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Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology Antti Kauppinen Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki 19 Filosofisia tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta Filosofiska studier från Helsingfors universitet Philosophical studies from the University of Helsinki Publishers: Department of Philosophy Department of Social and Moral Philosophy P. O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 A) 00014 University of Helsinki Finland Editors: Marjaana Kopperi Panu Raatikainen Petri Ylikoski Bernt Österman Antti Kauppinen Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in lecture room XII, University Main Building, on 9 January 2008, at 12 noon. ISBN 978-952-10-4474-8 (paperback) ISBN 978-952-10-4475-5 (PDF) ISSN 1458-8331 Helsinki University Print Helsinki 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................. 6 LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS ........................................... 9 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................. 10 1 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHICAL ABOUT PHILOSOPHICAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY?................................................................................. 10 2 THE ROLE OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IN METAETHICS ................... 25 2.1 Why Moral Psychology Matters to Metaethics..................... 26 2.2 Perspectives on Practical Reasoning and Moral Motivation29 2.2.1 The Sentimentalist Tradition ....................................................32 2.2.2 The Kantian Perspective...........................................................39 2.2.3 The Aristotelian Alternative.....................................................45 2.3 Empirical Study of Moral Thinking and Its Philosophical Implications.................................................................................. 60 2.3.1 The Moral/Conventional Distinction........................................60 2.3.2 The Process of Moral Judgment ...............................................70 2.3.3 Philosophical Implications .......................................................81 3 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY .......................... 105 3.1 The Metaphysics of Free Will............................................. 106 3.2 The A Priori Psychological Conditions of Moral Responsibility ........................................................................... 108 3.3 Empirical Questions about Moral Responsibility............... 121 4 NORMATIVE ETHICS AND WHAT WE ARE LIKE .......................... 136 4.1. Psychological Realism in Normative Ethics...................... 137 CONCLUSION.................................................................................. 164 REFERENCES .................................................................................. 168 Acknowledgements People who don’t enjoy the support of family, friends, and colleagues don’t have to worry about writing an acknowledgements section – mostly because they don’t finish their dissertations in the first place. I would certainly not have made it to the end without the support of many others. First of all, I want to thank Timo Airaksinen, who supervised my entire project and funded a large part of it through the Academy of Finland research project Practical Reason and Moral Motivation. I also want to note the support of Raimo Tuomela, who helped me along early on in my graduate studies by allowing me to participate in his Research Project on Social Action, even though my research interests were not an exact match. I am very grateful for that. Earlier yet, Heta Gylling and Matti Häyry hired me as a research assistant, which had the fortunate side effect that I got to know their work quite well and hopefully learn a little. Also at the Department of Moral and Social Philosophy in Helsinki, Tuula Pietilä, Karolina Kokko-Uusitalo, and Anu Kuusela offered invaluable help in practical matters throughout my studies. I was very lucky to work on a dissertation on metaethics at a time in which I could count on the support of exceptionally talented fellow graduate students working on similar issues. Within our research project, I had innumerable conversations with Jussi Suikkanen and Teemu Toppinen on fundamental questions and current debates. They also gave me detailed feedback on all the papers I published, and on some papers I did not even try to publish because they convinced me my argument just was not good enough. I shudder to think what my metaethical views would be had I not come to know them! Of other graduate students, Pekka Mäkelä worked on partially overlapping themes like moral responsibility, and always had time to give me some sage advice. Pilvi Toppinen and Jarno Rautio helped with political philosophy, and Tomi Kokkonen and Jaakko Kuorikoski never shied away from philosophical or political argument, whether or not any of us knew anything about the topic. Vili Lähteenmaki and Tuukka Tanninen tolerate no non-sense, and forced me to clarify my ideas whenever they came up in conversation. Merja Mähkä and Sanna Nyqvist each provided an intelligent outside perspective on the philosophical issues I worked on. Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen from Jyväskylä recognized me, and I want to recognize them in turn. Finally, of people who studied with me in Helsinki, Pekka Väyrynen deserves a special mention here. I doubt if I would ever have got interested in metaethics without his towering example. From the very start, Pekka held himself to world-class standards, and met them; from him, I learned to ask more of myself, and though I have never risen to the level I should have, I would surely be even less of a philosopher had I not tried to follow in Pekka’s footsteps. Much of my graduate work was done during visiting scholarships at Florida State, Pittsburgh, and Chapel Hill. In Tallahassee, Piers Rawling was most kind to invite me and moreover, with David McNaughton, teach me everything I know about deontology. Al Mele, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, and Jason Turner defended experimental philosophy, with the result that I wrote two papers criticizing it. Virginia Tice helped considerably with homesickness. The following year, Robert Brandom invited me to Pittsburgh, and taught an inspiring seminar on inferentialism. John McDowell was kind enough to have several thorough conversations on his work and read some of mine, and my fellow Finn Hille Paakkunainen helped me navigate the social world. After a year in Finland, I was able to strong-arm Geoff Sayre- McCord to invite me to Chapel Hill for a full year. This turned out to be one of the smartest things I had ever done. Not only did I enjoy Geoff’s metaethics reading group, but also had a chance to attend wonderful seminars by, among others, Susan Wolf, Richard Kraut, Jesse Prinz, and my arch-enemy Josh Knobe. These seminars and conversations gave me the push I needed to write my introduction and finally finish the dissertation. It is no surprise that their graduate students like Ben Bramble and Sven Nyholm have become such great people to talk metaethics with, and tolerable pool-players as well. Finally, I owe special thanks to three people. Lilian O’Brien first showed me how to write a dissertation, and then helped me work out my views. This is no place to discuss her other virtues; suffice it to say that since I came to know her through philosophy, I am glad I do philosophy. That’s as sentimental as I’m going to get. My parents, Pirkko and Tapio, never had the chance to go to university, nor would it have made sense given their background and interests. That makes it somewhat unlikely, sociologically speaking, that I should have become a doctor of philosophy and an academic professional. Yet it is they who put me on the path that I took, from my mother teaching me to read and to love the library to the long philosophical and historical and psychological conversations I used to have with my father when we should already have been sleeping. I know of no other people who would possess an equal amount of practical wisdom, in every sense of the word. I am still struggling to learn from them. I would dedicate this work to my parents, but I think I will wait for my first real book. St Andrews, Scotland, December 2007 Antti Kauppinen List of original publications This dissertation consists of the following publications: I The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy Published in Philosophical Explorations 10 (2), 95–112, June 2007. II Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity To be published in Topics in Contemporary Philosophy vol. 7: Action, Ethics, and Reponsibility, eds. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein. MIT Press 2008. III The Social Dimension of Autonomy To be published in The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth, ed. Danielle Petherbridge. Brill, Leiden 2008. IV Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique Published in Inquiry 45 (4), 479–498, December 2002. 9 Introduction 1 What Is Philosophical about Philosophical Moral Psychology? Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 4.1121 Throughout the twentieth century, philosophical work in metaethics largely ignored the psychological literature on moral judgment. … Over the last twenty years, a tradition in moral psychology has developed that really does, I will maintain, help us understand the nature of moral judgment. Shaun Nichols, Sentimental
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