The Role of the Sublime in Kant's Moral Metaphysics
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Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series I, Culture and Values, Volume 18 The Role of the Sublime in Kant's Moral Metaphysics By John R. Goodreau The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 1 Copyright © 1998 by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy Gibbons Hall B-20 620 Michigan Avenue, NE Washington, D.C. 20064 All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Goodreau, John R. The role of the sublime in Kant’s moral metaphysics / John R. Goodreau. p.cm. — (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series I. Culture and values ; vol. 18) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der Urteilskraft. 2. Kant, Immanuel, (1724-1804)— Contributions in concept of the sublime. 3. Sublime, the--History. 4. Asethetsics. I. Title. II. Series. B2784.G66 1998 98-47982 111’.85’092—dc21 CIP ISBN 1-56518-124-7 (pbk.) 2 Table of Contents Foreword ix Preface x Introduction 1 I. The Pre-Critical Years 17 II. The Emergence of the Critical Philosophy 47 III. The Critique of Judgment: The Beautiful 89 IV. The Critique of Judgment: The Sublime 133 V. After the Critique of Judgment 155 Conclusion 189 Bibliography 193 3 Foreword George F. McLean This work of Professor John Goodreau is topical, for the basic change of our times is its opening to the aesthetic dimension of human consciousness. To see this it is necessary to return to the beginning of the modern period. At that time it was the fashion to remove from the mind all except the clear and distinct ideas of technical reason. Thus Bacon would smash the idols which bore the content of human wisdom, Descartes would put all under doubt, and Locke would erase all in order to begin with the mind as a blank tablet. The work of the mind would be to assemble the simple ideas received in order to construct the content of human understanding. During the following four centuries the great potentialities of this method were sedulously explored. But with the Cold War it was seen to have reached the limits of its possibilities in not only distinct but conflicting systems. This situation indicated that there must be more to the human consciousness than had thus far been explored. This directed the mind beyond the first critique of Kant focused on the methodology of the physical series and the second critique focused on ethics to his third critique, that of aesthetic judgement. The development of this new level of awareness is of the greatest moment for it opens new levels of human consciousness in ways of finding unity in multiplicity. But for this to be properly an addition and evolution of human thought it is necessary that this be not contrary to science as developed in the first two critiques or even a simple addition thereto, but something that is implied therein. To investigate this is the task of the present work by Professor Goodreau. Upon it depends the cohesive and creative character of the changes we are experiencing at this turn of the millennium. For this contribution to deep and lasting progress Professor Goodreau has our admiration, gratitude and sincere and congratulation. 5 Preface Riccardo Pozzo When I heard John R. Goodreau suggesting that he would work on Kant's theory of the sublime as exposed in the Critique of Judgment taking into consideration Kant's Lectures on Meta- physics and Lectures on Ethics, which had then just been translated into English, I knew he was going to break new ground. The result is this study on The Role of the Sublime in Kant's Moral Meta-physics that Catholic University's George F. McLean has accepted for publication in the series "Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change" of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy in Washington, D.C. It is an innovative work from both the systematic and the historical point of view. With regard to the systematic point of view, Goodreau's work is indeed insightful. It forces us to reconsider Kant's relation to metaphysics. It forces us to accept that Kant's philosophy is not a refutation but is rather a legitimation of metaphysics and that this metaphysics is primarily a moral metaphysics. His main thesis that the feeling of the sublime permits us to experience the noumenon is very well argued and will surely gain attention. With regard to the historical point of view, Goodreau masters effectively all the fundamental methods of contemporary research in the history of philosophy. The history of Kant's development is enriched by a new line toward the Critique ofJudgment starting from Herder's Mitschriften of Kant's lectures on ethics of 1762-4, through the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, the Nachschriften of Kant's lectures on metaphysics and on ethics from the mid- seventies to the mid-eighties, taking into account both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason and making special reference to the Reflection 988, which Goodreau considers pivotal because of the moral foundation of intellectual pleasure." Texts by Hutcheson, Hume, Rousseau, Baumgarten, Meier, and Burke are analyzed by Goodreau and accounted for in the context of the history of Kant's sources. Of course, Goodreau also considers the dimension of the history of tradition by examining the eighteenth century reception of Longinus. Concerning the perspective of the history of the concepts, Goodreau's book is instrumental in explaining the differences between Kant's understanding of the sublime and that of his predecessors: with Kant the sublime is no longer merely a criterion for esthetics or a tool for poetics, it rather becomes a subject for metaphysical inquiry. The history of the problems is touched by Goodreau with regard to the question of, what is the role played by metaphysics in tying together aesthetics and ethics? The answer provided by Goodreau could not be clearer: the sublime is the doorway connecting aesthetics and ethics to metaphysics. (School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America) 7 Introduction Commentators on Kant's aesthetics generally seem to fall into two camps. The first group endeavors to interpret the third Critique in terms of consistency with the critical philosophy of the first two Critiques. The second group, while not ignoring the issue of consistency, is more open to an interpretation that is sympathetic to Kant's statements regarding a relationship between the aesthetic and the moral. The former group tends to dismiss Kant's explicit statements concerning the moral significance of his aesthetic theory as either irrelevant or inconsistent with the critical philosophy, if they do not ignore it altogether. This is especially true with respect to the sublime. As Robert Dostal writes, "Those sympathetic with the Kantian project have found [the sublime] exceedingly troublesome, while on very much the same grounds those, like the romantics, impatient with the strictures of the Kantian project find much to praise here."1 The present work will argue that there is a continuity in Kant's thought on the sublime and its moral role that can be traced from his earliest writings to his last work, and that there is no inconsistency between imputing moral and metaphysical significance to Kant's description of the experience of the sublime and the first two Critiques. The sections on the sublime in the Critique of Judgment are not as anomolous as some have argued. A continuity of ideas can be discerned through a study of the Kantian corpus, particularly his lectures on Metaphysics and Ethics, which come down to us in a series of student notebooks dating from the mid-1760s to the mid-1790s. The notebooks are especially significant in that they provide important insights into Kant's position during the silent decade" between the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 and the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. A survey of these notebooks reveals the evolution of such themes as intellectual pleasure, communal sense and the relationship between freedom, pleasure, aesthetics and morality. The Kantian sublime has not been considered in this historical context until now. Moreover, a survey of the corpus reveals Kant's lifelong concern with the problem of moral motivation, which speaks to the significance of the aesthetic experience, particularly the experience of the sublime, in terms of his overall concern with morality.2 Here the sublime will be considered in the context of moral motivation, which constitutes a new approach.3 Hence the present work will side with those commentators who attempt to reach an understanding of the Kantian sublime that is sympathetic to Kant's own claims concerning the role of the aesthetic experience but from a different perspective. Let us now turn to some examples. Paul Guyer is among the prominent writers who belong to the critical group. His detailed study of the Critique of Judgment, entitled Kant and the Claims of Taste, is focused on the problem of the intersubjective validity of the aesthetic judgment. Although the connection between aesthetic judgment and morality is not the focus of his book, Guyer does devote his last chapter to that topic. The feeling of the sublime, however, is conspicuous by its absence, and the focus of the chapter is on whether the analogous relationship between beauty and morality that Kant describes in §59 supports the intersubjective validity of the aesthetic judgment. Guyer explains in a footnote: "Although Kant's explanation of our response to sublimity might be taken to supplement and