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Philosophy at Cambridge Newsletter of the Faculty of Philosophy Issue 7 May 2010 From the Chairman Simon Blackburn Three splendid lectures enlivened the year. of meeting the target of £2 million Roger Scruton gave a talk on music and required to fund the 1896 Chair of human values to a packed audience at the Philosophy. As I write this, the School Alumni Weekend, bravely overcoming a of Arts and Humanities has passed our distracting balletic performance by the request for the position to be formally technician who was apparently needed to named the Bertrand Russell Professorship cope with the innovation of showing slides of Philosophy up to the General Board, and music together. As compensation, the where we expect it to be approved. We subsequent dinner in Roger’s honour was decided that Russell deserved the honour ravished by an impromptu performance of not only for his intellectual eminence, songs from Russia and Kazakhstan, by the but also for his visibility as a public face very talented partner of one of our guests. of philosophy. Barry Smith’s lecture on the philosophy Meeting the goal of this appeal is a of wine-tasting at the Cambridge Festival terrific achievement, and one of which of Ideas also saw academic delight we in the Faculty, and our alumni, can be mingled with more sensual pleasure as very proud. It is particularly gratifying that the audience thoughtfully reflected upon almost one hundred people gave their the importance of terroir and knowingly support to the cause. The Chair is now compared Pinot Noirs. Philip Pettit gave the independent of the bitter financial winds Routledge Lecture in Philosophy, offering blowing around many posts in academe, us a lucid and illuminating account of even in Cambridge. Particular thanks are rival conceptions of liberty, elegantly due to Hugh Mellor and Jane Heal, who juxtaposing such heavyweights as Hobbes, have worked tirelessly on behalf of the Bertrand Russell Berlin, Rawls, Skinner and Ibsen. We owe appeal, and to CUDO and Cambridge thanks to all these speakers, and to in America, who have ably supported Routledge for their continued support. us. We are planning to announce a However, the great news this year, celebratory event when all the formalities is always needed if enough of them is that thanks to some very generous are complete. are going to be able to pass the torch gifts the Faculty is now on the point Of course, needs continue. At present to another generation. One of Trinity we are encouraging donors to think College’s alumnus benefactors once of supporting graduate students by wrote “I should have as a memorial the endowing bursaries and grants. This is kind thoughts and gratitude of those If you have any comments or urgent, because there is so little public who had been helped by an unknown suggestions, please send them funding for graduate studies in the friend” and we firmly believe that many to the Editor: humanities. The subjects that the readers would like to share that sentiment. Government likes — science, technology, Last year in this column, Alex Oliver Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson engineering and medicine—do not talked of the booming demand for places Faculty of Philosophy include literature, history, languages or in philosophy and expressed gratitude University of Cambridge philosophy. Thanks to one fine gift this to colleagues, students, and staff for Sidgwick Avenue year we have been able to offer two their role in sustaining our Rolls-Royce David Bayless studentships. And thanks education. I am pleased to say that the Cambridge to one extremely generous anonymous demand continues. I also want to end CB3 9DA gift, we shall be able to continue to help by affirming that with ever-increasing Phone: +44 1223 331889 some of the best and most deserving pressures, the gratitude is ever more email: [email protected] students for another ten years. But more appropriate. Philosophy at Cambridge page 1 May 2010 requiring that each option in a choice Hobbes, Berlin and Freedom should escape interference, but also for adopting a more radical position. Philip Pettit This is the republican claim that even a robustly unimpeded choice will be unfree if it is subject to the permission or will of any other. Suppose that there is a doorkeeper guarding the two doors, A and B, but that they are each open because the keeper happens to like you. Would you have a free choice in such a case? An argument rather like Berlin’s adaptation argument suggests that you would not. Suppose you want A, not B, but door A is closed because the door-keeper does not like you. Now imagine that you can secure the goodwill of the door-keeper if you toady or fawn or kowtow appropriately. And imagine that you do ingratiate yourself by such means and that door A becomes as open as door B. Does that mean that you now have a free choice between A and B? Surely not. As freedom cannot be achieved just by adaptation, so it cannot plausibly be achieved by ingratiation. Where choice requires the ‘indulgence’ of another, as Richard Price put it in the eighteenth century, it is not properly Philip Pettit free choice. The thought experiment argues for the republican view that a Suppose you are wondering whether interference in the choice between choice is not free if its exercise requires to play a game of tennis and decide in playing and not playing tennis if you the permission and goodwill of another. the end against the idea. Did you make are not impeded in the option you Freedom consists in not being subject a free decision? Yes, you think, of course actually take. to the will of another: not being you did. But now I point out that the gate In his 1958 essay ‘Two Concepts of dominated by another, as by a master. to the tennis court was locked: perhaps Liberty’ Berlin may have gone along It is a nice irony that though Berlin even locked by someone who wanted to with this thought but, to his credit, he took Hobbes to be a forerunner of his make sure you couldn’t play. Are you still explicitly renounced it later, drawing on views, his arguments go in an extreme sure that you made a free decision? a metaphor of open doors. In order to non-Hobbesian direction. Not only does Most of us will respond by enjoy a free choice between certain his open-doors metaphor undermine distinguishing. Yes, you freely made a options, each option must be an open Hobbes’s explicit claim, making choice between the options you thought door, he said. It is not enough that the counterfactual as well as actual you had. But those options weren’t all actual door you push on happens to be interference hostile to freedom. It available and so you did not actually open; the counterfactual door you might also provides support for the view that have a free choice between playing have pushed on must have been open the freedom of a choice requires full and not playing tennis. too. You must not be exposed either to independence from the will of another, This very example was discussed in actual or to counterfactual interference. thereby sustaining the very ancient, an exchange between Thomas Hobbes Berlin made an interesting case for this republican ‘wisdom’ that Hobbes took and Bishop Bramhall in the seventeenth position. Suppose you are faced with two to be too ‘dearly bought’. century. Hobbes’s extraordinary view options or doors, A and B, and only A is was that you really have a free choice if open. If you can adapt your preferences you are not interfered with in the option so as to want A, not B, then on the view Philip Pettit is the Laurance S. you actually choose. And so he says, under question you will have ensured presumably with ‘real’ tennis in mind, that you have a free choice. But this is Rockefeller Professor of Politics that ‘it is no impediment...that the door absurd. You cannot make yourself free; and Human Values at Princeton is shut’ if you have not ‘a will to play’. you cannot ensure the freedom of University. In October 2009 he The Hobbesian way of thinking about a choice, just by adapting your gave the fourth Routledge Lecture free choice may continue in the theme, preferences appropriately. in Philosophy on the uses of Berlin’s sounded with particular brio by Isaiah I like Berlin’s metaphor and I like this open-doors metaphor. He also gave Berlin, that to be free in a choice is not to argument. One attractive feature is that the Seeley Lectures on a republican suffer interference there. On at least one the metaphor has resources not actually conception of democracy on reading of this idea you do not suffer exploited by Berlin. It argues not just for 26–30 April 2010. Philosophy at Cambridge page 2 May 2010 extent are human activities properly What is Legal Philosophy? subject to legal regulation? Who – legislatures or courts – should have Matthew H. Kramer the final say in determining whether people hold fundamental legal rights to be treated in certain ways? Is there any comprehensively applicable Although I teach in the Law Faculty at and, to a lesser extent, with most moral obligation to comply with legal Cambridge, most of my degrees and other domains of philosophy – but requirements? What is the appropriate all of my lecturing, supervisions and it addresses a number of distinctive general basis for the imposition of research are philosophical.