"The Participation of God HimseIr': Law and Mediation in the Thought of Richard Hooker

by

Charles W. Irish

Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University, Montreal July,2002

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT / RÉSUMÉ

This study focuses on the relationship between Hooker's doctrine of law and his concept of"participation," which is an important feature ofhis sacramental doctrine. In The

Lawes ofEcclesiasticall PoUtie (V.SO-67), Richard Hooker discusses the saving work of

Christ and man's participation in him through faith and the sacraments. How does Hooker understand participation in God? Hooker speaks of the Atonement, Justification and sacraments in the vocabulary ofthe magisterial Reform, but (perhaps uniquely) understands the same doctrines within the framework of law, the instrument by which God orders his creation. Hooker defines law in terms of Aristotelian causes to describe a process of participation: the causes that inform the natures, operations and ends ofcreatures accomplish a hierarchical process of emanation of being from God and return to God. Law therefore mediates between God and creation. Creatures participate in God through the naturallaw, but after the fall, man's participation is restored through the divine law. Hooker's account ofthe Incarnation and Atonement, justification through faith, and sacramental participation ­ the main features of the divine law - therefore takes into account the idea oflaw. Hooker's treatment ofparticipation, then, is based on categories in classical physics, and his doctrine of law influences his treatment of specifie theologicalloci.

Cette étude est centrée sur la relation entre la doctrine de la loi de Richard Hooker et son concept de «participation», qui est un aspect important de sa doctrine sacramentelle. 3

Dans Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie (<

50-67), Hooker examine l'œuvre de Salut du Christ et la participation de l'homme en lui grâce à la foi et les sacrements. Comment Hooker comprend-il la participation en le Christ?

Hooker parle de l'Expiation, de la justification et des sacrements en termes utilisés lors de la Réforme magistrale, mais (et peut-être uniquement) sa compréhension en est une des mêmes doctrines dans le cadre de la Loi, l'instrument par lequel Dieu organise sa création.

Hooker définit la Loi en termes de causes aristotéliciennes pour décrire un procédé de participation: les causes qui informent les natures, les fonctionnements et les fins des créatures accomplissant un procédé hiérarchique d'émanation de Dieu et de retour en Dieu.

La Loi sert donc d'intermédiaire entre Dieu et la Création. Les créatures participent en Dieu grâce à la Loi naturelle, mais après la Chute de l'homme, la participation de l'homme est restaurée grâce à la Loi divine. Le récit de Hooker sur l'Incarnation et l'Expiation, la justification à travers la foi, et la participation dans les Sacrements -les traits principaux de la Loi divine - prennent donc en compte l'idée de la Loi. La façon de Hooker d'aborder la participation est donc basée sur des catégories de la physique classique, et sa doctrine de la

Loi influence son traitement de lieux théologiques spécifiques. 4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1 am grateful to Professor W.J. Torrance Kirby for his supervision in the writing of this thesis. Throughout our acquaintance 1have gained much from his insight, enthusiasm and friendship. 1wish to thank him particularly for introducing me to Richard Hooker, and encouraging me to pursue a study of his thought.

1 thank Luc-Jean Roberge and Bruce Russell for their assistance in translating the thesis abstracto

Finally, 1 owe much to the community of friends 1 gathered in and around McGill

University, whose lively conversation and companionship supported me in my course of study and preparation for ordained ministry, of which this thesis is a part. My wife, Anna, has been a particular support. 5

CONTENTS

Abstract!Résumé 2

Acknowledgements 4

Abbreviations 6

Introduction 7

Chapter 1: Lawand Mediation 14

i. TheNatural Law 14

ii. TheDivine Law 30

Chapter2: LawandIustitia 41

Chapter3: Lawand the Sacraments...... •..•...... 61

i. TheDiscourse on SacramentsinBook VI 73

Conclusion 83

Bibliography 86 6

ABBREVIATIONS

FLE Hooker, Richard. The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker. Gen. ed. W. Speed Hill. Vols. 1-5. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977-1990. Vol. 6 (parts 1 and 2). Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1993.

Inst. Calvin, John. Institutes ofthe Christian Religion. Trans. Henry Beveridge. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989.

Just. Citations of Hooker's works in the text of this thesis refer to two editions:

Hooker, Richard. A LearnedDiscourse ofJustification, Works, andHow the Foundation of Faith is Overthrown. In The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker. Vol. 3. Ed. John Keble. 7th ed. Revised R.W. Church and F. Paget. Oxford: 1888.

Hooker, Richard. A Learned Discourse ofJustification, Workes, and How the Foundation ofFaith is Overthrowne. In The Folger Library Edition of the Works ofRichard Hooker. Gen. ed. W. Speed Hill. Vol. 5. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990.

Lawes Citations of Hooker's works in the text of this thesis refer to two editions:

Hooker, Richard. Ofthe Laws ofEcclesiastical Polity. In The Works ofthat Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker. Vols. 1-3. Ed. John Keble. 7th ed. Revised R.W. Church and F. Paget. Oxford: 1888.

Hooker, Richard. Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie. In The Folger Library Edition ofthe Works ofRichard Hooker. Gen. ed. W. Speed Hill. Vols. 1-4. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1977-1982. 7

INTRODUCTION

The notion of "participation" dominates the central chapters (SO-67) of Book V of

Richard Hooker's Ofthe Lawes ofEcclesiasticallPoUlie. fi these chapters Hookerdescribes

"how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the sacraments do serve to make us partakers of Christ" (V.SO.3; 2:208.22-209.2).1 Later he defines participation as "that mutual inward hold which Christ hath ofus and we ofhim, in such sort that each possesseth other by way of special interest, property and inherent copulation" (V.S6.1; 2:234.2931), which is effected by sacraments. Hooker's concept of sacramental participation is closely bound up with his doctrine oflaw, which he treats extensively in Book 1ofthe Lawes. Law, for Hooker, is an instrument of divine order, with cosmological and soteriological implications. The ordering function of law establishes participation between God and creation; through law, "aIl things in this world are said in sorne sort to seek the highest

[cause], and to covet more or less the participation of God himself' (I.S.2; 1:73.8-10).

Sacraments, appointed by God within the divine law to effect man's participation in God, must therefore be understood in the context oflaw. Hooker's discussion ofparticipation in

Book V- his substantial explication ofthe statement that "God is in Christ ... Christ is in us,

1 References to Hooker's Lawes show first the volume, chapter and section number of The Works of that Learned andJudicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker, 3 vols., ed. John Keble, 7th ed., revised R.W. Church and F. Paget (Oxford, ]888), followed by references pertaining to The Folger Library Edition ofthe Works of Richard Hooker, gen. ed. W. Speed Hill, vols. 1-4 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977-1982) and vol. 6 (parts 1 and 2) (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1993). Hereafter The Folger Library Edition will be cited as FLE, with volume, page and line numbers; commentary notes in the same edition are indicated by citing the relevant passage in Hooker's text, followed by"n." 8 and ... sacraments do make us partakers ofChrist" - can be understood most thoroughly only in relation to Book J. This essay explores the influence of Hooker's doctrine of law on his concept ofparticipation, with ultimate reference to the sacraments.

No study has adequately explored Hooker's concept ofparticipation as informed by his doctrine of law, although sorne recent scholarship has paved the way for such a study.

Bryan D. Spinks has noted the relation between law and Hooker's concept of the ordo salutis.2 He states that Book V, in which Hooker's discussion of sacramental participation takes place, must be read as following from Book 1. Spinks observes that for Hooker, "the created universe itself, with its laws, allows participation in the divine ... election through

Christ,justification, and the society ofthe church allows this participation to be achieved.,,3

His survey ofHooker's thought on salvation is therefore conscious ofthe context oflaw, but does not explore how Hooker's teleological definition of law relates explicitly to the discussion on grace and salvation.

John E. Booty has shown that the idea of participation is central to Book V of the

Lawes. He points to the importance for Hooker ofseveral New Testament concepts, namely, koin6nia, which Booty significantly calls "a cause-and-effect relationship," in which the receiver ofgrace is changed; men i5 (to dwell in), in which the communion ofthe Father and the Son is enjoyed also between the Son and the believer; and repentance, or metanoia, in which grace works in man to tum him to new life, bringing about "a kind of

2 Bryan D. Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican Theology: Sacraments and Salvation in the Thought ofWilliam Perkins and Richard Hooker (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1999), 109-158.

3 Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican Theology, 133. 9 transubstantiation in US."4 The description ofparticipation as a relationship between cause and effect - which, according to Hooker, is governed by law - indicates a link between law and participation, which, however, Booty does notexamine. Booty's indication ofthe close link between repentance and participation is likewise important, since Hooker sees repentance as the first step in man's participation in Christ's restoration ofthe law ofreason

(by which man seeks the highest cause), and a means to communion. Booty, however, is concerned to relate the idea of participation to Hooker's political thought, and does not expose its relation to law.

W.J. Torrance Kirby has outlined the neoplatonic process of "emanation" and

"return" evident in Hooker's doctrine of law, which nevertheless carefully maintains the

Reforrned distinction between the orders ofnature and grace.5 Law is originally and simply one, but emanates into two main expressions. The natural and divine laws represent the motions ofcreative emanation and redemptive return respectively. Hooker appeals to ancient sources in which the One is understood as both the source and the end ofthis cosmic motion.

This circularprocess is "accomplished hierarchically according to the lexdivinitatis," the law ofthe "great chain ofbeing," to which Hooker refers in several places.6 Booty also sees this

4 FLE 6(1):190-202.

5 W.J. Torrance Kirby, The The%gy of Richard Hooker in the Context of the Magisteria/ Reformation (Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2000), 23-32. See also Kirby, "Richard Hooker's Theory ofNatural Law in the Context ofReformation Theology," Sixteenth Century Journal, 30.3 (1999): 688­ 690.

6 Kirby, The The%gy ofRichard Hooker, 26. 10 law as basic to Hooker's "holistic" vision.? In this way law may be said to mediate, for the derivative forms of law remain simply in the one eternallaw, while it "continues to be in them without the loss of its own original simplicity."g This arder of procession and participation is disrupted byman's sin. Hooker appeals to an Aristotelian principle - namely, that the desire of natural things to find their proper ends cannot be frustrated - to show the necessity of the divine law, which overcomes this disruption by providing the process of return. Kirby shows, therefore, the mediating potential of law, but does not relate this observation to salvation and sacraments.

Against the background of these observations - that the idea of participation is a central motif in Hooker's work, that law mediates between God and creatures, and that law is related to salvation - a more particular exposition of the process of participation is possible, as weIl as an investigation of its implications in particular theological loci in

Hooker's thought (namely, the Atonement, justification, and finaIly the sacraments). Such an investigation is warranted in order adequately to appreciate the influence ofa doctrine of law in Hooker's theology; the inquiry helps to define the idea of participation in God, the role of Christ in re-establishing participation, and the specifie role of the sacraments as instruments ofparticipation.

What, then, is "participation," and how do the sacraments "serve" to make us partakers of Christ? The answer lies in a consideration of Hooker's theology of law in

? John Booty, "The Law ofProportion: William Meade and Richard Hooker," Saint Luke's Journal ofTheology 34.2 (1994): 25.

g Kirby, The Theology ofRichard Hooker, 27. 11 relation to his sacramental doctrine. Hooker's doctrine oflaw is fundamental to his account of sacramental participation in the redeeming work of Christ. His sacramental doctrine is expressed within the general parameters established by theologians ofthe Reformation, but he understands this doctrine within a developed theology oflaw.9 When Hooker describes law in Christian neoplatonic and Aristotelian (or teleological) terms, he is describing a process ofparticipation. Law has a mediating role, in which the emanation ofbeing through a chain ofsubordinate causes results in a retum to the First and Final Cause, God. Aristotle's causes are the means ofthis procession and retum. God is the efficient cause ofbeing; each subsistence takes its formaI cause from the Creator (through subordinate efficient causes, for example, a parent); the formaI cause contains the creature's final cause. By seeking its final cause, a creature participates, as far as its form permits, in the ultimate Final Cause, God

(1.3.4, V.56.5; 1:66.27-69.6, 2:236.22-32). "Law" is what govems these causes, and consequently creation's emanation and retum (1.2.1; 1:58.22-32). Creatures therefore participate in God through the naturallaw, but after the faH, man's participation is restored through the divine law (1.11.4-6; 1: 114.8-119.23). With reference to both the natural and divine laws, Hooker describes participation in the same causal terms; the difference between the two lies in the way in which participation is brought about, either naturaHy or supematuraHy. In Hooker's account ofthe divine law, Christ's atoning activity is the primary

9 For a discussion of the relation ofHooker's doctrine oflaw to that of the Reformers and Thomas Aquinas, see Kirby, The Theology ofRichard Hooker, and W. David Neelands, "Hooker on Scripture, Reason and 'Tradition'," Richard Hooker and the Construction ofChristian Community, ed. A.S. McGrade (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997),75-94. Kirby shows that Hooker adopts central concepts ofthe magisterial Reform - in particular, the distinction between the two realms ofnature and grace ­ while Neelands states that Hooker's treatment oflaw, while not opposed to Calvin's, owes much to Thomas Aquinas; for Hooker, "Iaw is always primarily of positive value" (77-78). See also Lee W. Gibbs, "Book 1," FLE 6(1):81-124. 12 means ofrestoring the participation in God that man was to have enjoyed through the natural

1aw (1.11.6; 1: 118.11-27). By virtue of the hypostatic union, Christ is able to carry out the law of man's nature, as weIl as offer satisfaction for its original abandonment (V.55.8,

VI.5.2; 2:232.23-233.5, 3:53.24-54.10). In this way he becomes the cause of new life for individuals, who partake of him as effects partake of their cause, and are oriented to their proper end (V.56.5-6; 2:236-238). Christ the Mediator is therefore also the New Law.

Although Christ is the cause of man's participation in God, the divine law includes subordinate means of participation. Hooker treats the justifying power of faith (expressed through repentance) as such a subordinate efficient cause (VI.5.3; 3:54.7-28). Faith is a cause ofparticipation, and sacraments are the instruments by which this grace is applied to man (V.50.1-3, V.60.1-3; 2:207-209, 2:254-256). In the sacramental mysteries, the Holy

Spirit derives to particularmen the grace enjoyed by Christ's human nature (V.56.7, V1.6.1 0­

Il; 2:238.12-15, 3:85.9-19, 88.3-6), causing them to participate in him as he participates in

God (V.57.5-6; 2:247.5-248.14). On the analogy that the person ofChrist is a cause, but his human nature an instrument, of salvation, sacramental signs are instruments of efficient divine grace, which alone causes participation (VI.6.1O; 3:85.5-27). Hooker's distinction between the efficient causes ofsalvation (God, Christ, and faith) and their instruments (the sacraments) corresponds with his distinction between grace and nature, and allows him to situate the sacraments within the hierarchical chain of being. Rooker's treatment of participation, then, relates sacramental doctrine to his doctrine of law. His study of causes reveals the way in which law accomplishes the return of man to God. Through a chain of efficient causes ofgrace (Christ'sjustifying Atonement, applied through faith in Christ), and 13 through the sacramental instruments ofthis efficient grace, man's nature (his formaI cause) is renewed, and he is brought to realize his final cause, participation in God.

Hooker describes participation in three stages. "[F]orasmuch as there is no union of

God and man without that mean between both which is both, it seemeth requisite that we first consider how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the sacraments to serve to make us partakers of Christ" (V.SO.3; 2:208.22-209.2). This study therefore also proceeds in three stages, relating each stage of participation to Hooker's doctrine of law. The first chapter seeks to show that Hooker understands law to operate through causes, and that the result ofthese causes is creation's participation in God. With the failure ofthe naturallaw, mediation is restored in the divine law, a new series of causes, through which "God is in

Christ." Chapter 2 examines the atoning work of Christ, and participation in him by faith, in terms oflaw. "Christ is in us" according to the operation ofcauses under the divine law.

Chapter 3 looks at Hooker's sacramental theology, and his distinction between causes and instruments, in order to discern the role ofsacraments in participation. Thus an overall aim is to relate Hooker's understanding of law to the series of causes through which God is in

Christ, Christ is in us, and the sacraments means of this participation. 14

CHAPTERI

THE MEDIATION OF LAW

i. The Mediation of the NaturaI Law

What does Hooker understand by participation? Hooker defines it as a "mutual inward hold" between God and his creatures (V.56.1; 2:234.29). John Booty observes that for Hooker, participation is more than the "commerce" represented by the conversation between God and men in the exchange of doctrine and prayer (Y23; 2:110.7-14).10

Participation describes the "union" established between God and men. 11 This "union" is the fruit of the commerce of doctrine and prayer. Booty daims that Hooker's concept of participation is informed by three related New Testament ideas. The first, koin6nia

(translated "communion"), Bootydescribes as "acause-and-effect relationship," in which the receiver ofgrace is changed, or "quickened." The sacraments are God's instruments for the working ofthis communion. The second is epitomized by the Greek verb mena("to dwell

10 Booty, however, states elsewhere: "By participation Hooker does not mean fusion, absorption, or deification [theosis] nordoes he refer to a casual relationship or kinship [syngenia]. What he means is indicated in chapter 23 [ofBook V] when he writes ofthe 'continuall intercorse' ofAngels, descending from heaven with doctrine ... and ascending with prayer .... In this context participation has to do with a mutual dynamic relationship.... Thus he would guard against ... a merger of the divine and the human ...." "Book V," FLE 6(1):198. Booty's apparent contradiction - that participation is more than "commerce," but no more than "commerce" - might be explained by his desire to assert that Hooker's concept ofparticipation, while more than an ordinary act of exchange ("commerce" in one sense), implies not the destruction of the creature (in a "merger") but its transformation by an act ofgrace ("commerce" in a different sense, having an extraordinary result). The type of commerce resulting in participation Booty therefore describes as "a cause-and-effect relationship, in which the receiver ofgrace is changed." FLE 6( 1): 198.

Il Booty, "Book V," FLE 6(1):190-191. 15 in"), which describes the relationship between the Father and the Son, and the re1ationship between Christ and the faithful. Just as the Father and the Son are united in a community of life, dwelling in one another, so the Son abides in the faithful and the faithful in him. The communion ofChrist's body and blood establishes this mutual indwelling. The fruit ofthis participation is the grace ofunction, whereby human nature is made perfect in its own way, as though Christ and the soul were "continuate" (V.56.?; 2:239.4-5). The third concept is that ofrepentance (metanoia), which again involves the transformation ofthe creature. By repentance, a gift of grace, man is restored to his original condition, inc1ined to obey the divine will, not out offear, but love. 12 Participation, then, is more than an act of"commerce" or outward exchange; it involves the transformation of the human being, and a consequent communion or mutual indwelling, in which the same life is in sorne way shared by God and men. These related ideas of communion, indwelling, and repentance are all present in

Hooker's idea of participation, but are united and described by Hooker's understanding of law. Hooker defines participation, or the "mutual inward hold" between God and man, as the coinherence of cause and effect governed by law. Through the causal principles established in nature by God (and supernatura1ly restored by him), created beings partake of the one who created them. "Participation" thus describes a process ofemanation and return through the natural or supernatural operation of causes.

In his inquiry into the principle of law in Book lof the Lawes, Hooker combines a

12 Booty, "Book V," FLE 6(1):198-201. 16 neoplatonic cosmology with Aristotelian physics. 13 The cosmic process of generation and return is explained by Hooker through an appeai ta Aristotle's doctrine of causes. In arder fully ta account for a thing's existence Aristotle identified four causes: formaI, final, efficient, and material. 14 Hooker does not dwell on the materiai cause, but makes use ofthe others. For him, Gad is the efficient cause ofbeing; each subsistence takes its formaI cause from the Creator (although usually through subordinate efficient causes, for example, a parent).15 The formaI cause contains or determines the creature's final cause. Byseeking its final cause, the creature participates, as far as its form permits, in the ultimate Final Cause,

GOd. 16 In other words, in the emanation ofbeing from the First Cause (Gad considered as the primary efficient cause), beings participate in the subordinate causes that bring them into existence; in the return ofbeings ta the One, they are directed by their respective final causes

13 The blending ofPlatonic and Aristotelian traditions was not unique to Hooker. The learning ofthe Renaissance, including that at Tudor Oxford, was eclectic; it inherited a medieval cosmology which synthesized both Aristotelian and Platonic insights. See Gibbs, "Book l," FLE 6(1):93. Hooker's tutor, John Rainolds, famously commented on Aristotle, and developed an Augustinian critique that was consistent with his dependence on neoplatonic sources. See Kirby, "John Rainolds," Dictionary ofSeventeenth Century British Philosophers (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2000), 677-679. Hooker's use of Aristotle is explicit. Hooker's undergraduate learning would have included Aristotle's Art ofRhetoric and Dialectic; his Logic and Physics might have belonged to any undergraduate's library. While writing The Lawes, Hooker was committed enough to an undiluted Aristotelian method to comment strongly against Ramism (1.6.4; 1:76.9-20). See Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican Theology, 93-97. See also Gibbs, "Book l," FLE 6(1):105 and FLE 1:76.9­ 20.0.

14 Aristotle, Physics, Book II.1-9; 192a-200b. See also J.T. Vallance, "Physics," The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1180, and FLE 1:67.23-24.y.o.

15 See V.56.5; 2:236.22-26: "God hath his influence into the very essence ofaIl things, without which influence ofDeity supporting them their utter annihilation could not choose but follow. Ofhim aIl things have both received their first being and their continuance to be that which they are." See also 1.3.4; 1:67.17-68.18.

16 Forms, or formaI causes, are that which give things "their being" (1.3.4; 1:67.24). In a footnote Hooker defines form. "Form in other creatures is a thing proportionable to the soul in living creatures. Sensible it is not, nor otherwise discernable than only by effects. According to the diversity ofinward forms, things of the world are distinguished into their kinds" (1.3.4, n. 1; 1:67.y). Being that which "gives the thing its specifie nature and is the cause ofits specifie properties" (FLE 1:67.23-24.0), form is therefore closely linked with law, which governs ends, another of the four Aristotelian causes. 17 back to the ultimate Final Cause. Law is the principle which govems this process of emanation and retum.

In the principle of the etemallaw, which derives from the reason of God, Hooker locates the fundamental order of creation. 17 This ultimate rational order is reflected in the consistent operation of aIl creatures according to their several ends:

AlI things that are, have sorne operation not violent orcasual. Neither doth any thing ever begin to exercise the same, without sorne fore-conceived end for which it worketh. And the end which it worketh for is not obtained, unless the work be also fit to obtain it by. For unto every end every operation will not serve. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure, ofworking, the same we term a Law (12.1; 1:58.22-29).

At this fundamentallevel of definition, Hooker links law with Aristotle's final cause. 18

Everything has an end; nothing finds its end unless its working is regulated and proportionate to its end; this regulation relative to an end is determined bylaw. The presence oftheformai cause is implied, in that the achievement of an end is by means "not violent orcasual."

Hooker does not cite Aristotle, but his observation that each thing has its proper operation

"not violent or ca~sal" - that is, naturaIly or intrinsicaIly determined - derives from the

17 See FLE 1:58.13-14.0. The concept of law as deriving from the divine reason has c1assical precedents. See also FLE 1:6ü.7-9.d.0.

18 See FLE 1:58.24, 26-29.00. Hooker's definition oflaw should be compared with Aquinas': "Law is a certain mIe and measure of acts." While Aquinas holds that "[e]very agent acts for the sake of an end," Hooker alone explicitly describes law as governing activity toward an end. Gibbs caUs Hooker's doctrine of law "nonauthoritarian" or "noncoercive." That is, Hooker defines law as a mie ofaction towards an end, rather than as a coercive commando By concentrating on law as a principle ofaction, Hooker is able to focus on the process ofbecoming rather than ofbeing, and to apply the idea oflaw even to the operations ofGod. Perhaps this emphasis on law as representing a process aUows Hooker to tie it to the cosmic process, in which creatures become what they ought to be through the pursuit oftheir proper ends. See Gibbs, "Book 1," FLE 6(1):88-89. See also FLE 1:63.6-64.3.0. See also A.S. McGrade and Brian Vickers, eds., Ofthe Laws ofEcclesiastical Polity: An Abridged Edition (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1975), 16-17. 18

Nichomachean Ethics. 19 Aristotle establishes that for rational beings, natural operation is voluntary; a man acts justly or unjustly when he does so voluntarily according to his knowledge (that is, not in ignorance). Actions performed under constraint or in ignorance are involuntary, or"incidental." Hookerextends this principle ofnatural operation to include creatures having no reason or even will. They operate naturaIly, or according to their fOrills, when not under "violent or casual," that is, "incidental," extemal compulsion. Law, then,

"assign[s] unto each thing" the "characteristic oganization,,20 that makes it what it is. By means of law, God applies his efficient power to order creation. Law, through the assignation of formaI and final causes, is therefore an expression of the highest efficient cause, name1y God the Creator.

The regulation oflaw is found first in the nature ofGod himself. "The being ofGod is a kind of1aw to his working; for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he doth" (1.2.2; 1:59.5-6). This law refers both to the "natural [and] necessary" operations of the Trinity, as weIl as to vo1untary operations etemally decreed by GOd. 21 This voluntary decree is termed the etemallaw. This 1aw the pagan philosophers were able to discem when they posited a First Cause, upon which aIl being depends, and spoke ofit consistently as an agent who - knowing what and why he works - "observeth in that working a most exact order

19 Nichomachean Ethics, 5.8, 1135a-I136a. See also FLE 1:58.22.0.

20 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Aristotle," The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 167-168.

21 See FLE 1:59.6-11.0. Hooker distinguishes between internaI operations "natural" to God, and external "voluntary" operations, in order not to confuse the eternal generation of the Son and the Holy Spirit with the creation of the worId. It also allows Hooker to apply law to God's operations: by defining law as a principle of action rather than as a compulsive force, Hooker can describe God's activity according to law without implying that God is under compulsion. See Gibbs, "Book l," FLE, 6(1):97-98, and McGrade, The Laws: An Abridged Edition, 16-19. 19 or1aw" (1.2.3; 1:60.4).22 Law is linked with cause, and therefore with a rational order. "AlI those things which are done by him have sorne end for which they are done; and the end for which they are done is a reason ofhis will to do them" (1.2.3; 1:60.20-23). God - the divine

Logos, or Reason - therefore is 1aw, and his operation is subject to this same 1aw. Since God is reasonable in nature, he works reasonably. Hooker's emphasis on the governing reason ofGod - to which his teleological concept oflaw is closely related23 -leads him to discount the doctrine that law governs creatures but not God, and has the nature simply ofcommand, that is, a motion ofhis will independent ofhis divine reason. He therefore distinguishes two uses of the phrase "eternal1aw": by the first eternal1aw God governs his own actions; the second eternallaw governs the operation ofcreatures (1.3.1; 1:63-64). This second eternal

1aw is differentiated primarily into the naturallaw (which governs non-rational agents, both voluntary and non-voluntary), the 1aw of reason (which governs rational beings, although

24 Hooker sometimes speaks ofthe naturallaw as comprehending the 1aw ofreason ), and the divine law (which governs rational beings responding to revealed truth). The rationa1ity of law is therefore reflected by an ordered cosmos. In identifying the law ofthe cosmos - the second eternallaw - with divine Wisdom, Hooker portrays a universe of"admirable frame,"

22 Hooker seems to equate the Aristotelian "First Cause" with the Neoplatonic "One," when he introduces this natural pagan apprehension ofthe First Cause with the statement that "Our God is one, or rather very Oneness, and mere unity, having nothing but itself in itself, and not consisting (as aIl things do besides God) of many things" (1.2.2; 1:59.20-22). See Kirby, The The%gy ofRichard Hooker, 24.

23 See Gibbs, "Book 1," FLE 6(1):97. Hooker's teleological definition emphasizes the rationality of law, which has not the character of mere command but directs things toward their own inherent perfections. Law is grounded in reason, and the divine will always follows the divine reason. See also Kirby, "Richard Hooker's Theory of Natural Law in the Context of Reformation Theology," 687.

24 See FLE 1:58.16.0. 20 according to a perfect eternal "pattern" (1.2.5; 1:62.1-7), in which law is enthroned in the bosom of God,

hervoice the harmony ofthe world; aIl things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very Ieast as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power, both Angels and men and creatures ofwhat condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet aIl with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother oftheir peace andjoy (1.16.8; 1:142.9-14).25

The government of different kinds ofthings by different kinds of Iaw only emphasizes this cosmic harmony; "to measure by any one kind oflaw aIl the actions ofmen were to confound the admirable order, wherein God hath disposed aIl laws, each as in nature, so in degree, distinct from other" (1.16.7; 1:142.4-7).

Law therefore "mns through" aIl things, uniting them in a whole by ordering each part toward its proper end. On the one hand, in the outward motion ofbeing emanating from

God, beings participate in their efficient cause; in the motion ofreturn to God, they seek their final cause. Things are thus related in a chain ofbeing and linked through one another to the

Highest Cause. Hooker defines this principle of order much later in the Book Vill of The

Lawes:

[O]rder is a graduaI disposition. The whole world consisting of parts so many so different, is by this only thing upheld; he which frameth them hath set them in order ... [God] requireth for ever this to be kept as a law, that wheresoever there is a coagmentation of many, the lowest be knit to the highest by that which being interjacent may cause each to cleave unto other, and so aIl to continue one (Vill.2.2;

25 Wisdom is not the divine Logos; God acts valuntarily (rather than "naturally," or necessarily) according to the second eternallaw. Unlike the divine persons, Wisdom has a subordinate, even creaturely, status: she is "that law eternal which God hath made to himself.... that law which hath been a/God and with God everlastingly" (1.2.5; 1:62.1-8; my emphasis). In John l, on the other hand, the Logos was with God and was God (not a/God) eternally. See FLE 1:62.2-8.0. 21

3:331.19-332.1).26

Law, therefore, mediates the divine governance between Creator and creatures. This mediation is illustrated in Hooker's account ofthe naturallaw. Under the naturallaw, even beings without reason or will act according to their ends, consistently with their created forms. The unconscious consistency ofthings is evidence ofa rational providence, whereby the particular operations ofparticular things are influenced by the one divine agent. In other words, the will of God concerning particular things is mediated to them through causes.

Hooker, then, properly embraces Aristotelian "entelechy" as distinct from Platonic "form."

He rejects the Platonic notion that in their operations natural things adhere to eternal ideas, and posits instead the influence oflaw, itself the mediated influence of God. According to

Hooker, the Platonists' "exemplary draughts or patterns," principles extrinsic to nature upon which they suppose she "fixeth her eye" as a navigator regards the pole-star, and to which she conforms her working, are replaced by law itself, "an ... original draught" intrinsic to particular natural beings (1.3.4; 1:66.31-68.15).27 The forms ofnatural things are the means by which they follow the laws of their nature in the manner of Aristotle's "entelechies."

When they act according to intrinsic principles, natural agents appear ta act purpasively:

26 See also V.76.9; 2:423.15-19: "1 could easily declare how ail things which are ofGod he hath by wonderful art and wisdom sodered as it were together with the glue of mutual assistance, appointing to the lowest to receive from the nearest to themselves what the influence of the highest yieldeth." Because things are linked in a "a graduaI disposition," disorder can have wide ramifications. See 1.9.1; 1:93.20-29: "For we see the whole world and each part thereof so compacted, that as long as each thing performeth only that work which is natural unto it, it thereby preserveth both other things and also itself. Contrariwise, let any principal thing, as the sun, the moon, any one ofthe heavens or elements, but once cease or fail, or swerve, and who doth not easily conceive that the sequel thereof would be ruin both to itself and whatsoever dependeth on it? And is it possible, that Man being not only the noblest creature in the world, but even a very world in himself, his transgressing the Law of his Nature should draw no manner of harm after it?"

27 See Gibbs, "Book l," FLE 6(1):100. 22

"what they do they know not, yet it is in show and appearance as though they did know what they do" (1.3.4; 1:6707-8)0 Contrary to appearances, however, they do not act independentlyo

In following the 1aws oftheir nature, they follow the effective will ofGod. Although having forms - and therefore an intrinsic princip1e ofoperation - natura1 agents are nevertheless not accorded an independence of action, not even to the point of being described as secondary causes; rather, they are "nothing else but God's instrument" (1.3.4; 1:69.19):

Those things which nature is said to do, are by divine art performed, using nature as an instrument; nor is there any such art or know1edge divine in nature itselfworking, but the Guide ofnature's work. Whereas therefore things natura1 which are not in the number of vo1untary agents .00 do so necessarily observe their certain laws, that as long as they keep those forms which give them their being, they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise than they do; seeing the kinds of their operations are both constantlY framed according to the several ends for which they serve, they themselves in the meanwhile, though doing that which is fit, yet knowing neither what they do, nor why: it followeth that aIl which they do in this sort proceedeth originally from sorne such agent, as knoweth, appointeth, holdeth up, and even actually frameth the same. ... [T]he natural generation and process of ail things receiveth order of proceedingfrom the settled stability ofdivine understanding. This appointeth unto them their kinds of working; the disposition whereof in the purity of God's own knowledge and will is rightly termed by the name ofProvidence.... That 1aw ... is as it were an authentical original draught written in the bosom of God himse1f; whose Spirit being to execute the same useth every particular nature, every mere natura1 agent, on1y as an instrument .0' to work his own will and p1easure witha1 (1.3.4; 1:67.17-68.18; myemphasis).

Form, therefore, is the princip1e in creatures that mediates to them the will ofGod conceming their ends and their manner of operation toward those ends, and consequently is an expression ofprovidence, or law. In defining providence, Rooker thus emphasizes not the mere will ofGod, but rather the divine "know1edge" and "understanding." Re appeals to the essentia1 rationa1ity of the divine nature in defining law. The reason as well as the will of 23

God is mediated in creation, in the establishment of an ordered and rational universe. Just as the forms oflaw emanate from the reason ofGod, nature's "orderofproceeding" - through efficient, formal, and final causes - emanates from the "divine understanding." Thus ordered, the "generation and process ofaIl things" echoes the neoplatonic procession ofcreation from and toward the One, guided byGod himself, through the causes govemed by his rationallaw.

By the law of reason, man is subjected in his own way to this order. Hooker holds the Aristotelian principle that man, like aIl creatures, has appetites and desires whereby he is inclined toward what he ought to be, and when he has achieved that goodness, he shaH be more perfect (1.5.1; 1:72.30-73.2).28 Since there is no goodness which does not proceed from

God, the First Cause, and since every effect contains the cause from which it came, aH things are said to seek the highest cause, "and to covet more or less the participation of God himself' (1.5.2; 1:73.5-10; myemphasis).29 Man naturaIly30 seeks a number of perfections whereby he imitates God: immortality, in the continuation of his being; immutability, in consistency in operation; the perfection of the divine reason and will, in knowledge and virtue (which separate man from other creatures and bring him into closest conformity with

God). Man naturally feels these desires and is accordingly cognizant ofhis end. The pagan philosophers sought a kind ofnatural deification: Hooker offers the examples ofPlato, who showed "how knowledge doth raise [men] up to heaven," and of Mercurius Trismegistus,

28 See Gibbs, "Book J," FLE 6(1):104.

29 Hooker derives these accepted maxims from Aristotle and medieval philosophy. See FLE 1:73.7­ 8.0., and 1:73.8-1O.q.o.

30 Hooker, with Aquinas, "holds that the human will is necessarily disposed toward the good." Man does not desire evil as such; he desires what appears to him to be good. Gibbs, "Book J," 6( 1): 105. 24 who urged righteous souls to "frame themselves according to the pattern of the Father of spirits" (1.5.3; 1:74.5-14). Reason presents to "the eye ofthe understanding" that good which can then be willed, so that knowledge and will are the two "principal foundations" ofhuman action (1.7.2; 1:78.1-5). After a chain ofincreasing perfections - sustenance, life, weIl-living, eternallife - there is something sought not as an end, but only for itself. This final desire of man is GOd. 31 "Moreover,"

desire tendeth unto union with that it desireth. Ifthen in him we be blessed, it is by force of participation and conjunction with him. Again, it is not the possession of any good thing can make them happy which have it, unless they enjoy the thing wherewith they are possessed. Then are we happy therefore when fully we enjoy God, as an object wherein the powers ofour souls are satisfied even with everlasting delight; so that although we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life ofGod (1.11.2; 1:112.13-20).

When man follows the law ofhis nature, he finds his proper end, which is union with God.

NaturaIly, man would grow in knowledge by degrees, until he should become "even as the angels themselves are" (1.6.1; 1:74.23), participating in God.

Just as the divine reason and will express themselves in the naturallaw, the wisdom of God emanates through the law of reason. Because man retains his form - his essential nature - even the fall does not destroy this mediation, although it seriously impairs il. After the faIl, human reason - where it remains unimpaired - continues to mediate God's rational will, for "the general and perpetuaI voice ofmen is as the sentence ofGod himself. For that which aIl men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught; and God

31 Kirby sees this Aristotelian chain of perfections as an example of the Lex divinitatis, noting that Hooker cites Pseudo-Dionysius here. Kirby, The TheoLogy ofRichard Hooker, 26, nn. 10 and Il. 25 being the author of Nature, her voice is but his instrument" (1.8.3; 1:84.1-5).32 This plainly echoes Hooker's earlier statement that "Nature .,. is nothing else but God's instrument"

(1.3.4; 1:68.19). In nature, men are "alaw unto themselves" (1.8.3; 1:84.8-9); that is, the light ofreason, which lightens every man coming into the world, enables men to know what truth and falsehood are, to identify good and evil, and thereby to learn the will ofGod. Hooker's reference to the light of reason clearly alludes to the Logos (see John 1.9). Just as natural agents operate with seeming autonomy, men make laws which seem to be their own, but which are in fact God's; man only discovers his law. "[A]s every good and perfect gift, so this very gift ofgood and perfect laws is derived from the Father oflights" (1.16.1; 1: 135.11-

13), through the lights of man:

laws apparently good are (as it were) things copied out ofthe very tables ofthat high and everlasting law even as the book ofthat law hath said concerning itself, "By me kings reign, and" by me "princes decree justice." Not as if men did behold [as "exemplary drafts"] that book and accordingly frame their laws; but because it worketh in them [as "entelechies"], because it discovereth and (as it were) readeth itself to the world by them, when the laws which they make are righteous (1.16.2;

32 See Gibbs, "Book 1," FLE 6(1):106-108, and 1:74.25-27.n. Medieval Platonic interpretations of Romans 2:14-16 taught that man's knowledge of the morallaw was innate, that is, implanted by God into individuals. Hooker sometimes uses this language (1.16.5; 1:190.12-13). But in 1.6.1; 1:74.17-28 he specifically rejects the notion ofinnate ideas and describes the human mind at birth as a tabula rasa, "without understanding or knowledge at ail.... a book, wherein nothing is and yet ail things may be imprinted." (H is in this context that Hooker objects to the rational short-cuts represented by Ramist interpretations of Aristotle. See FLE 1:75.28.w.n.) Man has two natural ways ofdiscovering the dictates ofright reason. He may journey labouriously from first principles through a process of rational demonstration to arrive at the course of right action, or he may search empirically for the signs that always attend the good; consensus is the chiefsign. Thus, "[t]he general and perpetuaI voice ofmen is as the sentence ofGod himself' (1.8.3; 1:84.1-2). Consensus itself, however, is always ultimately grounded in first principles, since individuals (such as Aristotle) have made the rational journey from first principles on behalf ofaIl. Despite the rejection ofthe Platonic doctrine ofinnate ideas in favour ofan Aristotelian tabula rasa, this passage is an example of the co-existence ofAristotelian and Platonic ideas in Renaissance thoughl. The two traditions existed alongside one another, but were eclectic in their use of sources and often relied on one another. This was true in Tudor Oxford. The principle vox populi vox dei (of which Hooker's view of consensus is a version) is found in both Aristotelian and Platonic sources, and Hooker cites both to support il. See Gibbs, "Book 1," FLE 6(1 ):93 and footnote; see also FLE 1:84.2.n and 1:84.m.n. 26

1: 136.8-15; myemphasis).33

Hooker can therefore refer to the magistrate as a kind of priest, or even a "god" (VillA. Il;

3:379.4-16), who, in administering the law to men, ministers to the will of God. Hooker again rejects the Platonic doctrine of exemplary heaven1y patterns, placing law's influence instead in the essential nature ofmen, as it were an "entelechy," where it "worketh in them."

In this way, law "readeth itself into the world," emanating from the Highest Cause through beings (in this case, men) subordinate in the cosmic hierarchy. The right use ofreason - by which the law ofman's nature "works in him" to discover the will ofGod - not on1y causes

God's reason to "read itself' into the world, but also governs man's return to God, as he discovers the proper object of his will. Law mediates between God and man when by efficient, formaI and final causes it oversees the "generation and process," the emanation and return, ofbeings from and to the first source ofbeing.

If law thus mediates, the rejection of law - and the ensuing disorder wrought in the nature ofthings by the rejection oftheir forms and ends - brings about separation from God.

The ange1s, for example, rather than finding their end in the love, adoration, and imitation of God, began to adore their own beauty (104.3; 1:7204-11). In abandoning the law of their nature, they found only destruction. Since this faIl, they labour "to effect an universal rebellion against the laws ... of God" (104.3; 1:72.15-17). For Hooker, sin is preeminently lawless. Bythe same sin ofpride, man's reason is corrupted, so that the knowledge ofgood

33 Hooker's metaphors often imply more than can conveniently be stated. Just as "book" implies ordered thoughts, their expression in words, and their publication, the "book ofthat law" is the divine Reason, the Word, Law himself, who "reads" himself into the world through lesser thoughts and words and laws, the logoi of man. 27 and evil is confused. The choice oflesser goods before better ones "cannot be done without the singular disgrace ofNature, and the utter disturbance of... divine order" (1.7.7; 1:80.26-

28). To abandon the law ofone's own nature is to lose participation in God. No creature can continue whole without the "perpetuaI aid and concurrence of that Supreme Cause of aB things" (1.8.11; 1:92.27-28); dislocated from the Supreme Cause, man becomes a weak link in the chain of being. Man's rebellion against the law of his nature is consequently a rebellion against aBlaw, and a loss of aB righteousness:

Good doth foBow unto aB things by observing the course oftheir nature, and on the contrary side evil by not observing it; but not unto natura! agents that good which we caB Reward, northat evil which we properly term Punishment. The reason whereof is, because amongst creatures in this world, onlyMan's observation ofthe Law ofhis Nature is Righteousness, onlyMan's transgression Sin.... [For he] doth not otherwise than voluntarily the one or the other (1.9.1; 1:93.30-94.7).

Law describes a being's operation and end. For rational agents, the observance of law, or righteousness, brings in participation in God; non-observance, or injustice, results in alienation from God.

Gibbs states that Hooker's emphasis on the rationality of law leads him to oppose

"the traditional idea ofsuperiorimposing his will upon inferiors and the coercive sanctioning ofthe imposition ofthat will byreward and punishment."34 The reasonableness ofGod's law may weB be noncoercive, but that does not mean that reward and punishment are absent from

Hooker's conception ofjustice. In his work on predestination (preserved among the Dublin

34 Gibbs, "Book 1," FLE 6(1):97-98. 28

35 Fragments ), Rooker describes how righteousness and reward are linked. Angels and men, being reasonable creatures, were created as "theliveliest representations" ofGod's perfection and glory, and were assigned "the greatest happiness" (4: 135.25-28). Their end was eternal life, their duty (towards that end) was obedience, and their natures were such that there was nothing wanting in them for the performance ofthat duty. God's good will, then, bestowed upon angels and men eternallife as a reward, but reward depends upon the performance of duty, and dutYupon voluntary agency. Volition is part of the excellence of the human and angelic natures. This capacity, however, implies the possibility ofwilling wrongly. Man had the capacity to continue in obedience to God, but did not. Through liberty there ensued sin

(4: 135-136). The consequence ofsuch injustice is punishment. Rooker speaks freely ofboth the mercy and the wrath ofGod. As Gibbs points out, however, reward and punishment are not means of coercion; they are the consequences of following, or of not following, God's rational (that is, just) will expressed through law.36 Anger and mercy in God are not passions, but are felt as such by man, who experiences in himselfthe effect ofbeing without

35 For a discussion of this collection of texts see FLE 4:xiii-xlviii.

36 Punishment is the natural, just consequence of sin. See the Dublin Fragment on predestination, FLE 4: 138-142. God "neither coveteth [sin] nor appointeth it, he noe way approoveth, he no way stirreth, or tempteth any Creature unto if' (4:138.5-6). With the appearance of sin, however, God's government accommodates the facto Created nature has the love of God, for he made it out of his goodness, but the corruption of nature can earn only his wrath. According to Hooker, "Sinne hath awakened justice .... The first cule of providence now, is that Sinne doe not goe altogether unpunished in any Creature" (4: 139.22-26). "Wrath and justice" join "love and mercy" as elements of divine governance (4:140.24). Love and mercy, however, are not thereby diminished. In the drama of salvation culminating in the work of Christ, God has given to the world ail that it needs for eternallife. Ali men are led that way to the beatitude for which they were first made, unless by "incurable malice" sorne individuals reject that mercy (4: 140.29-30). Eternal punishment is not God's original will for any man, but a consequence of iniquity. Although sin is not fore-ordained, punishment is, but solely upon the preceding occasion of sin (4: 142.9-13). 29 or within the law of his nature. 37

Hooker, therefore, does not let his estimation ofman's natural capacity diminish his doctrine ofthe fall. On the other hand, to acknowledge nature's corruption is not to reject nature altogether.38 The desire for God is "built into" man's nature so that it cannot be completely erased as long as man has his being (his form). Indeed, the history of man's striving shows a plain desire for something above the perfections ofsense and virtue, namely, the philosophers' desire for union with God. Of this final perfection nature is, however, made incapable by sin. Man is left desiring something beyond his natural strength to grasp,

"somewhat above capacity of reason, somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than conceiveth" (1.11.4; 1: 115.8-10). Sorne law other than

37 See VI.5.5; 3:56.5-57.16 (my emphasis): "Anger and mercy are in us passions; but in him not so. 'God,' saith St. Basil, 'is no ways passionate, but because the punishments which his judgements do inflict are, like effects ofindignation, severe and grievous to such as suffer them, therefore we term the revenge which he taketh upon sinners, anger; and the withdrawing ofhis plagues, mercy.' 'His wrath,' saith St. Augustine, 'is not as ours, ... but a calm, unpassionate, andjust assignation ofdreadful punishment to be their portion which have disobeyed; his mercy afree determination of aU felicity and happiness unto men, except their sins remain as a bar between it and them.' So that when God doth cease to be angry with sinful men, when he receiveth them into favour, when he pardoneth their offences, and remembreth their iniquities no more (for aU these signify but one thing), it must needs foUow, that aU punishments before due in revenge ofsin ... are remitted.... IfGod be satisfied and do pardon sin, our justification restored is as perfect as it was at the first bestowed." Punishment is the just response to injustice; but mercy is gratuitous, that is, gracious, "a free determination."

38 In an autograph note in the margin of A Christian Letter, Hooker chastises its author for condemning nature "under colour of condemning corrupt nature." See "Hooker's Autograph Notes on A Christian Letter (1599)," FLE, 4: 17.23-29. Just as natural agents, by foUowing the laws oftheir nature, offer an unconscious worship of God, man' s nature is stiU capable of mediating something ofthe will ofGod: "By that which we work naturally, as when we breathe, sleep, move, we set forth the glory ofGod as natural agents do, albeit we have no express purpose to make that our end .... In reasonable and moral actions another law taketh place; a law by the observation whereofwe glorify God in such sort, as no creature else under man is able to do .... those men which have no written law of God to shew what is good and evil, carry in their hearts the universallaw ofmankind, the Law ofReason, ... [which] doth somewhatdirectmen how to honour God as their Creator; but how to glorify God in such sort as is required, to the end he may be an everlasting Saviour, this we are taught by the divine law, which law both ascertaineth the truth and supplieth unto us the want ofthat other law. So that in moral actions, divine law helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to guide man's life; but in supernatural it alone guideth" (1.16.5; 1:138.23-139.10). The divine law does not replace the naturallaw; it clarifies it, renews it, and supplements it. For a survey ofthe "consonance" ofthe natural and divine laws based on Thomistic maxims, see Neelands, "Hooker on Scripture, Reason and 'Tradition'," 77-88. 30 reason is required to bring man to participation in God, and to the righteousness of the perfectly obedient. For man to be left without such means would reveal an inconsistency in

God, since the law ofnature expresses the rational will ofGod. Hooker accordingly appeals to Aristotelian principles to herald the necessary institution of a new redemptive law.

Natural axioms, which exhibit the divine will, take on the character of prophecies: "is it probable that God should frame the hearts of aU men so desirous ofthat which no man may obtain? It is an axiom of nature that natural desire cannot be utterly frustrate. This desire of ours should be frustrate, if that which may satisfy the same were a thing impossible for man to aspire unto" (1.11.4; 1: 114.14-18).39

ïi. The Mediation of the Divine Law

God has, indeed, "revealed a way mystical and supernatural, a way directing unto the same end ofZife by a course which groundeth itself upon the guiltiness of sin, and through sin desert of condemnation and death" (1.11.6; 1: 118.15-16; my emphasis). This new law takes into account man's departure from the law ofhis nature and its consequences, namely, the loss ofrighteousness and the consequent necessity ofpunishment, but aims to bring him to the same end for which the law ofreason was originaUy adequate. The supernaturallaw is established by the compassion of God, who provides redemption "by the precious death and merit ofa mighty Saviour, which hath witnessed ofhimself, saying, '1 am the way,' the

39 This "axiom" is AristotIe's. Nature, he says, "does nothing irrationally or in vain" (my emphasis). See FLE 1:1l4.15-16.b.n. 31 way that leadeth us from misery into bliss" (1.11.6; 1: 118.20-22). The "supernatura1 duty" demanded by the new law, which replaces man's natural obedience, is to believe in Christ's perfect obedience: "This is the work of God, that ye be1ieve in him whom he hath sent"

(1.11.6; 1: 118.26-27; John 6.29). The righteousness that man ariginally enjoyed through the law ofreason is restored bythe particular righteousness ofChrist, which is imputed to sinfu1 man through faith. As with the natural 1aw, Hooker describes this salvific divine 1aw, instituted by God through Christ, as mediated through causes. Bya special chain ofefficient causes, the divine law renews man's participation in God by re-establishing the formaI and final causes proper to man.

In the Institutes of the Christian Religion (2.17.1), John Calvin provides an instructive parallel to Hooker's scheme. In discussing the merit ofChrist, Calvin states that it is not contradictory to "oppose" Christ to the judgement of God, as the one who was punished in our place, while maintaining that he merited salvation for us. On the one hand,

Christ is the foremost example of divine predestination, which cannot be merited; on the other, this means only that the merit of Christ has its origin in God:

Therefore, when we treat ofthe merit ofChrist, we do not place the beginning in him, but we ascend to the ordination of God as the primary cause, because of his mere good pleasure he appointed a Mediator to purchase salvation for us. Hence the merit of Christ is inconsiderately opposed to the mercy of God. It is a well-known rule, thatprinciple and accessory are not incompatible, and therefore there is nothing to prevent the justification of man from being the gratuitous result of the mere mercy of God, and, at the same time, to prevent the merit of Christ from intervening in subordination to his mercy. .,. [I]n one ward, since the merit of Christ depends entirely on the grace ofGod (which provided this mode ofsalvation far us), the latter 32

is no less appropriately opposed to aIl righteousness of men than is the former. 4o

God, the predestining efficient cause ofsalvation, appoints Christ to work it as a secondary cause. Christ's obedience and sacrifice - by which he exercises righteousness (or merit) and restores the law of man's nature - are the divinely appointed means, the benefits of which

man enjoys by faith. For Hooker, likewise, God is the efficient cause of new life; God in

Christ is the subordinate or secondary cause, by virtue of the Incarnation, and his work of

obedience and sacrifice; Christ is in us through faith and the instrumentality of the

sacraments (V.SO.3; 2:208.19-209.2).41 The Incarnation of the divine Word accomplishes

a new cosmic "generation and process," as from him spring new creatures of (as it were)

perfect form, who return through him to the Father.

The Incarnation and atoning work ofJesus Christ, as a means ofparticipation in God,

therefore fulfiIls the original purpose of the naturallaw. Just as God is the first efficient

cause, an Unmoved Mover, in Hooker's description ofthe naturallaw, his account of the

divine law, like Calvin's, ascends "to the ordination of God as the primary cause" (Inst.

2.17.2); that is, it refers to higher causes to seek the origin and means ofsalvation. After the

mercy of God, the cause of salvation is in the Incarnation of the Ward. The divine nature

40 John Calvin, Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989),2.17.1 (myemphasis). Calvin's comments are observed here merely to illustrate the shape ofHooker's thought, but the comparison between his framework and Hooker's invites larger questions concerning the cosrnology inherited by both, and how rnuch he and Hooker rnay have thought in cornrnon. Despite this passage's superficial structural resemblance to Hooker's scherne, Gibbs suggests that Hooker's doctrine oflaw is in line with Aquinas' against the voluntarist tradition represented by Calvin, among others. See FLE 1:61.18­ 19.0.

41 Whereas Calvin goes on to describe the working ofthe Atonement, Hooker assumes the Atonement in passing - although using the same terms - and emphasizes the role ofthe sacraments. John Booty notes that this emphasis on the sacraments may reflect the emphasis of the debate between the establishment apologists and the Puritans. See Gibbs, "Book l," FLE 6(1):185. 33 assumed the human, so that "God might be in Christ reconci1ing to himse1f the world"

(Lawes V.5!.3; 2:210.26-211.1). The Son took upon himse1f not a man but man's nature.

Consequently, Christ is but one person, the Son ofGod, who was born, baptized, condemned, and crucified (V.52.3; 2:214). The hypostatic union oftwo natures, human and divine, is the source ofgrace in that it makes the activity ofChrist efficacious (V.53.3; 2:218). Whi1e the natures remain distinct - whatever is natura1 to the one is not essentially "communicated" to the other(V.53.1; 2:216.22-29); humanitydoesnotbecome deity(V.53.2; 2:217.18-218.17); sorne things he does as man, sorne as God, sorne jointly - both natures concur to one saving effect (V.53.3; 2:218.23-28). Yet although distinct, each "receives" something from the other. The union of flesh with deity is "to that flesh a gift of princip1e grace and favour"

(V.54.3; 2:222.19-21), which "doth add perfection to the weaker" (V.54.4; 2:223.6-7). The

Son of God 1ikewise gains the capacity to serve perfectly, to offer in man's place - through his perfect manhood - the perfect duty which is the cause ofrighteousness. "[T]he deity of

Christ hath enab1ed that nature which it took ofman to do more than man in this world hath power to comprehend; ... he hath rep1enished it with aIl such perfections as the same is any way apt to receive" (V.54.6; 2:224.25-225.2). The human nature in itse1fis no cause ofgrace

- it is not "apt to receive" such dignity as be10ngs alone to the divine nature - but, after the ordination ofGod (the highest cause), the subordinate cause ofgrace lies in the union ofthe two natures.

The Incarnation is therefore the "accessory" cause of sa1vation, in that it enab1es

Christ's human nature to perform man's duty, thus regaining participation in God through the pursuit ofthe good assigned to man. As the efficient cause ofsa1vation or participation, 34

"God in Christ is generally the medicine which doth cure the world, and Christ in us is that receipt ofthe same medicine" whereby each man is particularly cured (V.55.1; 2:27.25-27).

God is therefore in Christ as an efficient cause of salvation, and Christ is in us as an effect.

That is, the restorative benefits ofhis Incarnation and passion are available through partaking ofhim, which is through his presence in us (Y.55.1; 2:227.28-30). For Hooker, presence describes the mysteriously renewing effect in man ofthe Incarnation and sacrifice ofChrist.

Presence is the participation of the effect in the cause, and vice versa: 42

Participation is that mutual inward hold which Christ hath of us and we of him, in such sort that each possesseth the other by way of special interest, property, and inherent copulation. For plainer explication whereof we may from that which hath been before sufficiently proved assume to our purpose these two principles, "That every original cause imparteth itself unto those things which come out of it;" and "whatsoever taketh being from any other, the same is after a sort in that thing which giveth it being" (V.56.1; 2:234.29-235.3).

Hooker thus returns ta the principles oflaw that he has treated earlier: "sith there can be no goodness desired which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme cause ofaIl things; and every effect doth after a sort contain ... the cause from which it proceedeth: aIl things ... seek the highest [cause]" (1.5.2; 1:73.5-10). Here, however, he applies these natural principles to the operation of the divine law.43 Creatures partake of God because he is in

42 See Olivier Loyer, cited in John Booty, "Hooker's Understanding of the Presence ofChrist in the Eucharist," The Divine Drama in History and Liturgy, ed. John Booty (Allison Park: Pickwick Publications, 1984), 142.

43 See FLE 2:234.33-235.3.0. Hooker derives these principles from Aristotle, and perhaps Aquinas, who wrote: "AIl things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of ail things are similitudes of the divine being.... And so of those beings which desire God, sorne know Him as He is in Himself, and this is proper to a rational creature; others know sorne participation (participationes) of his goodness...." 35 them as their efficient cause, and draws them by means of their formaI causes toward their final causes, and thus finally toward himself, the ultimate Final Cause. Since aIl goods, that is, ends, emanate from God, all things desire God through these ends, and so return to him.

Similarly, redeemed creatures partake ofGod because he is in them through a supernatural efficiency, and draws them to himself through re-ordered desires. Through the appeal to these natural laws, Christ's mediation is identified with the mediation of law: being the

Mediator, he is the New Law. As God presides over the "generation and process," or emanation and return, of aIl things through the great chain of being, in Christ - that is, through the hypostatic union caused by God - a new creature is generated, capable of returning, in Christ, to God, both origin and end.

As law has its origin in the being ofGod, participation too begins there. The Son of

God, being light oflight, is light in light (V.56.2; 2:235.3-5). The only-begotten is thus the only-beloved, since "aIl things do ... love their offspring as themselves are more or less contained in if" (V.56.3; 2:236.2-5; myemphasis). Upon his assumption ofhuman nature, as man he is in God, and God in him. As man, joined to God, he receives "such life as to no other creature besides him is communicated" (V.56.4; 2:236.12-13). For this reason, the

Father loves him above aIl, and uniquely he loves the Father.

Likewise, as the influence of law extends to creation, so does the principle of participation. Just as the eternallaw springs out ofthe mysterious being ofGod, emanating into the world to order aIl things, what appears now in the world was "enwrapped within the bowels of divine Mercy, written in the book of eternal Wisdom, and held in the hands of omnipotent Power, the first foundations ofthe world being as yet unlaid" (V.56.5; 2:237.18- 36

22). In the divine fore-ordination from eternity, aIl things are "the offspring ofGod, theyare in him as effects in their highest cause," and he is in them as their life (V.56.5; 2:237.23-25; my emphasis). At this point, Hooker begins to deal at once with both natural and supernatural operations; the same language of cause, effect, and participation, is applied to the mystery ofpredestination, as much as to natural things:

Let hereunto [that is, to the natural operation of law] saving efficacy be added, and itbringeth forth a special offspring amongst men, containing them to whom God hath given the gracious and amiable name of sons. We are by nature the sons of Adam. When God created Adam he created us, and as many as are descended from Adam have in themselves the root out ofwhich they spring.... The sons ofGod have God's own natural Son as a second Adam from heaven, whose race and progeny they are by spiritual and heavenly birth. God therefore loving eternally his Son, he must needs in him have loved and preferred before aIl others them which are sithence spiritually descended and sprung out of him. These were in God as in the Saviour, and not as in their Creator only. It was the purpose of his saving Goodness, his saving Wisdom, and his saving Power which inclined itself toward them (V.56.6; 2:237.25-238.9).

The goodness, wisdom and powerby which the Father, the Son and the Spirit concur in every creative act is paralleled in God's saving goodness, wisdom and power in the bringing forth ofa new creature. Just as the natural sons ofAdam share in Adam's nature, as "every effect doth after a sort contain ... the cause from which it proceedeth" (1.5.2; 1:73.7-8), so God supernaturally brings forth new sons through his "natural son," the Son of God incarnate, who participate in his heavenly nature. The love of the Father for the Son is transferred to effects further down the chain of being, to those who are in the Son as the Son is in the

Father.44

44 See V.56.7; 2:238.10-18, where Hooker again compares the operations of natural and divine law. In God eternally through Christ, members of this spiritual offspring have God "actually now in them, as the 37

Members ofthis spiritual offspring have Christ's flesh and blood - that is, his human nature - as their own through mystical generation, as sons are in their father and a father in his sons. "We are therefore adopted sons ofGod to etemallife by participation ofthe ... Son of God, whose life is the well-spring and cause of ours" (V.56.7; 2:239.10-13). This participation in the manhood of Christ is effective because of what that human nature has accomplished by way of reconciling God and man:

The Church is in Christ as Eve was in Adam. Yea by grace we are every one of us in Christ and in his Church, as by nature we are in those our first parents. God made Eve of the rib of Adam. And his Church he frameth out of the very flesh, the very wounded and bleeding side ofthe Son ofman. His body crucified and his blood shed for the life ofthe world, are the true elements ofthat heavenly being, which maketh us such as himself is of whom we come.... So that in him even according to his manhood we according to our heavenly being are as branches in that root out of which they grow (V.56.7; 2:239.19-31).

Here, in other words, is the scheme previously outlined by Calvin: God as primary efficient cause imparts righteousness to man through Christ as a secondary cause, who works to reconcile God and man by his sacrifice. Since Hooker understands this divine law in the terms ofnatural causes, he easily adopts the metaphor ofnatural generation. God generates a new offspring, the Church, through Christ as through a parent. This new humanity, participating in Christ as every effect partakes of its cause, participates in God. Man's

"heavenly being," his regenerate nature newly oriented to God, grows out of Christ's manhood, just as branches grow out of their root, or children of their parents.

artificer is in the work which his hand doth presently frame." This relation is summed up as "The participation of the divine Nature." There are plain analogies between the participation ofa thing in its cause, a work in the artist, the creature in the creator, and redeemed or newly-created in the Saviour. The "workman" is the Platonic and Stoic name for the framer of the world. See FLE 1:68.25.0. 38

God, therefore, generates a new humanity through the humanity of the God-man.

God is the efficient cause ofnew life, but he achieves this end by means ofunion with human nature. As with things under the naturallaw, Christ's humanity is "nothing else but God's instrument" (1.3.4; 1:69.19), subject to the divine efficiency.45 In a manner analogous to the distinction between the divine and human natures ofChrist, Hooker distinguishes the divine cause and the creaturely instrument.46 The divine nature uses the human nature as an instrument:

Adam is in us as an original cause of our nature, and of that corruption of nature which causeth death, Christ as the cause original ofrestoration to life .... As therefore we are really partakers ofthe body of sin and death received from Adam, so except we be truly partakers ofChrist, and as really possessed ofhis Spirit, aIl we speak of etemal life is but a dream. That which quickeneth us is the Spirit of the second Adam, and his flesh that wherewith he quickeneth. That which in him made our nature uncorrupt, was the union ofhis Deity with our nature. And in that respect the sentence ofdeath and condemnation which only taketh hold upon sinful flesh, could no way possibly extend unto him. This caused his voluntary death for others to prevail with God, and to have the force ofan expiatory sacrifice. The blood ofChrist ... doth therefore take away sin, because "through the etemal Spirit ofGod he offered himself unto God without spot." That which sanctified our nature in Christ, that which made it a sacrifice available to take away sin, is the same which quickeneth

45 Hooker tends ta reserve the term "instrument" for natural beings or agents, designating only supernatural things as "causes." Thus, Christ - in whom the divine and human natures are supernaturally united - is a cause; the human nature by itselfis an instrument ofthe person ofChrist. Natural things are instruments. In a passage in which he rejects the Platonic notion that in their operations natural things adhere to eternal ideas, Hooker posits instead the influence oflaw, itselfthe mediated influence of God. The Platonists' "exemplary draughts or patterns" are replaced by law, "an ... original draught" which is not exemplary but an inherent principle ofaction (1.3.4; 1:66.27-68.18). See Gibbs, "Book l," FLE, 6( 1): 100. The forms of natural things (in this context, involuntary agents) are the means hy which they follow the Iaws oftheir nature, and foIIowing law, the will of God. Having forms - and therefore an intrinsic principle of operation - natural agents are nevertheless not accorded an independence of action, not even to the point of being described as secondary causes; rather, they are "nothing else but God's instrument" (1.3.4; 1:68.19). In the scheme ofredemption, human nature serves likewise as an instrument; the divine nature to which it is united alone acts efficiently.

46 For Hooker's adoption of the Reformed distinction between nature and grace, see Kirby, The Theology of Richard Hooker, 1-22. See also Kirby, Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1990),41-51. 39

it, raised it out of the grave after death, and exalted it unto glory. Seeing therefore that Christ is in us as a quickening Spirit, the first degree ofcommunion with Christ must needs consist in the participation of his Spirit, which Cyprian in that respect weIl termeth germanissimam societatem, the highest and truest society that can be between man and him which is both God and man in one (V.56.7-8; 2:240.3-30; emphasis added).

Adam is a subordinate efficient cause, a natural parent, in which men participate as effects contain their cause. Similarly, the Incarnate Word is a subordinate efficient cause of supernaturallife. God is the prime moyer who establishes this chain ofcauses, retaining his sovereign efficiency as he rules aIl through his Spirit. As man partakes naturally of the

"body ofsin" received from Adam, so he partakes supernaturally ofthe body oflife received from Christ, when, "possessed" by his Spirit who grafts him into this new chain of causes, he actually obtains that which belongs to aIl men in principle, to participate "of the grace, efficacy, merit or virtue of his body and blood" (V.56.1O; 2:242.2-3).47

As an original or primary cause, then, is in a secondary or proximate cause, God is in Christ; as a cause is present in that which it effects, Christ is in us; as a thing participates in its cause, we are in Christ, and through him, in the First Cause, God. Participation, therefore, is the "mutual inward hold" in which cause imparts itself to its effect, and the effect partakes ofits cause. The mutuality ofthis "inward hold" reflects the natural process ofemanation and return, in which efficient, formaI and final causes govern the participation of creatures in God their Creator, and God their End. "[S]ith there can be no goodness desired which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme cause ofall things; and

47 The activity ofthe Holy Spirit is not, ofcourse, peculiar to the divine law. As the "Power" ofGod, he is "nearest unto every effect which groweth from aIl three [persons of the Trinity]" (V.56.5; 2:237.5), whether natural or supernatural. On this account, the order of nature is in sorne respects just as mysterious as the matter of faith. See, for example, 1.3.4; 1:68.2-6 and V.56.5; 2:236.22-32. 40 every effect doth after a sort contain ... the cause from which it proceedeth: aIl things ... seek the highest [cause]" (15.2;1:73.5-10). The emanation of being through a chain of subordinate causes therefore results in a retum to the First and Final Cause. After the faIl, man's participation is established through the divine law. By the hypostatic union, Christ carries out the law of man's nature. ID this way he becomes the cause of new life for individuals, who partake of him as effects partake of their cause, and are oriented to their proper end. Man's participation in Christ's manhood involves his re-orientation from lawlessness to righteousness, as Christ's obedience and sacrifice restore the law of reason. 41

CHAPTER2

LAW and IUSTITIA

Hooker situates Christ's Atonement within the motions of cosmic generation and return, and therefore, consistently with his argument, describes it in the causal language of law. For Hooker, the question is how Christ's obedience and sacrifice restore the law of reason, and how man subsequently partakes of his righteousness, and thus regains participation in the divine life. The manhood of Christ is the instrument whereby he, as a secondary cause, works the redeeming purpose determined by God. By his human obedience and sacrifice - the one restoring the obedience ofAdam, the otherpaying for his disobedience

- Christ restores the justice that once belonged to the natural law, although now through supernatural means. This justice is imputed to man by faith. Faith, imparted to individuals by God, is the efficient cause of their participation in Christ's justice; faith, that is, is the means by which Christ's justice is applied to man. At the same time, it is also the formal cause of sanctification, by which man gradually becomes righteous in himself. The effect in man of Christ's justifying righteousness is therefore simultaneously the birth of a new creature and the beginning ofhis retum to the Final Cause. Hooker's cosmology therefore influences his understanding of the Atonement, and the faith by means of which God simultaneouslyjustifies and sanctifies individuals. The Atonement and faith are subordinate causes of participation, sustained by an emanating and returning "chain of being" through which man is born anew in Christ and subsequently oriented to God, his Final Cause. 42

Law and the divine iustitia, or justice, are closely related concepts in Hooker's thought. Law is a mediated expression of the divine reason, which orders aIl things weIl; iustitia is this "rectitude of order, which has its source in God himself, and embraces the whole order ofcreation, regulating the relations ofman to God, ofman to man, and mutual relations within the interior being of man.,,48 Law, then, is the means by which God establishes justice, or his rational will.49 After the faIl, Christ restores the justice ofcreation, by establishing a new law through which the justice ofGod - his rational will - is once again mediated to man. Hooker's use of law to describe the Atonement and man's consequent justification therefore appeals to the concept of justice, which has ancient precedents in western thought, and which culminates in St. Anselm's doctrine. 50 Hooker's doctrine ofthe

Atonement and justification show a debt to Anselm, but the former' s appropriation of the tradition is subsumed under his doctrine of law.

Robert Crouse traces the history of the idea of iustitia.51 Plato defined justice

(dikaiosun ë) as the virtue ofright order orproportion. Through Cicero, this notion ofjustice entered Roman legal thought, and although it defined the proper relationship between man

48 Robert Crouse, "The Augustinian Background ofSt. Anselm's Concept Justitia," Canadian Journal ofTheology 4 (1958): 114.

49 See William O. Gregg, "Sacramental Theology in Hooker's Laws: A Structural Perspective," Anglican Theological Review 73.2 (1991):162-164.

50 See Anselm, "Why Gad Became Man," The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

51 Crouse, "The Augustinian Background ofSt. Anselm's Concept Justitia," 113-118. Crouse argues that to characterize Anselm's view of the Atonement as "legalistic" or forensic is to misrepresent the central idea, iustitia, which has a substantial non-forensic history. While the idea has legal applications, it is foremost a philosophical notion referring to cosmic order. For an account emphasizing discontinuity in the history of the idea of iustitia, see Alister E. McGrath, Justitia Dei: A History ofthe Christian Doctrine ofJustification, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4-16. 43 and man,52 it referred ta "a principle underlying the arder of nature, the eternal and immutable expression of the sovereignty of God."53 This idea corresponds ta the biblical notion of Gad's justice, which manifests itself in the arder ofcreation. Man participates in this justice when he obeys Gad, primarily through the revealed Law. Greek and Hebrew ideas about justice therefore readily blended with one another. St. Paul, for example, employed the ward dikaiosunëta describe the divine justice, "bath as an attribute of Gad, and as a quality in man caused by God."54 The Latin translatars of Scripture fol1owed this tradition when they translated dikaiosunëas iustitia, as Cicero and others had done, fully intending bath the biblical and philosophical content of the ward. For Tertullian, far example, God's iustitia refers ta his ordering of creation. As Crouse describes it:

in accordance with his justice (which is correlative ta his goodness) [Gad] distinguished created beings and determined their natures. All the hierarchy of heaven and earth is an expression of the justice of Gad; and his judicial action is related primarily ta the ordering of creation, and only secondarily ta the judgement ofevil. Because ofman's place in this hierarchy ofjustice ... justice for man consists primarily in pietas, the knowledge and worship ofGad; and the neglect ofthis duty is tantamount ta the expulsion ofjustice from the life ofman and society.55

St. Augustine of Hippo broadly applied this notion ofiustitia in his theology. Gad himself

Augustine characterizes as the highest justice. As iustissimus ordinator, he orders all things

52 Cicero defined iustitia as reddens uniquique quod suum est, "returning to each whatever is his." See McGrath, Justitia Dei, 195.

53 Crouse, "The Augustinian Background ofSt. Anselm's Concept Justitia," 115.

54 Crouse, "The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept Justitia," 115.

55 Crouse, "The Augustinian Background ofSt. Anselm's Concept Justitia," 116. See a1so McGrath, Justitia Dei, 56-57. 44 in nature, according to the exemplary pattern of the eternallaw, or the Divine Ideas, which express the divine Reason. The hierarchy of created being therefore reflects the divine justice. The goodness of creatures lies in their conformity to this divine justice. Man's original condition - when he was in right relation to God, and rightly ordered in his own nature - was "just." By sinning, however - that is, by transgressing God's order and the order ofhis own nature - man lost this justice. In consequence ofhis disordered (or unjust) nature man is unable to offer to God his primary duty, iustitia (Tertullian's pietas). God himself, however, effects reconciliation in Christ, who, by assuming human nature and offering himself as a pure sacrifice, fulfills the requirements ofjustice and thereby restores it. By the purity and obedience ofhis manhood, Christ re-establishes the justice ofhuman nature. By participation in Christ, man is also made juSt.56

Crouse observes the similarities between Augustine's concept of iustitia and St.

Anselm's. Anselm defined iustitia as the rectitude ofthe will. Justice is what God (who is the supreme justice) wills, and human justice lies in the rational creature's obedience ofthis will. Man originally lived in astate ofjustice (iustitia originalis). Man's original sin lay in his free abandonment of the rational will, after which he was incapable of restoring the original order of justice. In the Incarnation, God himself undertook to restore his order;

Christ, by means of his humanity, restores man to his place in the order of things.57

For Hooker, law is the means by which God establishes iustitia: through Aristotle's causes, God establishes his rational order. Hooker therefore carries on the tradition

56 Crouse, ''The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept Iustitia," 117-118.

57 Crouse, "The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept Iustifia," 113-114. 45 embodied in Augustine and Anselm when he situates the Atonement and man'sjustification within the cosmic framework oflaw. His construction ofthe framework, however, may be unique, in that neither Augustine nor Anselm describe law (in Hooker's teleological definition) as a mediation of iustitia: Augustine relies on the exemplary Divine Ideas to mediate God's justice (we have seen how Hooker eschews the Platonic "ideas" in favour of

Aristotle's "entelechies"); Anselm understands iustitia as "action directed towards the highest good,"58 but does not refer this teleological view to a definition of law. There are, however, striking similarities between Hooker's cosmology and the cosmologies of

Augustine and Anselm. For each, iustitia is the expression of God's rational will. Just as

God is law, God himself is the highest justice. This justice is mediated in creation through a hierarchy of being, in which all things are ordered in relation to one another and within themselves. Man's place in this hierarchy is maintained by his adherence to the justice of his nature, which lies in the proper relation ofknowledge and will (which Hooker calls the law of reason). When man rejects this justice, or the law of his nature, he is rendered incapable of regaining il. God restores justice through the mediating activity of Christ, whose human nature performs the obligations ofjustice (1.11.5-6; 1: 117.12-118.22). For

Hooker, however, law is the means by which God establishes his justice, an observation that is vital to a proper understanding of his doctrines of the Atonement and justification.

Although Hooker does not deal with the Atonement systematically in the Lawes, his references to it point to the mainstreamunderstanding established by Augustine and Anselm,

58 McGrath, Justitia Dei, 56. Since Hooker apprehends law as an expression of iustitia, his account oflaw is parallel in ail essential respects to Anselm's account ofiustitia; see McGrath, Justitia Dei, 55-60. Such similarities might weil become the subject offurther study. 46 in which Christ's human nature is instrumental in the re-establishment ofman's participation in the divine iustitia. Byobedience, that is, by knowing and willing perfectly, Christ restored the law ofreason. "[B]y knowledge and assent the soul of Christ is present with aIl things which the Deity of Christ worketh" (V.55.8; 2:234.1-3). By this obedience Christ won the reward of life:

The Son of God which did first humble himself by taking our flesh upon him, descended afterwards much lower, and became according to the flesh, obedient so far as to suffer death, even the death of the cross, for aIl men, because such was his Father's will. [Upon this humiliation there followed] an exaltation ofthat which was humbled; for with power he created the world, but restored it by obedience. In which obedience as ... he had glorified God on earth, so God hath glorified in heaven that nature which yielded him obedience ... (V.55.8; 2:232.23-233.1).

His obedience included death, the satisfaction demanded byjustice for the infinite wrong that human sin had wrought. In his appeal to justice in his treatment ofChrist's sacrifice, Hooker is in the mainstream of the magisterial Reform. Lee W. Gibbs has characterized Hooker's understanding ofthe Atonement as "essentially the Latin objective or satisfaction theory,,,59 as formulated by St. Anselm:

59 See Gibbs, "Richard Hooker and Lancelot Andrewes on Priestly Absolution," in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community, ed. A.S. McGrade (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997),271. See also Gibbs, "Book VI," FLE 6(1):287. Hooker cites Bonaventure in support of this view of the Atonement; see FLE 3:54.q.n. That Hooker is also in li ne with the magisterial Reform in this matteris established bycomparing Hooker's summary with Calvin's exposition ofthe Atonement (Institutes, 2.16-17). Gibbs, however, cites Gustav Aulen's Christus Victor as a fair summary of Anselm's doctrine, and therefore apparently understands the Anselrnian doctrine to express a "Iegal" or "juridical" notion of justice. See Aulen, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Jdea of the Atonement, trans. A.G. Hebert (London: S.P.C.K., 1950), 106. Robert Crouse, on the other hand, argues that to characterize Anselm's view ofthe Atonement as "Iegalistic" is to misrepresent the central idea, iustitia, which has a substantial non-forensic history. While the idea has legal applications, it is foremost a philosophical notion referring to cosmic order. See Crouse, "The Augustinian Background ofSt. Anselm's Concept Justifia," 112-119. Likewise, Hooker's doctrine ofthe Atonement may not be characterized as "forensic." Because the ideas ofiustitia and law are so closely related, Hooker can readily assume Anselm's account ofthe Atonement, while relating it to his doctrine oflaw. For anotherrefutation ofAulen, see Wayne J. Hankey, "St. Anselm and the Medieval Doctors," Atonement and Sacrifice, ed. G.E. Eayrs (Charlottetown: 1990),41-62. 47

Satisfaction is a work which justice requireth to be done for the contentment of persons injured: neither is it in the eye ofjustice a sufficient satisfaction, unless it fully equal the injury for which we satisfy. Seeing then that sin against God eternal and infinite must needs be an infinite wrong; justice in regard whereof doth necessarily exact an infinite recompense, or else inflict upon the offender infinite punishment. Now because God was thus to be satisfied, and man not able to make satisfaction in such sort, his unspeakable love and inclination to save mankind from eternal death ordained in our behalf a Mediator, to do that which had been for any other impossible. Wherefore all sin is remitted in the only faith of Christ's passion, and no man without beliefthereofjustified. Faith alone maketh Christ's satisfaction ours .. , (VI.5.2; 3:53.24-54.9).

In addition to the restoration of human nature through Christ's obedience (that is, through his perfect knowledge and will), compensation was paid through his death.60 Faith is the means bywhich the Holy Spirit imputes to individuals the justice wrought by Christ. Hooker adds that "faith alone" means faith as the sole root ofother virtues - namely, hope and love- so that Christ's satisfaction is imputed not to those who merely believe, but to those whose faith makes them willing, by repentance, to amend their lives and become fit vessels ofgrace

(VI.5.3; 3:54.9-17). Repentance, although it is a divine gift, may therefore be spoken of as the satisfaction that man offers to God under the new law, since by it he is justified, or made righteous (VI.5.2-3; 3:54.19-28, 55.23-56.4).

While Hooker assumes this Anselmian framework, his idea of justification is coloured by his preoccupation with law as a means ofparticipation.61 Hooker describes the

60 "Restoration" and "compensation": 1 am using the terms that appear in a translation ofAnselm, "Why God Became Man," The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 283.

61 Although Hooker may be unique in emphasizing law as a means of participation, he is not alone in seeing thatjustifïcation is an aspect, or a consequence, ofparticipation itself. See McGrath, Justifia Dei, 201, 210-11,224-226. For Luther, faith isfides apprehensiva, a faith that "grasps" Christ and makes him present. While Christ's righteousness is extrinsic to the believer, Christ himself is nevertheless really present ta him, 48 establishment ofdivine justice in man through causes. Through a chain ofsecondary causes man is re-oriented to his proper final cause. By his atoning activity, Christ efficiently restores the law of man's nature; by faith, hope and love - the components of repentance - the effects of Christ's righteousness are applied to individuals, so that through him they return to God.62 The virtue ofrepentance is itself the work of God, an effect of grace, "the highestcause from whichman's penitencydoth proceed" (VI.3.6; 3: 13.11-12; myemphasis).

Faith, hope and love are infused by the Holy Spirit at once, but they operate in a certain order to one effect, that is, righteousness.63 The Holy Spirit illuminates the eye of faith, since unless the knowledge ofholy things is held in the understanding, the will can not be inclined to its proper object. Faith gives rise to hope when it conceives "both the possibility and the means to avert evil" (VI.3.3; 3:9.6-7), that is, that God is merciful and teaches the means to cure sin. The final stage in the chain ofgracious operation is the response oflove, so that the hope seen by faith may be realized. By this supernaturallove man inclines toward the end

effecting his regeneration. In his early works (in which he conceives ofjustification in "factitive" rather than "declarative" terms) Melanchthon, too, develops the idea thatjustification involves a personal union between Christ and the believer. Subsequent development of the idea ofjustification tended to emphasize the notion ofimputed iustitia aliena, thereby downplaying or rejecting the idea ofpersonal union by sharply distinguishing between the externality ofthe divine declaration ofrighteousness and the actual process ofregeneration in the believer; Calvin, however, preserves Luther's apprehension ofthe personal presence ofChrist in justification. "Calvin speaks ofthe believer being 'grafted into Christ,' so that the concept ofincorporation becomes central to his understanding ofjustification. The iustitia Christi ... is treated as ifit were man's within the context of the intimate personal union between Christ and the believer.... The two consequences of the believer's incorporation are iustificatio and sanctificatio, which are distinct and inseparable." Like Luther, Calvin holds that faith apprehends Christ, on whose account man is justified. Faith itselfdoes not therefore justify; it is the instrument of justification. Justification is therefore a consequence of incorporation. Hooker's account of justification closely parallels that of Calvin; see McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 291-292.

62 See FLE 3:7.22-23.0. "The virtue ofrepentance is for H[ooker] a part ofthe larger doctrines of participation and justification...."

63 See also 1.11.3; 1:113.9-29. This certain order is another "chain ofbeing." The grace ofGod, the highest cause, generates faith, which generates hope, which generates love, by which man returns again to God. Through the procession of these virtues, the human being returns to the cause from whom the virtues sprung. 49 for which he was made. "What is love toward God, but a desire for union with God? And shaH we imagine a sinner converting himself to God, in whom there is no desire for union with God presupposed?" (VI.3.3; 3:9.21-23). Repentance, then, sees that sin is "abreach of the law of God," but in seeing this, covers over that breach, by pleading the satisfaction wrought byChrist, who established the new law. Grafted into the law ofChrist by the Spirit, the sinner is by repentance made just, that is, righteous, through the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Hooker summarizes this process: "Repentance is ... the habit and operation of a certain grace in us: Satisfaction, the effect which it hath, either with God or man"

(VI.5.4; 3:54.29-31; myemphasis). The twofold effect offaith - "either with God or man"­ implies a twofold participation, that is, the "mutual inward hold" of cause and effect. The two motions of emanation and return are implied by the presence of faith: the effect of

Christ's righteousness in man is man's return through Christ to God. Christ perfectly fulfils the law of reason; his justice effects in man faith, hope and love - supernatural knowledge and will- which cause man's return to God, his Final Cause.

God, the primary efficient cause ofsalvation, appointed Christ as a secondary cause ofrighteousness, to work the obedience and satisfaction required byjustice and restore man's nature. God is also the primary efficient cause ofman's faith, whereby he begins to partake of Christ's offering, by knowing and willing the good through grace. Faith, then, or repentance, may be seen as a secondary or accessory cause of man's participation in this chain ofcauses. As Calvin put it, quoting John 3.16: "'God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish.' We see that the first place is assigned to the love ofGod as the chiefcause and origin, and that faith in Christ 50 follows as the second and more proximate cause.,,64 Thus restored, the soul may"covet more or less the participation of God himself' (15.2; 1:73.5-10). The desire of natural things to participate in God as far as they are capable is made perfect in the divine law. Duty, therefore, is not abrogated, although man's weakness to perform it is relieved.

Since faith is a subordinate cause ofrighteousness, it represents at once the effect in man of Christ's righteousness, and the retum of man to God through the supernatural renewal of his knowledge and will. By faith in Christ, man at once enjoys the benefits of

Christ's righteousness, and fulfils the "supernatural duty" by which he knows and wills his final cause, seeking God through Christ. This twofold participation in Christ implies two kinds ofrighteousness:

[B]ecause he is in us as a moving and a working cause ... Christ is whole with the whole Church, and whole with every part of the Church, as touching his Person, which can no way divide itself, or be possessed by degrees and portions. But the participation of Christ importeth, besides the presence of Christ's Person ... a true actual influence of grace whereby the life we live according to godliness is his ... (V.56.1O; 2:242.8-243.2).

Faith, an effect of grace, is at once the efficient cause ofjustification and the formaI cause of sanctification. It therefore represents the simultaneous nadir of the emanation of being, and the beginning of the return. Justification and sanctification are logically distinct, but simultaneous. This twofold participation in Christ, echoing the twofold process of emanation and return, is the "mutuaI inward hold" ofcause and effect, which partake ofone another in such a way that the return to God "naturally" proceeds according to the principle

64 Calvin, Institutes, 2.17.2. 51 of law: "sith there can be no goodness desired which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme cause of all things; and every effect doth after a sort contain ... the cause from which it proceedeth: all things ... seek the highest [cause)" (1.5.2; 1:73.5-10). By the imputation ofrighteousness, the soul is in Christ (as a thing participates in its cause); by the infusion ofrighteousness, Christ is in the soul (as a cause imparts itselfin its effects).65 One is by etemal predestinating decree, the other is by "actual incorporation," that is, the

"mystical conjunction" by which Christ is in men and men in him as cause and effect

(V.56.7; 2:238.30-239.13). Both of these modes of participation derive from one source, the First and Final Cause.66 Since Christ's redemptive justice is the cause ofjustification, justification remains the principal expression ofman's participation in the retum, but it has no effect apart from the inherent effects ofsanctification. In Hooker's logic, justification is both thefinal expression ofthe emanation ofbeing, and thefirst moment ofthe retum, which is worked out through sanctification. At the point of faith, the motions of emanation and

65 This distinction between imputed and infused righteousness appears in Hooker's A Learned Discourse ofJustification. See especiaIly Just. 6; 5: 112-114.

66 These last observations concerning "the twofold participation of grace" are derived from Kirby, The Theology ofRichard Hooker, 46, 48, 56. The mutuality of the "inward hold" also implies a doctrine of predestination, since the procession ofcauses extends from eternity into time, comprehending both the divine and the human wills: "We are ... in God through Christ eternaIly according to that intent and purpose whereby we were chosen to be made his in this present world before the world itselfwas made .... But in God we actually are no longer than only from the time ofour actual adoption into the body ofhis true Church, into the fellowship of his children.... For in him we actually are by our actual incorporation into that society which hath him for their Head, and doth make together with him one Body, ... for which cause, by virtue of this mystical conjunction, we are ofhim and in him even as though our very flesh and bones should be made continuate with his. We are in Christ because he knoweth and loveth us even as parts of himself. No man actually is in him but they in whom he actually is" (V.56.7., myemphasis). For Calvin, too, the consideration of causes takes place against the background of the eternal decree. After describing Christ as an "accessory" cause, he adds: "How did God begin to embrace with his favour those whom he had loved before the foundation ofthe world, unless in displaying his love when he was reconciled by the blood of Christ?" (Institutes, 2.17.2). See also Spinks, who in examining Hooker's ordo salutis is weIl aware of the role of the eternal decree; Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican Theology, 109-133. 52 return are simultaneous, although distinct, since by faith justification and sanctification occur at once (although in a logical order).67 The principal oflaw itselfexpresses this simultaneity: since every effect contains its cause, it seeks the highest cause. Because it is the effect in man of Christ's righteousness - the final moment in the divine law's emanating chain of being - justification is the cause of return to God through sanctification.

Hooker's distinction between types of causes - the divine efficient cause of justification (faith as a gift of grace), and the human formaI cause of sanctification (faith as an inherent quality), representing together the simultaneous motions ofemanation and return

- leads him to oppose the Tridentine view ofjustification, which he thinks confuses these causes. By distinguishing the divine and human moments in the process of cosmic emanation and return - that is, by discerning efficient, formaI and final causes in their proper relation - Hooker's doctrine of law clarifies the place held by Christ's justifying righteousness and the response of faith within the divine law: it clarifies man's place in

God's iustitia. Hooker'sA LearnedDiscourse ofJustification emphasizes the sole efficiency ofdivine grace, and the uniqueness ofChrist as a cause ofrighteousness, by repudiating the

Tridentine theology of merit. Hooker first identifies the common ground between Roman and Reformed doctrine:

They teach as we do, that God doth justify the soul ofman alone, without any other

67 See Just. 21; 5: 129-130. The efficient cause ofsanctification is the Roly Spirit, who infuses faith, hope and love ("habituai" righteousness), the effects ofwhich are good works ("actual" righteousness). The habit offaith is the means ofjustification, that is, the instrument by which the alien righteousness ofChrist is imputed. The order of these operations in man is therefore: the "Spirit of adoption"; faith (and the other virtues); justification; and actual righteousness, or good works. Justification and habituaI righteousness are granted to the soul simultaneously; actual righteousness, or works, follow in time. See also Gibbs, "Richard Rooker's Via Media Doctrine ofJustification," Harvard Theological Review 74.2 (1981):217-220. 53

coefficient cause ofjustice; that in making man righteous, none do work efficiently with God, but God. They teach as we do, that unto justice no man ever attained, but by the merits ofJesus Christ. They teach as we do, that although Christ as God be the efficient, as man the meritorious cause of our justice; yet in us also there is something required.... [B]y the merits ofChrist there can be no justification, without the application ofhis merits. Thus far wejoin hands with the Church ofRome (Just. 4; 5:109.24-110.6; myemphasis).68

Disagreement springs from divergent concepts ofjustification, and consequently different understandings ofthe means whereby it is applied: "we disagree about the nature ofthe very essence ofthe medicine whereby Christ cureth our disease, about the manner ofapplying it, about the number and the power of means which God requireth in us for the effectuaI applying thereofto our souls' comfort" (Just. 5; 5: 110.7-11; myemphasis). The controversy therefore centres on the types ofcauses involved in justification. Justifying righteousness, according to unreformed theology, is a "divine spiritual quality," that is, an infused righteousness that renders the faithful capable ofbringingforth works worthy ofreward. The

Christian, in other words, is inherently righteous, and may merit an increase ofrighteousness through good works (which, in turn, are made meritorious by being performed righteously), or suffer diminishment (through venial sin) or loss of righteousness (through mortal sin).

Grace diminished through venial sin may be regained through acts ofreparation. Mortal sin is addressed only by the sacrament ofpenance, which clears away the guilt ofsin but (unlike baptism, which also remits punishment) changes eternal punishment into satisfactory

68 References to Hooker's Leamed Discourse refer to the section number in "A Learned Discourse of Justification, Works, and How the Foundation of Faith is Overthrown," The Works ofthat Leamed and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker, vol. 3, John Keble, ed., 7th ed, revised R.W. Church and F. Paget (Oxford: 1888),483-547; and the volume, page and line number in The Folger Library Edition ofthe Works ofRichardHooker, W. Speed Hill, gen. ed., vol. 5 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1990). 54 temporal punishment (to be endured either in this world or the next, unless relieved by

"masses, works ofcharity, pilgrimages, fasts, and such like" [Just. 5; 5: 112.3-4]). "This,"

Hooker bluntly comments, "is the mystery of the Man of sin" (Just. 5; 5: 112.6).

By confounding the righteousness of Christ and the righteousness of man, the

Tridentine formulation of the doctrine of justification also confounds the causes of righteousness, attributing to creaturely acts what God alone can perform. In response,

Hooker distinguishes two types of rightéousness, by referring again to the twofold participation in Christ that corresponds with cosmic "generation and process": the righteousness imputed to man Uustification) by etemal decree, which is perfect, and the infused righteousness (sanctification) by "actual incorporation," which is imperfect (Just. 3;

5: 109.6-11). Hooker is therefore able to distinguish between efficient and formaI causes, or divine and human action, and clarifies their role within the emanating and retuming motions of the divine law through which God re-establishes his justice.

The righteousness wherein man is justified is not his own, and therefore not

"inherent." Rather, Christ's righteousness, which is perfect, is imputed to man. "Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in him. In him God findeth us, if we be faithful; for by faith we are incorporated into him" (Just. 6; 5: 112.24-26). Although man in himself is unrighteous, the man found in Christ through faith (which, again, includes the othervirtues ofhope and love, expressed in repentance), "Godbeholdeth with a gracious eye; putteth away his sin by not imputing it; taketh quite away the punishment due thereunto, by pardoning it; and accepteth him in Jesus Christ, as perfectly righteous, as ifhe hadfulfilled ail that is commanded him in the law" (Just. 6; 5:112.30-113.3; myemphasis). The faithful 55 man is, in short, "in the sight ofGod the Father, as is the very Son ofGod himself' (Just. 6;

5: 113.7-8). Hookerthus reiterates that in Christ, the law ofreason is re-established, and with it, man's iustitia. Faith is the means by which Christ's justice is imputed to man.69

Sanctifying righteousness, on the other hand, is inherent. Whereas justifying righteousness makes man perfectly free ofsin before God, sanctifying righteousness brings forth fruit worthy of the children of God. The one saves, the other manifests salvation; sanctification is no proper or efficient cause ofrighteousness. "By the one we are interessed in the right ofinheriting; by the other we are brought to the actual possession ofeternal bliss, and so the end of both is everlasting life" (Just. 6; 5: 114.2-4). Sanctification, then, is the graduaI, actual possession of the righteousness that is originally imputed. It is the working out ofthe effect ofChrist's righteousness, and man's realization ofhis final cause. Although sanctification is inherent, God is the cause of both kinds of righteousness:

God giveth us both the one justice and the other: the one by accepting us for righteous in Christ; the other by working Christian righteousness in us. The proper and most immediate efficient cause in us of this latter, is, the spirit of adoption .... That whereofit consisteth, whereof it is really and formally made, are those infused virtues proper and particular unto saints; which the Spirit, in that very moment when first it is given of God, bringeth with it: the effects thereof are such actions as the Apostle doth call the fruits, the works, the operations of the Spirit ... (Just. 21;

69 Hooker therefore adheres closely to the 1563 Article on justification: Tantum propter meritum Domini ac Servatoris nostri Iesu Christi, per fidem, non propter opera et merita nostra, iusti coram Deo reputamur. McGrath notes that the phrase "per fidem" makes it clear that faith is the means ofjustification, and not justifying in itself; Iikewise, "non propter ... nostra" emphasizes that no quality in man justifies. "Reputamur" is equivalent to the term that would later gain currency, "imputatio." The Article thus employs key phrases found in the Augsburg Confession, which argued thatjustification is propter Christum perfidem, and in Melanchthon's Apologia to the confession, in which he developed the idea ofimputation. See McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 211-212, 289-290. Kirby likewise observes that there is no difference between the Article, Calvin's representation ofthe Reformed doctrine ofjustification, and Hooker's understanding ofthe same. See Kirby, "Richard Hooker as an Apologist ofthe Magisterial Reformation," RichardHookerandthe Construction ofChristian Community, ed. A.S. McGrade (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), 226. 56

5: 129.7-16; myemphasis).70

In the first kind of righteousness, in which God accepts man as righteous in Christ, man is in Christ his cause; in the second kind, in which God works righteousness in man, Christ is in man in his effects. The Holy Spirit, the first efficient cause, brings forth faith, hope and love, which constitute the secondary cause ofjustification, as weIl as the formaI cause of sanctification. These divine virtues operating in man therefore direct him toward his final cause. By discerning the motions ofgeneration and return, orthe efficient and formaI causes ofparticipation, Hooker shows how God is the sole cause ofman's twofold righteousness, the single author ofthe "mutuaI inward hold" ofparticipation, and how man through Christ is re-oriented to his final cause.

Perfect righteousness, then, is imputed to the penitent believer. The cause of this faith is God; no work of man can justify. Christ alone works redemption. Tridentine theology, however, adds to this "foundation offaith," by confusing the means by which the merit ofChrist's redemption is applied, and consequently, according to Hooker, overthrows the foundation (Just. 17; 5: 124.9-21). Hookerconcedes that notevery addition to the express foundation offaith subverts it. To state, for example, that Jesus Christ alone saves, does not exclude man's consequent belief, confession, and obedience. But if that which is added detracts from the essence of the foundation, it simply overthrows it. The statement that

"[o]ur election is ofgrace for our works' sake" (Just. 29; 5: 150.7), for example, renders the idea of unmerited grace - that is, the sole efficacy of God - meaningless. To "mingle wine

70 The Formula ofConcord (1577) asserted that the Holy Spirit is the sole cause ofjustification. See McGrath, Iustifia Dei, 216. 57 with puddle, heaven with earth, things polluted with the sanctified blood of Christ" is to

"attribute those operations in whole or in part to any creature, which in the work ofour salvation are wholly peculiar to Christ" (Just. 29; 5: 149.8-12; my emphasis). When it attributes justifying merit to virtue and virtuous action, Trent confuses efficient and formaI causes, and therefore the divine and human elements in the "great chain of being."

For Hooker, the error of the papists lies in attributing the power of satisfaction to secondary efficient causes. Whereas repentance, a work ofGod in man, is the efficient cause ofjustification (that is, the divine declaration that the believer is righteous), it does not in itseljsatisfy; it is the cause of the imputation of Christ's satisfaction. Again, although it is the formaI cause of sanctification, inherent righteousness, because it is imperfect, does not satisfy for sin. God works through subordinate causes, but he aIone efficiently works redemption; secondary causes, as instituted by God, are merely "in their place and in their kind necessary, and therefore subordinated unto Christ" (Just. 30; 5:150.20-21; my emphasis). Beside the "bare and naked work, wherein Christ, without any other associate, finished aIl the parts of our redemption, and purchased salvation himself alone; for conveyance ofthis eminent blessing unto us, many things are required" (Just. 31; 5: 152.18-

19; my emphasis), such as justification through faith and sanctification. However, the work ofredemption itselfbelongs to him alone without any otherefficient causes: according to the eternal purpose of God, through him - born, crucified, buried and raised - God knew and loved his elect.71 This salvation God works through Christ "in such sort alone, that ourselves

71 The first efficient cause ofsalvation eternally knew his elect, chosen through Christ, the secondary cause of salvation. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 2.17.2: "... when we treat ofthe merit ofChrist, we do not place the beginning in him, but we ascend to the ordination of God as the primary cause, because of his mere good pleasure he appointed a Mediator to purchase salvation for us.... It is a well-known mie, that principle and 58 are mere patients, working no more than dead and senseless matter, wood, or stone, or iron, doth in the artificer's hand, no more than clay, when the potter appointeth it to be framed for an honourable use" (Just. 31; 5:152.28-153.4).72 Justification and sanctification, however, are performed by him through secondary causes: faith, and the fruits of the Spirit (Just. 31;

5:153.4-15). To such secondary causes, however, the "power of satisfying God for sin"

(Just. 32; 5: 153.18) may not be attributed; merit belongs to Christ's satisfying work alone, and is efficiently imputed to man through faith. Works are "no otherwise necessary than because our sanctification cannot be accomplished without them" (Just. 32; 5:154.10-11).

Since works simply manifest the hope and love that accompany faith, they cannot be thought to be causes ofjustification:

[H]e which giveth unto any good work of ours the force of satisfying the wrath of God for sin, the power of meriting either earthly of heavenly rewards; he which holdeth works going before our vocation, in congruity to merit our vocation; works following our first, to merit our second justification, and by condignity our last reward in the kingdom ofheaven, pulleth up the doctrine of faith by the roots (Just. 32; 5:154.18-25).

Just as God justifies the believer "not for the worthiness ofhis belief, but for his worthiness which is believed" (Just. 33; 5:160.1-2), God rewards the man who works, "yet not for any meritorious dignity which is, or can be, in the work, but through his mere mercy, by whose commandment he worketh" (Just. 33; 5:3-4).

accessory are not incompatible.... God, in order to remove any obstacle to his love toward us, appointed the method ofreconciliation in Christ.... How did God begin to embrace with his favour those whom he had loved before the foundation of the world, unless in displaying his love when he was reconciled by the blood of Christ?"

72 Cf. 1.3.4; 1:68.16-18: God "useth every particular nature, every mere natural agent, only as an instrument '" to work his own will and pleasure withal." 59

The Roman response - Hooker quotes Sir Thomas More - is that only grace makes works meritorious and satisfactory, that is, that good works are rewardable "through the mere goodness ofGod, that list to set so high a price upon so poor a thing; and that this price God setteth through Christ's passion, and for that also that they be his own works with us" (Just.

33; 5:159.7-10). Although, therefore, Roman doctrine asserts that good works spring from

"grace in us," this grace "is another thing in their divinity, than is the mere goodness of

God's mercy toward us in Christ Jesus" (Just. 33; 5: 160.18-21). In defining grace to include satisfactory and meritorious secondary causes in man, unreformed soteriology departs from the plain sense of the Gospel. It also confuses cause and effect, or efficient and formaI causes, and obscures the relative position ofChrist and his members in the "chain ofbeing": it distorts God's iustitia. By "grace," Hooker notes, St. Paul meant "a gift; a thing that cometh not of ourselves, not of our works, lest any man should boast and say, '1 have wrought out mine own salvation'" (Just. 34; 5: 160.28-30; myemphasis). When Rome, on the other hand, says "grace," she means "grace in such sort, that as many as wear the diadem ofbliss, they wear nothing but what they have won" (Just. 34; 5:160.31-161.2). Hooker asserts, once again, that secondary causes are "in their place and in their kind necessary," but their "kind," or formaI cause, does not include any meritorious quality:

"He saved us according to his mercy;" which mercy, although it exclude not the washing of our new birth, the renewing ofour hearts by the Holy Ghost, the means, the virtues, the duties, which God requireth at their hands which shaH be saved; yet it is so repugnant unto merits, that to say, we are saved for the worthiness of any thing which is ours, is to deny we are saved by Grace.... We deny the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, we imbase, disannul, annihilate the benefit of his bitter passion, ifwe rest in those proud imaginations, that life everlasting is deservedly ours, that we merit it, and that we are worthy ofit (Just. 34; 5: 161.5-15). 60

By conceiving ofjustifying grace as inherent - by stating, that is, that the formaI cause of man's justification lies in himself, rather than solely in Christ's righteousness - Tridentine theology does not simply acknowledge necessary secondary causes, but makes them satisfactory and meritorious. By failing to distinguish imputed and inherent righteousness,

Rome fails to distinguish the causes of righteousness, and attributes to man what belongs uniquely to Christ. This semi-pelagian soteriology confuses the raIes and natures ofthings in the "graduaI disposition" of cosmic arder. Hooker's doctrine of law, on the other hand, allows him to distinguish between types of causes, and to situate them within the cosmic pracess of emanation and return. Christ is the efficient cause of righteousness. By his obedience and sacrifice, Christ restared the iustitia once wraught thraugh the law ofreason.

Faith is a secondary efficient cause of participation in Christ's justice (the formai cause of justification), which is imputed to man. Simultaneously, faith is the formai cause of sanctification, by which man becomes inherently righteous, and begins to realize his final cause. The effect in man ofChrist'sjustifying righteousness is therefore simultaneously the birth of a new creature and the beginning of his return to the Final Cause. Hooker's cosmology therefore influences his understanding of the Atonement, justification and sanctification. The Atonement and faith are subordinate causes of participation in an emanating and returning "chain of being" through which man is born anew in Christ and subsequently oriented to God, his Final Cause. 61

CHAPTER3

LAW and the SACRAMENTS

McGrath has observed that the debates of the English Reformation tended to emphasize sacramental disputes, whereas the doctrine of justification received attention mainly on the Continent.73 For Hooker, however (especially as a second-generation reformer, by whose time the communication ofideas between England and the Continental churches had brought sorne doctrinal clarification74), the doctrines of justification and sacramental participation are obviously related, in that the divine law establishes both as means of participation in God. For Hooker, the same questions pertaining to justification also apply to sacramental doctrine: how are sacraments situated in the divine law?

Spinks has explored the role of the sacraments within the divine law by accurately situating them within Hooker's ordo salutis. While Book V is "in many ways ... the centre ofHooker's great work,"75 it presupposes the principles established in Books I-IV, namely, that the divine law comprises etemal decree, election through vocation, justification and sanctification, and finally sacramental participation. Sacraments are therefore part ofGod's ordering of the Church, which itself is ordered within the universe: salvation takes place

73 McGrath, lustitia Dei, 285.

74 McGrath, lustifia Dei, 285-292. After tracing the refinement ofthe idea ofjustification in England, McGrath observes that Hooker's doctrine ofjustification is essentially that ofCalvin.

75 Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican The%gy, 110. 62 within a universal order.76 Spinks's observations, however, fail to examine the impact of

Hooker's teleological definition oflaw on his sacramental teaching. Indeed, despite noting

Hooker's definition, Spinks appears to regard law merely as something "required" by God,

"a rule," and the implications of Hooker's regard for "ends" remains unrecognized.77

The sacraments hold a necessary place within the hierarchy ofcauses bywhich Christ generates a new being. Analogous to the humanity of Christ, the sacramental elements are instruments ofdivine efficiency. By virtue ofthe union ofdivine efficiency with creaturely instruments, however, sacraments may be spoken of as causes of grace. Just as the divine and human natures "concur unto one effect, and Christ in that respect be truly said to work both as God and as man one and the selfsame thing" (V.53.3; 2:218.26-28), the sacraments

(understood as divine grace working in union with outward signs) "work" righteousness in man.78 By identifying the causes of participation Hooker defines how sacraments, like

76 Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethanAnglican Theology, 110-115, 140-141.

77 See Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican Theology, 139, 145. The same problems appear in William O. Gregg, "Sacramental Theology in Hooker's Laws: A Structural Perspective," Anglican Theological Review 73.2 (1991): 155-176. Gregg states that "[t]he necessity ofBaptism for Hooker rests in the simple fact that Christ requires it of us," and that "[t]he justification and necessity of the sacrament [of the Eucharist] in Hooker's mind is that Christ commanded that this be done, gave it as a promise ofhis continued presence in the Church and to the faithful, and that is sufficient" (167-168), apparently forgetting that for Hooker, God commands nothing that is not reasonable, with a view to its end. Gregg, like Spinks, is aware that Hooker's discussion of participation takes place in the context of law, but does not manage to relate participation and causes. Gregg does, however, approach (in footnotes) the recognition that right relationship between God and man is the result of the twofold participation of cause and effect, which "paraIlels" (rather than is the outcome of?) the principles of law (170).

78 For Hooker, the proper definition of a sacrament includes both its outward and inward aspects ­ word, element, and grace - even though he carefuIly distinguishes the two, and for the purpose of distinction sometimes refers under the term "sacrament" only to the sacramental sign. See V.58.2; 2:248.31-249.19: "In writing and speaking ofthe sacraments we use for the most part under the name oftheir substance not only to comprise that whereof they outwardly and sensibly consist, but also the secret grace which they signify and exhibit.... But if that be separated which is secret, and that considered alone which is seen, as of necessity it must in aIl those speeches that make distinction ofsacraments from sacramental grace, the name ofa sacrament in such speeches can imply no more than what the outward substance doth comprehend. And to make complete 63 justification and sanctification, are "in their place and in their kind necessary" (Just. 30;

5:150.20-21) within the divine law. Christ, through his atonement for sin, is the efficient cause of righteousness; the divine virtues are the efficient causes of the imputation of this righteousness to man, and the formaI cause of righteousness in man; sacraments are the

"causes instrumental" (V.67.5; 2:334.18) ofthese gracious operations. Through this "chain ofbeing," the divine law's motions ofemanation and retum - man's new birth and retum to

God - are accomplished. The coinherence of cause and effect, by which man partakes of

Christ's righteousness for the renewal of his formaI cause (the divine image) and the realization of his final cause (union with God), are secured by God through subordinate means, first through faith as an efficient cause, secondly through sacraments as instruments.

Sacramental participation is therefore subordinate to the participation established through faith, but sacraments have a crucial place as the ordinary means by which the graces associated with faith are imparted.

The etemal decree orders that election is worked out through "actual incorporation" in Christ (V.56.7; 2:238.30). This actual participation consists in the graces of imputation and infusion of righteousness. The instruments for this imputation and infusion are sacraments.79 Sacraments, as "means conditional which God requireth in them unto whom

the outward substance of a sacrament, there is required an outward form, which form sacramental elements receive from sacramental words. Hereupon it groweth, that many times there are three things said to make up the substance of a sacrament, namely, the grace which is thereby offered, the element which shadoweth or signifieth grace, and the word which expresseth what is done by the element." Hooker adds to these three elements the necessity ofa "serious meaning" (V.58.3; 2:250.9) in sacramental ministration, which is supplied by the publicly declared intention of the Church. See FLE 2:248.15.0 and 2:250.7-14.0.

79 See Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican Theology, 132. 64 he imparteth grace" (V.57.3; 2:246.1-2), are therefore, as Spinks observes, "a mIe or law."so

They are a law because they have an end, namely, incorporation into Christ: "grace is indeed the very end for which these heavenly mysteries were instituted" (V.50.3; 2:208.9-11).

Hooker's inquiry into sacramental participation therefore presupposes his inquiry into the nature of law. Since each thing in nature works towards its end, which is attained through the exercise of appropriately measured operations established and govemed by law (1.2.1;

1:58.22-29), to determine the role ofsacraments in salvation Hooker resolves to understand their formaI and final causes: "their efficacy resteth obscure to our understanding, except we search somewhat more distinctly whatgrace in particularthat is whereunto they are referred, and what manner ofoperation they have towards it" (V.50.3; 2:208.13-16; myemphasis).

The end ofthe sacraments is grace. In the Dublin Fragment Virtus Sacramenti et Dei gratia,

Hooker defines "grace" as:

first, [God's] favour and undeserved mercie towards us; Secondlie, the bestowing of his holy spiritt which inwardlie worketh; thirdlie, the effects ofthat Spritt whatsoever butt especiallie saving vertues, such as are,faith, charitie, and hope, lastlie the free and full remission of all our sinnes. This is the grace which Sacraments yeeld, and whereby wee are all justifyed. To be justifyed, is to be made righteous. Because therefore, righteousnes doth imply first remission of sinnes, and secondlie a sanctifyed life, the name is sometyme applyed severally to the former, sometymes joyntlie it comprehendeth both (FLE 4: 117.5-14).

Hooker's definition ofsacramental participation therefore comprehends the "mutua1 inward hold" ofjustification and sanctification, the participation in Christ that ensues through faith.

Sacraments, as means to this participation, therefore "both signifye and cause grace"

so Spinks, Two Faces ofElizabethan Anglican Theology, 139. 65

(4: 117.2). The power to "cause grace," however, can not be attributed to the part of the sacrament which "signifies." Just as grace derives first from the "favour and undeserved mercy" ofthe first efficient cause ofsalvation, and subordinately from the divine gift offaith as a secondary cause, the grace derived through sacraments also has God alone as its author.

Althoughjustification and sanctification are among the graces "yielded" by sacraments, "The generall cause which hath procured our rernission ofsinnes is the blood ofChrist, therefore in his blood wee are justifyed, that is to say cleered and aquitted from aIl sinne. The condition required in us for our personall qualification heerunto, is faith" (4: 117.14-17). To say that faith alone is necessary for the imputation of Christ's death, however, is not "to separate thereby faith from any other qualitie or dutie, which God requireth to be matched therewith" (4: 118.1-3; my emphasis); just as hope and love must be joined to faith, God requires the use ofsacraments by the faithful, to whom he imparts grace. Because they are required by the divine law, sacraments are "signes effectuaIl, they are the instruments ofGod, whereby to bestowe grace, howbeit grace not proceeding from the visible signe, butt from his invisible power. God by sacraments giveth grace" (4:119.13-16).

The divine law ("do this in remembrance of me"SI) therefore commands faith to express itself liturgically, so that the faithful may partake of Christ's body. Supernatural birth takes place in the Church, which administers the imputation and infusion of Christ's gifts through sacraments. Hooker refers to natural generation to describe how sacraments assist the supernatural "generation and process" of a new creation:

SI The Book of Common Prayer, 1559: The Elizabethan Prayer Book, ed. John Booty (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976), 263. 66

The Church is to us that very mother of our new birth, in whose bowels we are aU bred, at whose breasts we receive nourishment. As manytherefore as are apparently to our judgement born of God, they have the seed of their regeneration by the ministry of the Church which useth to that end and purpose not only the Word, but the Sacraments, both having generative force and virtue (V.50.1; 2:207.13-19).

By imputation ofrighteousness, whereby he is found in Christ, the son ofGod is "bred"; by infusion ofrighteousness, whereby Christ is found in him, he is "nourished." This breeding and nourishment, through the sacraments ofbaptism and the eucharist as subordinate means, represent the motions ofre-creative emanation and redemptive return respectively: through the sacrament ofjustification, man is given anew his proper formaI cause, and is thereby newly-created by the efficiency of the Roly Spirit; through the sacrament of sanctification, he realises his final cause as dictated by his newly-informed nature. Although baptism and eucharist achieve this new pattern of generation and return as subordinate means, as signs they do not share the role of the theological virtues as secondary causes of participation.

Sacramental signs are "in their place and in their kind necessary" (Just. 30; 5: 150.20-21) as instruments (rather than causes) of grace.

The sacramental ceremonies commanded in the divine law consist in both the visible ceremony and "somewhat else more secret in reference whereunto we conceive that ceremony to be a sacrament" (V.50.2; 2:207.26-27), the force or effect that makes them necessary to man. For grace is the end for which these mysteries were instituted, and the matter ofthe sacrament represents the "grace which worketh salvation" (V.50.3; 2:208.18-

19). They are, therefore, "powerful instruments ofGod to eternallife. For as our naturallife consisteth in the union ofthe body with the soul; so our life supernatural is the union ofthe 67 soul with God" (V.50.3; 2:208.19-22). As instruments, then, sacraments convey the force ofa supernatural cause. Hooker frequently uses the word "sacrament" to denote an outward sign. The sign is not to be confused with the grace that it imports, which alone "worketh salvation."

Sacraments are therefore more than symbolic orpedagogical, but - being creatures - theyare not themselves causes of grace. Primarily, they mark when God imparts the grace ofparticipation, and serve as "means conditional which God requireth in them to whom he imparteth grace" (5.57.3; 2:246.1-2). Christ and his effects, entering into the soul of man,

"give notice ofthe times when they use to make their access" (V.57.3; 2:246.15-18). As

"moral instruments" of salvation, their use is necessary, not because the sign itself has any virtue, but because they are the ordinary means of grace, which is received from God

(V.57.4; 246.25-30). In the ceremony ofbaptism, for example, the Holy Spirit baptizes (that is, the Holy Spirit is the efficient cause ofjustification), although God accomplishes this

"work of our new birth not with the Spirit alone but with water thereunto joined" (V.59.5;

2:253.7-9):

we make not [outward] baptism a cause ofgrace, yet the grace which is given them with their baptism doth so far forth depend on the very outward sacrament; that God will have it embraced not only as a sign or token what we receive, but also as an instrument or mean whereby we receive grace, because baptism is a sacrament which God hath instituted in his Church, to the end that they which receive the same might thereby be incorporated into Christ, and so through his most precious merit obtain as weIl that saving grace ofimputation which taketh away aIl former guiltiness, as also that infused divine virtue ofthe Holy Ghost, which giveth to the powers ofthe soul their first disposition towards future newness oflife (V.60.2; 2:255.1-13).

Although faith, as an effect of the divine efficacy, is in turn the cause of the imputation of 68 righteousness, and the formaI cause ofinherent righteousness, these graces are instrumentally applied to the faithful through sacraments. They are, therefore, means ofparticipation, and signs of the "mutual inward hold" between Christ and the soul.

Through the sacrament of baptism, Christ's righteousness is imputed to the individual. As a cause abides in its effect, Christ is wholly present to the regenerate man:

"because he is in us as a moving and a working cause ... Christ is whole with the whole

Church, and whole with every part ofthe Church, as touching his Person, which can no way divide itself, or be possessed by degrees and portions" (V.56.1O; 2:242.8-28). Just as the union of God and man in the Incarnation is the principle for the actual unction of human nature, this simple union between Christ and his member is the principle for the actual infusion of graces into man: "the participation of Christ importeth, besides the [simple and perfect] presence of Christ's Person ... a true actual [but imperfect] influence of grace whereby the life we live according to godliness is his" (V.56.1O; 2:242.28-243.2). By the sacrament of Christ's body and blood, Hooker maintains, the faithful participate in his vital humanity by degrees (V.67.1; 2:330-331). The chosen instruments of bread and wine, therefore, become "instruments of life," "conducts oflife and conveyances ofhis body and blood," to those "doing what was required and believing what was promised, [so that] the same should have present effect in them" and fill them with awe at "the heaven" which they may see "in themselves" (V.67.4; 2:333.25-334.5). In other words, to receive his flesh and blood through the sacramental elements is to receive their effect in us. Christ and man partake of one another, as cause and effect partake of one another, through the sacrament.

Hence, in referring to the bread and wine, "my body," means "the communion ofmy 69 body," and "my blood," "the communion of my blood" (V.67.S; 2:334.12-13). Hooker therefore draws an important distinction between the case in which an effect infallibly accompanies something (as grace accompanies the outward sign), and that in which the effect grows out ofsomething else (as man's being is regenerated out ofChrist's manhood):

The bread and the cup are his body and blood because they are causes instrumental upon the receipt whereof the participation ofhis body and blood ensueth. For that which produceth any certain effect is not vainly nor improperly said to be that very effect whereunto it tendeth. Every cause is in the effect which groweth from it. Our souls and bodies quickened to eternallife are effects the cause whereof is the Person of Christ, his body and his blood are the true wellspring out of which this life floweth. So that his body and blood are in that very subject whereunto they minister life not only by effects ofoperation, even as the influence ofthe heavens is in plants, beasts, men, in every thing which they quicken, but also by a far more divine and mystical kind ofunion, which maketh us one with him even as he and the Father are one (V.67.S; 2:334.17-30; emphasis added).

Even ifbread and wine are "causes instrumental" and not causes in themselves, they may be said to be the body and blood, since by them God produces the "certain effect" of participation in Christ's manhood. In this sense, sacraments may be called causes of participation. The natural and the divine being so closely united, although without confusion, a "communication of idioms" takes place, whereby the properties of one thing may be predicated of another.82 At the same time, a more profound kind ofcommunication occurs between God and man, as the body and blood, which have for instruments bread and

82 See V.53.4; 2:219.8-18: "A kind ofmutual commutation there is whereby those concrete names, God and Man, when we speak ofChrist, do take interchangeably one another's room, so that for truth ofspeech it skilleth not whether we say that the Son ofGod hath created the world, and the Son ofMan by his death hath saved it, or else that the Son ofMan did create, and the Son ofGod died to save the worid. Howbeit, as oft as we attribute to God what the manhood of Christ claimeth, or to man what his deity hath a right unto, we understand by the name ofGod and the name ofMan neither the one nor the other nature, but the whole person ofChrist, in whom both natures are." See also "communicatio idiomatum," Oxford Dictionary ofthe Christian Church, ed. EL. Cross and E.A. Livingstone, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 386. 70 wine, take their effect in man, so that Christ is in the faithful man as the principle ofhis life.

For this reason, then, "[t]he real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not therefore to be sought for in the sacrarnents, but in the worthy receiver of the sacraments"

(V.67.6; 2:334.30-32).

True participation, therefore, is that ofthe believer in Christ his cause; the grace that brings about this participation accompanies the use of visible signs. Just as the person of

Christ is the cause of man's salvation, and not his human nature in itself (which is nevertheless instrumental), the sacramental sign can be onlyan instrument ormeans ofgrace, although Christ the cause ofgrace is united with its use. Hooker therefore explicitly relates his sacramental theology to the principles ofhis Christology.83 In response to the charge, for example, that sacraments in Reforrned thought are "naked, empty and uneffectual signs; wherein there is no other force than only such as in pictures to stir up the mind" (VI.6.1O;

3:84.18-20), Hooker responds:

[E]ven as in the person ofour Lord Jesus Christ both God and man, when his human nature by itselfis considered, we may not attribute that unto him, which we do and must ascribe as oft as respect is had unto both natures combined; so because in sacraments there are two things distinctly to be considered, the outward sign, and the secret concurrance ofGod's most blessed Spirit ... sacraments therefore as signs have onlythose effects before mentioned; but ofsacrarnents, in that byGod's own will and ordinance they are signs assisted always with the power of the Holy Ghost, we acknowledge whatsoever either the places ofScripture, or the authorities ofcouncils and fathers, ... can shew to be wrought by them. The elements and words have power of infallible signification, for which they are called seals of Gad'struth; the spirit affixed unto those elements and words, power of operation within the soul, most admirable, divine, and impossible to be exprest. For so God hath instituted and

83 For an examination of the importance ofChristological principles at work in Hooker's theology, see Kirby, The Theology ofRichard Hooker, 41-58. See also Kirby, Richard Hooker's Doctrine ofthe Royal Supremacy, 51-53. 71

ordained, that, together with due administration and receipt of sacramental signs, there shaH proceed from himself grace effectuaI to sanctify, to cure, to comfort ... (VI.6.1O; 3:85.6-27; myemphasis).84

If sacraments (as signs) are said to "work" anything, it is by a communication of idioms.

Hooker's preoccupation with the mode of Christ's presence in the sacramental mysteries therefore reflects more than contemporary obsessions or a peripheral question. 85

If Christ is thought to be present extemally in the elements, the sacramental sign must be

84 Again, Christ's natural flesh and blood are spoken of as the cause of eternallife "not by the bare force of their own substance, but through the dignity and worth of his Person which offered them up by way of sacrifice," that is, by virtue of their union with divinity (V.67.4; 2:333.13-16).

85 See V.55 and V.67 .6-1 0; 2:227-234, 334-338. John Booty has stated that "Hooker was ... seriously limited in that he concentrated on the mode ofChrist's presence, even while arguing that that was not the main issue." Booty, "Hooker's Understanding of the Presence of Christ in the Eucharist," The Divine Drama in History and Liturgy, 141. On the contrary, since the participation of Christ and the soul in the twofold participation of cause and effect - that is, the causal mode of Christ's presence - was the central issue for Hooker, he tried to argue that the "seriously limiting" - and un-Christological- concept was that ofsacraments as causes ofgrace. The rhetoric ofHooker's briefirenical appeal (V.67.6-10; 2:334-338), which Booty takes to argue that "the mode of Christ's presence ... was not the main issue," should not overshadow his basic argument. See "Hooker's Autograph Notes on A Christian Letter (1599)," FLE 4:46-47. The authors ofA Christian Letter took exception to Hooker's irenical tone: "...you seeme to make light of the doctrine of transubstantiation, as a matter not to be stoode upon or to bee contended for, cared for or enquired into...." Hooker replies, "Not to be stood upon or contended for by them, because it is not a thing necessary, although because it is false as long as they doe persist to mainteine and urge it, there is no man so grosse as to think in this case wee may neglect il. Against them it is therefore said They ought not to stand in it as in a matter of faith not to make so high accompt of iL.. It is a matter of faith to believe that sacraments are instruments whereby god worketh grace in the soules ofmen, but the maner how he doth it is not a matter offaith." Statements similar to Booty's appear in Gregg, "Sacramental Theology in Hooker's Laws," 168. Gregg characterizes the institution of the sacraments as a product ofGod's decree without referring to God's reason (or ends), which allows him to posit an agnosticism on Hooker's part with respect to the operation of sacraments: "The justification and necessity ofthe sacrament in Hooker's mind is that Christ commanded that this be done, gave it as a promise of his continued presence in the Church and to the faithful, and that is sufficienl. Precisely how this is effected is not Hooker's question." The efficacy of sacraments, however, is manifestly Hooker's question, which he answers precisely in the causal terms oflaw. He does not, contrary to Gregg's suggestion, try to avoid "becoming entangled in the divisive morass of what he regards as unfruitful particulars such as ... the details of the theologies of transubstantiation and consubstantiation (both of which he rejects) but without denying the possibility of either." Perhaps Hooker does not deny the possibility of transubstantiation and consubstantiation, but he at least argues strenuously for their improbability (on the grounds established by law, in the distinction between efficient, formaI and final causes in the divine law) and specifically denies their necessity. 72 approached as a secondary cause ofgrace after Christ.86 Hooker was simply too committed a Reformer to countenance the placement of any cause ofparticipation between Christ and the sou!. In the Book of Common Prayer - which was undoubtedly one of the strongest influences in Hooker's eucharistie theology87 -faith is a cause ofparticipation, that whereby the believerpartakes ofChrist in the divine mysteries: "Feed on him in thy heart byfaith with thanksgiving."88 The result ofthis "feeding" is the immediate participation of Christ in the soul, a "transubstantiation in us" rather than in the sacramental elements: "Grant us therefore

(gracious Lord) so to eat the flesh of thy dear Son Jesus Christ, and to drink his blood, that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body, and our souls washed through his most precious blood, and that we may evermore dwell in him, and he in US.,,89 Hooker wants to maintain the immediacy ofparticipation through the grace of faith. In the bare emphasis in

86 The Christological analogy cannot be pressed too far, for the sacrament does not represent another incarnation: there is only one Incarnation, and one Mediator. For Hooker to concede that the Spirit ofChrist is objectively present with the bread and wine even apartfromfaith (on the analogy that the hypostatic union is an objective fact whether or not Christ is believed), would be to replace Christ. One would communicate with the sacred species, "hypostaticaIly" united with the Holy Spirit, rather than the divinized humanity of Christ through the sacred species! Hooker, then, is careful not to imply such an objective, external presence in sacraments: "we first consider how God is in Christ, then how Christ is in us, and how the Sacraments do serve to make us partakers of Christ" (5.50.3., my emphasis). He does not say, "how Christ is in the Sacraments." Again, "Ifon aIl sides it be confessed that the grace of Baptism is poured into the soul of man, that by water we receive it although it be neither seated in the water nor the water changed into it, what should induce men to think that the grace of the Eucharist must needs be in the Eucharist before it can be in us that receive it?" (V.67.6; 2:335.10-14; myemphasis). When Hooker, therefore, refers to sacraments as "causes" (e.g. "causes instrumental"), he is careful to quaiify the sense of the word; he prefers to calI them "means" or "instruments."

87 See Booty, "Book V," FLE 6(1):207-209. See also Booty, "Hooker's Understanding of the Presence ofChrist in the Eucharist," 141, 144.

88 The Book ofCommon Prayer, 1559, 264. Cf. Article XXVIII: "And the mean whereby the Body ofChrist is received and eaten in the Supper is Faith."

89 The Book ofCommon Prayer, 1559,263. This transubstantiation results in a new creature, capable of offering obedience to God: "And here we offer and present unto thee, 0 Lord, ourselves, our souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice unto thee..." (264). 73 the Communion office on the atoning death of Christ, one may see a reinforcement of this immediate relation.9o The sufficient justifying power of Christ's death does away with the need for any intermediate stage, any further secondarycause ofparticipation extemal to man, and revolutionized the liturgy and ordered ministry.91

i. The Discourse on Sacraments in Book VI

In the so-called "tract on confession" in Book VI,92 in which he discusses absolution as a sacrament, Hooker clarifies the distinction between cause and instrument, and asserts that God is the primary efficient cause of grace. Hooker draws his argument from the principles of law in order to discuss, first, sacraments in general in relation to causes, and second, ministerial absolution in particular in relation to the divine cause of forgiveness.

Although, therefore, absolution is not a sacrament in the sense of Article XXV93 , by discussing it in relation to higher principles Hooker establishes the place held by sacraments

90 "[He] made there (by his one oblation of himself once offered) a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins ofthe whole world ... grant that we, receiving these thy creatures ofbread and wine, ... in remembrance ofhis death and passion, may be partakers ofhis most blessed Body and Blood" (The Book ofCommon Prayer, 1559, 263; myemphasis). The faithful reception ofcreaturely bread and wine conveys the Body and Blood.

91 E. Donald Cameron, "Atonement and Sacrifice in the Sixteenth Century Anglican Reformers," in Atonement and Sacrifice: Doctrine and Worship, ed. G.E. Eayrs (Charlottetown: St. Peter Publications, 1990), 76.

92 For a survey of the textual problems of Book VI, see Gibbs, "Book VI," FLE 6(1):249-261.

93 Hooker does not calI absolution a sacrament, but he speaks ofit in such terms. See Article XXV: absolution has not the dignity of Baptism and the Lord's Supper - which are "sacraments of the Gospel," that is, necessary means ofgrace common to aIl Christians - but it is nevertheless one ofthe "states of life allowed in the Scriptures." As such, Hooker describes it as a means of grace, although not a necessary one. 74 in the hierarchy of causes that express the mediation of the divine law. The discourse on sacraments in Book VI therefore further illustrates Hooker's dependence on the principles of law to describe the operation ofsacraments.

Repentance is assisted by the assurance of pardon. Since the ministerial pronouncement offorgiveness is said to absolve man from sin, what warrant has the minister ofGod concerning forgiveness? God alone forgives, but the pronouncement offorgiveness by man is not thereby prohibited. Christ authorized his Apostles and subsequent ministers of his Word to pronounce the forgiveness of sinners in his name. The minister offers this pronouncement on the assurance of faith (since God in Christ assured forgiveness for the penitent) and the outward signs oftrue repentance (VI.6.1; 3:69.14-70.10).

Repentance, for Hooker, is "the true inward conversion of the heart" (VI.6.2;

3:70.14), sufficient to obtain God's forgiveness, since it is the satisfaction demanded by God under the divine law: it presupposes the justification of the sinner through faith, and is the subsequent formaI cause of his inherent righteousness, and his first inclination toward his final cause. Through repentance, the effects of Christ's righteousness take place in man.

Rome, however, imposes the necessity of a sacramental penance as the sole remedy for mortal sin after baptism. Sacraments, according to her, are composed both of form and matter; the duties of the penitent - contrition, confession, and satisfaction - being the form, avai1 nothing unless the priest exacts or enjoins them, and then applies his sentence of absolution.94 He is appointed ajudge in God's place, and no sinner can be reconciled apart

94 Hooker cites Bellarmine's De sacramento poenitentia, 1.16: "The action (namely, ofthe penitent) is not part ofthe sacrament, except to the extent that it is subjected to sacerdotal power...." See FLE 3:70.d.n. 75 from his ministry (VI.6.2; 3:70.22-71.8).

Hooker concedes that, by his words "Whose sins ye remit, they are remitted," Christ indeed appointed judges over sinfuI souls, gave them authority to absolve, and promised to ratify in heaven what they did in earth. But, like every temporal jurisdiction, this apostolic authority is limited in that it must proceed "in due order" and within "due bounds" (VI.6.3;

3:72.6-8). That is, only "in its place and in its kind" (Just. 30; 5:150.20-21) is it useful.

Although the ministeria1 office has received power from God to remit sin, it has "not such sovereignty ofpower, that no sin should be pardonable in man without it" (VI.6.3; 3:72.10­

Il). It has not, in short, God's sovereign efficiency. As God is the primary efficient cause ofsalvation, he alone is the cause of forgiveness, but he nevertheless appointed ministerial absolution to assist repentance, and therefore the returning motion of redemption.

Analogously, Pharaoh gave power to Joseph to command in his name; he did not grant that nothing could be done without Joseph's command, and thereby render himself unable to command anything without Joseph. "The papacy," on the other hand, "maketh aIl sin unpardonable which hath not the priest's absolution" (VI.6.3; 3:72.19-20), in which case, absurd1y, "Gad hath by promise so hampered himself, that it is not now in his own power to pardon any man" (VI.6.2; 3:71.14-16).

What, then, is the force of absolution? Hooker's answer may be applied to any sacramental sign, namely the water ofbaptism or the bread and wine ofthe eucharist. The ministerial pronouncement offorgiveness by no operation ofitselfalters the state ofthe soul.

A creaturely act, it does not take away sin, but decisively assures the soul of "God's most gracious and merciful pardon" (VI.6.4; 3:72.26-73.1). Christ alone makes satisfaction for 76 sin, and he alone forgives. God, then, through Christ, is the sole cause of forgiveness.

Hooker does not, however, deny the power of the minister to absolve, since "higher causes in operation .,. [may] concur with inferior means, his grace with our ministry, God really performing the same which man is authorized to act as in his name" (VI.6.4; 3:74.6-8).

(Hooker stops short of describing these "inferior means," as far as they are creaturely, as causes.) God retains his sovereignty; if an unrepentant man obtains ministerial absolution,

God does not ratify it, but where "due order" and "due bounds" are observed, he is willing to exercise remission of sin through the earthly ministry appointed by him. He does not, therefore, require this ministry, since his grace is the only cause of forgiveness, and repentance the "only dutYor condition required in us" (VI.6.5; 3:74.10-11). Ministerial absolution is supplied as a convenience, "especiallyfor the strengthening ofweak, timorous, and fearful minds" (VI.6.5; 3:25-26). As an outward sign then, absolution is only declarative, since the removal ofsin is nothing a creature can do. Hooker cites the support of St. Jerome and Peter Lombard for this interpretation, and conc1udes: "the discipline of repentance both public and private was ordained as an outward mean to bring men to the virtue of inward conversion; so that when this by manifest tokens did seem effected, absolution ensuing (which could not make) served only to dec1are men innocent" (VI.6.8;

3:83.14-18). Ministerial absolution manifests or dec1ares remission ofsin; in the same way, sacraments as outward signs do not cause, but rather manifest or dec1are grace.

Rome, by contrast, holds penitence to be a sacrament, in that absolution is an external sign but also a cause of that which it signifies. Thomas Aquinas held that the sacramental signs "through Christ and the priest's benediction receive a certain supernatural transitory 77 force" (VI.6.10; 3:86.10-12), that prepares the soul to receive grace. They do not cause grace, but by an inherent quality help to convey it. Against Aquinas, Hooker cites Duns

Scotus and William ofOccam in support ofhis claim that "no sacrament ofthe new law can

... be properly a cause to work grace" (VI.6.9; 3:84.5-7; my emphasis), whether by its own virtue or anything supematurally given to it. That is, the sacramental sign is not an efficient cause ofparticipation. Rather, sacraments are said (by a communication ofidioms) to work or confer grace, for God is present in their administration; the effect proceeds from him

"without any real operation oftheirs" (VI.6.9; 3:84.11). Despite the scholastic witness that

Hooker draws up against Aquinas, however, the Thomistic theologians go even further to claim that grace is an "immediate effect of the outward sign," not because of any inherent quality but through "God's mere motion or application" (VI.6.1O; 3:86.16-87.4). Hooker dismisses as meaningless the proposaI that God "moves" a sacramental element until it brings forth grace,95 but retums to an earlier scholastic witness, Bonaventure, who wamed against honouring the "bodily signs" at the expense of"the cause which worketh in them, and the soul which receiveth them" (VI.6.11; 3:87.23-27). Participation occurs immediately between God and the sou!. Hookeris accordingly prepared to assert that the sacramental sign

"hath ofitselfno natural efficacy towards grace, neither doth God put into it any supematural inherent virtue" (VI.6.11; 3:87.28-29; myemphasis). On the Christological analogy, then,

95 See FLE4: 120.6-13: "The motion ofGod, as they themselves expound it an application ofthe signe together with the charge and commandment given it, to convey an intimation of his will to the soule, which presently thereupon conceiveth and bringeth forth grace, through that obedience which aIl creatures yeeld to Gods word when they once hear il. An explication more obscure then the thing itselfe which they would expIaine, and aIl because they affect metaphors, where nothing butt exact proprietie of speech can plainlie instrucl." Hooker's use of causes to describe the operation of the divine law may be an attempt to avoid figurative speech. 78

with the outward sign God joineth his Holy Spirit, and so the whole instrument of God bringeth that to pass, whereunto the baser part could not extend.... [W]here the instrument is without inherent virtue, the effect must necessarily proceed from the only agent's adherent power (VI.6.11; 3:88.4-14; myemphasis).

Just as the human nature ofChrist by itselfis no cause ofsalvation, but an instrument ofthe divine nature united with it, making the person ofChrist a cause ofsalvation, the sacrament understood as the union ofthe instrument with God's power may be described as effective.

What the sacramental sign does not do, God "the only agent" does in union with it, giving it the dignity of an instrument and resulting in a communication of idioms:

At the time therefore when [God] giveth his heavenly grace, he applieth by the hands ofhis ministers that which betokeneth the same; nor only betokeneth, but, being also accompanied for ever with such power as doth truly work, is in that respect termed God's instrument, a true efficient cause ofgrace; a cause not in itself, but only by connection of that which is in itself a cause, namely God's own strength and power (VI.6.11; 3:90.15-91.2; myemphasis).

Sacraments as outward signs, then, work nothing, but manifest externally what God does invisibly, so that they may be said (with the Council ofTrent, with whose moderate language

Hooker agrees) to "contain and confer grace" (VI.6.11; 3:89.8-9). The "delivery and administration" of sacraments remains in the hands of men, but by them, "as by personal instruments, God doth apply signs, and with signs inseparablyjoin his Spirit, and through the power ofhis Spirit work grace" (VI.6.11; 3:91.9-13). Accordingly, absolution as a sign is merely dec1arative, but by association with God's Spirit may be termed nonetheless an

"instrument, a true efficient cause of grace." In the context of communicatio idiomatum alone Hooker appHes the name of"cause" to a natural being. Since the outward sign is not 79 properly a "cause" of grace, the priest has no independent role "as in cases of mutual commerce, where diverse persons have diverse acts to be performed in their own behalf; a creditor to show his bill, and a debtor to pay his money" (VI.6.11; 3:91.15-17). In the same way, the faith, hope and love ofthe penitent are not discrete human acts "performed in [his] own behalf," that is, of his own power; theyare effects ofdivine efficiency. In ministerial absolution, God is the First Cause bath of the grace of repentance and the grace of forgiveness, applied through subordinate means (faith and absolution). While faith is a secondary efficient cause offorgiveness, outward absolution is properly an instrument ofthis forgiveness:

God and man do meet in one action upon a third, in whom, as it is the work of God to create grace, so it is his work by the hand of the minister to apply a sign which should betoken, and his work to annex, that Spirit, which shaH effect it. The action therefore is but one, God the author thereof, and man a cooperator by him assigned to work for, with, and under him. God the giver ofgrace by the outward ministry of man, so far forth as he authorizeth man to apply the sacraments ofgrace in the soul, which he alone worketh, without eitherinstrument ofco-agent (VI.6.11; 3:91.17-26).

Hooker's Christology, again, lies behind this view of the role of sacraments in the establishment ofthe divine law. "God and man do meet in one action upon a third" both in

Christ and in the sacramental mysteries. In Christ, God and manhood are united by grace to re-establish iustitia in man. God alone effects this reconciliation, using human nature ta perform the obligations ofiustitia. The Holy Spirit imparts ta particular men the benefits of

Christ's performance; faith is the instrument by which God imputes and infuses iustitia.

Similarly, the Holy Spirit and sacramental instruments are united to impart these graces to man. Just as God alone in Christ effects reconciliation, so God alone in the sacramental 80 mysteries effects grace. However, just as the manhood of Christ plays an instrumental raIe necessary ta the re-establishment of God's justice, sa the outward sacramental signs play necessary raIes as instrumental causes ofparticipation in Gad. These raIes are described in causal terms, since law is the instrument ofiustitia. Itis important for Hooker ta distinguish types ofcauses - efficient, formaI, and final causes, together with instrumental means - since ta confuse them leads ta a misapprehension of the chain of being, or iustitia, which characterizes the fallen mind: it was man's abandonment ofthe law ofreason which caused his fall fram iustitia originalis. In the Church as in nature, therefore, the reason and will of

Gad is mediated ta creatures thraugh a chain of being. With reference ta the raIe of the minister in the Church's sacramental mysteries, Hooker writes:

1could easily declare how aIl things which are of Gad he hath by wonderful art and wisdom sodered as it were together with the glue ofmutual assistance, appointing ta the lowest ta receive fram the nearest ta themselves what the influence ofthe highest yieldeth. And therefore the Church being the most absolute of aIl his works was in reason ta be also ordered with like harmony, that what he worketh might no less in grace than in nature be effected by hands andinstruments duly subordinated unto the power of his own Spirit. A thing bath needful for the humiliation of man which would not willingly be debtor ta any but ta himself, and ofno small effect ta nourish that divine love which now maketh each embrace other not as men but as angels of Gad (V.76.9; 2:423.15-27; myemphasis).

The chain ofbeing descends fram Christ, a secondary efficient cause ofjustice by virtue of his Incarnation and Atonement, ta faith, a secondary efficient cause ofjustification and the formaI cause ofsanctification, ta sacraments (orministerial functions) as instrumental causes of the same grace. Just as the magistrate is a "god," that is, a natural instrument of God's rational will thraugh the exercise ofnatural reason (see chapter 1), the minister is an "angel of Gad," that is, an instrument of his redemptive will thraugh the efficiency of the Holy 81

Spirit. The natural "hands and instruments" which, in themselves, can only outwardly declare the grace of God, are supernaturally "effective" when accompanied by his grace.

"Gods omnipotent will causeth grace, ... the outward signe doth shew his will, and ...

Sacraments implying both, are thereby termed both signes and causes" (4: 121.5-9). They are not only "certain sure witnesses" but also "effectuaI signs of grace" (Article XXV).

Like the Incarnation, the Atonement, and justification propter Christum perfidem,

Hooker's sacramental doctrine must therefore be understood in the context oflaw. Through the divine law, the operation ofwhich Hooker describes in causal terms, God's iustitia is re­ established in creation, and more particularly in man, who thereby finds again his place in the cosmic hierarchy. When man is brought to new birth in Christ, he participates in Christ as an effect partakes of its cause. Law so operates that participation in an efficient cause involves orientation toward a final cause. This new orientation in man is established by the

Holy Spirit, who efficiently infuses the gift offaith, by which man is justified and sanctified; his formal cause is thereby renewed, and he is consequently ordered toward his final cause.

Divinely appointed instruments - namely, the sacraments ofbaptism and the eucharist - serve to impart the graces of justification and sanctification, thereby assisting the new man's achievement of his final cause, which is union with God. Participation itself, then, is described in causal terms: man partakes of Christ as an effect partakes of its cause, and as a being seeks its final cause, God. This technical Aristotelian language should not obscure the lively relationship between God and man that it describes. Christ and the redeemed partake of one another as parent and offspring. God's love for man establishes this new 82 birth, in which man returns to God through love: through the law of reason man discovers his final cause when he knows and loves God. The operation ofthe divine law, in which the sacraments have their necessary place, therefore expresses both the emanation ofand return of a new creation from and to its source and end. 83

CONCLUSION

Hooker's doctrine of law is essential to understanding his account of sacramental participation in the redeeming work of Christ. Building upon Christian neoplatonic and

Aristotelian conceptions, Hooker sees that the notion of participation is intrinsic to the ordering function oflaw. The chain ofbeingemanates through a process ofcause and effect; it returns through the search ofaIl things for their perfections, ultimately to the most perfect

First and Final Cause: "sith there can be no goodness desired which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme cause ofaIl things; and every effect doth after a sort contain ... the cause from whieh itproeeedeth: all things ... seek the highest [cause]" (1.5.2; 1:73.5-10).

Law governs this process by establishing eaeh creature's form and its manner of working towards its particular end. Creatures participate in God by following the divinely ordained laws of their nature. The specifie law of man's nature is the law of reason, by which he knows and loves the highest good, God. Through the law of reason man might have achieved participation in God, since "desire tendeth unto union with that itdesireth" (1.11.2;

1:112.13). This law, however, which would have led to perfect participation had man followed it, was rendered ineffective by man's rejection of it in the Fall. As this naturally implanted law no longer led back to the First and Final Cause, it ceased to mediate human salvation. A new law, then, was required, and instituted through the justice and mercy of

God, who would not allow the disintegration ofthe rational cosmic order established by him through law. This new law, the divine law, is established in the person of Christ, who 84 becomes a Mediator, himself the New Law. Through a supernatural process of cause and effect the divine law brings to birth a new creature. By the Incarnation Christ participates in God as his cause, and God dwells in him with the effect ofhis grace; Christ is in the man to whom the virtue of his glorified manhood is derived, and that man is in Christ as the author ofhisrenewed nature. This mutual indwelling ofcause (Christ) and effect (regenerate man) is made possible through the perfection of Christ's human nature, by which he offers to God perfect obedience according to the law of man's nature. By perfectly knowing and loving God, Christ restores human nature. By his death Christ makes satisfaction, enduring the punishment earned by man's abandonment ofthe law. In this way the human nature of

Christ serves as an instrument for the twofold restoration of righteousness, and the person of Christ becomes the cause of new life. The effects of man's restoration are feH in individuals when, through the efficiency of the Holy Spirit, they believe and are excited to hope and love, performing by grace the duty required of them under the new law, thus participating in the New Man, and through him, God. The infused habit offaith is the means ofjustification, or the instrument by which the perfect righteousness of Christ is imputed.

At the same time, man is gradually sanctified by the imperfect but inherent virtues, and subsequent good works. Faith is therefore an efficient cause ofjustification (not because it is meritorious, but because by it Christ's merit is imputed to man), as weIl as the formal cause ofsanctification. The sacraments are instrumental in this imputation and infusion of grace. Hooker emphasizes their role as instruments, in order to reserve as causes the grace of God and the person of Christ, and maintain the immediate relationship established in

Christ between God and the sou!. God alone effects salutary change in man, and does not 85 require or employ subordinate causes. Hooker safeguards this immediacy by carefully distinguishing between grace and nature, or cause and instrument: the grace ofGod is a first cause of participation; Christ - in whose person two natures are united by grace - is a secondary cause; faith, a work of the Holy Spirit by which he causes man to participate in

Christ, is another secondary cause; the sacramental signs are instruments and not secondary causes. Since the definition ofa sacrament properly refers to the union ofword, element and grace (while distinguishing the role and power of each), Hooker sometimes refers to sacraments as causes ofparticipation. He does so, however, by a communication ofidioms, a manner of speech by which the properties of grace are attributed to the instruments of grace. Through this series of causes and means emanating from the Highest Cause, man is generated anew and retums to his Final Cause. Hooker's apprehension of a mediated cosmos, in which "order is a graduaI disposition" (VllI.2.2; 3:331.19), does not, therefore, prevent him from simultaneously asserting man's immediate relationship to God. By distinguishing grace and nature, or divine and natural causes, Hooker discems the manner in which the divine law's emanating order ofcause and effect, through which man partakes ofthe First Cause, leads him to retum to the Final Cause and participate immediately in God through supematural knowledge and love. According to the natural law, Adam had only to know and will the good to participate in God; under the divine law, man has only to know and will the good through faith, hope and love to find the same union. 86

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