommes élevés en pouvoir soient plus éclairés que les autres; je sais que les fautes des particuliers ne peuvent jamais ruiner qu’un petit nombre de familles, tandis que celles des princes et des ministres répandent la désolation sur tout un pays. Jean-Baptiste Say1 1. Introduction It is common knowledge that Leviathan is a monster that ap- pears in different passages of the Bible. Leviathan was also used by the English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, as the title of the book in which he describes what he conceived to be the pro- per structure of the State, which although not absolutist, should 1 Say, Traité d’économie politique, p. 35. 175 05-barciela_173_200_05-barciela_173_200 30/06/16 11:25 Pagina 176 CARLOS BARCIELA have a very great deal of authority. Almost in the same period in which John Locke was advocating the need for a limited, democratic state with division of powers, Hobbes defended the existence of a strong state as a way to overcome the fratricidal tendencies of human beings, summed up in the famous phrase: “man is a wolf to man”. -
The Case of International Trade Roger Guesnerie
WORKING PAPER N° Mots clés : Codes JEL : Second Best redistributive policies: the case of international trade Roger Guesnerie December 2000 Abstract The paper presents a brief review of recent work that focuses on the normative economics of international trade. In an Heckscher Ohlin - like economy, with skilled and unskilled workers, the available redistributive tools, (that include income taxation) are not powerful enough to allow the separation of efficiency and equity issues and ”production efficiency” is no longer desirable. At a social optimum that calls for redistribution towards the unskilled workers, the social value of the unskilled intensive good is necessarily smaller than its production price. This finding allows to unify existing results and suggests conjectures. Résumé : Ce document présente une revue de travaux récents qui portent sur l’économie normative du commerce international. Dans une économie à la Heckscher-Ohlin, avec du travail qualifiéetdutravailnonqualifié, les outils disponibles pour la redistribution, (qui incluent un impôt non linéaire sur le revenu) ne sont pas assez puissants pour permettre une certaine sèparation des considérations d’équité et d’efficacité et ”l’efficacité de la production” n’est plus souhaitable. A un optimum social, qui appelle de la redistribution vers les travailleurs non qualifiés, la valeur sociale du bien intensif en travail non qualifié est nécessairement plus petite que son prix de production. Cette propriété de l’optimum permet d’unifier des résultats existants et suggère des conjectures. 1. Introduction. This paper provides a brief presentation of recent research Naito (1996), (1998), Gabaix (1997a) (1997b), Guesnerie (1998) (see also Spector(1999),...,) that focuses on the normative economics of international trade, and in particular, on how both the efficiency and redistributional dimensions should properly be taken into account. -
'Nationalist' Economic Policy John E. Richardson
The National Front, and the search for a ‘nationalist’ economic policy John E. Richardson (forthcoming 2017) To be included in Copsey, N. & Worley, M. (eds) 'Tomorrow Belongs to Us': The British Far- Right Since 1967 Summarizing the economic policies of the National Front (NF) is a little problematic. Compared to their copious discussion of race and nation, of immigration, culture, history and even the environment, British fascists since WWII have had little to say, in detail, on their political-economic ideology. In one of the first content analytic studies of the NF’s mouthpiece Spearhead, for example, Harris (1973) identified five themes which dominated the magazine’s all pervasive conspiracy thinking: authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, racism, biological naturalism and anti-intellectualism. The economy was barely discussed, other than in the context of imagined generosity of the welfare state. The topic is so under-developed that even Rees’ (1979) encyclopaedic bibliography on British fascism, covering over 800 publications on and by fascists (between 1923-1977) doesn’t include a section on political economy. Frequently, the closest fascists get to outlining their political-economic ideology is to identify ‘the problem’: the forces of ‘cosmopolitan internationalism’ (that is: the Jews) importing migrants, whose cheap labour threatens white livelihoods, and whose physical presence threatens the racial purity of the nation. ‘The solution’, on the other hand, is far less frequently spelled out. In essence, fascist parties, like the NF, are comparatively clear about what political economies they oppose – international capitalism and international communism – but are far less clear or consistent about the political economy they support.