Introduction

Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

Special Section: https://www.cambridge.org/core Chronologies and Complexities of Western Neoliberalism

Val Marie Johnson . IP address:

170.106.33.14

Introduction

, on

02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15

What is that hedonistic world, that realm of pure political economy, ever kept in view by the adepts of Neo-liberalism when they attack us and cry triumphantly, “You will never get further nor do better!” This hedonistic world is that in which free competition will reign; . . . where every indi- , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at vidual will be conversant with his true interests . . . ; where everything will be carried on by genuinely free contract . . . [, by] a bargaining where neither violence, nor fraud, nor lies, nor ignorance, nor dependence . . . will come in to upset so delicate an operation: a world where the law of supply and demand will bring about the maximum of utility for both individual and society. . . . Where is that world? Nowhere save in the inaccessible regions of abstract thought. (Charles Gide, “Has Co-operation Introduced a New Principle into Economics?”)

As a recent call for papers on the history of neoliberalism points out, confusion with regard to its meaning and currency in part stems from the fact that

its proponents and critics “too often naturalize” neoliberalism (H-Net 2010): https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms it is framed as inevitable or an all-purpose concept that ultimately defines nothing (ibid.; see also Rose 1996; Lemke 2002). The essays in this section seek to rectify this by looking carefully in various ways at the history of neo-

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

324 Social Science History

liberalism and other forms of liberalism, thus denaturalizing the ideas and https://www.cambridge.org/core practices that they encompass in the present. In a testament to the perceived reach of neoliberal practice and thought, neoliberalism has in the last two decades been the subject of scholarly investigations too diverse and extensive to summarize briefly, in fields including international relations (Overbeek 1993; Simon 1995; Wook Lee 2008), international development (Dello Buono and Bell Lara 2008; Mensah 2008), social geography and urban studies (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey . IP address: 2005), environmental studies (Heynen et al. 2007), history (Thompson 2007; Hamilton 2009), sociopolitical theory (Barry et al. 1996; Lemke 2002; Brown

170.106.33.14 2003), and criminology and law (Hannah-Moffat and O’Malley 2007; Social Justice 2007).

Bringing together the work of the political sociologists Stephanie Lee , on

Mudge and John Krinsky and the urban sociologist Christopher Mele, this 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 section highlights how neoliberalism can be fruitfully analyzed both through a broad comparative method of the sort Mudge deploys and through fine- grained case studies centered on the sort of more localized issues and scales found in Mele’s and Krinsky’s essays. Mudge’s 1945–2004 survey of political programs from 22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel- , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at opment (OECD) nations documents a shift to neoliberal emphases in these programs across Continental, Nordic, and Anglo-liberal countries with increasing uniformity from the 1970s on. Mele and Krinsky trace the development of neoliberal urban political economies back into the post–World War II histories of a small and a large US city, respectively. Mele scrutinizes industrial and postindustrial urban development in Chester, Pennsylvania, and Krinsky considers union participation in consecutive New York City governing regimes. We begin here by examining the complexities involved in the definition and chronology of different forms of liberalism, including neoliberalism, and how these play out in scholarship and contemporary events. We then turn to an overview of the section essays and their contributions.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms Even a brief foray into historical and contemporary questions around neoliberalism reveals the recurring tensions and confusions surrounding it and other forms of liberalism. Neoliberalism is now commonly understood to be the intellectual child of neoclassical liberal economists working in the Ger- man and Austrian schools beginning in the 1930s and in connection with the (University of) Chicago school from the 1950s on. These economists’ advo- cacy of individual freedom, private property, and competitive markets as the

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

Introduction 325

ultimate values of government, and their critique of collectivism and state-led https://www.cambridge.org/core social organization,1 were marginal into the 1960s because social or welfare liberal ideas and tactics advocated by economists such as John Maynard Keynes held sway (assigning significant roles to state regulation of markets, public expenditure, and so on). At least as early as the 1970s, however, various fac- tors—including a series of local, national, and international capitalist crises— led to the gradual ascendance of previously marginalized neoclassical ideas

(Cockett 1995; Harvey 2005; Foucault 2008; Mudge in this section). In their . IP address: emerging neoliberal forms, tactics to promote individual freedom and choice and critiques of welfare methods were informed by perceptions of the eco-

170.106.33.14 nomic and moral costs of socialized government (Rose 1996; Foucault 2008). In part through the national political leadership of figures such as Mar-

garet Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Deng Xiaoping and the development of , on

international organizations and agreements such as the World Trade Organi- 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 zation and the North American Free Trade Agreement, from the late 1970s through the 1990s neoliberalism was forged globally into a new economic orthodoxy and majoritarian politics. By the first decade of the 2000s thinking and governing through tools conducive to the production of choice, competition and profit (deregulation of markets, privatization of services, empha- , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at sis on individual responsibility, and so on) were well institutionalized in and beyond the formal economic realm (Stiglitz 2002; Brown 2003; Harvey 2005). In the context of the recent and ongoing global economic crisis, there has been much popular speculation about a shift in dominant thought and practice away from neoliberalism and back toward a welfare liberal approach to defining and solving problems, including prominently those created by capitalism. According to this speculation, in the face of the crisis, “We are [again] all Keynesians now” (Boston Globe 2008; see also Fox 2008; Meacham and Thomas 2009). History provides considerable material that inspires caution in the face of oversimplified chronologies of “rise and fall” and definitions of neolib-

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms eralism and its relations with other forms of liberalism. The Oxford English Dictionary entries for neo-liberal and neo-liberalism credit the first English- language use of these terms to an 1898 publication by the French economist and economics historian Charles Gide. As in the epigraph above, Gide chided the Italian Maffeo Pantaleoni and other neoclassical economists in his era for their blind adherence to the abstract principles of competitive free market capitalism and for their rejection of “co-operative” principles.

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

326 Social Science History

He argued that the latter principles were “children” of liberty that might be https://www.cambridge.org/core used “to restore the free play of supply and demand” when it was disturbed and yet neoliberals treated them as a “poor relation” in the family of liberal political economy (Gide 1898: 491, 494). Gide (ibid.: 492) dubbed such thinkers “new Liberals” because, he argued, their adherence to these abstract principles (also espoused by classical liberals) was motivated by “scientific” considerations rather than by “a narrow conservatism” or “the a priori desire to justify the existing economic . IP address: order.” Here we have an early version of the construction of economists as professional experts, detached from politics and economic interests, that

170.106.33.14 was essential to the eventual rise of both economists as technocratic political actors and neoliberalism as majoritarian politics (see Babb 2004; Mudge in

this section).2 , on

But Gide (1898: 491–92) underscored as well that there was much that 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 was not new about neoliberal ideas in his era, when French economists were “accustomed for over half a century to hear the highest authorities in the political economy we call libérale declaring . . . that co-operation” was a delusional approach. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, conflict and interchange between advocates of ideas and tactics aspiring to a , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at “pure political economy” of competing individuals and those seeking more “co-operative” arrangements have been prominently associated with historical developments from the Depression and the two world wars forward. Gide reminds us that these struggles were part of the history of Western liberalism, and of politics and economics more broadly, well before the twentieth century. His critique of the “inaccessible” and “hedonistic” qualities of neoliberal “pure political economy” (in response to the neoliberal framing of cooperative economics as delusional) is also prescient of very recent analyses of how fantasy plays a key role in the workings of contemporary neoliberalism (Dean 2008, 2009). In recent speculation about the abandonment of neoliberalism, Newsweek

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms proclaimed on its February 7, 2009, cover that “we are all socialists now” above an agitprop image of a red hand and a blue hand (Republican and Democrat) locked in embrace. The article subtitle inside indicated that the US “economy already resembles a European one” and “will become even more French,” that is, socialist (Meacham and Thomas 2009). Yet it was the rise of different forms of neoliberalism in France and other parts of Europe that inspired, from the late 1970s forward, the efforts of Michel Foucault

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

Introduction 327

(2008) and other political theorists to trace the genealogy of liberalism (Barry https://www.cambridge.org/core and Rose 1996). In this section Mudge too documents a neoliberal consensus in OECD party programs long ensconced by the early 2000s. Although our understanding of neoliberalism is hindered by flattening nationally, region- ally, and locally distinct forms of neoliberalism and other sorts of politics, it is not immediately clear how, if there has been some form of neoliberal consensus in Europe for years, resembling or becoming more European or French makes or will make the US economy more socialist. . IP address: The cycle to and from economic toolboxes (classical liberal–welfare liberal–neoliberal–welfare liberal) may be read as the historically recurring

170.106.33.14 management of the cyclical crises of capitalism. Keynes did envision “him- self as a doctor of capitalism” (Time 1965). Historical scrutiny of the credo

“We are all Keynesians now” also enriches our interpretation of Keynesian- , on

ism and how and why the credo and Keynesianism itself are being revisited 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 now. Aptly with regard to the current crisis, Wikipedia (2010b) notes that the credo “is popularly associated with the reluctant embrace in a time of financial crisis of Keynesian economics by individuals such as Nixon who had formerly favored free market capitalism.” In the midst of increasing unem- ployment and industrial layoffs in late 1970 and early 1971, US president , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at Richard Nixon undertook measures such as deficit spending, proclaiming to the media that “I am now a Keynesian in economics” (Silk 1971; see also Reuters 1971). However, the phrase “We are all Keynesians now” was first attributed to the neoliberal economist (and future Reagan economic adviser) Milton Friedman in a late December 1965 Time article on how Keynes’s theories were “a prime influence on the world’s free economies.” A month later Fried- man (1966) clarified in a letter to Time that his exact statement was “In one sense, we are all Keynesians now; in another, nobody is any longer a Key- nesian.” Friedman expressed the ambivalence with which conservatives have approached welfare liberal measures (referenced by Gide and Wikipedia

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms a century apart). He also hinted at the ambiguity and changeability in the meaning, interplay, and practice of different forms of liberalism. Arguably, he alluded to the fact that by the mid-1960s “Keynesianism” and the US economic growth associated with it were already altered. Friedman’s statement “We are all Keynesians now” concluded a section in the 1965 Time article on changes in Keynesianism itself. Before and after Keynes’s death, various economists synthesized Keynes’s ideas with those

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

328 Social Science History

of classical liberals, creating neo-Keynesian or neoclassical Keynesian eco- https://www.cambridge.org/core nomics (see Hicks 1937; Samuelson 1947, 1948). As Time (1965) explained, while Keynes sought “prosperity and stability” during the Depression, neo-Keynesians applied “Keynesianism + the theory of growth.”3 While Time (ibid.) emphasized the success and prominence of Keynesian or neo- Keynesian methods, it also noted that US economic production in 1965 was “scraping up against the top levels of the nation’s capacity, and federal spending and demand [were] soaring because of the war in Viet Nam.” . IP address: Time’s inclusion of Friedman’s commentary on Keynesianism and its presentation of Friedman as “the nation’s leading conservative economist” also

170.106.33.14 reflected his growing influence in the United States. By 1966, for example, he was writing a regular column for Newsweek.

Thus Friedman’s 1966 assertion that “in one sense, we are all Keynesians , on

now; in another, nobody is any longer a Keynesian” alluded to many things. 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 Keynesianism and the US political economy were changing or had changed even in the era perceived as the golden age of welfare liberalism. Friedman in a sense foretold his own future national and international prominence as a neoliberal policy adviser and the ambivalent and ambiguous work to come: in Nixon’s turn to “Keynesianism”; in the current rendering of “Keynesian” , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at economics through massive state bailouts of financial corporations and markets (Stiglitz 2008; Sjostrom 2009); in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) linked provision of economic aid and enforcement of privatization and public-sector austerity measures for teetering European economies such as that of Greece (Thomas and Kulish 2010).4 Theorists emphasize that “the saturation of the state, political culture, and the social with market ratio- nality” is a primary characteristic of neoliberalism (Brown 2006: 695; see also Martin 2002). Yet while the crisis in political economy today is alleged to have led to a seismic shift in the tools of governing, the crisis and responses to it are most prominently framed in economic (and particularly finance) terms and measures: above all else, how are the markets feeling about measures to

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms stabilize the markets? In sum, we are not done with neoliberalism yet. The three authors in this section help us make further sense of the history (and thus the present) of neoliberalism by enriching our understanding of at least two important and intersecting dimensions of it: (1) the temporal development of neoliberal ideas and techniques and (2) the range of agents, ideas, tactics, and dynamics that have produced histories of neoliberalism and other forms of liberalism.

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

Introduction 329

With regard to the temporal development of neoliberalism, as I have https://www.cambridge.org/core done here, the essays locate neoliberalism in longer histories of liberalism and other forms of politics dating from the postwar era through the 1960s and 1970s. Mudge’s examination of neoliberal themes in OECD party programs from 1945 on reveals that center-right European parties emphasized these themes consistently and that the shift toward neoliberalism in center- left parties from the 1970s forward was key to producing neoliberalism as majoritarian politics in the West. From her data Mudge convincingly argues . IP address: that “market-friendly leftisms” or “third-way movements” were not rejec- tions of neoliberalism but rather “a constituent element . . . of neoliberal-

170.106.33.14 ism’s political face” (see also Ryner 2004). Krinsky explores how “contentious corporatism” and neocorporatism

bound New York City labor unions with formal political and corporate actors , on

into governing regimes in the 1950s–1970s that steadily detached union 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 leaders from their membership and disempowered them, providing the groundwork for union cooperation in and victimization through neoliberal policies. Mele illustrates how 1960s and 1970s urban planning and development in Chester was both characteristic of welfare liberalism (in acknowledg- ing “extant social and economic conditions” and proposing to address them) , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at and an element in neoliberalism’s rise through the failure of “never properly funded or initiated” earlier initiatives. His Chester portrait also reminds us that neoliberalism’s US urban ascendance was built on longer histories of industrialization, deindustrialization, and institutionalized racism. Krinsky and Mele thus effectively add to the sort of careful work on the prehistory of US neoliberalism recently undertaken by Shane Hamilton (2008; see also Hackworth 2007). The authors’ investigations illustrate how the temporal dimensions of neoliberalism’s emergence are linked with (and thus teach us new things about) the involvement of particular social actors and dynamics. Mudge’s documentation of a shift in OECD center-left party programs beginning in

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms the 1970s, and of “overall neoliberal emphases” in these programs by the 1980s, underscores that the US Treasury Department, the IMF, and the World Bank’s imposition of a “Washington consensus” on developing countries (Williamson 1989; cf. Stiglitz 2002, 2003) does not provide a full expla- nation of the global spread of neoliberalism. As the author of the term itself notes, the “Washington consensus” sought to implement in Latin America “ideas that had long been accepted as appropriate within the OECD” (Wil-

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

330 Social Science History

liamson 2004: 1). Mudge’s argument that OECD party programs indicate https://www.cambridge.org/core the production of “a new political center” as much in “conservative, Nordic, and southern countries as in Anglo-liberal contexts” from the 1970s forward (see Mudge’s figures 5–7) also raises interesting questions about the recent framing of the economies of Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain as bloated and inefficient (literally, “PIGS”) because of their failure to implement neoliberal reforms.5

Krinsky’s New York City study highlights how long-term trajectories of . IP address: union involvement in municipal governance, and dynamics linked with specific economic crises, are interrelated in the history of shifts in liberal tactics

170.106.33.14 and ideas used to govern the city. Like Mudge’s focus on the importance of center-left parties in producing neoliberalism as majoritarian politics,

Krinsky’s emphasis on the long-term role of union leaders in the forma- , on

tion of corporatist, neocorporatist, and neoliberal practice at the municipal 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 level belies assumptions about neoliberalism as produced primarily by right- wing political and intellectual actors and representatives of private capital or through the Left’s reaction to economic crisis and right-wing politics in the 1990s.

Mele and Krinsky each apply the ideas of the geographers Jamie Peck , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at and Adam Tickell (2002: 380) about “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism to describe how diverse tactics of state withdrawal and intervention enact variable “‘local neoliberalisms’ [that] are embedded within wider net- works and structures.” Mele sees urban development in Chester as unfolding through consecutive moments of “roll-back” followed by “roll-out” neoliberalism. However, his examination of neoliberalism as “historically contin- gent and geographically specific” (Jackson 1989: 23) demonstrates that even the “roll-back” dynamics in this locale involved significant state intervention to facilitate private development. Krinsky reveals how in some ways “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism operated simultaneously in New York City.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms In the face of neoliberalism’s self-presentation “as completely non- political” (Beck 2002: 122), the essays enrich our understanding of the various state and nonstate actors and of the types of formal and informal politics that have produced neoliberalism. The histories recounted here emerge in political debate, alliances and conflicts, and successes and failures through formal party platforms and forms and through formal and informal governing arrangements among and between state actors (politicians, party players,

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

Introduction 331

officials, civil servants) and nonstate actors (union leaders and members, pro- https://www.cambridge.org/core fessional experts, corporate and financial representatives, citizen groups, various media) at the international, national, state, regional, and municipal levels. While Mudge shows us the sweep of neoliberalism’s formal political rise among OECD nations’ political party programs, Mele and Krinsky bring us more localized analyses of global shifts and crises in political economy and of the tools through which they are effected on the ground—from federal subsidies, state tax schemes, and municipal land-use policies to state-private . IP address: development partnerships, collective bargaining, and labor legislation. Although Mudge tackles the question most directly, all the essays sug-

170.106.33.14 gest the limited conceptual helpfulness of an oversimplified left-right political spectrum (and a neat evolution from social welfare liberalism to neolib-

eralism) for understanding how diverse actors, ideas, and tactics have shaped , on

the emergence and operation of neoliberalism. The authors explore how 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 politically “left and center-left” party members, union leaders, and urban planners helped produce neoliberalism through the success and failure of their own initiatives as well as their struggles with “right-of-center” actors. In Krinsky’s apt terms, the “paths to neoliberalism are not always sudden and are populated by policies that are not necessarily driven by neoliberal , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at assumptions.” Thus, for example, the integration of municipal public-sector unions into New York City’s governing regimes from the 1950s on meant that what Krinsky calls “municipal Fordism” (or Keynesian Fordism) channeled “industrial conflict into reformist, nonrevolutionary directions” by means of which labor leaders helped forge neoliberalism in the city. The essays further suggest that some of the confusion surrounding the operations of neoliberalism is rooted in the contradictions, mythical qualities, and obfuscation that characterize the political work of liberalism more broadly, particularly with regard to central (neo)liberal tenets around free realms and free subjects. Mudge’s analysis reveals the tensions between neoliberalism (1) as a “political form” and (2) as “laissez-faire” through her

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms description of the work of producing and disseminating laissez-faire ideas and practices. Thus, for example, the rise of neoliberalism has meant that (overweaning) welfare state technocrats (Hayek 1949) were replaced with (freedom-loving) neoliberal experts who cannibalized the economics profes- sion and then political life until (in Mudge’s terms) “the state’s charge is to build and preserve marketlike environments” but magically “economic policy making is depoliticized.” This simultaneous forging and obfuscating

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

332 Social Science History

of political work is a crucial aspect of the struggle to define “politics” that https://www.cambridge.org/core Mudge highlights as characteristic of the neoliberal era. In a related analysis, Mele demonstrates how intervention to facilitate “free market” urban development in Chester has involved the evolution of public decision making on development (including city infrastructure and services) into private/corporate-state decision making in the interest of capital. From a sociospatial perspective, the free market urban development of isolated upscale islands in Chester for use almost exclusively by well-heeled . IP address: residents from elsewhere produces an urban polity and physical landscape free of the majority of the Chester public (for the global relevance of this dynamic,

170.106.33.14 see Smith 2006). In Chester these “free” realms sit cheek by jowl with spaces in which the violence of neoliberal policies is enacted through state with-

drawal from and intervention against the poor and racialized through envi- , on

ronmental racism and carceralization (see also Davis and Monk 2007; Wac- 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 quant 2009; Crocker and Johnson 2010). If we are to bring neoliberalism out of “the inaccessible regions of abstract thought,” as a taken-for- granted reality or as a cartoonish concept to critique, we must historicize and contextualize the actors, ideas, techniques, and dynamics at play in formal and informal politics. When neoliberalism , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at and related forms of liberalism are examined—through broad but careful comparative analysis or fine-grained case studies—as political struggles at the local, regional, national, and international levels, they are revealed as any- thing but neat and tidy. And it is precisely from that sociohistorically specific messiness that we can garner hope for future areas of research and political intervention. We do appear to be perched at a potential juncture of political decision making, precipitated by yet another crisis of capitalist political economy. If we are to assess the wisdom and fruitfulness of neoliberal versus social liberal tactics and ideas or push beyond what are arguably tautologies of liberal government and its relations with capitalism over a century old, careful consideration of that messiness is the place to start.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms

Notes

This essay emerges out of 2008 and 2009 Social Science History Association panels on “chronologies of neoliberal governing” and my own research funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I am grateful to John Krinsky, Christopher Mele, and Stephanie Lee Mudge for the conversations we have had on these issues and to Donna Gabaccia for her careful reading of this essay and of the other essays in the section.

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

Introduction 333

1 See, e.g., the Mont Pelerin Society’s “Statement of Aims” at www.montpelerin.org/ https://www.cambridge.org/core montpelerin/mpsGoals.html (accessed May 4, 2010). The society, founded by Fried- rich von Hayek in 1947, and its international membership have been central to the spread of neoliberal ideas (see Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). 2 For expertise as more broadly important to forms of liberal government, see, e.g., Barry 1996; Osborne 1996; Rose 1996, 2006; O’Malley 2008. 3 For more recent analysis of the operation of neo-Keynesianism at the local level in Great Britain and its relations with neoliberalism at the national and international

levels, see Eisenschitz and Gough 1996. . IP address: 4 Landon Thomas Jr. and Nicholas Kulish (2010) report: “The aim is to secure . . . even deeper budget cuts than the tough measures imposed so far, like reductions in

civil service pay. . . . Steps being discussed include closing down parts of the little- 170.106.33.14 used Greek railway system, which employs 7,000 people . . . ; limiting unions’ ability to impose collective bargaining agreements, which lead to ever-higher public sector

pay; cutting out the two months of pay that private-sector workers get on top of their , on

annual pay packages; increasing the retirement age and cutting back on pensions; 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 and opening up the country’s trucking market in an effort to lower extremely high transportation rates that have hindered the country’s competitiveness.” The article reports concerns that neither the IMF nor the United States (“the fund’s largest shareholder” [ibid.]) can afford it if Portugal, Ireland, and Spain also seek IMF aid (presumably with the same sort of conditions attached). See also Epitropoulos 2010. 5 The acronym’s reference to Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain dates to the mid- , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at 1990s. In the context of the recent economic crisis, Ireland and the United Kingdom have been added to the acronym. In 2010 both national governments implemented measures akin to those applied by the IMF to Greece. For an overview of the PIGS acronym’s history, see Wikipedia 2010a. For the contemporary rendering of the acronym, see Economist 2010.

References

Babb, S. (2004) Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Barry, A. (1996) “Lines of communication and spaces of rule,” in A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose (eds.) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Rationalities of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 123–41. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms Barry, A., T. Osborne, and N. Rose, eds. (1996) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberal- ism, Neoliberalism, and Rationalities of Government. Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press. Beck, B. (2000) What Is Globalization? Cambridge: Polity. Boston Globe (2008) “We are all Keynesians now.” November 25. Brenner, N., and N. Theodore, eds. (2002) Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe. Oxford: Blackwell.

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

334 Social Science History

Brown, W. (2003) “Neo-liberalism and the end of liberal democracy.” Theory and Event https://www.cambridge.org/core 7 (1): 1–23. ——— (2006) “American nightmare: Neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and de-democrati zation.” Political Theory 34 (6): 690–714. Cockett, R. (1995) Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter- Revolution, 1931–1983. London: HarperCollins. Crocker, D., and V. Johnson, eds. (2010) Poverty, Regulation, and Social Justice: Readings on the Criminalization of Poverty. Blackpoint, NS: Fernwood.

Davis, M., and D. Monk, eds. (2007) Evil Paradises: Dreamworlds of Neoliberalism. New . IP address: York: New Press. Dean, J. (2008) “Enjoying neoliberalism.” Cultural Politics 4 (1): 47–72.

——— (2009) Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism 170.106.33.14 and Left Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Dello Buono, R., and J. Bell Lara, eds. (2008) Imperialism, Neoliberalism, and Social

Struggles in Latin America. Leiden: Brill. , on

Economist (2010) “Europe’s economic woes: The PIIGS that won’t fly.” May 18, www 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 .economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15838029. Eisenschitz, A., and J. Gough (1996) “The contradictions of neo-Keynesian local economic strategies.” Review of International Political Economy 3 (3): 434–58. Epitropoulos, M. (2010) “Making sense: Greece as a demonstration project.” Dollars and Sense, May–June, www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2010/0510epitropoulos.html. Foucault, M. (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978– , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at 1979, ed. M. Senellart, trans. G. Burchell. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Fox, J. (2008) “The comeback Keynes.” Time, October 23. Friedman, M. (1966) Letter to the editor. Time, February 4. Gide, C. (1898) “Has co-operation introduced a new principle into economics?” Eco- nomic Journal 8 (32): 490–511. Hackworth, J. (2007) The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hamilton, S. (2008) Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ——— (2009) “The populist appeal of deregulation: Independent truckers and the politics of free enterprise, 1935–1980.” Enterprise and Society 10 (1): 137–77. Hannah-Moffat, K., and P. O’Malley, eds. (2007) Gendered Risks. London: Routledge- Cavendish.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Hayek, F. (1949) “The intellectuals and socialism.” University of Chicago Law Review 16 (3): 417–33. Heynen, N., J. McCarthy, S. Prudham, and P. Robbins, eds. (2007) Neoliberal Environ- ments: False Promises and Unnatural Consequences. New York: Routledge. Hicks, J. (1937) “Mr. Keynes and the ‘classics’: A suggested interpretation.” Economet- rica 5 (2): 147–59. H-Net (2010) Call for papers, “Genealogies of neoliberalism,” special issue, Radical His- tory Review (112), www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=175192.

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

Introduction 335

Jackson, P. (1989) Maps of Meaning: An Introduction to Cultural Geography. New York: https://www.cambridge.org/core Routledge. Lemke, T. (2002) “Foucault, governmentality, and critique.” Rethinking Marxism 14 (3): 49–64. Martin, R. (2002) Financialization of Daily Life. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Meacham, J., and E. Thomas (2009) “We are all socialists now.” Newsweek, February 7. Mensah, J. (2008) Neoliberalism and Globalization in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mirowski, P., and D. Plehwe, eds. (2009) The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of . IP address: the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. O’Malley, P. (2008) “Neoliberalism and risk in criminology,” in T. Anthony and C. Cun-

neen (eds.) The Critical Criminology Companion. Annandale, NSW: Federation: 170.106.33.14 55–67. Osborne, T. (1996) “Security and vitality: Drains, liberalism, and power in the nineteenth

century,” in A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose (eds.) Foucault and Political Reason: , on

Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Rationalities of Government. Chicago: University of 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 Chicago Press: 99–121. Overbeek, H., ed. (1993) Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy. Lon- don: Routledge. Peck, J., and A. Tickell (2002) “Neoliberalizing space.” Antipode 34 (3): 380–404. Reuters (1971) “Nixon reportedly says he is now a Keynesian.” New York Times, Janu- ary 7. , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at Rose, N. (1996) “Governing ‘advanced’ liberal democracies,” in A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose (eds.) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Ratio- nalities of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 37–64. ——— (2006) The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ryner, M. (2004) “Neo-liberalization of social democracy: The Swedish case.” Compara- tive European Politics 2 (1): 97–119. Samuelson, P. (1947) Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- versity Press. ——— (1948) Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Silk, L. (1971) “Nixon’s program: ‘I am now a Keynesian.’” New York Times, January 10. Simon, S. (1995) “Realism and neoliberalism: International relations theory and South- east Asian security.” Pacific Review 8 (1): 5–24.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms Sjostrom, W. K., Jr. (2009) “The AIG bailout.” Washington and Lee Law Review 66 (3): 943–91. Smith, N. (2006) “Gentrification generalized: From local anomaly to urban ‘regenera- tion’ as global urban strategy,” in M. Fisher and G. Downey (eds.) Frontiers of Capi- tal: Ethnographic Reflections on the New Economy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 191–208. Social Justice (2007) “Securing the imperium: Criminal justice privatization and neoliberal globalization.” Special issue, 34 (3–4). Stiglitz, J. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: Norton.

. Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200011561

336 Social Science History

——— (2003) “Challenging the Washington consensus: An interview with Lindsey https://www.cambridge.org/core Schoenfelder, 7 May 2002.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 9 (2): 33–40. ——— (2008) “We aren’t done yet: Comments on the financial crisis and bailout.” Economists’ Voice 5 (5): article 11. Thomas, L., Jr., and N. Kulish (2010) “I.M.F. promises more aid for Greece as European crisis grows.” New York Times, April 28. Thompson, N. (2007) “From Hayek to New Labour: The changing ideology of public service provision,” in P. Dibben, P. James, I. Roper, and G. Wood (eds.) Modernizing

Work in Public Services: Redefining Roles and Relationships in Britain’s Changing . IP address: Workplace. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave: 11–28. Time (1965) “The economy: We are all Keynesians now.” December 31.

Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecu- 170.106.33.14 rity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Wikipedia (2010a) “PIGS (economics),” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PIGS_%28economics

%29 (accessed May 1). , on

——— (2010b) “We are all Keynesians now,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/We_are_all_ 02 Oct 2021 at 11:49:15 Keynesians_now (accessed April 15). Williamson, J. (2004) “A short history of the Washington consensus.” Paper commis- sioned by Fundación Centro de Estudios y Documentación Internacionales de Bar- celona and presented at the conference “From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance,” Barcelona, September 24–25. Williamson, J., ed. (1989) Latin American Readjustment: How Much Has Happened? , subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Wook Lee, Y. (2008) The Japanese Challenge to the American Neoliberal World Order: Identity, Meaning, and Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms