University of Cincinnati

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date:______

I, ______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of: in:

It is entitled:

This work and its defense approved by:

Chair: ______

Shaking Digital Fists: The Shape and Tactics of

Internet-mediated Social Movement Groups

A Thesis submitted to the

Division of Research and Advanced Studies

of the University of Cincinnati

In partial fulfillment for the degree of

Master’s of Arts

In the Department of Communication

Of the College of Arts and Sciences

2007

Brian Austin Warner

B.A. University of Cincinnati, 2003

Committee Chair: Dr. Steve Depoe

ABSTRACT

Electronic activism runs the gamut from interest cultivation, revenue generation, information dissemination, and membership generation to more disruptive "electronic civil disobedience." Examples of the latter include the Yes Men, who have use “parody- ware” to further their message, and Electronic Disturbance Theater’s use of Denial of

Service (DoS) attacks and form floods that draw attention and publicity. This study conducted an ethnographic rhetorical analysis of three social movement groups, The Yes

Men, ®™ark and Electronic Disturbance Theater, that actively utilize the Internet as their main vehicle of agitation. As these groups are not accounted for in classical and organizationally focused theories of social movements, Gerlach’s (2001) SPIN theory and Costanza-Chock’s (2003) repertoire of electronic contention were applied to the selected groups. It was found that all groups could be considered SPINs and were found to utilize one or more mode of contention as outline by Costanza-Chock.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1

Literature Review 2 Confrontational Organizational Approaches 2 SPIN 10 Strategies 14 Critique of Social Movement Literature 27 Literature Review Summary 31 Research Questions 31 Methods 32 ®™ark 33 The Yes Men 34 Electronic Disturbance Theater 36 Limitations 37 Study Overview 37

CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATION 39

Spin Theory 39 Segments 39 Polycentric 44 Integrated Networks 47 Description of SMGs 54 ®™ark and the Yes Men 54 Electronic Disturbance Theater 57 Findings 60

STRATEGIES: CHAPTER 3 65

Electronic Civil Disobedience 67 Conventional Contention 67 Disruptive Contention 72 Violent Contention 80 Description 88 ®™ark 88 The Yes Men 91 Electronic Disturbance Theater 94 Findings 100

CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 104

Critique of Classical Theories 105 Future Indications for Internet Protest Groups 118 Conclusion and Future Research 126

REFERENCES 128

v CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

On the night of Dec. 2nd and 3rd, 1984, a Union Carbide chemical plant in

Bhopal, India, began leaking 27 tons of the deadly gas methyl isocyanate. None of the six safety systems designed to contain such a leak were operational, allowing the gas to spread throughout the city of Bhopal. Half a million people were exposed to the gas, and

20,000 have died to date as a result of their exposure. In 2001, Michigan-based chemical corporation Dow Chemical purchased Union Carbide, thereby acquiring its assets and liabilities. However, Dow Chemical steadfastly refused to clean up the site, provide safe drinking water, compensate the victims, or disclose the composition of the gas leak, information that doctors could use to properly treat the victims (www.bhopal.org).

In November of 2004, an activist group known as the Yes Men registered the domain www.dowethics.com, a parody of Dow Chemical’s website, which is still currently live and accessible. The site design is almost identical to Dow’s corporate website, www.dow.com, the editorial content being the only difference. On November

29 of the same year, BBC World Television sent an email to www.dowethics.com in error, requesting a Dow representative appear on the newscast to discuss the company's position on the 1984 Bhopal incident. The BBC, unaware that it had contacted the Yes

Men in error, scheduled an interview with who they thought was a Dow spokesperson.

At 9:00am GMT, on December 4, 2004, the BBC aired a report in which a Dow spokesperson appeared to make the following announcement: Dow would accept full responsibility for the Bhopal disaster, and had a $12 billion dollar plan to compensate the victims and remediate the site by liquidating Union Carbide. Additionally, this

spokesperson suggested that Dow would push for the extradition of Warren Anderson, former Union Carbide CEO, to India to face criminal charges (theyesmen.org).

The Yes Men illustrate a growing phenomenon of social movement groups that utilize modern electronic media, such as the Internet, as their main mode of agitation. It is the assertion of this thesis that classical social movement theories do not adequately describe the emerging trend of agitators utilizing electronic media as their primary mode of contention. As such, the current paper examines ways in which social movement groups utilize electronic media as tools of agitation. It aims to do so by applying and expanding on Gerlach’s (2001) SPIN concept of social movement organizational methods and Costanza-Chock’s (1993) concept of electronic civil disobedience through several case studies of contemporary activist organizations while reflecting on critiques of organizationally focused movement theory.

This chapter begins with an overview of social movement literature, focusing first on social movement group organizational styles and strategies and then on criticisms of classical social movement theory. It will then turn to the methodology of the study, followed by research questions, limitations and a preview of subsequent chapters.

Literature Review Confrontational Organizational Approaches

Inherent in social movement group (SMG) definitions furthered by many scholars is the concept of a linear, organizational structure that mirrors those found in bureaucratic organizations. These definitions typically feature a leader, a specific organizational purpose, and often focus on both resource acquisition and a linear life path as prerequisites for success. Specifically, Zald and Ash (1966), who apply organizational

theories to the study of social movements, suggest that the “success or failure of the

[social movement organization] can be highly dependent on the qualities and commitment of the leadership cadre and tactics they use” (p. 338).

In perhaps the most widely cited example, Simons (1970) views social movement organizations through a leadership/organizational lens. According to Simons (1970), the leader-centered conception of a social movement is based both on sociological theory and on organizational theory, in that social movements follow similar organizational structures as more “formal” collectives do (i.e. governmental agencies, corporations, etc.).

According to Simons, “a social movement is not a formal structure, but is nevertheless is obligated to fulfill parallel functions. Like the heads of private corporations or government agencies, the leaders of social movements must meet a number of rhetorical requirements” (p. 3). According to Simons (1970), these leadership requirements include attracting and maintaining a following, selling the movement’s message to established masses and the movement’s following, and reacting to oppression from establishment forces. To further strengthen his analysis of SMG’s, Simons suggests that these leadership requirements generate five rhetorical problems. First, leaders must often exaggerate or conceal the actions and rhetoric of the movement both internally and externally. Better said, leaders often must be ambiguous in their communication to their own constituency and to the outside (media, establishment, etc.). Leaders must also combat bureaucracy and organizational discombobulation within their organization.

Since members of a social movement want to participate in decision making and activism strategies, it is the leader’s mission to keep everyone in line and on task. Members look to the leader for guidance and direction when there is often no clear course of action. In

addition, the leader must also be able to adapt and react to messages across multiple types of media.

As such, a social movement behaves much the same way corporations do, at least from this organizational perspective. For example, scholars Hackman and Johnson (2000) define leadership as “symbolic communication which modifies the attitudes and behaviors of others in order to meet shared group goals and needs” (p.12). Specifically,

Hackman and Johnson list six primary mechanisms a leader uses to manage an organization’s climate: emphasizing the underlying values of an organization, reacting to critical incidents, allocating resources, role modeling, awarding rewards, and selecting the correct followers (pp. 241-243). All six of these are congruent with Simons’ conception of an SMG: leadership, rhetorical requirements, and the problems that necessarily need be addressed by them. That said, by placing an emphasis on a single- leader theory, Simons necessarily likens social movement groups to contemporary corporations and government agencies.

This sentiment is echoed more contemporaneously by Stewart, Smith, and Denton

(2001), who suggest that social movements may differ in their level of organization, but they must be “at least minimally organized,” have identifiable leaders, members, and organizational coalitions (p. 2). They go on to posit that “social movements differ from institutionalized collectives not principally in terms of the functions their persuasive efforts must perform, but in terms of the constraints placed upon the fulfillment of these functions” (p. 51) (emphasis mine). This also reflects to Simons’ ideas of leadership, rhetorical requirements, and the problems those requirements address. While Stewart et al.

do not necessarily advocate directly for an organizational view of SMG’s, they nonetheless further the idea of a top-down leader.

In addition to leadership parallels, many movement scholars have likened SMG’s to established institutions’ resource-dependent nature. McCarthy and Zald (1977) expand on this organizational view of SMG’s by developing the concept of Resource

Mobilization:

Several emphases are central to the [resource mobilization perspective] as it has

developed. First, study of the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is

crucial to and understanding of social movement activity. Because resources are

necessary for engagement in social conflict, they must be aggregated for

collective purposes. Second, resource aggregation requires some minimum of

organization, and hence, implicitly or explicitly, we focus more directly on social

movement organizations . . . Third, in accounting for a movement's success and

failures there is an explicit recognition of the crucial importance of involvement

on the part of individuals and organizations from outside the collectivity which a

social movement represents. Fourth, an explicit, if crude, supply and demand

model is sometimes applied to the flow of resources toward and away from

specific social movements. Finally, there is a sensitivity to the importance of

costs and rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in

social movement activity (p.1216).

This theory necessarily suggests that much like corporations, the success or failure of a

SMG is wholly dependent on the group’s access to, and management of, resources.

While the goals of a movement organization (at least according to Zald’s definition)

concentrate on changing society rather than offering a product or service, and their member incentives are typically purposive rather than profit-driven (Zald and Ash, 1966, p. 329), traditional social movement scholars still lump SMG’s into the same organizational drive and structure as bureaucratic organizations.

Also inherent within social movement scholarship is the description of the evolution of a movement as a linear or cyclical process. As an early exemplar of this,

Griffin (1952) outlines three stages of a social movements: a period of inception, period of rhetorical crisis and period of consummation. During the period of inception, the sentiments of the movement are brought into the public eye either by repeated persuasion by a group or by an exigency. During the period of rhetorical crisis, social movement groups encounter rhetorical opposition from an opposing faction (news reporters, counter organizations, politicians, law enforcement, etc.), which disturbs the “balance that had existed in the mind of the collective audience” (Griffin, 1952, p 186). Finally, during the period of consummation, the aggressors of the second period give up, either because they cannot win, because public opinion is to strong, the media eye is no longer focused on them, or because they have already won and public opinion was swayed. Griffin notes that these stages move in a very cyclical (but linear) way, wherein the period of consummation transitions back into a period of inception.

Many others agree with this developmental approach to social movement understanding. According to Stewart et al. (2001), SMG’s have a life-cycle and mature from one phase to another, from conception to death. They argue that greater understanding of a SMG can be gained if the scholar understands how it came to be, how it lived and how it ended by describing the evolution of the movement through five stages:

genesis, social unrest, enthusiastic mobilization, maintenance, and termination. The genesis stage describes the social movement is in its infancy. In this stage, a group of like-minded individuals identifies a problem that needs to be addressed. In this stage, establishment forces, the masses, and the media are largely unaware of group or its activities. Also during this time, the social movement’s leader begins to emerge. This person, according to Stewart et al., is the intellectual who “strives for salvation, perfection, and the good in society” (2001, p. 131). For example, John Muir founded the

Sierra Club around defeating a building of a dam within Yosemite park boundaries

(http://www.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/).

According to Stewart et al. (2001), a triggering event must occur for a movement group to progress from the genesis stage. The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent

Spring is an example of this for the modern environmental movement. Once a triggering event occurs, the movement moves into the social unrest stage. At this point, the media may take notice of the movement’s activities. Here, the movement grows in size and membership and the group formulates a mission statement or manifesto for the purposes of ideology articulation and movement in a unified direction. This ideology creates an in- group/out-group divide and us-versus-them division. According to Stewart et al. (2001),

“when frustration leads to disaffection with institutions and their ability or desire to resolve problems, the social movement enters the stage of enthusiastic mobilization” (p.

138), which is the third stage of the movement’s life-cycle.

During the enthusiastic mobilization stage, the true believes are the ones carrying the torch of righteousness, converting the non-believers and assimilating them into the movement. In addition, institutional and media forces become acutely aware of the

movement’s activity. The goal of this stage, according to Stewart et al.(2001), is to raise awareness levels of the issue at hand so that multiple groups can exert pressure simultaneously (p. 138-139). Leaders of the movement must deal with repressive acts of the institution, competing organizations and counter-agencies. As an example of this,

Stewart (1997) cites the work of Stokely Carmichael’s “black power” rhetoric during the civil rights movement as an example of a group’s activities in enthusiastic mobilization stage.

The important point of the enthusiastic mobilization phase, as Stewart et al. (2003) points out, is that success is not instantaneous (p. 141) and change is not swift in coming.

According to Stewart et al., “movement members . . . cannot accept harsh rhetoric and confrontation for long” (p. 142). They tire, and as such, the social movement must rest and regroup. As such, leaders spend much of their time explaining setbacks and failures.

This is hallmark of the maintenance stage.

The maintenance stage is often a quiet time, one used for leader change or organizational restructuring as suggested in Simons (1970). It is also used for maintaining membership, generating further revenue and interest and plotting further strategies. This stage is similar to the genesis stage in that the group awaits a triggering event to return to the social unrest or enthusiastic mobilization stage. Stewart et al. (2001) cites the Klu Klux Klan as a group in this stage, where they are less active, yet still are gain media attention. From the maintenance stage, the movement can either go directly to termination stage, or regroup and escalate back to any of the stages mentioned above.

Finally, the group moves to the termination stage. According to Stewart et al.

(2001), two things could happen at this stage: 1.) the goals of the movement have been

achieved and the group becomes institutionalized or disbands; 2.) the movement fails in its task and dies away to nothing or splinters off into sub-groups that then re-enter the life cycle at the genesis stage. The important thing to note is that any movement group could jump from any stage to termination and back again. As suggested by Stewart et al.

(2001), Ralph Nader’s consumer-protection groups exist in this phase.

The literature reviewed above may be inadequate when dealing with modern

SMG’s, especially ones that utilize modern technologies such as the Internet as their chief method of contention. In 2006, with widespread adoption of the Internet in industrialized countries, Web chat rooms and forums, listservs, and other technology-driven mass communication devices, it may be unnecessary for a SMG to have a leader in the classical sense as described in the above literature. Armed with the definitions listed above, how would the student of social movement classify the anti-globalization movement, with its many interwoven Internet-mediated groups such the Yes Men? Or the techno-shenanigans of re-code.com, a temporary protest group formed from members of another anti-globalization groups, when protesting Wal-Mart? Or the Electronic

Disturbance Theater, whose members participate in agitating for multiple causes? None of these groups collectively have a leader as described by the literature. Simply put, the above theories involving bureaucratic emulation and top-down leadership have difficulties describing the structure (or lack thereof) of SMG’s. A theory that more adequately describes SMG’s engaged in electronic communication is certainly needed for proper understanding of today’s agitation. This thesis will explore the degree to which

Gerlach’s SPIN is applicable to the study of cyber activism.

SPIN

Gerlach (2001) suggests a different approach to describing the structure and oscillating quasi-cyclic nature of social movement groups. Instead of advocating a leadership/organizational approach, Gerlach proposes a segmented network of social movement groups. His theory outlines ways SMG’s are able to protect against establishment suppression, collaborate on like-minded projects, share resources and information, and closely associate with one another. This approach to examining social movement and “uncivil-society” actors in segmentary, polycentric and integrated networks (SPINs) may describe more accurately the multi-tiered, multi-leader cooperative environment of cyber activism, according to Gerlach (2001).

As described by Gerlach, the segmentary portion of SPIN suggests that a social movement is “comprised of many diverse groups, which grow and die, divide and fuse, proliferate and contract” and that “a typical SPIN is composed of semiautonomous segments” (Gerlach, 2001, pp. 289-290). Escobar (2004) aggress with this assessment in his discussion of anti-globalization movement groups, comprised mostly of electronic actors, and suggests that “movements can be thought about in terms of self organizing networks (a meshwork) of movements that produce behavior that goes beyond each individual movement” (p. 354). For example, the contemporary environmental movement is made up of groups as diverse as Earth First! to the Sierra Club. These groups may have different methods, but their messages and participants often overlap. As will be discussed later chapters, both the Yes Men and re-code.com are members of the

®™ark group, which is an in-group of conglomco.org, which is an in-group of

hacktivist.net, which itself is a network of activists who utilize the Internet as their means of activism against the tactics of the WTO and international corporations.

The natural question that comes to mind when considering the segmentary portion of this theory is why would segments splinter from each other? Gerlach suggests four reasons why groups divide: for individual personal power, preexisting cleavages between groups, competition among groups, and ideological differences. While many of the theories reviewed above speak to one or many of these reasons (especially Zald with his theory of Resource Mobilization, which describes competition and cleavages based on resources), none are inclusive. Another question that comes to mind is what movements gain or lose by dividing in smaller groups. Specifically, Gerlach posits that “having a variety of groups permits a social movement to do different things and reach out to different populations” (p. 293). In cases such as hacktivist.net and its sister groups, there are several segmentary layers of electronic contenders, each with their own agenda, but all sharing a common means to achieve them.

It is this need to share resources that describes the Polycentric nature of SPIN groups, which, according to Gerlach (2001), suggests each subgroup of the SPIN develops its individual leaders. According to Gerlach:

These movements have many leaders or centers of leadership, and . . . these

leaders are not ultimately directed or commanded through a chain of command

under a central leader. The leaders, like the segments, are not organized in a

hierarchy; they are “heterarchich.” They do not have a commander in chief.

There is no one person who can claim to speak for the movement as a whole, any

more than there is one group that represents the movement (p. 294).

While this portion of Gerlach’s theory deals with leadership, it contrasts with the above leadership literature sharply. “Leadership is usually situational, as leaders arise to cope with particular situations or episodic challenges in the life of a movement” (Gerlach,

2001, p. 294), which necessarily suggests that leaders are not necessarily appointed as implied by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Simons (1970). Additionally, and because of the segmented nature of SMG’s, “there is no one person or group able to make decisions that are binding upon all or even most of the participants in the movement. This makes negotiation and settlement difficult, if not impossible” (Gerlach, 2001, p. 295). When it comes to institutional repression, Gerlach suggests that it is much harder to quell uprising when there is no static leader to address or dispose of (p.35).

The portion of Gerlach’s theory most applicable to the current discussion is integrated networks. Gerlach contends that the individual segments form a network of loose affiliation to each other, united under a common cause, using differing methods to achieve the same ends, often sharing members, working together, sharing resources and communicating what methods work and what ones do not. Specifically, SPIN SMG’s

“form an integrated network or reticulate structure through nonhierarchical social linkages among their participants and through the understandings, identities, and opponents these participants share” (Gerlach, 2001, p. 295). In his discussion of the anti- globalization movement, Escobar (2004) suggests that “in cyberspace and complexity we find a viable and at least potentially meaningful model of social life. This model is based on self-organization, non-hierarchy, and complex adaptive behavior on the part of agents, a model that contrasts sharply with the dominant model of capitalism and modernity” (p.

353). For the case studies outlined in the following sections, re-code.com was started as a

project suggested by ®™ark.com, and carried out by the Carbon Defense League

(another member of the hacktivism.net SPIN) and members of both conglomco.org and the Yes Men. This interweaving of groups is a phenomenon that is poorly described by organizational-oriented social movement scholars. For example, Stewart et al. (2001), suggest that “one or more organizations are an essential component of social movements”

(p. 5), but they stop short at describing the ways in which these groups interact.

There are several reasons why SPIN may more adequately describe the development of an SMG. First, a SPIN, by its very nature, prevents suppression, “to the extent that local groups are autonomous and self-sufficient, some are likely to survive the destruction of others” (Gerlach, 2001, p, 303). Functionalism and schism aids penetration into a variety of social settings, which also helps with the division of labor.

SPINs are difficult to suppress because it is harder to defeat multiple groups than a singular one. As already indicated, because of the webbed network of a SPIN, there is no singular entity or leader for opposition to destroy. The flexibility of SPIN allows for differing networks to address different problems in different ways, which makes SPIN networks more resilient to changes that Griffin (1952) or Stewart et al. (2001) suggest would move a group from one mode or phase to another. Diversity helps groups attack institutions from multiple angles. The more people there are in a network, the more hands there are to complete work. In terms of escalation of effort, when one group gets attention, the others want it as well, which leads to inter-group participation and competition, which leads to increased productivity. Moreover, when one group tries something new, and it works, other groups will pick up on that technique. The inverse is also true.

This is quite different than life cycle approaches, such as the one defined by

Stewart et al. (2001), in that Gerlach’s SPIN does not specify a beginning or an end to things, but rather describes an interconnectivity of smaller groups of the whole. Stewart et al.’s approach does not discuss the concepts of multiple leaders, multiple groups and how they interact, but rather focuses on the rise and fall of social movements and activist organizations.

Strategies

With a better understanding of the structure and formation of SMGs, I now shift the discussion to strategies of movement groups. While many scholars have defined strategies that are useful in describing the activities of social movement groups, these theories need to be “ported” (to borrow a computer science term) to the information age.

For example, Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen (1993) suggest seven strategies utilized by classically conceived agitators as petitioning the establishment, promulgation for the group, solidification of the group, polarization between groups, nonviolent resistance, escalation/confrontation of the cause, and Gandhi/guerrilla events.

First, as Bowers et al. (1993) explains, when a group seeks social change, it must bring its grievances before the establishment and make explanation why policy or conduct should be changed. According to Bowers et al., “petition involves tactics like selection of motive appeals, selection of target audiences, selection of types and sources of evidence, and selection of language” (p. 20). Failure to complete this process could spell disaster, as it could be proven by establishment forces that agitators did not maneuver through proper channels at the onset of irritation.

Second, promulgation describes recruiting new members and exploitation of mass media. Bowers et al. (1993) posit that through promulgation, SMGs “win public acceptance of [their] ideology, their system of values and beliefs, and their policies”

(Bowers, Ochs and Jensen, 1993, p. 21). Tactically, SMG’s practice promulgation through potential legitimizers (key establishment individuals who lend credence to their message), and by staging newsworthy events. This part is crucial to tech-enhanced groups, and will be address more directly in later sections.

Third, SMGs must build solidification within their ranks. The solidification process, according to Bowers et al., is “the rhetorical process by which an agitating group produces or reinforces the cohesiveness of its members, thereby increasing responsiveness to group wishes. This is a very difficult tactic because the type of individuals who are willing to join dissent movements are easily energized but are difficult to control” (Bowers et al., 1993, p. 24). This is especially true for SPIN groups, whose membership is diverse and spread across networks. Specifically, solidification is achieved through the use of song, chants, slogans, identifiable icons, and in-group publications (Bowers et al., p. 24).

Fourth, movement groups intentionally attempt to polarize themselves from their opposition, thus establishing and reinforcing in-groups and out-groups. According to

Bowers et al. (1993), “Polarization assumes that any individual who has not committed to the agitation supports the establishment . . . the agitator forces individuals to choose between the agitator and the establishment but present the choice in a manner that makes it easier to side with the agitator than with the leaders of the establishment “ (p. 34). This

is important for both membership building and solidification of the group as it certainly discourages issue fence-sitters.

Fifth, in their description of nonviolent resistance tactics, Bowers et al. (1993) suggest that “nonviolence places agitators in a position where they are violating laws they consider unjust and destructive to human dignity . . . Usually, the agitators simply do what they would be permitted to do if the laws they were violating had been changed” (p.

37). These tactics include, but are not limited to, physical barriers such as sit-ins, hunger strikes, picket lines, placing agitator bodies in harms way, and financially impeding tactics such as boycotts and strikes. The ultimate purpose is to force the establishment to pay attention to the agitators and their message, if only for a moment. According to

Bowers et al. (1993), “If the establishment resists [these tactics], it must do so by physical suppression” (p. 37). This often works in the favor of the agitator in terms of sympathetic support, as physical removal is typically a highly visible event.

Sixth, Bowers et al. (1993) suggest that escalation and confrontation “consists of a series of tactics, each of which is designed to escalate the tension until the establishment representatives finally resort to physical suppression” (p. 42). As was implied in the above discussion of nonviolent resistance, this strategy often works in favor of agitators in terms of hyper-mediated coverage and garnering sympathetic support. Finally, the strategies of Gandhi and Guerilla work in concert with each other, with one group committed to the strategy of non-violent resistance and another committed to aggressive strategies of resistance (Bowers et al., 1993). According to Bowers et al., “the strategy assumes that the activities of each group will contribute to the achievement of common goals” (p. 43).

Stewart et al. (2001) also cite specific strategies, many of which fit squarely within one of Bowers et al.’s seven strategies, as will be illustrated below. That said, the six strategies of social movement rhetoric, as defined by Stewart et al. (2001), are transforming perceptions of reality, altering self-perception of protestors, legitimizing the social movement, prescribing courses of action, mobilizing for action, and sustaining the social movement. Transforming perceptions is an important rhetorical tool for social movement leaders and persuaders as it allows the leader or persuader to paint a picture of a horrible past, describe the problem to their followers and convince them that now is the time to act, and should they do so, the future looks bright. Once followers are motivated and inspired, it is important to build their egos and convince that they can make a change.

This strategy also alters the self-perception of agitators in that it empowers the followers and paints them as “blameless victims of oppression” (p. 59) or the saviors of others.

According to Stewart et al., the function of legitimizing the social movement is the goal of every movement, and has two components: conferring ideological authority and maintaining legitimacy (p. 62). First, SMG’s seek to be legitimate in the eyes of both their followers and public at large, because with legitimization comes power. This power, according to Stewart et al., comes in the forms of reward, control, identification, terministic control, and moral suasion. By legitimizing rewards given to members, controlling what members focus on, enforcing SMG identification items such as symbols and emblems, controlling meaning, and evoking feelings of honor and morals, a SMG is able to legitimize itself as an institution (Stewart et al., 2001, p. 62-63). Once it has established this legitimacy, it is concerned with keeping it, which is accomplished through both coactive and confrontational strategies. Coactive strategies, according to

Stewart et al., are achieved by establishing “their actions as those of legitimate organizations” (p. 65). Confrontational strategies or those designed to “make a significant number of people see the social order as illegitimate” (Stewart et al., 2001, p. 67).

Because of this focus on legitimacy, this function fits within Bowers et al.’s strategy of both petition and promulgation since both are concerned with supporting the SMG’s cause and gaining public acceptance of their ideas.

Stewart et al. (2001) suggest that the function of prescribing courses of action is to lay out the plan for the followers to follow, including what must be done, when, by whom and how it must be carried out (p. 68). Someone needs to be the person with the plan, or else the movement will disintegrate into chaos. The function of mobilizing for action is for leaders and persuaders to gather new members, organize the ones they have, and move forward with the plans laid out during the prescribing courses of action stage.

Both of these functions could easily fit into either Bowers et al.’s definition of promulgation or solidification.

Finally, sustaining the social movement is the function of movement rhetoric that attempts to maintain interest and discipline within the organization and respond to victories and failures while maintaining visibility of the movement. According to Stewart et al., a leader must justify setbacks and delay to his/her members in order to maintain discipline and add meaning to victories. Additionally, leaders must maintain viability and visibility of the movement, keep it moving, and keep it in the public eye (p. 76).

These things are done through the use of ceremonies, meetings and assurances, which

Bowers et al. describe adequately when discussing their solidification stage.

While both Bowers et al. and Stewart et al. both describe strategies, neither precisely prescribe modes of agitation utilized by Internet-mediated SMGs. Since the advent of the Internet, people the world over have taken advantage of the net’s ability to link people and causes together that would otherwise exist separately, whether due to geographic barriers or lack of awareness. This ability to network, both physically in terms of computer networks and communicatively in terms of social and political networks, has certain implications for the study of movement groups and is not described by either Bowers et al. or Stewart et al. According to Deibert (2000):

Linked through the Internet across state borders, the tentacles of these citizen

networks have begun to infiltrate nearly every major international political issue-

area, from security to human rights to the governance of the global economy.

Although many of the groups that make up these networks predate the advent of

the Internet, there has been an explosive growth in their numbers in the past

decade coinciding with its widespread popularity (pp. 255-256).

It is the position of this thesis that modes of activism, while somewhat parallel to traditional tactics, also depart in several areas. This thesis will explore the extent to which modes of activism take on forms that are both parallel to real-space activism and unique in their own right. As it has been with political campaigns and business, social movement campaigns must obtain and maintain a presence in cyberspace to be effective in today’s information society. Given that social movements are often lacking in resources, the Internet provides an inexpensive method to reach large publics. Whether by listserv, email, or web-space, the Internet has provided activists with unparalleled access to large publics. As establishment forces increasingly implement the “paperless”

office, as e-commerce continues to be a viable medium for capitalism exercise, and as corporations continue to globalize, forms of activism must follow suit to be effective.

According to Wray (1999), “just as capitalism has become increasingly nomadic, mobile, liquid, dispersed and electronic, so resistance must also take on these attributes. Instead of physically blocking a building entranceway, or occupying a CEO’s office . . . we need to think about how [SMG’s] can blockade and trespass in digital and electronic forms” (p.

109). Specifically, Deibert (2000) suggests that “the Internet formed the technological infrastructure of the [social movement] campaign in ways that older, more traditional media simply could not accommodate” (p. 256). Wray (1999), who provides much of the basis of electronic civil disobedience theory, suggests that:

as activists become computerized, and computer hackers become publicized, we

are going to see an increase in the number of cyber-activists who engage in . . .

ECD [Electronic Civil Disobedience]. The same principles of traditional civil

disobedience, such as trespass and blockage, will be applied, but more and more

these acts will take place in electronic or digital form: The primary site for ECD

will be cyberspace (p. 108).

Fandy (1999) agrees with this stance: “The new technology and the ‘compression’ of space have drastically altered the nature of resistance to the state by expanding the domain of political activities” (p. 142).

To describe this shift from more conventional, “real word” tactics, to those in the online realm, Costanza-Chock (2003) defines a repertoire of electronic contention. He does so by positing three forms of electronic contention: conventional, disruptive, and violent (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Repertoire of Electronic Contention Matrix, Costanza-Chock (2003).

Repertoire of Electronic Contention Tactic/Outcome Matrix

Political Mobilization Cultural Outcomes Outcomes Outcomes Conventional -Electronic -Tactical Internet use: -Information Tactics lobbying: -Planning for distribution -Online petitions conventional street -Alternative news -Non-flooding mobilizations via web, [www.indymedia.org] email and fax email, listserv, BBS -Alternative campaigns calls to action commentary [cwa-union.org] [www.protest.net] [znet] -Coordination during -Alternative publishers mobilizations [www.autonomedia.org] -Oppositional electronic art [www.rtmark.com] -Online fundraising -Online merchandising -Online research -Representation [www.rawa.org]

Disruptive Some proponents -Email flood, Form -Site alteration Tactics of electronic flood, Fax bomb -Site redirection collective action (collective action) -Data theft have claimed direct -Virtual Sit-In -Data destruction policy outcomes. [Electronic -Email flood, Form [www.etoy.com Disturbance Theater: flood, Fax bomb 'toywar' campaign] www.thing.com/- (actions by individuals) rdom/ecd] -Viruses, Worms, and Trojan Horses -Denial of Service (action by individual) -Virtual Sit-In [Electronic Disturbance Theater: www.thing.com/- rdom/ecd] Violent Tactics Cyberterrorism (physical harm to humans caused by disruption of power grids, water system, air traffic control, and so on).

*While it seems that violent electronic tactics would likely result in outcomes in all three spheres, careful theorization of cyberterrorism is beyond the scope of this paper.

Conventional tactics of electronic contention represents the bulk of electronic contention used by social movement and activist organizations. Specifically, Costanza-Chock (2003) suggests that “the vast majority of electronic contention by SMOs involves the use of the

Internet to amplify and extend ‘traditional’ movement communications efforts” (p. 174.)

Specifically, websites, listservs, user groups, blogs, and emails, are typical modes of conventional electronic contention.

Through the use of the websites and the like, a social movement group can disseminate its information, recruit new members, feature on-line petitions for members and visitors to sign, solicit donations, and coordinate group member activity. These activities conform in many respects to traditional practices of social movement groups in real-space.

Specifically, websites can serve or support many of the categories of agitation as outlined by Bowers, Ochs and Jensen (1993), most specifically their concept of petition: by generating a following, organizing letter writing campaigns to governmental officials and conducting online petitions. Additionally, their concept of promulgation via websites encourages new membership and offers ways to purchase or receive pro-movement propaganda such as buttons, stickers and t-shirts.

Bowers, et al.’s (1993) concept of solidification is also served by conventional contention on the Internet in the form of displaying logos, slogans and song lyrics, allowing members to submit their own work and ideas, e-newsletters and create blogs to further disseminate the movement’s message. Conventional contention within emails, listservs, and websites also illustrate the Bowers, et al. (1993) concept of polarization by polarizing an audience either for or against a specific topic and specifying those who get

the message and those that do not. Especially in terms of emails and listservs, there are those that get the information (in-groups) and those that do not (out-groups). Through these methods, social movement groups can quickly and easily point out flag issues and flag individuals to mass publics.

A fine illustration of Costanza-Chock’s concept of conventional electronic civil disobedience in action, and an illustration of how electronic contention both reinforces classically conceived and electronically specific tactics, is the Chiapas, Mexico uprising in 1994. The uprising of Mayan Indians against the government gained instant national and international attention, creating a network of electronic support that was far different from the general insurrection for which the Zapatistas had hoped (Froehling, 1997, p.

292).

On January 1, 1994, Zapatistas, comprised mostly of Mayan Indians occupied seven towns in Chiapas, Mexico including the second largest town in the state in protest against the NAFTA trade agreement. After only 12 days of fighting, the Mexican government declared a cease fire. This took the Zapatistas by surprise because they had planned for longer conflict and a large media event wherein a portion of the Zapatista army was to march on a suicide mission to Mexico City to both divert attention away from Chiapas and to bring international media attention to their conflict (Froehling, 1997, p. 295). While this media event in real space never took place, the words of the Zapatista leader, Subcomandante Marcos, filled email discussion lists and listservs across the globe, causing a different type of event. While there was no legitimizing filter to the dearth of information created both by Marcos and those sympathetic to the Zapatista cause, the

Internet filled in the lack of coverage by mainstream and traditional media sources

(Froehling, 1997, p. 300). According to Froehling (1997), “within a few days of the uprising there were appeals by human-rights organizations for letters of protest to the U.S. and Mexican governments, for donations, and for volunteers as human rights observers.

Human rights caravans were launched from the U.S. to Chiapas” (p. 300). Almost instantly, websites and special email lists devoted wholly to the events of the Zapatista sprung up around the world. In many cases, individual pieces of information were duplicated across information sources, adding to Froehling’s concept of Internet-as- rhizome and adding credibility to Gerlach’s SPIN theory as discussed above.

The culmination of the Zapatista Internet presence was to create an

Intercontinental Network of Alternative Communication, in which groups that were loosely connected by their concern about Chiapas and the Zapatistas could exchange information and coordinate strategies. According to Froehling (1997), the “amount of international attention is widely accredited with forcing the Mexican government to stop the shooting war and to protect the Zapatistas from annihilation” (p. 298). This protest event illustrates Gerlach’s (2001) SPIN theory of social movements as discussed above.

In this case, the network portion of Gerlach’s theory was comprised of those sympathetic to the Zapatista cause. This nonhierarchical organization of discussion lists, newsgroups and websites made it impossible for Mexican government organizations to spin or alter the circulation of information as it had done with domestic media in the past (Froehling,

1997, p. 304).

The end result of the Internet-based Zapatista movement was an information dissemination campaign to mass publics, through plurality of messages, conventional electronic civil disobedience and SPIN networks of information, transmitted through

conventional electronic contention means. By using conventional electronic contention, the Zapatistas were able to control the content of their message and heighten awareness for their cause. This instance of SMG activity is described by Bowers et al.’s idea of both promulgation and solidification, as well as all of Stewart et al.’s six prescribed functions of social movement activity. Where this instance departs from traditional concepts of social movement tactics is in its scope. Had the Zapatistas not utilized the Internet to disseminate their message and recruit sympathetic followers, the event would certainly not have achieved global attention and arguably would not be as effective as it was.

Disruptive tactics of electronic contention, often referred to as hactivism and typically framed by conventional media outlets as terrorist activities, are not necessarily illegal forms of protest, (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 176). While it may sound counterintuitive, disruptive electronic contention can be classified under Bowers et al.’s

(1993) concept of nonviolent resistance. Disruptive acts such as virtual sit-ins, which take the form of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks or form floods as described by Costanza-

Chock (2003), involve conscientious efforts by the SMG to break a law to get a message across. This activity is not unlike real-life sit ins. To clarify, a DoS attack involves singular or multiple protestors repeatedly and rapidly requesting a non-existent webpage from a Web server. These repeated requests cause the server to utilize an abundance of bandwidth, which detracts from normal Web traffic. Consequently, legitimate traffic to the website is deflected; a server error log file is generated, cataloguing the attack and often carrying the attacker’s message. While the general public cannot view the website while it is being bombarded, the site administrator is force fed the agitator’s message.

Form floods take a similar form: utilizing a specialized program, agitators rapidly and

repeatedly fill out online feedback, ordering or purchasing forms with their group’s message. This results in a database overload, which causes the host system or website to become unstable (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 176). This ultimately has the same effect of a DoS attack; It clogs a communication device with the agitator’s message. Much like chaining oneself to a tree or laying down in front of a car, DoS attacks, form floods and other forms of virtual sit-ins force someone in real-space acknowledge that the protestor exists and often be force fed the protestor’s message.

The third set of electronic contention tactics is classified as violent. According to

Costanza-Chock (2003), “ an increasing amount of government and corporate literature dealing with electronic contention is focused on what is perceived to be the rising threat of violent electronic action or cyberterrorism” (p. 177). However, this literature tends to classify all forms of ECD as violent. Where violent electronic modes of contention differ from either conventional or disruptive tactics is in their focus on physical property damage or intentional injury. Violent methods, often called “hacking,” include infiltrating computer systems with intent to steal personal identification such as credit information, destroy systems, or even gain control over public and government networked computing systems that control public works or air traffic. These methods are extreme and include scenarios where hackers may injure property, human life or both (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 177). While the majority of movements operate in either the conventional or disruptive forms, establishment forces have managed to apply the “terrorist” or “hacker” moniker to any that utilize ECD as their primary form of agitation. Groups that utilize one or more forms of ECD as their primary mode of agitation will be explored in depth in subsequent sections.

In summary, movement studies have categorized strategies of action utilized by social movement groups, yet these studies have often ignored electronic means of agitation. Specifically, Costanza-Chock seeks to amend these definitions with his repertoire of electronic contention. This thesis will explore to what degree Costanza-

Chock’s ideas of ECD can be applied to the study of modern Internet-mediated SMG’s.

Critique of Social Movement Literature

With an understanding of how Internet-mediated SMG’s organize and operate, I shift discussion a final time to critiques of classical social movement theory. Scholars have often struggled with how to best define and explain social movement groups.

According to Melucci (1984), “movements are hard to define conceptually, and there are a number of approaches that are difficulty to compare. The various authors attempt to isolate some empirical aspects of collective phenomena, but since every author stresses different elements on can hardly compare definitions” (p. 823). Classically, by adopting analysis methods from sociology, these scholars have given primacy to concepts of structure, organizational qualities, life cycles, leadership, and resources.

As reviewed in sections above, Griffin (1952) was the seminal movement scholar by suggesting the ways of studying the rhetoric of “dead white guys” by focusing on the single orator and evaluating the effects of persuasion on audiences was less appropriate and that analysis of social movements is dependant on the study of multiple artifacts.

However, Griffin goes on to suggest that movements have a specific organizational life pattern: a period of inception, a period of rhetorical crisis and a period of consummation

(p. 186). More contemporarily, Stewart et al. (2001) suggest that social movements mature from one phase to another, from conception to death (p. 129-148). While this

position is agreeable to some extent, as it would be somewhat difficult to gain complete understanding of the “hows” and “whys” without an understanding of the events surrounding the movement, it may also exclude from scholarship certain groups that do not conform to rigid definition.

Simons (1970) expanded on this idea of lifecycles as bases for an organizationally themed social movement theory:

In addition to suggesting categories for descriptive analysis (a skeletal typology of

stages, leaders, media, audiences, etc. has already been provided by Griffin), it

can indicate . . . the requirements that rhetoric must fulfill in social movements,

the means available to accomplish these requirements, and the kinds of problems

that impede accomplishment (p. 2).

Simons goes on to prescribe the organizational patterns and quality of leadership necessary for collective to be considered a social movement. Specifically, as reviewed previously, Simons suggests that social movement groups and their leaders are obligated to fulfill parallel functions to formal organizations such as corporations and governmental agencies (Simons, 1970, p. 3). This line of thought gave way to McCarthy and Zald’s

(1977) idea of resource mobilization and measurements of a movement’s success both by organizational styling and by the volume of resources at their disposal.

Some scholars have sought some distance from this line of thought. According to

Melucci (1984), “Today the times seems appropriate for a reassessment of the theoretical contribution of the seventies in the field of social movements” (p. 182). Specifically, the idea of quantifying movements via organizational and leadership theory, and counting

resources is unsettling to scholars, as it has the potential to omit fringe movement groups from scholarship. According to Cathcart (1978),

I find it difficult to accept such a construct or definition of movements, not

because I want to be a purist about the word movement but because such a

definition fails, in my opinion, to help us distinguish between two fundamentally

different forms of rhetoric – one which I shall call managerial and the other I shall

call confrontational. To put it all another way, it can be very useful to our

understanding of socio-political activities if we can distinguish between those

rhetorical actions which by their form uphold and re-enforce the established order

and those which reject the system (p. 237).

Cathcart believes that a social movement only exists when its rhetoric and activities are confrontational and argues that groups that utilize a more managerial form are not movements at all, which is in stark contrast to the assertions of Simons and other scholars who adopt an organizational view of movements. According to Cathcart, confrontational rhetoric is symbolic because of its dramatizing ways, which may speak to some of the more contemporary tactics of groups engaged in electronic civil disobedience or those that practice image events as defined by DeLuca (1999). While these confrontational acts may be instrumental in that such acts could open up channels for movement rhetors to disseminate their message, it is more consummatory than it is instrumental in that it demands a response that “goes beyond the confrontation itself” (Cathcart, 1978. p. 246) since the establishment must respond to all challenges to legitimacy. Managerial rhetoric, as described by Cathcart (1978), is interested in keeping the existing system of values by changing something within it (p. 239). Basically, the system or institution is not bad, just

flawed. There is no intention to overthrow the current system or question the moral base of it. Confrontational rhetoric, on the other hand, is quite interested in turning the system on its ear. Groups that use this type of rhetoric (the only types of social movements as far as Cathcart is concerned) wish to overthrow the system. Managerial rhetoric is quite similar to Stewart’s (2001) concept of coactive strategies in that coactive groups try to work with and within system boundaries to achieve social change, often times adopting system and institutional ideals in an attempt to gain legitimacy (p. 64).

This idea, of course, is quite the opposite from the sociological viewpoints held by Simons and others, which leads more contemporary scholars to reject those theories wholly. According to DeLuca (1999),

While the last two decades have witnessed a slow turn in sociology to a discursive

if not rhetorical vision of social movements, rhetorical theory has imported a

traditional sociological approach that emphasizes organizations and resources at

the expense of rhetoric. Through a complex interaction of disciplinary,

institutional, and perhaps interpersonal relations, since the early 1970s Herbert

Simons’ sociological approach to social movement has been the dominant

paradigm in the discipline of rhetoric . . . The end result is that Simons’

hegemonic rhetorical theory of social movement is a disciplinary achievement

that renders invisible many groups and tactics. (p. 27).

Since there are many groups that adopt differing forms of organization and tactics than those described by scholars such as Simons and those that are low both on resources and social capital, it may behoove scholarship to look for alternate theories. It may be important to integrate multiple approaches to achieve better understanding of social

movements, especially fringe groups that utilize newer methods to agitate. This thesis will explore to what degree these groups can inform social movement scholarship.

Literature Review Summary

The above literature review suggests three things. First, studies have described social movement groups as having an orderly organizational scheme similar to that of bureaucratic agencies. Additionally, classical studies have described a linear or multi- tiered life-cycle approach to analyzing the rise and fall of a movement group, yet are not able to describe how movements oscillate between stages of development. However, others, most notably Gerlach (2001) with his concept of SPIN organizations, suggest that movements are not necessarily formally organized and not necessarily linear in their life paths. Second, contemporary studies have described modes and techniques of action utilized by social movements, yet they generally ignore electronic means of agitation.

Specifically, Costanza-Chock (2003) amends these definitions with his repertoire of electronic contention. Finally, classical theories of social movement have received criticism for their focus on organizational styles, and it may be necessary to adopt a broader view as suggested by Cathcart (1978) and DeLuca (1999). This paper seeks the expand upon classical social movement theories as described in the above literature by examining three cases of modern social movement group behavior.

Research Questions

The goal of this study is to paint a broader picture of how Internet-mediated social movement groups organize, agitate and achieve media attention. Based on the above literature, I pose the following research questions:

RQ1: To what degree do modern Internet-mediated SMG’s such as The Yes Men,

®™ark, and Electronic Disturbance Theater fit into Gerlach’s SPIN theory?

RQ2: To what degree do modern Internet-mediated SMG’s such as The Yes Men,

®™ark, and Electronic Disturbance Theater utilize methods of electronic contention as described by Costanza-Chock?

RQ3: To what degree does a framework of SPIN groups engaged in electronic contention reinforce criticisms of organizationally focused social movement literature?

Methods

To best illustrate the emerging trend of Internet-mediated SMG, the current study will analyze selected activities of three groups: ®™ark, The Yes Men, and Electronic

Disobedience Theater. Through thick description (Geertz, 1973; Neilsen and Rao, 1987;

Wittle, 2000; Sade-Beck, 2004) of illustrative activities, this paper will attempt to draw conclusions based on collected artifacts including news reports, journal articles, Web sites, videos and direct email communication with group members.

According to Neilsen and Rao (1987) who draw on Geertz’s (1973) original definition, “’Thick description’ entails the sorting out of structures of signification, unraveling layers of meaning created by human actors in social settings” (p. 525). Wittle

(2000) cautions against the application of this methodology to Internet networks as it may lead to “to a thin description and a flat analysis of the individual nodes of a network” (p.

5). However, Sade-Beck (2004) advocates for the use of thick description to conduct

Internet research. Specifically, “there is a good foundation for the use of qualitative research methodologies based on the integration of online and offline data gathering in

Internet ethnographic research to obtain [thick description]” (Sade-Beck, p. 13). As such,

elements of each of the three group’s structures, methods of agitation and media visibility will be illustrated based on collected artifacts. These artifacts will allow the current paper to answer the three research questions explained below and help paint a broader picture of how Internet-mediated SMG’s organize and operate. A brief overview of the selected groups is necessary for broader understanding.

®™ark

®™ark (pronounced artmark), originally created in 1993 as an Internet bulletin board to disseminate the founder’s political ideals, has since transformed (and incorporated itself) to a clearinghouse of activist ideas. The core of the ®™ark system is a database on the Web (www.rtmark.com) that connects ideas with activists, and activists with capital. This database is populated with user-generated ideas complete with discussion lists and links to resources. According to RTMARK (1998), ®™ark was established to combat “unchecked global rise of corporate power” by creating an Internet database that contains lists of “projects of sabotage and subversion, as well as financial rewards for their accomplishment” (p.293). What is most interesting about ®™ark is that it is a registered corporation. While this may seem counterintuitive given this current paper’s stance on viewing social movement groups as being organized in that manner,

®™ark’s incorporation is veneer only. According to a Myerson and Jain (2003) interview with Frank Guerrero:

®™ark’s primary reason for existing is to use the corporate veil as a way to

permit people to offset their liability for participating in these projects, many of

which fall into the grey areas of the law . . . as a corporate entity, ®™ark is able

to take these projects and provide a corporate umbrella for them, absorbing some

of the liability and displacing it from the workers and the funders (p.129).

According to their Web site, “®™ark is indeed a corporation, and benefits from corporate protections, but unlike other corporations, its "bottom line" is to improve culture, rather than its own pocketbook; it seeks cultural profit, not financial”

(www.rtmark.com).

Of interest is the way ®™ark solicits donations and expertise for their projects .

According to digitalarts.lcc.gatech.edu (2006):

®™ark is a brokerage that benefits from "limited liability" just like any other

corporation; using this principle, ®™ark supports the sabotage (informative

alteration) of corporate products, from dolls and children's learning tools to

electronic action games, by channeling funds from investors to workers for

specific projects grouped into "mutual funds

(digitalarts.lcc.gatech.edu/unesco/Internet/artists/int_a_rtmark.html).

By grouping projects into these “mutual funds,” ®™ark has show some success in both completing large scale projects and protecting those involved from institutional retaliation. Specifics will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.

The Yes Men

Of the three groups analyzed, The Yes Men are the most prolific in terms of generating their own media, having published both a book and feature length documentary. The story of The Yes Men is really a continuation of ®™ark, with founding members of ®™ark also being founding members of the Yes Men. What sets the two apart is the scope of their projects. While ®™ark specializes in providing ideas

and means for agitation projects, The Yes Men seem to specialize in physically and publicly performing stunts, specifically against large corporations. According to the

FAQ section of their website:

We need to be devious in order to achieve a condition of honesty. This is very

different from "guerrilla marketing," where companies are devious in order to

achieve a condition of real criminality, sometimes. But we certainly won't stoop

to actual lying, despite what you might think (www.theyesmen.org/faq/).

The Yes Men specialize in website parody, which they term “identity correction.”

Specifically, they mimic websites, (utilizing software called Reamweaver, a play on the popular Web design program Dreamweaver) in order to present their version of reality.

For example, during the 1999-2000 presidential election cycle, The Yes Men created a parody of George W. Bush’s website at GWBush.com (the actual candidate’s site is

GeorgeWBush.com). According to Bichlbaum, Bonanno, and Spunkmeyer (2004):

Bush was clearly in need of some big-time identity correction. Our GWBush.com

ended up looking almost exactly like Bush’s own site, but featured highlights

from Bush’s career: the decline of Texas to the status of most polluted state in the

union . . . his repeated and abject failures at business ventures; his refusal to deny

that he had taken cocaine . . . and, in the “Genealogy Fun” section, his

grandfather’s ties to the Nazis (p. 14).

In the case presented at the beginning of this chapter, The Yes Men were able to mimic

Dow Chemical’s website so successfully, that the BBC mistook their site for the actual

Dow Chemical site. A more in depth look at this group will be presented in subsequent chapters.

Electronic Disturbance Theater

The Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) is of interest to this study specifically because they are instrumental in expanding the technologies utilized by SMG’s to agitate electronically. EDT has developed, and continues to develop, much of the software technologies utilized for DoS attacks and form floods. In addition to furthering the technology of electronic activism, EDT is very active in utilizing their own product.

According to their own website, EDT “is a small group of cyber activists and artists engaged in developing the theory and practice of Electronic Civil Disobedience (ECD)”

(www.thing.net/~rdom/edd/). ECD, according to Wray (1998), provides a useful benchmark to travel back to the historical practice of civil disobedience in the United

States and travel forward to the imagined practice of civil disobedience in the near future.

(p.107). Wray goes on to suggest:

Acting in the tradition of non-violent direct action and civil disobedience,

proponents of Electronic Civil Disobedience are borrowing the tactics of trespass

and blockade from these earlier social movements and are applying them to the

Internet. A typical civil disobedience tactic has been for a group of people to

physically blockade, with their bodies, the entranceways of an opponent's office

or building or to physically occupy an opponent's office -- to have a sit-in.

Electronic Civil Disobedience, as a form of mass decentered electronic direct

action, utilizes virtual blockades and virtual sit-ins. Unlike the participant in a

traditional civil disobedience action, an ECD actor can participate in virtual

blockades and sit-ins from home, from work, from the university, or from other

points of access to the Net. Further, the ECD actor can act against an opponent

that is hundreds if not thousands of miles away. The Electronic Disturbance

Theater, primarily through its Flood Net device, is promoting ways to engage in

global, mass, collective and simultaneous Electronic Civil Disobedience and

direct action. (www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/EDTECD.html)

EDT, who originally focused on electronic actions against the Mexican and U.S. governments during the Zapatista incident described in the above literature, has since expanded their scope to other activist activities. Specifics will be discussed in later chapters.

Limitations

In the course of this study several limitations were discovered. First, only three social movement groups were studied. This limited the scope of this study, limiting generalizability of findings. Additionally, cases chosen for evaluation had been reported on in some form already which necessarily lends some bias towards research. However, because of the nature of the Internet, it would be difficult to witness many of the events described in subsequent sections firsthand.

Another limitation is the scope of this project. Missing from this discussion is a description and analysis of institutional control, an important element in evaluating social movement tactics. However, such discussion is beyond the scope of the current project.

Study Overview

This chapter was an introduction to the concepts and texts of this study. Chapter 2 begins the case studies by applying Gerlach’s (2001) SPIN theory to analyze structure of

®™ark, The Yes Men, and Electronic Disobedience Theater. Chapter 3 will apply

Costanza-Chock’s (2003) theory of ECD to examine specific tactics utilized by the three

selected groups. Chapter 4 will conclude the case studies with a examination of how analysis of such groups may reify critiques of classical social movement theory.

Additionally, it will provide general conclusions and direction for further scholarship.

CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATION

This chapter seeks to better understand the ways in which Internet-mediated

SMG’s organize. As early as 1970, Gerlach described a differing model for how social movement groups organize themselves. Rather than a top-down, bureaucratic model,

Gerlach suggests a less structured model consisting of a network of individuals and/or organizations working in concert to achieve a common goal. Instead of advocating a leadership/organizational approach, Gerlach (2001) proposes a segmented network of social movement groups. His theory outlines ways SMG’s are able to protect against establishment suppression, collaborate on like-minded projects, share resources and information, and closely associate with one another.

Since, according to Gerlach (2001), “segmentary, polycentric, and network organization[s] [are] more adapted to the task of challenging and changing society and culture than [are] the centralized organization” (P. 290), this chapter will break down

Gerlach’s SPIN theory into its individual components and analyze each as it may apply to the selected groups: ®™ark, The Yes Men, and Electronic Disturbance Theater. This discussion will begin with an outline of segments, followed by polycentricism, and integrated networks.

Spin Theory Segments

Central to the current discussion is that modern social movement groups acting within a particular movement are segmentary in nature. Gerlach and Hine (1970) suggest that “by describing a movement as segmentary, we mean that it is composed of a great variety of localized groups or cells which are essentially independent, but which combine

to form larger configurations or divide to form smaller units” (p. 41). This system of segments is beneficial to agitators in that a.) it allows for multiple memberships across different groups; b.) activism is/can be a part-time and short-term time investment for members and; c.) personal energy and involvement is often the only requirement for participation in these groups (Melucci, 1984, p. 829). This section will concern itself with the concept of multiple membership, how segmentation closely resembles the physicalities of online agitation, and how segmentation is beneficial to both individual members, groups and movements as a whole.

First, segments allow for individuals to participate in multiple memberships across groups seeking similar goals. A key concept of this is that segments often overlap, enabling actors to be members or leaders of several organizations simultaneously

(Gerlach, 2001). This is quite different than the bureaucratically defined movement groups suggested by Stewart, Smith, and Denton (2001), which must be “at least minimally organized,” have identifiable leaders, members, and organizational coalitions

(p. 2). While Gerlach’s segments may not exist in chaos, they also do not necessarily exist in order. According to Gerlach and Hine (1970):

All social systems are composed of parts or cells, but in a bureaucratically

centralized society, these segments are always subordinated to a center and

operate according to a prescribed chain of command. Furthermore, new segments

are formed in accordance with the rules and at the decision of or at least with the

approval of the central administration. In contrast in a segmentary system fission

and proliferation of cells take place independently, unrelated to any central

decision making (p. 41-42).

A note here: In the above quote, Gerlach does not specify group or cell size, an important feature of modern tech-enhanced social movement groups, which is in stark contrast to traditional conceptions of what constitutes a social movement group. The notion that groups are segmented suggests that Stewart et al.’s (2001) conception of movement groups may be inadequate as it potentially leaves out those groups that may not have readily identifiable membership. While many definitions, such as Stewart et al.’s, suggest that movement groups must be minimally organized and have certain membership, the segmentary portion of Gerlach’s theory allows for groups to have both singular members and transient actors. Stewart et al. (2001) would suggest that minimal and transient membership constitutes a “trend, fad or unorganized protest, not a social movement.” (p. 2). Stewart et al.’s definition leaves out groups have extremely transient memberships or no “identifiable” members at all.

Second, the segmented section of Gerlach’s model is quite appropriate when considering online activism in online arenas, as it closely describes the actual activity of online activism. In the physical world, a person or persons group together over the

Internet to agitate towards a common goal. Often they are separated by both time and space when communicating with others in the group. As such, individual group members are segmented from one another, as the groups they are a part of can be segmented from the movement as a whole.

Common sense seems to support this idea. On an individual level, only one person can utilize a computer at a time. While others may look on, only a singular person can actually operate it at a time. This idea is not unique to protestors. Even if one is part of a self-managing team, or part of a division/unit in a corporation or governmental

structure, engaging with electronic devices is a solitary venture. New media have provided new ways for individuals to communicate with others across vast distances via the Internet, but by utilizing devices such as email, instant messaging, Voice over Internet

Protocol (VoIP), a person is still solitarily engaged with the medium in order to communicate.

While activities may be shared, echoed, or co-opted elsewhere in the world, the fact remains that computer actors are spatially isolated. So by very nature, people engaged in this type of behavior are necessarily isolated from each other in a very real way. As such, online actors are segmentary simply because of the medium they utilize.

Third, the segmentary nature of groups also allows members to achieve goals in a way most appropriate to their individual and/or group’s ideology. According to Gerlach and Hine (1970):

In a segmentary system, each unit has different ideas about how to achieve the

more general objectives of the movement, and each interprets the movement

ideology in it’s own way. New cells are formed from the splitting of an old cell,

from proliferation by the gathering of new members under new leaders, and from

the combinations and permutations of these (p. 42).

Specifically, segmentation allows each group or member to develop and apply their own style to achieve goals (Gerlach and Hine, 1970). Where Gerlach views this as a strength,

Stewart et al. (2001) views this phenomena as a detraction to effectiveness. They claim, for example, that “movement persuaders must deal with competing and often antagonistic organizations, each with its own leaders, followers, and strategies . . . to distance the movement’s mainstream from dangerous ‘fringe elements’ to attain legitimacy and

credibility among the public” (p. 141). Gerlach sees the division of groups less as a competition for resources and more as an alternate way to achieve a similar goal.

Specifically, Gerlach posits reasons why groups segment: for individual personal power, preexisting cleavages between groups, competition among groups, and ideological differences. One other major cause for segmentation, according to Gerlach and Hine

(1970) is:

what we have decided to call “geographic peel-off.” Members of one cell will

move to another city for extra-movement reasons – usually jobs or family

connections. Unless they find a compatible . . . group to join, these individuals

will often initiate a new cell and begin converting local residents (p.46).

While many of the theories in the above reviewed literature speak to one or many of these reasons, especially McCarthy and Zald (1977) with their theory of Resource Mobilization, which describes competition and cleavages based on resources, none are all inclusive.

According to Gerlach (2001):

In all of these movements, individuals and small or local groups each feel the

need to take the initiative in achieving those movement goals the person or the

groups considers important. They don’t wait to be asked. This helps produce

divisions among persons and groups over ideology and tactics (p.291).

In Gerlach’s (2001) view, however, this segmentation, is a positive outcome of social movement group organization: “having a variety of groups permits a social movement to do different things and reach out to different populations” (p. 293).

Polycentric

That social movement groups are segmentary also suggests that groups are polycentric in terms of leadership. According to Gerlach (2001), “by polycentric I mean that these movements have many leaders or centers of leadership, and that these many leaders are not ultimately directed or commanded through a chain of command under a central leader” (p. 294). SPIN theory treats leadership quite differently than classical and/or sociological definitions of social movement leaders (e.g. Simons). In contrast,

Gerlach and Hine (1970) suggest that social movement groups should be viewed through an anthropological lens:

The term used in social anthropology to describe those societies or tribes which

do not have a leadership hierarchy is “acephalous,” which means without a head

or headless. Such a tribe is a social cultural and ethical entity, yet its segments are

politically and economically autonomous. In this type of structure there is no

political or decision-making authority above the level of the local community or

localized clan or lineage of kinsman (p. 34-35).

While there exists no leadership of the whole, there certainly exists some guidance for action at a micro level. As suggested by Gerlach and Hine (1970), “relationships between their leaders and followers are of the primus inter pares [first among equals] type” (p. 35).

This idea contrasts sharply with Stewart et al.’s (2001) idea of social movements, for which leaders are central to decision making processes. This section showcases the difference between classical social movement leadership definitions and the polycentric portion of Gerlach’s SPIN theory.

Simons (1970) suggests that “any movement, it is argued, must fulfill the same functional requirements as more formal collectives. These imperatives constitute rhetorical requirements for the leadership of the movement” (p.2). If, as Simons suggests, a movement is obligated to fulfill the same rhetorical requirements as “more formal collectives,” then this necessitates certain rhetorical requirements of a centralized leader.

These requirements include maintaining membership, secure adoption of the movements ideology by both members and the public at large, and directly address resistance to said ideology (p. 3-4).

Stewart et al. (2001) support this single leader model of social movement by suggesting that a movement must have an identifiable leader to be considered a valid social movement (p. 2). In their explanation of social movement leaders, Stewart et al.

(2001) suggest:

Typical leaders of typical social movements are organizers who must foster and

maintain unity within specific organizations and coalitions, or at least cooperation,

among competing organizations each of which has its own beliefs about what

must be done, who must do it, and how it must be done. They are decision-

makers with limited legitimacy and powers to reward and punish while constantly

facing conflicting demands on their positions and movements from within and

without. And they are the symbols, the faces, of their movements in the eyes of

members, sympathizers, legitimizers, countermovements, and institutions (p.124).

This quote suggests that movements have a singular leader with responsibilities for cohesion between groups, decisions for the movement as a whole, holding power (at least

to some degree) over direction and actions of the movement, and that a movement leader functions as the “face” of the movement to the media.

SPIN theory disagrees with these statements. According to Gerlach (2001), “The leaders, like the segments, are not organized in a hierarchy they are ‘heterarchich’ [sic]”

(p. 294). However, this does not mean that the media or movement outsides doesn’t pick a spokesperson for the movement or group. According to Gerlach (2001), movements or segments “do not have a commander in chief. While the press often picks out an individual to feature and quote, in reality it is rare for one person to be acknowledged by participants as the movement leader” (p. 294). Gerlach and Hine (1970) introduced this concept when investigating Pentecostal and Black Power movements: “To outsiders, these men often appear to be key individuals without whom the movement would grind to a halt. But not one of them could be called a leader of the movement in which they work” (p. 36).

While Gerlach and Hine (1970) suggest while movements do have some organization, they (or their segments) do not have a centralized leader. According to

Gerlach and Hine (1970), movements “have organizational structures which can be best described as acephalous – or better, polycephalous (many headed)” (p. 35). Gerlach and

Hine (1970) go on to suggest five features of polycentric leadership. First, leaders across multiple segments are able to disagree with each on direction and actions. Second, segment leaders do not have a roster of, or even know about all segments and/or segment members who consider themselves of the movement. Third, no single segment leader can make decisions binding on all participants or segments in the movement and none can speak for the whole. Fourth, no segment leader in a movement has regulatory power

over the movement. Fifth, there is no such thing as a “card carrying” member. There is no leader, therefore, who can even determine who is or is not a member of the movement, let alone direct, regulate or speak for that movement (p. 36-37).

Where scholars like Stewart et al. (2001) agree with SPIN concepts is in what qualities a person must possess to be a leader of a segment. According to Stewart et al.

(2001), “leaders are able to lead because they possess one or more of three critical attributes—charisma, prophecy, and pragmatism. Charisma allows leaders to inspire by leading followers to see the truth, imagine what might be, see themselves as people and dare to demand change in the face of real danger” (p.124). Gerlach (2001) agrees with this point; “movement leaders are more likely to be charismatic than bureaucratic.

Leadership is usually situational, as leaders arise to cope with particular situations or episodic challenges” (p. 294).

In sum, leaders in a SPIN are typically situational in nature and do not make decision for the movement as a whole. In fact, according to Gerlach (2001), “social movement groups are likely to try to make decisions by having everyone agree or consent, and leaders must learn hot to work within this often long and laborious process” (p. 295).

Integrated Networks

Possibly the most interesting potion of Gerlach’s SPIN theory is the concept of integrated networks. Much has been written about networks in social movements. For example, Melucci (1984) suggests:

The normal situation of today’s “movement” is to be a network of small groups

submerged in everyday life which require a personal involvement in experiencing

and practicing cultural innovation. They emerge only on specific issues . . . the

submerged network, although composed of separate small groups, is a system of

exchange. The new organizational form of contemporary movements is not just

“instrumental” for their goals. It is the goal in itself. Since the action is focused

on cultural codes, the form of the movement is a message, symbolic challenge to

the dominant patterns. Short-term and reversible commitment, multiple leadership

open to challenge, temporary and ad hoc organizational structures, are the basis

for the internal collective identity, but also for symbolic confrontation with the

system (p. 829).

There is good reason for looking at social movements as networks, especially those that utilize online-technologies, as the structure of the Internet (and even ways we talk about the Internet, e.g. “the net”) is an interconnected Web of computers and servers.

Much like Melucci suggests above when referring to social movement networks, computer network structures are comprised of separate computers or groupings of computer servers that combine to route information from the source to the requestor.

These systems are always in flux, as one system may be responsible for routing certain information at one moment, then responsible for routing other information later. The topology of computer networks, specifically the Internet (world wide web) is best explained by Calvert, Doar, and Zegura (1997) who suggest that “today’s Internet can be viewed as a collection of interconnected routing domains. Each routing domain is a group of nodes (routers, switches, and hosts), under a single (technical) administration, that share routing information and policy” (p. 160). If one were to map this concept of the

Internet onto SPIN segments, the above definition could be translated into: today’s social movement groups can be viewed as a collection of interconnected segments operating in

a particular movement towards a common goal. Each segment is a group of people, under a single organization that shares information, activities and resources with other segments.

To further strengthen the arguement that computer networks and SPIN networks are similar, I pull further from Calvert et al.’s (1997) definition:

There is no central administration that controls - or even keeps track of - the

detailed topology of the Internet although its general shape may be influenced to

some small degree by policies for assignment of IP addresses and government

funding of inter domain exchange points, the Internet, for the most part, just grows.

The technology used to route and forward packets is explicitly designed to operate

in such an environment (p. 160).

This definition is not dissimilar to Gerlach and Hine’s (1970) definition of networks in a

SPIN: “Something that is reticulate is weblike, resembling a network—with crossing and intercrossing lines. We have chosen this term to describe an organization in which the cells, or nodes, are tied together, not through any central point, but rather through intersecting sets of personal relationships and other group linkages” (p. 55). This idea of integrated networks is an important component of SPIN as it unifies segments towards a common goal. While it does not specify the ways in which unification happens, nor does it suggest temporal duration of unity, it is the cornerstone of SPIN theory. However, necessary to the present discussion is why segments network together and how they do so.

First, Gerlach (2001) suggests that segments “form an integrated network or reticulate structure through nonhierarchical linkages among their participants and through the understandings, identities, and opponents these participants share” (p. 295). This

quote is appropriate as networked structures are often more conducive in sharing resources and support essential to coordination of efforts and activities then are bureaucratic structures. According to Gerlach, et al. (2000):

The development of the fax and especially the Internet have contributed greatly to

the ability of participants to communicate across their networks, to expand

recruitment of new participants and segments, and to develop and express the

overarching ideology which ties segments together even as they maintain the

specific group ideologies which makes them ethnolocally attractive (p. 15).

Escobar (2004) echoes these sentiments by suggesting that “in cyberspace and complexity we find a viable and at least potentially meaningful model of social life. This model is based on self-organization, non-hierarchy, and complex adaptive behavior on the part of agents, a model that contrasts sharply with the dominant model of capitalism and modernity” (p. 353). As discussed in the above literature, bureaucratic leader/organizationally focused models often focus on both resource acquisition and a linear life path as prerequisites for success. This necessitates competition rather than cooperation. Networked segments are also arranged nonhierarchically, which is often helps facilitate sharing. Much like the discussion of polycentric leaders, there is no one individual segment or network of segments that has total ownership or control; there is no one group that speaks for the collective. However, also as discussed in the literature, social movement groups are typically low on both social and monetary capitol.

Networked segments address this issue by providing a vehicle to share resources.

Second, since networks enable movement participants to exchange information, ideas and coordinate action (Gerlach, 2000, p. 296), it is necessary to describe further

how this phenomenon occurs. Gerlach, Palmer, and Stringer (2000) suggest that “SPINs are networks, that is they are coordinated through reticulation or networking. The individual segments are woven or integrated into networks by personal interactions among leaders and participants, by overlapping participation, and by the sharing of ideologies, common causes and common opponents” (p. 14). Much like individual membership within a segment, segment membership within a network is far from static.

According to Gerlach (2001), “Networks do not have a defined limit but rather expand or contract as groups interact or part ways” (p. 296). This can happen in a multitude of ways: 1.) a member could quit altogether; 2.) a member could split participation between multiple segments, thus reducing overall participation in the initial segment; 3.) a member could shift membership to a differing segment completely. Curtis and Zurcher

(1973) speak to this by suggesting:

Interorganizational processes . . . can be identified on two levels which

conceptually overlap: the organizational level where networks are established by

joint activities, staff, boards of directors, target clientele, resources, etc.; the

individual level, where networks are established by multiple affiliations of

members (p. 53) .

Especially when considering SPINs that operate nationally or trans-nationally (which is typical of the groups selected for this thesis), groups will often combine for one-time projects. For instance, if certain members of group A are interested in a project that certain members of group B are planning, often they will create a temporary segment for that particular project, combining the interested parties of both A and B. Diani (1999) supports this claim by suggesting:

When mobilization takes place on a national scale it usually relies upon

connecting structures provided either by the local branches of the organizations,

or (perhaps more frequently) by other types of organizational infrastructures.

These may include other types of associations and informal networks operating as

“transmovement free spaces” (p. 3).

The use of the Internet certainly facilitates this phenomenon since it allows for near instant collaboration with others in geographically distant areas. Additionally, it also makes conceivable the independent existence of these informal networks (Diani, 1999, p.3). This is an important feature of SPIN theory, as it accounts for groups that would otherwise not be classified as movement groups by classical definitions. Specifically, since the structure of a SPIN allows a leader in one group to be a follower in another, and vice-versa, groups that combine for one-time projects necessarily qualify as a social movement group. Additionally, according to Gerlach (2001), “movement participants are not only linked internally, but with other movements whose participants share attitudes and values” (p. 296). Since segment membership is transitory within a particular movement, members can shift segment and network affiliation between movements.

Please allow me this tangent: As communication scholars, it is easy to get trapped by definitions. In a recent discussion with a professor on the topic of this thesis, it was asserted that if one could not categorize which movement a particular group identified with, said group could not be classified as a movement group. Rather, it should be relegated to the status of “pressure group.” It is the position of this thesis that this opinion is short sighted. By defining movement groups in broad terms, the theoretical strength of the network portion of Gerlach’s SPIN model allows mergers of differing movement

actors to collaborate on projects that may be beneficial to one, or both movements. Since, as Diani (1999) suggests, social movements should be regarded as “networks of relationships which connect informally - i.e., without procedural norms or formal organizational bindings - a multiplicity of individuals and organizations, who share a distinctive collective identity, and interact around confliction issues “(p.2), ad hoc networks are necessarily elevated from the realm of “pressure groups” that are “less worthy of scholarly attention” and hypothetically, into the realm of communication scholarship. Since a goal of this study is to paint a broader picture of how Internet- mediated social movement groups organize, it is of interest to determine to what degree modern Internet-mediated SMG’s fit into Gerlach’s SPIN theory.

As exemplars of social movement groups engaged in activism through electronic and online methods of agitation, the section below will examine the organization of three groups, ®™ark, the Yes Men and Electronic Disturbance Theater to address RQ1. The following criterion will be used to determine if groups under study can be classified as

SPINs: 1.) If the group can be considered a segment of a social movement, as defined by

Gerlach (2001); 2.) if a group’s leader, if one exists, cannot be said to speak for the movement as a whole as outlined by Gerlach’s (2001) concept of polycentricism and; 3.) if there is evidence of member, resource, and activity sharing between the group under scrutiny and other groups within the movement. This sharing will be consider to be evidence of Gerlach’s concept of integrated networking.

The next section with start with a description of each group, followed by discussion of decrees of inclusion within Gerlach’s (2001) SPIN model. An interesting side bar to the current thesis: It was found that groups that potentially fall into Gerlach’s

SPIN theory are quite challenging to research. Gerlach suggest that SPIN groups are resistant to institutional repression because of their transient membership, sporadic coalitions, and situational leaders. While this likely prevents suppression, it also presents significant barriers to research. Unless one able to physically witness the physical acts of

SPIN SMG activities, a researcher can never be sure exactly who is doing what when. A prime example of this is ®™ark and the Yes Men; There are nearly as many accounts of each group’s genesis as there are accounts of their exploits. However, the reality of their foundations is very different depending on the source. As such, both groups will be discussed concurrently.

Description of SMGs ®™ark and the Yes Men

While foundational accounts of ®™ark and the Yes Men are murky, what is clear is that the Yes Men spawned from ®™ark. More convoluted is 1.) when ®™ark was formed; 2.) at what point the Yes Men spun off from ®™ark and; 3.) how many members, if any, are shared between the two organizations. First, the genesis of both

®™ark and The Yes Men is so interrelated, it would be difficult to discuss one without mentioning the other. Much of the history of both groups is shrouded in secrecy, mostly because the actors of both groups have chosen pseudonyms when engaged in activities or when being interviewed. However, the genesis of both the Yes Men and ®™ark began with the activism of two men, Igor Vamos and Jacques Servin. That said, there are several conflicting accounts over the formation of these groups.

According to Boyd (2005), “a cohesive timeline of the history of [®™ark and the

Yes Men] does not exist . . . There is purposeful confusion by Vamos and Servin about

their identities and group involvements, as well as discrepancies found between various sources documenting the dares and circumstances behind the creation of the Yes Men” (p.

4). For example, in a 2001 interview with Umelec magazine, Ray Thomas (who is identified in the interview as the official spokesperson for ®™ark) states: “[®™ark] formed in 1993 when we did our first action, Barbie/GI Joe, and we’ve done many actions since” (Buehler and Kera, 2001). In an 1998 nettime.org interview at the Open X conference with a ®™ark representative named Ernesto Lucha claims “In 1991 [®™ark] was founded by a small group of people who were concerned with the power that corporations had errogated [sic] over the years, and thought they had gotten way too far in getting rights as citizens” (Bosma, 1998). However, ®™ark’s own website suggests a third date: “since 1996, the RTMARK brand has accrued value by providing key services to artists, activists and the intellectual community”

(www.rtmark.com/rtcom/success/newsroom). As of this writing, there exists only one academic attempt at pining down a timeline for either organization.

According to Boyd (2005), “In 1993, Igor Vamos founded the Barbie Liberation

Organization (BLO), made up of anti-commercial activists intent on exposing gender stereotypes.” According to most accounts, Vamos and other in the BLO purchased talking Barbie and GI Joe dolls from California retail stores during the 1993 Christmas shopping season. He then opened the dolls and switched their voice devices so that “G.I.

Joes would say things like ‘Math is hard,’ while Barbies would bark ‘Dead men tell no lies’” (Bichlbaum, Bonanno and Spunkmeyer, 2004, p. 11). Once the voice devices were switched, the dolls were then returned to the stores they were purchased from. The purpose of this stunt was to question corporate profiteering of gender roles. In order for

their prank to reach the masses, and to claim responsibility for the stunt, the BLO sent out press releases, launched a website, and recorded videos of their actions which resulted in international press coverage (Barry, 1998; Boyd, 2005; rtmark.com).

In 1996, Jacques Servin was working as a programmer for Maxis, a software firm responsible for creating the popular SimCopter games. Prior to the release of the game to the public, Servin altered the game so that an army of male ‘bimbos’ clad only in tiny swimsuits ran around kissing each other and the player’s avatar. This addition to the game was not discovered until after its initial release of 50,000 copies (Silberman, 1996;

Barry, 1998; Byod, 2005). Servin was terminated from Maxis immediately upon the discovery. According to Boyd (2005), “the incident, like the BLO stunt, earned worldwide exposure which Servin capitalized on by creating the anonymous activist website ®™ark in late 1996” (p. 13).

The transformation of Vamos and Servin to their pseudonyms Frank Guerrero and

Ray Thomas and then again to Mike Bonanno and Andy Bichlbaum signifies their transition from individual actors, to ®™ark members and then to Yes Men.

After three years of agitation under the ®™ark banner, Vamos and Servin created the

Yes Men. According to Boyd (2005), “Vamos and Servin underwent . . . identity metamorphosis in 1999 with the creation of the Yes Men, this time as Mike Bonanno and

Andy Bichlbaum, respectively” (p. 16).

Third, in terms of membership of the two groups, numbers are mixed. Often the two organizations are confused as the same however, interviews with members make it clear that many members (including Vamos and Servin) are transient between the two

organizations. According to a 2001 Umelec interview with an unidentified ®™ark member:

About four people got together and decided to put some energy into ®™ark and

decided to make a system that would make sense, but you know it’s changed over

the years and gotten more refined. In around 1996, 1997 it took its present form.

There’s about six [members] now. I work a lot on the website. Other people do

the finances. We all write press releases, which is the main activity of ®™ark,

writing press releases, we all collaborate on that (Buehler and Kera, 2001).

During a 1998 nettime.org interview, an ®™ark member identified as Ernesto Lucha suggested that there were “about five [members] at the moment, it is a fluid entity, as corporations are. We have a varying membership. We hide behind the name ®™ark, we avoid personal liability for things that ®™ark might be doing” (Bosma, 1998).

In sum, the specific membership and foundation date of these organizations is questionable. What can be said with some certainty, is that Vamos and Servin had a hand in creating both organizations, and as of the writing of this thesis, most closely identify themselves with the Yes Men. While both groups agitate in a number if differing social movement, the are most frequently active in the anti-globalization movement.

Additionally, both groups agitate against “unchecked global rise of corporate power” yet, however, each utilize differing means to achieve the same goal.

Electronic Disturbance Theater

While the pathway of ®™ark and the Yes Men is far from linear, shrouded in secrecy and misdirection, The Electronic Disturbance Theater is much more open about their membership and foundational story. EDT’s genesis, much like that of the Yes Men,

stems from another group and begins with Ricardo Dominguez. Dominguez joined the activist group Critical Art Ensemble (CAE) during the 1980's, during that organization’s formative years. According to Rolf (2005), “Dominguez, who was instrumental in founding [EDT], had come from the Critical Art Ensemble (CAE), a similar small collective supporting a number of causes including AIDS awareness” (p. 70). According to Dominguez (2004), “CAE was a group of artists of various specializations dedicated to exploring the intersections between art, technology, radical politics, and critical theory”

(www.gothamist.com). The mission of CAE was to develop tactics and tools of resistance against the “authoritarian tendencies of a given cultural situation” (Hirsch, 2005).

According an interview with Critical Art Ensemble member Steve Kurtz on the formation of CAE:

I wish that there was a grand heroic story for the founding of CAE, but there isn't.

We were disgruntled students who decided we needed to take control of our own

education and exercise some agency within the cultural environment in which we

found ourselves. The formation of CAE in 1986 was simply a response to a

localized problem of cultural alienation. (Hirsch, 2005, p. 26)

CAE was founded originally in 1986 with membership including Steve Kurtz, Steve

Barnes, Dorian Burr, and Hope Kurtz. This membership fluctuated between 1986 and

2005. According to Hirsch (2005), “Barnes and [Kurtz] founded CAE in 1986. The original members also included Hope Kurtz, Dorian Burr, Claudia Bucher and George

Barker. After George and Claudia left in 1988, Ricardo Dominguez and Bev Schlee joined [CAE]. Ricardo left in 1993. Dorian left in 2002.”

An important milestone to note: In 1994, CAE authored a book entitled The

Electronic Disturbance, published by Autonomedia. This book (and its 1996 companion

Electronic Civil Disobedience), distributed freely by CAE and presumably written in collaboration with Dominguez, expresses their theories of Electronic Civil Disobedience

(ECD). These theories, according to Wray (1998), provides a useful benchmark understanding both the historical practice of civil disobedience in the United States and travel forward to the imagined practice of civil disobedience in the near future. (p.107).

Specifically, Wray suggests practitioners of ECD act “in the tradition of non-violent direct action and civil disobedience . . . proponents of Electronic Civil Disobedience are borrowing the tactics of trespass and blockade from these earlier social movements and are applying them to the Internet” (www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/EDTECD.html).

It is the experience with Critical Art Ensemble and ECD that prompted

Dominguez to break off from CAE and create the Electronic Disturbance Theater.

According to Dominguez (2004):

In the 90's I wanted to pursue the development of ECD as a practice and not just a

theory. I found the support I needed from very distinct camps on-line: the net.art

community in NYC and the Zapatista communities around the world. They both

understood that we needed to explore the use of the digital space beyond

communication and documentation – we needed simple gestures of mass-non

violent direct action on-line.

(http://gothamist.com/2004/11/29/ricardo_dominguez_artist_and_electronic_civil

_disobedience_pioneer.php)

And so the Electronic Disturbance Theater was born. EDT’s membership, as of the time of this writing is composed of Dominguez, Carmin Karasic, Brett Stalbaum, and Stefan

Wray, who is an activist and media scholar. Karasic and Stalbaum were instrumental in creating the technology behind FloodNet, EDT’s main method of agitation. FloodNet will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

Findings

As exemplars of social movement groups engaged in activism through electronic and online methods of agitation, the section above sought to sketch the organizational qualities of ®™ark, the Yes Men and Electronic Disturbance Theater to address RQ1.

As discussed, the following criterion is used to determine if groups under study can be classified as SPINs: 1.) If the group can be considered a segment of a social movement, as defined by Gerlach (2001); 2.) if a group’s leader, if one exists, cannot be said to speak for the movement as a whole as outlined by Gerlach’s (2001) concept of polycentricism and; 3.) if there is evidence of member, resource, and activity sharing between the group under scrutiny and other groups within the movement. This sharing will be consider to be evidence of Gerlach’s concept of integrated networking.

First, the agitation targets of the above groups indicate that they are segments of the larger anti-globalization movement (though no group explicitly claims allegiance to a singular movement). As suggested by Gerlach and Hine (1970) “by describing a movement as segmentary, we mean that it is composed of a great variety of localized groups or cells which are essentially independent, but which combine to form larger configurations or divide to form smaller units” (p. 41). The sketches of ®™ark and the

Yes Men and EDT each provided evidence of cleavages from one group to another. In the case of ®™ark, Vamos and Servin established the group, then moved on to form the

Yes Men years later. Both ®™ark and the Yes Men seem to agitate towards similar

goals, but often utilize differing tactics to achieve the same end. This can also be said of

Electronic Disturbance Theater. Dominquez, an early member and theorist for the

Critical Art Ensemble, split off to form his own group, EDT. Like, ®™ark and the Yes

Men, EDT and CAE agitate towards similar goals of the anti-globalization movement.

Second, each group analyzed is polycentric. As reviewed above, Gerlach and

Hine (1970, p. 36-37) suggest five features of polycentric leadership. First, leaders across multiple segments are able to disagree with each on direction and actions. While there is no documentation to show where the analyzed groups have disagreed over ideology or practices, one can infer that a difference in opinion caused Vamos and Servin to move from ®™ark to the Yes Men and Dominquez from CAE to Electronic Disturbance

Theater. A personal interview I conducted with Mike Bonanno seems to support this assumption: “we were . . . getting burned out on rtmark, it needed new blood.”

Gerlach and Hine suggest that segment leaders do not have a roster of, or even know about all segments and/or segment members who consider themselves of the movement. Of the groups analyzed, EDT was the only group to have a published roster of core members. However, considering the vast number of people that participate in

FloodNet activities, or respond to ®™ark fund activities, or participate in parody websites creation utilizing the Yes Men’s ReamWeaver, it can be inferred that none of the core members mentioned above have a roster of all participants. Nor would they want one, considering the questionable legalities of some of their activities. Specifically, both the Yes Men and ®™ark have taken steps to mask their membership for that very reason, which certainly questions whether anyone in that organization has knowledge of the true identities of other members.

Third and fourth, Gerlach and Hine suggest that no single segment leader can make decisions binding on all participants or segments in the movement, and no segment leader in a movement has regulatory power over the movement. Considering the vast number of groups that agitate within the anti-globalization movement, the segmentation of the groups in question, the movement of media-defined key members from one group to another, it is clear that no one person speaks for the sum of the anti-globalization movement. Additionally, no one person in the groups analyzed can be said to be the spokesperson or leader of groups other than their own. For instance, EDT has several spokespeople. Stephan Wray is prolific in his writing, as is Dominguez. However, nether claim leadership of EDT. The same can be said of Vamos and Servin. Both are quoted often (utilizing their pseudonyms), yet nether claim ownership of their own group, let alone others in the anti-globalization movement. There is no leader, therefore, who can even determine who is or is not a member of the movement, let alone direct, regulate or speak for that movement.

Fifth, Gerlach and Hine suggest that there is no such thing as a “card carrying” member. It would appear that participatory action is the only requirement for membership in these groups. All three have websites that enable a person to “sign up” to receive communiqués, submit suggestions for action, and ways to recruit others. There is no evidence of membership dues or formal obligations.

Finally, both groups can be considered integrated networks, in that they share members and leaders, collaborate on projects, and share resources. Gerlach and Hine

(1970) suggest that integrated networked groups are weblike, with crossing and intercrossing lines. “We have chosen this term to describe an organization in which the

cells, or nodes, are tied together, not through any central point, but rather through intersecting sets of personal relationships and other group linkages” (Gerlach and Hine,

1970, p. 55). Gerlach (2001) suggests that segments “form an integrated network or reticulate structure through nonhierarchical linkages among their participants and through the understandings, identities, and opponents these participants share” (p. 295). This quote is appropriate as networked structures are often more conducive in sharing resources and support essential to coordination of efforts and activities then are bureaucratic structures. This concept is closely echoed by Dominquez when speaking about his involvement with EDT’s Zapatista project:

The movement of information through various Zapatista networks of resistance

can be said to have occurred via a strange chaos moving horizontally, non-linearly,

and over many sub-networks. Rather than operating through a central command

structure in which information filters down from the top in a vertical and linear

manner - the model of radio and television broadcasting - information about the

Zapatistas on the Internet has moved laterally from node to node

(www.gothamist.com).

As opposed to bureaucratic organizationally focused models of social movement organization, which place heavy emphasis on both resource acquisition and a linear life path as prerequisites for success, integrated networks places emphasis on collaboration.

This collaborative model was found in the groups analyzed. Indications point towards the analyzed groups sharing resources, specifically Web space and technologies such as

FloodNet and ReamWeaver, and projects such as Toywars. According to Hirsch (2005) in an interview with CAE’s Steve Kurtz:

There are many reasons [why we work collaboratively]. One key reason was that

we believed that cultural praxis was too complex for one person to do by

him/herself. Idea generation, conceptualization, research, theorization, material

production, administration, site scouting, cultural and social presentation,

documentation and archive construction--it's too much. Moreover, no one person

can be good at all these things--a division of labor was necessary. We also wanted

to be able to address whatever topic we felt was important at the moment and to

examine it in whatever medium or combination of media we thought was the most

suitable. One person can't do all this in any kind of timely way. And finally, we

were poor; we knew we had to combine resources (p. 28).

It is this division of labor, this combining of resources, that qualifies the analyzed groups as integrated networks.

In sum, the groups analyzed were found to be SPIN groups as defined by Gerlach

(2001) because 1.) they are all members of a greater social movement, yet are not limited to agitating exclusively within it and thus Segmentary; 2.) leaders of the analyzed groups cannot be said to speak for the whole of the movement, or the any of the groups analyzed other than their own and thus Polycentric and; 3.) they are Integrated Networks because they share membership, resources and projects.

With this in mind, the next chapter will examine the tactics which Internet- mediated social movement groups in an effort to answer RQ2.

STRATEGIES: CHAPTER 3

The former chapter sought to better understand the ways in which Internet- mediated SMGs organize. The current chapter seeks to gain a better understanding of the strategies of Internet-mediated SMGs. As suggested in the literature, many scholars have defined strategies that are useful in describing the activities of social movement groups. For example, Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen (1993) suggest seven strategies utilized by classically conceived agitators as petitioning the establishment, promulgation for the group, solidification of the group, polarization between groups, nonviolent resistance, escalation/confrontation of the cause, and Gandhi/guerrilla events. Similarly, Stewart et al. (2001), defines six strategies of social movement: transforming perceptions of reality, altering self-perception of protestors, legitimizing the social movement, prescribing courses of action, mobilizing for action, and sustaining the social movement. While these strategies are still essentially useful, they no longer completely describe current day tactics.

This chapter contends that the Internet has become a valuable tool for social movement groups. According to Denning (2001):

The Internet . . . can benefit individuals and small groups with few resources as

well as organizations and coalitions that are large or well-funded. It facilitates such

activities as educating the public and media, raising money, forming coalitions

across geographical boundaries, distributing petitions and action alerts, and

planning and coordinating events on a regional or international level. It allows

activists in politically repressive states to evade government censors and monitors

(p. 242).

According to Vegh (2003), “activists now take advantage of the technologies and techniques offered by the Internet to achieve their traditional goals” (p. 71). If, as alluded to by aforementioned scholars, the Internet provides powerful tools for communicating and coordinating action (Denning, 2001, p. 242), classical definitions are in need of an update.

To echo some concepts introduced in previous chapters, it is important to note how the Internet and other networked technologies have changed the landscape of activism.

Since the advent of the Internet, people the world over have taken advantage of the net’s ability to link people and causes together that would otherwise exist separately, whether due to geographic barriers or unawareness. The ability to network, both physically in terms of computer networks and communicatively in terms of social and political networks, has certain implications for the study of movement groups and is not described completely in theories furthered by either Bowers et al. (1993) or Stewart et al. (2001).

The shift from physical battlegrounds to virtual ones makes sense considering the widespread use of the Internet and related technologies.

In 2003, to describe a shift from more conventional, “real word” tactics, to those in the online realm, Costanza-Chock defines a repertoire of electronic contention. He does so by positing three forms electronic contention: conventional, disruptive, and violent. This approach to describing the tactics of social movement group will be the lens by which this chapter examines the chosen groups outlined in chapter one. This chapter will follow Costanza-Chock by discussing each component of the repertoire individually, followed by short vignettes of how the Yes Men, ®™ark, and EDT utilize the Internet to

agitate, and conclude with analysis of the degree to which the groups can utilize the repertoire.

Electronic Civil Disobedience Conventional Contention

The above section alludes to the idea that social movements of today rely on the

Internet, at least to some degree, to achieve their ends. To describe these phenomena,

Costanza-Chock (2003) outlines the first mode of electronic contention: conventional.

Conventional electronic contention is the most widespread and easily identifiable tactic utilized by current SMG’s. According to Costanza-Chock (2003), “the vast majority of electronic contention by SMOs involves the use of the Internet to amplify and extend 'traditional' movement communications efforts” (p. 174). Traditional communication efforts can be thought of as any “real world” (read: physical) way that a group communicates its message to its constituents and the public at large. Examples of such efforts could be newsletters detailing the history and ongoing projects of a group, posters, slogans, mass-mailings, donation solicitation, and petitions and are described well by Bowers et al. (1993) with their concepts of petition, promulgation, solidification and polarization. To translate these concepts into an online sphere, Costanza-Chock’s definition of conventional electronic contention is broken into seven groups: representation, information distribution, research, cultural production, fund-raising, lobbying, and tactical communication.

First, Costanza-Chock’s concept of representation describes the ways in which groups present themselves on a website. According to Denning (2001), "the Internet offers several channels whereby advocacy groups and individuals can publish

information (and disinformation) to further policy objectives" (p. 246). As of this writing, it is hard to imagine any group, whether corporate, non-profit, personal or SMG that does not have some kind of Web presence. For SMG’s this Web presence typically displays mission, projects, history, membership, and links to affiliated groups. This typically usually includes contact information. One function of such websites is to establish a kind of ongoing presence for organizations and other movement actors (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 175). According to Denning (2001), "one reason the Internet is popular among activists is its cost advantage over traditional mass media. A message can potentially reach millions of people at no additional cost to the originator" (p. 246). This is an important factor to SMG's, as they are often lacking capital necessary to communicate within print or broadcast media. The Web also provides communication tools that are impossible to achieve through print or broadcast media; that of two-way mass communication. With the advent of blogs, forums and listserv discussion groups, visitors of a SMG website are able to interact with group members and other visitors in real time, thus generating real-time user generated content. This can be a powerful tool for a SMG to gauge public opinion and get direct feedback on their actions and ideas while still communicating core values.

Second, this Web presence is typically designed for the dissemination of information. Information distribution, according to Costanza-Chock (2003) “includes, but is not limited to, the distribution of information about movement goals, campaigns, actions, reports, and so on via website, email, listservs, bulletin boards, chat rooms, ftp, and other Internet channels” (p. 175). Specifically, the information disseminated is designed for consumption by both/either the general public and specific audiences.

Examples of this are press releases, academic reports, and video segments packaged for rebroadcast or redissemination (such as the contemporary viral video phenomenon). A group that is well known for pushing repackaging content in this way is MoveOn.org.

This group supplies an “Email a Friend” link that allows website visitors to send information to others, thus amplifying the scope of the original message and directing

Web traffic back to their site. This closely fits within Bowers et al.’s (1993) concept of promulgation.

Third, many SMG’s utilize the Internet as a research tool. According to

Costanza-Chock (2003), “many [SMG’s] use the Internet as a resource for gathering specific information relevant to their cause, including information about opponents or targets, information produced by other movement actors, case studies of parallel situations, historical background, theory, economic data, environmental data, media analysis, and so on” (p. 175). Denning (2001) also supports this idea: “Specifically, activists may be able to locate legislative documents, official policy statements, analyses and discussions about issues, and other items related to their mission" (p. 243). Publicly available search engines such as Google Scholar offer a quick and easy way to research topics. According to Denning (2001), “In addition to information relating to a particular policy issue, the Web offers cyberactivists various information that can help them use the

Net effectively" (p. 245). Gone are the days when a trip to the library and physically riffling through the archives is necessary to research particular topics or people. Much information, especially regarding governmental actors, is not readily available online.

From this author’s personal experience, that which is not readily available can easily be requested utilizing an online Freedom of Information Act form and a free email address.

Fourth, Costanza-Chock (2003) suggests that conventional forms of contention serve a cultural purpose. According to Costanza-Chock, “visual art, music, video, poetry, net.art, and other forms of cultural production by artists active in, associated with, or supportive of social movements are often posted, distributed, or sold online” (p. 175).

This part is particularly important considering the rhetorical hurdles a social movement group must overcome. Specifically, SMGs must build solidification within their ranks.

The solidification process, according to Bowers et al. (1993) is, “the rhetorical process by which an agitating group produces or reinforces the cohesiveness of its members, thereby increasing responsiveness to group wishes. Specifically, solidification is achieved through the use of song, chants, slogans, identifiable icons, and in-group publications

(Bowers et al., p. 24).

Fifth, the Internet offers an easy way for social movement groups to generate revenue from supporters, either by selling wares such as T-shirts, bumper stickers, books, buttons and other branded paraphernalia. Additionally, SMG’s are able to solicit donations. According to Costanza-Chock (2003), “fundraising efforts are also aided by computer-assisted direct mailing campaigns and by member database management” (p.

175). From a resource perspective, the generation of revenue is an important component of social movement group communications. As suggested in the “the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is crucial to and understanding of social movement activity . . . because resources are necessary for engagement in social conflict”

(McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1216). Groups such as the Sierra Club make extensive use of the fundraising aspect by directing Web traffic towards paying membership dues and collecting tax deductible donations. For example, Figure 2 below shows the front page of

www.sierraclub.org, which features a main navigation pane on the left that provides ways to “Join or Give” to the organization, buy books and a link to an “Online Store.”

Figure 2. Screen shot (taken 3/5/07) of the Sierra Club’s website, www.sierraclub.org.

Fifth, Costanza-Chock (2003) suggests that groups utilize an online presence for lobbying efforts. According to Denning (2001), “one advantage of the Internet over other media is that it tends to break down barriers erected by government censors" (p. 243).

These lobbying efforts take the form of collective action aimed directly at influencing the political process and legislative outcomes. This also includes visitor-driven activities such as online petitions (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 175). For example, the Sierra Club website (Figure 2, above) has a link that allows visitors to track legislation as it moves through Congress and links to current surveys and petitions. According to Denning

(2001), "whether or not government agencies solicit their input, activists can use the

Internet to lobby decision makers" (p. 260).

Finally, groups also utilize the Internet as a form of tactical communication.

Costanza-Chock (2003) defines this term as “the use of the Internet or other electronic communications to aid mobilization efforts, both before and during street or 'real world' collective actions. This includes calls to action distributed via email, listservs, websites, chat sessions, and virtual meetings, as well as coordination during street actions using these and other (pager, cell phone) communications technologies” (p. 176). According to

Denning (2001), "advocacy groups can use the Internet to coordinate action among members and with other organizations and individuals. The Internet lets people all over the world coordinate action without regard to constraints of geography or time" (p. 256).

While the Sierra Club is not known for its direct citizen actions, the website (Figure 2, above) features calls to action, ways to sign up for email lists and listservs, weblogs, forums and publicizes group activities.

Disruptive Contention

The second portion of Constanza-Chock’s repertoire of contention is Disruptive.

Disruptive contention is less commonplace than conventional contention, and has received less scholarly attention. Disruptive forms of electronic contention, often referred to as hactivism and typically framed by conventional media outlets as terrorist activities, are not necessarily illegal forms of protest (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 176). As discussed in Chapter 1, in their description of nonviolent resistance tactics, Bowers et al.

(1993) suggest that “nonviolence places agitators in a position where they are violating laws they consider unjust and destructive to human dignity . . . Usually, the agitators

simply do what they would be permitted to do if the laws they were violating had been changed” (p. 37). These tactics include, but are not limited to, physical barriers such as sit ins, hunger strikes, picket lines, placing agitator bodies in harm’s way, and financially impeding tactics such as boycotts and strikes. The ultimate purpose is to force the establishment to pay attention to the agitators and their message, if only for a moment.

Bowers et al. refer specifically to physical world tactics. However, it is the assertion of the current thesis that these tactics transfer directly to online arenas. Specifically,

Denning (2001) describes the disruptive form of online contentious activity as hactivism:

Hacktivism is the convergence of hacking with activism, where “hacking” is used

here to refer to operations that exploit computers in ways that are unusual and

often illegal, typically with the help of special software (“hacking tools”).

Hacktivism includes electronic civil disobedience, which brings methods of civil

disobedience to cyberspace. Because hacking incidents are often reported in the

media, operations in this category can generate considerable publicity for both the

activists and their causes (p. 263).

This is an important connection between hactivism and classically conceived disruptive activism. According to Bowers et al. (1993), “If the establishment resists [these tactics], it must do so by physical suppression” (p. 37). Costanza-Chock describes a range of disruptive tactics that fit into Bower’s et al.’s model, including Email and form floods, fax bombs, viruses, data theft, site alteration, denial of service, and virtual sit ins. These will be described in detail below.

An email or form flood is one of the easiest and lest technical method of disruptive contention. According to Costanza-Chock (2003), “Target systems can

become incapacitated when forced to handle an extremely high volume of email, especially if emails contain large attachments (typically image files or very long texts).

This can be done by an individual using software that automatically sends messages at high speed, or by groups of hundreds or thousands of people all sending messages simultaneously” (p. 177). According to Denning (2001), “the effect [of an email bomb] can be to completely jam a recipient’s incoming email box, making it impossible for legitimate email to get through. Thus, an email bomb is also a form of virtual blockade”

(p. 268). Form floods are similar to email floods but use rapid repeated filling out of online feedback, membership, or purchasing forms to slow or crash the target system. In fact, form floods are often email flood as well, since many forms generate emails to an administrator account. For example, figure 3 illustrates a typical online form.

This particular form generates an email based on user input. Activists utilizing form flood techniques fill out the form individually, in concert with other activist simultaneously, or have specialized software to fill it out rapidly. Typically, the text entered into the form’s field is specific to the protest activity. For example, Costanza-

Chock cites an example of activism against Navy.com:

The Netstrike for Vieques used the Navy's own online enlistment form, filling

required 'name,' 'address,' and other fields with requests that the Navy cease

bombing and honor demands by Viequenses and many other prominent Puerto

Ricans (including the Mayor of Vieques, the Mayor of San Juan, and the

Governor of Puerto Rico) for a public referendum to decide the fate of the US

military presence. Several hours into the action, at around 4pm, CWA sent out a

call to action to its 750,000 members. Nearly a thousand people joined the action

during the next hour. At 5pm, Electronic Disturbance Theater received a phone

call from the administrator of www.navy.com, who demanded that the action be

brought to a halt. According to the administrator, the Netstrike had "completely

flooded our enlistment database with thousands of messages, and now our site is

starting to crash" (p. 201).

Figure 3. Screen shot (taken 4/1/07) of the University of Cincinnati’s visitor guide request form, http://www.uc.edu/ucomm/forms/visitorguide/.

The key to the potency of this tactic is how the hosting server deals with the form. When a person fills out a form, one of two things occurs; either an email is sent to an administrator account or a database entry is recorded. By rapidly filling out the form with multiple thousands of entries in a short amount of time either the email account

becomes flooded with the activist’s message, thus blocking further submission by more legitimate traffic, or the database overloads and returns a server error. Either way, a database or email administrator must intervene and clear the offending entries and is thus exposed to the activist’s message. Until this administrator intervenes, no further submission can be accepted by the form. In the case cited above by Costanza-Chock

(2003), a Navy server administrator was able to clear out the database files, was exposed to the message, and called upon the activist’s to cease their attack.

Second, Costanza-Chock (2003) describes a non-computer-mediated technological disruptive attack: a fax bomb. According to Costanza-Chock (2003), this is performed by the “jamming of targeted fax machines by sending extremely high volume

(for example, one word per page) faxes” (p. 176). The is accomplished by writing or typing a message on several pieces of paper, taping them together and feeding them through their fax machine. As the machine feeds the paper through, the activist takes the leading page and tapes it to the last page, thus making an infinite loop. The fax machine then sends the message over and over again, running the target machine out of paper and overloading its memory with the activist’s message.

Third, Costanza-Chock (2003) describes viruses, worms, and Trojan horses as

“software designed to take a wide variety of action, including data destruction, providing access to restricted files, allowing remote control of targeted servers, or simply displaying a message, can be introduced either to specific targeted systems or onto the public

Internet” (p. 178). According to Denning (2001), “Computer viruses have been used to propagate political messages and, in some cases, cause serious damage” (p. 278). This is a more invasive technique (and one that qualifies as hacking) than those listed above, as

the activist is able to enter target computer systems without permission to disseminate messages. This software is often camouflaged as harmless attachments within emails or disguised as legitimate downloads on websites. According to Denning (2001),

Hacktivists have used computer viruses and worms to spread protest message and

damage target computer systems. Both are forms of malicious code that infect

computers and propagate over computer networks. The difference is that a worm

is an autonomous piece of software that spreads on its own, whereas a virus

attaches itself to other files and code segments and spreads through those

elements, usually in response to actions taken by users (e.g., opening an email

attachment). The boundary between viruses and worms, however, is blurry (p.

278).

Once downloaded, the software exploits security flaws on the target system and allows complete or partial system access to the activist. Viruses and worms are potent in that they are hard to detect by the user, and harder to track where they came from. Some of the more malicious forms of these, once unwittingly downloaded by a target, email themselves to others based on email contacts saved in the user’s email account. This, then, opens up multiple systems for activist to exploit. According to Denning (2001), “it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for an organization to prevent all viruses, because users unwittingly open email attachments with viruses and spread documents with viruses to colleagues” (p. 280). This tactic is often employed in conjunction with other disruptive tactics, as many are dependent on system access.

Fourth, Costanza-Chock describes data theft and data destruction as a disruptive tool. According to Costanza-Chock (2003), “Hacktivists can gain entry to corporate,

government, multilateral institution, or other target servers and steal private or classified documents useful to SMOs for drawing media attention or for other tactical purposes.

They can also destroy or alter data” (p. 178). This can be viewed as a more aggressive form of the conventional tactic of research, but relies on hacking or the use of viruses, worms or Trojans to work. According to Denning (2001), “computer break-ins are extremely common, and targets include commercial and educational computers as well as government ones” (p. 277).

Fifth, Constanza-Chock (2003) describes the tactic of website alteration and redirection, which “involves illegal entry to target sites and alteration of text or images, or rerouting that sends visitors automatically to a different site (often one that expresses an oppositional viewpoint to target policies or actions)” (p. 178). This is a fairly common practice among hactivists. According to Denning (2001), “the media is filled with stories of hackers gaining access to Web sites and replacing some of the content with their own”

(p. 272). This tactic is not technologically different than those employed for data theft, in that a hactivist gains entry into a computer that hosts a website and replaces or alters that site’s content with their own. Redirects, however, are a little different than data alteration. This activity is based on server technology and is frequently used by legitimate Web server administrators to direct traffic to specific Web pages. For example, if a Web page moves, it is normal to add a redirect from the old Web address to the new.

Hactivists take advantage of this technology by redirecting legitimate traffic away from the targeted website and towards their own. In terms of infiltrating the system, the activity is the same. However, there is no data (except the redirect) that is changed. The

Web pages on the targeted server still exist in their normal state, but viewers can no longer access them.

Sixth, Costanza-Chock describes Denial of Service (DoS, sometimes revered to as

Distributed Denial of Service, DDoS) attacks and Virtual sit-ins. These encompass various strategies, including some of those listed above, and result in blockage of public access to the target site. (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 178). According to Denning (2001):

A virtual sit-in or blockade is the cyberspace version of a physical sit-in or

blockade. The goal in both cases is to call attention to the protestors and their

cause by disrupting normal operations and blocking access to facilities. With a sit-

in, thousands of activists simultaneously visit a Web site and attempt to generate

so much traffic against the site that other users cannot reach it.

Typically, DoS attacks involve large numbers of people sending repeated simultaneous requests to target sites for webpages or other files. The result of this activity is the target site becomes inaccessible to regular users (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p. 178).

To facilitate understanding, imagine the following: You type in a Web address into your Web browser, yet misspell the address (e.g. www.uc.edu/hoem/ instead of www.uc.edu/home/). Since that page does not exist on the server, you will not see the page you expected, rather you will typically see an error page or a “404 not found” page.

This activity creates a log on the Web server that you requested a page that doesn’t exist.

A DoS attack takes advantage of this. By rapidly and repeatedly requesting pages that don’t exist, the server log overflows and server bandwidth is drained. Bandwidth can be thought of as a drainpipe, where Web users are the drainage water. If there are too many requests on the server for Web pages, the drain slows down and eventually clogs. This

clog can happen because the server is so overloaded that it is no longer able to process requests to view a page, or because server administrators are forced to remove a target site in order to keep the server from becoming overwhelmed (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p.

178).

Violent Contention

The boundaries between disruptive electronic contention and the final portion of

Costanza-Chock’s repertoire, violent contention, is blurry at best as it is often characterized by a hot-button term: terrorism. According to Costanza-Chock (2003), “an increasing amount of government and corporate literature dealing with electronic contention is focused on what is perceived to be the rising threat of violent electronic action, or 'cyberterrorism” (p. 177). Denning (2001) defines cyberterrorism as:

. . . the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It covers politically motivated

hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe

economic damage. An example would be penetrating an air traffic control system

and causing two planes to collide. There is a general progression toward greater

damage and disruption from the first to the third category, although that does not

imply an increase of political effectiveness. An electronic petition with a million

signatures may influence policy more than an attack that disrupts emergency 911

service (p. 241).

There is are two important things to note; first, the word “perceived” utilized by

Costanza-Chock; and second, the word “terrorism” utilized by Denning in the above passages. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go discuss in depth the meaning

of the word terrorism, it has some bearing on the current discussion. According to

Costanza-Chock (2003):

depending on the definition of violence, tactics that fall under [violent electronic

contention] might include certain kinds of property destruction such as server

wipes or data corruption, but certainly include potential scenarios where hackers

are able to cause human injury or death by gaining control over networked

computer control systems - for example, air traffic control, electrical power grids,

gas mains, and the like (p. 177).

As of the time of this writing, there have been no reported instances of hactivism that have caused human injury or death, and thus no reported instances of violent electronic contention. This, however, has not stopped institutional forces from labeling hactivist activity as terrorism and equating disruptive electronic contention with violent contention.

According to Denning (2001), “terrorist groups are using the Internet extensively to spread their message and to communicate and coordinate action. However, there have been few, if any, computer network attacks that meet the criteria for cyberterrorism” (p.

281).

In this age of shifting colors of terror alerts, the US’s war on terrorism, and post-

9/11 sentiment, it is easy to see that the political landscape for political activists is fraught with peril. This labeling can be thought of as institutional repression. Costanza-Chock defines the concept of institutional repression as any form of legislation or prosecution of movement participants that utilize electronic civil disobedience (p. 176). By classifying disturbance as hacking and activists and hactivists as terrorists, institutions are able to apply laws formally reserved for more violent electronic crimes. Legislation such as the

Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act are contemporary examples of this. Specifically, recent amendments to the Patriot Act specify provable damages to institutions of $5,000 will result in up to 10 years in jail. Under such laws, activist organizations and social movement groups must tread carefully or face incarceration and fines. According to

Manion and Goodrum (2000):

Penalties for hacktivism are meted out with the same degree of force as for

hacking in general, regardless of the motivation for the hack or the political

content of messages left at hacked sites. Most governments do not recognize

hacking as a political activity and the penalties for breaking into computers can be

extreme (p. 16).

Stewart et al. (2001) define six strategies of Establishment suppression, of which counter persuasion, coercive persuasion, and coercion are of interest here. Counter persuasion describes how Establishments manipulate social context (through the power of naming), appeal to the fears of the masses, challenge the nature and motives of the social movement, challenge the accuracy of the movement’s rhetoric, all in an attempt to generate a moral backlash in the masses.

The manipulation of social context is perhaps an Establishment’s most powerful tool of counter persuasion as the remaining tactics are generated by it. The framing of cyber activists as hackers and terrorists and framing electronic civil disobedience tactics as a terrorist activity reduces credibility encourages prosecution. Specifically,

Establishment forces have framed DoS attacks as hacking. In an address to the Senate

Judiciary Committee in 2000, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder said:

At this point, I would simply say that we are taking [DoS] attacks very seriously

and that we will do everything in our power to identify those responsible and

bring them to justice. In addition to the malicious disruption of legitimate

commerce, so-called "denial of service" attacks involve the unlawful intrusion

into an unknown number of computers, which are in turn used to launch attacks

on the eventual target computer . . . For a real-world terrorist to blow up a dam, he

would need tons of explosives, a delivery system, and a surreptitious means of

evading armed security guards. For a cyberterrorist, the same devastating result

could be achieved by hacking into the control network and commanding the

computer to open the floodgates . . . Thus, the number of victims in these types of

cases can be substantial, and the collective loss and cost to respond to these

attacks can run into the tens of millions of dollars – or more

(http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/dag0229.htm).

Similarly, Michael Vatis, Director of the National Infrastructure Protection Center of the

FBI suggested to the State Judiciary Committee in 2000 that:

Hackers (or "crackers") are also a common threat . . . we have seen more cases of

hacking for illicit financial gain or other malicious purposes. The distributed

denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks earlier this month are only the most recent

illustration of the economic disruption that can be caused by tools now readily

available on the Internet (http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/vatis.htm).

As suggested in earlier chapters, DoS attacks have been used as “virtual sit-ins” in past protest activity. A DoS attack does not involve entry into a target system, and therefore

is not “hacking” by traditional definition. This framing of civil disobediences as terrorism opens the door for Establishment use of coercive persuasion.

Coercive persuasion as described by Stewart et al. (2003), encompasses threats and oaths from the Establishment, as well as surveillance and infiltration of

Establishment forces into the movement. Sections 202 and 217 of the United States

Patriot Act of 2001 are prime examples of coercive persuasion, specifically surveillance.

Section 202 of the Patriot Act (Authority to Intercept Voice Communications in

Computer Hacking Investigations) allows governmental policing agencies to gain a court’s authorization to surveil face-to-face conversations or tap phone calls when investigating computer crimes. Section 217 of Patriot (Intercepting the Communications of Computer Trespassers) allows governmental policing agencies or persons "acting under color of law" to monitor and intercept electronic communications. This section of the Act specifically reads:

It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law

to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer trespasser

transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer, if—the owner or operator

of the protected computer authorizes the interception of the computer trespasser’s

communications on the protected computer; the person acting under color of law

is lawfully engaged in an investigation; the person acting under color of law has

reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser’s

communications will be relevant to the investigation; and such interception does

not acquire communications other than those transmitted to or from the computer

trespasser. (H. R. 3162, p. 47)

This section of Patriot allows for establishment forces to monitor, so long as an Internet

Service Provider (ISP) cooperates, any and all electronic communiqué. This includes instant messaging, website use, email, and listserv postings. Additionally, Section 220 specifically provides for establishment obtainment of email. Since computer crimes and

Internet Service Providers (ISP) don’t necessarily exist in the same district, Section 220 allows investigators to obtain warrants outside of the district in which the court is located.

Depending on the interpretation of this section, investigators are able to obtain warrants from any district and any judge in the country. It should be noted that sections 202, 217 and 220 were scheduled to sunset December 31, 2005, but did not.

In addition to the Patriot Act, the Terrorism (Total) Information Awareness program specifies multiple data collection and data mining tools, such as Carnivore and

Echelon, to build virtual profiles in the War on Terror. The objective of TIA, as defined by The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is:

to create a counter-terrorism information system that: (1) increases information

coverage by an order of magnitude, and affords easy future scaling; (2) provides

focused warnings within an hour after a triggering event occurs or an evidence

threshold is passed; (3) can automatically queue analysts based on partial pattern

matches and has patterns that cover 90% of all previously known foreign terrorist

attacks; and, (4) supports collaboration, analytical reasoning and information

sharing so that analysts can hypothesize, test and propose theories and mitigating

strategies about possible futures, so decision-makers can effectively evaluate the

impact of current or future policies and prospective courses of action.

(http://www.darpa.mil/)

As shown in figure 4, the TIA first detects, classifies and identifies potential terrorist activity. Second, TIA tracks the communication and digital movements of the potential terrorist. Third, TIA interprets the data collected in phases one and two. Finally, utilizing the interpretation of phase three, establishment forces are able to launch a preemptive strike on the targeted potential terrorist.

While TIA’s budget was eliminated in September 2003, elements of the project are ongoing in the private sector, and tools like Carnivore have been outsourced to private companies. These three sections of Patriot and the tools generated by TIA specify an arguably panoptic surveillance strategy that establishment forces use to exert coercive persuasion forms of suppression over cyber protestors.

This leads to Stewart et al.’s (2001) concept of coercion (p. 332) which specifies arrest, brutality, and highly restrictive legislation as Establishment suppression tactics.

Specifically, Section 225 of the Homeland Security Act specifies sentencing and prosecution guidelines for computer criminals based on:

. . .the potential and actual loss resulting from the offense; the level of

sophistication and planning involved in the offense; whether the offense was

committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial benefit;

whether the defendant acted with malicious intent to cause harm in committing

the offense; the extent to which the offense violated the privacy rights of

individuals harmed; . . . whether the violation was intended to or had the effect of

significantly interfering with or disrupting a critical infrastructure. (H.R. 5710,

2002)

(Figure 4. DARPA presentation slide: Overview of Terrorism Information Awareness program (http://www.darpa.mil/).

Based on the restrictive nature of this legislation, establishment ability to serveil computer systems and electronic communication at will, and the definition of electronic civil disobedience as terrorist and hacker activities, cyber activists must tread cautiously to avoid arrest, prosecution and incarceration. However, according to Manion and

Goodrum (2000), “under U.S. law, terrorism is defined as an act of violence for the purpose of intimidating or coercing a government or civilian population. Hacktivism clearly does not fall into this category, as it is fundamentally non-violent” (p.16). With this in mind, the next section will supply short vignettes of how each of the analyzed

SMG’s utilize electronic means to agitate, followed but a discussion of degrees to which they utilize Costanza-Chock’s (2003) repertoire of contention.

Description ®™ark

As with discussions of organizational structure in earlier chapters, it is difficult to describe the tactics of ®™ark without implicating The Yes Men as they are so interrelated. However, as discussed in the literature, the core of the ®™ark system is a database on the Web (www.rtmark.com) that connects ideas with activists, and activists with capital. This database is populated with user-generated ideas complete with discussion lists and links to resources. According to RTMARK (1998), ®™ark was established to combat “unchecked global rise of corporate power” by creating an Internet database that contains lists of “projects of sabotage and subversion, as well as financial rewards for their accomplishment” (p.293). According to their site, “®™ark is indeed a corporation, and benefits from corporate protections, but unlike other corporations, its bottom line is to improve culture, rather than its own pocketbook; it seeks cultural profit, not financial” (www.rtmark.com). By grouping projects into what they term “mutual funds,” ®™ark has shown some success in both completing large scale projects and protecting those involved from institutional retaliation.

®™ark’s tactics are communicated via their and database of projects. Their Web presence is visually appealing, and it is easy to navigate (figure 5). Visitors of this site are able to learn about currently available ®™ark projects, how they define protest, the history of the organization, and the success or failure of past projects. This website, according to Boyd (2005), mimics a corporate structure, “but does not try to pass as a business platform based solely on monetary profit like the organizations they target . . .

Since it often does not create the projects it sponsors, but rather focuses on publicizing

them, ®™ark acts as a corporate middle man. Because of this emphasis on publicity and appearance, ®™ark adopted a farcical version of the sleek, corporate look” (p.10).

Figure 5. Screen shot of www.rtmark.com

One of the standard tactics employed by ®™ark is to anger a targeted corporations, such as Dow Chemical or Shell Oil, and get the company to issue a cease and desist letter, which ®™ark then releases to the media in a press release about the “bullying” corporation. By utilizing news RSS/XML services such as Google News or Yahoo!, the press release and subsequent rebuttal by ®™ark enjoys a broad circulation, which leads to expanded media coverage about the battle between ®™ark and its chosen target. The purpose of this is to cause embarrassment for the targeted company. By utilizing the same digital public relations resources and tactics as large corporations, ®™ark aims to tarnish the public image such corporations construct corporation (Boyd, 2005, p. 10-11).

They accomplish this by leveraging what they call ‘assets.’ According to their website, “Among ®™ark’s assets are: The ®™ark brand, associated service marks, and

webdentity . . .; Intellectual property rights to corporate sabotage schemes; Proven public relations methodologies; Valuable media industry relationships; A dedicated and critical user base; Verifiable art-world cache” (http://www.rtmark.com/rtcom/success/newsroom).

According to Thompson (2006), ®™ark “uses the Internet and the Web as a platform to raise awareness of social and corporate injustices, to build community, and ultimately to foster change” (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2479/is_1-2_34/ai_n16910393).

In addition to press release stunts, ®™ark also promotes electronic contention to a degree. It is here that the line between ®™ark and The Yes Men blurs. Several sources cite ®™ark as being responsible for certain antics, such as the creation of gatt.org, while other sources credit The Yes Men with its creation. Regardless, it is clear that ®™ark has a hand in creating (or at least fostering the creation) of parody websites designed to confound visitors. The majority of these parody website stunts have a real-world activism component to them as well. Gatt.org is a prime example. In 1999, ®™ark /The

Yes Men registered the domain gatt.org (the original name of the WTO organization) just before the Seattle protest. This website mimicked the official WTO website in several aspects, however the content was written by the protestors. Soon after they set this site up, they started receiving emails meant for the real WTO members with offers to speak at

WTO conventions. According to Miller (2002) “shortly after they set up a spoof World

Trade Organization site at www.gatt.org, they received an e-mail inviting WTO director

Mike Moore to address a conference in Finland. The Yes Men replied saying that unfortunately Mr. Moore wouldn't be able to make it, but would it be okay if he sent a substitute? The organizers agreed and when it came to the event, 150 business delegates got quite a surprise” (p.3).

The Yes Men

As indicated in the literature, of the three groups, The Yes Men are the most prolific in terms of generating their own media. The Yes Men also have a fairly robust

Web presence (figure 6), featuring information about the group in several languages, news of current “hijinks,” ways to purchase their merchandise (DVD and book), how to join and receive mailings, and ways to contact the group directly. Their tactics, as described in earlier chapters, involve the parody of corporate or governmental websites created for deception purposes. Once website visitors have been deceived, Yes Men projects are typically followed up with a real-world component: an interview in disguise on traditional media. According to Mike Bonanno during a personal interview conducted on 4/18/07, “Our tactics are kind of like many creative resistance strategies that happen in physical space as well . . .just as the virtual sit-in mimics a real sit-in.” The introduction to this thesis offers one of the more popularly discussed Yes Men antics: their activity with Dow Chemical and their appearance on the BBC.

Another example of their exploits is with re-code.com. Re-code.com was created by Nathan Martin and Tyler Nordgren as part of a ®™ark.com anti-corporate project.

While the founding members of The Yes Men were not specifically involved in this project, their ReamWeaver technology and ®™ark’s database was. According to a personal interview between this author and Bonanno, “We gave some advice to the perps . . .”

Utilizing parody, the re-code.com website mimicked the layout and design of both walmart.com and priceline.com. The parody of this site was three fold, the design of the

site, and the parody of establishment surveillance techniques, and the parody of popular advertising slogans.

Figure 6. Screen shot of www.theyesmen.org.

The concept of the re-code agitation is relatively simple: encourage website users to surveil and collect “data” (UPC product bar code information) from what they termed

“publicly available databases” (products on shopping store shelves) and enter said data into the re-code.com website. Once entered, website users would be able to search for products they wished to buy, enter the price they wished to pay for that product, and generate a barcode sticker that could be printed and applied to products on store shelves.

The purpose of this agitation was, according to Nathan Martin:

to find ways to bypass [filtering systems] to distribute real [emphasis mine]

information . . . we had these ideas of the revolution, the power of the consumer,

the power to name your own price that have been used now as advertising

campaigns . . . by corporations to sell us things or make us think that we are

somehow involved in a revolution (re-code.com).

Featured on re-code’s cite was a “name-your-own-price” system, which was similar in structure to priceline.com’s system for airline ticket sales. Additionally, re-code.com featured a five minute instructional video, which detailed how the system worked and how a user could contribute to the online product database. Martin and Nordgren chose priceline.com to parody because:

. . . we thought that priceline.com was a good example and that we could carry

their idea to its extreme and really allow people to name their own price in a way

that was sometimes absurd, but was already being done with price sticker

switching and barcode switching . . . (re-code.com)

The site advocated creativity when it came to re-coding products. For example, the re- code video suggested that uses re-code name brand products with their generic equivalent or replace the bar codes on rifle ammunition with bar codes for Nurf balls.

According to an Associated Press article, on April 2, 2003, Wal-Mart sent the site host of re-code.com a cease and desist order. Based on legal advice, re-code was shut down insomuch as the re-code pricing system and re-code.com front page was altered so that navigation from it was impossible. However, a Google search revealed that much the site was still intact and that information about the project was still available to the public. As of the writing of this thesis, www.re-code.com is now 404, not found.

However, many Yes Men projects, such as gatt.org and dowethics.com still function and are still mistaken for the websites that they parody.

Electronic Disturbance Theater

As suggested by the literature, Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) is instrumental in expanding the technologies utilized by SMG’s to agitate electronically.

EDT has developed, and continues to develop, much of the software technologies utilized for DoS attacks and form floods. In addition to furthering the technology of electronic activation, EDT is very active in utilizing their own product. Because EDT is more interested in practicing the theories of ECD through the use of FloodNet and DoS attacks, their website is the hardest to find and navigate (Figure 7). Specifically, it does not have a reliably identifiable URL name (such as rtmark.com or theyesmen.org).

While it features some information about the group, current/past activities, and offers ways to join, it does not offer ways to buy products, sign up for further information, or offer easily identifiable ways to contact the group. That said, ECD is quite active in promoting the utilization of their FloodNet software.

FloodNet is a digital tool designed to disrupt Web page traffic in a way similar to the way foot traffic is impeded by protestors engaged in a sit-in. This digital sit-in is commonly referred to as a Denial of Service (DoS) or Destributed Denial of Service

(DDoS) attacks. A DoS attack involves singular or multiple (DDoS) protestors repeatedly and rapidly requesting a non-existent webpage from a Web server. These repeated requests cause the server to utilize an abundance of bandwidth, which detracts from normal Web traffic. FloodNet is the tool by which protestors can engage in this activity.

According to EDT’s website, FloodNet is used 1.) reload a targeted Web page several times per minute and; 2) for the conceptual-artistic spamming of targeted server error logs (http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ZapTact.html).

The Web site of an institution or symbol of Mexican neo-liberalism is targeted on

a particular day. A link to FloodNet is then posted in a public call for participation

in the tactical strike. Net surfers follow this link; then by simply leaving their

browser open the FloodNet Applet will automatically reload the target Web page

every few seconds. The intent is to disrupt access to the targeted Web site by

flooding the host server with requests for that Web site.

(http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ZapTact.html).

Figure 7. Screen shot of http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ecd.html.

As reviewed in the literature, legitimate traffic to a target website is deflected and a server error log file is generated, cataloguing the attack and often carrying the attacker’s

message. While the general public cannot view the website while it is being bombarded, the site administrator is force fed the agitator’s message.

Electronic Disturbance Theater’s list of projects is many and varied. However, they are likely best known for their involvement with the digital Zapatista movement.

According to Vegh (2002), “In particular, [EDT] was in large part responsible for globalizing the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, through their virtual sit-ins against the server of the Mexican President's Office and other symbolic targets”

(http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_10/vegh/index.html).

According to EDT’s website, “The Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, immediately entered the global stage just after January 1, 1994 when their communiques signed by

Subcommandante Marcos were distributed across the world through the Net”

(http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/EDTECD.html) Almost instantly, websites and special email lists devoted wholly to the events of the Zapatista sprung up around the world. The uprising of Mayan Indians against the government gained instant national and international attention, creating a network of electronic support that was far different from the general insurrection for which the Zapatistas had hoped (Froehling, 1997, p.

292). According to Wray (1998), “[EDT] engaged its FloodNet software and invited participation to an international set of artists, digerati, and political activists to make a

"symbolic gesture" in support of Mexico's Zapatistas”

(http://switch.sjsu.edu/web/v4n2/stefan/index.html). In one instance, EDT’s ongoing contributions to the Zapatista movement came in the form of multiple electronic blockades against several websites owned by the Mexican government, Mexican

President Zedillo’s personal website, the Frankfort stock exchange, and the Pentagon’s

website (Meikle, 2002, p. 151). According to Meikle (2002), “close to 10,000 people took part, with the FloodNet software sending around 600,000 hits per minute to each of the target sites” (p.151).

While the Zapatista movement remains EDT’s most media covered, academically cited, and longest running projects, it is far from a singular focus. Another project significant to the current discussion is Electronic Disturbance Theatre’s involvement with

Toywar, a collective action against toy manufacturer eToys in 1999. Etoy, an activist and artist website, came under attack in 1999 by Internet toy giant eToys for trademark infringement. Some background: etoy.com was registered in 1995. eToys.com was registered in 1999. According to the etoy.com project bio on rtmark.com,

In late 1999, Internet toy giant eToys attempted to buy etoy.com from European

art group etoy, and offered upwards of $500,000 in cash and stock options for the

domain. etoy turned down the offer, so on November 29, 1999, eToys obtained a

court injunction preventing etoy from operating a website at www.etoy.com,

which had been registered before eToys even existed. To obtain the injunction

eToys told the judge that etoy.com was confusing customers, and furthermore that

it contained pornography and calls to violence. etoy.com had never made any

reference to eToys or toys, and only an extremely primitive conception of art

could lead one to see pornography or violence on its pages.

(http://www.rtmark.com/legacy/etoy.html)

The court ruled in eToys’ favor and etoy.com was shut down. This activity drew the attention of anti-globalization group ®™ark, who volunteered to help “fight back against the strong-arm practices of the toy company. The fight for etoy was joined by ®™ark

and the Electronic Disturbance Theatre” (McKenzie, 2005, p. 25). Following in the tradition of ECD, EDT offered up the services of FloodNet while ®™ark publicized the event on their website as a current project and mounted a massive media. During the months of November and December, ®™ark created an etoy fund, allowing online users to “invest” or donate money to assist the artists. Additionally, they launched email campaigns towards eToys’ investors and staff, as well as the online and printed press.

However, most effective tactic was the virtual sit in that took place from 15-25 December, a campaign termed the ’12 days of Christmas’ action (Meikle, 2002, p. 168). According to Dominguez (2004):

When the net.art group eToy refused the companies’ offers they went after them

using a U.S court in L.A. to take away the groups domain and e-mail system. At

that point EDT, rtmark.com, The THING, fakeshop.com and many, many others

created a series of smart swarm actions that forced the company to give up its

legal actions against etoy.com and return its domain and email function. A few

days later the company crashed because it had lost so much Christmas revenue

during the Toywar (www.gothamist.com).

This swarm activity, as suggested by Dominquez, involved the massive utilization of

FloodNet to block access to eToys.com during the Christmas shopping season. EDT created a portal to FloodNet on their website that allowed people around the world to log on to EDT’s site at specified times and participate in a DoS attack on eToys’ Web site.

According to McKenzie (2005), “as a ‘pure’ e-commerce company, the site was the toy firm’s only store, so tying up its Web traffic effectively shut down the business for hours every day for ten consecutive days” (p. 25).

The end result of Toywar was a reduction of eToys.com stock from a reported $77 USD per share to less than $20. The significance of this event is that it marks the first documented event where EDT and ®™ark (and presumably the Yes Men since their membership is convoluted) collaborated.

Another example of this activity is the virtual sit-in for living wage at Harvard

University in 2001. According to Costanza-Chock (2003):

In the spring of 2001, approximately 30 students from the Harvard University

Progressive Student Labor Movement (PSLM) occupied University

administrative offices in an attempt to force the University to comply with a City

of Cambridge living wage ordinance that tied minimum salaries to a cost of living

formula. Several hundred employees on Harvard's janitorial staff were receiving

below the living wage, and the administration was increasingly employing temp

workers who not only received below living wage but also received no benefits.

PSLM members who were not inside the occupied offices, together with other

supportive students, built a tent city outside the occupied building that served as a

home base from which rallies, music events, film screenings, and media visits

were managed. In the third week of the action, as media attention seemed to reach

a plateau and administration officials continued to refuse to negotiate with

activists, a group called the Electronic Disturbance Theater offered to help the

PSLM escalate their tactics by adding a 'Virtual Sit-In' to the building occupation.

(p. 184)

PSLM and ECD decided that the DoS action would target the websites of corporations with board members who were also Harvard Board of Trustees. ECD, along with

thousands of on-line participants, utilized FloodNet software to apply DoS attacks to each of the targeted websites, thus filling server logs with '[email protected] not found' messages. However, it is impossible to judge the degree to which the attacks contributed to the Harvard administration's partial capitulation to the Progressive Student

Labor Movement (PSLM), which took place one week later (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p.

184).

Findings

The section above sought to sketch the tactics of ®™ark, the Yes Men and

Electronic Disturbance Theater to address RQ2. As discussed, the following criteria are used to determine if groups under study can be classified as utilizing Costanza-Chock’s repertoire: 1.) if the group utilizes electronic means as their primary mode of contention;

2.) if the group has an identifiable Web presence and utilizes it as described by Costanza

-Chock’s concept of conventional contention; and 3.) if there is evidence of the group utilizing electronic means to agitate via disruptive or violent forms of contention.

First, it is found that each of the examined groups utilizes electronic means as their primary mode of contention, specifically the Internet. While Costanza-Chock specifies alternate means of electronic contention such as fax-bombs, the examined groups agitated specifically via websites and Internet-mediated technologies. It is argued that without websites and Internet databases, ®™ark would not exist in its current form.

Without parody websites, there would be no way for the Yes Men to deceive mass publics as effectively. Without Internet technologies such as javascript, and without websites as targets, ETD and their adherence to EDT would not viable. While these groups could certainly exist without technology, their use of it makes them 1.) more

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visible on a global scale (due, in part, to the global nature of the Web); and 2.) because of that visibility, arguably more effective at raising awareness because of the access to large publics that the Internet provides.

Second, each of the analyzed groups had a Web presence that featured all of

Costanza-Chock’s seven sections of conventional electronic contention: representation, information distribution, research, cultural production, fund-raising, lobbying, and tactical communication. First, through their website, groups were able to represent themselves to large publics, displaying each group’s mission, projects, history, membership, and links to affiliated groups. Second, in each website, there was information designed for consumption by both the general public and specific audiences.

Specifically, ®™ark and The Yes Men had a specific sections for journalists, with easily quoted press releases and downloads. Third, each group’s website provided additional- information link sections for visitors to research the group further. Fourth, each website can be classified as net art, as each of the groups had easily identifiable icons and slogans.

Fifth, the Yes Men were the only group that had a readily identifiable revenue generation section where visitors could buy branded items such as DVDs and books. However, each group offered ways to join and donate money to the cause. Sixth, while none of the sites had direct links to petition efforts they can still be said to fulfill this component. If, as suggested by Costanza-Chock (2003), lobbying efforts take the form of collective action aimed directly at influencing the political process and legislative outcomes, then each site itself could be considered a lobbying effort. Finally, each of the groups utilized their

Web sites as hubs of tactical communication. Each site had calls to action and specific

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links on how to join the activities. As such, each group was found to utilize Costanza-

Chock’s conventional contention.

Finally, it is determined that each group utilized their electronic means and/or

Web presence for disruptive contention. In addition to each group being labeled hacktivists by nearly every article, scholarly or otherwise, each group performed at least one tactic as described by Costanza-Chock as being disruptive. For example, ®™ark, has supported the use of form floods and email-bombs. The Yes Men, even though they own the websites that they deface, strategically name these sites to intentionally confuse the visitor. ETD virtually invented DoS attacks as they pertain to social movement activity and regularly utilize form floods in their agitations. While no group was found to practice violent tactics, it is important to note again that the difference between disruptive tactics and violent ones is blurry and based purely on societal definitions.

For example, in The Yes Men’s agitation against Dow Chemical outlined in the introduction of this thesis, no one was physically injured. However, money was lost as the stock exchange reacted to the news that Dow was allegedly selling off the Union

Carbide plant. Even though there were no repercussions for The Yes Men, there is still speculation as to whether damage was done to the company. If damage was done, it could be interpreted that violence action was taken against Dow since their stock price was affected by the interview. When ECD performed a form flood upon Navy.com and a

DoS attack on the Pentagon’s computer systems, that also could be construed as violent attacks. In a post 9-11 era, it is conceivable these activities could be equated with terrorism, especially if they originate from foreign countries.

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In sum, the groups analyzed were found to be utilize the repertoire of contention as outlined by Costanza-Chock (2003) because 1.) each of the groups analyzed utilizes electronic means as their primary mode of contention; 2.) each the groups has an identifiable Web presence and utilizes it as described by Costanza -Chock’s concept of conventional contention; and 3.) there is evidence of each group utilizing electronic means to agitate via disruptive forms of contention.

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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

This thesis began with a short vignette of the Yes Men’s social action against Dow

Chemical and their treatment of the Union Carbide/Bhopal India disaster. The story concludes as follows: The press coverage of that event was significant, for it was not yet known that the interviewed Dow agent was a phony. For two hours after the initial BBC broadcast, the story of Dow’s auction of the Union Carbide plant and Dow’s generous donation of the proceeds was the top item on news.google.com, which feeds a multiplicity of news websites. The stakeholders of Dow responded negatively to the news;

“CNN reports [sic] a Dow stock loss of 2 billion dollars on the German exchange”

(yesmen.org). Later that day, Dow Chemical (the real company this time) submitted a retraction to major media outlets, stating that it had no intention of following through with the statements of the BBC newscast. The Yes Men countered this press release with one of their own, contradicting the official Dow release, and suggesting that the interview and statements therein were genuine. The retraction and subsequent press release battle between the Yes Men and Dow was the top Google story for the remainder of November

4 (theyesmen.org), which is illustrative of the massive media attention and Internet popularity actions such as these can receive.

The previous chapters have outlined the organizational patterns (or lack thereof) and strategies of Internet-mediated social movement groups, which are contrary to popular classical social movement theories. A scholar armed with the tools provided by classical theories may have problems accounting for the actions of the Yes Men, or categorizing the groups analyzed as social movement group at all. Utilizing the classical lens, groups such as the Yes Men would be invisible. As such, the current chapter will

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attempt to answer RQ3: To what degree does a framework of SPIN groups engaged in electronic contention reinforce criticisms of organizationally focused social movement literature? In doing so, I will also consider the following questions: How does the emergence of these groups reinforce that classical theories are in need of amendment and;

How could the emergence of newer technologies further shift social movement agitation into an online sphere? First, this chapter will consider criticisms of classical theories, and will conclude with indications for further scholarship.

Critique of Classical Theories

Much of the criticism leveled at classical social movement scholarship is that it only considers a portion, or gives privilege to certain aspects of what constitutes a social movement and what constitutes a social movement group. Such scholarship often gives primacy to the concept of “text” or structure, and focuses purely on the physicalities of a group, its makeup, and what it looks like rather than the meaning of the actions, the group, and/or the movement as a whole within a greater social context. Lest my meaning in this chapter is mistaken, each of these scholars’ theories has merit to some degree in current social movement discussions. However, many of their theories are insufficient at describing the whole of social movements and their groups if one is to include the emergence of Internet-mediated groups such as the ones described in this thesis.

Enck-Wanzer (2006) summarizes this point into four general limitations suffered by this classical line of thought:

First, despite explicit recognitions to the contrary, all [classical theories] have a

verbal bias that directs them to be concerned first and foremost with the words

protestors speak and write . . . Second, although rhetorical scholars focusing on

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social movement have documented the key role non-verbal rhetorics play in

confrontation and the rhetoric of the streets, that role is often reduced to an

instrumentality that enables or facilitates verbal rhetorics . . .Third, rhetorical

social movement scholarship is to often leader-centered to be fully applicable to a

study of organizations . . . which do not have a clear leader . . . the problem,

instead, is that the leader-centered studies do not equip a critic to examine the

rhetoric of a group that saw itself first and foremost as a collective and resisted

internally the tendencies for leaders to emerge . . . Fourth . . . many of the

aforementioned studies run the risk of reifying or fetishizing the “text” in a way

that misses the radical fragmentation of late-modern rhetorics forms (p. 178-181).

Addressing Enck-Wanzer’s first limitation, times have changed since Griffin first suggested ways in which to analyze social movement activity from a communication perspective. For example, Griffin (1952) suggests that students of social movement should “permit the study of a multiplicity of speakers, speeches, audiences and occasions” (p. 184). This is applicable to a point, if we use a broad definition of

“speeches” and “occasions.” If by occasions, Griffin also means acts, then his statement carries more weight. Speeches and newspapers have given way to television in its many varied forms, which is giving way to the Internet as a preferred communication medium.

Considering the time in which Griffin wrote, television wasn’t as we know it now; the

Internet didn’t exist. If the word “speeches” could be expanded to include television coverage, YouTube videos, Web sites, listservs and the like, then Griffin’s ideas have more merit in the current discussion. However, without these interpretations, and with a strict understanding that speech has a one-way property of conferring persuasion (or

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coercion depending on the circumstance) upon an audience in a specific context, then how can a scholar utilize this definition to explain the act of the Yes Men appearing on the BBC. Clinging to antiquated definitions is dangerous as we push forward.

Addressing Enck-Wanzer’s second limitation, it is important to view the activities of social movement not as a functional gateway to Habermasian public-sphere discussion, but rather as a form of rhetoric. As suggested by Cathcart (1980):

A movement does not “move” in the objective world. It can only be interpreted

through bits and pieces of behavior and “created” by the symbolic form and

meaning these verbal and non-verbal behaviors take on in relationship to already

established symbolic forms and meanings. A movement is perceived, created,

and responded to symbolically as its confrontational strategies are juxtaposed with

the symbolic forms and contents of the established legitimized collectives with

which it interacts (p. 268).

McGee (1980) aggress with Cathcart’s definition: “Simons et al. do not require either the concept ‘movement’ or the concept ‘rhetoric;’ they say nothing about the human condition which could not be said with the term ’organizational communication,’ and they say nothing at all about the meaning of the collective life, about ‘progress’ and

‘human destiny’” (p. 240). Melucci et al. (1989) also echoes this statement:

Contemporary movements operate as signs, in the sense that they translate their

actions into symbolic challenges to the dominant codes . . . In this respect,

collective action is a form whose modes of organization and solidarity deliver a

message to the rest of society. Collective action . . . raises questions that

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transcend the logic of instrumental effectiveness and decision-making by

anonymous and impersonal organizations of power. (p. 12)

For McGee, social movement is a set of meanings rather than a phenomenon (McGee,

1980, p. 234). Classical definitions as postulated by Griffin, Simons, McCarthy and Zald,

Stewart et al., and others view the movement as an entity, a thing that lives and dies, rather than a set of meanings. Griffin suggests limits on what constitutes a social movement, one that has a life-cycle. According to Griffin, every movement has three phases, a period of inception, period of rhetorical crisis, and a period of consummation

(Griffin, 1952, p. 186). This begs several questions: can a group exist without a rhetorical crisis or a period of consummation; and can a period of inception and rhetorical crisis happen at the same time? Based on Griffin’s description of what constitutes a rhetorical crisis, “a time when on of the opposing groups of rhetoricians succeed in irrevocably disturbing that balance between the groups which had existed in the mind of the collective audience” (p. 186), what if a group has a period of inception, is ineffective at “disturbing the balance,” and has a period of consummation? Is that still a social movement group? One could see, based on the actions of groups described in earlier chapters of this thesis, that this could happen. Griffin stops short of describing criteria scholars should utilize to decide how and to what degree the “balance” was disturbed.

Stewart et al. (2001) also detail a specific set of life circumstances, a specific path a group must follow from genesis to death, in order to be classified a movement group

(detailed in chapter 2 of this thesis). One could logically infer, then, that if groups skip steps, go from genesis directly to enthusiastic mobilization, that the group in question is less a social movement group and more a campaign (Stewart et al., 2001, p. 2-5, p.129-

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148). This, of course does not take into account recent trends in technology that allow for impromptu gatherings and instantaneous communication with people around the world.

It also ignores the non-verbal confrontational activities (e.g. DoS attacks, Web site parodies) of the groups analyzed in this thesis. It would seem that this line of scholarship does not consider the social context. If we are to strap on Griffin’s tool belt, we would be ill equipped to analyze many groups that have been attributed to modern social movements such as DeLuca’s (1999) pet groups, EarthFirst! and ELF, as well as the groups described herein.

In reference to Enck-Wanzer’s third limitation, and as detailed in the literature, classical scholars have treated social movement groups as akin to establishment and corporate structures. Specifically, Simons (1970) offers to fill out the Griffin tool belt by choosing to focus primarily on leaders of social movement groups and the ways in which these groups follow “more formal collectives” (p. 2) in they way they organize.

Specifically, he takes great pains over several essays to describe how movement groups have a specific leader, and that leaders must address the public and his/her constituents in a certain way through a laundry list of rhetorical requirements: leaders must attract workers, secure the adoption of their product by the larger structure, and react to resistance (p 3-4). For Simons, SMGs are organized, and are therefore bound by the same set of rules that corporations and governments. For example, Simons suggests that

“organizational efficiency and adaptation to pressures from the external system are clearly perquisite to promotion of a movement’s ideology” (p. 4).

If we are to take Simons at face value, and compare social movement groups to corporate entities, then the activities of the group are reduced to commodities and debts.

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Simons makes reference in his rhetorical requirements to social movement groups (he utilizes the term social movement organizations, furthering his focus on the organizational aspects of social movements) needing to “secure adoption of their product by the larger structure (i.e., the external system, the established order). The product of any movement is its ideology, particularly its program for change” (p 3-4). This definition certainly blurs the line between the movement and the institution. This focus on SMG-as-organization and top-down management, is problematic when analyzing groups that have no ascertainable members, much less leaders. While public figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,

Susan B. Anthony, and Mahatma Gandhi are all iconic figures (in part because of the treatment history gives to them), these people were but a part of the movements they participated in. There is no doubt that those individuals were instrumental in their respective groups. However, focusing on their rhetoric and rhetorical requirements, stipulated by Simons as the only “text” of the movement, necessarily obscures actions of the group or movement as a whole not enacted by the leader.

Maybe scholars chose leaders because of ease of study and the great number of texts generated by historical leaders and great orators. If volume is indeed the limiting factor, then groups such as the Yes Men, who generate massive amounts of text (DVDs, books, and printed, broadcast, and website news stories, blogs, chats, emails, etc.) should also be considered.

Utilizing this Griffin-Simons tool belt, how is the scholar to analyze groups such as ®™ark, which has no leader, has transient membership, and agitates as part of the anti-globalization movement? What of groups that agitate for several movements?

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DeLuca (1999) asks similar questions; “If theories are frames for seeing and making sense of the world, what does Simons’ framework enable us to see and, more important in our case, what does it obscure” (p. 31)? The fault with this particular line of thinking is that it draws in absolutes. The argument here is not whether or not establishment forces and social movement groups share similar characteristics (they certainly do in some cases, today’s Greenpeace being an excellent example), but that requiring defined leaders and a particular organizational pattern limits the number of groups that can be considered. And maybe that makes some sense. Certainly we must draw a line somewhere, where we can say with some confidence a thing is or is not a social movement group. However, according to DeLuca (1993):

By adhering to Simons’ sociological framework for studying social movements,

wherein social movements are reduced to organizations, rhetorical theorists leave

themselves incapable of making sense of one of the most important social

movements of our time, the change in public consciousness in modern industrial

societies of the meanings of nature, progress, reason, and even humanity, changes

propelled by rhetorical acts of small groups or even lone individuals amplified by

modern means of mass communication so that they can reach millions of people

(p. 33-34).

While DeLuca speaks specifically of environmental groups, his point is applicable to the groups in this thesis.

Other scholars have built upon Simons’ ideas of SMG-as-organization. Chapter 2 of this thesis examined Stewart et al’s (2001) assertion that movement groups must be at least minimally organized and have a step-by-step life cycle (p.2, 129-148). As outlined

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in the literature, McCarthy and Zald (1977) offer another organizational lens, resource mobilization, to view social movement groups. Much like industry and business, it is postulated by McCarthy and Zald (1977) that success is a direct factor of the amount of resources the entity has. Specifically, the theorists suggest that social movement groups must have resources in order to succeed:

Each SMO [social movement organization] has a set of target goals, a set of

preferred changes toward which it claims to be working. Such goals may be broad

or narrow, and they are the characteristics of SMOs which link them conceptually

with particular SMs [social movements] and SMIs [social movement industries].

The SMOs must possess resources, however few and of whatever type, in order to

work toward goal achievement. Individuals and other organizations control

resources, which can include legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor (McCarthy

and Zald,1977, p. 1221).

Organizationally-minded social movement scholars ignore that social action typically does not take place on a level playing field. McCarthy and Zald may suggest that resources can be minimal, and would argue that a person’s body utilized for a sit-in would be considered a resource, they overlook meanings associated with that act and any potential media coverage that body generates, and go so far as to equate such acts to mainstream advertising. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977):

The more dependent a SMO is upon isolated constituents the greater the share of its

resources which will be allocated to advertising. As indicated, SMO advertising can

take the form of mailed material which demonstrates the good works of the

organization. Media bargaining can also be conceptualized as SMO advertising. By

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staging events which will possibly be "newsworthy," by attending to the needs of

news organizations, and by cultivating representatives of the media, SMOs may

manipulate media coverage of their activities more or less successfully (p. 1230).

Equating nonviolent protest with a help-wanted advertisement removes the meaning of the act. Let’s unpack this further. Consider the example given at the beginning of this thesis. If the Yes Men’s action against Dow Chemical was an indeed an advertising effort on the part of the anti-globalization movement, then the advertising would at least need a call-to-action statement to be deemed effective from an advertising standpoint. According to Kawas (2001), “Direct response advertising and marketing is one of the more immediate tools in the marketers' arsenal to move potential customers into action. At its core, direct response advertising is a marketing message that incorporates a ‘call to action.’” No such call was detected during analysis of the interview. As such, it is difficult to apply the McCarthy and Zald hypothesis to this instance.

That said, the mathematical formula one could derive from McCarthy and Zald’s perspective, ideology + money + people = social change, makes sense and is certainly a useful quip during conversation. However, this equation is not a constant and does not exist in a vacuum. It does not take into account intangibles such as media attention and popular opinion versus public policy. It certainly doesn’t take into account groups that have large amounts of resources, yet are deemed less effective by others groups within the movement, nor does it explain groups that are low on resources yet are able to enact change (or at very least make their cause a blip on the public consciousness radar).

Conquergood (2002), speaks directly to this point: “Subordinate people do not have the

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privilege of explicitness, the luxury of transparency, the presumptive norm of clear and direct communication, free and open debate on a level playing field that the privileged classes take for granted” (p. 146). While I am not suggesting that all actors within a social movement are fiscally subordinate, certainly some are. For example, Dow

Chemical possesses far more resources than the Yes Men; a Russian whaling fleet possesses more resources than GreenPeace protestors in a rubber dingy (or, at very least, a bigger boat). Arguably, the actions of both of these groups were effective in gaining attention, and in each of these cases, the subordinate voice was the loudest. As such, the organizational lens ill equips us to view social movements. According to DeLuca (1993):

With Simons’ framework as a guide, we would focus on collectivity that resemble

institutionalized organizations, paying particular attention to their resources and

the rhetoric their leaders employ to fulfill the functional requirements with the

greatest organizational efficiency. The rhetoric, then, follows from the demands

of the organizational form and operates within organizations matrices (p. 31).

While DeLuca is speaking specifically towards Simons, he levels criticism at theorists that can’t get past the organizational-leader centric theories and look at a larger picture of what defines a social movement group.

Classic social movement scholars do well to analyze specific pieces of how groups interact internally and externally, but should recognize they are only analyzing a portion of what constitutes a movement and how it is enacted. By looking at portions of a movement, a group, or an actor, scholars enact their own brand of agenda-setting. By trumpeting these portions in journals and tomes and calling it the whole, they blind us to other portions worthy of scholarship. This is problematic in much the same way a

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blindfolded person has difficulty describing an elephant based on careful examination of the tail. Griffin, Simons, Stewart et al., McCarthy and Zald and others are adept at analysis concerning portions of the elephant, but their theories cannot be said to describe the whole. They have drawn a line that is not inclusive of all groups that act within social movements. What is the critic to do then? Perhaps consideration of theories such as

Gerlach’s (2001) SPIN are in order. According to Enck-Wanzer (2006), “it is important to try to shift our critical optics (at least slightly) about street movement rhetoric so that we might see beyond how function, and begin seeing how intersect to form (an)other rhetoric of resistance that is qualitatively different than a critic might have assumed” (p. 181). Theories such as ECD may provide this ocular shift.

In reference to Enck-Wanzer’s fourth limitation, Griffin (1952) does offer the following, which is of some use to the current discussion:

The critic must judge the discourse in terms of the theories of rhetoric and public

opinion. This perspective means that the critic will operate within the climate of

theory of rhetoric and public opinion in which the speakers and writes he [sic]

judges were reared, and in which they practiced: in other words, that he [sic] will

measure practice in terms of the theories available, not to himself [sic], but to the

speakers and writers he [sic] judges (p.187).

If, by this, Griffin means a scholar must take social/historical context and available theories into account when analyzing a movement or group, then this is useful for analyzing the groups described in this thesis. The Internet and associated technologies are part of the today’s social context as utilized by the Yes Men and others, and ECD is

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an available theory. However, Griffin suggests nothing of actions and actors, giving primacy to the “text,” either written or spoken. Utilizing Griffin’s theory, we could only analyze the text of the Yes Men’s website, the transcript of the interview, and the press releases they sent out to the media. This wholly overlooks the act of falsely representing

Dow on international television and the acts of parody that lead up to the BBC broadcast, unless we take a broader reading his use of the word “discourse” and take that to mean more than he is implying. At very least, the ways people communicate to the masses has changed. At one point, mass communication was an orator speaking in front of a group of people. Presidential candidates such as Henry Truman performed “whistlestop” stump speeches from the back of the presidential train, Ferdinand Magellan. Dr. King gave mass sermons to his congregation that led to the Montgomery Bus boycotts. During those times, it was necessary for movement actors to spread their message to the masses using available means: giving speeches and performing photograph worthy stunts for newsprint. The images of women’s suffragists picketing in front of the White House is a prime example of the latter. As such, it is easy to see why social movement scholars have historically given primacy to speeches and written documentation produced by movement actors.

Giving primacy to spoken and written words, the “text,” over bodies and/in action does not paint a complete picture of the social action. There is meaning within the words, spoken and written. There is also meaning within the actions and the ways the actions are carried out. Is that not to be consider text as well? If so, then perhaps ECD is a valid theory of social movement group tactics. If one was to read Griffin’s suggestions explicitly, the actions have less (or no) meaning, are not part of a larger “text” (if we are

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to continue using that word), and not worthy of analysis. If there is agreement that times have changed, and the ways in which people gather and protest have also changed (at least to some degree), then it follows that our tool belt should also change, or at very least, expand to include new tools. While all of the classical methods and theories are still applicable to a degree, the day of the single orator physically in front of all the people they are addressing is all but gone.

The emergence of groups such as the Yes Men, ®™ARK and Electronic

Disturbance Theater further showcase that earlier theories of social movement are in need of revision. Utilizing Griffin’s tools, none of the above groups would qualify as movement groups, yet they clearly agitate towards change in multiple movements. None of these groups have demonstrated a clear beginning, nor answer a singular rhetorical crisis. Utilizing Simons’ model, looking purely at leaders, these groups would also not qualify, since none have discernable leaders, nor do they seem to have static membership.

While they may have members that are more public than others, they have not been identified within their respective groups, and have gone as far as assuming pseudonyms to hide their identities from the public. Using Stewart et al.’s model, it would be hard to classify the above groups since none have a discernable organizational pattern. Using

McCarthy and Zald’s techniques of resource mobilization, these groups would certainly be doomed to failure since they have few recorded resources. However, considering each of these groups continue to agitate at the time of this writing, it would seem that they manage.

Only with broader definitions can we hope to capture and explain modern

Internet-mediated SMGs, if even only for a moment. Considering the fast pace of

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technology, and the swift learning curve of Internet citizens, that moment may be fleeting indeed. However, only with broader definitions can we hope to capture the essence and meaning of social movement actors utilizing the technologies of today. If we must discern a social movement group by its organizational styling, then the definition should be broad enough to be inclusive of groups that agitate within a recognized movement.

Approaches such as Gerlach’s SPIN theory are more inclusive of groups that quack like a duck, but do not look like a duck under classic definitions. This is not to say that all groups are a SPIN although, according to Gerlach (2001), it is “the most common type of

[social movement] organization” (p. 289). However, it is the most inclusive definition in terms of groups that agitate today, especially those that utilize the Internet and related technologies.

In addition, tactical typologies such as Costanza-Chock’s Electronic Civil

Disobedience are specific enough to categorize activity, yet broad enough to recognize that said activities can span multiple categories simultaneously (Costanza-Chock, 2003, p.

174). With the growth rate of the Internet, the speed at which new technology surpasses old, the number of groups that organize and agitate in this manner is sure to grow. Groups such as the Yes Men, ®™ark and EDT point on a spotlight the shortcomings of popular theory and pave the way for newer and more inclusive theories.

Future Indications for Internet Protest Groups

As indicated in the previous section, focusing on groups that utilize the Web as their main method of agitation is important to the discussion of social movements and their affiliated groups. The Web and the Internet as a whole has become the vehicle by which people communicate with each other and become aware of public affairs. Much

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the same way as presidential stump speeches were conducted on the back of train cars, now presidential messages are uploaded onto YouTube, an Internet video site, for users to download. As was discussed in chapter 3, the Internet has become a valuable tool for social movement groups. According to Owens and Palmer (2003),

The World Wide Web, however, significantly alters the media landscape of

protest, giving activists access to a mass medium that they themselves control.

The Web places activists on a more equal footing with other media outlets when

waging the battle over public relations. (p. 336)

The battle for the streets has spilled or morphed into the Internet. And if we take the cases presented in this thesis as example, the battle for the streets has turned into the battle for the Internet. However, this brings up an interesting point. What has plagued the Internet from an information dissemination standpoint and traditional printed media is the word “niche.” If one walks into any book store, there are a multitude of magazines a trade publications, all geared towards a particular subset of people. For example, if a consumer was interested in a body building magazine, there are literally dozens of publications to choose from, each reporting on the subject in a slightly different way.

The same goes for the Internet. There are scores of websites, personal, professional, corporate, non-profit, about any topic imaginable. Because there are so many, popular search engines such as Google do not find them all. Additionally, the meta tags that search engines utilize to return search results (page title, description, etc.) may not be descriptive enough to lure potential visitors to the referring page. As such, the visitor must know where to go, know the unique website address (or at very least the right places to click hyperlinks), in order to view the message. This is problematic when considering

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the Web and Internet as a media tool. If a protest agent wants to be heard, and utilize the

Internet as a vehicle for their voice, it may be difficult for their voice to be heard amid the myriad of other voices on the World Wide Web unless there is a way to direct potential views. Owens and Palmer (2003) agree with this conclusion: “Using their own media, activists choose which events to cover and how to frame them . . . while activists gain more control over media production, fewer consume the end product” (p. 338).

So how is this message heard? To combat this trend towards a niche-only media campaign, Internet-mediated SMGs have utilized DeLuca’s (1999) concept of image events, staging news-worthy events for traditional media which then act as amplifiers for the protestor’s message. The Yes Men’s BBC interview, ®™ark’s Operation Barbie, and

EDT’s DoS attacks at Harvard could all be examples of this idea. Image events are public direct actions, presented as a challenge to dominant ideologies. Although designed to attract media attention and generate publicity, “image events are more than just a means to get on television. They are crystallized philosophical fragments, mind bombs, that work to expand the universe of thinkable thoughts” (DeLuca 1999, p. 6).

As was the case for EDT’s involvement with the Zapatistas described in chapter 2 and 3, image events are a necessary element of a radical group’s rhetoric, as groups of this type are typically low on social capital, a term defined by Putnam (1993) as “the features of social organization, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (p. 35). However, traditional definitions of rhetoric do not include images (or image events for that matter) as items worthy of analysis (Deluca, 1993; Enck-Wanzer, 2006). This classic view of rhetoric discounts image events and marginalizes groups that utilize such tactics. According to

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DeLuca (1993):

Confrontational rhetoric was measured against the ideals of reasoned discourse or

was seen as a technique to gain attention for the “real” rhetoric. Even when a few

scholars started to study agitation, coercion, and confrontation as forms of

rhetoric in their own right, their traditional definitions of rhetoric reduced

agitation, coercion and confrontation to instrumental activities, not constitutive

action (p. 15).

An alternate view (DeLuca, 1999; Delicath and DeLuca, 2003; Enck-Wanzer, 2006) in which image events are viewed as a form of rhetoric, challenges the contemporary notion that rhetoric is strictly verbal. Therefore, image events as rhetorical devices, serve to deconstruct and articulate identities, ideologies, consciousness, communities, publics and cultures, and are designed to interrupt Dominant Social Paradigm thoughts by breaking through hegemonic discourses produced by corporately owned media structures.

An important element of image events is that they occur in and attempt to refashion the public sphere on the Internet. While in some ways image events are in contradiction with Habermas’ idea of a liberal space wherein a deliberative public achieves opinion through reasoned discourse, the creation of a hypermediated sphere of 24-hour news networks and high-speed Internet allows social movement groups to provide social comment through performance of image events. The end result is public critique through public spectacle. According to Goodnight (1987) in his discussion of the public sphere,

“the public has become partial, exiling the discourse of poverty from the public scene into networks that bypass the poor” (p. 430). As suggested above, radical social movement groups lack social capital and are therefore silenced by dominant forms of

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discourse. It is the image event, as described by DeLuca, and the Internet as a vehicle of production and dissemination that allows marginalized groups enter into politics, allowing them access into “an arena where interests conduct controversy and openly struggle for power” (Goodnight, 1987, p. 429). According to DeLuca, these social movement groups attempt to disrupt hegemonic discourses through the shock or laughter of an image event that challenges the way the public thinks: “radical . . . groups contest social norms and deconstruct the established naming of the world” (DeLuca, 1999, p. 59).

While DeLuca writes specifically of environmental advocacy groups during the infancy of the Internet as we know it today, image events are potentially a powerful weapon in the Internet-mediated SMG tool belt. Specifically, Wray (1999) suggests that

“if the desired goal of ECD is to draw attention to particular issues by engaging in actions that are unusual and will attract some degree of media coverage, then these actions have a high degree of effectiveness” (p. 110). These same lessons translate into the on-demand world as exemplified by the Yes Men’s BBC interview. Protestors of The Yes Men,

®™ARK and EDT act as log jammers, mokeywrenchers, to bring further attention to their cause and to their Web presence.

One of the limiting factors towards utilizing the web in this way is the niche

Owens and Palmer allude to. However, recent changes in technology have brought about a new way to interact with the web, and thus a new way for social movement groups to interact with each other and society as a whole. This change, called Web 2.0 (a bit of a misnomer since there was no Web 1.0), enables two way communication via the Internet.

According to Alexander (2006),

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Social software has emerged as a major component of the Web 2.0 movement . . .

During the past few years, a group of Web projects and services became

perceived as especially connective, receiving the rubric of “social software”:

blogs, wikis, trackback, podcasting, videoblogs, and enough social networking

tools like MySpace and Facebook to give rise to an abbreviation mocking their

very prevalence: YASN (Yet Another Social Network). Consider the differences

between these and static or database-driven Web pages. Wikis are all about user

modification; CNN’s front page is decisively not. (p. 33)

Use of the Internet and social networks alluded to in the above quote have grown quite popular over the past few years, reaching a broad range of demographics. For example,

Mankoff, Matthews, Fussell, and Johnson (2007) suggest that “the Internet in general, and social networking sites in particular, provide access to a population that includes middle aged professionals (through Yahoo! 360), young adults (through Friendster and

MySpace), and a broad range of families (through MySpace, which includes many of the

87% of teens who are on the Internet)” (p. 2).

The key to Web 2.0 is user-generated content. The architecture of the Internet is shifting away from the days of one-way communication and static web-pages to pages that feature dynamic and ever changing pages. Blogs and wikis are a prime example.

The creator of the service begins a conversation (which is hyper-linked to many other conversations occurring simultaneously) and the visitors of the site are free to comment and converse with the creator, and each other.

The vignette at the beginning of this thesis and concluded at the beginning of this chapter alluded to a news feed from news.google.com. This concept of RSS (Really

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Simple Syndication) data feeds is also inherent within the Web 2.0 concept. When building a page, setting up a new aggregator, or launching a blog, creators are able to include any of thousands of news feeds (an instant news ticker). As such, when news breaks, it shows up on unknown thousands of Web pages in addition to the content already featured. Web page creators are also able to create their own feeds (which display changes and their current Web page content) for others to subscribe to. This cheap version of syndication seems to be the future of Internet content.

Among other trends, social bookmarking sites such as Digg.com allow users to submit links, videos, pictures, and news stories. The more people visit the added links and “digg” (indicate that the story, picture, or video was interesting in some way), the higher the rank that item is given. The higher the rank, the higher the visibility the link gets on the dig.com home page. This, ideally, gets around traditional ideas of agenda setting, since it is the users who decide what is news worthy and what is not, what can be considered and what is clearly hoax.

These features are but a few items that set Web 2.0 apart from early understandings of how the Web was used. Much like Gerlach’s concept of SPIN, all these items – from blogs, to news feeds, to dig.com are all interconnected to some degree.

They are segments of Web 2.0, polycentric in that the services are independently generated, integrated in that anyone can include these items in their Web page, and networked because they depend on each other and the users to function.

In the future (and potentially even today) Internet-mediated SMGs will have to rely less on mainstream mediated image events to drive traffic to their websites; Web 2.0

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concepts may be helpful in spreading their message in a more dynamic way. Mankoff et al. (2007) provide insight on this subject:

Social networks can support participation both by structurally connecting

participants to opportunities and by socializing participants to the issues and

shaping their beliefs. This suggests that social networking sites may be able to play

a role in helping to increase individual participation in a social movement and in

supporting change, both structurally and by shaping beliefs and culture. (p. 4)

The end result may be that an image event will have even more impact, as users share videos and comment on the event on their own, and other’s, Web sites. As of the time of this writing, there are hundreds of Yes Men videos (the Bohpal BBC video is the most popular when “the Yes Men” phrase is searched) that users are sharing

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SlUQ2sUti8o). There are even Yes Men tribute videos created by users who have found the Yes Men’s antics “cool,” featuring multiple pages of comments about the videos with links to more information.

While Web 2.0 isn’t necessarily a brave new world, it certainly has the potential to make communicating with the masses easier for SMG actors. Much like viral video, it only takes is one viewer to appreciate the message and add it to a blog or a social bookmarking site. From there, there is no telling on how many websites that information will display. While written before Web 2.0 was conceived, Owens and Palmer (2003) foreshadowed what was to come:

By making the means of media production more widely available and giving

activists new opportunities to share their views with others, it lays the foundation

for a more democratic public sphere . . . since it is accessible from virtually

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anywhere, the Web overcomes the problems of low access and distribution of

alternate media (p. 338).

That said, even as you are reading these words, the ways in which people communicate over the Internet is changing. As such, it behooves us as communication scholars to build theories that are more inclusive and less exclusive.

Conclusion and Future Research

Classical scholarship has ill equipped the student of social movements to study radical groups such as the Yes Men, ®™ark, and Electronic Disturbance Theater.

Evaluating a SMGs based on membership size, structure, leadership, or depth of its resources pool necessarily omits these types of radical groups. Gerlach’s (2001) SPIN theory is more inclusive, and more adequately describes the social movement phenomena as described in this thesis. The groups in question were found to be segmentary, exhibit multiple leaders, work together, and exchange members through the networking with other groups within the movement. Costanza-Chock’s theory of Electronic Civil

Disobedience was found to be descriptive of tactics employed by the chosen groups, each one exhibiting both conventional and disruptive tactics. Finally, it was found that these theories exist in contrast with classical conceptions of social movements and such theories are necessary if groups such as Yes Men, ®™ark, and Electronic Disturbance

Theater are to be included within movement scholarship.

Future research within the realm of Internet-mediated SMGs can take many forms.

First, this thesis only lightly touched on potential institutional responses to any of the actions taken. As of the time of this writing, there are several pieces of legislation that

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specify severe penalty for some of the actions described in Chapter 3. Bowers, Ochs and

Jensen (1993), specify methods of institutional repression and control. Future research could consider the ramifications of engaging in Denial of Service attacks and other destructive forms of ECD.

Second, this study touched lightly on a key concept to DeLuca’s image events: the ideograph. In the post 9/11 world, under legislation such as the Patriot Act and

Homeland Security Act, several tactics employed by the studied groups have been labeled “terrorist activity” (most notably, EDTs DoS attacks). It is of interest to explore the ideograph of terrorism in the context of Internet-mediated SMGs.

Third, it was beyond the scope of this thesis to explore further DeLuca’s idea of image events as they apply to the online sphere. It was asserted in this chapter that there is a one to one comparison, but the vehicle as described by DeLuca is far different than the Web 2.0 ideas as outlined above. Certainly Web sites such as YouTube and

GoogleVideo carry some of the same concepts as television, but the Web is more interactive that traditional TV.

Fourth, Web 2.0 concepts need to be fully explored in regards to social movements.

If movement groups are just now dipping their toes into the shallow end of the pool, it will be interesting to see scholarship regarding groups that take more advantage of it that the ones here.

These ideas as well as others would add to the study of Internet-mediated social movement literature. They also would add to the communication field by broadening definitions and consideration rhetorical sources from the broadening spectrum of new media.

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Bichlbaum, A., Bonanno, M., & Spunkmeyer, B. (2004). The Yes Men: The True Story of

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