EYE SPY INTELLIGENCE MAGAZINE 118 2018 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ “Soviet Espionage Has Never Stopped
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Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan
Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan Louise Olsson & JOHAN Tejpar (Eds.) BIRGITH Andreassen, JosepH HOENEN, SYNNE HOLAN, SOPHIE Kesselaar, BJØRG Skotnes, JOHANNA VALENIUS � ���������������������� ������������������� RO_ BZ_Logo _2_301U_pos op wit_en.eps RO_ BZ_Logo _2 7462C_pos op wit_en.eps Logo ‘derden’ voor gebruik in colofon met Logo ‘derden’ voor gebruik in colofon met ongestreken papiersoorten ( UNCOATED ) op witte achtergrond gestreken papiersoorten ( COATED ) op witte achtergrond Kleur is gebaseerd op PMS 301U Kleur is gebaseerd op PMS 7462C Bij gebruik in full colour offsetdruk Bij gebruik in full colour offsetdruk omzetten naar: C100 M54 Y4 K19 omzetten naar: C100 M45 Y6 K28 RO_ BZ_Logo _2_301U_pos op kleur_en.eps RO_ BZ_Logo _2 7462C_pos op kleur_en.eps Logo ‘derden’ voor gebruik in colofon met Logo ‘derden’ voor gebruik in colofon met FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-fundedongestreken papiersoorten agency under the ( UNCOATED Ministry of Defence. ) op gekleurde The core activitiesachtergrond are research, methodgestreken and technology papiersoorten ( COATED ) op witte achtergrond development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 per- sonnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOIKleur Sweden’s is gebaseerd largest research op institute. PMS FOI301U gives its customers access to leading-edge expertiseKleur in a islarge gebaseerd number op PMS 7462C of fields such as security policy studies, defence and securityBij gebruik related analyses,in full colour the assessment offsetdruk of various types of threat, systems for control and Bijmanagement gebruik of in crises, full colour offsetdruk protection against and management of hazardous substances,omzetten IT security naar: and theC100 potential M54 offered Y4 by K19 new sensors. -
Afghanistan Order of Battle by Wesley Morgan December 2012
Coalition Combat Forces in Afghanistan AFGHANISTAN ORDER OF BATTLE by Wesley Morgan December 2012 This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for particular districts or provinces; artillery units, including both those acting as provisional maneuver units and those in traditional artillery roles; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and “white” special operations forces, described in general terms. It does not include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. International Security Assistance Force / United States ForcesAfghanistan (Gen. John Allen, USMC)ISAF Headquarters, Kabul Special Operations Joint Task ForceAfghanistan / NATO Special Operations Component CommandAfghanistan (Maj. Gen. Raymond Thomas III, USA)Camp Integrity, Kabul1 Combined Joint Special Operations Task ForceAfghanistan (USA)Bagram Airfield; village stability operations, Afghan commando advisors, and other SOF missions2 Special Operations Task ForceEast (USA)Bagram Airfield; operating in eastern Afghanistan Special Operations Task ForceSouth (USA)Kandahar Airfield; operating in Kandahar Province Special Operations Task ForceSouth-East (USN)U/I location; operating in Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces Special Operations Task ForceWest (USMC)Camp Lawton, Herat; operating in western Afghanistan and Helmand Province TF Balkh / 2-7 Infantry (Lt. Col. Todd Kelly, USA)Camp Mike Spann, Mazar-e-Sharif; operating in northern Afghanistan 3 TF 3-69 Armor (Lt. Col. Orestees Davenport, USA)U/I location; possibly attached to CJSOTF-A in Ghazni Province 4 ISAF Special Operations Forces / Special Operations Command and Control Element (Brig. -
Field Experience with a Chitosan-Based Haemostatic
6-Seiter Sonderdruck Form-01 15.08.2011 10:56 Uhr Seite 1 Reprint from MCIF 3. /4-2011 Reprint from MCIF 3./4 -2011 E. C. T. H. TAN, C. P. BLEEKER (NETHERLANDS) Field experience with a chitosan-based haemostatic dressing B Uncontrolled hemorrhage is the leading cause of death among combat casualties A and is the second major cause of death in civilian trauma patients. Major impro- vements have been made in the deve- lopment of novel dressings with D haemostatic properties to control heavy bleeding in non-compressible areas. We describe the use of chitosan gauze (Celox GauzeTM), a chitosan-based hae- mostatic agent for the control of massive traumatic bleeding in 7 patients. C Introduction Fig. 9: A CeloxTM Gauze; B ChitoGauzeTM; C HemCon®; D QuikClot® Gauze (previously Combat Gauze). Bleeding remains a leading cause of death in trauma patients, both in civilian Table 2: Overview of a number of haemostatic dressings (prices October 2010 in the Netherlands). and military settings. Military experience in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan has led Fig. 1: Lifeliner 3’s mobile medical team in action during an operation. Product Material Cost in € Effective- Shelf Side Use Weight Regis- Website to the introduction of the Combat Appli- (excl. VAT) ness life effects tration International importer cation Tourniquet (CAT-T®)(1) to treat haemostatic dressing in the field based on tracted from shrimp, cross react with red Dutch distributor severe bleeding from the extremities and BATLS 2006 JSP (57). Many comparative blood cells and form a solid clot, regard- Celox Chitosan 43,50 + 3 yr None USA, Singapore, 57 gram FDA + http://www.celoxmedical.com/ haemostatic dressings for severe bleeding animal studies 1-8 and case series 9-12 less of the natural clotting mechanism of Gauze Germany, Poland, CE+ index.htm from extremities, head, neck and torso. -
North Korean Cyber Capabilities: in Brief
North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief Emma Chanlett-Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs Liana W. Rosen Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics John W. Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Catherine A. Theohary Specialist in National Security Policy, Cyber and Information Operations August 3, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44912 North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief Overview As North Korea has accelerated its missile and nuclear programs in spite of international sanctions, Congress and the Trump Administration have elevated North Korea to a top U.S. foreign policy priority. Legislation such as the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122) and international sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council have focused on North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile programs and human rights abuses. According to some experts, another threat is emerging from North Korea: an ambitious and well-resourced cyber program. North Korea’s cyberattacks have the potential not only to disrupt international commerce, but to direct resources to its clandestine weapons and delivery system programs, potentially enhancing its ability to evade international sanctions. As Congress addresses the multitude of threats emanating from North Korea, it may need to consider responses to the cyber aspect of North Korea’s repertoire. This would likely involve multiple committees, some of which operate in a classified setting. This report will provide a brief summary of what unclassified open-source reporting has revealed about the secretive program, introduce four case studies in which North Korean operators are suspected of having perpetrated malicious operations, and provide an overview of the international finance messaging service that these hackers may be exploiting. -
ENGLISH Only
FOM.GAL/3/19/Rev.1 4 July 2019 ENGLISH only Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe The Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir 4 July 2019 Regular Report to the Permanent Council for the period from 22 November 2018 to 4 July 2019 1 Introduction Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have the honour to present to you my latest report to the Permanent Council, which covers the period from November last year until today. In introducing this report I would like to focus on two key issues that we are facing when it comes to freedom of the media and freedom of expression. The first and greatest challenge facing journalists and other media actors which I wish to address is safety. I would like to warn, in particular, against the risk of normalization and indifference. Just two weeks ago, Vadim Komarov, a journalist from Cherkasy in Ukraine, died from his wounds following a brutal attack in May. His death did not generate much international attention or outrage, but it is no less revolting and sends a clear and sordid message of intimidation to many of his colleagues working on the same issues in the country. Komarov was investigating corruption and abuses of power in his city for many years and had been attacked in the past. He was the second journalist killed this year in the OSCE region. In April, 29-year-old journalist Lyra McKee was shot while covering riots in Northern Ireland, in the United Kingdom. She was a passionate and talented young journalist, known for her investigative reporting on the political history in the region. -
Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace
Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr1335 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: 978-0-8330-9249-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark Cover Image: US President Barack Obama (R) checks hands with Chinese president Xi Jinping after a press conference in the Rose Garden of the White House September 25, 2015 in Washington, DC. President Obama is welcoming President Jinping during a state arrival ceremony. Photo by Olivier Douliery/ABACA (Sipa via AP Images). Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. -
The Whistleno. 96, October 2018
“All that is needed for evil to prosper is for people of good will to do nothing”—Edmund Burke The Whistle No. 96, October 2018 Newsletter of Whistleblowers Australia (ISSN 2205-0299) Reality Winner, imprisoned whistleblower Articles National Appreciation Day. The Senate resolu- tion encourages US federal agencies to Whistleblower Day inform IN 1777, ten sailors and marines from employees, contractors working on the ship Warren petitioned the US behalf of United States taxpayers, Continental Congress — the precursor and members of the public about the of the US Congress — to take action legal rights of citizens of the United against their commander, the first States to “blow the whistle” by commodore of the US Navy, who they honest and good faith reporting of alleged was war profiteering and misconduct, fraud, misdemeanors, mistreating prisoners of war. Congress or other crimes to the appropriate supported them, including when the authorities. commander took them to court. On July 30 the following year, the The resolution also acknowledges the US Continental Congress unani- After Whistleblowers Australia formed contributions whistleblowers have mously: in 1991, we were in contact with the made, at their own personal risk, NWC to support Australian whistle- “combating waste, fraud, abuse.” Resolved, That it is the duty of all blowers from the late 1980s, those who The US Congress has not yet desig- persons in the service of the United had forced the 1989 Queensland nated July 30 as National Whistle- States, as well as all other the in- Fitzgerald Inquiry and ones who later blower Day on a permanent basis. -
In the United States Court of Appeals for The
Case: 17-15458 Date Filed: 01/31/2018 Page: 1 of 5 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _______________________ No. 17-15458 _______________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. REALITY LEIGH WINNER, Defendant-Appellant _______________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia _______________________ BEFORE: MARTIN, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Reality Winner, who is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) by allegedly providing a classified top-secret government document to a news organization without authorization, appeals from the district court’s pretrial detention order. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition, or combination of conditions, would reasonably assure Ms. Winner’s presence at trial, which is currently scheduled for March of 2018. See 18 U.S.C. § Case: 17-15458 Date Filed: 01/31/2018 Page: 2 of 5 3142(e)(1). See also United States v. Medina, 775 F.3d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that risk of flight under the Bail Reform Act is determined under a preponderance of the evidence standard). Generally speaking, cases arising under the Bail Reform Act present mixed questions of law and fact which receive plenary review on appeal, but purely factual findings are reviewed only for clear error. See United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 487 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1465, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1985). As explained in Hurtado, conclusions concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense and the weight of the evidence under § 3142(g)(1)- (2), as well as the factors set forth in § 3142(c)(1)(B), require the exercise of judgment and are reviewed de novo. -
The Iranian Cyber Threat
The Iranian Cyber Threat May 2021 0 Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 2 Cyber Retaliation ..................................................................................................................................... 2 Iran’s National Security Strategy .............................................................................................................. 4 Laying the Groundwork ........................................................................................................................... 5 Structure ................................................................................................................................................... 5 Defense ................................................................................................................................................... 6 Offense .................................................................................................................................................... 6 History of Iranian Cyber Attacks and Incidents ........................................................................................... 7 The Attacks .............................................................................................................................................. 8 Iranian Cyber Army ................................................................................................................................. -
View Final Report (PDF)
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY III INTRODUCTION 1 GENESIS OF THE PROJECT 1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1 INDUSTRY SITUATION 2 METHODOLOGY 3 GENERAL COMMENTS ON INTERVIEWS 5 APT1 (CHINA) 6 SUMMARY 7 THE GROUP 7 TIMELINE 7 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 9 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 9 APT10 (CHINA) 13 INTRODUCTION 14 THE GROUP 14 TIMELINE 15 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 16 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 18 COBALT (CRIMINAL GROUP) 22 INTRODUCTION 23 THE GROUP 23 TIMELINE 25 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 27 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 30 APT33 (IRAN) 33 INTRODUCTION 34 THE GROUP 34 TIMELINE 35 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 37 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 38 APT34 (IRAN) 41 INTRODUCTION 42 THE GROUP 42 SIPA Capstone 2020 i The Impact of Information Disclosures on APT Operations TIMELINE 43 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 44 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 48 APT38 (NORTH KOREA) 52 INTRODUCTION 53 THE GROUP 53 TIMELINE 55 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 59 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 61 APT28 (RUSSIA) 65 INTRODUCTION 66 THE GROUP 66 TIMELINE 66 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 69 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 71 APT29 (RUSSIA) 74 INTRODUCTION 75 THE GROUP 75 TIMELINE 76 TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKS 79 DISCLOSURE EVENTS 81 COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 84 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTOR RESPONSE 84 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 86 MEASURING THE SUCCESS OF DISCLOSURES 90 IMPLICATIONS OF OUR RESEARCH 92 FOR PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT AND FORWARD DEFENSE 92 FOR PRIVATE CYBERSECURITY VENDORS 96 FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 96 ROOM FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 97 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 98 ABOUT THE TEAM 99 SIPA Capstone 2020 ii The Impact of Information Disclosures on APT Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This project was completed to fulfill the including the scope of the disclosure and capstone requirement for Columbia Uni- the disclosing actor. -
The Iranian Cyber Threat
The Iranian Cyber Threat May 2020 0 Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 Structure ................................................................................................................................................. 4 History of Iranian Cyber Attacks and Incidents ......................................................................................... 6 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 11 Introduction In the early morning hours of January 3, 2020, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani was killed in a U.S. drone strike that targeted his convoy immediately after landing at Baghdad’s international airport. Iranian leaders vowed “harsh retaliation” for the attack, and followed up on this threat by firing a salvo of over a dozen ballistic missiles at two Iraqi air bases housing U.S. troops in the early morning hours of January 8, wounding over 100 soldiers. While Iran has not yet taken additional major acts of revenge, it has signaled that it is likely to strike U.S. interests again at a future time of its choosing. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, intoned that while the ballistic missile attack represented a “slap on the face” for the U.S., “military action like this (ballistic missile) attack is not sufficient,” vowing to refuse to enter negotiations and to continue to confront the U.S. until its influence is expelled from the region. In the intervening period, Iran’s leaders have maintained a steady drumbeat of threatening rhetoric aimed at the U.S., with Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Qaani, for instance vowing to “hit his enemy in a manly fashion.” With U.S.-Iran tensions heightened, the U.S. national security apparatus has cautioned that one avenue for retaliation Iran is likely to pursue is launching offensive cyber attacks targeting the U.S. -
Threatscape of the US Election
Gage Mele Threatscape of the US Election Overview of the mainstream highlighting the importance of The cyber attacks targeting political elections is in full free, fair, transparent, and credible elections to the swing as the 115th United States midterm elections preservation of democratic societies. However, what grow closer. The exploitation of vulnerabilities and can arguably be observed as the first large-scale direct cyber attacks targeting election-related entities election meddling operation took place in 2014 are somewhat expected; however, a different form when Russian-attributed threat actors targeted the of cyber attack has the potential to have a disruptive Ukrainian Presidential election. This can be viewed as impact to the elections: disinformation campaigns. the beginning of election cyber attacks because since The use of disinformation tactics in today’s social that time, it is difficult to go through election cycles media-obsessed society is the most prominent threat around the globe, particularly presidential elections, to the democratic process. This form of attack is at without hearing or seeing the possibility of Russian a significant and troublesome level that the average and other state-sponsored or threat group activity. voter may not be fully aware of. The presence and Fast-forward to the US 2018 midterm election, and overall use of social media on a global scale allows one would be hard-pressed to avoid seeing security the sharing of information at astounding speeds, and researchers and media outlets discuss threats posed threat actors can take advantage of this data sharing to nation’s election infrastructure. A wide range to propagate false narratives and influence the of threat actors pose a risk to the elections from masses.