Wai45

Muriwhenua Land Claim.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE MURIWHENU A LAND CLAIM, 1865-1950. -

Evidence of Claudia Geiringer 27 April 1992. CONTENTS.

Chapter. Page No. Maps and Diagrams. 2 Introduction. 3 Chapter One: The Socio-Economic Context, 1865-1920. 7 Chapter Two: Crown Purchase Operations in Murwiehnua after 1865. 38 Chapter Three: Operations of the Native Land Court, 1865-1909. 72 Chapter Four: The Resident Magistrate's System and the Native Schools System. 116 Chapter Five: Maori Land Administration, 1890-1930. 147 Chapter Six: Land Development Schemes in Muriwhenua. 183 Chapter Seven: Protest over Surplus Lands. 211 Conclusion. 230 Bibliography. 231 MAPS, GRAPHS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Figure. Page No. 1. Crown Grants and Surplus Land 1865: Mangatete, Oruru, Mangonui. 9 2. Crown Purchases 1850-56: Mangatete, Oruru, Mangonui. 10 3. Maori Land in Muriwhenua at 1864. 11 4. Maori Population of Mangonui, 1874-1921. 18 5. Rise and Fall of New Zealand Kauri Gum Exports, 1850 to 1980. 21 6. Cost of Stores on the Aupouri Peninsula: 1898. 28 7. Crown Purchases in the West Coast Area, 1870-1900. 40 8. Crown Purchases during the 1870s under the Immigration 41 and Public Works Acts. 9. Crown Purchases in Muriwhenua, 1880-1910. 69 10. Extent of Title Fragmentation in Muriwhenua, 1908. 96 11. Native Reserves 1865. 109 12. Education for Assimilation: Trafalgar Day at the Farthest North 146 School, Hapua. 13. Parengarenga and Pakohu, Vested Lands. 153

2 INTRODUCTION.

My name is Claudia Geiringer and I am a Wellington-based historian. I graduated from the University of Otago in March 1990 with BA honours in history (first class). I have been working on the Muriwhenua Land Claim since August of that year.

The purpose of this study is to report on the administration and alienation of Maori land in Muriwhenua and the socio-economic progression of the Muriwhenua people from 1865 to the mid-twentieth century. It is general report, covering the whole Muriwhenua area over nearly one hundred years of its history, and is intended to provide the background to more specific investigations.

The period divides into two distinct but overlapping phases. In the first phase, a phase of disintegration, the Native Land Court, Native Land Purchase Branch, and other Crown agencies presided over the continued alienation of Muriwhenua land to Crown and settlers, and the fragmentation of remaining Maori land holdings. During this period, Crown agents failed to address the many social and economic problems facing Muriwhenua Maori and concentrated instead on the alienation and individualisation of Maori land. This phase of disintegration began prior to 1865 and was largely finished by the 1920s. Nonetheless, some ofits features, for example fragmentation of title, continued long after.

The fIrst four chapters of my report deal with this phase of disintegration. In Chapter One, I outline the socio-economic background to the claim from 1865-1920 and discuss the cycle of poverty, disease, debt and land alienation in which Muriwhenua Maori were trapped during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

While this socio economic context is essential to any analysis of Crown / Maori relations, the focus of this report is on the Crown and the actions of the Crown. In the next three chapters, I discuss the implementation and effects of government policy in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In Chapter Two, I examine the actions of Crown purchase agents in Muriwhenua and ask, to what .extent did they jeopardise the rights of the legitimate owners of Muriwhenua land? In this

3 respect, I examine to past reports article two of the Treaty of Waitangi imposed on the Crown: "fIrst to ensure that the Maori people in fact wished to sell; and secondly that each tribe maintained a suffIcient endowment for its foreseeable needs" 1.

In Chapter 1bree, I analyse the operations of the Native Land Court system in Muriwhenua and examine its effect on Muriwhenua land with regard to title determination, land alienation and land administration. Again I ask the question, to what extent did the Native Land Court, as agent of the Crown, protect the rights of legitimate claimants to Muriwhenua land?

Chapter Four deals with the actions and attitudes of other Crown agents who impacted on the lives of Muriwhenua Maori during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While the chapter focusses specifIcally on fIrst, the Resident Magistrate's System and second, the Native Schools System, I also analyse the adequacy of the Crown's general response to the health and welfare issues effecting Muriwhenua during the period.

Chapters Five and Six examine the second phase of Crown I Maori relations in Muriwhenua: the phase of reform. During this phase, which began in the 1890s, Crown agents were forced to confront the crippling problems of Maori land use and administration which they themselves had created. While these attempts involved at times considerable funding, they were hampered by the persistent ethic of individualisation and assimilation. In addition, these reforms focussed on the utilisation of remaining Maori land, and the Crown thus avoided confronting the most fundamental problem facing Muriwhenua Maori: lack of remaining Maori land.

In Chapter Five I examine the administration of Muri whenua land from the 1890s and focus on the Crown's attempts to reverse the process of title fragmentation and multiple individual ownership. Chapter Six outlines the history of land development schemes in Muriwhenua under fIrst the Tokerau Maori Land Board, and then the Native Department

Chapter Seven examines the history of protest and response over surplus lands in Muriwhenua during the entire period, 1865-1950. It focuses specifIcally on the history of protest over two blocks: Motuopao and Tangonge.

1 Ngai Tahu Report, Vol 2, pp. 238/239 [Wai 27].

4 I originally intended this report to examine the history of the Muriwhenua Claim from 1865 to the present day. Although the later twentieth century has proved beyond the scope of this report, in my conclusion I do suggest some directions for further research.

My report is based almost entirely on written evidence, and as such is subject to certain limitations. The most extensive written documentation of Crown I Maori relations over the period are the Crown's own records of its actions. I thus rely predominantly on the version of events supplied by Pakeha writers, usually Crown agents themselves. Although, during the twentieth century, the files increasingly contain letters from Muriwhenua Maori expressing their own point of view, I have been forced even in these instances to rely on official translations. By its very nature this evidence is thus one sided.

The claimants no doubt have their own oral record of the issues discussed in this report, particularly for the latter period which is within living memory. Given the limitations of time and the enormous quantity of written evidence available, however, I have concentrated on written sources. This report should be considered in light of oral evidence yet to be presented.

The other limitation to my evidence is that caused by changing geographical boundaries. The area for the Muriwhenua Claim, as defined in the 1988 Murlwhenua Fishing Report, stretches from Whangape harbour on the West coast to Mangonui harbour on the East Coast. Unfortunately most available sources do not use this region and it is virtually impossible to tailor statistics to this area.

The administrative division that corresponds most closely to the area of the Muriwhenua Claim, that of Mangonui County, has a similar boundary in the West but goes further South to Whangaroa harbour in the East. To further complicate the situation, the boundaries of Mangonui County changed at least twice during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other sources use different regions again. For instance the Mangonui Consolidation and Development schemes comprised both Mangonui and Whangaroa counties.

In qualitative terms, these differing descriptions are not particularly significant The history of Muriwhenua has much in common with the history of surrounding areas such as Whangaroa and indeed with the whole of the Auckland peninsula.

5 On the other hand, changing geographical descriptions make any statistical comparisons over time difficult. There is very little that can be done about this problem. Where possible I have tried to make my statistics compatible. Elsewhere I have been content to make explicit the different land definitions that are being used.

This study is, of course, preliminary. All my conclusions are drawn on the basis of the limited evidence I had before me and should not be regarded as definitive. The report is intended to open up rather than to preclude areas of further research.

6 CHAPTER ONE : THE SOCIO·ECONOMIC CONTEXT, 1865-1920.

Introduction. For Muriwhenua Maori the period 1865-1920 was characterised by continued land loss, agricultural downturn, endemic disease, and increased dependence on the European gum economy. Maori were trapped into a cycle of poverty, ill health, gum digging, debt, and land alienation which disrupted and demoralised their communities and hindered any positive social or economic development

This chapter attempts to provide the socio-economic context in which any understanding of Crown / Maori relations in Muriwhenua most be placed. The chapter examines the extent of land alienation in Muriwhenua during the nineteenth century and the difficulties Muriwhenua Maori experienced in utilising their remaining land. It then looks in some detail at the twin problems of disease and gum digging, and their disruptive effects on Maori. The chapter concludes with an examination of the problems faced in Muriwhenua after the collapse of the international gum industry in 1914.

Land Alienation Prior to 1865. In order to understand the distinctive history of Maori in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century it is necessary to review the history of the preceding decades. Historical research on Maori / Crown interaction in New Zealand has tended to focus on Maori in the central North Island. This research has highlighted the importance of large scale alienation of Maori land under the Native Land Court system during the post 1865 period 1. In Muriwhenua, however, the most economically significant alienations took place prior to 1865.

Rigby deals with the alienation of Muriwhenua land prior to 1865 in his most recent report. In short, these alienations divide into three stages. First, Maori engaged in a number of transactions with early European settlers prior to 1840. Second, the Crown set up Old Land Claims Commissions during the 1840s and 1850s to investigate these transactions. Out of the

1 For example, M. P. K. Sorrenson, "Land Purchase Methods and their effect on Maori Population 1865- 19m" ,Journal of the Polynesian Society [IPS], 1956, 14(3).

7 123791 acres of Munwhenua land claImed, the Crown granted 23636 acres of land to Pakeha settlers, reserved 786 acres to Maori and claimed 39207 acres as "surplus land". The Pakeha grants and the Crown's "surplus" land claims centred on the potentially fertile Kaitaia Valley. In contrast, the Crown allowed much of the less agriculturally productive Far North to revert to Maori2[Figure 1].

Finally, between September 1856 and May 1865 the Crown undertook a large scale purchase programme in the Far North. Crown agents purchased over 207000 acres, 30% of the total land area of Muriwhenua, in forty three separate transactions3. One of the first of these purchases was the huge 86885 acre Muriwhenua South Block. The rest centred on the fertile Oruru valley, an area which, prior to first European contact, supported one of the most dense populations in the country4. Maori were virtually expelled from this area and Crown agents pressured them to vacate the remaining reserves5 [Figure 2].

By 1865 the Crown or European settlers thus owned nearly 270000 acres (roughly 43%) of Muriwhenua land. This land centred on the most fertile, or potentially fertile areas6. The much less fertile Muriwhenua North block was the largest area still in Maori ownership. A large area of Maori land remained along the West Coast between Ahipara and Whangape, and inland in the Takahue valley. Maori retained smaller holdings on the Karikari peninsula and scattered throughout the claim area. At a time when Maori made up more than 80% of the population of Muriwhenua they thus owned only 57% of the land. The percentage of agriculturally productive land owned by Maori was considerably smaller stm7 [Figure 3].

2 B. Rigby. "A Question of Extinguishment: Crown Purchases in Muriwhenua 1850-1865" [Extinguishment], p. 72 [Wai 45] ; B. Rigby, "The Muriwhenua North Area and the Muriwhenua Claim" [Muriwhenua North Report], p. 39 IWai 45]. 3 Extinguishment, p. 32. 4 Mangonui Sewerage Report. pp. 13-15 IWai 17]. 5 B. Rigby, "The Omm Area and the Mangonui Claim" [Orum Report], pp. 45-49 [Wai 45]. 6 Extinguishment, p. 125. 7 According to the 1874 census the population of Mangonui County was 2613, of whom 524 (19%) were non-Maori: New Zealand Census, 1874.

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Figure 3: Maori Land in Muriwhenua at 1864.

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11 Land Alienation and Fragmentation, 1865-1920: An Overview. Although Crown and settlers had picked the eyes out of Muriwhenua land by 1865 large scale alienations of Maori land continued throughout the following decades.

During the 1870s Crown purchase agents acquired a further 65282 acres of Muriwhenua land under the Immigration and Public Works Acts. These purchases were mainly on the West Coast between Ahipara and Whangape, and further inland around Kaitaia and Takahue Valley8.

Crown purchase operations slowed down after the 1870s. Returns from the Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR) show that between 1880 and 1910 the Crown purchased a further 10561 acres of Muriwhenua. Most of this land was adjacent to the 1870s purchases. Between 1870 and 1910, the Crown thus purchased a total of 75843 acres of Muriwhenua land9.

Under the Native Land Acts of 1862 and 1865 the Crown abandoned its right of preemption and opened Maori land to private purchases. Because the Crown took little responsibility for regulating the sale of land to private individuals, these purchases are harder to document. We do know that private purchases during the late nineteenth century made massive inroads into remaining Maori land. By 1908 when the Stout I Ngata Commission visited Muriwhenua, only 109706 acres of land in Mangonui County remained in Maori ownership. The Crown had vested 57306 acres of this land in the Tokerau Maori Land Board to discharge survey liens. A further 680 acres were already leased to Europeans. Maori actually retained control of only 51720 acreslO.

According to the Stout I Ngata Commission, the total area of Mangonui County was 559100 acresll. In 1908 Maori thus owned less than 20% and controlled less than 10% of the land in

8 "Return of Land Purchased by the Government from Natives in Mangonui, etc" AlHR, 1876, C-5 [Preliminary Report Supporting Documents [pR Doc], Vol 2: 40] ; "Return of Lands Purchased Under the Immigration and Public Works Acts, AlHR, 1877, C-8 [PR Doc, Vol 2: 46]. 9 "Lands Purchased and Leased from Natives in North Island", AJHR, 1897, G-3, p. 2 ; "Lands Purchased and Leased from Natives in North Island",AJHR, 1908, G-3, p. 2. 10 "Interim Report of the Native Lands Commission, on Native lands in the Counties of Whangarei, Hokianga, Bay of Islands, Whangaroa, and Mangonui'\ AlHR, 1908, G-lJ [hereafter Stout!Ngata: G-lJ], pp. 42-45 [Doc Bank].

12 Mangonui County, In contrast, Maon made up 42% of the populatIon of MangonUl at the 1906 census12,

The land that remained in Maori ownership was of very poor quality, Stout I Ngata described the land on the western side of the county between Herekino and Ahipara as the best of the land still owned by Maori. Even this was mostly poor gum land: the dregs of the 1870s Crown purchases. The Commission described the remaining Maori land as poor or patchy 13, In a confidential return prepared for the Commission in 1907, the Department of Lands claimed that only 28821 acres of Native Land in Mangonui County was worthy of consideration for European settlement 14.

Remaining Maori land holdings in Muriwhenua were also becoming increasingly fragmented. After 1865, under the individualisation and succession policies implemented by the Native Land Court, the size of Maori land blocks in Muriwhenua became smaller and the number of individual owners of each block increased. The Stout I Ngata Commission produced information about the ownership of 42617 acres of Muriwhenua land. This land was divided into 140 blocks and into a total 2748 individual interests. The average size of each individual interest was a mere 15 1/2 acres. By 1908 much of the remaining Maori land in Muriwhenua was thus fragmented past the point of economic use l5.

The Economic Downturn. Although Muriwhenua never competed with the Bay of Islands or Hokianga as a centre of Maori I Pakeha trade, the early nineteenth century had been a period of brisk economic activity during which Maori in Muriwhenua had found ready markets for their agricultural produce, as well as for other commodities such as timber and flax 16. In 1868 White referred to the extent of cultivations during the 1840s, "quantities of native produce being sent to Mangonui to supply the wants of the numerous whalers then visiting the port, besides wheat, corn, onions,

11 Commissioner of Crown Lands to Stout, 9 April 1908, MA 78/6. 12 New Zealand Census, 1906; Stout!Ngata: G-lJ, pp. 6n [Doc Bank]. 13 Ibid. 14 "Return of the Native Lands in the North Island Suitable for Settlement, March 1907, MA 78121b. 15 Stout!Ngata: G-lJ, pp. 42-45. 16 B. Rigby & J. Koning, "Muriwhenua Land Claim: A Preliminary Report on the Historical Evidence" [Preliminary Report], pp. 12-14 [Wai 45].

13 exported to Auckland, and even Sydney" . By 1865. however. this era of intense market activity had ended. The ready markets of the 1830s and 1840s disappeared with the end of the whaling era and the southward shift of economic and political power to Auckland.

There were other reasons for the economic downturn experienced by Muriwhenua Maori during the late nineteenth century. By 1865 Muriwhenua Maori had lost most of their agriculturally valuable lands to the Crown and settlers. Large scale alienation of Muriwhenua land continued throughout the rest of the century. This, and the fragmentation of remaining land holdings under the Native Land Court system, took an obvious toll on the agrarian economy.

Much of the land in Muriwhenua was, at any rate, not suitable for the intensive agricultural techniques introduced by the missionaries and early settlers and adopted by Maori. In contrast, traditional methods of agriculture had involved regular abandonment to allow the land to rejuvenate. This was even more the case with the less agriculturally productive land still owned by Maori after 1865. In 1872 A. H. Russell, the visiting inspector of schools, described Maori land in the Far North as "poor to a degree which it is difficult to conceive". Consequently, Russell noted, one saw "little or no attempt at cultivation" 18.

In addition, the area lacked the necessary infrastructure to support Maori economic development. Particularly after the alienation of the most accessible agricultural land, lack of roads in the interior severely hindered Maori farmers19. In 1879 George Kelly claimed that want of roads from settlements to the interior means that there was no point Maori growing more produce than they needed for their own use: "in fact they grow barely enough,,20. The next year Kelly noted:

The small market they obtain for produce from their cultivations, owing to the difficulty of getting such to a market from want of roads (no money having been spent in this district for opening roads through Native land for many years), so disheartens them that they have almost abandoned their cultivations, and do not

17 White Report, 5 Sept 1868, A1HR, 1868, A-4, No 16, p. 36 [pR Doc, Vol I: B2]. 18 The Inspector of Schools to the Hon. the Native Minister, 13 March 1872, "Papers Relating to Native Schools", AlHR, 1872, F-5, No 7, p. 12 [pR Doc, Vol. 2: 20]. 19 Kelly Report, 9 May 1879, AlHR, 1879, G-l, No 2, p. 1 (pR Doc, Vol I: B9]. 20 Ibid.

14 Lack of an economic infrastructure continued to be a problem for Muriwhenua Maori well into the twentieth century. For example when Mr Watt, the Te Kao school teacher, arrived in Muriwhenua in 1915 there was still no formed road on the Aupouri Peninsula22.

As the century wore on, the role of agriculture in the Muriwhenua economy thus diminished. Maori continued to grow crops such as tukau, potato, com, kumara and taro for subsistence, and apparently tobacco was also grown for local consumption23. In 1883, however, Bishop noted:

It is very apparent that the Natives are cultivating less ground each year and, as a natural consequence at the present time they do not raise sufficient food for their own subsistence24.

The next year Bishop again commented how little land was being cultivated:

Whereas formerly large areas could be seen planted with potatoes, kumeras, taros, com, &c., now small patches dotted about here and there form the sole visible proof of industry25.

The downturn in agriCUlture forced Maori to seek other forms of sustenance. Traditionally, Muriwhenua Maori had relied heavily on kai moana. As the Waitangi Tribunal claimed in the Muriwhenua Fishing Report, "It is this dependence on the sea through having a land resource that was comparatively poor... that distinguished the Muriwhenua circumstance,,26. The Tribunal suggests that after 1840 with the decline in markets for produce in Muriwhenua, there may have actually been a revived interest in large scale tribal fishing ventures. During the late nineteenth century these were replaced by smaller whanau-based activity27.

21 Kelly Report, 6 May 1880, AfHR, 1880, G-4, No 2, p. 1 [PR Doc, Vol 1: BlO]. 22 J. Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 22.

23 Bishop Report, 5 June 1883, AfHR, 1883, G-1A, No 2, p. 1 [PR Doc, Vol 1: B13] ; Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, AfHR, 1885, G-2, No 3, p. 3 [PR Doc, Vol 1: B15]. 24 Bishop Report, 5 June 1883, Op cit, p. 1. 25 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, AfHR, 1884, Session II, G-1, No 2, p. 3 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B14]. 26 Muriwhenua Fishing Report, pp. 92/93 [Wai 22]. 27 Ibid, p. 76 ; Ibid, pp. 91-93.

15 Although fIshmg contmued to be an mtegraI part of the Munwhenua SubsIstence economy, there was little development of fishing along commercial lines. The Muriwhenua Fishing Report notes that during the late nineteenth century Muriwhenua Maori apparently supplied a flourishing mullet trade, until government regulations in the 1890s forced them out of the industry28. Resident Magistrates reports during the 1880s also document attempts by Muriwhenua Maori to carry on commercial whaling, apparently with indifferent success29. In general, however, lack of markets, lack of capital, and increasingly prohibitive fishing laws from the 1890s onwards restricted the development of commercial fishing.

Traditionally, sea and land had complemented each other in the Muriwhenua economy. Although fishing continued to be an important source of sustenance, it did not replace the role of the land. During the late nineteenth century an increasingly landless Maori population became more and more reliant on employment as unskilled labourers in the European cash economy: public works, timber and most particularly, gum digging.

Disease and Population Decline. Crippling health problems and continued population decline further disrupted and demoralised the economy of Maori in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century.

Most contemporary accounts during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century emphasise the high levels of disease and mortality. Scarlet fever, typhoid, measles, rheumatic fever, influenza, tuberculosis and pneumonia were all endemic, in addition to malnutrition, skin diseases and chronic invalidism. Indeed many Maori communities simply staggered their way from one major health crisis to another30.

Major epidemics of fatal disease were frequent throughout the period. For example, in July 1874 Brissenden, a Crown Land Purchase Agent, visited the community at Ahipara and found they were suffering from a severe outbreak of typhoid. Thirty four people had died in three weeks and many more including Timoti Puhipi, a prominent chief, were seriously m31 . The

28 Ibid, pp. 93/94. 29 Bishop Reports, 1883-1889 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B13-18]. 30 For example, White Report, 21 June 1872, AJHR 1872, F-3, No 1, p. 3 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B3) ; Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 3 ; Memorandum from Sec. of Education to Under Sec. of Native Dept, 25 August 1906, MA 21/20 [Doc Bank].

16 '"'I-'~U'"'~'U'"' spread to other settlements the acting Resident Magistrate, blamed this epidemic for the huge population reduction of 23% between- the 1874 and 1878 census32.

The next year, another epidemic at Ahipara led to the death of the school master and the temporary closure of the schooL Twenty eight people in the community died, including two members of the school committee. In Kaitaia the same epidemic caused a drop in school attendance to seventeen out of a possible thirty one33.

The most obvious quantitive indicator of the early impact of European disease in Muriwhenua is population decline. Prior to European contact the Muriwhenua claim area supported a considerable population. Evidence presented to the Waitangi Tribunal during the Mangonui Sewerage Claim suggested that during the eighteenth century the Oruru valley alone supported a population of perhaps 8000. By the end of the eighteenth century the local Oruru population had already been halved34.

Over the next fifty years, dramatic population decline took place throughout Muriwhenua. Rigby I Koning estimate that by 1845 the population of Muriwhenua had been reduced to 4000, and that between 1845 and 1858 the population had again been halved35. In 1868 W. B. White, the Resident Magistrate for Mangonui, commented on the huge change in conditions during his 20 years of office:

On my first arrival, twenty years ago on paying my flrst visit to Ahipara, I was struck by their numbers, their large villages and pas, occupied by a numerous population ... Now I regret to say, the country is almost a waste, the population dwindled to a few hundreds36.

31 Mr Brissenden to The Hon. Native Minister, 27 July 1874, "Native Land Purchase Agents", AJHR 1875, G-7, No 52, pp. 15/16 [Doc Bank]. 32 G. Kelly to Under Secretary, 9 May 1878, "Census of the Maori Population, 1878", AJHR, 1878, G-2, No 2, p.1 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 52].

33 Ven Archdeacon Clarke to the Hon. the Native Minister, "Native Schools: Reports of Inspecting Officers", AJHR, 1875, G-2, No I, p. 2 [pR Doc, Vol II: 34]. 34 Mangonui Sewerage Report, p. 15 [Wai 17]. 35 Preliminary Report, pp. 104/105. 36 White Report, 5 Sept 1868, Op cit, p. 36.

17 Census figures taken from 1874 onwards show that the Maori population of Mangonui County continued to decline into the 1870s,- reaching a low of 1615 in 1878.

Because of its early history of Maori / European interaction, Muriwhenua was one of the first areas to experience dramatic population decline. It was also one of the first areas to reverse this trend. Census figures for Mangonui County indicate that by 1880 the Maori population of Muriwhenua was increasing. As living conditions and available health services didn't improve noticeably during the late nineteenth century, improved natural immunity to European disease probably caused this recovery [Figure 4].

Figure 4: Maori Population of Mangonui, 1874-1921.

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Despite population recovery, regular epidemics of fatal disease continued to visit Muriwhenua's Maori communities. In 1883 H. W. Bishop, the Resident Magistrate noted:

18 Fevers of various types have been so constantly recurring of late years, with such fatal results, that it is a matter of no small gratification to be able to record a season without them37.

A year later Bishop again reported widespread disease. A virulent typhoid epidemic once more swept the district. It visited nearly every Maori settlement and caused numerous deaths38. The following year the inspector of Native schools noted the prevalence of disease throughout the district, causing eleven deaths at Ahipara school, four at Pukepoto and nine at Peria39.

Health reports over the period 1909-1915 give an interesting insight into the unusually high levels of disease faced by Muriwhenua Maori well into the twentieth century. Over this period health conditions in the Far North received an unusually high profile both in the Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives and in Kai Tiaki, the journal of the New Zealand Nurses Association.

During 1909-1915, nurses dealt with four major epidemics in the Muriwhenua area. In July 1909 the Health Department sent Nurse Akenehi Hei, the first Maori Nurse, to the Parengarenga area where she found and treated at least five major infectious diseases. At Te Hapua she found a sick person in every house, mainly children:

Influenza; relapses of same; some of the complications of scarlet fever, which they had last year, such as discharges from ears, sore eyes, swelling in neck, etc. One girl (16 years) is in the last stage of consumption40.

She then travelled to the gum camps nearby where she treated patients for rheumatic fever, tuberculosis and typhoid41 .

Two years later Native Nurses contended for several months with an "exceptionally severe" outbreak of typhoid at Ahipara. Later in the year the epidemic moved up the Aupouri peninsula

37 Bishop Report, 5 June 1883, Op cit, p. 1. 38 Bishop Report, 12 May, 1884, Op cit, p. 1 ; Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 2. 39 "Education: Native Schools", AlHR, 1885, E-2, pp. 2/3 [PR Doc, Vol II: 70]. 40 Nurse Akenehi Rei, Kai Tiaki [Doc Bank], Vol II, No 3, July 1909, p. 105. 41 Ibid.

19 to Parengarenga42. The small pox epidemic followed in 1913, causing widespread illness and a number of deaths43.

Another epidemic of typhoid followed hot on the heels of small pox. From July to December 1914, this disease spread around the communities at Sweetwater, Awanui and Mangonui. In December of the same year, nurses also recorded a severe outbreak of measles accompanied by pneumonia at Parengarenga44. During 1915 the typhoid epidemic spread south to Whangape where by October fifty cases had been reported45.

High levels of disease and mortality caused considerable disruption, dislocation and demoralisation to Maori communities and threw them into greater dependence on the European cash economy. High mortality also substantiated the belief widely held amongst both races long after population trends in fact showed otherwise, that the Maori were a dying race. The near constant state of disruption and devastation caused by endemic disease provides the backdrop against which one must analyse all Crown / Maori interaction in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries46.

Kauri Gum. For Maori in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century cash income was almost synonymous with gum digging.

Although Maori in Muriwhenua had been involved in digging gutp for commercial export from the 1840s, there was little demand for gum at that time. During the 1850s, however, kauri gum established a place in the international varnish making industry, and by the end of that decade a flourishing export trade had been established. Prices rose dramatically, as did demand. Rigby / Koning estimate that, after receiving little more than a cent per kilo for gum in 1840s, by early 1856 Maori diggers were receiving 8.5 cents per kil047.

42 "Report on Public Health and Hospitals and Charitable Aid .... AJHR, 1912, Session II, H-31, p. 20 [Doc Bank] ; Ibid, p. 64 ; Ibid, p. 76 ; Kai Tiaki, Vol IV, No 3, July 1911, pp. 108/109. 43 Kai Tiaki, Vol VI, No 4, October 1913, p.150 ; Ibid, Vol. VII, No 2, April 1914, p. 85. 44 "Report on Public Health and Hospitals and Charitable Aid", AlHR, 1915, H-31, p. 26 [Doc Bank]. 45 Kai Tiaki, Vol VIII, No 2, April 1915, p. 87 ; Ibid, Vol VIII, No 4, October 1915, p. 199. 46 On dying race theory, see A. BaHara, Proud to be White?, pp. 83/84. 47 Preliminary Report, pp. 104-106. 20 By 1865, at any rate, gum was an integral part of the Muriwhenua economy_ It was to dominate the economy for the next sixty years. Between 1856-1893 the quantity of gum exported from New Zealand and the prices paid for it continued to rise. The expansion of the industry within New Zealand was absorbed by increased demand in Europe and America48.

Figure 5: Rise and Fall of New Zealand Kauri Gum Exports, 1850-1880.

,"10000

r 9000 8000

7000

6000 ~

5000 ~

~OOO •

3000

2000

1000 ~~--~--~~--~--~--~~r-~--~--~--~~~~;r~0 1850 1860 la70 leaD 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 19<10 1950 1960 19701980

Source: B. W. Hayward, Kauri Gum and the Gumdiggers, p. 46.

Most written accounts of .the gumfields tend to focus on the British diggers, who appeared during the mid-1860s, or on the Dalmations who flooded to the fields during the 1890s. Yet gum digging throughout North Auckland, and particularly in Muriwhenua, was for most of its history, a predominantly Maori concern. Storekeepers who furnished statistics to the 1893 Royal Commission at the height of the gum digging industry estimated that Maori made up 780 (77%) out of a total 1009 diggers in Mangonui County49. The Resident Magistrates' reports,

48 "Report of the Kauri-Gum Industry Inquiry Commission", A1HR, 1893, H-24 [Kauri-Gum Commission: 1893], pp. 1/2 [Doc Bank] ; Ibid, p. 12. 49 1893 Kauri Gumfields, IA 104/1, Appendix F(1).

21 1868-1892 ale filled with accounts of me dominance of this activity. In 188~ H. W. Bishop, _ described it as "the great stand-by of Natives in the North" and argued that gum digging afforded employment to members of every family at some point of the yea.r50. The gum fields remained an important source of income for Maori in Muriwhenua decades after most European diggers had disappeared.

The Social Costs of Gum Digging. The reasons for increased Maori dependence on gum digging have already been discussed. The effects of land loss and endemic disease both led Muriwhenua Maori to greater dependence on the European cash economy. In the absence of any other sustainable economic activity, gum digging provided a crucial source of income51 .

Although there is no doubt that gum digging thus staved off considerable hardship, it involved high social costs. In order to procure gum, Maori pursued a nomadic existence, often camping for months on the low swampy ground where gum was most abundant. In times of high prices, everyone from the very young to the very old was engaged in digging. Contemporary observers linked conditions in the gum camps with the high levels of disease and mortality experienced by Muriwhenua Maori52.

Kauri gum threw Maori into dependence on the European cash economy and subjected them to all its fluctuations. Because of its international context, the kauri gum industry was vulnerable to changes in the economy both at home and abroad. While the overall picture from 1860 to 1900 was one of growth, the industry experienced huge swings from year to year. The place where these changes were felt most heavily was on the fields. When the prices were high, a decent enough living could be made, but during periods of depression, Maori were thrown back on other meagre resources.

In the Muriwhenua Fishing Report the Waitangi Tribunal state that gum digging was "not so much a new life style as a hedge against crop failures or natural disaster,,53. This view

50 Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 3. 51 See preceding sections. Also Preliminary Report, p. 105 ; Ibid, p. 163. 52 For example White Report, 21 June 1872, Op cit, p. 3 ; Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 3 ; Memorandum from Sec. of Education to Under Sec. of Native Dept, 25 August 1906, Op cit. 53 Muriwhenua Fishing Report. p. 93.

22 perhaps under estimates the extent to which disease, land ahenanon and economic depression had already disrupted Maori communities. Although gum digging filled a vacuum in the economy, it disrupted the cohesion of Maori communities even further.

It is true that Maori often dug part time and attempted to incorporate digging into a seasonal economy of farming and fishing. It is equally true, however, that at times of high prices digging diverted energy away from other seasonal economic activities. In 1872, for example, the Resident Magistrate noted that the people were much occupied in digging:

This call upon their energies is much greater than in former years; there is more competition, consequently they are induced by the high prices generally ruling to work all through the year, and in the winter months great mortality ensues 54.

The industry slid during the late 1870s but was booming again by 1880 and prices were higher than ever. That year George Kelly noted:

This article has for the last six or seven months commanded so high a price that the Natives have been better off than usual: in fact, it is their only means of obtaining a living55.

High prices led to neglect of cultivations and an increased dependence on store bought food. In 1883 Bishop noted:

Natives throughout the district during the greater portion of the year subsist wholly on supplies obtained from the various stores, and the result is that they are rarely, if ever, out of debt56.

The next year he claimed that Maori were cultivating little land at any of the settlements and that the kainga had a deserted appearance: "... during a portion of the year the people depend entirely upon supplies procured from the stores, to be paid for by the proceeds of the sale of gum,,57.

54 White Report, 21 June 1872, Op cit, p. 3. 55 Kelly Report. 6 May 1880, Op cit, p. 1. 56 Bishop Report, 5 June 1883, Op cit, p. 1. 57 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 3.

23 Gum digging thus contributed to a downward economic spiral. Maori initially resorted to digging because of land loss, endemic disease and economic downturn. Dependence on gum digging led to neglect of agriculture, high rates of ill health, and further dependence' on cash income. Dependence on cash led both to further land loss and to greater dependence on gum digging. As early as 1868 Puckey described this relationship:

... there is no near market for produce and the natives not only consume what they grow, but when they leave their inland stations, to dig kauri gum to purchase clothes, etc. with, they expend a large share of their earnings in flour and sugar. It is thought that the "Maoris" in the North are poorer at this time, than they were twenty years ago. We have not been able to purchase a supply of wheat or potatoes from the Natives for several years past, principally owing to the "Kauri" gum digging58.

In same report Puckey noted that Muriwhenua Maori were anxious to sell more land59.

By the mid 1880s prices on the gum fields were falling, and the industry was slipping along with the rest of the country into depression. While the fortunes of the industry could change almost over night, dependence on the gum economy was not so easily reversed. During periods of depression the adverse effects of Maori reliance on gum digging were thus seen most clearly. Maori experienced considerable hardship and had to rely more than ever on credit at the local store60.

Exploitation on the Gum Fields. The monopolistic practices of many storekeepers I gum traders considerably worsened the problem of debt.

In theory, gum diggers were self-employed: it was rare for anyone to dig for wages. In reality the gum diggers' independence was sharply curtailed by their relationship to the local storekeeper, usually also the buyer of the gum.

58 Puckey Journals, pp. 529/530 [PR Doc, Vol 1: e2]. 59 Ibid. 60 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 2 ; Bishop Report, 17 May 1887, AJHR, 1887, Session II, G- 1, No 2, p. 2 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B16].

24 As the several commissions that examined the industry took practically no Maori evidence, Maori testimony on the subject is lacking. European diggers. who testified to the practices of many storekeepers I gum buyers. complained most commonly about the exorbitant prices for stores on the fields and the correspondingly low prices for gum. In addition diggers complained that many storekeepers would not give out cash when it was owing, and simply carried the balance between the price of the gum and the store account as credit in the books. The 1898 Kauri Gum Commission noted that this caused the greatest hardship when the storekeeper was also the publican, and the diggers wasted their paper credit on drink. In these cases, the commission concluded, the diggers were little better than the publican's "Working bullocks". Diggers also claimed that storekeepers charged different prices for different diggers, depending on what they thought they were able to pay61.

The relationship between digger and storekeeper was at its most exploitative when the storekeeper was also the owner of the land being dug, in which case he had a free hand in the type of conditions he might impose. Diggers in this situation were practically bound to the owner or lessee of the land and as the 1898 commission noted, ..... must trust entirely to the honesty of the storekeeper not to pay him too little for his gum, and not to charge him too highly for his stores"62.

In cases where Crown or Native land was being dug, diggers were by no means free from such obligations. Because of the remoteness of many fields, diggers were often still forced into a position of dependence, and might be refused stores unless they sold their gum to the storekeeper at a low price63. One digger described the dynamic of this relationship to the 1898 commission:

If a man had money in the storekeeper's hands, and did not choose to take the prices that were offered by the storekeeper for his gum, if he went to sell it to another store the storekeeper would say, "Take it to the man you buy your goods from." Once in the storekeeper's hands you are bound to sell your gum and get your provisions from him, and accept his prices64.

61 "Report and Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Kauri-Gum Industry" [Kauri-Gum Commission: 1898], AJHR, 1898, H-12, p. 10 (Doc Bank]. 62 Kauri-Gum Commission: 1893, pp. 3/4 ; Kauri Gum Commission: 1898, p. 10. 63 Ibid, p. 41. 64 Ibid.

25 The fact that many diggers were tied to the storekeepers through debt cemented this position of dependence. The debtor / creditor relationship meant that the diggers was forced to accept whatever conditions the trader might impose. The Awanui publican noted in 1898 that whereas free diggers could live for 14s to 15s a week, those already in debt to certain storekeepers would pay as much as 18s to £165.

Gum Digging on the Aupouri Peninsula. During the late nineteenth century, most Muriwhenua Maori were in debt. The situation was particularly bad on the Aupouri Peninsula where, in 1873, White noted the "reckless credit" given by traders had resulted in impoverishing the Maori66. A. G. Allan, the Head Teacher at Te Kao school, described the situation around Parengarenga in 1888:

To the Natives the gumfields have been a curse. They have disregarded the raising of crops, as in the fonner years, with the exception of potatoes and kumeras. With all their earnings upon the gumfields, they are deeply in debt, and they and their families for the most part are badly clad. Allover the gurnfields the Natives are in a species of bondage to the storekeepers and it is to the latter's advantage to keep them so. Gum at present is very low in price - but such is not the case with provisions which are thirty percent higher than can be purchased anywhere else. In such a state of matters how can the Natives be expected to keep their children regularly at school67 .

The dominant figure in the gum digging industry north of Parengarenga was Samuel Yates, the "King of the Far North". Yates ran a huge gum buying business as well as running his sheep and cattle over 150000 acres of land on the Aupouri peninsula. According to the Cyclopedia of New Zealand, 400 tons of gum passed through his hands every year68. Yates had a great deal of influence within Muriwhenua society both because of his economic position and because of his marriage to Ngawini (Annie) Yates, an influential Pukepoto woman. The influence of Yates was such that many Maori now are under the mistaken impression that he was a judge of the Native Land Court69.

65 Ibid, p. 38. 66 White Report, 22 April 1873, AIHR, 1873, G-1, No 2, p. 1 CPR Doc, Vol 1: B4]. 67 Henderson, Op cit, p. 46. 68 Cyclopedia of NZ, Vol 2, p. 607 ; N. C. McKenna, Mangonui, Gateway to the Far North, p. 123. 69 S. Murray, Te Karanga a te Kotuku, p. 17.

26 The diggers who worked Yates' land were bound to him, if not by stipulated conditions then by the isolated nature of the area. In 1891 John McGavin, the Te Kao school teacher and Yate's neighbour, described this relationship:

I may explain the Mr Yates is the only trader of any importance in that district; he also leases or owns all the land - except Maori reserves - North of Parenga Harbour. All the Maoris are in his debt, and their improvidence is likely to keep them s070.

In the Muriwhenua North Report, Rigby suggests that Maori sold the 56678 acre Muriwhenua North block to Yates to discharge their debts 71.

Further down the Aupouri Peninsula, the most prominent figure in the gum industry was Joseph Evans: settler, hotel keeper and Mangonui County Councillor. By the turn of the century, Evans dominated the gum fields from Awanui to Parengarenga. He had stores at Waipapakauri, Waiharara, Hohoura and Te Ka072. At the 1898 commission, diggers made numerous complaints about Evans' trading practices: that he held on to the balance of their money and they couldn't get settlement; that his prices were exorbitant; that he would not particularise his stores so they could not object to the price of goods73. Indeed one witness said in relation to Evan's stores:

Storekeepers do not intend that a digger shall leave the field with a shilling in his possession. If your bill at the store is not a big one he will not buy your gum, leaving it on your hands on purpose to punish you for not having dealt more largely with him74.

By 1898 Bowker, a Greek from Austria had opened a store in opposition to Evans at Waipapakauri, and many diggers preferred to deal with him75. A comparison of the prices charged for basic commodities by Yates, Evans and Bowker gives some indication of the practices engaged in by the latter two. While Yates' and Evans' prices were generally similar,

70 John McGavin to Sec for Education, 15 July 1891, BAAA lOOl/574c [Doc Bank]. 71 Muriwhenua North Report, p. 42. 72 Kauri-Gum Commission: 1898, p. 38. 73 Ibid, p. 41. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid, pp. 38/39.

27 Bowker charged less for every comparable commodity and often as little as two thirds of the price:

Figure 6: Cost of Stores on the Aupouri Peninsula: 1898.

Prices Yates Evans Bowker Sugar per pound 41/2d 4d 31/2d Tea per pound 4/- 3/6 to 4/- 2/- to 2/3 Flour 50 Ib 9/- 9/- 8/- Butter (Tin) 1/6 1/6 Tinned meat 1/6 1/3 1/2 Candles 1/- 1/- 9d Coffee per pound 2/- 2/- 2/- a tin

Source: Kauri-Gum Commission: 1898,pp. 38139.

In 1898 L H Claudet, the Awanui publican claimed that prices of stores could vary at different places on the field from 13s to £1 for the same goods76.

Although Maori on the Aupouri Peninsula were generally at the receiving end of the unfair practices engaged in by gum traders, they did make some attempt during the 1890s to take control of the situation. At the 1893 commission John Anton Subritzki, a settler at Awanui, claimed that a good many "native stores" had been erected during the past years77. Other witnesses noted that Maori had started a cooperative store between Hohoura and Parengarenga and that Maori were trying to control digging on their own land. In the past Maori at Te Kao had charged a royalty to allow Pakeha to dig, but were now refusing to renew licenses in an effort to preserve the remaining gum78.

76 Ibid, p. 38. 77 1893 Kauri Gumfields, p. 199. 78 Ibid, p. 216; Ibid, p. 223.

28 Five years later Maori were still operating a store at Te Kao, and it was patronised by both Maori and non-Maori79. The ban on European diggers, however, had fallen by the way side. Evans told the 1898 Commission that he had paid Maori for the privilege of erecting his own store at Te Kao and had placed Austrian diggers on land80.

Attempts by Te Kao Maori to run a cooperative store during the 1890s were ultimately unsuccessful. It was not until the 1920s, with the help of Acheson and the Maori Land Board, that the Crown finally assisted Te Kao Maori to establish to establish their own community store, and undercut the inflated prices of the gum traders81 .

The Establishment of Native Schools System in Muriwhenua. The disruption caused to Maori communities by ill health, poverty and dependence on gum digging also hindered the development of a state-aided education system in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century.

When the Crown made its first concerted attempts to establish a Native Schools system during the early 1870s, Muriwhenua Maori responded enthusiastically. By 1874, Maori communities had established state-subsidised schools at Parengarenga, Peria, Pukepoto, Kaitaia, Awanui and Ahipara and had enrolled 206 children82. After this initial enthusiasm, however, the Native school system expanded very slowly. By 1880 there were still only six native schools throughout Muriwhenua and enrollment figures had barely increased83. Although attendance had picked up a little by the turn of the century, Maori attendance at Muriwhenua schools continued to be low and prone to major fluctuations until well into the twentieth century.

There were a number of reasons for this low participation in the school system. During the first decade of Native schooling, the high financial contribution required of Maori deterred many from participating in the system. Inaccessibility also kept attendance figures down, children having to walk long distances each day, braving storms, floods and bad roads to attend the

79 Kauri-Gum Commission: 1898, p. 39. 80 Ibid, p. 38. 81 Henderson, Op cit, p. 56. 82 "Reports of Inspecting Officers of Native Schools", AIHR, 1874, G-8, p. 23 [PR Doc, Vol 2: 29]. 83 "Education: Native Schools", AIHR, 1881, E-7, Table 2, p. 15 [PR Doc. Vol 2: 60].

29 schools84. In addition, the prevalence of disease and the economic dependence on gum digging in Muriwhenua took a heavy toll on school attendance figures.

Scarcely a year went by in which the Reports of the Native Schools Inspectors did not note the serious interruptions caused to the Native School system in Mangonui by disease. The frequent epidemics which hit Muriwhenua communities during the late nineteenth century dramatically effected the school roles and frequently led schools to be closed.

For example during the 1884 epidemic, the school inspector noted that there had been eleven deaths at Ahipara school, seven at Pukepoto, and nine at Peria. The effects of the epidemic at Te Kao had also been "widespread and- fatal" and had caused a drop in the school during the year from forty eight to twenty eight85. While 1884 was an exceptionally bad year, sickness was, as Bishop noted in his 1885 report, "at all times ... apt to injuriously affect the attendance at the various schools"86.

Gum digging was as much of a problem as disease. For Maori gum digging was a family based economic activity. When the Inspector of Native Schools visited the Far North in 1872 he claimed to have seen girls of six or seven returning from fields with bits of gum87. Gum digging led to huge fluctuations in the school roles. Although when the schools first opened, the community would often undertake to keep their children off the fields, the economic imperative was such that during times of high prices this was not possible. In 1882 James Pope, the inspector, noted of Mangonui:

The gum fields are the principal difficulty with which the teachers in this district have to contend. Often children are away gum-digging for months together. Of course, when they come back, they are found to have forgotten a great deal of what they had previously learnt, and to be as wild as unbroken colts88 .

In 1884 Pope noted that during the previous year the failure of kumera crops and two floods at Awanui led to children going digging89. The next year Pope noted.that Awanui was plagued

84 See Chapter 4: discussion on the adequacy of the Crown's provisions in these regards. 85 "Education: Native Schools", 1885, Op cit, pp. 2/3. 86 Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 4. 87 Memorandum from Sec of Education to Under Secretary of Native Affairs, 25 August 1906, Op cit. 88 "Education: Native Schools", AJHR, 1882, E-2, p. 2 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 64].

30 by gum:

Gum-digging is the bane of the school. As parents can by this kind of work get enough rough pakeha food to support them, they cultivate but little, and are constantly going away to dig gum at the North Cape and elsewhere, and taking their children with them. Really, Awanui can hardly be considered a permanent settlement at present90.

According to Pope, the scarcity of gum at that time led Maori to spend long periods in the swamps and was a major cause of illness91.

In Te Kao: 75, J. Henderson describes the combined effects of disease and gum digging on Te Kao school during the late nineteenth century. According to Education Department files cited by Henderson, during the last term of 1884, twenty seven of pupils left for the gumfields, three died of fever and two were nearly dead, four were to be married, and two were taken to the North Cape because their parents considered there was not sufficient food at the kainga92.

Concern about sufficient food at the settlement was apparently well grounded. Henderson was able to interview Karena Wiki, the only surviving original pupil of Te Kao school. Woo described how they all lived together in the meetinghouse while their parents were away digging gum, the older looking after the younger. There they survived off kumera, maize and paraoa parai (flapkacks), which they supplemented from their own foraging in the creeks (eels and watercress)93.

During a winter epidemic of typhoid amongst the children in 1888 or 1889, Education Department flies claimed,

... there was not a kumera in the whole district therefore the children had to earn their own living. Frequently after the dismissal of the school they take their spear and spade to dig for the everlasting gum, otherwise they go without

89 "Education: Native Schools", A/HR, 1884, E-2, p. 3 [Doc Bank]. 90 "Education: Native Schools", 1885. Op cit. p. 3. 91 Ibid, p. 2. 92 Henderson. Op cit, p. 8. 93 Ibid, p. 9. ,

31 In 1891 John McGavin, the Te Kao school teacher, wrote to the Education Department concerning the pros and cons of establishing a school on Parengarenga Harbour:

For the greater part of the year the people live in temporary camps, digging gum, it was so at the time of my visit. ..On the gum field the people have plenty of good food; for the children and old people left at the kainga, nothing is provided except plenty of kumera and whatever fish they can catch for themselves ... Would education and poor food, balance gum digging and good living?95.

During the 1890s attendance figures continued to be irregular and caused the frequent closure of Muriwhenua Schools. In 1891 even the much lauded Pukepoto school was forced to close because, despite the best efforts of Timoti Puhipi to keep attendance up, only thirteen children were present. According to the Inspector the causes of the closure were "the poverty of the Natives and their almost entire dependence on gum-digging for a livelihood". The school did not reopen until 189496.

At the end of 1892 Te Kao school was forced to close when the school role dropped to sixteen. During the year the McGavins had complained that they were occupied morning, noon, and night with doctoring to the community. The school did not reopen until July 189497.

The following year the Ahipara school was also forced to close, "because the Maoris persistently kept their children away to dig gum". It was closed for two years98.

In 1894 the government passed legislation making it compulsory for Maori children to attend school. Such legislation was completely facile. Attendance at Native Schools continued to be restricted by practical and economic considerations which simplistic government regulations

94 Ibid, p. 12. 95 John McGavin to Sec for Education, Op cit. 96 "Education: Native Schools", AJllR, 1892, E-2, p. 7 [PR Doc, Vol II: 83] ; "Education: Native Schools", AJllR, 1895, p.2 [PR Doc, Vol II: 87]. 97 Henderson, Op cit, p. 9 ; Ibid, p. 13 ; "Education: Native Schools", AJllR, 1893, E-2 p. 2 [pR Doc, Vol II: 85]. 98 "Education: Native Schools", AJllR, 1894, E-2, p. 3 [PR Doc, Vol Ii: 86] ; "Education: Native Schools", AlllR, 1896, p.2 [Doc Bank].

32 could not remedy. Irregular attendance and frequent closures of Murlwhenua schools continued well into the twentieth century

For example, in 1902 the Te Kao school was again closed for eight months because of a widespread epidemic which was particularly severe in the Far North99. The next year the inspector noted that sickness has wrought great havoc in Mangonui schools. At the Paparore school most of the prepatory class had been carried off by the epidemic. Peria school had also suffered disastrously 100.

In 1914 Inspector Bird noted that many Maori children still received no education, or attended so irregularly as to "render any progress impossible". Bird particularly singled out the northern gumfields for comment:

No satisfactory solution has been found to the problem presented by the case of those who with their parents lead a nomadic life on the gumfields of the far north. Dressed in the veriest rags, unkempt and filthy, half-starved, and housed in structures hardly fit for dogs, these children, some of them mere babies, are compelled to live and work under conditions that are appalling. The parents migrate great distances away from their own settlements and do no cropping. Hence during the winter they are forced to contract, with the various gumfields storekeepers, debts which it costs a summer of slavery to work off, and in this the children have to bear their part 10 1.

Bird suggested, again rather simplistically, that "some action should be taken by the authorities to see that the children, even though they are Maoris, are not allowed to work under the conditions which we have described".

The Early Twentieth Century: Progress or Continuity? For all its draw backs, gum digging provided Muriwhenua Maori, at times of high prices, with a crucial source of cash income. By the turn of the century gum digging may have led to some temporary improvements in social conditions. Henderson writes of the 1890s:

99 "Education: Native Schools", AJHR, 1903, E-2, p. 4 [Doc Bank].

100 "Education: Native Schools", AJHR, 1904, E-2, pp. 5/6 [Doc Bank]. 101 "Report on Native Schools", 1914, E-3, p. 6 [Doc Bank].

33 Gum was now the one occupation of the people, children often dug as much gum as their parents: more freedom, better food, better clothes (bought with earnings) came from the gumfields102.

The Muriwhenua Fishing Report also notes measurable socio-economic improvements caused by gum digging:

By the turn of the century Maori social conditions in the Far North had improved measurably, through gum digging. There were better houses, the people were better clothed, they ate better than before and for the first time in a century their numbers were beginning to improve103.

These claims are balanced by continued accounts of the extreme socio-economic deprivation caused by gum digging. The Reverend Herepo Harawira described the gum camp at Ngataki where he was born at the turn of the century as "a place hardly fit for human habitation" 104:

Here on the gumfields most families like us lived in whares or shacks made from any available material. In our case and most others as well, large gum sacks were split down the sides and laid across a frame similar to that used for a ridge-pole tent. By saving about ten or twelve sacks, a quite cosy home could be made 105.

As a child he and his siblings would walk anything from four to ten miles to school in Te Kao depending on where his parents had camped in search of gum106.

After an extensive visit to the far North during 1903 Pomare noted what hard work it was to make a living out of gum. Pomare noted that most of the Native land was poor and unproductive, that almost the only source of income was the practically exhausted gum-digging industry, and that the "extreme poverty" made it hard to do much in the way of health reform 107. Two years later Riapo Puhipi in his role as sanitary inspector said about gum digging:

102 Henderson, Op cit, p. 13. 103 Muriwhenua Fishing Report, p. 93. 104 F. Keene (ed), Rangatira from Aupouri, p. 6. 105 Ibid, pp. 6n. 106 Ibid, p. 10. 107 Report of Dr Maui Pomare, "Public Health Statement", AJHR, 1903, H-31, p. 67.[Doc Bank].

34 It is well nigh forty years since the Natives commenced digging for gum, and I have not yet seen a Maori who has benefited thereby, ONE of the great fruits of the Maori's gum-digging are bills from the storekeepers, and afterwards summonses. Many families have moved to the gumfields, where they slave and starve and take their children of school age to the di strict 108 .

Whatever prosperity gum did bring was superficial. When, after the outbreak of World War One, the bottom dropped out of the gum market, the entire Muriwhenua region went crashing down into a depression that lasted for at least thirty years. In 1914 the situation was so bad that the government made a hurried tour of the Northern gumfields. They reported:

The position ... was most acute in the far North, for in all that large district lying to the north of Lake Ohia and Waipapakauri, and extending nearly to the North Cape, gum-digging is almost the only avenue of employment. .. The position as far as the working-man was concerned was that he either had to engage in gum- digging or to migrate 109.

While the situation was bad for everybody the report particularly singled out married men and "practically the whole of the Maori population, who in the past had been living from hand to mouth, and who would soon be in distress unless assistance was given to them" 110.

To deal with the emergency, the government bought the diggers' gum at half its pre-war value and also ran a public works scheme for the unemployed. While this eased the worst of the crisis, it did nothing long term for the crippled Muriwhenua economy. The gum industry made a partial recovery 'after the war but suffered further market crisis during the Depression and the Second World War. The introduction of synthetics to the varnish making industry finally killed the gum trade 111.

Muriwhenua Maori continued, for want of any alternative, to depend on gum for a livelihood until well into the twentieth century. A. H. Watt, the Te Kao school teacher described the situation when he first arrived during the First World War:

108 Riapo T Puhipi to Maui Pomare, 10 May 1905, "Public Health Statement", AJHR, 1905, H-31, p. 60 [Doc Bank]. 109 "Report on the Kauri-Gum Industry", AJHR, 1915, C-12, p. 2 [Doc Bank]. 110 Ibid, p. 3. 111 B. W. Hayward, Kauri Gum and the Gumdiggers, p. 48.

35 Apart from what the people could grow or obtain from the sea or the beaches, gum­ digging provided their only means of livelihood. They never appeared to earn very much and were rarely free of debt to the storekeepers who were also the gum­ buyers. There was nothing constructive about the work. It was really a form of mining and its destructive effects on the land can be seen to this day. Much of the old poverty of the district is due, I am sure to the constant burning, over a long period, of the vegetation to clear the ground for digging. There was a very high rate of infant mortality in those days. As many as 25 percent of the children died before reaching the age of three years. Very young infants were taken out to the gumfields where their mothers worked- indeed they were sometimes born there - and where living conditions were bad enough for adults, let alone tiny infants112.

When Acheson investigated the slump of 1924 in Te Kao the situation was much the same. Acheson wrote:

The Natives have only one industry - gum-digging. When gum slumps, the Natives at once feel the pinch. When high prices rule, the traders take all the profits to pay off back debts. The traders charge enormous prices for their goods. For instance, a bag of sugar costs the Natives 35/- whereas the landed cost to the traders including freight can hardly be more than 18/- to 20/- a bag. The retail price in Auckland is only 16/- odd. Nearly all the Northern Native live in miserable shacks, while the mortality among their young children on the gum fields is appalling. I see no hope for these people if they continue to rely upon gum-digging for a living 113.

Gum digging had provided a temporary salve for the flagging Muriwhenua economy and, as the Muriwhenua Fishing Report argues, had disguised the true extent to which land sales had left Muriwhenua Maori without adequate land for themselves or their descendants 114. After the collapse of the gum industry these problems were thrown into sharp relief.

As early as 1908, when the Stout / Ngata Commission visited the Far North, people turned out in large numbers to submit their blocks and expressed their desire to utilise their land more productivelyl15. After the collapse of the gum industry Muriwhenua Maori showed an increasing desire to tum back to the soil in an effort to solve their economic difficulties.

112 Henderson, Op cit, p. 25. 113 Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, MNI 19/1/548 Part III [Doc Bank]. 114 Muriwhenua Fishing Report, p. 114. 115 Stout/Ngata: G-lJ, p. 1.

36 n. Two factors, ill health and gum digging, dominate all accounts of the conditions faced by Muriwhenua Maori during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These twin factors caused constant disruption to the social and economic continuity of Maori communities in Muriwhenua.

TIl health and gum digging were part of an ongoing cycle of socio-economic deprivation. While continued land alienation was also an integral part of this cycle, the proceeds from sale of gum to some extent disguised the degree to which land alienation compromised the region's economic viability. The collapse of the gum industry in 1914 threw these problems into sharp relief.

37 CHAPTER TWO: CROWN PURCHASE OPERATIONS IN MURIWHENUAAFTER 1865.

Introduction. Although the most significant alienations of land to the Crown occurred during the 1850s and 1860s, the Crown continued to purchase Muriwhenua land during the remainder of the nineteenth century. Between 1870 and 1910 the Crown purchased a total of 75843 acres of land from Muriwhenua Maori. The activities of Crown purchase agents in Muriwhenua thus provide an important arena for the analysis of Crown / Maori relations in Muriwhenua after 1865.

The main source of evidence used in this chapter is the Crown's own correspondence files relating to its land purchase activities. Although the correspondence between purchase agents and government officials contained in these files provides a necessarily one sided view of the Crown's activities, the files contain important information about the nature of the Crown's purchase operations in Muriwhenua.

It is impossible to analyse the Crown purchases without some understanding of the Maori perspective on land sales. This chapter thus starts by examining the reasons why Maori alienated their land to the Crown during the late nineteenth century. The chapter then examines the activities of Crown purchase agents in Muriwhenua and asks in what ways, if any, they protected, or alternatively disregarded the rights of Maori vendors with respect to the sale of their land.

The chapter focuses on the major burst of Crown purchase activities during the 1870s and ends with a brief overview of the Crown's subsequent purchase activities.

Crown Land Purchases in Muriwhenua during the 1870s: the Chronology. Mter 1870 the Crown resumed large scale purchasing of Maori land to provide for the vast public works and immigration schemes of the Vogel administration. The Immigration and Public Works Acts of 1870 and 1873 authorised a total £700000 to be spent on such purchases, much of which was spent in the Auckland Province. In 1873, in order to facilitate

38 land purchases, the government reconstituted its IILand Purchase Branch" and attached it to the Native Department under Sir Donald McLean. During the 1870s a network of purchase agents negotiated large scale land purchases throughout the North Island1.

W. B. White, the Mangonui Resident Magistrate, negotiated the earliest of these purchases in Muriwhenua, that of the Kaitaia (North) Block. White purchased the 5806 acre block on 31 July 1872, for a sum of £725/15/- or 2/6 an acre. During the 1870s the Crown also attempted to purchase the southern Kaitaia block but eventually abandoned the idea because of a twenty one year stay on alienation2.

After 1873, a number of specially appointed purchase agents negotiated land sales in the Far North. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas McDonnell, the first of these, first visited Muriwhenua in July 1873. McDonnell was joined in October 1873 by E. T. Brissenden and in early 1875 by J. W. Preece3.

In 1875 these agents purchased four adjacent blocks in the Takahue Valley, a total of just over 39000 acres, at the sum of 2/4 an acre. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas McDonnell, who began negotiations for the blocks in July 1873, claimed that the Government had been trying to obtain a foothold in the area for the past twelve years4.

In 1877 Crown agents completed the purchase of a further 18672 acres of Maori land between Ahipara and Herekino. They purchased two coastal blocks, Tauroa and Epakauri, for 4d an acre, and the Orowhana block, slightly inland and adjacent to the Takahue purchases, for 3/- an acre.

Finally, Crown agents completed the purchase of 1706 acres of land in the North Cape (Murimotu No 1) in 1879. During the 1870s the government thus purchased a total of 65282 acres of Muriwhenua land under the Immigration and Public Works Acts.

1 D. Colqhoun, "The Waipoua-Maunganui Claim: A Preliminary Report", 3.1 [Wai 38] ; "Notes on Land Purchase", MA/MLP. 1/2 74/346 [Doc Bank] ; A. Ward, A Show of Justice, p. 255. 2 "Kaitaia (North) Block, Hokianga District", No 64, H. H. Turton, Maori Deeds of Land Purchases [Doc Bank]. 3 Colquhoun, Op cit, 3.2.1. 4 Thomas McDonnell to Native Secretary, 27 September 1873, MAlMLP 1/1 1873/222 [Doc Bank].

39 eKaitaia

d ~ Ir.I I:: rP '"'l rt) --J eAhipara (j o'"'l ~ ~ ri I:o:l=­ til rt) .c:.. til o :r TAKAHUE No.1 ...... =­rt) TAKAHUE ~ No.2 ~ (j o I:o:l ...... til ;> '"'l ~ ""'"~ Q I \C> TE RAWHITIROA ""'"Q P Figure 8: Crown Purchases during the 1870s under the Immigration and Public Works Acts.

Date of Deed. Block. Area. Purchase Price. 31 July 1872 Kaitaia 5806-0-0 £725-15-0 4 May 1875. Takehue No 1 24122-0-0 £2814-04-8 4 May 1875. Takehue No 2 4405-0-0 £513-18-1 15 June 1875 TePuhata 3352-0-0 £391-01-4 15 June 1875 Te Uhiroa No 1 7219-0-0 £842-04-4 8 March 1877 TeTauroa 10510-0-0 £175-0-0 8 March 1877 Epakauri 1600-0-0 £27-0-0 8 March 1877 Orowhana 6562-0-0 £984-0-0 9 June 1875 Murimotu No 1 1706-0-0 £87-10-0

Source: Appendices to the Journal of the House ofRepresentatives; Turton's Deeds.

Reasons for Muriwhenua Land Sales: The Maori Perspective. Because so little written Maori testimony has survived, the principle written sources available on the subject of Crown land purchases in Muriwhenua during the 1870s are the Crown's own records of its land purchase activities. It would be inappropriate on the basis of such evidence to draw many conclusions about the Maori understanding of these sales. Not only is such evidence, even where it purports to describe the attitudes of Maori participants, recorded almost entirely from the perspective of the Crown's own agents, but it is also recorded in English rather than Maori. This means that, even where it does deal with the views supposedly expressed by Maori participants, substantial inaccuracies may occur in the process of translation and interpretationS.

While the main focus of this chapter is thus, appropriately, the actions and intentions of the Crown in respect of its Muriwhenua purchases, it is impossible to analyse the Crown's actions within a vacuum. Before focussing on the Crown it is necessary to at least address the question

5 See Evidence of Dr Margaret Mutu, "Tuku Whenua or Land Sale" [Draft], Section 4.5, pp. 40/41 [Wai 45], on translation and interpretation of pre-1840 deeds. 41 -of why Muriwhenua Maori alienated their land to the Crown during the 1870s. Although much of the evidence used to answer this question must necessarily be circumstantial, some insight can be gained from an examination of both the transactions themselves and the broader cultural, political and economic framework in which they took place.

The Socio-Economic Context of Land Alienation. For Maori throughout Muriwhenua the 1870s were characterised by endemic disease, rapidly declining population, widespread land sales and increased participation in and dependence on the European gum economy6.

In the Muriwhenua Preliminary Report, Rigby / Koning suggest a relationship between these factors during the 1850s and 1860s. They argue that the demoralising effects of disease, the increased cash needs created by illness, and the growing dependence on the European cash economy created by gum digging all contributed to land sales7 .

In 1956 Keith Sorrenson suggested another possible relationship between these factors. He argued that the marked Maori population decline during the late nineteenth century was largely the result of the social disorganisation accompanying individual dealing for Maori land under the Native Land Court system8.

While these factors are all linked, the nature of the relationship is probably more complex than that outlined by Sorrenson. As Sorrenson noted, there is a correlation between alienation of Maori land and depopulation. In Muriwhenua the most significant land alienations occur during the period 1850-80, also a period of major depopulation. 1880 marks the end of depopulation in Muriwhenua in addition to the end of major Crown purchases. Sorrenson's argument that the demoralising effects of land alienation may have contributed to depopulation stands true. On the other hand, the equation can also be reversed: the demoralising effects of disease and depopulation in Muriwhenua themselves contributed to the alienation of remaining Maori land. Major epidemics disrupted the economic life of the community and created a need for ready

6 See Chapter One. 7 B. Rigby & J. Koning, "Muriwhenua Land Claim: A Preliminary Report on the Historical Evidence" [Preliminary Report], pp. 105/106 [Wai 45]. 8 M. P. K. Sorrenson, "Land Purchase Methods and their effect on Maori Population 1865-1901", Journal of the Polynesian Society [JPS], 1956, 14(3), p. 184.

42 cash. The sale of land was one of the few means of obtaining this cash. Another was gum digging. In the long run, however, participation in the gum economy led to the same end. Gum drew Maori into debt and thus into greater dependence on the European cash economy. This, too, resulted in the need for further land sales.

The relationship between all these factors was cyclical. Poverty and disease created cash needs which led directly to land alienation. They also led Maori into a dependence on gum digging. Gum digging led back to greater poverty and disease, to dependence on the European cash economy, and thus to further land sales. In the long term, land alienation itself led back to increased economic impoverishment. And so the cycle of poverty, disease, debt and land alienation continued.

Although the relationship was therefore not a simple one of cause and effect, poverty and disease certainly contributed to the sale of Muriwhenua land. For example, during the year preceding the final alienation of over 39000 acres in the Takahue valley, an important birding and berry gathering area for the Ahipara people, the community at Ahipara were suffering from a virulent typhoid epidemic. Tirnoti Puhipi, one of those taken ill, was also one of the principal named owners of the Takahue block. Brissenden, the land purchase agent, noted the devastating effects of this epidemic on the community9.

The same year Colonel McDonnell claimed that "the greed for money" led the natives "to all sorts of tricks and devices to obtain advances" 10. McDonnell was aware of the relative poverty of the Northern tribes and, indeed he used it as an argument to convince Muriwhenua Maori to sell more land. He made no connection, however, between this poverty and the supposed "greed" he had observed 1 1.

One of the most obvious correlations between debt and land sales was the private purchase in 1873 of the 56678 acre Muriwhenua North Block by Samuel Yates and his Auckland financial backer, Stannus Jones. Yates, known to local Maori as the "King of the Far North" ran a huge gum buying and trading business around Parengarenga. As Rigby points out, the relationship

9 Mr Brissenden to the Hon. the Native Minister, 27 July 1874, AJHR, 1875, G-7, No 52, pp. 15/16, [Doc Bank]. 10 McDonnell to Under Secretary, 22 October 1874, MA/MLP 1/2 74/442, [Doc Bank]. 11 McDonnell to Native Secretary, 27 September 1873, Op cit.

43 between Yates and local Maori was almost certainly that of creditor to debtor. It is likely that Maori sold this land to Yates in order to discharge their debts 12.

The cycle of poverty, disease and debt provided the backdrop to all Crown / Maori interactions over Muriwhenua land during the late nineteenth century. It is within this context that any explanation of Crown land purchase activities in Muriwhenua must be placed.

The "Pursuit of Mana". Another analysis used to explain nineteenth century land sales elsewhere in the country is that described by Ann Parsonson as "pursuit of mana". In Parsonson's opinion, land sales were a means of asserting hapu or tribal rights to a particular block of land and were thus a function of the competitive nature of inter-hapu and inter-tribal relations. The act of selling was an assertion of mana over the land 13.

The "pursuit of mana" explanation appears at first to contain a fundamental logical flaw. Why would Maori leaders sell their communities' land and thus loses all rights to that land for all time, simply in order to verify some existing right?

The explanation makes more sense, however, when one considers that Maori "vendors" did not necessarily regard transactions over land as absolute sales in the European sense. For example, Dr Margaret Mutu will present evidence on the Maori understanding of pre-Treaty transactions in Muriwhenua. Mutu describes these transactions as tuku whenua: the allocation of land rights to particular individuals and their families in order to incorporate them into the tribal structure. If the grantees or their descendants chose to move off the land, the rights then reverted to the tribe14.

In such cases, the intent of tribal leaders was obviously the retention rather than the alienation of land rights. Within this context, the "pursuit of mana" explanation of land "sales" makes more sense. For example, in the Preliminary Report Rigby / Koning argue that pre-1840

12 B. Rigby, "The Muriwhenua North Area and the Muriwhenua Claim" [hereafter Muriwhenua North Report], pp. 41-43 [Wai 45]. 13 A. Parsonson, "The Pursuit of Mana.", in W. H. Oliver (ed.), Oxford History of New Zealand, pp. 140- 167. 14 Mutu, Op cit, Section 2, p. 7. 44 transactions with settlers in the Oruru area were in part a means of asserting a tribal right to land contested by other tribes. They argue, however, that such transactions were not intended as sales: they entailed the limited and temporary transferral of land rights and were as much a means of retaining control over the land as parting with it:

... Ngapuhi sought to reinforce their authority by granting land rights to Europeans. By granting Pakeha occupancy rights, their Maori grantors sought to protect their title. By these grants, however, they believed they maintained, and even strengthened, their claim. Ngapuhi grants to Dacre and Butler were therefore not land transfers in the European sense of absolute alienation. They transferred to their Pakeha wards ... rights to use the land, but not the sole and permanent ownership of the landl5.

Rigby / Koning thus apply the "pursuit of mana" analysis of land sales to pre-1840 transactions in Muriwhenua to describe the strengthening of tribal claims to land through the allocation of occupancy rights to select European settlers.

It is doubtful, however, whether such an analysis can also be applied to the Crown land purchases during the 1870s. The Maori understanding of the 1870 Crown purchases was significantly different from their understanding of pre-1840 transactions. In particular, after thirty years of frequently unsatisfactory dealings over land, Maori leaders were no doubt more aware of the finality of such transactions in European eyes.

Evidence from Crown files on the sale of Takahue suggests that Maori leaders did realise the risk of permanent alienation from these sales. In his discussions with Maori vendors McDonnell noted that Puhipi and other chiefs referred to the lack of benefit they had received from earlier sales and asked McDonnell "to point out the benefit, if any, that would accrue to themselves supposing they did agree to sell a portion, as they certainly had not from those lands they had hitherto sold,,16. In contrast, Crown land purchase records do not contain evidence that the "pursuit of mana" was an important factor in these sales.

For these reasons, it is unlikely that Maori leaders saw the 1870s Crown purchases as a means

15 Preliminary Report, p. 34. 16 Thomas McDonnell, "Report on Land Purchases North of Auckland", 7 August 1873, MA/MLP 1/1 1873/19, pp. 4-5 [Doc Bank] ; Thomas McDonnell to Native Secretary, 27 September 1873, Op cit.

45 to strengthen their claims to the land. The "pursuit of mana" explanation of land purchases would seem to have more relevance to the pre-1865 history of Muriwhenua. At any rate, by the 1870s the government had provided Maori leaders with a more convenient vehicle with which to assert their mana over land. From 1865 onward, Maori vigorously contested their relative interests in land before the Native Land Court. Indeed the Crown forced them to contest such rights before they could sell the land.

Anticipation of Long Term Socio-Economic Benefits. The above evidence indicates that by 1870 Maori leaders were more aware than previously of the Pakeha understanding of land sales, at least in reference to the finality of such transactions. Nevertheless, Maori vendors themselves continued to view such transactions in a distinctively non-European way. In particular, Maori vendors continued to view land sales as political decisions, designed to produce long term benefits for the community as a whole. They viewed immediate financial renumeration from such sales as secondary to longer term social and economic benefits.

Crown land purchase files relating to the Takahue purchases in Muriwhenua indicate that Maori sold the land there primarily not to gain cash but rather to attract settlers into the area and participate in the positive economic spin offs of European settlement. In August 1873 Timoti Puhipi wrote to McDonnell assenting to the purchase of Takahue. Because written Maori evidence is so rare during the period, this letter is an important piece of evidence. Puhipi gave as the reason for his assent "that we want Europeans to corne (and reside on the land) not later than January 1874,,17. The January ultimatum suggests that in this case European residence was regarded not merely as an anticipated benefit but as a necessary condition of sale. Indeed McDonnell, in a covering letter to the Native Department stated:

The Ahipara natives are evidently anxious to get Europeans located in their neighbourhood and wish, I fancy, to enter into a compact, that if they part with land, that settlers be placed on it within a certain time18.

In the event the sale did not proceed till well after the January ultimatum. In May 1875, however, Brissenden reported that the sellers were still anxious that "settlers should be located

17 Timoti Puhipi to Thomas McDonnell, 7 August 1873 (translation), MA/MLP 1/1 1873/12, [Doc Bank]. 18 Thomas McDonnell to Native Department, 16 August 1873, MA/MLP 1/1 1873/12, [Doc Bank].

46 This evidence indicates the social context in which Maori perceived land sales. Such transactions were not private sales of land made for individual or personal benefit, but social transactions designed to further the community's needs as a whole.

From this point of view such sales were in a very real sense "treaties": cessions of land to the Crown based on anticipation of a range of social benefits that might accrue from closer contact with European settlers. Such sales were political decisions, made by community leaders on behalf of the community as a whole and designed to provide lasting benefit to the community.

Maori anticipation of the long term benefits arising from land sales would go some way to explain the often paltry prices that Maori accepted for their land from the Crown. For this reason Ahipara vendors in the Takahue sale expressed their willingness to trade with the government rather than private individuals despite the lower prices offered by the Crown20.

The importance attached to the possible long term benefits of sale indicates that Maori leaders were still searching for positive solutions to their communities' economic difficulties. Given the failure of land sales in the past to eventuate in such long term economic benefits, this line of reasoning might be seen as almost naive. Nevertheless, discussions between McDonnell and the sellers of Takahue indicate that the Maori owners were well aware that land sales had not resulted in such positive spin offs in the past and were equally suspicious that economic benefits would not result from the sale of Takahue21 . Given the desperate socio-economic difficulties faced by Muriwhenua Maori at this time, Maori leaders may have felt they had few other options of economic advancement. As will be discussed later in the chapter, Crown agents freely exploited this desperation.

The Role of the Crown: Land Purchase Agents and their Methods. While the motives and intentions of Maori land sellers provide important background to Crown land purchase activities the focus of this chapter must necessarily be the actions of the Crown:

19 Brissenden to Clarke, 11 May 1875, p. 5, MA/MLP 1/3 75/274, [Doc BankJ. 20 Thomas McDonnell to Lieutenant Colonel St John, 22 December 1873, MA/MLP 1/1 1873/222, pp. 2- 4, [Doc BankJ. 21 Thomas McDonnell, "Report on Land Purchases North of Auckland", 7 August 1873, Op cit ; Thomas McDonnell to Native Secretary, 27 September 1873, Op cit.

47 the role the Crown Land Purchase Agents played in facilitating purchases - their actions and intentions; the degree of coercion the Crown exerted on Maori vendors; the degree to which the Crown actively protected the interests of Maori vendors.

In dealing with land sales elsewhere in the country, a number of historians have argued that the dubious practices of Crown agents were a significant factor in trapping Maori into selling their land22.

Land purchase methods also aroused strong contemporary criticism. Indeed in May 1875 the Auckland Provincial Government set up a committee of inquiry to investigate such complaints. The central government effectively disarmed this inquiry when it instructed its officers to refuse to give information. Nevertheless, both Maori and European observers continued to criticise the actions of Crown purchase agents throughout the 1870s23.

Payment Procedures. One of the big questions surrounding the fairness or otherwise of Crown purchase activities was that of pre-payment. The practice of advancing payments on land to secure a foothold was commonplace in Murlwhenua. This practice opened up a massive potential to prejudice the rights of Maori vendors and made a mockery of the very safeguards which the Crown had itself initiated through the Land Court system.

In the case of the four Takahue transactions, McDonnell made a first down payment in November 1873, 18 months before the first deed was actually signed. At a meeting at which he claimed about a hundred Maori assembled, he paid a £30 deposit, as well as contributing to "providing refreshments for the natives". Although McDonnell may not have yet fixed a final purchase price, he made several more payments throughout the next financial year. By the time Maori actually signed deeds for the four blocks, they had received substantial down payments on the land24.

22 For example, Sorrenson, Op cit, p. 190 ; Ward, Op cit, p. 255 ; A. Ballara,"The Pursuit of Mana?", JPS, Vol 91, No 4, Dec 1982, pp. 523-524. 23 Colqhoun, Op cit, 3.2.2 ; Ibid, 3.2.5. 24 Thomas McDonnell to Lieutenant Colonel St John, 22 December 1873, Op cit, p. 5 ; "Area of Lands Purchased and Leased", AJHR, 1874, C-4, p. 6 ; Lt-Col McDonnell to Mr J. W. Preece, No 84, 9 April 1875, "Native Land Purchase Agents", Op cit, p. 30; Northern Minute Book 2, pp. 203-204.

46 Crown agents adopted a similar procedure in the case of the three 1877 purchases, making initial payments more than two years before the deeds were signed25. In the case of Epakauri, this may have caused an embarrassing mix up. In 1875, prior to surveyor adjudication of the block, Brissenden estimated the area of the block at 5000 acres and made a down payment of £80. When the survey was completed, however, the block was found to be only 1600 acres. The agreed purchase price of 4d an acre only amounted to a third of the money already paid. It is uncertain how, or whether, the extra money was retrieved26.

In all these cases, initial negotiation and payment took place both before the Crown surveyed the land and before the Native Land Court had adjudicated ownership of the blocks. On the other hand there is no evidence that the Land Purchase agents themselves initiated any process to establish the rightful owners of the land. By making pre-payments Crown agents thus effectively bound Maori to sell before they had established either who actually owned the land, or what the land was worth, or even what were the boundaries or size of the land in question.

Once the Crown agents believed they had committed Maori to sell, they took control of the proceedings, organising surveys of the blocks and ushering them through the Native Land Court. What with delays in surveys and Native Land Court sittings, however, it was often a matter of years before the court adjudicated title to the blocks.

The exact legal status of these proceedings was dealt with by Tribunal and Crown researchers in relation to Waipoua-Maunganui (Wai 38). In the Preliminary Report, David Colqhoun argued that the Crown's dealings prior to adjudication of ownership by the Court were not recognised under the Native Land Acts. According to Colqhoun the Crown apparently claimed authority to do so under section 42 of "the Immigration and Public Works Amendment Act, 1871,,27.

In the Crown's response, David Armstrong argued that there was in fact nothing in the Native Land Acts to forbid the practice of pre-payment. AlIDstrong also argued that section 42 of the 1871 Act was irrelevant and was only designed to give the Government an advantage over

25 Lt-Col McDonnell to Maj Green, No 78, 13 Jan 1875, "Native Land Purchase Agents", Op cit, p. 28. 26 "Statement Relative to Land Purchases, North Island", AJHR, 1875, G-6, p. 17 ; "Statement Relative to Land Purchase, North Island", AlHR, 1876, G-1O, p. 15. 27 Colqhoun, Op cit, pp. 82-93.

49 private purchasers jn cases where jt consjdered the acqujsjtjon of land essentjal for publjc purposes28.

From my own reading of the relevant enactments, it seems the legislature was prepared neither to forbid dealings prior to Native Land Court adjudication, nor to openly countenance them. Section 75 of "the Native Lands Act, 1865" (also section 85 of "the Native Lands Act, 1873") made all dealings prior to the issue of a certificate of title "absolutely void". It stopped short, however, of making them illegal. It was not until 1883 that the legislature finally made dealings prior to adjudcation of title illegal and punishable29.

On the other hand, the only positive authorisation for such pre-court negotiations was, as Colqhoun recognised, section 42 of "the Immigration and Public Works Amendment Act, 1871". This section only applied to the acquisition of land "for the purpose of mining for gold for the establishment of special settlements or for the purposes of railway construction,,30.

Regardless of whether Crown agents found legislative authority for their actions, the practice of making payments prior to adjudication of title opened up a massive potential for prejudice. Pre-payment effectively bound the recipients to sell the land months before the Crown had established their rights to the block, or even the boundaries of the land in question.

Pre-purchase activities meant that any owners not subject to the initial negotiations were presented with a virtual fait accompli, the only means out of the sale being expensive subdivision. The practice also weakened the parties' subsequent negotiating power in terms of a fair price: once Maori had accepted a deposit they were bound to sell to the government at any price. Pre-payment thus hindered the operation of the "free market" in determining the price for Maori land31.

The practice of making payments prior to adjudication of title also undermined the validity of the Native Land Court system. The Crown had established this system specifically in order to

28 D. A. Armstrong, "Crown Actions in Respect of Waipoua-Maunganui, 1874-1876", pp. 12-27 [Wai 38]. 29 Section 75, "The Native Lands Act, 1865", New Zealand Statutes [hereafter NZS], 1865, No 71, p. 274 [Doc Bank] ; Section 85, "The Native Land Act, 1873", NZS, 1873, No 56, p. 252 [Doc Bank] ; Ward, Op cit, p. 289. 30 Section 42, "The Immigration and Public Works Amendment Act, 1871", NZS, 1871, No 75, p. 327 [Doc Bank]. 31 David Armstrong concedes this argument: Armstrong, Op cit, p. 62. 50 ascertain and define ownership rights to customary Maori land. It is therefore ironic that the Crown's own agents saw fit to preempt the Court's process of determination and to virtually complete the purchase of Maori land before the Court had adjudicated title to the blocks.

Land Purchase Agents, did not accept criticism of their pre-purchase activities. They argued that in almost all cases the proceedings from initial negotiation to the final signing of the deed took place without hitch, and that the Court merely confirmed title to the people to whom the deposit had been paid32.

In the case of several of the Muriwhenua Crown purchases, however, the proceedings were far from problem free. In May 1875 Brissenden informed the Native Department that the adjudication of title to Epakauri, Tauroa and Orowhana had been adjourned because of a dispute between Maori and the Survey Department. By the time this dispute occurred the Crown had already made substantial down payments on the land in question. Brissenden gave no indication of the cause of this dispute and asserted that the matter had been settled3 3. When these blocks came to Court, however, they were the subject of a lengthy tribal dispute between Rarawa and Ngati Kuri. It would appear that Crown agents had indeed preempted important and complex ownership issues34.

In any case, the ease with which the Crown purchase blocks usually passed through the Court is more indicative of the Court's reluctance to interfere with Crown purchase activities than of the fairness of pre-payment. Government officials both inside and outside the Court system regarded it as inappropriate for the Native Land Court to interfere with Crown purchases in any way. Indeed it was a matter of some question whether it was necessary for lands being purchased by the Crown to pass through the Native Land Court at alL Prendergast, the Attorney General, apparently thought not. He argued:

It is not a question of law whether an investigation in the N. Lds Ct [sic] can be safely dispensed with in Govt [sic] purchases, but of policy and expediency. Such an investigation is not necessary as between the Crown and the Native Owners. If

32 For example, Mr J. W. Preece to the Hon. the Native Minister, No 11, 3 July 1875, MA/MLP 1/4 75/278, [Doc Bank]. 33 Brissenden to Clarke, 11 May 1875, p. 2, Op cit. 34 Epakauri, Tauroa and Orowhana Blocks, 6 March 1877, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 142 ; Epakauri Block, 2 November 1876, Northern Minute Book 3, pp. 184 ff.

51 the Crown obtam a ceSSIOn from the true owners they cannot as"agamst the Crown set up the want of the Native Land Court adjudication35.

In fact the Land Purchase Department did pass all Muriwhenua lands through the Court prior to final purchase, but resisted any actual interference from the Court. Brissenden suggested that the Crown purchases should not be subject to the "cast iron rules" which were applied to private purchasers:

I would suggest that the Judges be requested to give the utmost facility to the passage of Government blocks through the court, and to wave the enforcement of technical rules in such cases. The Government might agree to indemnify the Judges against any departure from the strict course of procedure required by the Act36.

Brissenden and other land purchase agents need not have worried. Although Native Land Court procedures did cause long and often inconvenient delays, at no point did the judges question the propriety of Crown purchase activities in Muriwhenua. Apparently the judges agreed that the Court had no part to play in regulating Crown purchase activities. Maning suggested that the Land Purchase Department bypass the Court process altogether and instigate their own separate Court of inquiry. Brissenden wrote in 1875:

The advice Mr Manning gave, was I consider valuable and sound. He advised the Government should avoid the Native Land Court for their special cases, and be satisfied to Gazette the Lands and hold a court of inquiry as to ownership and to grant certificates of title to the Natives, and then Gazette the Lands, as Waste Lands of the Crown ... In most cases the owners could and would allow the certificate of title to be made direct to the Queen37.

According to Colqhoun, Maning's relations with Crown purchase agents were relatively strained38. Relations with Monro who followed him, were more amicable. In 1875 Brissenden wrote:

I cannot refrain from expressing to you the obligation I feel myself under to Mr.

35 Prendergast, quoted in St John to Clarke, 2 January 1874, MA/MLP 1/1 73/222 [Doc Bank]. 36 E. T. Brissenden to the Hon. Donald McLean, 3 August 1874, MAlMLP 1/4 75/279 [Doc Bank]. 37 E. T. Brissenden, "Memorandum to Sir Donald McLean on Matters Connected with Land Purchase North of Auckland", 2 January 1875, MA/MLP 1/475/279 [Doc Bank]. 38 Colqhoun, Op cit, 3.2.2.

52 Munro, as presiding Judge of the Native Land Courts held by him at Ohaeamue [sic], Mangonui, and Herd's Point. In every instance he has shown the greatest consideration for me, while on behalf of the Government he has carefully and patiently investigated the numerous difficult and tedious cases brought before him. None failed to pass unless those for which the surveys and maps were not completed39.

As the Court failed to question the fairness of the Crown's purchase activities, the fact that the Court subsequently confrrmed title to those owners identified by Crown purchase agents does not mean that the Crown's determination of ownership was necessarily adequate. For example, Takahue, which apparently passed through the Court with minimal fuss, was the subject of frequent petitions throughout the l880s from Maori who felt that the Crown had not recognised their rights to the land40.

Likewise, the purchase of Kaitaia (North) was disputed during the 1870s. In December 1875 Rata Kepa, Heta Rameka and Hone Haki wrote to Fenton claiming that of the £1100 they believed was due for the Kaitaia purchase only £800 had ever been paid, They asked for £800 acres back in lieu of the £400 still due after seven years41 , In advising the Department on the issue White said:

I have looked over the letter from Rata Kepa and others, they were probably not considered by the Grantees to have much claim on the block referred to: the land was simply bought at five shillings and six pence per acre, not for eleven hundred pounds. I do not think they were much consulted on the subject42.

In defence of their pre-purchase activities, Crown purchase agents also claimed that Maori vendors often pressured them to make down payments on the land at an early stage of the negotiations. For example, in December 1873 McDonnell claimed in relation to the Takahue purchase that, as the result of pressure from the Maori vendors, he had been forced to borrow a

39 Brissenden to McLean, No 88, 3 July 1875, "Native Land Purchase Agents", Op cit, p. 36. 40 Petition No 46, 6 July 1880, "Reports of Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1880, 1-2, p. 8 [preliminary Report Supporting Documents [hereafter PR Docs], Vol 2: 59] ; Petition No 32, 5 July 1881, "Reports of Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1881,1-2, p. 3 [PR Docs, Vol 2: 62] ; Petition No 272,4 August 1882, "Reports of Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1882,1-2, p. 18 [pR Docs, Vol 2: 65] ; Petition No 435, 11 August 1886, "Reports of Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1886,1-2, p. 39 [PR Docs, Vol 2: 73]. 41 Rata Kepa and others to Fenton, 2 December 1875, MA/MLP 1/32 92/152 [Doc Bank]. 42 White to Under Secretary, 19 January 1876, Ibid.

53 sum from a local trader in order to bind the agreenaenl''''

While it is hardly surprising that Maori vendors wished binding agreements with the Crown to be marked by some form of immediate payment, this does not justify the fact that Crown agents were making such binding agreements prior to the ownership of the land in question being determined.

In addition, pressure from Maori vendors for early payment must be seen within the context of the precarious nature of the Muriwhenua economy during this period. The habit of binding Maori to sell land prior to determination of title was not a constructive response to the desperate cash needs of many Maori communities and in fact only contributed towards the ongoing cycle of poverty and deprivation.

Crown purchase agents also complained that they were competing against private purchasers in an open market for Maori land and were at a considerable disadvantage in comparison with "those individuals who purchase on private account when the money is generally laid down at the time of sale"44. This meant that, as long as private dealers were unrestricted in terms of dealings prior to Court determination of title, Crown agents were unlikely to further disadvantage themselves by abstaining from this activity.

The responsibility for pre-payment activities thus rested not just with the Native land purchase department and its agents but with the legislature. Clearly what was needed was legislative prohibition of such pre-Court activities, in the case of both private and Crown purchases.

Multiple Deeds. Another dubious practice associated with pre-payment was that of having more than one deed signed for the same block of land. This happened in three of the Crown purchases during the 1870s: Kaitaia North, Te Puhata and Te Uhiroa. In the case of the Kaitaia purchase the subsequent transaction took the form of an additional payment made to descendants of the original signers in order to secure their interests in the land45. In the other two cases,

43 Thomas McDonnell to Lieutenant Colonel 8t John, 22 December 1873, Op cit, pp. 3-5. 44 E. T. Brissenden to the Hon. Donald McLean, 3 August 1874, Op cit. 45 "Conveyance of Interest in the Kaitaia Block, Mangonui District", No 23, Turton, Op cit.

54 however, the first deed did not secure the signatures of all the named owners of the block. The second deed was a mopping up exercise in which remaining signatures were gathered and a secondary payment made46. In these cases the balance of payment kept in hand for the remaining signatories was far more than their share "so as to make it in the interest of those who have signed to assemble the absentees,,47. This practice again begs the question to what extent the later signers were presented with a fait accompli.

In this respect, the circumstances surrounding the Murimotu purchase are also instructive. This block passed through the Native Land Court in October 1873. Two years later White negotiated the sale of the block with seven of the ten named owners and a deed was apparently signed48. During the next three years the remaining owners refused to selL In May 1877 White wrote to the Under Secretary justifying his expenses on the Murimotu case. The isolation of the Murimotu people, he claimed, "has produced a truculent, quarrelsome, bigoted communitylt49. In 1878 the Crown finally gave up hope of purchasing and applied to have its share subdivided50. This case, where the remaining signatories successfully held out against the Crown and retained their shares, was exceptional.

Misleading Arguments and Promises. Practices such as pre-payment and the signing of multiple deeds show the Crown's failure to protect the interests of Maori vendors by establishing a fair system for the purchase of Maori land. While this was bad enough in itself, correspondence files relating to the sale of Takahue valley indicate that Crown purchase agents went so far as to actively mislead Maori vendors in order to facilitate land sales.

As already discussed, the sellers of the Takahue valley sold their land cheaply to the government apparently because they anticipated long term benefits arising from the immediate settlement of Europeans in the valley. Maori vendors appear to have regarded this settlement as

46 "Te Puhata No 2 Block, Mangonui District", No 23F, Ibid; "Uhiroa No 2 Block, Mangonui District", No 23E, Ibid. 47 Mr J. W. Preece to the Ron the Native Minister, 3 July 1875, Op cit. 48 "Statement Relative to Land Purchase, North Island", AJHR 1876, G-lO, p. 15. 49 White to Under Secretary, 4 May 1877, MA/MLP 1/1883/112 [DocBank]. 50 Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 204/205.

55 a necessary condition of sale. Thomas McDonnell's conespmrdence with the Land Pm chase Department shows that he actively fostered this belief amongst Maori vendors in order to persuade them to sell their land to the Crown.

In July 1873 McDonnell met at Ahipara with Timoti Puhipi and other chiefs. At this meeting McDonnell told Maori that they could not utilise all their good land and that they should sell some of it to attract European emigrants:

I then explained that if good land was sold by them, pakeha's would not only be glad to come, but would remain, and prove a lasting benefit to the natives. "Your land, I argued, is as a fat ox, the whole of which, you cannot consume, part of which, you offer for sale to buy utensils to cook and enjoy the remainder. But what a fool I would be, to take what you offer - namely the horns, and the hoofs. No, sell me a quarter of your bullock, and the Government will then give you that, which will enable you to use the remainder to advantage51 .

McDonnell noted that at first Puhipi and other chiefs were reluctant to sell the land, arguing that "if they sold their lands cheaply for such a purpose, and no pakeha's came to reside on it, they would have sold cheaply to no purpose,,52. Even after Puhipi's letter of apparent assent, McDonnell travelled again to Ahipara where Maori grilled him once more on the issue of European immigration. He was again asked,

... to explain the reason why the Government wanted land and to point out the benefit, if any, that would accrue to themselves supposing they did agree to sell a portion, as they certainly had not from those lands they had hitherto sold, but were now a poor, though they said, deserving case of people who had not killed any pakehas53.

In his reply McDonnell contrasted the poverty of the Ahipara Maori with the supposed prosperity of southern tribes. He argued that the principal cause of poverty in the Far North was the lack of European settlers living amongst them, "to push you on, to purchase your produce, to give you new ideas, to praise you when you behave well, or to caution you when you behave ill,,54. He argued that if Maori at Ahipara agreed to part with a large block of

51 Thomas McDonnell, "Report on Land Purchases North of Auckland", 7 August 1873, Op cit, pp. 4-5. 52 Ibid. 53 Thomas McDonnell to Native Secretary, 27 September 1873, Op cit. 54 Ibid. 56 good land, "land that you yourselves would cultivate" at a reasonable price, Pakeha would come and reside on the land and Maori would become wealthy and prosperous.

If you sell land, true, you will have parted with it but unlike other lands you have sold, you, yourselves, and your children after you will continue to reap a benefit from the White man who will occupy it and kindle his fires upon it. It is now for you to decide, whether you are going to remain with your wives and little ones in a state of disgraceful poverty, considering the means you have at hand, or seize the chance that is now before you and better your condition 55.

According to McDonnell, he then went through the same process of negotiation with the owners at Herekin056.

McDonnell thus encouraged Maori vendors to believe that there was a direct relationship between land selling and prosperity. This correlation was, of course, entirely inaccurate, as the situation in the Far North itself indicated: Maori in Muriwhenua had sold most of their prime agricultural land prior to 1865 and were far from prosperous. Indeed in areas such as the Oruru valley where the most land had been sold, Maori barely maintained a presence.

It was true that Ahipara Maori might have benefited from European settlement close to their own communities, and the economic infrastructure that would have followed such settlement. They were less likely to benefit from the Crown's purchase of 39000 acres of adjoining land in the Takahue valley. The large contiguous purchases of the 1870s continued to encourage separate economic development for Maori and Pakeha communities in Muriwhenua. Government policy, as the settlement of Oruru had already shown, encouraged the economic segregation of Maori and Pakeha57.

While McDonnell may well have believed in a general sense, as most Europeans did, that Maori would benefit from increased exposure to European civilization, he must have realized that the relationship he drew between land selling and prosperity was therefore dubious. At any rate, McDonnell went further than to pose a relationship between land selling and prosperity. Clearly, in the case of the Takahue valley purchases McDonnell and the principal vendors

55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Preliminary Report, p. 88.

57 arrived at an explicit understanding of the uamre of [he nausactioI1, over and above an exchange of land for money: that in return for the purchase of the Takahue valley the Government would ensure the immediate settlement of Europeans in the area for the benefit of Maori.

As discussed above, these promises were extremely important in the decision of Maori vendors to sell. They regarded European settlement not merely as an anticipated benefit but as a necessary condition of sale. Clearly, McDonnell also communicated the nature of this understanding to Head Office. Because Crown agents recorded so little of other negotiations, we can only speculate whether similar understandings were arrived at with regard to other Crown purchases in Muriwhenua. The question then arises to what extent did this create an obligation on the Crown's part to fulfill such expectations? In the event, the Crown did not deliver on its promise to settle Europeans immediately in the Takahue valley-. For ten years after the 1875 purchase no Crown settlement occurred. Then during the 1886-7 depression Ballance established a "village settlement" scheme. The scheme was an ill conceived affair, designed as a relief measure to disperse the unemployed into the country districts. Little care was taken in the choice of the locality for the settlement or of the people to take them up. By 1892 only twelve struggling settlers remained58.

Although the government put in considerable funds towards road works, both to improve access to the settlement and to provide subsistence employment for those who persevered with their holdings, there were few if any downstream benefits for local Maori59. The road works were designed specifically to give employment to the struggling European settlers and therefore did not provide local Maori with employment. Indeed, at the similar Herekino settlement where much of the road access actually ran through Maori land and Maori contractors insisted on doing the work themselves, Lands and Surveys officials expressed their strong resentment of Maori participation in such works. Government officials thus did not encourage local Maori to share in the benefits of European settlement60.

The road works had the added benefit of opening up a considerable amount of adjacent Crown lands for sale. Because of the large size of contiguous Crown purchases in the area these roads

58 "Village-Homestead Special Settlement System in New Zealand", AIHR, 1891, Session II, CoS, p. 9, [Doc Bank] ; "Department of Lands and Surveys", AJHR, 1892, C-1, p. 18 [Doc Bank]. 59 "Village-Homestead Special Settlement System in New Zealand", Op cit, p. 9. 60 "Surveys of New Zealand", AJHR, 1888, C-1A, p. 16 [Doc Bank]. 58 were unlikely to have improved access to Maori setdements61 .

Some historians and anthropologists argue that much of the controversy surrounding land issues has arisen from cultural misunderstanding between Maori and Pakeha. For example, Ann Parsonson argues that nineteenth century land sales were "utilitarian transactions from which both sides felt themselves to benefit, while each failed to understand the exact significance of the sale for the other". In a similar vein, Joan Metge refers to Maori and Pakeha "talking past each other" in relation to the issue of title to the foreshore62.

While Maori and Pakeha did often talk "past" each other, in the case of the Takahue purchases McDonnell both understood Maori expectations of the transaction and exploited them. McDonnell tried to make his arguments more convincing to Maori by using Panakareao's famous statement about the" shadow of the land" and twisting it around to apply to the need for European settlers:

... you, the Rarawa were, with Ngapuhi the first to welcome the white man but you have let him, the substance, go from you, all that you have retained is the shadow and other tribes are now enjoying the benefits that might have been yours this day63.

McDonnell must have known that the Government would not honour any promises over the sale of Takahue beyond those explicit in the deed, and that there was no guarantee the Maori vendors would receive the long term benefits he promised to them. Clearly, the Pakeha perception of dollars for land prevailed.

The Question of Free Choice: did Maori wish to Sell? The above discussion raises the question, did Crown agents go to adequate lengths during the 1870s to ensure that Maori vendors wished to sell their land? Did Maori vendors exercise freedom of choice over the sale of their Muriwhenua land? To what extent did Crown Purchase Agents recognise and discharge an obligation to actively protect the interests of Maori vendors

61 "Village-Homestead Special Settlement System in New Zealand", Op cit, p. 9. 62 Evidence of Alice Joan Metge, p. 15, [Wai 45: Doc #C20] ; Parsonson, Op cit, p. 147. 63 Thomas McDonnell to Native Secretary, 27 September 1873, Op cit.

59 over the sale of their land?64

On one level, many Maori were obviously willing participants in land sales: the Crown did not "force" sales upon Maori in any literal or physical sense. The Crown purchases discussed above did not amount to the confiscation of Maori land.

Nevertheless, the degree to which Maori gave informed consent to these sales was limited by the practices of Crown purchase agents discussed above: failure to determine ownership and boundaries prior to negotiation; the presence and influence of Crown purchase agents during Native Land Court procedures; Crown purchase agents' use of misleading arguments and promises.to encourage Maori to sell the land. These factors indicate the failure of Crown agents to ensure that the Crown purchased land only if and when the owners had given their free and informed consent to such a sale.

In addition, the issue of whether Maori owners "wished" to sell their land raises the question of what freedom of choice is. As already discussed, these Crown purchases took place within a context of poverty, debt and endemic disease and at a time when there were few if any economic alternatives to land sales. The question then arises, can true consent be said to have been given if external circumstances left Maori vendors no other practical option? In this respect, the question of Maori consent to land sales is linked to the Crown's failure to positively address the socio-economic problems faced by Muriwhenua Maori during this period.

Crown purchase agents such as McDonnell recognised and exploited these limitations to freedom of choice. Through practices such as pre-payment and promising Maori long term economic benefits from the sale of their land, Crown agents played on the Maori poverty and need for cash.

While not "forcing" land sales upon Maori in any literal sense, Crown agents thus took no action whatsoever to ensure that Maori in fact wished to sell their land. Crown agents did not discharge an obligation to actively protect the interests of Maori vendors in respect of land

64 In previous Waitangi Tribunal reports the principle of "active protection"- that the Treaty of Waitangi obliged the Crown to recognise the Maori interests specified in the Treaty and actively protect them­ clearly emerges. For example, Manukau Report, quoted in Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Environmental Management and the Principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi, p. 107.

60 Creation of Reserves. The Ngai Tahu report, summing up previous Waitangi Tribunal reports, states that the second article of the Treaty imposed on the Crown a duty to ensure first that the Maori people in fact wished to sell their land, and second that each tribe maintained !fa sufficient endowment for its foreseeable needs". It is clear, as discussed above, that Crown purchase agents during the 1870s did not discharge the first of these obligations: to ensure that Muriwhenua Maori in fact wished to sell their land. The question then remains, did Crown purchases agents fulfill the second of these requirements: did they go to adequate lengths to ensure that land was left for the sufficient needs of Maori vendors? To my knowledge, Crown purchase agents in Muriwhenua during the 1870s recognised no protective responsibility of this kind whatsoever65.

Prior to 1905 there was no legal obligation on the part of the Crown Land Purchase Agents to ensure that the Maori vendors had sufficient land for their maintenance66. Nevertheless, early

Crown purchase policy in Muriwhenua had acknowledged at l~ast in theory the need to leave Maori vendors with some land for their present and future needs. The Crown having rejected out of hand any form of joint occupancy arrangement, the other option was to reserve land exclusively for the use and occupation of Maori. As Rigby I Koning pointed out, the intention of reserving land was very different from that of joint occupancy: "Joint occupancy was designed to integrate Pakeha into Maori society, while reserves sought to segregate Maori within Pakeha society ,,67 . Nevertheless, reserved land was better than no land at alL

In theirpre-1865 purchases in Muriwhenua, Crown agents had implemented a reserves policy. Donald McLean described such reserves as:

... blocks of land excepted by the Natives, for their own use and subsistence, within the tracts of land they have ceded to the Crown for colonization, and in general there has been a distinct understanding that they should not at any time be called upon to alienate any lands so reserved, it being considered essential for their

65 Ngai Tahu Report, Vol 2, pp. 238/239 [Wai 27]. 66 "General Report on Native Lands and Native Land Tenure", AIHR 1907, G-1C [Stout I Ngata: G-1C], p. 8 [Doc Bank]. 67 Preliminary Report, p. 88. 61 own maintenance

While the sufficiency of such reserves may be called into question, McLean acknowledged two general principles at least in theory: on the one hand such reserves should be inalienable, on the other they should be sufficient to provide for the needs of the vendors and their descendants 69.

During the 1870s, however, Crown purchase agents did not follow such a reserves policy. The evidence suggests that after 1865 Crown Purchase Agents in Muriwhenua ceased to acknowledge any responsibility to ensure reserves were made. The land purchase correspondence I examined was completely silent on the subject of leaving Maori sufficient land. The Crown agents did not record any discussions as having taken place with the vendors on this issue, nor did they show any interest themselves in this matter. The minutes of the Native Land Court hearings at which these blocks were adjudicated are equally silent.

The one reference to reserves that I came across in the Land Purchase Correspondence was in relation to surveys of the blocks in the Takahue Valley. In this case McDonnell reported that an arrangement had been reached with the vendors that the Government would survey the blocks at its own expense but that Maori would have to pay for the survey of any reserves they wished to make70. Given that many Maori were already by 1875 in debt to surveyors, this arrangement was, if anything, active discouragement to Maori to create reserves. Certainly, in the case of the four Takahue blocks, none were made71.

In all the Crown purchases during the 1870s, the only land excluded from the sales was that included in apparently pre-existing reserves: a 16 perch wahi tapu called Kaiaponui a reserve along the river at Kaltaia, two Native Reserves, Mokorau and Waitaha, along South West coast of the Tauroa purchase and the 5220 acre southern portion of the Kaitaia block72. The Native Land Court had made the last and most substantial of these, the Kaitaia (South) Block,

68 McLean to Col Sec, 29 July 1854, quoted in Ibid, p. 128. 69 Ibid. 70 Thomas McDonnell to Lieutenant Colonel St John, 22 December 1873, Op cit, p. 3 ; Lt-Col McDonnell to Mr J. W. Preece, No 84, 9 April 1875, "Native Land Purchase Agents", Op cit, p. 30. n No 23A - No 23D: Mangonui District, Turton, Op cit. 72 New Zealand Gazelle [NZG], 25 June 1874, No 34, pp. 403-404 ; NZG, 21 Nov 1878, No 115, p. 1614.

62 inalienable for 21 years from 1870 because of the supposed existence of gold. The Land Purchase Department made concerted attempts to purchase the block in the years following the Kaitaia (North) Purchase, and only lost interest when it discovered that it would need the authority of parliament to remove the restriction73.

Land Purchase Agents in Muriwhenua during the 1870s thus made no effort to ensure that land was reserved from their purchases to provide for the "sufficient needs" of Maori vendors. David Colqhoun suggests in relation to Waipoua / Maunganui that the officers "probably considered the land left unsold provided sufficient for Maori needs"74. Land not explicitly reserved, however, did not fit the criteria stated by McLean himself: that such land should be inalienable.

At any rate, it seems unlikely that the land left over from the purchases of the 1870s was sufficient for the needs of the Maori owners. As already discussed, alienations prior to 1865 had already deprived Muriwhenua Maori of much of their agriculturally valuable land. Maori vendors may well have actually excluded the land purchased during the 1870s from earlier sales in order to provide for their future maintenance. For example, according to Rigby I Koning, Panakareao resisted the sale of Takahue during the 1850s because it would "be required for the use of the Natives, whenever the surrounding districts shall have been purchased". The sales of the 1870s thus further eroded an already seriously depleted Maori land base 75.

As seen on the map of Crown purchases, during the 1870s the Crown purchased a large contiguous area of land in the West Coast hinterland. Although much of this land was not of very good quality and was not permanently occupied, it was an integral part of the economy of the coastal communities. Ross Gregory, giving evidence about Te Wharo Oneroa a Tohe to the Tribunal last year, talked of how his people moved around between the coast and its hinterland depending on the availability of resources. This gave the false impression to many early European observers, for example census makers, that some areas were heavily populated and others entirely deserted. Gregory stated that his tipuna spent time at Takahue as well as at

73 Pollen to White, 7 March 1873, MA MLP 1/32 92/152 [Doc Bank] ; Daniel Pollen to W. B. White, 28 November 1872, Ibid; Pollen to Minister for Public Works, February 1873, Ibid. 74 Colqhoun, Op cit, 3.2.4. 75 Preliminary Report, pp. 117/118.

63 Ahipara, Herekino, Manukau and Pukepoto76.

Takahue was thus a seasonal birding and berrying ground which supplemented the coastal economy of the Ahipara people. Its sale must have severely disrupted the seasonal economy of West Coast Maori. Although Maori owners were left with some coastal land, this land was too poor to sustain close settlement. While it may be possible to provide a more specific analysis of the amount of land left per person in the West Coast area, it appears unlikely that the sales of the 1870s left West Coast Maori with adequate land to sustain their economy.

Regardless of whether Maori were in fact left with sufficient land, what is certain is that Crown land purchase agents did not take responsibility for ensuring that this happened, either by creating reserves or by deliberately excluding land from sale. Indeed, they show no sign of having interested themselves with this issue at all, let alone acknowledged an obligation to act upon it. Crown land purchase agents in Muriwhenua during the 1870s did not ensure that sufficent land was left for the present and future needs of Maori owners.

Adequate Payment. Nor did Crown purchase agents during the 1870s recognise any obligation to ensure that the Crown made adequate payment for Maori land. According to the Stout / Ngata Commission, there was no legislative regulation for fixing a minimum price for Maori land prior to 190577. The land purchase correspondence relating to Muriwhenua reveals that purchase agents tried to get the lowest possible price for Maori land without any consideration for the welfare of the Maori vendors.

The correspondence over the Takahue purchases is again revealing. In October 1873 head office gave McDonnell the go ahead for the Takahue purchases, at a price not exceeding 3-0 an acre. This, however, was a maximum figure. McDonnell was told that if he could purchase the land at a lower rate "so much the better for the colony,,78.

76 Oral Evidence of Ross Gregory, 4 March 1991, Tribunal hearing on Te Wharo Oneroa a Tohe [Wai 45]. 77 Stout/Ngata: G-1C, p. 8. 78 Lt Col St John to H T Clarke, 17 October 1873, MA/MLP 1/1 1873/222 [Doc Bank] ; H. T. Clarke, 29 October 1873, Ibid; Lt-Co1 St John to Lt-Col McDonnell, 30 Ocober 1873, Ibid.

64 In following this up, McDonnell bargained the vendors at Ahipara down from a suggested SI­

an acre, already.a.reduction on what they believed they could get fromprivatesellers j .to.2/4 an . acre. He then persuaded Herekino Maori to sell for the same price. In negotiating this figure McDonnell argued that "at least one third of the land would be indifferent,,79. In contrast he told the Native Office that the land was, "as far as I have seen, and can judge, ... superior to any land north of Auckland,,80.

McDonnell obviously considered the low price he had negotiated a reason for self congratulation. He later reminded the Native Department "that in the purchase of the Victoria Valley Block I succeeded in effecting a saving of over £1,266, as I was authorized to offer 3s. an acre if I could not get it for less,,81.

Although the Crown recognised that there were valuable timber resources on several of the Muriwhenua blocks, when buying the blocks they made no allowance for the value of such timber. According to McDonnell, Ahipara Maori had wished to be paid for the timber on the Takahue block and he had declined:

... if you, I said buy a shirt, you do not pay extra for the buttons. All garments that have buttons are purchased with the buttons and in this instance the trees are the buttons of the land82.

Crown agents also recognised no responsibliIty to ensure that adequate distribution of payments were made. In 1875 Preece admitted that in certain cases there may have been some dishonesty and dissatisfaction over the division of the money but argued,

... that is a matter it is impossible for anyone to remedy but themselves. The only course we could adopt was, to pay the money before all the parties, and let them decide who should take it, and thereby leave the responsibility of the division with them83.

79 Thomas McDonnell to Lieutenant Colonel St John, 22 December 1873, Op cit, pp. 2-4. 80 Ibid, p. 5. 81 Lt-Col McDonnell to Mr H. T. Clarke, No 86,9 June 1875, "Native Land Purchase Agents", Op cit, p. 31. 82 McDonnell to Native Secretary, 27 September 1873, Op cit. 83 Mr 1. W. Preece to the Hon. the Native Minister, 3 July 1875, Op cit.

65 The Rationale of Land Purchase. Crown land purchase agents in Muriwhenua during the 1870s thus failed to protect the interests­ of the Maori vendors with regards to the sale of their land. They did not ensure that Maori wished to sell the land, nor that sufficient land was left for their future needs, nor even that the Crown made adequate payment for the land purchased. Crown purchase agents clearly did not act in the interests of the Maori owners. The question then remains, in whose interests did they act? Who benefitted from the Crown purchases in Muriwhenua during the 1870s?

The Crown purchased land during the 1870s under the Immigration and Public Works Acts and thus, in theory at least, in the interest of European settlement. It was certainly with this in mind, as I have previously argued, that Muriwhenua Maori agreed to sell the land to the Crown.

In the case of Muriwhenua, however, most of the land the Crown purchased was rugged, inaccessible and of poor quality: not in fact suitable for the type of close farming settlement promoted by the Vogel administration. The area was also hampered by the lack of port facilities at Ahipara. The land purchased from Muriwhenua Maori during the 1870s was largely unsuitable for the purposes of the Immigration and Public Works acts. Although an integral part of the seasonal economy of West Coast Maori, it was not suitable for the establishment of European-style farming communities along the lines promoted by Vogel. I have already described the fate of the Takahue settlement established during the 1880s.

In addition, the only factor that stopped land purchase agents from acquiring even more unsuitable land in Muriwhenua was that they couldn't bargain Maori down to a low enough price. For example, in 1873 McDonnell visited Parengarenga to consider the purchase of land on the 'North Cape. Although McDonnell claimed that he had scarcely ever seen "a more worthless country", he offered to purchase 23000 acres of land for the Crown at two pence an acre. Maori declined this offer84.

Crown land purchases in Muriwhenua during the 1870s thus went ahead without regard to the interests of either the Maori vendors, or for that matter of European settlement. It would appear that purchase agents got caught up ih the buying frenzy created by the large amount of money available under Vogel's immigration policy. Land purchase agents rather lost sight of the goal

84 Thomas McDonnell to Lieutenant Colonel St John, 22 December 1873. Op cit.

66 of settlement in the race to buy the most possible land at the lowest possible price.

In contrast, David Armstrong in his report on Waipoua I Maunganui argues that in the aftermath of the Land Wars, the Native Department treated the purchase of Maori land with a great deal of wariness. He sites examples where Donald McLean instructed purchase agents not to buy land if it might cause inter-hapu disputes, not to press sales on reluctant Maori, and to reserve sufficient land for the vendors85. .

The agents active in Muriwhenua were also active elsewhere in the North and may well have received such instructions. I found no examples in the Muriwhenua correspondence, however, of them being given. If McLean did issue such instructions, they were issued on an ad hoc basis. Such restr~ints were not built into the system and were certainly at odds with the main thrust of Native Department policy, which was to encourage agents to purchase the most land for the least money and to reward them for such. As argued above, McDonnell when blowing his own hom to the Native Department made mention of the low prices he succeeded in getting for the land, not his care when dealing with Maori vendors86. The Crown also encouraged its agents to excess by paying them on commission. At least one Muriwhenua agent was paid on this basis. In 1873 Brissenden wrote to head office requesting a commission of 3 pence an acre for each acre he was able to hand over to government87. In March the next year he wrote,

I know it has been usual for the Governments Agents to pass by ... [small ] blocks. They often entail as much trouble as the acquisition of large blocks and thus leave the agent no acreage profit. I do not mean to allow any selfish motive to stand in my way but to secure all useful native lands that I can, be the blocks small or large88.

Payment on commission was surely a clear signal to Crown agents to purchase as much land as possible, regardless of the needs either of the vendors or the Crown. The legislature finally outlawed payment on commission in the "Government Native Land Purchases Act, 1877,,89.

85 Annstrong, Op cit, pp. 30-32. 86 Lt-Col McDonnell to Mr H. T. Clarke, No 86, 9 June 1875, "Native Land Purchase Agents", Op cit, p. 31. 87 Brissenden to McLean, 28 Sept 1873, MA/MLP 1/4 75/279 [Doc Bank]. 88 Brissenden, "Memorandum on Purchase of Native Lands North of Auckland", 18 March 1874, Ibid. 89 "The Government Native Land Purchases Act, 1877", NZS, 1877, No 30, p. 212.

67 If McLean did issue cautionary instructions, Crown purchase agents in Muriwhenua certainly ignored them. There is no evidence, as I have already argued, of any such caution being taken over the purchase of Muriwhenua land. Rather, purchase agents responded to the obvious pressure to purchase as much land as possible at the lowest possible prices. This policy benefitted neither the Maori vendors nor, for that matter, the interests of European settlement.

Crown Purchases after the 1870s (Overview). In 1876 McLean commented with regard to purchases in the North Auckland region:

Viewing the large extent of country that has been from time to time acquired from the Natives in the North, and the representations that have been made by the District Officer appointed under the Native Land Act of 1873, as to the quantity of land still in the possession of the Narives, it has become a question for consideration whether after the present negotiations are completed, it would be right, regard being had to the wants of the Natives, for the Government to acquire any more land in that district90.

McLean's comment marked a change in Crown land purchase policy. The next year, Crown agents completed the last of their Muriwhenua purchases under the Immigration and Public Works Acts. During the l880s the Crown purchased only one block of Muriwhenua land: Rawhitiroa No 1 (1482 acres). This hiatus in Crown purchase activity, however, can also be attributed on the one hand to a general lull in Crown land purchases after the land rush of the 1870s and on the other hand, to the fact that there were not many large tracts of Muriwhenua land left for the Crown to purchase.

In the 1890s under the systematic land purchase policies of the Liberal government the Crown again resumed the purchase of Muriwhenua land. During 1891 and 1892 the Crown purchased the 5220 acre southern portion of the Kaitaia block (Kaitaia A and B) for £2160. From 1895- 1897 C. F. Maxwell negotiated three more purchases for the Crown under the provisions of "the Land Act, 1892": Rarotonga A (969 acres), Aputerewa No 2A (177 acres) and Patiki Nos 1-13 (1990 acres). Like the 1870s, these purchases centred around the coastal area between Whangape and Ahipara, and inland to Kaitaia91 .

90 The Hon. the Native Minister, "Statement Relative to Land Purchasy", AJHR, 1876, G-lO, p. 1 [Doc Bank]. 91 "Lands Purchased and Leased from Natives in North Island", AJHR, 1897 G-3 p. 2 ; 7 October, 1897,

68 Finally during 190711908, J. W. Browne purchased Manawatahi (Three Kings Islands) for the Crown92.

Figure 9: Crown Purchases in Muriwhenua, 1880-1910.

Date Of Deed. Block. Area. Purchase Price. 11 March 1882 Rawhitiroa No 1 1482-0-0 £315-0-0 5 March 1892 Kaitaia A and B 5220-0-0 £2160-00-1 19 March 1897 Rarotonga A No 1 969-0-0 £218-0-7 22 July 1897 Aputerewa No 2A 177-0-0 £35-08-0 26 July 1897 Patiki Nos 1-13 1990-0-0 £497-10-9 12 Feb 1908 Manawatahi 1692-0-0 £307-16-5 Source: Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives.

During the 1880s and 1890s the Crown's purchase activities in Muriwhenua were not nearly as extensive as they had been during the 1870s: there was, after all, not much land left of any value. As in the 1870s, however, Crown officials continued to take no responsibility for leaving the vendor,s with sufficient land for their future needs. Many Crown agents still considered the extinguishment of Native title in itself a sufficient rationale for land purchase, and the Crown continued to purchase just about anything if the price was low enough.

For example, during the 1890s Maori wrote to the Crown offering the Muriwhenuatika block for sale. The Native Department referred the question to the Surveyor General who claimed that the block was not worth buying "unless it could be obtained very cheaply". Nevertheless, the Native Department decided that for "the purpose of extinguishing the Native title over this land it might be worth while to offer 1/6 per acre if all the owners will sell". In the event, Maori vendors refused to sell the land to the Crown at such a low price93.

No 86, p. 1747. 92 "Lands Purchased and Leased from Natives in North Island", AJHR, 1908, G-3, p. 2; NZG, 9 July 1908, No 53, p. 1815. 93 MAlMLP 1/37 95/166 [Doc Bank].

69 As in the 1870s, Crown purchase agents made no attempt to reserve land for Maori vendors. Correspondence files during the 1890s do not mention this issue, and the only reserve in fact made was a small 8 1/2 acre area excepted from Rawhitiroa purchase94.

Nor did Crown agents treat existing Maori reserves with respect. During the 1870s and 1880s, Crown agents continuously attempted to purchase the Kaitaia (South) Block, which the Native Land Court had made inalienable for twenty one years. These attempts were only finally abandoned because it was too much trouble to have the restriction removed. The Crown purchased the block in 1892, almost as soon as the stay on alienation was removed95.

As in the 1870s, there is thus no evidence that Crown purchase agents recognised any responsibility to protect the rights of claimants with regard to reserving them sufficient land for their future use.

Because of the brevity of land purchase correspondence during the 1890s it is difficult to establish in what other ways, if any, Crown agents compromised the rights of Maori vendors. The 1890s Crown purchases differed from the 1870s in that they were primarily negotiated some years subsequent to Native Land Court adjudication. Negotiation and payment prior to Court adjudication was thus not an issue.

There is at least one case, however, where subsequent Maori protest raises important questions about the ethics of the Crown's purchase activities in Muriwhenua. The purchase of the Kaitaia (South) block was the subject of a major dispute during the 1890s.

John Lundon, the agent whom the controversy surrounded, purchased the 5220 acre Kaitaia block in 1892 on a £50 commission from the Crown. As this was not enough to cover his costs, Crown officials seem to have been aware that he would also take some commission from claimants but did not interest themselves in the details.

In the event Lundon paid the Maori vendors 4s 6d per acre out of the 7s 6d given by the Government. He took for himself a commission of 3s an acre. For every share in the Kaitaia Block, claimants received £130 lOs and Lundon retained the remaining £87. When Maori

94 NZG, 24 August 1882, No 70, p. 1139. 95 MA/MLP 1/32 92/152.

70 owners sIgned the deed the Rawene postmaster, Mr Millar, handed each one cheques for their full share in the land. Lundon immediately repossessed th~ cheques and subs_equently paid $e vendors the reduced amount. Vendors did not question Lundon's retention of their cheques because they though it was part of the formal proceedings.

It is unclear from the evidence whether Maori vendors were aware that Lundon would take a commission, or even whether they were aware that Lundon was operating as an agent on their behalf rather than for the Crown. What is clear is that Lundon did not inform the vendors how much the Crown was paying for their land When Maori vendors subsequently found out that the Crown had paid £217 lOs a share they immediately petitioned parliament for redress.

The Native Affairs Committee heard the case in August 1892. The Committee found that the vendors had personally received the full amount of the purchase money from the Government officer Mr Millar, and that the Crown were thus in no way responsible. The committee argued that the claimants should have appealed to a Court of law, not to parliament. They recommended, as there was obviously a case to be answered, that the Crown give them every assistance to do so. The Committee also asked the Government "to carefully note the apparently peculiar conduct of the officials in the performance of their duties in connection with the above transaction"96.

The controversy surrounding the Kaitaia purchase shows the Crown's failure to establish a fair system for the sale of Muriwhenua land in the 1890s. Lundon claimed to be operating on behalf of the Maori owners, not the Crown. Even if his claim is accepted, the Crown surely had some responsibility to regulate the activities of private agents in respect of sale of land to the Crown.

Conclusion. The sale of Muriwhenua land to the Crown during the late nineteenth century can only be understood if placed within its context of extreme socio-economic deprivation. During the late nineteenth century, land alienation was an integral part of the cycle of poverty, debt and disease in which Muriwhenua Maori were trapped. While land sales provided much needed cash, Maori also sold their land because they anticipated long term community benefits arising from European settlement. Crown purchase agents encouraged Maori to believe that they would

96 Report on the Petition of Herewini Te Toko and others, "Native Affairs Committee", AfHR, 1892, J- 3A [pR Doc, Vol II: 84] ; MA MLP 1/32,92/152.

71 directly benefit from the settlement of Europeans in the area.

In the absence of alternative solutions to the socio-economic problems they faced during the late nineteenth century, Maori vendors did not exercise free choice over the sale of their land. In addition, Crown purchase agents pressured Maori vendors to sell through such practices as making payment prior to Court adjudication, and through the use of misleading arguments, lies and promises.

During the late nineteenth century the rationale of Crown land purchase agents was to buy as much land as possible for the least possible money. Crown agents made no attempt to protect the interests of Maori vendors, either by ensuring they in fact wished to sell, or by reserving land for their continued use and occupation, or by ensuring that the Crown made adequate payment for Maori land.

As Crown agents clearly did not regard it as part of their duty to protect the interests of Maori vendors, what was needed was some external system of checks and balances. After 1865 the Native Land Court could theoretically have provided this system. In the next chapter I examine the operations of the Native Land Court in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century and ask how successfully the system protected the rights of Maori claimants in respect of the sale and administration of their land.

72 CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONS OF-THE"NATlVELANDCOURT; 1865-1909.

Introduction. The Native Land Court system was designed to provide a means of converting Maori customary title to land into a title derived from the Crown and cognizable under English law1.

The ftrst attempt to legislate for such a tribunal was "The Native Lands Act, 1862". According to Alan Ward this act, which legislated for district courts under the chairmanship of the Pakeha magistrate, envisaged working through existing Maori leadership to determine customary rights to land. The act was not declared operative until December 1864 when, in Muriwhenua, the Crown appointed W. B. White as Judge and a number of chiefs as Land Court Assessors. In January 1865, however, the Crown appointed Francis Dart Fenton Chief Judge of the Native Land Court. Fenton envisaged a centralised tribunal with a roving judge handing down judgement. On the 11 January he cancelled the districts under the act and proclaimed one district, subject to the jurisdiction of one coun2.

"The Native Lands Act, 1865" legislated for the system envisaged by Fenton. From 1865 through until the present day this system has been the major vehicle through which Crown / Maori relations, particularly but not exclusively in relation to land, have unfolded. The Native Land Court is a major focus for the Muriwhenua grievances before the Tribunal.

This chapter deals with the initial forty four year phase of Native Land Court operations, during which the Court determined title to all recognised Maori land in Muriwhenua. Over this period the operations and ethics of the Court were informed by, on the one hand the desire to facilitate the alienation of Maori land to Crown and settlers and, on the other hand the desire to enforce upon Maori a system of land tenure in line with the European ethic of individualisation. The period was characterised by the award of land, with little consultation, to a few individuals, the fragmentation of land holdings and the continued large scale alienation of

1 Preamble, liThe Native Lands Act, 1862", New Zealand Statutes [NZS], 1862, No 42, pp. 195/196 [Doc Bank] ; Preamble, liThe Native Lands Act, 1865", NZS, 1865, No 71, p. 264 [Doc Bank]. 2 A. Ward, A Show of Justice, p. 152; Ibid, p. 180.

72 The chapter starts with a general overview of Native Land Court operations in Muriwhenua, after which I examine the adequacy of the Court's process of title determination under successive nineteenth century legislation. I look at the Court's policies of individualisation and succession, and their effect on the fragmentation of Muriwhenua land holdings. I then examine the cost of the Native Land Court system and the role of the Court in facilitating the further alienation of Muriwhenua lands. In this respect, I ask the questions, were the Court's provisions for reserving Maori land adequate? Did the Court fulfill a protective function with regard to the alienation of Muriwhenua land?

The Native Land Court in Muriwhenua. Native Land Court operations began in Muriwhenua in April 1865 when W. B. White held sittings at Ahipara and Mangonui. Over the next forty four years all remaining recognised Maori land in Muriwhenua passed through the system. When the Stout I Ngata Commission toured the Far North in 1908 they found only 6904 acres of papatupu land remaining in Mangonui County. Most of this remaining papatupu land passed through the Court the following year3.

In 1865, although Crown and settlers already owned much of the most agriculturally productive land, Maori still owned over 350000 acres of land in Muriwhenua. All of this 350000 acres, over two thirds of the total land area of Muriwhenua, passed through the Native Land Court system at some stage. It included all the land that was alienated to Crown or settlers from 1865 onwards, as well as any land that Maori retained. Land that remained in Maori ownership stayed permanently under the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court system, unless or until its owners sold it. The Native Land Court system was thus a key institution in the history of Maori I Crown interaction in Muriwhenua4.

3 "Interim Report of the Native Lands Commission, on Native lands in the Counties of Whangarei, Hokianga, Bay of Islands, Whangaroa, and Mangonui", AIHR, 1908, G-lJ [Stout!Ngata: G-lJ], p. 45 [Doc Bank]. 4 See Chapter One.

73 Determination of Title. One of the important questions that arises in relation to tbe operations-of the N <.itive Land Court in Muriwhenua is that of title determination: did the Court go to adequate lengths to ensure that all those with a legitimate interest in the land were included or represented in the title?

Prior to 1873 the Court detennined title to Muriwhenua land under the ten owner system established by "The Native Lands Act, 1865" and subsequent amendments. After 1873 the Court operated under "The Native Lands Act, 1873".

The available evidence suggests that under both these systems, the Court failed to protect the rights of legitimate claimants to Muriwhenua land.

The Ten Owner System. The process of title determination began in Muriwhenua, as elsewhere in the country, under the provisions of "The Native Lands Act, 1865". This act empowered the Native Land Court to make inquiries with regard to the ownership of blocks of Maori land and to order the issue of a certificate of title, which could then be converted into a Crown grant. Land titles thus detennined could be declared the property either of ten or less named individuals or, in the case of blocks of 5000 acres or more, of a tribal group5.

The 1865 act embodied a fundamental contradiction: on the one hand it placed on the Court an obligation to "ascertain by such evidence as it shall think fit the right title estate or interest of the applicant and of all other claimants to or in the land" [my italics]; on the other, it obliged the Court, except in blocks of over 5000 acres, to issue title to ten or less owners6. These two requirements were not compatible with each other. As Native Land Court judges were well aware, all Maori land was owned in common, by iwi or hapu7. While individuals had a right to an equal share in the tribes resources, the rights of the individual or whanau to land were always subordinate to those of the tribe. The individual or whanau might have a conditional right of use or occupation, delegated from the tribe, but they did not have a right of absolute

5 Section 23, "The Native Land Act, 1865", p. 266. 6 Ibid. 7 For example, Fenton to the Native Minister, "Report on the Working of "The Native Lands Act, 1865''', AJHR, 1867, A-lO, p. 4, (preliminary Report Supporting Documents cPR Doc], Vol 2: 7].

74 ownership. It was thus a contradiction in tenns to issue a block title to ten or less absolute owners and, at the same time, to protect the interests of all legitimate claimants in the land8.

Nonetheless, even within this framework White and other Land Court judges did have an option. They could have awarded tribal title to blocks in excess of 5000 acres. The Court, however, did not exercise the option of awarding tribal ownership. Instead the Court adopted what became known as the ten owner system: the practice of issuing title to ten or less named individuals. The certificate of title and subsequent Crown grant vested the land absolutely in these owners, unencumbered by any trusts or conditions. Under this system the Court awarded vast acreages of formerly tribal lands to a few individuals9.

W. B. White, the first Native Land Court judge in Muriwhenua, presided over Native Land Court sittings in the Far North from April 1865 - October 1869. The minutes from White's early adjudications provide information about the Court's operations in Muriwhenua. During his four years as Native Land Court Judge White awarded title to nearly 25000 acres of Muriwhenua land under the ten owner system. While ten was the maximum number of owners entered on the certificate, in many cases White awarded title to considerably fewer. For example, the first two blocks to which White awarded title were the Houhora block (7710 acres) and the Rarawa block (107 acres). In both cases the applicant was Paraone Ngaruhi. White awarded Houhora to the applicant and three others, and Rarawa to the applicant alone 10.

An 1867 return of certificates issued by the Court gives additional infonnation about the Court's operations. According to the return, from 1 November 1865 to 30 June 1867, White issued title to twenty eight blocks of land in Mangonui. The size of these blocks varied: two blocks were less than five acres; ten were between 5-100 acres; 14 were between 100 to 1000 acres and; 2 were between 1000-10000 acres. Of these blocks the Court issued eight to one grantee, four to two grantees and the remaining sixteen to 3-10 grantees 11.

8 N. Smith, The Maori People and Us, pp. 53-56 ; I. H. Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure, pp. 59-6l. 9 "Report of the Commission into Native Land Laws", AIHR, 1891, Session II, G-l [hereafter Rees Commission], p. vii [Doc Bank]. 10 Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 1-51 ; Houhora and Rarawa Blocks, 13 July 1865, Ibid, p.l. 11 "Return of the Certificates Issued by the Native Land Court", AIHR, 1867, A-IOC, p. 6 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 6].

75 White never used the option of awarding tribal title. Indeed the first block he adjudicated in Muriwhenua_waLthe371O_ acre Houhora_ block. __White_ awarded _this block to_ four __ _ indi viduals 12. White I s actions thus affirmed the principle that Maori customary rights to land could be adequately translated into law by awarding title to a handful of named individuals. In doing so he deprived the majority of Maori of any legally recognised interest in the land

The Idea of Trusteeship. White and other Native Land Court judges may have justified this practice through the notion of trusteeship: that the named owners acted as representatives of the larger tribal group. Norman Smith, writing of the ten owners system in 1948, claimed that the system:

... enabled dealings with Maori lands to be simplified by making it possible for prospective purchasers and lessees, to negotiate with a restricted number of leading owners who purported to represent the general body of the hapu, or tribe ... In the majority of cases the persons named in the title were in fact deemed to be trustees or representatives of themselves, and the general body of the owners of the land13.

More recently, Hugh Kawharu concurred with this opinion. He argued that under the early Native Land Acts, the Court usually specified the tribal elders, the traditional authorities, as the representative owners. These named owners were then expected to act as tribal representatives in any dealings over the land, particularly sale or lease 14.

The Court minute books for Muriwhenua clearly indicate that most early applicants applied for title not merely on their own behalf but by virtue of their relationship to a larger kinship group. On occasion the Court recorded applicants (in English translation) as claiming the land "belonged" to theml5. More commonly, however, applicants phrased their rights in terms that clearly indicated a trustee relationship with a larger body of owners. For example, applicants claimed to "represent our families"; to be "the chiefs of this piece"; or to be the "principal person in this place" 16. In at least one case, the Mangataraire Block, the applicant

12 Houhora Block, 13 July 1865, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 1. 13 Smith, Op cit, pp. 176/177. 14 Kawharu, Op cit, p. 76. 15 For example Paraone Ngaruhi, Houhora Block, 13 July 1865, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 1. 16 Omaia Block, 31 August 1866, Ibid, p. 14 ; Ahitahi 1 Waikainga, 31 August 1866, Ibid, p. 15 ;

76 claimed to represent other owners in order to speed up the sale of the land: "I am the representative by consent of the other claimants, the land is sold to a European and I will divide the money amongst them" 17.

The principle of trusteeship was thus implicit in many of the statements that Maori applicants made to the Court. This principle could in part explain the domination of Court proceedings by some individuals. Whereas many Maori never applied to the Court, a small group of prominent individuals appeared again and again in the Court and received title to land. These Maori, generally prominent chiefs, often had prior contact with systems of European bureaucracy and knew how to operate within them. While no doubt some had dishonest motives in frequenting the Land Court, it is more than likely that as prominent chiefs many themselves believed that they were the appropriate people to appear in Court and to represent their community on the certificate of title. Many of the larger body of owners no doubt assumed likewise. Smith argues:

Nothing was further from the minds of the latter [the larger body of owners] than the cession of their rights in the land, so as to confer upon the persons named in the certificate, absolute and complete powers of alienation, without reference to them18.

The Court minute books thus clearly indicate that many claimants to the Court perceived themselves not as absolute owners but as trustees. Although White may have used this fact to justify the practice of awarding customary lands to one or two individuals, the principle of trusteeship was not recognised under the 1865 Act. In the case of immediate sale, the Court assumed no responsibility over division of the money. In all cases the individuals who received certificate of title received absolute and unrestricted rights of ownership to the land. Not only did the Court not enforce an obligation of trusteeship, it provided no legal means for such a relationship to be recognised. This opened up the potential for many Maori to be dispossessed of their legitimate interest in the land.

To what extent this sort of dispossession actually occurred is harder to ascertain. Obviously the written record does not provide information about the number of people the Court system

Taheke Block, 31 August 1866, Ibid, p. 15. 17 Mangataraire Block, 19 October 1869, Ibid, p. 47. 18 Smith, Op cit, p. 177 ; See also on trusteeship, Kawharu, Op cit, pp. 58-61.

77 dispossessed or who these people wete. In addition, what happened on the title did not necessarily represent what actu!llly occurred in practice. In the c(!se of immediate sale, the named owners mayor may not have redistributed the proceeds. Likewise, when immediate sale did not occur, the named owners mayor may not have recognised an ongoing trustee relationship or put the land to community use.

Nevertheless, what is important is that under the law, such a trustee relationship was not recognised. To the extent that a trustee relationship did continue to exist, it therefore existed in spite of, not because of, the operations of the Court. Indeed Chief Judge Fenton argued that if the Court recognised or enforced an ongoing trustee relationship, it would perpetuate the "evil" of communal ownership 19. By failing to recognise such a relationship the Court thus deprived the majority of owners of any legally recognised interest in the land.

The Process of Determination. Even if such a trustee relationship had been recognised under existing Native Lands legislation, White still had a responsibility to ensure that all interested groups were at least represented on the tide. The available evidence suggests that White failed to do this.

Under the 1865 act and subsequent amendments any Maori, no matter what their position in the community could instigate a claim for land. In theory the Court then had a responsibility to determine the rights of all claimants to the land in question. In practice, however, Fenton insisted that judgements be based only on evidence presented in Court. This meant that recognition of an interest in the land was contingent on appearing or being represented in Court. Such a system naturally worked in favour of land selling Maori, who obviously were more likely to instigate a claim than those who did not contemplate sale. Factors such as defective notification procedures and the long distances to travel probably deterred many other legitimate claimants from participating in the Court system20.

Under this system any Maori person could apply to the Court as an individual, and be granted

19 Report in Hawkes Bay Herald, 4 November 1880, quoted in "Memorandum by the Hon. R. Stout on Owhaoko and Kaimanawa Native Lands", AJHR, 1886, G-9, p. 14, [Doc Bank]. 20 Section 23, "The Native Lands Act, 1865", Op cit, p. 266 ; K. Sorrenson, "Land Purchase Methods and their effect on Maori Population 1865-1901", Journal of the Polynesian Society [JPS], 1956, 14(3), pp. 186/187 ; D. A. Armstrong, "Crown Actions in Respect of Waipoua-Maunganui, 1874-1876", pp. 20/21 [Wai 38].

78 absolute individual rights to formerly tribal land. The system thus encouraged individual exploitation of customary land rights. Indeed, the Court's attitude to such exploitation was summed up by Chief Judge Fenton who in 1867 expressed his disregard for whether the named owners were, "trustees put in for the purpose of sale on behalf of the tribe or whether they are to be regarded as intelligent members of the tribe determined to possess freeholds for themselves"[my italics]21.

The Court minute books for the Far North indicate that under this system White did not • ",,>;' conduct a thorough investigation into tide. He accepted on face value the claims of the applicant and the handful of claimants that appeared before the Court. He did not question the representative nature of such claimants. Indeed, the Court minutes do not indicate that White was actually concerned about whether applicants applied as individuals or as representatives of a larger kinship group22.

Available evidence thus indicates that White did not act to ensure that the legitimate representatives of all interested groups were in fact represented on the certificate of title. It is more difficult to tell from the recorded minutes to what extent White actually ignored information presented to him in Court about the rights of legitimate claimants. In most cases the amount of information recorded in these early minutes is negligible and indicates little or no opposition in the Court to the handful of individuals to whom White awarded title. There is some indication from another source, however, that White actively discouraged Maori from having more than a few names on the certificate of title. In 1867 he wrote to Fenton:

In this district the Natives have shown great anxiety to place as many names on the grant as possible, which, of course, adds considerably to the expense when they are required to go to a distance to transfer their property23.

The fact that Muriwhenua Maori themselves wanted as many names as possible on the certificate of title is not evident in the recorded minutes. Nor is it evident in White's judgements. As I have already stated, White awarded title to twenty eight blocks of land in Mangonui from 1 November 1865 to 30 June 1867. Out of these, he awarded eight to one

21 Fenton to the Native Minister, "Report on the Working of "The Native Lands Act, 1865"", Op cit, p. 4. 22 Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 1-51. 23 White to Fenton, No 5, 5 July 1867, "Report on the Working of "The Native Lands Act, 1865"",Op cit, p. 10.

79 grantee and four to two grantees. Of the remaining sixteen, only a few were awarded to the maximum ten grailtees. This indicates-th-at White did- nof aef on Maori wishes-to have as many names as possible on the certificate of title. White thus may indeed have omitted from consideration important discussions with Maori about their wishes regarding title24.

Problems with the Official Record. The above discussion raises the question of the accuracy of the early Court minute books as a record of Native Land Court proceedings.

It is clear from reading these minutes that the often lengthy proceedings have been reduced to a brief summary. For example, on 19 December 1865 at Mangonui, White determined title to three blocks. What may well have been a full day of hearings was reduced in the minutes to three pages. As an example, the first of these adjudications reads as follows:

Rangirangia. 176 acres. Plan produced by J CampbelL Kareka Kawau states land under investigation is his, there are other claims by Hau Mikara, Reihana Te Huhu, Nopera Kuka,Wharu Neiho, Hau Peka, Pita Tohia, Wiremu Te Wha, Timoti Popata, Matenga Pairata. No opposition. Certificate ordered for Kareka Te Kawau and the above nine25.

Each of the listed claimants may have provided the Court with quite extensive information about the nature of their claim to the land, none of which was recorded in the minutes. If the recorded minutes really were a full record of the days hearing, then the entire proceedings took perhaps half an hour. As this is extremely unlikely, it appears that the Court minutes books include only the information that the recorder, probably White himself, considered worthy of entering into the official record. The extreme brevity of the Court minutes thus suggests that important discussions about title may have been omitted from the official record.

The fact that the minutes are in English is also problematic. During the 1860s and indeed several decades later, the first and in most cases only language of Maori appearing before the Court was Maori. All the evidence was presented to the Court in Maori and the great majority

24 Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 1-51 ; "Return of the Certificates Issued by the Native Land Court", 1867, Op cit, p. 6. 25 Rangirangia Block, 19 December 1865, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 3.

80 of Maori attending the Court proceedings could not even understand English. Yet the only official record of the proceedings is in English translation. No record in Maori, if there ever was one, has survived.

Translation from Maori to English is always problematic, particularly where major conceptual differences, such as those between Maori and European concepts of land ownership, exist. Claimant evidence to be presented to the Tribunal concerning pre-Treaty deeds in Muriwhenua shows how misleading and fundamentally inaccurate such translations can be26.

The official record of Native Land Court proceedings is thus both heavily abbreviated and in English translation. In effect, this means that there is no reliable written record extant of the Maori evidence given at the Native Land Court. The minute books tell us more about White's attitudes and priorities than those of the claimants.

The one sided nature of the official record also underlines the enormous power that Judges such as White had within the Native Land Court system. Although Section 10 of the 1865 act enabled the Governor to appoint "such clerks interpreters and other officers as may be required" to facilitate the Court's proceedings, White appears to have conducted many of his determinations single handed. There is no evidence that a clerk was present and although the Crown appointed George Kelly as a translator, he appears to have attended only infrequently. At many hearings White was the only Pakeha official present and acted as clerk, translator and judge. There were thus few checks and balances within the system to White's autocratic power27.

The Crown's failure to provide an accurate record in Maori of the Court's proceedings also underlines the Crown's failure to ensure Maori any effective control within the system for determination of title to their customary land. In effect, the language barrier debarred Maori participants from access to vital information about and comprehension of the Court's activities. Even the Native Land Acts, the legislative framework for the Court's operations, were not available to Maori in their own language.

26 Evidence of Dr Margaret Mutu, "Tuku Whenua or Land Sale?", Draft, Section 4.5: Conclusion on the Translations, pp. 40/41 [Wai 45]. 27 Section 10, "The Native Lands Act, 1865", p. 265.

81 The Assessor System. Also crucial to the Crown's failure'to ensure Maori any effeCtive control" of the process was 'the lack of provision for official Maori participation in the Native Land Court system.

According to Alan Ward the original "Native Lands Act, 1862" provided for a relatively high degree of Maori participation within the Native Land Court system. The act, which legislated for district Courts under the chairmanship of the Pakeha magistrate, envisaged working through existing Maori leadership to determine customary rights to land. Because of the Land Wars, the act was not declared operative until December 1864. One month later, the Crown appointed Francis Dart Fenton as Chief Judge. Fenton envisaged a more centralised Native Land Court system with a roving Judge handing down judgement. On 11 January 1865 he cancelled the districts under the Act and proclaimed one district subject to the jurisdiction of one court28.

"The Native Lands Act, 1865" legislated for the system envisaged by Fenton. The act provided for the appointment of two Maori Assessors to assist the Pakeha Judge to determine title. In 1867 the number of required assessors was reduced to one. In the Far North the Crown appointed Maihi Te Huhu and Reihana Kiriwi as assessors. These two men, and after 1867 often Te Huhu alone, assisted White with the process of title determination29.

It is difficult to establish what contribution, if any, these assessors made. There is no evidence in the minutes of them expressing an opinion or contributing to the process of determination in any way. If they did make a contribution, White did not consider it important enough to record. No independent record of the assessors activities exists. Indeed the only evidence of their presence is their signatures at the bottom of the English record of some adjudications. Even this formality was lacking in many cases.

As Ward argues, the 1862 act had envisaged "the chiefs of a district meeting with the local Resident Magistrate and threshing out agreement on boundaries in that district only". Such a system could have utilized traditional structures and decision making processes to ensure a high degree of consultation and consensus in the Court's determinations 30.

28 Ward, Op cit. p. 152; Ibid. p. 180. 29 Section 6 & Section 12. "The Native Land Act. 1865". pp. 264/265 ; Section 16. "The Native Lands Act, 1867", NZS, 1867, No 43, p. 475 [Doc Bank] ; Northern Minute Book 1. pp. 1-51.

82 In contrast, the assessor system removed tfie process of tItle determmation from tradItional authority and decision making structures. It provided instead for the limited incorporation of select Maori into the Court's structure. These Maori were hand picked by the Crown. In this way Crown agents could ensure that only those Maori who they regarded as supporters of the Crown activities participated in the system. For example, Rigby / Koning note a correlation between those Maori on Grey's official runanga and those Maori who collaborated with land sales. They identify Reihana Kiriwi, the Court assessor, as being involved in no less than ten Crown purchases31.

The two assessors were expected to represent the interests of all Muriwhenua Maori. This was patently ridiculous. Although they were chosen from existing leadership, and may have been the legitimate representatives of certain segments of Muriwhenua society, the assessors could not possibly represent the interests of the five iwi and numerous hapu claiming interest to Muriwhenua land. The assessors system ignored the importance of these hapu and iwi affiliations and indeed completely disregarded such traditional structures of decision making and authority. By operating outside of these structures, the system made the assessors less answerable to their people. The failure of the assessor system is indicated by their silence.

The Ten Owners System: Conclusions. Under "The Native Lands Act, 1865" the Native Land Court system thus failed, both in its legislative framework and in the practices adopted by the Court, to protect the rights of legitimate claimants to Muriwhenua land. The Court appears to have operated a selection policy based on the idea of trusteeship. This idea, however, was not recognised or enforced under Native Lands legislation. Even had such a trustee relationship been legally recognised, White's determinations were at any rate not adequate to ensure that all interested groups were represented on the title. The Court also failed to ensure adequate Maori participation in the process of determination or even an accurate record of the Court's proceedings.

30 Ward, Op cit, p. 180. 31 B. Rigby & J. Koning, "Muriwhenua Land Claim: A Preliminary Report on the Historical Evidence" [Preliminary Report], p. 150 (Wai 45]. 83 "The Native Lands Act, 1867".

Section 17 of "The Native Land Act,1867"~ significantly altered'the legislarlvesituation with regard to detennination of title. The section required the Court to ascertain the title not only of the applicant or claimants to the land but also "of every person who and every tribe which according to Native custom owns or is interested in such land whether such person or tribe shall have put in or made a claim or not" and to enter their names on the Court records. At the consent of all the owners, the Court could then issue a certificate of title to ten principal owners. The power of these ten with regards to alienation was restricted pending subdivision. They could lease for up to twenty one years but could not sell the land32.

The 1867 Act did not make legislative provision for a trustee relationship between the principal owners and the larger body of owners: it merely restricted the powers of the ten principal owners pending subdivision. It was designed purely to protect the interests of the larger body of owners with regards to the proceeds of alienation. Nevertheless, the act at least provided legislative acknowledgement of the fact that the ten owner system was insufficient to protect the interests of all legitimate claimants to Maori land.

In practice, however, the Court largely ignored the provisions of the 1867 Act. Fenton claimed that the insertion of names on the certificate was usually the result of an internal arrangement amongst the tribe, "the consideration being that the names of those now inserted are to be omitted in certain other certificates, for it must be remembered that all lands are owned by the tribel!33. According to Alan Ward, Fenton thus claimed discretionary powers and continued to issue certificates to ten or less owners as if they were the only owners34.

The act appears to have made little difference to the operations of the Court in Muriwhenua. In only one case, that of the Konoti Block, White used its provisions to restrict the powers of the ten named owners in favour of a larger group. In all other cases, White continued to award the land to ten or less owners with no such restrictions35.

The 1867 act provided legislative acknowledgement of the fact that under the ten owner

32 Section 17, "The Native Lands Act, 1867", pp. 475/476. 33 Fenton to the Native Minister, "Report on the Working of "The Native Lands Act, 1865"", Op cit. 34 Ward, Op cit, pp. 213-216 ; Ibid, p. 251. 35 Konoti Block, 21 July 1868, Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 37/38.

84 system, the ten principal owners could not be regarded as absolute owners of Maori land. In ignoring the restrictive provisions of the act, White refused to give legal weight to this principle. White and other Native Land Court judges may have used the existence of a trustee relationship to justify the ten owner system, but they were not prepared to make legal provision for such a relationship.

The 1867 act also removed any doubt as to the Court's obligation to ascertain the rights of all the.Qwners of land brought before it It clearly obliged the Court to be pro-active with regard to tide determination and to instigate a thorough investigation, if necessary extending outside the confines of the Courtroom36.

The Court minutes books indicate that White also ignored this obligation. He continued to accept on face value the claims of the handful of individuals who pressed their claim to land and made no attempt to ascertain the rights of the larger body of owners37.

Unfortunately the minute books of Frederick Maning, the judge who followed White in the Far North, have not survived. Maning was very critical of Monro, the judge who succeeded him, claiming that Monro deliberately ignored the rights of the majority of owners of Maori land38. Nevertheless, Maning was no more diligent in his application of Section 17 than White had been. For example in 1871 he granted the 56678 acre Muriwhenua block to seven people with no restrictive provisions39. Crown schedules of land reserved by the Native Land Court under Maning indicate that he did not ever use the restrictive provisions of the 1867 Act40.

Section 17 of "The Native Lands Act, 1867" thus failed to protect Maori owners from dispossession under the ten owner system. Although it dealt with some of the worst aspects of the ten owner system, in practice the section was largely ignored by the Court. White and probably Maning continued to neglect their responsibility to ensure that all legitimate owners of Muriwhenua land were represented on the certificate of tide.

36 Section 17. "The Native Lands Act, 1867", pp. 475/476. 37 Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 28-51. 38 Maning quoted in D. Colquhoun, "The Waipoua-Maunganui Claim, A Preliminary Report", 3.2.5 [Wai 38]. 39 B. Rigby, "The Muriwhenua North Area and the Muriwhenua Claim",.Doc 6 [Wai 45]. 40 See my analysis of reserve provisions later in chapter.

85 _ The Principle_ of Individualisation .and "The Native .Lands Act, 187J'~.. One of the main purposes of the earliest Native Lands legislation was the destruction of communal title and the individualisation of Maori land tenure. As the Hon. Mr Sewell argued in 1870, a principal objective of the Native Lands Acts was to detribalise Maori:

... to destroy, if it were possible, the principle of communism which ran through the whole of their institutions, upon which their social system was based, and which stood as a barrier in the way of all attempts to amalgamate the native race into our own social and political system. It was hoped that by the individualisation of titles to land, giving them the same individual ownership which we ourselves possessed, they would lose their communistic character, and that their social status would become assimilated to our own41.

Chief Judge Fenton, one of the main architects of the 1865 Act, shared this view. He claimed in 1880 that the "whole theory of the Native Land Act, when the Court was created in 1862, was the putting an end to Maori communal ownership,,42.

That as it may be, prior to 1873 the legislature did not entirely commit themselves to the individualisation of Maori land. As already stated, the 1865 Act provided that in blocks in excess of 5000 acres the Court could chose to award tribal rather than individual title. If anything, the 1867 act strengthened this option. Section 17 clearly stated that Court could, if it wished, list the names of interested iwi or hapu rather than individuals on the Court records43.

The legislature thus continued to equivocate on the issue of individualisation, and to provide the Court with the option of affirming corporate ownership of Maori land. In contrast, the Court itself refused from the first to accept the validity of tribal title and operate on this basis. From its earliest operations the Native Land Court worked on the assumption that title to Maori land could only be issued to a set of named individuals, however large, rather than to a corporate body.

In 1873, Parliament finally abandoned any attempts to provide for corporate ownership of

41 Hon. Mr Sewell, quoted in Smith,Op cit, p. 182. 42 Report in Hawkes Bay Herald, 4 November 1880, Op cit, 43 Section 17, "The Native Lands Act, 1867", pp. 475/476. 86 Maori land. Under the uN ative Lands Act, 1873 II a memorial of ownership containing the individual names of every person interested in the land replaced the earlier certificate of title. The act thus abolished the ten owner system but, as the 1891 Commission argued, carried the principle of individual ownership to its farthest limits:

From granting land to a tribe by name, as intended by the Act of 1865, the whole people of the tribe individually became the owners - not as a tribe, but as individuals44.

With the 1873 Act, the legislature abandoned any attempt to protect Maori owners through a system of trusteeship or representative ownership. Instead, the 1873 Act placed on the Court an obligation to ascertain and list every individual member of every iwi or hapu interested in every block of Maori land that came before the Court. The legislature thus tried to protect the rights of Maori owners by granting each and every one of them absolute ownership rights to each and every block their hapu or iwi had an interest in.

In order to achieve this, the 1873 Act provided for district officers, who were obliged to seek out and compile infonnation, with the assistance of local chiefs, regarding ownership of tribal land. The act required these officers to notify the judge of any counter claim they were aware of on land coming before the Court. In addition, the 1873 Act obliged the judge himself to instigate preliminary inquiries into land coming before the Court in order to ascertain the legitimacy of the application, and to require the presence of any witnesses whose evidence appeared to be necessary45.

Title Determination in Muriwhenua under Judge Monro. In theory, the 1873 Act thus clearly obliged the Court on the one hand to establish the rights of all owners of Maori land and on the other hand to include the names of all these owners on the memorial of ownership. An examination of the Court minute books during the 1870s under Judge Monro indicates that in practice nothing of the sort occurred.

Monro began holding sittings in Muriwhenua in 1875. On at least one occasion, that of the

44 Rees Commission, p. viii. 45 Sections 21, 37, 38 & 42, "The Native Lands Act, 1873", NZS, 1873, No 56, pp. 241-244, [Doc Bank].

87 Mokaikai block, Monro issued a certificate of title using the 1867 Act46. In the main, however; Monro operated under the provisions of the 1873 Act, which had been gazetted in the North in February 187447.

Monro's minute books indicate that in practice, the process of title determination under the 1873 Act differed little from under the ten owner system. Monro did not treat seriously his obligation either to ascertain the individual rights of all owners of Maori land or to include all their names on the memorial of ownership.

The evidence suggests that, despite the provisions of the 1873 act, neither district officers nor judges instigated a thorough investigation into the ownership of blocks that passed before the Court. In the Northern district the Court did in fact appoint district officers. The Court appointed White to this position in May 1874 and he was replaced by Webster in December of the same year48. The Court minute books do not indicate, however, that the District Officer played any role in protecting Maori rights to land. Although Webster was present at many of the Court's sittings, he appears to have functioned more as an advocate for the Crown than for Maori. On occasion he objected to claims before the Court on the grounds that the land already belonged to the Crown49. In contrast, Webster never addressed the Court on behalf of Maori interests. The system of district officers was widely acknowledged as a failure and was soon disbanded altogetherSO•

There is also no evidence that Monro instigated on his own account any form of preliminary inquiry into land coming before the Court. Like White under the ten owner system, the Court minute books suggest that Monro limited his investigation of Maori land rights to the inside of the Court room. He relied entirely on the evidence presented before him in Court and did not question its validity, even when there was a glaring discrepancy between the number of claimants in Court and the number of potential owners of Maori landSI.

46 Mokaikai Block, 1 May 1875, Northern Minute Book ·1, pp. 69/70. 47 New Zealand Gazette [NZG], No 9, 19 Feb 1874, p. 101. 48 NZG, No 27, 21 May 1874, p. 330; Ibid, No 68,24 Dec 1874, p. 852. 49 For example Taimaro Block, 3 May 1875, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 75 ; Motuopao, 5 March 1877, Ibid, p. 141. 50 Ward, Op cit, pp. 254-256 ; Rees Commission, pp. ix/x. 51 For example, Takahue Nol and No 2, 29/30 April 1875, each awarded to 3 claimants, Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 57-61.

88 Just as there had been under the te'n owner system, there continued to be a major discrepancy between the number of potential claimants to Maori land blocks and those that ended up receiving title. In a few cases Monro awarded title to a large number of claimants and in one case, the Taumatawiwi block, to as many as thirty nine claimants52. In many cases, however, Monro awarded land to less than ten owners just as it had been under the ten owner system. This was patently in breach of Monro's obligations under the 1873 act to ascertain the rights of all owners of Maori land blocks brought before it53.

Monro thus clearly did not instigate procedures to actively ensure that all owners of Maori land were included in the memorial of title. In addition, Monro may have deliberately ignored the rights of claimants to Maori land. For example, Frederick Maning claimed that Monro, "witingly [sic] and delibrately [sic] ignored the rights of nine tenths of the owners of almost every case he had to do with and left them at the mercy of a few rangatira sharks .. 54.

Maning was probably referring to the selection of representative owners which, as under the ten owner system, continued to occur at the knowledge and sanction of the Court. Rather than include the names of every individual member of the tribe or hapu, claimants to the Court appear to have continued to select their own representatives for the memorial of ownership. Court minutes indicate that Monro was aware of this process of selection and indeed encouraged it. For example on 29/30 April 1875 Monro adjudicated title to Takahue No 1 (24122 acres) and Takahue No 2 (4405 acres). Monro awarded each of these blocks to three claimants. Timoti Puhipi, gave evidence that their people had occupied the land from the time of their ancestor Tarainga and had a permanent settlement there. Puhipi thus obviously claimed the land as the legitimate representative of a larger group55.

As under the ten owner system, the intention in selecting names was often to speed up the sale of the land. For example on 2 March 1877 Monro determined title to Paua No 2. George Kelly stated that in order to expedite the sale of the land to Yates one name would represent three claimants in the memorial of ownership56. Also in March 1877, Monro determined title to the

52 Taumatawiwi Block, 10 March 1877, Ibid, pp. 187-189. 53 For example Merita Block, 918 acres, 7 March 1877, Munro awarded to 9 claimants, Ibid, pp. 155- 163. 54 Maning quoted in Colqhoun , Op cit, 3.2.5. 55 Takahue Nol and No 2, 29/30 April 1875, Northern Minute Book I, pp. 57-61. 56 Paua No 2, 2 March 1877,Ibid, pp. 115-117.

89 Epakauri, Orowhana and Tauroa blocks, all to be sold to the Crown. Although this land had been the subject ·of a dispute. between Ngati Kuri I Rarawa; .heard· by. the Court at Hokianga;· only four names ended up on each memorial of ownership. Hare Reweti, one of the claimants, stated that the disputants had come to an arrangement amongst themselves as to the names which were to be included on the memorial57.

In these cases and many others, Monro clearly chose to ignore the fact that many more people had rights to the land than the few individuals he recorded on the memorial of ownership. Dr David Williams, in his submission to the Tribunal hearing the Te Roroa claim, reports on Monro's attitude. When asked in the case of Timu Kerehi v Duff whether anything took place to suggest that more than ten owners existed Monro replied, "I don't think in Court; but we might have had an idea from conversation with the Natives that there were more owners; and we very likely supposed there were,,58. Monro disingenuously justified his actions by saying that it was in accordance with Maori custom. Williams argues:

The Judge did not cite any authority for the proposition that during the course of a short court recess the communal rights of a hapu could be suddenly transformed ~ Maori custom into private property rights often or fewer individuals. No authority could be found for such a preposterous proposition59.

Whether or not such a process of selection was in accordance with Maori custom it certainly was not in accordance with the 1873 Act. The act required Monro to include on the memorial of ownership the names of every individual member of the iwi or hapu interested in the land. In contrast, the act did not provide for any form of trusteeship or representative ownership.

The fact that the Court accepted and encouraged such a process of selection must have surely suggested to Maori that the named owners would in fact be their legitimate legal representatives. The 1873 Act did not cater for such a system of representation. Under the act Maori held all ownership rights absolutely. Whereas in the case of land immediately sold some distribution of the proceeds may have occurred, it was virtually impossible within the system created by the native land legislation for such land to be administered long term on behalf of the tribe.

57 Epakauri, Tauroa, and Orowhana Blocks, 6 March 1877, Ibid, pp. 142/143. 58 Monro, quoted in D. V. Williams,Working Copy, p. 5/6 [Wai-38]. 59 Williams, Ibid, pp. 5/6.

90 Thus while the legislature totally abandoned any attempt to establish a system of trusteeship or representative ownership for Maori limd, in practice the Court also refused to implement the policy of individualisation outlined in the 1873 act.

The failure of Monro and other judges to fully implement the act shows an anomaly between the rhetoric and practice of individualisation. In theory, individualisation entailed the Court granting individual interests in the land to all Maori owners. The act, thus strictly applied, would have countered the sort of flagrant dispossession that occurred under the ten owner system. In practice, however, the process adopted by the Court of putting as few names as possible on the memorial of ownership dispossessed many Maori of their legitimate interests in the land.

Problems with Individualisation. The question remains, however, what would have happened if Monro and other Native Land Court judges had fully implemented the 1873 Act? As will be discussed below, the principle of individualisation introduced under the 1873 Act was, in fact, completely unworkable. Even to the limited extent that it was adopted, it made the effective administration of Maori land virtually impossible.

Individualisation of ownership rights contradicted the very basis of Maori customary land tenure, where individual rights to land were always subject to those of the tribe. As the 1891 Commission argued, when establishing such a system the legislature had plenty of information before them that no such individual title existed in Maori society, and had the word of several authoritative sources condemning its application60.

The 1891 Commission further argued that it would have been relatively simple to provide a corporate system of Maori land tenure and that such a system would have been in accordance not only with Maori tribal custom but also with the direction being taken by modern European capital:

When the colony was founded the Natives were already far advanced towards corporative existence. Every tribe was a quasi-corporation. It needed only to

60 Rees Commission, pp. viii/ix.

91 reduce to law that old system of representative action practiced by the chiefs. and the very easiest and safestmodeof corporate dealing could hav~ been obtained.. So simple a plan was treated with contempt. The tribal existence. was dissolved into its component parts. The work which we have with so much care been doing amongst ourselves for centuries-namely, the binding-together of individuals in corporations- we deliberately undid in our govemment of the Maoris61.

In disregarding the communal nature of Maori land tenure, the legislature created fundamental inequities within the Native Land Court system. The practice the Court adopted, of including only a few names on the memorial of title, caused many Maori to be dispossessed of their legitimate interests in the land. On the other hand, had the Court recognised the interest of every individual member of the tribe and included each of them on the memorial of ownership then the situation would have been patently absurd: each piece of Maori land no matter how small would have been divided into potentially hundreds of individual shares.

The imposition of individual tenure onto a communal system of land ownership was completely impracticaL As will be discussed below, even to the extent that the Court did implement this principle, it created a system of land tenure so fragmented and chaotic that it rendered the administration of much Maori land virtually impossible for the next hundred years.

Title Fragmentation and Multiple Ownership. Even under the ten owner system, a block as defined by the Court might have up to ten individual undefined interests within it. Under the 1873 Act and subsequent amendments, Maori land blocks could be made up ofliterally hundreds ofthese undefined shares. Owners of such land were in an anomalous position: they had neither an adequately defined personal interest in the land, nor a corporate legal identity under which to manage the land.

The Court's succession policy made this situation even worse. The 1865 Act had used the vague formula that land should succeed according to European law "as nearly as can be reconciled with native custom", leaving its application largely up to the Court. Fenton decided that inheritance of Maori intestate should be divided equally amongst the children. This policy contrasted with Maori customary rights to land, which were based on a combination of

61 1b'd1 ,p. XVlll....

92 inheritance, occupation and Identification with a cornrnunity62. Nm was it ill line even widt British laws of succession, which had for centuries recognised the importance in a society where land was the most important asset for that land not to become fragmented63. Alan Ward asserts,

The result was that titles soon became divided into an infinite number of shares, smaller and less economic with each succeeding generation, until they were soon so over-crowded and fragmented as to put the actual land almost beyond efficient use64.

The typical situation thus created by the Native Land Court was blocks of Maori land with multiple owners, the individual interests of whom had not been defined and were frequently very small. Each of these owners might have shares in many such blocks, each of which was on their own too small to be of economic use. With each generation these interests became increasingly fragmented.

Meanwhile the Court battled to define and partition every individual interest in the land, a task which became increasingly huge as each new generation succeeded to the land. The logical extension of this policy of individualisation came in the "Native Land Court Act, 1888". This act provided that in every case where an order of ownership or of partition was made, the Court should define the respective individual interest of each owner. The Rees Commission described this act as "the climax of absurdity":

How was the Court to decide the individual interest of those who held no individual interest at all: By what principle of partition was it to be governed? ... even if all those titles were defined, they would then, under the present system, have to be located, and the Maori lands cut up, in the midst of an universal scramble, into a hundred thousand allotments of varying size, character, and location, all made at the absolute will of the Native Land Court Judges65.

The internal contradictions within this process of succession, partition and fragmentation led the Rees Commission to compare the work of the Court to the "task of Sisyphus,,66.

62 Ward, Op cit, pp. 186/187. 63 For example, T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, p. 527 ff, on primogeniture. 64 Ward, Op cit, pp. 186/187. 65 Rees Commission, p. xvii. 66 Ibid. 93 Title Fragmentation in Muriwhenua: the Stout I Ngata Commission. An examination of the Stout I Ngata Commission's findings provide some insight into the extent of title fragmentation in Muriwhenua by the early twentieth century. The commission visited the Far North in 1908 and also correlated information on Maori land ownership supplied to them by the Department of Lands and Surveys, the Native Land Court, the Tokerau Maori Land Board, the District Land Registrar and the Native Land Purchase Office. Because of major discrepancies between the returns supplied by these various Government agencies. the commission experienced some diffieulty in compiling c0!l'ect data on Maori land ownership. Nevertheless the commission's findings provide a useful picture of the state of Maori land holdings after the first forty years of Native Land Court operations67.

The Stout I Ngata Commission found that 109706 acres of land in Mangonui County remained in Maori ownership in 1908. Of this land 6904 acres had not passed through the Court, and a further 680 acres was under lease or negotiation for lease to Europeans. The Crown had vested a further 57306 acres in the Maori Land Board for administration68.

The remaining 44817 acres was Maori land that had passed through the Native Land Court and was still under Maori contro1. This 44817 acres was made up of 148 blocks of land. ranging in size from a mere three roods to 9280 acres. The average size of each block was 303 acres. In 1907 the Native Department forwarded to the Commission a list of "large blocks of Native land" in North Auckland. The Department considered only fopr blocks in Mangonui worthy of mention: Parengarenga No 5A No 3 (10264 acres) ; Parengarenga No 5B No 2 (29383 acres); Ahipara (6654 acres) and Manukau (9280)69. Of these four blocks, Ahipara had not yet passed through the Court system and the Maori Land Board controlled the two Parengarenga blocks.

The size of the blocks does not mean much, however, unless one also examines the extent of multiple ownership. The Stout I Ngata Commission produced information about the ownership of 42617 acres (140 of the 148 blocks). Twenty seven of these blocks were owned by only

Sisyphus: a character in Greek mythology who was condemned in Hades to push a boulder to the top of a hill. Each time he reached the top, the boulder would roll down and he would begin again. 67 Commissioners to Native Minister, 3 March 1908, MA 78/21b [Doc Bank]. 68 Statistics based on the schedules of land in Mangonui County, Stout/Ngata: G-IJ. pp. 42-45. 69 Under Secretary to Sir Robert Stout, 23 March 1907, MA 78/21b, Op cit.

94 one petson. The Iemaining 113 were under mttltiple oWflership. The IB:f'gest block, the 9280 acre Manukau block was owned by 733 people.

Over the whole 42617 acres of Maori land for which the Commission produced ownership information there were a total of 2748 individual interests in the land, most of them undefmecL The average number of owners per block was 20.The average size of each individual interest, ' assuming that the each block was divided into interests of equal size, was 15 1/2 acres.

Figure 10 shows the distribution of size of the individual interests in land that the Court had created. Given that most of these interests were in fact undefined, it is a somewhat artificial calculation. Nevertheless it is significant because it illustrates the logical consequences of the Court's individualisation policy on Maori land tenure. While as many as 10% of the individual interests created by the Court were smaller than one acre, only 10% were larger than thirty acres. By far the majority of individual interests (75%) were smaller than twenty acres.

Even by 1908 after only 40 years of the Court operations, most of the individual shares in Muriwhenua were thus too small to be economic. During the following years the individualisation and succession policies of the Court, combined with a quickly increasing Maori population, fragmented the land even further.

Although the Native Land Court thus undermined the existing corporate ownership of Maori land, it failed to replace it with a workable system of individualised ownership. The individual interests created by the system were not only too small to be of economic value but were largely undefined. Native Land Court records supplied to the Commission in 1907 indicate that only 1441 acres of Maori land had in fact been successfully individualised70. The rest continued to be owned by multiple individual owners, each holding their own undefined interests in the land. The task of providing for collective management of such lands has dominated Maori land law and administration from the 1890s until the present day71.

Of course, the interests defined by the Native Land Court were not always representative of what actually happened on the land. In reality, many Maori continued to operate on the basis of traditional rights, alliances and obligations and were not confined by the Court's unworkable and illogical pronouncements. The result was a chaotic system of land administration where

70 Under Secretary to Sir Robert Stout, 20 March 1907, MA 78/18 [Doc Bank]. 71 See Chapter 5. 95 Figure 10: Extent of Title Fragmentation in Muriwhenua, 1908. 0.12

§ :-~ t:.JJ 9 0.1 .!ll ::r:: 2) f.l~ ~ 0.08 ,$ >. .5 g ';;:! '''';...... 0 <:<;j '-01:) ......

r-- r-- 0.02 -

I o r-.- ~ o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Individual Share Size In Acres. ~0.;:. 9 ,l::l 1009f;· ::r:: j.l.) 'B 90% ~ 80% ~ 0~ ,....t- r- >l> 'I"J ~,.... \-; 0-; 70%

~ i "-> ~ ;---- Q; t:: ~ ".... ~~ ~ ~ $:l ;::: 50% - ...... ~ d <1:0 ~ ;::; if 40% ~ ~ ·lJ .;:::. ~ -g <1:0 ...... P.. 30% ...... - 0 ;---- >1) .~ 20-;1) ~ ...... - 0 10% ~ r----I ·8p ,D L 'S 0 I I I .l::l Q o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

II) Individual Share Size In Acres. what happened on paper bore little resemblance to what actually happened in reality. The disparity between the two, and the confusion and complexity of official Maori land ownership, created an increasing hindrance to the effective utilisation of remaining Maori land

The Cost of the Native Land Court System. Paradoxically, the process of subdivision and fragmentation which rendered Maori land increasingly uneconomic also created enormous debts. The Court's cost recovery policy taxed Maori communities heavily. For a straight forward title adjudication during the 1860s and 1870s claimants paid £4, regardless of the size of the block: £1 for the investigation, £1 for the examination, £1 for the certificate of title and £1 for the Crown grant72. These sums were significant for an already poverty stricken community, particularly in cases where the sale of the land was not imminent. Apparently the expense of Court proceedings got worse during the 1880s. In 1891 the Rees Commission argued:

Its fees and charges are greatly in excess of what they were ... Its demand for excessive daily fees is so imperious that Natives not able to pay are refused a hearing, and thus in many cases the real owners are compelled to stand by and see their land given to strangers73.

Maori paid for every step of the process: not just title adjudications but successions, partitions and appeals. In some cases such costs could be considerable. For example in May 1882 Judge Symonds subdivided the Patiki Block (2219 acres) into thirteen. Maori paid court costs of £2 for each of the thirteen subdivisions. This amounted to £26 in addition, no doubt, to the cost of subdivisional surveys74.

The fees charged were often so out of proportion to the value of the land that in 1891 the Rees Commission argued:

So heavy have the burdens become which the successive laws have placed upon the ascertainment of Native title that before the individual interests of Natives can become vested in them by order of the Court the whole value of the land is often

72 Northern Minute Book 1, p. 29. 73 Rees Commission, p. xi. 74 Patiki Subdivisions, 25 May 1882, Northern Minute Book 1, pp. 250-253.

97 Problems with Surveys. Of all the expenses involved in passing land through the Court, the one that perhaps taxed Maori most heavily was that of obtaining a survey. Under the Native Land Court system the Crown required Maori to obtain at their own expense a preliminary survey of all land passed through the Court In the case of many of the Muriwhenua Crown purchases during the 1870s, which were effectively negotiated prior to Court adjudication, the Crown agreed to fmance and undertake the surveys themselves as part of the purchase agreement. As far as all other land was concerned, Maori had to come up with the cost themselves.

What this meant was that in effect the Crown expected Muriwhenua Maori to finance the surveying of virtually all the land still in their possession in 1865. Much of this land then passed almost directly out of Maori ownership.

In contrast, Crown policy acknowledged that the cost of surveying the land was too great for the majority of European settlers to bear. For example, when the Bell Commission investigated Muriwhenua old land claims it provided that the European claimants could cover their survey costs by allowing the Crown to grant land directly to the surveyor, at no cost to the claimant76. Most Government settlement schemes during the nineteenth century provided the land for the settler already surveyed77.

During the 1860s and early 1870s the Crown was reluctant even to provide the machinery for the surveying of Maori land because of the trouble of securing payment from the owners. Most Maori land was thus surveyed by private surveyors dealing directly with the owners78. These surveyors were subject to few checks and already indebted Maori communities were exposed to much exploitation within the system. In 1867 the Inspector of Surveys, noted:

The Native land owners is already placed at a very great disadvantage in getting his

75 Rees Commission, p. xii. 76 Preliminary Report, pp. 83/84. 77 "Native Lands and Native Land Tenure". AJHR, 1907, G-1C [Stout/Ngata: G-1C], p. 15 [Doc Bank]. 78 Report of the Assistant Surveyor-General, "The Surveys of New Zealand", AJIIR, 1878, H-17, p. 3 [Doc Bank].

98 money, to some one to survey his land on .credit,- and so·often· pays double what it cost a European79.., ......

Such expenses were far beyond the resources of most Muriwhenua communities. When immediate sale was the intention, the cost of the survey could be recovered from the purchase price. If sale was not the intention, then paying survey costs caused enormous difficulties.

From 1873 onwards, the legislature provided for the cost of surveys to be advanced by the government and secured as a lien on the land. Huge costs subsequently mounted up on the land and were for the most part unrecoverable except through sale of the land80.

Nor did survey costs end with the initial process of title determination. Each time Maori brought their lands before the Court to obtain partitions, the Court required additional subdivisional surveys at great expense. In 1883 Bishop, the Resident Magistrate, noted:

The very great expense ... attached to survey fees, &c., in connection with the subdivision of the blocks, makes it almost impossible for many of the grantees to bear their share. I think it is worthy the attention of the Government as to whether it would not be well to establish some process by which owners of a block of land could obtain a subdivision without the attendant expenses eating up more than half its value81 .

As the land became increasingly fragmented and thus less revenue producing, surveys debts correspondingly built up on the land. This was demonstrated most clearly on the Aupouri peninsula, where the cost of extensive subdivisional surveys of the Parengarenga and Pakohu blocks during the 1890s amounted to over £100082. In order to recover this debt the surveyors, Mountain and Newton, obtained a charging order against the land and in 1904 the Government passed legislation to enable the blocks to be vested in the Maori Land Council for failure to discharge survey liens. In one fell swoop, Maori thus lost control of over half the remaining Maori land in Muriwhenua83.

79 Me Reale, "Report on Surveys under the Native Lands Act", AJHR, 1867. A-lOB, p. 5 [Doc Bank]. 80 "Surveys of New Zealand" 1879, R-19, p. 7 [Doc Bank] ; Surveyor General, "Surveys of New Zealand", AJHR, 1882, C-3, p. 3 [Doc Bank]. 81 Bishop Report, 5 June 1883, AJHR, 1883, G-la, No 2, p. 2 CPR Doc, Vol 1: BI3]. 82 Mountain and Newton to Native Owners, Pakohu Block: Attached Schedule, 7 May 1900, LS­ A/I108/1599 [Doc Bank].

99 The Effect of the Court on Alienation. The issue of debt raises the question of whether the Court system facilitated the alienation of further Muri whenua land to Crown and settlers. Historians such as Keith Sorrenson and Angela Ballara who have studied the Native Land Court system have tended to focus on its role in leading to the large scale alienation of Maori land. In this process they see debt as of central importance. For the fIrst time under the 1865 Act, Maori land could become a security for debt. Local storekeepers and publicans colluded in enticing Maori into debt in order to gain a hold on the land. Indebted Maori then passed the land through the Court system and into the hands of prospective buyers. After 1871 Government purchase agents joined in this process of involuntary alienation84.

Once a block was before the Court, all legitimate claimants were forced to participate in the process if they wished to retain their interest in the land. In addition to the expense of lawyers, court fees and survey fees, they had to face the cost of living in town for months at a time while the case was heard These expenses often led to further land sales85. Ward asserts,

The Maori people were consequently exposed to a thirty-year period during which a predatory horde of storekeeper, grog-sellers, surveyors, lawyers, land agents and money-lenders made advances to rival groups of Maori claimants to land, pressed the claim of their faction in the Courts and recouped the costs in land 86.

These historians argue, convincingly, that the Native Land Court system was designed to facilitate the alienation of Maori land to European settlers. As Angela Ballara argues, many legislators held a totally cynical attitude to Maori land alienation and were fully aware that they were building into the system inequities that would result in excessive land loss87.

Some judges of the Native Land Court regarded any transfer of land from Maori to Pakeha as in itself beneficial. When White reported the sale of 56678 acres of land to Yates in 1873, a

83 "The Maori Land Claims Adjustment and Laws Amendment Act", NZS, 1904, No 49, p. 264 [Doc Bank] ; Ibid, p. 270. 84 A. Ballara,"The Pursuit of Mana?", IPS, Vol 91, No 4, Dec 1982, P 532 ; Sorrenson, Op cit, p. 186 ; Ibid, p. 190. 8S Ibid, pp. 186/187. 86 Ward, Op cit, pp. 185/186. 87 Ballara, Op cit, pp. 534-536.

100 purchase he had helped to facilitate, he argued, "by the present course of allowing the Natives to sell, the Government, without trouble or expense, derive a:-revenue-both-directly by fees and -_. indirectly by the beneficial occupation of the land by Europeans .. 88. White also applauded the positive effects of land sales for the rather unconvincing reason that the money from sales enabled Maori to live better89.

Judge Monro shared these views. He argued:

I have always looked upon the wide extent of the uncultivated holdings of the Maori as a curse to them rather than a blessing; and I maintain that every legitimate encouragement should be held out to them to part with their surplus lands to those who can make the use of them for which they were intended, care being taken that each Native has ample land secured for his own maintenance90.

Nonetheless, the arguments used by historians to analyse the effect of the Native Land Court elsewhere in the country cannot be applied to Muriwhenua without some qualification. Many of the factors which historians such as Sorrenson have attributed to the operations of the Native Land Court - debt, major land alienation and major depopulation - already existed in Muriwhenua prior to 1865. The "inflationary spiral of trading, debt-incurrence, land-alienation, further purchasing, further debts and further land sales or leases" described by Ballara existed in Muriwhenua independent of the Native Land Court. In the Far North much of the most economically significant alienation of Maori land took place in the pre-1865 period.

Having made this qualification, it is nonetheless true that the Native Land Court in Muriwhenua did, as already argued, contribute significantly to the problem of Maori debt While it is always difficult to prove a direct relationship between such debt and the sale of land, contemporary observers admitted that such a relationship existed. In 1878 the Assistant Surveyor General, speaking of Maori lands in general, noted that overdue payments on surveys were not likely to be recovered until the land was sold91 . Ten years earlier White wrote to Fenton:

Many of the grants issued have been avowedly obtained to enable the owners to sell

88 White Report, 22 April 1873, AJHR, 1873, G-l, No 2, p. 1 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B4]. 89 Ibid. 90 Quoted in Williams. Op cit, p. 6. 91 Report of the Assistant Surveyor-General, "The Surveys of New Zealand", Op cit, p. 3.

101 to Emopeans ... the expenses deter the Natives from coming befOie the Comt, unless they have previously agreed to sell the land92.

The Court and Private Purchase. Perhaps the major effect of the Native Land Court system with regard to land sales was that it opened up the purchase of Maori land to private individuals. Under the 1865 Act the Crown abandoned its preemptive right and exposed Maori land to the forces of the "free market". This meant that the storekeepers, gum buyers and publicans to whom Maori became indebted were able to directly recoup their costs in land. A direct relationship thus developed between exploitation of Maori on the gum fields and further land loss. In the Muriwhenua North report Rigby describes how, within six months of the formal granting of title to the 56678 Muriwhenua block, it was sold to Yates. It is hardly coincidental that Yates who eventually controlled 137000 acres of Maori land, either as owner or lessee was also the local gum buyer and storekeeper93. Certainly the Court minute books during the 1860s and 1870s indicate that many blocks were put through the Court simply to legitimate pre-negotiated sales, both to Crown and settlers94.

Because the Crown took no responsibility for regulating private purchase, it is difficult to locate comprehensive information about exactly what land was sold, under what conditions and to whom. One can get some idea of the extent of private sales from looking at the extent of alienation. In 1865, despite old land claims and Crown purchases, Maori still owned over 350000 acres of land in Mangonui County. By 1908 only 109706 acres remained in Maori hands. While Crown purchases account for roughly 75843 of the remaining alienations, much of the rest can presumably be accounted for by private purchase.

Alienations after 1865 thus reduced Muriwhenua land holdings by a further 70%. While most of the best quality land was alienated prior to 1865, private purchases after 1865 account for huge losses in quantative terms95.

92 White to Fenton, 5 July 1867, No 5, "Report on the Working of "The Native Lands Act, 1865"", Op cit, p. 10. 93 B. Rigby, "The Muriwhenua North Area and the Muriwhenua Claim" (Muriwhenua North ReportJ, pp. 37-41 (Wai 45] ; Ibid, p. 43. 94 For example, Paripari Block, 28 December 1865, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 5 ; Omaia Block, August 31 1866, Ibid., p. 14. 95 "Return of the Native Lands in the North Island Suitable for Settlement", March 1907, MA 78/21b 102 Individualisation and Alienation. If the onset of private purchase under the Native Land Court system hastened the alienation of Maori land, so to did the onset of individual or private sales by Maori. As Kawharu argues, Court-determined title ignored "one of the most crucial factors in the Maori system of land ownership: ultimate control over the disposal of the tribal estate being vested in the tribal elders"96. The Court system enabled Crown and private purchasers to deal with land-selling individuals rather than collectively with a tribal authority. The system destroyed existing community controls:

The crowd of owners in a memorial ... became suddenly possessed of a title to land which was a marketable commodity. The right to occupy and cultivate possessed by their fathers became in their hands an estate which could be sold. The strength which lies in union was taken from them. The authority of their natural leaders was destroyed97.

Under the Native Land Court system, land sales took on a whole new character. Prior to 1865 the Government and settlers generally dealt with tribal elders, as the only possessors of sufficient authority to alienate Maori land98. These transactions were not private sales of land, made for individual benefit but social transactions designed to further the community's needs as a whole. They were political decisions, made by community leaders on behalf of and for the benefit of the community, and based on the anticipation of range of social benefits that might accrue from closer contact with European settlers. As already discussed, Crown purchases during the 1870s, which were primarily negotiated prior to adjudication by the Court, shared these features99.

In comparison, after 1865 Maori could sell their individually defined interests in the land for personal benefit with out regard to the needs of the community as a whole. Crown purchase correspondence files during the late nineteenth century show that many individuals wrote to the Crown offering land. For example, during the 1890s Meinata te Rara wrote to the Government several times offering to sell the Kaitaia block. Te Rara was apparently unaware that the Maori

[Doc Bank]. 96 Kawharu, Op cit, p. 82. 97 Rees Commission, p. x. 98 Kawharu, Op cit, p. 74. 99 See Chapter 2.

103 · grantees had already sold the land to the Crown tOO. In January 1893 Te H

I now write to you a second time about the land which has been already laid before you. My mind is fully made up that it should be sold. There need be no survey made - it has already been surveyed, + contains (1)5,220 [5,220.0] acres. Let no survey be made. My proposal is that you + I should talk together secretly. This tribe has no knowledge of the fact that this is still Native land - they say that it has passed into the possession of the Government. It was the Spirit of the Night which disclosed the matter to me, + that is why I am strong in writing to you. My fixed idea is that you + I should talk together personally - mouth to mouth. There are many other lands in a similar position ... if the land is put through the Court, all the people will go into it - however, if I pass it through another channel of the law, it will be wholly mine; under ancestral title, it will be wholly mine101.

The individualisation of Maori land under the Native Land Court system thus changed the whole tenor of land sales, and in doing so probably hastened the further alienation of Maori land.

The Court's Protective Function. The question remains, to what extent did the Native Land Court protect Muriwhenua Maori from the excessive alienation of their lands? Did the Court fulfill the Crown's obligation to ensure that Maori maintained "a sufficient endowment for ... [their] ... foreseeable needs .. 102.

As argued in the last chapter, most Crown policy makers and officials recognised at least in theory that it would be expedient to leave Maori with some land for their present and future use. During the 1850s and 1860s Crown purchase agents implemented this principle through a policy of reserving land from their purchases for the Maori vendors.

In 1865 the responsibility for fulfilling the Crown's obligations with regard to reserves devolved to the Native Land Court. The evidence suggests that after 1865, Crown purchase agents in Muriwhenua ceased to acknowledge any responsibility to ensure that reserves were

100 Meinata te Hara, 23 February 1893, MA(MLP 1/32 93/49 [Doc Bank] ; Native Land Purchases, July 13 1893, Ibid. 101Meinata te Hara (translation), 11 January 1893, MA(MLP 1/3293/50 [Doc Bank]. 102 Treaty principle as stated in Ngai Tahu Report, pp. 238/239.

104 made. With the exception of a couple of wahi tapu, the Crown made no reserves from its purchases during the 1870s.

In addition, the private purchasers whose activities were legalised under the Native Lands Acts did not take the needs of vendors into account, nor were they obliged to under any legislative enactment. The Court therefore remained as the only potential protector of Maori interests.

The responsibility for ensuring that Maori were left with sufficient reserves was thus left in the hands of the Native Land Court and was built into Native land legislation. The 1865 Act merely provided the judge with the option of recommending that blocks be placed under restriction from alienation 103. The next year, however, an amendment act made it actually incumbent on the judge to take note of the needs of claimants and to restrict alienation where necessary104. Section 20 of the 1867 Act placed on the Court a duty in every case ...

. . .to inquire and take evidence as to the propriety or otherwise of placing any restriction on the alienability of the land comprised in the claim or of any part thereof or of attaching any condition or limitation to the estate to be granted 105.

The 1873 Act expressed this function of the Court in even stronger terms. The preamble to the act stated the desirability ...

. . . of assuring to the Natives without any doubt whatever a sufficiency of their land for their support and maintenance, as also for the purpose of establishing endowments for their permanent general benefit from ol!t of such land 106.

The act appointed district officers, one of whose duties was to reserve "a sufficient quantity of land in as many blocks as he shall deem necessary for the benefit of the Natives of the district". While not placing any upper limit on the size of such reserves, the act specified that they were to be no less than 50 acres for every man, woman and child 107. Under the 1873 Act the Court thus clearly had a duty to protect Maori from the excessive alienation of their lands.

103 Section 28, "The Native Lands Act, 1865", p. 267. 104 Ward, Op cit, p. 214. 105 Section 20, "The Native Lands Act, 1867", pp.476/477. 106 Preamble, "The Native Land Act, 1873", p. 238. 107 Rees Commission, p. ix.

105 While this was all very well in theory, in reality there was a great deal of resistance to the Court fulfilling such a protective role. Chief Judge Fenton, for example, believed the Crown had no role to play in protecting Maori from alienation. He argued that it was not "the duty of the Legislature to make people careful of their property by Act of Parliament, so long as their profligacy injures no one but themselves" 108.

As argued in Chapter two, government officials both inside and outside the Court system in fact regarded it as inappropriate for the Native Land Court to interfere in any way with Crown purchase activities. Neither Crown purchase agents nor Native Land Court judges in Muriwhenua believed that the Court should fulfill a protective role with regard to such purchases. The Court completely failed to question the fairness of the Crown's purchase activities or the sufficiency of its reserve provisions.

Nor, for that matter, is there any indication that the Court fulfilled such a protective role in relation to other Muriwhenua land. Court minutes show that, although prepared to grant reserve provisions when specifically requested by the claimants, the Court made no attempt to ascertain for itself the sufficiency of reserved lands or to instigate reserve procedures.

The lack of protection the Court offered to Muriwhenua Maori in this respect can best be judged by the Court's failure either to protect existing Muriwhenua reserves, or to create new reserves for the use and maintenance of Muriwhenua Maori.

The Court's Treatment of Pre-Existing Reserves. The Crown created several reserves in Muriwhenua prior to 1865 as a result of Old Land Claims Commissions and early Crown purchases. According to Rigby I Koning, the Crown granted three reserves to Maori from land examined by Crown Land Claims Commissions: Waimanoni or Rangaunu from Maxwell and Southee's claim (185 acres); Okokori or Doubtless Bay from Joseph Matthews' Parapara claim (340 acres); and Pukepoto near Kaitaia from Puckey's claim (246 acres) 109. In addition, Maori claimed that the Crown had reserved to them a 132 acres block called Matarau out of Ford's Okiore claim 110.

108 Fenlon, "Report on the Working of "The Native Lands Act, 1865"", Op cit, p. 4. 109 Preliminary Report, pp. 93-96. 110 Matarau, 15 March 1867, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 29.

106 The Crown also reserved land for the use of the Maori vendors from its pre-1865 purchases. The Department ofS-urvey-and L-and--Infonnation list eighteen suclt-reserves:Waikiekie-­ (Panakareao's Town Reserve in Mangonui), Pakautararua, Hikurangi, Te Awapuku, Mangatete, Peria, Mangataiore, Takeke, Taemaro, Waiaua, Te Ahua, Kaiaka North and South, Motukahakaha, Waimahana, Te Kuihi, Ikatiritiri andWaipuna. In addition to these, Rigby I Koning mention two quarter acre launching reserves at Oruru (possibly the same as Ikatiritiri I Waipuna) a reserve at Houhora and a 79 acre reserve at Otengi 111 [Figure 11].

These reserves were the only land that Maori retained from much of the most fertile land in Muriwhenua, alienated to Crown and settlers prior to 1865. Crown policies fonnulated during the 1850s designed such reserves to be inalienable and to cater entirely for the needs of the vendors and their descendentsl12.

Nonetheless, the Crown never defined the exact status of such reserves. Donald McLean apparently believed that they should be administered by local boards made up of both Maori and Pakeha 113. The Crown failed to create any such mechanism for administering Muriwhenua reserves. Nor is there any evidence that any Muriwhenua land was ever administered under "the Native Reserves Act, 1856" or some other form of trusteeship. The reserves appear to have simply reverted to ordinary customary title.

By 1865 many reserves had disappeared from the official record. An 1862 return of Native reserves included, of those outlined by DOSLI and Rigby / Koning, only Houhora, Waimanoni, Okokori, Hikurangi, Motukahakaha, Otengi, and the two Oruru launching reserves. The return also included three reserves not listed by DOSLI: Whangatuatia and Pakaka at Ahipara and a reserve at Kohumaru 114. The Crown claimed to have already taken possession of Panakareao's Mangonui reserve. The remaining fourteen reserves had simply disappeared off the record 115.

111 DOSLI Sheet 004, "Pre 1865 Land Claim and Crown Purchase Boundaries" ; Preliminary Report, p. 135. 112 McLean to Col Sec, 29 July 1854, quoted in Ibid, p. 128. 113 Ibid. 114 "Return of Native Reserves made in the cession of Native Territory to the Crown", AJHR, 1862, E-IO, p. 4. [pR Doc, Vol II: 3] ; Ibid, p.28. 115 Ibid, p. 4 ; Ibid, p. 28.

107 In 1865 the fate of all remaining reserves, regardless of whether or not the Crown still acknowledged their existence, was the same. Under the Native Land Court system they were subject to exactly the same process of adjudication as all other Maori land. During the period 1865-1870, claimants brought many of these blocks before White. Court minutes show that the Judge did not single them out for special attention nor even acknowledge their special status.

In some cases the claimants drew the Court's attention to the special status of these lands and requested that they be rendered inalienable. The Court made Waimanoni, Hauturu (Mangatete) Mangataiore and Te Ahua inalienable at the request of claimantsl16.

In at least four cases the Court granted unrestricted title to previously reserved lands. In December 1865, Peni te Pai brought the 1130 acre Peria block before the Court and it passed unrestricted to nine named owners. The claimant mentioned that there was a reserve on the land called "Tanaiti Koko", but the Court did not include any reserve provisions in the titlel17.

In January 1866 the Court granted unrestricted title to the Takeke block. Although the claimants did not specifically request a reserve, they did state at the hearing that the land had been previously reserved out of the Maungataniwha block. The Court failed to acknowledge this in the title 118.

In February 1868 the Court issued unrestricted title to the 500 acre Hikurangi block. The claimants stated that ~ey wished to sell the block. The Court ignored the fact that the Crown and Maori vendors had set this land aside as a reserve in an 1861 purchase agreementl19.

Finally, in October 1869 the Court granted unrestricted title to Pakautararua in two blocks. Claimants told the Court that they wished to sell a 22 acre portion of the block. The Court did not acknowledge that this land had previously been reserved 120.

116 Waimanoni, 15 March 1867, Ibid, p. 31 ; Hauturu, 15 March 1867, Ibid, P 32 ; Mangataiore, 15 March 1867, Ibid, p. 33 ; Te Ahua, 21 July 1868, Ibid, P 40. 117 Peria, 19 December 1865, Ibid, p. 3. 118 Takeke, 30 December 1865, Ibid, pp. 7/8. 119 Hikurangi, 21 July 18681bid, pp. 36/37. 120 Pakautararua, 19 October 1869, Ibid, pp. 49/50.

108 Tokarau

(Doubtless B [£ y )

&:,;.~ ;:: ;;;; ...... '. o ~ ID P(lraparn Str :::t. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~..... 00 ~

Koltala •

Perio

Skm '·3m1' -- .. Pule.pot" Betyveen 1865 and 1870 the Court thus failed to protect the status of existing Muriwhenua reserves. Nor did the Native Land Court reserve sufficient land from Crown and private purchases after 1865.

During his first two years as a Native Land Court judge (1865 and 1866) White did not issue restricted title to a single block of Muriwhenua land. In 1867 White issued restrictions to five blocks: Paekotare, Hauturu, Mangataiore, Waimanoni and Matarau. Only one of these, the tiny Paekotare block (8 acres) was not a pre-1865 reserve. In 1868 White issued restrictions to three more blocks: Te Ahua, Te Hororoa and Kon0ti. Of these, Te Ahua and Te Hororoa (Kaiaka North) were pre-existing reserves and Konoti was only restricted pending subdivision under the tenns of the 1867 Act. It was not made inalienablel21.

During his four years as Native Land Court judge White thus made only seven blocks of Muriwhenua land inalienable: 1538 acres of the more than 25000 acres that came before him. Only eight acres of this was not part of pre-existing reserves, which should have already been inalienablel22. In effect White thus reserved virtually no new land for Muriwhenua Maori.

Maning who followed was no better. During 1870 Maning restricted four blocks from alienation: Te Neke, Te Wairoa, Okahu and Kaitaia (South). Of these, Te Neke was a pre­ existing reserve. Maning made Okahu and Kaitaia inalienable for only 21 years. The insufficiency of such an arrangement is indicated by the fate of the Kaitaia block. The Crown purchased the Northern portion of the block in 1872 and almost immediately began to agitate for the purchase of the Southern portion. They approached Judge Maning who stated that the restriction was put at the instance of the owners because of supposed existence of gold. Maning had no objection at all to the removal of the restriction. He explained,

... as I have reason to believe that valuable minerals have actually been discovered not far from the block of land in question and seeing that the probable ultimate effect of the restriction would be to enable the Government to acquire the land in preference to any private speculator, a thing, which, supposing the land did turn out to be a gold field, I considered would be for the public interest, I acceded to the request of the Native owners without remark ... As to the removal of the

121 Ibid, pp. 1-51 ; "Report from the Commissioner of Native Reserves", AJHR, 1871, F-4, Grants with Limitations, p. 21 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 17]. 122 Ibid.

1 10 restriction on sale there can be no objection, supposing the Government to be the purchaser, the· Native owners of the KaitaiaBlockhaving still much more· land than· ... is necessary to them for their comfortable maintenance and more indeed than they are ever likely to make a profitable use of except in the way of leasing to European settlers and I have therefore no hesitation in recommending under the consideration I have stated, that the restrictions on the sale of the Southern portion of the Kaitaia Block be removedl23.

In the event the process of removing the restriction proved to be more complicated than expected so Crown purchase agents bided their time. The Crown purchased the block in 1891 and 1892, as soon as the 21 year stay on alienation had been removed.

Altogether between 1865 and 1870 the Crown thus restricted from alienation eleven blocks of Muriwhenua land (13131/ 1/ 10). If one excludes the Okahu and Kaitaia blocks, the acreage of these reserves came to only 2105/1/ 10. Not counting pre-existing reserves, the Crown made only 50/0/8 acres of Muriwhenua land inalienable between 1865 and 1870124.

The Creation of Reserves after 1870. In 1870 the Crown appointed Major Charles Heaphy to the position of Commissioner of Native Reserves. Although Heaphy played an important role in identifying existing Muriwhenua reserves, and thus no doubt protecting them from subsequent alienation, he did not play an active role in the creation of new reserves for Muriwhenua Maori.

In his first report Heaphy attempted to collect and collate available information about Native reserves. In Muriwhenua he identified two types of reserves in existence. The first, Class C.1 (grants with limitations) were those blocks discussed above, that had been restricted from alienation through the Native land Court system125.

In addition to these, Heaphy identified a second class of reserved lands in Muriwhenua: pre­ existing reserves that had not yet passed through the Court. Heaphy listed eleven such reserves in Muriwhenua, a total of 1194 acres: Paewhenua Island, East side; Hostelry Reserve; Part of

123 Maning to Fenton, 23 October 1872, MA/MLP 1/32 92/152 [Doc Bank]. 124 "Report from the Commissioner of Native Reserves". Op cit, p. 21. 125 Ibid, p. 3.

1 1 1 Kohumaru No 49; Walroa (Ahlpara); Walaua (Doubtless Bay); Otengl; Pukepoto, PuhlPl'S Village; Taimaro; Horahora River Reserve; and the two launching reserves at Oruru 126, Many of these, he admitted "had been entirely lost sight of until search was made for the purpose of compiling the attached schedules" 127,

Heaphy also collated information about pre-existing reserves that had been subsequently granted without restriction or otherwise disposed of, These amounted to 1864/3/0 acres of Muriwhenua land: Whangatuatia (Ahipara); Peria; Takeke, Kaiaka; and Panakareao's Mangonui Reserve 128,

Theoretically, Heaphy was also responsible for recommending to the Government land that should be rendered inalienable through the operation of the Native Land Court129. Heaphy did make one important statement in relation to the alienation of Muriwhenua land. In his opening report he concluded that the "Rarawa" of Mangonui had "sold recklessly and are in danger of becoming paupers", He recommended that "none of the cultivations of the Rarawa . , . should be allowed to be sold" 130. Beyond this general statement, which the Crown patently ignored, there is no evidence that Heaphy provided the Court with specific recommendations for reservation of Muriwhenua lands. If he did provide the Court with such information, it was certainly ignored.

The responsibility for ensuring adequate reserves remained entirely in the hands of the Native Land Court. After 1873, however, the Court was as negligent with regard to creation of reserves as it had been previously, As previously discussed, under the 1873 the Crown appointed district officers, one of whose duties was to reserve a sufficient quantity of land, but no less than 50 acres for every man, woman and child, for the benefit of Maori of the district 131. There is no evidence that the district officers for Muriwhenua fulfilled such a function.

126 Ibid, p. 40. 127 Ibid, p.3. 128 Ibid, p. 43. 129 "Papers relating to Major Heaphy's Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves; and, Reports from the Commissioner of Native Reserves", AJIlR 1870, D-16, p. 3, [pR Doc, Vol 2: 16]. 130 "Report from the Commissioner of Native Reserves", Op cit, p. 5. 131 Rees Commission, p. ix.

1 12 Between 1875-1878 Judge Monro did not place restrictions on a single block of Muriwhenua land. Between 1870 and 1886 the Court restricted alienation on six blOCks: Oparihi (4/3/0); Aputarewa No 1 (702 acres); Mangaiti No 1 (52 acres); Mangaiti No 2 (16/3/20); Mangaiti No 3 (9/2/12) ; and Pupuke West (1000 acres)132.

The evidence thus indicates that in practice the Native Land Court did not actively ensure that Maori were left with sufficient land for their maintenance. Most Pakeha officials, both inside and outside the Court room, acknowledged at least in theory the principle that Maori should not be left completely destitute. Even Monro qualified his support of land alienation with the proviso that care should be taken "that each Native has ample land secured for his own maintenance,,133. In practice, however, the Court was not prepared to place limits on the alienation of Muriwhenua land. The amount of land reserved to Muriwhenua Maori during the late nineteenth century was so small as to be almost insignificant. It was insufficient for subsistence and was certainly not based on the concept of equal economic participation with Europeans.

The creation of inalienable reserves was certainly not an ideal solution to the problem of Maori land alienation. As already discussed, reserves sought to segregate Maori from Pakeha. In addition such reserves, in removing the right of Maori owners to sell their land, could be described as paternalistic.

Within the system of land alienation set up by the Crown, however, such inalienable reserves were the only ongoing provision made for Muriwhenua Maori. The Crown was unwilling to uphold any form of joint occupany arrangement and, most importantly, the socia-economic and political forces in favour of land alienation were so strong as to necessitate some form of external protection. As Stout / Ngata noted in 1907,

...the experience of half a century shows - (1) that in the absence of competition produced by restrictive legislation, and in the face of encumbrances due to litigation and survey costs, circumstances are created which practically compel the Maori people to sell at any price; (2) that the individualisation of titles to the extent of ascertaining and defining the share of each individual owner in a tribal block owned

132 "Return of Land Possessed by Maoris, North Island", AJHR, 1886, G-15, p. 14 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 72] ; Ibid, p. 21. 133 Quoted in Williams, Op cit, p. 6.

113 try a large number... practically renders impossible eoneerted aetion on the part of a tribe or hapu in the consideration of the fairness or otherwise of the price offered, or in the consideration of the advisability of parting at all with the tribal lands 134.

Under the economic and political system set up by the Crown, such inalienable reserves were thus the only provisioh made for the needs of Muriwhenua Maori and their descendants. As such the Crown's failure to provide adequate reserves is of great significance.

Conclusion. The above evidence indicates that during the late nineteenth century the Native Land Court failed on every count to protect the rights of Maori claimants to Muriwhenua land. The Court's process of title determination was inadequate to ensure that all legitimate claimants were represented on the certificate of title or memorial of ownership. Nor were Maori adequately represented or consulted within the Native Land Court process itself.

Although the Court's policy of individualisation destroyed existing corporate ownership of Maori land, the Court failed to replace it with a workable system of individual land tenure. Instead, the system led to the fragmentation of remaining Maori land holdings beyond the point of economic use, and the creation of multiple undefined individual interests in the land. The system also created massive debts.

In addition Court-induced debt, the onset of private purchases, and the individualisation of Maori land ownership all hastened the whole sale alienation of Maori land to Crown and settlers after 1865. Despite this, the Court failed to make adequate reserve provisions for the use of Maori owners and their descendants.

This chapter has dealt almost entirely with the effect of the Native Land Court system on land ownership and use. It should be remembered, however, that the European ethic of individualisation was a moral and cultural imperative which had little to do with the rationale of economics. As the Rees Commission suggested, even European economics had in fact been moving for a long time in the direction of corporatisation 135.

134 Stout!Ngata: G-IC. p. 8. 135 Rees Commission, p. xviii.

1 14 Individualisation attacked Maori culture at its roots: it undermined the social, political and economic structure of Maori s

115 CHAPTER 4. THE RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S SYSTEM AND THE NATIVE SCHOOLS SYSTEM.

Introduction. This chapter examines the more general provisions made for Maori health, education and welfare in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It analyses the impact of the Crown's assirnilationist policies on Muriwhenua Maori.

During the mid-nineteenth century, the main agent of European law and administration in Muriwhenua was the Resident Magistrate. 10e chapter opens with a discussion of the Resident Magistrate's System in Mangonui and examines their response to the welfare needs of Muriwhenua Maori. Although I discuss the impact of the Resident Magistrates in their own right, I also use the system as focus to examine the more general provisions the Crown made for Maori welfare in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century.

The other principal representative of the Crown in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the Native Schools teacher. I conclude the chapter with an examination of the Native Schools System in Muriwhenua. I discuss its adequacy, both in terms of access to education, and in terms of the intent and effect of the type of education provided.

The Resident Magistrates System, 1865-1893 (Introduction). The Resident Magistrate for Mangonui, the permanent representative of the Native Department, was the main agent of European law and administration in the Muriwhenua area from 1846- 1893. The 1846 Resident Magistrates' Courts Ordinance and subsequent legislation provided for a separate system of local administration and justice for predominantly Maori areas. Under this legislation, the Resident Magistrates had complete jurisdiction in all cases between Maori and Pakeha. In cases involving Maori only he could consult with two Maori Assessors 1. Through this system, the Native and Justice Departments administered Muriwhenua for much of the nineteenth centhry.

1 A. Ward, A Show of Justice., p. 74.

116 In total, three Resident Magistrates sat in Mangonui: William Bertram White (1848-1878), George Kelly (1878-1882), and H. W. Bishop (1883-1893). These men served as the principal mediators between the Maori world and the transplanted system of European law and administration. On the one hand, they interpreted and applied European laws and policies with regard to local conditions. On the other, they kept Auckland and Wellington based policy makers informed on a broad spectrum of health, welfare, education and justice issues as they related to Muriwhenua.

The Resident Magistrates provided the Government with much of its information and insight into local conditions and problems faced by Maori. They thus could have played an important role in protecting and promoting Maori welfare, both as advisors and as administrators in their own right. In Mangonui, however, an examination of their reports to the Native Department,

1868-1893, indicates that the Resident Magistrates cri~icised Maori culture and society, and sought wherever possible to encourage assimilation into the purportedly superior European culture. This ethnocentric outlook prevented them from effectively representing Maori interests. In so far as they did recognise problems faced by Maori in Muriwhenua, they failed to identify either the causes or the possible solutions. In particular they failed to identify any constructive role for the Crown or Crown agents in dealing with these problems.

Attitudes to Gum Digging. One example of this failure to address the problems faced by Muriwhenua Maori in a constructive manner is the Resident Magistrates' attitude to gum digging. In their reports, they frequently bemoaned Maori dependence on gum and argued that it led to bad living conditions, disease and malnutrition2. Although they thus acknowledged that Maori dependence on gum resulted in widespread economic distress, they failed to highlight the role European gum traders played in this process.

I found only one reference to the role of European traders in the gum economy. In 1873 White reported that around Parengarenga other traders had started in opposition to Samuel Yates. White argued that because of this competition, Maori were impoverished and in debt "far

2 For example, White Report, 21 June 1872, AIHR, 1872, F-3, No I, p. 3 [preliminary Report Supporting Documents [PR Doc], Vol I: B3] ; Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, AlHR, 1885, G-2, No 3, p. 3 [pR Doc, Vol I: BI5].

117 beyond their means,,3. While thus acknowledging the problem of trader-induced debt, White. defended Yates, describing him as .. ' .

. . . very much liked by both Natives and Europeans of this district. He is most kind and gentle with the Natives, and has their confidence4.

Although Yates, by virtue of his marriage into Te Aupouri society, may well have enjoyed the confidence of many local Maori, this does not change the fact that his basic relationship with them was that of a creditor. White's defense of Yates at the expense of other traders was therefore misleading. It was clearly influenced by the state of White's personal relationship with Yates and did not accurately describe the nature of debtor I creditor relations in the

Parengarenga area. Nonetheless, it was the o~ly reference that, in twenty five years of published reports, the Resident Magistrates made to the problem of debt.

Nor did the Resident Magistrates identify the causes of Maori dependence on gum. While quick to brand it a social evil, they did not attempt to examine the factors that forced Maori into gum digging. Bishop asserted that gum digging led Maori to neglect their cultivations but did not understand that the opposite was also true: that factors such the erosion of the land base and the lack of markets for produce left Maori few economic alternatives to gum diggingS.

Where there are no causes, there are generally no solutions. Because White and Bishop failed to identify the socio-economic causes of Maori involvement in gum digging, they also failed to suggest positive solutions to the problem. They saw gum digging as yet another unsatisfactory aspect of the Maori way of life that they already denigrated. This attitude exonerated the Government from any responsibility to deal with the problem.

George Kelly's analysis of the position of gum in the Muriwhenua economy differed in one important respect. In his reports to the Native Department from 1878 and 1882, Kelly argued that the lack of roads to get their produce to market had been a major factor in causing Muriwhenua Maori to abandon their cultivations. Kelly suggested this was one of the reasons for Maori dependence on gum. Kelly identified a role for the Government in improving the situation, saying, "I trust the road works now about to be commenced by the Public Works

3 White Report, 22 April 1873, AJHR, 1873, G-l, No 2, p. 1 [pR Doc, Vol I: B4J. 4 Ibid. 5 Bishop Report, 29 May 1888, AJHR, 1888, G-5, No 2, p. 1 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B17J.

118 Department in this district will have the effect of bringing about a more wholesome state of affairs" 6.

Kelly also believed that the lack of roads had a direct effect on the gum industry. Talking alxmt the Omahuta field in North Hokianga he pointed out that the difficulties Maori experienced in getting their gum to seaport "rob the industry of its lucrative advantages .. 7. Kelly thus understood both that the lack of economic infrastructure in Muriwhenua was a significant cause of economic impoverishment, and that the Crown could playa role in remedying this situation.

Regulation of the Kauri Gum Industry_ Kelly's insight was not shared by the other two Resident Magistrates. Nor was it shared by other Government officials. During the nineteenth century, the Crown failed to address any of the problems surrounding Maori participation in the kauri gum industry.

During the 1890s, two major Crown commissions dealt with conditions on the gum fields of North Auckland. Although both these commissions travelled throughout North Auckland and examined numerous witnesses including diggers, traders, and Auckland gum merchants, both took practically no Maori testimony and barely mentioned Maori diggers in their reports.

Although many European diggers testified to the exploitative relationship existing between diggers and gum traders, neither commission recommended that the Crown regulate this relationshipS. The 1893 Commission acknowledged that diggers of private land were practically bound to the owner or lessee of the land but argued that, although this opened up the possibility of store owners taking advantage of the diggers, this did not happen often. If conditions were too bad, the commission argued, the diggers would simply move elsewhere. The commission argued that accusations of the "truck-system" - the payment of wages in stores or provisions - were irrelevant given that diggers didn't actually work for wages, and that such accusations were generally based on personal, commercial or political antipathy. Relations

6 Kelly Report, 9 May 1879, AIHR, 1879, G-l, No 2, p. 1 [PR Doc, Vol 1: B9] ; Kelly Report, 6 May 1880, AlHR, 1880, G-4, No 2, p. 1 [PR Doc, Vol 1: BlO]. 7 Kelly Report, 19 May 1882, A1HR 1882, G-l, No 2, p. 1 CPR Doc, Vol I: BI2J. 8 Report of the Kauri-gum Industry Inquiry Commission, A1HR, 1893, H-24 [Kauri-Gum Commission: 1893J, [Doc Bank] ; .Report and Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Kauri-Gum Industry, AlIIR,1898 H-12 {Kauri-Gum Commission: 1898], [Doc BankJ.

119 between the diggers and storekeepers, the commission argued, were friendly and satisfactory9.

The 1898 Commission similarly acknowledged that in cases where the condition to work the land was based on the exchange of gum for stores the digger "must trust entirely to the honesty of the storekeeper". In some cases, the commission argued, the digger might be at a considerable disadvantage from not being paid in cash. The commission felt, however, that it would be detrimental to both the digger and the industry to interfere with the advance of food supplies:

If the digger considers that too much is being exacted from him in the way of unlimited tribute on his gum and provisions, his only remedy is to move further on, either on to the lands of the Crown or those of some other proprietorlO.

Both commissions were primarily concerned with producing some kind of revenue from the gum industry in order to compensate for its destructive effect on the landscape and on the state of the roads. The 1893 commission identified Maori diggers as being largely responsible for this problem and used this as an excuse to promote rating of Maori land:

In the Maori parts of the district, the surface of the ground which is supposed to indicate a line of road is reduced to a state scarcely describable, by the use of bullock drays, which, in proportion as they destroy the roads, require the services of a more numerous team of bullocks, and by this means the mischief is continually augmented ... The rating of Crown and Native lands is also a proposal into the particulars of which we cannot enter. We may, however, remark that it is impossible for anyone to travel in the winter through those parts of the country­ usually the best parts- which are in the hands of the Maoris, without feeling a strong conviction that it is very unfair that they should contribute nothing to the maintenance of those roads which their owners have had so large a share in destroying, whilest the burden is left to fall upon the scanty and inadequate rates extracted from a few scattered and struggling settlers 11.

In response to these pressures, "the Kauri-gum Industry Act, 1898," legislated for both an export tax on kauri gum, and a licensing system for diggers. Under the act, areas of Crown

9 Kauri-Gum Commission: 1893, p. 4. 10 Kauri-Gum Commission: 1898. p. 10. 11 Kauri-Gum Commission:1893. p. 5.

120 James Pope's Health for the Maori (1884). This book, which, according to McKenna, Pope was inspired to write after a trip to the Far North, was translated into Maori and disseminated through Native schools as a reader for Maori children 14, By the tum of the century it was into its third edition and had achieved almost biblical status on Maori health issues. In 1885 Bishop claimed of the book:

When Mr. Pope's excellent little work, "Health for the Maori," is translated and freely circulated amongst the Natives, all the various points to which their attention should be directed, will be brought more ably and prominently before them, and the result should be in every way beneficial15.

Since the ideas presented in this book influenced European policy makers, education and health workers until well into the twentieth century they deserve close analysis.

Pope's manual presents an interesting mixture of superstition, gross Eurocentricism and good common sense. Some of his recommendations are sensible, practical and of contemporary relevance. For example he warned against building houses on low lying, undrained land, and advocated exercise, cleanliness and a low starch diet. Closely interwoven with these fairly useful suggestions was a vigorous and frequently irrelevant indictment of many aspects of Maori culture, and a similarly vigorous advocacy of European custom

For example Pope condemned tangihanga and indeed hui of all sorts, and recommended picnics and "tea-meetings" as a healthy alternative. He argued that Maori should drink tea, coffee and cocoa, should eat "pakeha" food and should cook their food in European ovens. He also advocated the adoption of European customs with regard to marriage. Pope presented these cultural maxims as integral steps along the road to good health and hygiene.

Even when Pope's ideas were not blatantly Eurocentric, they were often largely irrelevant to the problems Maori actually faced. The Victorian obsession with "hygiene" pervaded his prescriptions. He saw health in terms of cleanliness, fresh air and invigoration. While harmless enough by themselves these "hygiene" issues tended to obscure the more fundamental causes of Maori ill health. In doing so they also obscured the real answers. By neglecting the deep

14 N. C. McKenna, Mangonui. Gateway to the Far North, p. 62 ; R. T. Lange, "The Revival of a Dying Race", p. 98. 15 Bishop Report, 30 April, 1885, Op cit, p. 3.

122 land were set aside as kauri-gum reserves, available exclusively for digging. Local authorities were authorised to issue three types of licenses: a gum-buyers license, a "special" license, available to Maori and British subjects at the cost 5s per annum; and an "ordinary" diggers license, available to other diggers at the cost £1 per annum. "The Kauri-gum Industry Act Amendment Act, 1899" restricted digging in kauri-gum reserves to holders of a "special" license 12.

Although the act thus discriminated primarily against Dalmatian diggers, the payment of a license fee fell particularly heavily on part time diggers and thus on most Maori. The 1898 Commission had in fact suggested that Maori should be exempted from the licensing provisions of the act 13.

While gum-digging was partly responsible for the terrible state of the roads in the North, it was clearly ridiculous to hold Maori financially responsible. Although, as Kelly pointed out, Maori suffered in a number of ways from the state of the roads, the people who chiefly benefitted from the gum trade were not the diggers but the local gum traders and, even more, the Auckland and international gum merchants. As an industry, gum digging was exploitative of both people and the environment, and Maori diggers were as much pawns in this process as the roads or the landscape.

Attitudes to Maori Health. As with gum digging, Pakeha officials in Muriwhenua failed to take any responsibility for the health problems faced by Muriwhenua Maori during the late nineteenth century. Although they frequently acknowledged the dreadful state of Maori health, they did not analyse either the deep rooted causes or the possible government initiated solutions to the problem. Rather they saw disease as a necessary consequence of the Maori way of life and culture. Crown agents believed that the only way to solve this problem was for Maori to reject their own customs in favour of European ones. In this process European officials could play only a limited role.

Attitudes to Maori health over this period were perhaps best exemplified and epitomised by

12 "The Kauri-gum Industry Act, 1898", NZS, 1898, No 23, pp 89-94 [Doc Bank]; The Kauri-gum Industry Act Amendment Act, 1899", NZS, 1899, No 18, pp 51/52 [Doc Bank]. 13 Kauri-Gum Commission: 1898, p. 14.

121 seated eatlses of Maori health problems they Goald oRly provid.ed. superficial answen;. Eo, example, what point was there in telling Maori not to live in low lying swampy areas if their livelihood depended on it?

As early as 1868 White accounted for the Maori health problems in Muriwhenua by reference to internal factors only. Explaining the dramatic population decline he had witnessed he argued:

Such a fearful decrease in numbers is scarcely to be accounted for by the sudden advance of the white man, with his spirituous liquors and change of habits, but more perhaps to a nature exhausted by disease engendered by deleterious food, immoral habits, constant state of war and anxiety,-and of late years accelerated by the use of intoxicating liquors, idleness, scarcity of food, irregular and insufficient clothing, and their present custom of dwelling in small temporary huts and lying on the damp ground16.

During the 1880s, Resident Magistrates reports echoed Pope's prescriptions. In 1884 Bishop argued that the high rate of disease among Muriwhenua Maori was caused by "an utter and persistent disregard of the most ordinary sanitary precautions" I? . What is more, he argued, Maori would have to change their entire outlook on life in order to remedy the situation:

It would be almost necessary to change the entire nature of the Maori to effect any voluntary improvement in his social and domestic habits. His present style of life is part and parcel of his nature, and ... is highly demoralizingl8.

Bishop identified many real causes of disease amongst Maori: bad diet, insufficient clothing, low lying, damp sites for kainga and lack of isolation when dealing with contagious diseases 19. Unfortunately he did not identify the factors that caused Maori to live in such conditions. Bishop apparently believed that these factors were all directly within Maori controL He consistently blamed Maori for the health problems they faced. He argued ...

. . . so long as the people persist in living in such unhealthy localities, and in generally disregarding the most ordinary, and easily understood sanitary laws, just so long will they be specially liable to disease, which will be unerringly fatal20.

16 White Report, 5 September 1868, AlHR, 1868, A-4, No 16, p. 36 [PR Doc, Vol 1: B2]. 17 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, A1HR, 1884, Session II, 0-1, No 2, p. 1 [PR Doc, Vol I: B14}. 18 Ibid, p. 2. 19 Ibid, pp. 1(2.

123 The few solutions Bishop did suggest to the problem attacked key institutions in Maori culture. For example, Bishops believed that improvements in health and living standards were dependent on individualization of Maori land. He also railed against huis and hakaris, for which he claimed Maori "unhesitatingly impoverish and starve themselves for rnonths .. 21 . Bishop particularly criticised tangihanga:

When a death occurs it is the same thing over again. The corpse, reeking with contagion, is surrounded by lamenting relatives and friends, who oftentimes will . embrace the body in a transport of grief. This continues for hours, and the same thing occurs constantly22.

In contrast Bishop ignored one of the most significant factors in the high rate of Maori mortality: lack of immunity to introduced European diseases. He also ignored the deep rooted economic causes of Maori susceptibility to disease. In effect, Bishop saw Maori society as a closed system, where both the problems and the solutions were internaL This attitude, which placed the responsibility for Maori ill health squarely on Maori shoulders, exonerated the Crown from any real obligation to deal with the problem.

That is not to say that the Resident Magistrates considered that the government had no role to play in treating Maori health. During the 1870s both White and Kelly urged the government to appoint a doctor to the district23. But their attitude to Maori health, was motivated at its best from paternalistic concern and did not encourage the Government to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem. By arguing that Maori health problems were self-generated, the Resident Magistrates encouraged complacency about Maori health. Indeed Bishop went so far as to recommend that the only useful government initiated solution to the problem would be strictly enforced legislation to compel Maori to improve their sanitary habits24. Bishop also reacted strongly against newspaper criticism of the way Pakeha officials in the Far North dealt with Maori health problems:

20 Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 2. 21 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 2; Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 3 ; Bishop Report, 29 May 1888, Op cit, p. 1. 22 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 2. 23 White Report, 21 June 1872, Op cit, p. 1 ; Kelly Report, 9 May 1879, Op cit, p. l. 24 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. L

124 All reasonable efforts have been made to iintigate the evils arising from the fever, and to check its spread; and, though these may have failed to a great extent, it appears to me unreasonable to say, without due knowledge of the facts, that the welfare of the Maoris as a people is being neglected25.

Health Care for the Maori, 1865-1900. This complacency was typical of the attitude Crown officials took to the serious health problems in Muriwhenua. In fact the Crown made no concerted attempt during the late nineteenth century to deal with the health problems faced by Muriwhenua Maori.

In July 1874 Brissenden, the Crown Land Purchase Agent, found the community at Ahipara suffering from a severe outbreak of typhoid. Thirty four people had died in three weeks and many more were seriously ill. According to Brissenden, the community expressed their dissatisfaction at the neglect of the Government officer (presumably White), who apparently had not been near or offered any assistance. In an effort to rectify the situation, Brissenden provided them with "a few comforts" and £25 in cash from the govern~ent account26.

During the nineteenth century, this ad hoc approach was characteristic of the Crown's response to Maori health problems in Muriwhenua. Crown initiatives to deal with the problem were sporadic, disorganised, and under funded. They were generally inadequate and frequently ineffective.

In 1860 the Native Department began to pay a £100 annual subsidy to doctors in various rural centres to treat Maori patients. This subsidy, which was available on and off until the 1930s, was the Crown's only attempt to provide health care professionals for Maori communities during the nineteenth century27. Its provision depended on the availability and willingness of local doctors and the fortunes of the Native Department under successive parliamentary regimes28.

25 Ibid, p. 2. 26 Mr Brissenden to The Hon. the Native Minister, 27 July 1874, in "Native Land Purchase Agents", AJHR, 1875,0-7, No 52, pp. 15/16 [Doc Bank]. 27 Lange, Op cit, p. 247. 28 Ward, Op cit, gives a general account of the fortunes of Maori health services under successive nineteenth century governments.

125 For a brief period in the early 1860s Muriwhenua Maori had both a subsidised medical officer and a hospital. The Crown established the Mangonui Native Hospital in 1859 with Dr Thomas James Trimnell as its Superintendent29. It is likely, given the nature of other "hospitals" erected during the nineteenth century, that the Mangonui Hospital was no more than a barely provisioned hall to which the chronically ill could be brought for treatment. It was closed in 1865 as a cost cutting measure. Dr Trimnell resigned and remained in the area in a purely private capacity30.

The rest of the century was plagued by discontinuity in even the most basic health services for Maori. After Trimnell's resignation there does not appear to have been a doctor available to Maori in Muriwhenua until the 1880s. In 1867 William Puckey noted that he ,had attended many calls to the sick, as there was now no government doctor in the area31 . Five years later W. B. White noted that although Dr Trirnnell was still farming at Pukepoto, he would not attend patients unless he received a high fee, well out of the reach of local Maori. White urged the immediate appointment of a subsidised doctor32.

It seems that the Native Department did not heed White's request. In 1878 George Kelly noted the devastating effects of a typhoid epidemic in 1874/1875 on the Maori population. "Natives entirely without medical aid" Kelly added, "soon succumb to epidemics, even of a far milder nature than typhoid fever,,33. The next year Kelly claimed that there was still no doctor available nearer than Auckland34.

In 1883, however, the Native Department were again paying Dr Trimnell a medical subsidy, and he was apparently undertaking a large scale vaccination campaign in Muriwhenua35. A year later Bishop reported that Trirnnell was dealing with a virulent typhoid epidemic effecting settlements throughout the area36. It is unclear whether Trimnell's services were retained

29 McKenna, Op cit, p. 61. 30 Ibid, ; B. Rigby and J. Koning, "Muriwhenua Land Claim: A Preliminary Report on the Historical Evidence" [Preliminary Report]. p. 175 [Wai 45]. 31 Puckey Journal, p. 489 [pR Doc, Vol 1: C2]. 32 White Report, 21 June 1872, Op cit, p. 3. 33 Mr G Kelly to Under Secretary, Native Department, 9 May 1878, "Census of the Maori Population 1878", AJHR, 1878, G-2, No 2 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 52]. 34 Kelly Report, 9 May 1879, Op cit, p. 1. 35 Bishop Report, 5 June 1883, AJHR, 1883, G-IA, No 2, p. 1 [pR Doc, Vol 1: 13].

126 throughout the 1880s. In A Show of Justice, however, Ward asserts that while Ballance was Native MinisterIrom 1884-1887, the-dep8rl:irierlt declined to subsidise medical officers unless the community could pay half the subsidy, a luxury that Muriwhenua Maori could ill afford37. In 1890 the Native Department was paying Trimnell a measly subsidy of £2538. Even when there was a subsidized medical officer in the Muriwhenua area, the size of the region, the state of the roads and the culturally domineering attitudes of western health professionals meant that most Maori would never have had access to him. In 1906 the Native Department estimated that subsidised medical officers served Maori within only a 10-20 mile radius. The same year Dr Trimnell claimed to have seen a mere 144 patients, an average of less than three a week39.

Nor were subsidised medical officers renowned for their enthusiasm and commitment. In 1911 the Inspector General of Health noted that the services rendered by those supplied with medical subsidies had generally been "very perfunctorily performed"40. Two years later Valentine reported that under the old system (recently reorganised) medical officers had little enthusiasm for the work and rarely visited Maori communities41.

Beyond the uncertain provision of a subsidised medical officer, the only other type of relief provided by the Crown was the supply of drugs, usually to combat emergency situations such as the 1884/1885 typhoid epidemic42. In 1890, T. W. P. Smith in Kaitaia was receiving a £15 subsidy from the Native Department to act as a "dispenser" of drugs43. More commonly, medicines were dispensed through the local school teachers. In 1884 the Inspector of Native Schools noted the necessity of school teachers filling this role:

It often happens that no professional aid is procurable in cases of sickness amongst the Natives, without very great delay, and expense that they really cannot afford to

36 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 1. 37 Ward, Op ci~ p. 294. 38 "Civil List for Native Purposes", AJHR, 1890, B-3A, p. 2 [Doc Bank]. 39 MA 21/20. 40 "Public Health Statement", AJHR, 1911, H-31, p. 183 [Doc Bank], 41 "Public Health Statement", AJHR, 1913, H-31, pp. 2/3 [Doc Bank]. 42 Bishop Report. 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 1 ; Dr TrimneU, 4 May 1885, "Reports from Native Medical Officers", AJHR, 1885, G-2A, No 2, p. 1. 43 "Civil List forNative Purposes", 1890, p. 2.

127 incur. In such cases few will be prepared to deny that a teacher might relieve much suffering, and sometimes prevent death, if he would undertake to give out to the Natives, as they appeared to need them, doses of castor-oil, a few drops of chlordyne, a little sulphur-ointment, or a few grains of quinine44.

The same year Bishop reported that teachers of Native Schools had done their best to treat patients throughout the district and that "liberal" supplies of drugs had been made available to many of them from the Native Office45.

Native School teachers made untrained, unpaid, overworked, and often reluctant health professionals. For example, in 1884 Pope noted that, whereas generally Native teachers did their best in this matter, some were indifferent and unwilling to be troubled out of school hours. Pope claimed this could lead the community to become equally indifferent about the school46.

Nor, if the 1890s were anything to go by, was the supply of drugs to Native schools as liberal as Native Department officials suggested. Justice Department correspondence during the 1890s contained frequent letters from Mangonui school teachers complaining about the tardy supply of urgently needed medicines47.

This, then, was the sum total of health services provided by the Crown during the nineteenth century: the uncertain provision of a subsidised medical officer, and the equally sporadic flow of drugs for dispensation through the schools. The Crown's response to the appalling health conditions prevailing in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century was at best, half hearted.

Assimilation and Individualisation. The above examples indicate that Resident Magistrates in Mangonui did not identify a constructive role for the Crown in dealing with the problems faced by Muriwhenua Maori. They failed to either protect or promote the interests of Maori in Muriwhenua. Their attitudes

44 "Education: Native Schools", AfHR, 1884, E- 2, p. 3 [Doc Bank] 45 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 1. 46 "Education: Native Schools", 1884, p. 3. 47 Justice Department Series 1, Registered Correspondence, 1893-1900.

128 were infonned by a condescending paternalism towards Maori society and culture and a corresponding arrogance about· European ·values .. ·· .

Because of this paternalism all three Resident Magistrates defined Maori interests in tenns of assimilation into European culture: they equated progress with Europeanisation. They praised any signs of the adoption of European civilisation, such as permanent cultivation of the soil and use of European fanning techniques, as well as the adoption of European lifestyle and use of the English language48. In contrast they were overtly hostile towards any distinctively Maori activity or organisation.

Bishop railed against Maori cultural fonns such as hui, hakari, and particularly tangihanga, arguing that they were the main means of Maori impoverishment and ill health49. Bishop also analysed the effects of gum digging in moral terms. Because of gum digging, he argued, Maori in Mangonui lacked an incentive to "downright industry". Gum digging rendered them idle and unfit for "settled employment,,50. Indeed Bishop took this analysis to such an extreme that during the 1880s depression, he praised the widespread unemployment experienced by Maori arguing:

If this has the result of compelling more attention to the tilling of the soil it will be a source of congratulation51 .

The Resident Magistrates directly supported assimilation by encouraging the individualisation of Maori land through the Native Land Courts. Both White and Kelly worked for the Court, White as a judge and Kelly as a translator. White in particular was intimately associated with the Court's operations in Muriwhenua. As a Native Land Court judge from 1865-1869, he presided over the initial individualisation and fragmentation of Muriwhenua land. Not surprisingly, White firmly believed in the benefits of individualisation. He argued that the 1865 Act was the best thing done for the Maori and that it gave them a real stake in the prosperity of the country52.

48 White Report, 21 June 1872, Op cit, pp. 3/4; Kelly Report, 9 May 1878, AIHR, 1878,0-1, No 2, p. 1 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B8]. 49 Bishop Report, 12 May 1884, Op cit, p. 2 ; Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 3. 50 Ibid; Bishop Report, 10 June 1891, AJHR 1891,0-2, No 2, p. 1 [Doc Bank]. 51 Bishop Report, 17 May 1887, AJHR, 1887, Session II, 0-1, No 2, p. 2 [pR Doc, Vol 1: B16) 52 White Report, 5 Sept 1868, Op cit, p. 37.

129 Bishop also f'mnly supported individualisation, indeed he argued that improvements in health and living standards were dependent on it53. Bishop recognised that the expense of subdivision surveys penalised Maori and suggested the Government should establish a means by which owners could obtain a subdivision "without the attendant expenses eating up more than half its value,,54. Nevertheless, he recommended that kainga should be divided into individual ten acre lots, arguing that this would break up the "mischievous system" of communism:

Huis, hakaris, &c., would then be almost impossible, and thus the popular means of impoverishment would be done away with55.

Like White, Bishop saw individualisation of land as the key to Europeanising Maori because it struck at the heart of collective organisation, both social and economic. He did not consider the actual economic viability of such individual economic organisation in Muriwhenua. For example Bishop's ten acre lots would have been, as Rigby I Koning point out, uneconomic shares56.

Support of Land Purchase. As illustrated above, the assimilationist policies of the Resident Magistrates were far from benign. By failing to recognise and promote Maori values and concerns, the Resident Magistrates precluded any constructive response to socio-economic problems faced by Maori in Muriwhenua. They also threatened the retention of Maori culture and language and contributed to the process of fragmentation which rendered Maori land uneconomic for the next one hundred years.

While this was done in the name of assimilation, there was a fundamental contradiction in assimilationist policies. By arguing that Maori should be "as Europeans", assimilation should theoretically have offered Maori equal status within the European world. In reality the Resident Magistrates promoted an economic system in which Maori could not participate equally. This is most clearly shown by the support the Resident Magistrates gave to the alienation of remaining

53 Bishop Report, 29 May 1888, Op cit, p. 1. 54 Bishop Report,S June 1883, Op cit, p. 2. 55 Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, Op cit, p. 3. 56 Preliminary Report, p. 171.

130 For much of the nineteenth century Crown land purchase activities were conducted under the auspices of the Native Department. The Department fIrst took control of land purchase in 1865 and, although the offIcial status of the land purchase administration changed a number of times, continued to more or less administer the system until its (the Native Department's) abolition in 1892. The Resident Magistrate, as permanent representative of the Native Department in outlying districts, played an active role in coordinating, administrating and advising land purchase activities in Muriwhenua.

In addition to his role in servicing the land purchase system, White also acted as a Crown purchase agent. Rigby I Koning argue that he negotiated a number of major Crown purchases in Muriwhenua from 1850-186557. When the Crown resumed land purchase activity in Muriwhenua during the 1870s White again acted as their agent, negotiating the sale of the Kaitaia (North) Block in 1872. Despite the activities of specially appointed land purchase agents in Muriwhenua after 1873, White continued his personal involvement in Crown land purchases, negotiating the Murimotu purchase in 187558. In 1873 White also facilitated a private purchase that of the 56678 Muriwhenua North Block59.

Rather ironically, the Crown also appointed White to the position of district offIcer under the "Native Land Act, 1873". This position was designed expressly to protect Maori from excessive alienation of their land.

White argued that land sales were benefIcial for both Maori and Pakeha. He urged the purchase of land in the Kaitaia area throughout the 1870s, arguing that if it was retained it would be "a source of annoyance to future settlers,,60. Likewise, he supported the private purchase of the 56678 acre Muriwhenua Block by Yates and Jones, arguing that the Crown would derive benefIt "both directly by fees and indirectly by the beneficial occupation of the land by Europeans". This indicates, as Rigby points out in the Muriwhenua North Report, that White

57 Ibid, p. 110 ff. 58 See Chapter 2. 59 B. Rigby, "The Muriwhenua North Area and the Muriwhenua Claim" [Muriwhenua North Report], pp. 41/42 [Wai 45]. 60 White to General Government Agent, Auckland, 26 December 1871, MA MLP 1/32, 92/152 [Doc Bank] ; White to Under Secretary, 19 January 1876, Ibid.

131 did not believe that Maori ownership of the land was

White argued rather weakly that Maori benefitted from the sale of their land, both to the Crown and to private individuals, because money from the sales enabled them to live better. Consequently, he argued, health was better62. This concentration on the short term benefits of land sale indicates that White did not envisage an economic system in which Maori land owners participated on equal terms with Pakeha. White's paternalism allowed him to envisage Maori as a land lessproletariat fulfilling the needs of the Pakeha settlers.

Although neither Kelly nor Bishop were so overt in their support of the alienation of remaining Maori land, none of the Resident Magistrates did anything to stem the flow of alienation. Not once in all their reports did they identify the negative effects of land alienation or suggest any limits to it.

As argued in the last two chapters, neither the Land Purchase Department nor the Native Land Court offered any effective protection to Muriwhenua Maori with regard to land alienation. The Resident Magistrates, working hand in glove with these agencies, also failed to protect Maori from excessive alienation of their remaining lands.

The End of the Resident Magistrate System. Through the Resident Magistrates' system, the Crown at least acknowledged a fundamental principle: that Maori had specific needs and would suffer if lumped under the same system of justice and administration as Pakeha settlers. During the late nineteenth century the Crown abandoned this principle.

In A Show of Justice Alan Ward documents the gradual decline of the Resident Magistrate's system during the late nineteenth century under pressure from settlers interests, hostile to any perceived "special" treatment of Maori.From 1865 onwards the power and jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrates decreased. Although Donald McLean partially revived the power and prestige of the Native Department during the 1870s, after 1879 the retrenchments continued. During the 1880s many of its administrative functions were taken over by other departments,

61 Muriwhenua North Report, p. 42 62 White Report, 22 April 1873, Op cit, p. 1.

132 and the Resident Magistrates became increasingly involved in land matters on behalf of Crown. By the end of the decade the principal functions of the Native Department were administering the Native Land Court and the Government land purchasing programme, and advising the Government. Finally, in December 1892 the Crown finally dismantled the Native Department and farmed out its various functions to other departments. The next year, the Government replaced the Resident Magistrates with Stipendiary Magistrates with strictly judicial functions, and Maori became amenable to ordinary legal processes63.

As the Resident Magistrate's System declined, Native School teachers replaced the Resident Magistrates as the most important mediators between Maori communities and the European power structure. Native Schools came to play an eclectic role in Maori society, providing centres for education, health care and community activity. The role of the Native School and Native School teachers in Maori communities therefore provides an important arena for the analysis of Maori I Crown interaction in Muriwhenua.

The Native School System in Muriwhenua. The Government first attempted to provide a state education system for Muriwhenua Maori during the 1860s, with experiments in village day schools teaching in English. Alan Ward notes that one of these was erected in Whangape during 1863, with the support of the Waimate Runanga64. The next year, the Government opened schools in the principle settlements from Mangonui northward and appointed R. H. Matthews, son of the Rev. Joseph Matthews, as superintendent for the northern districts. These efforts apparently received little support from local Maori 65.

"The Native Schools Act, 1867", legislated for a national system of state aided village schools. To come under the act, the Crown required Maori communities to form a committee and request the establishment of a schooL They were expected to provide'the land for the school, at least half the cost of the school buildings, and at least one quarter of the annual contribution to

63 Ward, Op cit, pp. 196-303 ; G. V. Butterworth, Maori Affairs, p. 6 ; Ibid, p. 45; Ibid,p. 54 ; Bishop Report, 17 May 1887, Op cit; Bishop Report, 10 June 1891, Op cit; Bishop Report, 24 June 1892, AJHR 1892, G-3, No 2 [Doc Bank]. 64 Ward, Op cit, p. 137. 65 Cyclopedia of New Zealand, Vol 2: Auckland, p. 597.

133 salary and other expenses. The government then contnbuted the remamder. In order to quahfY for state funding the act requir.ed the schools to provide instruction, conducted as far as possible in English, in the ordinary subjects of a primary English education. The Native Department administered the new system66.

The Crown delayed effectual implementation of the new policy for some years. Barrington / Beaglehole report that by 1870 the government had opened only thirteen day schools over the whole of New Zealand67. In 1868 W. B. White claimed that education in Mangonui was still a "dead letter":

During the last few months of last year, Mr Matthews ... could seldom get the children to attend, though to meet their convenience several schools were established in the larger villages; no interest whatever was shown by either parents or children, until Mr Matthews services had to be dispensed with68.

In fact it was not until 1871 that the Crown made any real effort to construct a workable education system for Maori. In that year the Crown created the position of Inspector of Native Schools and passed" the Native Schools Amendment Act, 1871". This act enabled the state to grant funding to schools in cases where the communtity was unable to make the cash contribution required of them69.

Muriwhenua Maori seized the new government initiative with enthusiasm. In 1871 there was only one village school in Mangonui County, at Pukepoto. The next year White reported three schools - Awanui, Ahipara, and Parengarenga - at various stages of completion. In addition, Maori at Kaitaia and Victoria were vigourously requesting schools for their communities70. By 1874, Native schools were up and running at Pukepoto, Awanui, Ahipara, Parengarenga, Kaitaia and Peria71.

66 "The Native Schools Act, 1867", NZS 1867, No 41, p. 467 ff [Doc Bank]. 67 J. M. Barrington and T. H. Beaglehole, Maori Schools in a Changing Society, pp.101-107. 68 White Report, 5 Sept 1868, Op cit, p. 37. 69 The Inspector of Schools to the Hon. the Native Minister, 25 July 1872, "Papers Relating to Native Schools", AJHR 1872, F-5, No 2, p. 6 [PR Doc, Vol 2: 20] ; "The Native Schools Act Amendment", NZS, 1871, No 55, pp. 245/246. 70 White Report, 21 June 1872, Op cit, p. 3. 71 "Native Schools. Report of Inspecting Officers", AJHR, 1874, G-8, p. 23 [PR Doc, Vol 2: 29].

134 The 1867 and 1871 Acts provided the basis for the dual system of education that was to operate in New Zealand for 100 years. In 1879 control of the system shifted to the Department of Education, but the system continued to operate independently of the regional education boards administering the state system72. Although by 1910 the majority of Maori in New Zealand were attending Board schools, in secluded areas like Muriwhenua the Native Schools System continued to be an important force.

Access to Education. As discussed in Chapter One, factors such as health, economic imperatives and inaccessibility limited the expansion of the Native Schools System in Muriwhenua. The question remains, to what extent did the Crown ensure that Muriwhenua Maori had adequate access to these schools?

During the 1870s the cost of Native Schools limited the degree to which Muriwhenua Maori were able to participate in the system. Although the 1867 and 1871 Acts provided government funding for Native schools, both were based firmly on the principle of self help: that the initiative and a substantial part of the funding should come from Maori communities themselves. While the 1871 amendment allowed for some lee way in the size of the financial contributions made by Maori, this was not necessarily put into practice by Crown officials.

When A. H. Russell, the first Inspector of Native Schools, visited North Auckland in 1872, he noted the exceptional poverty north of Waimate and suggested that Maori in the Far North should only contribute one quarter of the schoolmaster's salary. While this was an acknowledgement of the particularly bad conditions faced by Maori in the North, one quarter of the school master's salary was still a substantial financial contribution and was at any rate no less than Maori had been required to pay under the original 1867 Act 73.

In actual fact, in the scramble to take advantage of the new educational opportunities offered, Muriwhenua communities often agreed contribute significantly more than the 1867 Act required of them. When this took the form of a financial contribution towards the school master's

72 Butterworth, Op cit, p. 45. 73 Inspector of Schools to the Hon. the Native Minister, 13 March 1872, "Papers Relating to Native Schools", Op cit, No 7. p. 12.

135 salary, it placed a considerable ongoing burden on the community74.

Russell was at least sympathetic towards the poverty faced by Maori in the Far North. In contrast, W. B. White, who played an important role in the local administration of the schools, believed Maori communities should be forced to make a substantial financial contribution to their schools. In 1874 he observed:

The true principle of requiring the parents to contribute towards the education of their children being now tried for first time, will give them, in my opinion, the interest wanted in all former trials, and will break down that constant craving for Government support which has been so conspicuous in all former efforts to raise the standard of Native character75.

White's paternalism allowed him to believe Maori would benefit morally from having to pay fees. In fact, as the Archdeacon Clarke observed, by 1875 inability to pay fees was keeping many Muriwhenua children away from schools76. The same year White noted that in five out of the six Muriwhenua schools, fees were not forthcoming. Nonetheless, White came to a rather different conclusion: they had ample means, he argued, but chose to spend it in "debauchery 1177.

The Pukepoto school was the one school in respect to which the Native Department tried to use the flexibility allowed under the 1871 Act. Charles Master~ and a determined Pukepoto community had established this school in April 1870 despite the absence of school house, books, desks or a school master's salary. Provincial, and subsequently General Government funding was eventually forthcoming and in 1872 Russell singled out the school as an example of "how much may be done with very small means by those who really have an object at heart". Russell commented on the large contribution made by Timoti Puhipi who, in addition to paying £20 a year as the Maori contribution towards the salary, had loaned a whare for the

74 Communities at Parengarenga and Ahipara both agreed to pay £40 pa towards the schoolmasters salary, as well as providing the land. and a considerable contribution towards the erection of the school house: Inspector of Schools to the Hon. the Native Minister. "Papers Relating to Native Schools", 13 March 1872. Op cit, No 14, p. 15. 75 White Report. 8 May, 1874, AJHR, 1874, G-2, No 2, p. 1 [PR Doc, Vol 2: B5]. 76 Yen Archdeacon Clarke to the Hon the Native Minister, "Native Schools. Reports of Inspecting Officers", AJHR, 1875, G-2, No 1, pp. 1/2 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 34]. 77 White to Under Secretary, 22 May 1875, "Native Schools. Further Reports of Inspecting Officers",AJHR, 1875, G-2A, No 2, p. 2 [pR Doc, Vol 2: 35].

136 school house, supported the scholars, "whose parents are saId to be too poor to contribute", and provided a twelve acre site for a new building about to be erected. Russell recommended that Puhipi, who was "by no means well ofP', should be relieved of his £20 contribution. The Native Department accepted this recommendation because of the exceptional circumstances involved78.

Even in this case White was relentless in his application of the principle of self help. In 1872 he noted:

I cannot help regretting that the Native contribution has been dispensed with at Pukepoto, as it will form an example for others to resist or refuse to pay after expense has been incurred in the erection of buildings &c., &c79.

In the long run, White's view prevailed. In 1875 Archdeacon Clarke observed that Pukepoto school, still regarded as "par excellence the school of the North", had paid fees for the fIrst time. Clarke supported the imposition of fees but did note that Pukepoto Maori resented having to pay, "as they consider it a breach of the understanding they came to with Colonel Russell" 80.

The distance many Maori had to travel to attend also retarded Maori participation in the Native Schools System. As late as 1880 there were only six native schools in Mangonui County, servicing a total of 236 pupils81 . Three more opened during the rest of the century improving but not remedying the situation. Throughout Muriwhenua the slow growth of the Native School system did not keep up with the demand expressed by Maori communities through regular petitions to the Government82.

Inaccessibility meant that Maori children had one of three alternatives, either to travel huge distances each day to attend the schools; or to spend the week camped at the schools, separated

78 Inspector of Schools to the Hon. the Native Minister, 14 March 1872, "Papers Relating to Native Schools", Op cit, No 9, pp. 12/13 ; Hon. the Native Minister to the Inspector of Schools, Ibid, No 10, p. 13 ; Ven Archdeacon Clarke to the Hon Native Minister, Op cit, p. 2.' 79 White Report, 21 June 1872, Op cit, p. 1. 80 Ven Archdeacon Clarke to the Hon the Native Minister, Op cit, p. 2. 81 "Education: Native Schools", AJHR, 1881, E-7, Table 2, p. 15 [PR Doc, Vol 2: 60]. 82 For example, in 1883/1884 four Mangonui communities petitioned the government requesting schools. All four were refused: "Education: Native Schools", AJHR, 1884, E-2, p. 2.

137 from the families; or simply to not participate in the system. Many Maori in Muriwhenua continued to use this third alternative: -As late-as-1914 Inspector-BiTdnoted that many Maori children, particularly on the northern gumfields, received no education83.

While this inaccessibility was to some extent a function of rural life, the provision of school services in certain areas was obviously inadequate. One of these areas was the Aupouri Peninsula. Maori at Parengarenga successfully requested a school in 1872 but it was closed in early 1875, apparently because of "the determined opposition of the residents to the schoolmaster". It was never reopened, despite frequent applications from the local Maori. For the rest of the decade, the scattered communities of the Aupouri peninsula had to send their children as far away as Awanui if they wished to parti~ipate in the school system84.

In 1881 Maori at Te Kao took the situation into their own hands. They built a hut and opened a school on their own initiative under the unpaid tutorship of James Adamson. The Native Department finally agreed to step in with funding but, because of their preference for married couples, would not give Adamson a full subsidy. In November, 1882 the new schoolhouse opened in Te Kao under a new teacher85.

The opening of the Te Kao school was a significant improvement for Maori on the peninsula. It was still too far away, however, for Maori in the North Cape. It took another fifteen years for the government to provide North Cape Maori with their own school. Two generations of Maori thus missed out on the opportunities offered through schooling.

Nonetheless, a comparison of Board and Native Schools in Muriwhenua at the turn of the century indicate that Pakeha settlers in Muriwhenua were in fact only slightly better provided for than Maori. The 1901 census recorded 580 Maori in the 5-15 age group in Mangonui (56%), compared with 381 Europeans in the same age group. Given the likelihood of under counting in the Maori census, the proportion of Maori was in fact probably slightly higher. By 1900 there were nine Native Schools in Mangonui as compared with eleven Board ones. The over all expenditure on Native schools in Mangonui was, however, slightly higher than on the Board schools: £1412 (52%), compared with £127986.

83 The Native Schools Code 1880, in Barrington and Beaglehole, Appendix, p. 273. 84 "Report on Native Schools", AJHR, 1914, E-3, p. 6 [Doc Bank]. 85 J . Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 7.

138 These figures indicate that, while Pak:eha settlers in Mangonui, had more schools and received more funding per head of popUlation than Maori, the disparity was not as significant as one might expect. At a time when the Government was reducing its expenditure in all other areas of Native policy with the exception of land purchase, the Native Schools System continued to receive considerable official support and funding.

The Purpose of Native Schools: Education for Assimilation. In order to understand why the Crown funded the Native Schools System so disproportionately in comparison with other areas of Maori welfare, one must understand what the Crown intended to achieve through the system. As historians of the Native School System have pointed out, the main intention behind the schools was one of assimilation. Crown policy makers and educationalists throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the Native Schools as a key means to facilitate the break: down of Maori culture and provide for the spread of European ideas and values 87 .

In 1900 the Inspector of Native Schools described the purpose for which the system had been set up. The schools, he argued, were founded to bring Maori into line with Western civilization by accustoming them to European language, buildings and family life. They were designed to aid the slow process of assimilation by familiarising Maori with European ideas and customs88.

The English language was seen as the cornerstone of this process. In itself a key element in the colonising culture, it was also seen as an absolute prerequisite to the transmission of other European ideas and values: without English, Maori could not be civilised. From 1867 onward, English was thus both the principle subject in the curriculum of all Muriwhenua schools, and also the medium through which all other subjects were taught. Many Native Schools teachers could neither understand nor speak Maori, and indeed many educationalists considered this ignorance desirable: in his inspection of the Peria school in 1875 the Archdeacon Clarke noted:

The business is carried on entirely in English, as the teacher fortunately knows but

86 "Education", AJHR, 1901, E-l, p. 9 [Doc Bank] ; "Education: Native Schools", AJHR, 1901, E-2, p. 18 [Doc Bank] : New Zealand Census, 1901, p. 288 ; Ibid, p. xliv. 87 Barrington and Beaglehole, p. 156. 88 "Education: Native Schools", AJHR, 1900, E-2, p. 16 [Doc Bank].

139 When Pope took charge of the Native School System in 1880 there was a slight policy change in relation to the use of Maori. Pope recognised that a knowledge of Maori language might be advantageous when teaching English to junior classes and actually included an elementary knowledge of the language in his grading system for teachers90. This change was limited in intent. In the Native Schools Code (1880) Pope explained:

It is n?t necessary that teachers should, at the time of their appointment, be acquainted with the Maori tongue. In all cases English is to be used by the teacher when he is instructing the senior classes. In the junior classes the Maori language may be used for the purpose of making the children acquainted with the meanings of English words and sentences. The aim of the teacher, however, should be to dispense with the use of Maori as soon as possible91.

By the turn of the century Pope had, in any case, revised his opinion. By 1903 he was describing the use of Maori to teach English as an anachronism92. During the twentieth century attitudes to the use of Maori language continued to harden, and were extended even to its use in the playground93.

Teachers were also supposed to exert their assimilationist influence through taking a wider role in the community. In the Native Schools code Pope asserted:

It is not intended that the duties of the teacher should be confmed to the mere school instruction of the Maori children. On the contrary, it is expected that the teachers will by their kindness, their diligence, and their probity, exercise a beneficial influence on all the natives in their district94.

The same year Pope sent a circular to all Native School teachers outlining their role in the

89 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1867, pp. 863/864 ; Yen Archdeacon Clarke to the Hon the Native Minister, Op cit, p. 1 ; "Education: Native Schools" 1900, Op cit, p. 18. 90 Barrington and Beaglehole, p. 126 ; "The Native Schools Code: 1880", in Barrington and Beaglehole, Appendix, p. 270. 91 Ibid, p. 263. 92 Barrington and Beaglehole, p. 135. 93 Ibid pp. 149/150. 94 "The Native Schools Code: 1880", pp. 262/263.

140 community:

... exercise a beneficial influence on the Natives, old and young; to show by their own conduct that it is possible to live a useful and blameless life, and in smaller matters by their dress, in their houses, and by their manners and habits at home and abroad, to set the Maoris an example that they may advantageously imitate95.

Judith Simon, in her thesis on the Native Schools System, argues that these assimilationist policies were designed to destroy traditional forms of social control and promote land_ acquisition96:

Thus while the Land Court operated ... to alienate Maori from their land, the Native schools, in support of this objective, set out to alienate them from their traditional culture and language97.

Assimilationist policies were a fundamental detraction from the right of Muriwhenua Maori to speak their own language and practice their own culture. In addition, while the schools were intended to totally eradicate the Maori language, in remote areas such as Muriwhenua, Maori continued to speak their own language until well into the twentieth century. The prohibition of Maori language in schools thus served to divorce Maori from access to knowledge that would enable them to compete in the Pakeha economic arena.

Native Schools Teachers in the Community. The success of Native Schools in Muriwhenua was also affected by the competence and sensitivity of particular teachers. During the 1870s and 1880s many schools were forced to close because of bad feeling between the school teacher and the community. For example, in 1875 White noted that the school at Parengarenga had closed because of the community's opposition to Mr \Villiamson the school master. Another school did not open at the North Cape for over twenty years98.

95 "Directions for Teachers of Native Schools: 1880". in Barrington and Beaglehole, Appendix, p. 275. 96 J. Simon, "The Place of Schooling in Maori-Pakeha Relations", PhD Thesis, pp. nn3. 97 Ibid, p. 87. 98 White to Under Secretary, 22 May 1875, Op cit, p. 1.

141 The same year White noted there was also bad feeling at Ahipara, between local Maori and the new school master Major-Wood. White had-no sympathy with -Maori over· these problems, . claiming that in both cases Maori were being entirely unreasonable99.

Problems of this nature led to the periodic closure of the Ahipara school throughout the 1870s and 1880s. In 1882 the Inspector noted that "the people seem to take too much interest in the teacher and his affairs":

Ahipara has yet to make a good reputation for itself. There have been four teachers there within quite a short period. Two of these, on being removed to other districts, have got on capitally. It is to be hoped that the present teacher will succeed where the others have failed, and avoid getting into the "hot water" that seems to be characteristic of the place" 100.

As already discussed, the Crown also expected Native School teachers to providing Maori with health care. Reluctance to do so could lead to resentment from the community. In 1884 Pope claimed:

This matter of dispensing medicines is one about which the Natives are most sensitive, and, if they see no outward and visible sign of the master's caring whether they live or die, so long as he is not troubled with their ailments, it is hardly to be wondered at if they get to care nothing at all about the welfare of the school10l.

While problems with individual teachers could thus limit the success of Muriwhenua schools, the opposite was also true. Under a good teacher, the Native School could thrive. For example, a lucky run of committed teachers at Te Kao during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries established the school as an important force in community life. Inspector's reports during the early twentieth century noted the high academic standards of Te Kao pupils, and an unusually high proportion of the schools' pupils won scholarships to the denominational boarding schools.

99 Ibid. 100 Education: Native Schools", AIHR, 1882, E-2, p. 2 JPR Doc, Vol 2: 64] ; White to Under Secretary, 5 Jan 1876, "Native Schools", AIHR, 1876, G-2, No 1, p. 1 JPR Doc, Vol 2: 41].; White to Under Secretary, 21 May 1877, "Native Schools", AIHR, 1877, G-4, No 1, p. 1 JPR Doc, Vol 2: 49]. 101 "Education: Native Schools", 1884, p. 3.

142 Schools lIke Ie Kao became Important centres of commumty activity. According to Mt A. H. Watt, the Te Kao school teacher from 1915-37, examination day at Te Kao. achieved such prominence that the community called a public holiday and gathered at the school102.

In isolated communities the school teacher continued to fulfill an eclectic function in the community until well into the twentieth century. At Te Kao, Watt became deeply involved in the development schemes during the 1920s and 1930s103. The schoolteacher at Te Hapua during the early 1930s reponed on his role in the community: .

Officially, I was Headteacher of the School, Postmaster of an office which included all branches, Registrar of Maori Births and Deaths and Hon. Secretary of the Wharf. In addition, however, I took a leading part in land consolidation and development, dispensed medicines and handled most of the sickness and, as there were no local police, within the limits of an assumed jurisdiction maintained public order 104.

While the general purpose of the Native Schools system was one of assimilation, the success of individual Native Schools in Muriwhenua thus depended to a large degree on the commitment, competence and sensitivity of particular teachers.

Access to Secondary Schooling. As already discussed, assimilationist policies embodied a fundamental contradiction: although they theoretically posed the idea that Maori should be "as Europeans", in fact such policies did not aim to provide equality, even on European terms. In her thesis on "The Place of Schooling in Maori-Pakeha Relations", Judith Simons argues that the Native Schools System was designed to train Maori to fill a second economic and social tier in New Zealand society105.

This differentiation in education is nowhere more evident than in provision for post-primary education. During the mid-nineteenth century, the availability of secondary education for both Maori and Pakeha was limited to those who could afford to pay for it. This system obviously worked to the disadvantage of Maori, who were already concentrated in lower socio-economic

102 Henderson, Op cit, p. 23. 103 Ibid, pp. 25/26. 104 Rust, "The Te Hapua Situation", MA 19/1/660. 105 Simon, Op cit, p. 79; Also R. Shuker, The One Best System?, p. 195 ff.

143 groups.

During the late nineteenth century, as well as offering free places in endowed secondary schools the Government development a system of free District High Schools. Few Maori attended these schools. In contrast there was no attempt to provide on a large scale for secondary schooling of Maori. The main form of Maori secondary education was the private denominational boarding schools which provided for the education of a small anglicized elite 106.

Although, during the 1880 and 1890s a system of free government scholarships to these church schools increased Maori participation in secondary education, the rate of participation lagged far behind Pakeha. In 1909, 124 Maori pupils received free education at church boarding scho?ls. In contrast, 6624 pupils received free secondary education at almost exclusively Pakeha institutions. In addition, many more Pakeha could pay for their own children's secondary education 107.

During the 1860s and 1870s very few Muriwhenua Maori could afford to receive any form of secondary education. In 1877 Rev. Mr Stuart paid to place two Pukepoto and two Peria boys at St Stephen's. The Resident Magistrate's response to this move reveals the general attitude that Pakeha officials held to Maori secondary education. White commented:

Should this opportunity to advantage the boys be continued yearly by Mr. Stuart, it will form a great stimulus to their zeal; but unless the parents or friends are prepared to contribute liberally towards placing a boy either in a profession or trade, I cannot help thinking it a doubtful experiment. Although admitting the highly meritorious character of the attempt, my own views are practically confined to enabling the Native youth to communicate freely in English with the settlers-in fact, to substitute English for Maori, and to stimulate the energy and working capacity of these youths, too much inclined to idleness108.

During the 1880s and 1890s, with the increase in scholarships, the number of Muriwhenua youth able to attend denominational boarding schools increased. Such an education, however,

106 Simon, p. 80. 107 "Education", AJHR. 1910, B-1, p. 39 [Doc Bank]. 109 White to Under Secretary. 21 May 1877, Op cit, p. 2.

144 remained the preserve of a very small minority. In addition, even with scholarships, children were only able to take up such places at the cost of real sacrifice to the impoverished community109.

There was no District High School at all in Muriwhenua until the 1930s, when the Kaitaia Primary School opened a secondary departrnent llO. It is unlikely that many Maori attended this school. It was not until 1944 when Te Kao school became a District High School that Muriwhenua Maori got their own secondary school111.

Conclusion. This chapter has focussed on the actions and attitudes of the Mangonui Resident Magistrates: the principal representatives of the Crown in Muri whenua during the mid to late nineteenth century. An examination of the Resident Magistrates' reports, 1865-1893, show that these men were highly Eurocentric in their outlook, and correspondingly judgemental about Maori culture and values. As a result, they failed to identify any constructive role for the Crown in dealing with health and welfare issues, and instead promoted land purchase, individualisation and cultural assimilation.

The attitudes of the Resident Magistrates both reflected and influenced a more general complacency on the part of the Crown to the problems faced by Muriwhenua Maori. During the late nineteenth century the Crown failed to repond to the serious socio-economic difficulties faced in Muriwhenua.

The exception to this rule was the Native Schools System, which the Crown funded in complete disproportion to other areas of Maori welfare. This system was designed to aid the process of assimilating Maori into the purportedly superior European culture. Whereas assimilation claimed to offer Maori equal participation in the European world, assimilationist policies were in fact designed to further economic and social distinctions between Maori and Pakeha.

lO9 Henderson, p. 10. HO F. Keene, To The Northward, pp. 174/175. lillbid, p. 178.

145 Figure 12. Education for Assimilation: Trafalgar Day at the Farthest North School, Hapua.

Source: "Educan'on: Native Schools", AfHR, 1904, E-2.

146 CHAPTER FIVE: MAORI LAND ADMINISTRATION, 1890-1930.

Introduction. One of the most crippling legacies of the Native Land Court system in Muriwhenua was the fragmentation of Maori land holdings and the creation of uneconomic shares. Although this process of fragmentation continued into the twentieth century, from the 1890s onwards Crown agencies made parallel attempts to deal with the problems of title fragmentation and multiple ownership that they themselves had created.

During the period 1890-1930 the Crown toyed with three possible solutions to the problem of Maori land fragmentation: first, the vesting of Maori land in a statutory body for administration; second, the incorporation of owners under a management committee; and third, the consolidation of individual shares. This chapter places these three in their historical context and discusses their impact on Muriwhenua Maori during the early twentieth century. The chapter provides the historical and political background to Maori land development in the 1920s and after.

The Pressure for Reform. In chapter three, I discussed the increasing fragmentation of Muriwhenua land under a system of Native lands administration designed primarily not for the utilisation of Maori land but for its alienation. During the late nineteenth century the twin problems of title fragmentation and multiple individual ownership rendered much of the remaining Maori land holdings in Muriwhenua increasingly uneconomic. Court and survey costs mounted up on the land and created a further hindrance to effective utilization 1.

At the root of these problems was the Court's application of the principle of individualisation and its failure to provide for the corporate ownership or management of Maori land. During the l870s and 1880s successive governments passed extensive enactments and amendments which tampered with the Native Land Court system but did not effect this basic principle. While unsuccessful in removing inequities within the system, this huge body of legislative refonn

1 See Chapter 3.

147 succeeded in creating a system of Native land tenure so confused and cumbersome that in 1891 the Rees Commission claimed,

... lawyers of high standing and extensive practice have testified on oath that if the Legislature had desired to create a state of confusion and anarchy in Native-land titles it could not have hoped to be more successful than it has been2.

Although the system primarily affected Maori land owners, by the 1890s European observers had identified the uncertainty, complexity and expense of the Native Land Court system as a major inhibition to European settlement. The problem of multiple individual ownership, which grew worse with each succeeding generation, also made the sale or lease of Maori land to Europeans increasingly difficult. These factors led to growing pressure, from both Maori and Pakeha, for reform of the Native Land Court system3.

The Rees Commission. In 1891, as a result of these concerns, the Ballance administration established the Commission into Native Land Laws (the Rees Commission). The Crown instructed the commission to examine the origins, history and operations of the existing system of Native land administration and to suggest changes that could be made "so as to benefit both Natives and Europeans and prompt settlement,,4. The commission did not visit the Far North, nor did it take submissions from the Muriwhenua tribes. Nevertheless, the commission's findings are of direct relevance to the history of Maori land administration in the Far North because of its extensive criticism of the Native Land Court systemS.

To summarise, the Rees Commission produced a wide ranging indictment of the Native Land Court system, focussing on the principle of individualisation established under the 1873 Act and subsequent amendments. This principle, they argued, had been "the foundation and source of all the difficulties which have since arisen ... the pregnant cause of mischief and

2 "Report of the Commission into Native Land Laws", AJHR, 1891, Session II, G-l [hereafter Rees Commission], p. xi [Doc Bank]. 3 Ibid, p. xii. 4 Ibid, p. v. 5 The Commission's findings are also discussed at some length in Chapter 3: Problems with Indi vidualisation ff.

148 confusion,,6. If the Court had instead instituted a system of corporate ownership, the commission argued, "the difficulties, the frauds, and the sufferings, with their attendant loss and litigation, which have brought about a state of confusion regarding the titles to land, would never have occurred"7.

In addition, the Rees Commission listed numerous complaints about the day to day operations of the Court: unnecessary delays, excessive costs, insecurity of title after adjudication and political and Government influence brought to bear upon decisions, to name a few8. They concluded:

Testimony, gathered from all quarters and from both races, shows that from the commencement of the surveys, when a Native applies to have land brought under the operation of the Native Land Act and the Native Land Court, down to the period when the European purchaser registers his title under the Land Transfer Act, every step is burdened with unnecessary cost, and offers inducements to many species of fraud; while the whole proceeding tends to demoralise both Natives and Europeans,to frighten away capital, to paralyse industry, to turn the Courts of justice into theatres of oppression, and to hinder the settlement and prosperity of the country9.

Despite these criticisms, the Rees Commission failed to question either the inherent acceptability of further alienation of Maori land or the need to encourage Maori to develop their own lands. One of the Crown's acknowledged aims in establishing the commission had been to promote "prompt settlement". What this in fact meant was to promote European settlement, in other words, the alienation of more Maori land. It did not occur to Crown agents during the 1890s that promoting settlement might encompass helping or encouraging Maori to develop their own land. Indeed government agents appear to have viewed development of Maori land during the 1890s solely in terms of its sale or lease to Europeans.

The Rees Commission's recommendations for Maori lands administration reflected this paternalistic ideology. Although they argued that the Native Land Court system had paralysed industry and inhibited Maori land development, they did not make any positive

6 Rees Commission, p. viii. 7 Ibid, p. vii. S Ibid, p. xii. 9 Ibid, p. xiii.

149 recommendations for the future utilisation of Maon land by Maon owners. Likewise, they identified the role of the Native Land Court system in leading to the unchecked alienation of Maori land and concluded that under the present system Maori would soon be completely landless10. Nevertheless they not only condoned but actively supported opening up more Maori land to European settlement, arguing:

Immense areas of idle territory existing while an industrious population are leaving the colony because they cannot get land to settle on is an injury to New Zealand and to its people 11.

The commission's recommendations centred round establishing a fairer and more effective means of alienating Maori land. To this end, they proposed that the Crown should establish a Native Land Board consisting of both Maori and European members, with plenary power over Maori land. The Board would have the ability to act as a trustee on behalf of Maori owners. The commission proposed that block and district committees of Maori owners should form to determine boundary and ownership issues and to choose sufficient reserves for the Maori owners. The Native Land Board would then lease or sell the balance. The commission strongly recommended that this new system be made compulsory12.

The Rees Commission thus proposed to establish a statutory body in which to vest Maori land in order to overcome the problem of multiple individual ownership of Maori land blocks. The commission saw this Board as a solution to the problem of multiple ownership only in terms of further alienation of Maori land, by sale or lease. They did not envisage that the Board would be involved in the development of Maori land by or on behalf of the Maori owners.

The Vesting oj Maori Land in Maori Land Councils. Although the Crown did not implement the Rees Commission's recommendations during the 1890s, the idea of vesting Maori land in a statutory body in order to overcome the handicaps inherent in multiple ownership of Maori land remained an appealing option. The Stout / Ngata Commission report noted that from 1895 -1900 the legislature sanctioned a number of subsidiary schemes ...

10 Ibid. pp. x/xi. 11 Ibid. p. xx.

12 Ib"dl , pp. XXI-XXV."

150 · .. generally in the direction of consolidating in the hands of committees or of trustees the powers of alienating or of managing tribal land so as to overcome the difficulties of title inherent in tribal lands with large numbers of individual ownersl3.

By the turn of the century, increasing concern over Maori landlessness and economic vulnerability led the Crown to again focus on the problem of more effective utilisation of Maori land. The preamble to "the Maori Lands Administration Act, 1900" stated as its raison d'etre increasing concern over Maori landlessness, and the need to make provision, "for the better settlement and utilisation of large areas of Maori land at present lying unoccupied and unproductive, and for the encouragement and protection of the Maoris in efforts of industry and self-help". Under the act the Crown suspended its purchase activities and legislated for the formation of Maori Land Councils. The Crown authorised these councils to exercise all the powers of the Native Land Court in relation to title determination, succession, and partition, and to create inalienable papakainga reserves for all Maori. Section 28 of the act also enabled Maori owners to convey land to the councils on trust for "leasing, cutting up, managing, improving, and raising money upon the same"14.

The act thus legislated for a statutory body in which to vest Maori land for the purposes of administration, much as had been proposed by the Rees Commission. The Crown intended the councils to facilitate the utilisation of Maori land primarily through long-term leasing. Nevertheless, section 28 of the Act clearly enabled the councils to manage or improve Maori land as well as to lease it. While it was unclear exactly what form this management would take, the act thus opened up the possibility that the councils might play a role in Maori land development. Carroll apparently hoped that Maori would lease their surplus lands and use the money for development of their remaining lands 15.

The vesting of Maori land in the councils thus provided a possible solution to the problem of multiple individual ownership of Maori land blocks. From the point of view of the Maori

13 "General Report on Native Lands and Native Land Tenure", AJHR, 1907, G-1C [Stout/Ngata: G-1C], p. 4 [Doc Bank]. 14 "The Maori Lands Administration Act, 1900", New Zealand Statutes [hereafter NZS], 1900, No 55, pp.468-483 [Doc Bank]. 15 G. V. Butterworth, Maori Affairs, p. 6 ; Ibid, pp. 58/59.

151 owners, however, it was a paternalistic and authoritarian solution as it removed all control of their lands from them:--

As the Rees Commission themselves pointed out, a similar legislative solution to the problem of multiple ownership had been tried in 1886. "The Native Lands Administration Act, 1886" provided Maori owners with the option of handing over control of their land to the Crown who would sell or lease it as an agent on their behalf. The act was unacceptable to Maori owners. No Maori brought their lands under its jurisdiction, and it was repealed two years laterl6.

Like the 1886 Act, lithe Maori Lands Administration Act, 1900" took control of Maori land away from the owners and placed it in the hands of a council not directly responsible to them. The act provided for six District Maori Land Councils in the North Island, each of seven members. Maori in the district elected three members to the council and the Crown appointed the other four, one of whom was Maori. While these councils operated on a regional rather than a national basis they did not provide for input at the local iwi or hapu level in the administration of land vested in them. The Tokerau Maori Land Council, for example, was supposed to represent the interests of all Maori land owners throughout the whole of the North Auckland area. The council thus operated on the false assumption that the interests of all North Auckland iwi could be grouped together without consideration for local concemsl7.

In any case, Parliament soon further reduced the degree of Maori representation on the councils. "The Maori Land Settlement Act, 1905" transformed the councils into Maori Land Boards. These consisted of three members: the Judge and Registrar of the local Maori Land Court, and a third Maori member. The Judge was the President of the Board and held all real power in case of disagreement. In 1913, the Crown abolished the Maori representation entirely and reduced the boards' membership to two18.

The vesting of Maori land in such boards or councils was thus unacceptable to Maori owners because it deprived them of management and authority over their land. As the Stout / Ngata Commission noted in 1907, the Maori Land Councils were doomed to failure for same reasons as 1886 Actl9.

16 A. Ward, A Show of Justice. p. 296; Rees Commission, p. xvi; Stout/Ngata: G-IC. pp. 5/6. 17 "The Maori Lands Administration Act, 1900", pp. 470/47l. 18 "Native Affairs Commission", 1934, G-ll p. 9 [Doc Bank] ; Butterworth. Op cit. p. 63; Ibid. p. 69.

152 Compulsory Vesting of Maori Land: Parengarenga and Pakohu. "The Maori Lands Administration Act, 1900" had left it to the discretion of Maori owners whether to vest their lands in the Maori Land Councils for administration. From 1904 onwards, the failure of Maori to voluntarily vest their lands in the councils, and growing pressure from Pakeha to open up yet more Maori land to European settlement, led the legislature to encroach on the principle of voluntary vesting. In 1904 Parliament authorised the compulsory vesting of Maori land in the councils, first in default of rates payments and then in default of survey mortgages. In the following years provisions for compulsory vesting were extended to land the Minister believed was not suitable for occupation by the Maori owners, land that was infested with noxious weeds and land that was "required" for settlement by the Maori owners on a proper and effective basis20.

Provisions for compulsory vesting of Maori land in the councils or boards had important consequences for Muriwhenua Maori. "The Maori Land Claims Adjustment and Laws Amendment Act, 1904" enabled the Crown to vest certain specified blocks of land, in respect of which the owners had failed to discharge survey liens, in the district Maori Land Council. Included in the scheduled blocks were 57306 acres of Maori land on the Aupouri Peninsula:

Figure 13: Parengarenga and Pakohu, Vested Lands.

Block. Area. Amount Owing. Parengarenga No.3 1998-0-0 £23-1-5 Parengarenga No.4 100-0-0 £ 8-2-1 Parengarenga No.5 '46144-0-23 £ 689-5-8 Pakohu No. 1 4169-0-0 £127-1-6 Pakohu No. 2B 6261-0-0 £256-8-10 Pakohu No 3. 935-0-0 £ 75-17-8 Pakohu No. 5 14-3-0 £ 6-1-2 Source: Maori Land Claims Adjustment and Laws Amendment Act, 1904: First Schedule.

19 Stout!Ngata: G-IC, pp. 5/6. 20 Ibid, p. 6.

153 Maori owners were unable to meet the two month ultImatum to pay these extensIve survey costs and the Crown subsequently vested these b!ocks, or their respective subdivisJons, inJhe Tokerau Maori Land Board. The board then divided the blocks into seven sections which they offered for lease. By March 1908 four sections had been leased and three remained to be offered21 .

According to the figures provided by the Stout / Ngata Commission in 1908, the 57306 acres of land vested in the board amounted to over half the Maori land remaining in Mangonui County. It included the homes of Maori based at Te Kao and Te Hapua papakainga. It also included substantial gum lands, which provided the main source of livelihood for Maori on the Aupouri Peninsula. The vesting of this land and the board's subsequent treatment of local Maori is thus of major significance to the history of Maori land administration in the Far North.

Compulsory vesting of Maori land highlighted the authoritarian and paternalistic aspects of the Maori Land Board system. Maori on the Aupouri Peninsula were deprived without their consent of management and authority over their lands. It is true that the land might otherwise have passed out of Maori hands to defray survey costs. Nevertheless the vesting of land in the board amounted in effect to little more than the enforced alienation of Maori land.

Nor did vesting of the land in the board further the utilisation of Maori land by or for Maori. The 1900 Act had opened the possibility that the councils might play some role in development of Maori land other than through its lease to Europeans. In addition, section 292 of the 1909 Act specifically enabled the Maori Land Boards to manage lands vested in them by Maori Councils in respect of survey liens as a farm22.

The Tokerau Maori Land Board did not explore this possibility. The board continued to function primarily as an agent for leasing Maori land to Europeans. The board did not develop the lands at Parengarenga and Maori owners effectively lost all opportunity to utilise the land for their own benefit. Although the board argued that the rents were not excessive and that there was nothing to stop the owners tendering for lease, most Maori owners clearly did not have the financial resources to re-lease their own lands from the board23.

21 "The Maori Land Claims Adjustment and Laws Amendment Act", NZS. 1904, No 49, p. 264 [Doc Bank] ; Ibid. p. 270 ; Registrar NLC to Under Secretary, 15 Feb 1907, MA 78/21b [Doc Bank) ; Return of Tokerau Maori Land Board, 20 March 1908, MA 78/6 [Doc Bank]. 22 "Native Affairs Commission", Op cit, p. 9.

154 Nor were the proceeds returned to Maori to enable them to develop their own land. By 1910 all costs had been repaid from the survey liens on Parengarenga and Pakohu. A return of that year shows that there were six leases on the land, five held by Europeans and one by a Maori. The board collected an annual rental of £432. The proceeds from these leases continued to go not to the Maori owners but to the general Tokerau Board's account. Although the leases were theoretically administered on their behalf, Maori owners did not receive any such benefits24.

The Board's Reserve Provisions. As already stated, the land vested in the Tokerau Board catered for the livelihood of Maori living on the Aupouri peninsula. Before leasing the land, the board created reserves for the occupation and maintenance of the resident owners. Local Maori disputed the adequacy of these reserves. They felt that they were not sufficient to sustain the resident owners, and they resented their lands being leased while they were not adequately provided for.

The bad feeling surrounding the situation was such that when the Stout I Ngata Commission travelled to the area in 1908 Carroll particularly instructed the commission to allow the grievances to be fully ventilated and to establish whether it would be disadvantageous to the Maori owners to offer the remaining unleased sections for selection25. Meanwhile, a storm during March 1908 destroyed the kumara plantations and caused Maori even greater distress. Maori at Parengarenga sent a further request to Carroll for a means of livelihood26.

The commission declined a request to hold a sitting at Te Kao itself. Instead they took evidence on 27 April 1908 at Ahipara, from representatives of Te Kao and Te Hapua Maori27. Manuera Waata appeared on behalf of Te Kao residents. Waata complained that the board had misled Te Kao Maori as to the extent of reserve provisions. Prior to vesting in the council, the Native Land Court had reserved Parengarenga 5B No 3, a 2725 acre block, as the Te Kao papakainga. Resident Maori understood that the board would not interfere with this arrangement. On survey, however, the board cut out nearly 1800 acres from the reserved block

23 Jas. W. Browne, President Tokerau District MLB to Under Secretary, 16 June 1908, MA 78/21b. 24 "Native Lands Vested in the Maori Land Boards", AJHR, 1910, G-IO, p. 2 [Doc Bank]. 25 Carroll to Ngata, 2 March 1908, MA 78/6 [Doc Bank]. 26 Hare Raharuhi et al to Hon. James Carroll, 20 April 1908, MA 78/21b. 21 MA 78/6

155 and threw If mfo one of the sectIons for prospective leasing (LOt A). Te Kao Maon felt that the remaining reserves were inadequate. Waata requested that the original reserve (5B No 3), which had still not been leased, revert to them28.

Maori at Te Hapua also complained that the board's reserve provisions were inadequate. Murupaenga Rewiri, testifying on their behalf, complained that although the board had reserved 708 acres of land at Te Hapua, the land was wet and a good deal was actually under water during the winter months. Rewiri requested that Lot G (872 acres) the lease to which had been surrendered, be given back so as to give them a larger area of dry land in their papakainga reserve. He also requested that an additional area be cut out of Pakohu 2B and returned to them29.

Also at issue was control of the existing Maori reserves. These reserves were in an unusual legal position: although the board actually owned them by statute in fee simple, they were clearly intended for the use and benefit of resident Maori. Maori felt they should have absolute control of these areas and objected to the board's interference.

Manuera Waata claimed that Judge Brown had cut out five acres from the Te Kao reserve for Walter Evans' store. Evans, who had also taken up one of the leased sections, had previously lived on the reserve for about eight years without any problems. Since he got his lease from the board, he had started behaving in ways that upset local Maori. For example, he had begun to employ Sunday labour and had brought liquor into the area for the supply of his employees30.

According to Waata, Evans had also employed Dalmations to dig gum on the unleased Lot A. Some had set fire to a flax area along Te Kao stream on Parengarenga 5B No 3, the former reserve which Maori claimed should be returned to them. Local Maori could not get the Dalmatians to leave the property31.

28 Evidence of Manuera Waata re Parengarenga Lands, 27 April 1908, Ngata's Minute Books, MA 78/5, pp. 246/247 ; "Interim Report of the Native Lands Commission, on Native Lands in the Counties of Whangarei, Hokianga, Bay of Islands, Whangaroa, and Mangonui", AJHR, 1908,0-11 [Stout/Ngata: G- 11], p. 55 [Doc Bank] 29 Evidence of Muru Paenga Rewiri re Pakohu Block, 27 April 1908, Ngata's Minute Books, MA 78/5, pp. 250/251 ; Stout/Ngata: G I-J, p. 55. 30 Ibid; Evidence of Manuera Waata re Parengarenga Lands, Op cit. 31 Ibid.

156 Te Hapua Maori also objected to the board's interference in their papakainga reserves. According to Rewiri, the board collected fees from the storekeepers in the reserved areas amounting to about £20 per annum. The board also collected royalties on gum from the papakainga amounting to about 1/- in the pound. Timothy Yates collected royalties at Te Hapua and Evans' children collected them at Te Ka032.

Judge Brown, the president of the board denied that these reserve provisions were inadequate. He argued that the reserved areas were ample for the requirements of resident Natives, and that the interests of the majority of non-resident owners had to be considered. Brown claimed that Blake, the surveyor, considered that the reserves were sufficient, and that a larger area had eventually been measured than first suggested33.

While resident Maori clearly suffered from the paucity of reserve provisions, it is hard to see in what ways the non-resident owners benefited. As already discussed, the board did not return the money from the Parengarenga leases to the owners. It remained in the Tokerau Board account, where it benefitted neither resident nor non-resident owners.

Brown also denied that the board had interfered unduly with the reserves, arguing that the board had not required strict supervision over gum resources in papkainga areas, and indeed had not interfered with the papakaingas in any way beyond requiring persons wishing to erect stores to pay a license fee to the board. According to Brown, the board had not, in fact, collected any royalty from the great deal of gum collected at Te Hapua34.

By collecting rent from storekeepers at the papakainga, however, the board denied Maori residents any control over the exploitative practices of the storekeepers. The stores from which the board collected rent contributed to the impoverishment of local Maori. As already discussed, many diggers at the 1898 Kauri Gum Commission complained about the exploitative practices engaged in by the Evans family. This behaviour continued under the board's regime. When Acheson visited the area in 1924, he found that the exorbitant prices charged by storekeepers contributed to the desperate poverty experienced by Maori at Te Kao and Te Hapua. Prior to 1924 the board not only turned a blind eye to such exploitation but, by

32 Evidence of Mum Paenga Rewiri re Pakohu Block, Op cit, pp. 250/25L 33 Jas. W. Browne, President Tokerau District MLB to Under Secretary. 16 June 1908, MA 78/21b. 34 Ibid.

157 denying Maori rent from the stores and collecting rent itself, contributed to and even legitimated such exploitation35:

While vesting of Parengarenga and Pakohu thus overcame the problems of title fragmentation and multiple ownership, it did not work to the advantage of Maori owners, either resident or non-resident. They lost control and use of their lands and did not gain access to the revenue from the leases. Nor did the board assist Maori land development in the area. Meanwhile, Maori residents felt that the remaining reserves were insufficient for their requirements. When Acheson finally prompted the board to assist Te Kao Maori during the 1920s, he argued, "the Tokerau Board feels under a special obligation to help the Te Kao and Te Hapua Natives because of the misfortunes they have suffered through the leases arranged by the Board in 1907,,36.

The Stout / Ngata Commission: General Recommendations. The Maori Land Board system did not answer the increasing pressure from Maori to be assisted to utilise their lands. Nor did it meet corresponding pressure from Pakeha to open up more Maori land to European settlement. In 1907 the Crown established another royal commission to investigate these problems.

The 1907/1908 Commission into Native Lands and Native-Land Tenure (the Stout / Ngata Commission) toured throughout New Zealand, taking evidence from Maori owners and European officials. The two man commission, made up of Chief Justice Sir Robert Stout and Apirana Ngata, produced numerous reports, both general and specific, into the issue of native land tenure.

Like the Rees Commission, the Crown's main purpose in establishing the Stout / Ngata Commission was to facilitate the settlement of Europeans on remaining Maori land. The Crown instructed the commission to inquire and report into the state of Native unoccupied or unprofitable land and to furnish immediate and specific information on the lands available for European settlement. Although the commission was also obliged to make provision "for the

35 Chapter 1: Gum Digging on the Aupouri Peninsula; Acting Registrar to Head Office, 18 February 1936, MNI 19/1/210 [Doc Bank]. 36 Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, MAIl 19/1/548 Part III, p. 2 [Doc Bank].

158 use and mamtenance of the Maon owners and theIr descendants", the pnmary mtennon of the Government was clearly the settlement of Europeans37.

Again like the Rees Commission, Stout I Ngata responded with a wide ranging indictment of the Native Land Court system and its effect on Maori land tenure. Unlike the Rees Commission, however, Stout I Ngata envisaged a role for the Crown in enabling and encouraging Maori to develop their remaining land.

Stout I Ngata noted the widespread demand amongst Maoridom to be assisted to farm their own land and concluded that the first priority in dealing with remaining Maori lands should be the settlement of Maori: "the encouragement and training of the Maoris to become industrious settlers". The commission noted the many problems faced by Maori in developing their own lands:

If it is difficult for the European settler to acquire Maori land owing to complications of title it is more difficult for the individual Maori owner to acquire his own land, be he ever so ambitious and capable of using it. His energy is dissipated in the Land Courts in a protracted struggle, first, to establish his own right to it, and, secondly to detach himself from the numerous other owners to whom he is genealogically bound to the title. And when he has succeeded he is handicapped by want of capital, by lack of training38.

The commission identified the absence of any legislation to encourage or train Maori to settle their lands and compared this with the notable assistance given to European settlers39. They concluded that Maori should not only be able to farm their lands but that the State had an obligation to assist them to do so:

The Dominion, in our opinion, has a duty to the Maoris. Let the Maoris have time to learn farming according to European methods, and let agricultural instructors and guides be appointed to train them. If the Maoris fail when proper means are taken to teach them, and when their titles are complete, it will be time enough to cavil at their unused lands40.

37 "Interim Report on Native Lands and Native-Land Tenure", AJIlR, 1907, G-l [Stout/Ngata: G-l], pp. iJii [Doc Bank] ; Slout/Ngata: G-IC, p. 1. 38 "General Report on Native Lands and Native Land Tenure", AJIlR, 1907, G-lc, p. 15. 39 Ibid, p. 7 ; Ibid, p. 15. 40 "Native Lands and Native-Land Tenure", 1908, G-IF [Stout/Ngata: G-IF], p. 4 [Doc Bank].

159 The Stout I Ngafa Commission recommended that the purchase of Maori land under the existing system should cease. Instead, they recommended the widespread use of the Maori Land Boards as an agent for owners or as the registered owner with the power to sell, lease, borrow on the security of the land and make reserves41 . Although the boards would be able to sell or lease "surplus" Maori land, the commission emphasised that the use of the boards should be designed primarily to encourage the settlement rather than the alienation of Maori land:

In dealing, therefore, with the lands now remaining to the Maori people we are of opinion that the settlement of Maoris should be the first consideration. And it is because we recognise the impossibility of doing so on a comprehensive scale by the ordinary method of partition and individualisation that we recommend the intervention of a body, such as the Maori Land Board, to be armed with powers sufficiently elastic to meet the exigencies of the situation42.

The boards would have the power to reserve burial-places, village sites and papakainga, set aside blocks as communal farms, grant leases to Maori tenants or incorporate owners of land to enable them to farm under an elected committee and raise money on security of the land for advancing to Maori farmers43 . Finally, the commission recommended that the law should be amended to enable large scale exchanges of land so as to facilitate consolidation of individual interests in Maori land44.

Like the Rees Commission, Stout I Ngata thus recommended as a solution to the problem of multiple individual ownership, the use of Maori Land Boards to facilitate the sale and lease of Maori land. The paternalistic aspects of this solution were still apparent and were highlighted by the fact that three quarters of the net proceeds of sales were to be paid not to the Maori owners but to the Public Trustee for investment45.

As far as management of remaining Maori land was concerned, however, Stout I N gata did not

41 Stout!Ngata: G-Ie, pp. 16/17. 42 Ibid, p. 15. 43 Ibid, p. 18. MIbid, p. 19. 45 Ibid, p. 18.

160 anticipate the Boards being used So much as an end in themselves as an agent to assist Maori to manage their own lands. In order to accomplish this goal they appear to have favoured the incorporation of Maori land blocks under a committee of management Incorporation provided an alternative solution to the problem of joint ownership of Maori land blocks. Years later Ngata described the principles on which incorporation was based:

It was necessary on the one hand to evolve a system of organising the individuals in the title in such a way as to stabilise corporate action and legal decisions, and on the other hand to secure legislative recognition of the title expressing such an organisation as could be legally offered to a money lender and on which he could lend ... The system is known as the incorporation of native land owners and is in effect an adaptation of the tribal system, the hierarchy of chiefs being represented by the Committee of Management. As with the tribal hierarchy, so with the Committee, its executive functions gravitate into the hands of someone capable of satisfying the diverse elements in the community, while complying with the business requirements of the undertaking46.

The Crown had first legislated for the use of such incorporations under "the Native Lands Administration Act, 1886". As already discussed, no Maori brought their lands under this act's jurisdiction. This was followed by "the Native Land Court Act, 1894", which gave the Native Land Court power to incorporate the owners of Maori land. Although there was nothing to actually debar the incorporated owners from using the land themselves, this act was in fact designed to facilitate alienation of Maori land. The act had one other major downfall: it provided that the Public Trustee was entitled to receive all the proceeds from alienations and from other income. Although section 23 of "the Maori Land Claims Adjustment and Laws Amendment Act, 1906" further extended the powers of such incorporations, in 1907 there was still no comprehensive legislation to cover the incorporation of owners of Maori land for the purposes of land development47.

Stout I Ngata in Muriwhenua. In 1907 the legislature passed "the Native Land Settlement Act", to implement many of Stout I Ngata's initial recommendations. While Part I of this act made provision for the alienation of Maori lands to Europeans through the Maori Land Boards, Part II was intended to facilitate the

46 Ngata, The Maori People Today pp.139j140, quoted in G. Asher and D. Naulls. Maori Land, p. 39. 47 Ward, p. 296 ; Rees Commission, p. x. ; Ibid, p. xvi; Stout/Ngata: G-IC. p. 4 ; Judge R. N. Jones to Chief Judge NLC, 9 March 1907, MA 78/21a, pp. 4-8 [Doc Bank].

161 commission's recommendations with regard to remaining Maori lands. The act provided for the incorporation of owners under the terms of the 1894 and 1906 actii;and also for Maori hind to .. be leased to specific Maori for farming48.

Stout / Ngata used the legislation of 1907 as a basis for their specific recommendations over Muriwhenua land. During the months of March and April 1908, the commission toured extensively through the Far North and took submissions from Maori owners. People turned out in large numbers throughout the area to submit their blocks.

The commission spent two days taking evidence from Maori in Mangonui County. On 27 April Ngata sat alone at Ahipara. He was joined by Stout at Mangonui on 30 ApriL At both sittings, Maori owners voiced a widespread desire to utilise their lands in accordance with the provisions of the 1907 Act. While some asked for their land to be sold or leased to Europeans, many wanted to be enabled to farm their lands, either by incorporating or by leasing the land to specific Maori, usually the resident owners49.

The testimony taken by Stout I Ngata was extremely rushed: in two days they took individual evidence on almost all the blocks of Maori land in Muriwhenua. It was thus no doubt subject to many inaccuracies. Nevertheless, Stout / Ngata must have been the first Crown commission to take such extensive local testimony from Maori, and to base their recommendations on the wishes of Maori owners.

Stout / Ngata made specific recommendations about 89024 acres of Maori land in Mangonui. The Parengarenga and Pakohu lands, which parliament had vested in the Maori Land Board, comprised 57306 acres. The Commission recommended another 7801 acres of land for "general setdement": 6819 by lease and 982 by sale. They recommended the remaining 23236 acres for Maori occupation, an area which they admitted was small for a Maori population of 2053 at the last census. The commission recorded the wishes of the owners of many of these blocks, either to have the land incorporated to enable development, or to lease the land to one or some owners under the terms of the 1907 Act50.

48 "The Native Land Settlement Act, 1907", NZS, 1907, No 62, pp. 271-285 [Doc Bank]. 49 Stout's Minute Books, MA 78/2 ; Ngata's Minute Books, MA 78/5. 50 Stout!Ngata: G-lJ, pp. 42-45.

162 WhIle most of the recommendations were made In accordance WIth the expressed WIShes of the owners, there was one notabl~ exception. At the commission, Manuera Waata expressed the desire of Te Kao Maori to be allowed to develop their lands. In addition to requesting the enlargement of their papakainga, Waata also requested that substantial areas of the still unleased sections revert to them to be managed under the incorporation systemS1 ,

Although the commission was sympathetic to the requests of both Te Kao and Te Hapua Maori to have their papakainga areas enlarged, they did not support the Te Kao initiative to manage a more substantial portion of the vested lands. The commission argued that if the owners were to manage the land they should pay rent to the Board "so as to secure proper use of the land and the gum on it,,52.

Results 0/ the Stout / Ngata Commission. As already discussed, some of the initial recommendations of the Stout / Ngata Commission were immediately incorporated into legislation in "the Native Land Settlement Act, 1907", and the commission made its recommendations for Muriwhenua land on the basis of this act. "The Native Land Act, 1909" further consolidated and strengthened provisions for farming incorporations and for leasing Maori land to would-be Maori farrnersS3.

Despite these legislative enactments, the long term results of the Stout / Ngata Commission as far as Maori land development was concerned were negligible. The commission had trod a narrow path of political acceptability between encouraging Maori land development and opening up further Maori land to European settlement. The two were in fact irreconcilable. In the aftermath of the commission, the Government acted quickly on its provisions to open up Maori land to "general settlement" under Part I of the 1907 Act54. During the next 13 years large scale alienation of Maori land continued.

On the other hand, nothing was done to assist Maori to develop their land. Although farming

51 Evidence of Manuera Waata re Parengarenga Lands, Op cit, p. 248 ; Ibid, p. 253 ; Stout/Ngata: G-lJ, p.55. 52 Ibid. 53 Butterworth, Maori Affairs, pp. 66/67. 54 Jan-July 1909 in "Correspondence re Tokerau District Native Land Commission Reports", NLC Whangerei. 19 Misc [Doc Bank].

163 incorporations had seemed an attractive means of solving the problem of multiple ownership, they were insufficient -in -them~elves unless-the- Crown was -also-prepared to provided - development assistance. During the next two decades the Crown made no provision to enable Maori owners to develop their lands either through loans or through much needed practical assistance. The enthusiasm and initiative inspired amongst Maori by the Stout / Ngata Commission remained largely unchanneled.

European Economic Development (the Comparative Context). The lack of encouragement the Crown gave to Maori land development during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contrasts with the considerable assistance offered to European settlers in the Far North. A comprehensive discussion of the history of European settlement in Muriwhenua would entail extensive research of its own. Nevertheless, this comparative context is crucial to any analysis of Maori under-development in Muriwhenua.

One of the primary ways in which the Crown assisted European settlement in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century, to the detriment of local Maori, was through the extensive purchase of Maori land. These purchases are reviewed in the Muriwhenua Preliminary Report and in Chapter 2 of this report.

In addition, the Crown offered a number of aids and incentives to encourage European settlement. During the 1850s under the Forty Acre System, the Crown encouraged settlement in the Muriwhenua area by giving free grants of Crown land to British immigrants. During the 1870s under the Homestead System the Crown again provided free grants of land for European immigrants, conditional on specific improvements being made on the land within a certain number of years55.

During the 1880s, the Crown settled a number of Europeans at Takahue, Herekino and Fern Flats on perpelUallease under the Ballance Village Settlement Scheme. Under the scheme, which was designed to relieve unemployment during the 1886-7 depression, the Crown advanced the settlers money for erecting a house and making specific improvements to the land. The scheme, which had been rushed in as a relief measure, was not a success. Settlers suffered considerable hardship and many left the land. Nevertheless, some stayed and managed

55 Keene, To The Northward, p. 128.

164 to establish themselves in the area. By 1907 the Crown ranger noted that the Herekino settlement, for example, had become quite prosperous56.

The Crown recognised a clear obligation in the case of these village settlements to provide a livelihood for those who persevered with their holdings. In addition to cash advances, the Crown incurred considerable expense in providing extensive road works for the settlements. These works served the dual purpose of providing subsistence employment for the settlers and rendering access to the settlements. They also opened up thousands of acres of adjoining Crown lands for further European settlement. By February 1891 the Crown had spent over £9000 on advances and road works to the three settlements57.

During the 1890s the Crown offered more concerted assistance and support for European settlement. Under "the Lands Act, 1892" the Crown purchased a further 2,729,000 acres of Native lands for the purposes of close settlement58. The Stout I Ngata Commission described the considerable assistance offered to Pakeha settlers under this system:

The land-settlement policy of the colony is framed in such a manner that the Waste Lands Boards undertake all the preliminary work of putting the titles to selections in order, of surveying them as far as possible with a view to practicable fencing­ boundaries, road access, and homestead-sites. The selector concerns himself only with financial arrangements to effect the necessary improvements. Here again the State comes to his assistance and lends him money on easy terms. He claims such facilities and assistance as a matter of right, because he is a valuable asset to the State. Under the Land for Settlements Acts we sometimes spend as much as £13,000 for the settlement of one settler, and we suppose that the average cost of settling one settler on land under these Acts is not much less than £1,50059.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, assistance to Pakeha settlers in Muriwhenua also continued in the form of public works under taken by both the Crown and the Mangonui County Council. In general these public works programmes had two main

56 Ibid; "Village-Homestead Special-Settlement System in New Zealand", AfHR, 1891, Session II, C- 5, pp. 1/2 [Doc Bank] ; Ibid, p. 9 ; "Department of Lands", C-l, 1907, p. 71 [Doc Bank]. 57 Keene, Op cit, pp. 52-54 ; "Village Homestead Special Settlements", AfHR, 1888, B-19, p. 2 [Doc Bank] ; "Village-Homestead Special-Seulement System in New Zealand", Op cit, pp. 9/10 ; Ibid, p. 12 ; "Surveys of New Zealand", AJHR, 1888, ColA, p. 16 [Doc Bank]. 58 Stout!Ngata: G-l C, pp. 4/5. 59 Ibid, p. 15.

165 thrusts: on the one hand providing better access to existing settler communities, and on the other hand opening up further Crown lands fot settlement. "In both cases Pakeha settlers benefitted, both in terms of employment opportunities and the economic infrastructure that the roads provided.

In contrast, the Crown did not recognise the same responsibility to provide Maori settlers either with employment through public works or with roads for their lands. During the mid­ nineteenth century road building did provide a source of employment for many Muriwhenua Maori, and Resident Magistrates' reports note that Maori showed considerable desire to participate in public works employment60. During the later nineteenth century, however, Maori increasingly competed for this work with Pakeha settlers who also saw it as an important source of supplementary income. Both Crown and Mangonui County Council saw work given to Maori as work taken away from needy Pakeha settlers. As early as 1877 White reported, "The very small amount of work under Road Boards has not, as a rule, included much Native labour"61. During the 1880s the Crown showed considerable reluctance to allow Maori to participate in the principal road works in the district, those associated with the Ballance village settlements. For example survey officials commented of the Ahipara-Herekino Road:

All the portion of the road (about seven-eighths of whole) which runs through Native land has been made by Native contractors, who are very jealous at the works additional to the original formation being given to the village settlers, and refuse to allow fascining material or gravel to be taken off their land except at exorbitant rates. At the same time, it is a necessity that the settlers should have the work, as many of them will not be able to exist without it62.

As noted above, public works programmes were heavily weighted on the one hand towards existing European settlements and on the other hand to opening up Crown land for settlement. In contrast there was a notable absence of public works development in predominantly Maori areas, for example the Aupouri and Karikari Peninsulas.

Although roads did sometimes pass through Native Land, usually on route to Crown land or

60 Resident Magistrates Reports, AIHR, 1812-1881 [pR Doc, Vol I: B3-H]. 61 White Report, 21 May 1877, no. 2, AJHR 1877, G-I, p. 1., CPR Doc, Vol 1: B7]. 62 "Surveys of New Zealand", AIHR, 1887, Session II, C-2, p. 17 [Doc Bank] ; "Surveys of New Zealand", AIHR, 1888, Op cit, p. 16.

166 settler communities, both the Crown and the Mangonm County CouncIl were reluctant to provide or service roads through Magri land. For example in 1897, the Lands and Surveys Department noted of the road connecting Awanui with the Herekino Village Settlement that unfortunately it passed mainly through Native land and the Mangonui County Council would thus not assist in its maintenance. Again in 1900 the Department of Lands and Survey noted that they were not pushing ahead with the Larmers I Takahue road, "as the land through which it passes is still in the hands of Natives, and the line will only enhance its value,,63. On the other hand, Crown and settlers were quick to condemn Maori for non payment of rates. Even the Rees Commission used the rating issue to justify further European settlement of Maori land:

While the rights of the Crown and of the Natives, and the authority of Parliament, claim attention, the rights of the general public must not be forgotten. The land of the Maori is untaxed. While the European population are called upon to pay heavy interest on loans partly spent in improving the value of the Native lands, and partly in Native wars, the Native people pay comparatively little taxation; while local rating falls with great weight upon the European, but not to the same extent on the Native64.

There were thus numerous ways in which the Crown exclusively promoted European settlement in Mangonui. In late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Muriwhenua area was not prosperous, and at times both Maori and many Pakeha settlers experienced considerable hardship_ There was comparatively little high quality land available, and the area as a whole suffered from lack of markets and lack of good port and roading facilities. Nonetheless, this does not detract from the enormous amount of assistance given to Pakeha settlers compared with that offered to Maori.

In addition, by the early twentieth century Lands and Surveys rangers noted that the Muriwhenua economy was improving. In 1908 the ranger noted a steady increase in the number of Pakeha settlers in Mangonui and greatly increased interest in the dairy industry. Two cooperative factories and two creameries were in full operation and two more creameries were proposed for the next season. Two years later the ranger again noted the increase in dairying, despite the lack of first class land, and commented on the general improvement in

63 "Department of Lands and Survey", AJHR, C-l, 1897, Sess II, p. 48 [Doc Bank] ; "Department of Lands and Survey, AJHR, C-l, 1900, p. 47 [Doc Bank] ; Okaihau to Victoria Valley Road, "Surveys of NZ", 1887, Op cit, p. 14. 64 "Rees Commission, p. xx.

167 economy65.

The Crown furthered European settlement during the second decade of the twentieth century by extensive swamp drainage operations in the Kaitaia area. These works opened up more European land for dairying66. Although some Maori no d01Jbt benefitted from the drainage operations, most Maori land in the Kaitaia area had been purchased during the nineteenth century. In 1921 the Chief Drainage Engineer reported:

.. .it is noteworthy to record the progress which the district has made since the inception of work in and around the swamp. Areas which at one period were subject to flood have now become town allotments, others which were lagoons for several months during the year have now become pasture. Large areas have been subdivided into small dairy farms, and the aspect everywhere is one of prosperity and progress67.

Meanwhile the tradition of discriminatory assistance to Pakeha settlers continued with rehabilitation programmes after the war. Under the Discharged Soldiers Settlement Act, 1915 the Crown undertook a large scale programme to establish soldiers on farms. By 1920 over £14000000 had been authorised to be raised towards soldier settlement. Some of the settlements were in the Mangonui area68.

In theory, there was apparently nothing to stop Maori return soldiers from taking advantage of these provisions. A report in 1917 noted:

It may not be generally known that Maori members of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force have the same privileges in selecting land under the Discharged Soldiers Settlement Act as European members, and in one or two instances have taken advantage thereot69.

While the same report noted that it was "most essential that every returned soldier should be

65 "Department of Lands", AIHR, C-l, 1907, p. 12 [Doc Bank] ; "Department of Lands", AIHR, C-l, 1908 p. 18 [Doc Bank] ; "Department of Lands", AIHR, C-l, 1910,p. 14 [Doc Bank]. 66 "Swamp Drainage", AIHR, 1933, C-4, p. 1 [Doc Bank]. 67 "Swamp Drainage", AIHR, 1921, Sess II, C-4, p. 1 [Doc Bank]. 68 "Discharged Soldiers' Settlement", AIHR, 1918, C-9, p. 2 [Doc Bank] ; Keene, Op cit, p. 53. 69 "Discharged Soldiers' Settlement", AIHR, 1917, C-9, p. 6 [Doc Bank].

168 --"_... _,,._. __ . ------afforded the fullest infonnation as to the method of securing land and the tenns on which it is allotted", obviously nothing was done to advise Maori soldiers about their eligibility for these provisions 70. Most Maori did not know that they could take advantage of the legislation, and very few in fact did so. Nor did the legislation cater for the specific requirements of Maori returned soldiers, for example to be settled in their district of origin. A further legislative provision, which enabled Maori to donate land to the Crown for settlement of Maori soldiers, suggests that the Crown did not in fact intend Maori to take advantage of the provisions available for Pakeha returned soldiers71.

For Muriwhenua Maori, the Crown's treatment of their returned soldiers was an ongoing take. For example, when Eru Ihaka and 100 others from Te Kao petitioned the new prime minister, Michael Joseph Savage, in 1936, one of the grievances they asked him to address was the lack of assistance given to Te Kao's returned soldiers72. Savage replied that he had been given to understand that Maori returned soldiers received exactly the same assistance as Pakeha, and that if this was not the case then Te Kao Maori should place the facts before the "proper authorities,,73.

The Changing Political Climate. While the Crown thus gave notable assistance to Pakeha settlers in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, prior to the 1920s the Crown provided no assistance at all to Muriwhenua Maori to develop their own lands. During this period the Crown continued to focus what attention it devoted to Maori land almost entirely on its alienation. Despite the rhetoric of assimilation, which encouraged Maori to be as Europeans, Crown agents pursued policies which forced Maori into the position of second class citizens, devoid of an adequate land base. Development of Maori land was pursued entirely in tenns of its lease or sale to Europeans.

By the 1920s, however, the political and economic climate in New Zealand was much more favourable to the support of Maori land development tentatively proposed by the Stout / Ngata

70 "Discharged Soldiers' Settlement", 1918, p. 2. 71 Ibid, p. 4 ; G. V. Butterworth, itA Rural Maori Renaissance?", IPS, Vol 81, No 2, June 1972, p 165. 72 Petition to Savage, 1936, MNI 19/1/210 [Doc BankJ. 73 Native Minister to Eru Ihaka, 12 March 1936, MNI 19/1/210.

169 Commission. In his 1972 article Graham Butterworth posed a number of reasons for this change. First;~-large scale purchase-of Maori-land~ tailed-off-nuring~the-early-t920s. -The­ recession of 1920-2 led to a heavy fall in land values and consequently relieved much of the pressure to open up Maori lands to European settlement. The biggest factor in the way of assisting Maori to develop their own lands, competition from settler interests, was thus removed74.

The cessation of Maori land purchase also forced the government to confront the problem of the debts that had been amassing on Maori land from rates and survey liens. Because these were a first charge on Maori land, the Government did not have to seriously confront the problem as long as large scale purchase of Maori land continued. When land purchase slowed down, non-payment of rates became a major political issue75.

By the 1920s it was also no longer possible for policy makers to ignore the fact that the Maori population was on the increase. Although the view that Maori were a dying race persisted long after available statistical information contradicted this opinion, by 1920 Crown agents were very much aware of the economic implications of Maori popUlation increase: that not enough Maori land remained to support an increasing population. Policy makers feared that the Maori population might become an increasing charge on the state76.

During the 1920s Crown officials th us increasingly came to view Maori land development as a rational and necessary economic step. Ngata wrote in 1931:

It has suddenly dawned on the official mind that the development of Native lands will have the same if not greater effect than the settlement of Crown or pakeha lands - add to wealth and production, add to the number of effective and financial occupiers of land, reduce general and hospital rates and promote by so much the well being of New Zealand77.

In addition, Pakeha urbanisation served to increase the appeal of Maori land development. From 1890-1920 large scale urbanisation and industrialisation of the Pakeha population

74 Butterworth IPS, p. 170. 75 Ibid, pp. 173/174. 76 Butterworth IPS, pp. 167/168. 77 Ngata to Buck, 29 June 1931, Sorrenson (ed), Na To Hoa Aroha, Vol 2, pp. 162/163.

170 occurred. As Pakeha moved to the towns and CIties, they became Increasingly concerned with keeping Maori on the land and thus preserving the economic distinction between the races. Over the first two decades of the twentieth century there was a considerable shift in settler rhetoric about the Maori to emphasise their "natural" identification with the land.

This change was closely reflected in the curriculum of Maori schools, with a noticeable shift from an academic to a practical curriculum. Historians of the Native School system argue that the intention behind this shift was the production of rural-based peasantry. Considerable pressure was put on those schools still offering a matriculation based curriculum to drop it in favour of practical courses, and much stress was also placed on the need for educated Maori to return to their communities. Even Te Aute, previously the exception in terms of its high academic standards, was forced to introduce agriculture into the curriculum. When the school refused to respond to initial pressure to move in this direction, its scholarship system was temporarily suspended. In 1929 the Director of Education summarized the aim of the Native Schools system as, "to teach the [Maori] lad to become a good farmer and the girl to become a good farmer's wife"78.

The political and economic climate thus came increasingly to favour Maori land development as a means of stopping Maori both from becoming a drain on Pakeha charity and also from competing with Pakeha in the new economic opportunities offered by the expansion of the cities. The rise of the Ratana movement added fmal impetus to the desire amongst officialdom to find a political solution to Maori grievances 79.

Out of this political and economic milieu, Apirana Ngata became prominent as the leading exponent of Maori land development. As mentioned above, Ngata" promoted his ideas about Maori land development somewhat tentatively as early as 1907. During the first two decades of the twentieth century Ngata successfully promoted consolidation, incorporation and farming development amongst his own Ngati Porou iwi on the East Coast.

In 1921 Gordon Coates took over as Native Minister and during the next seven years, as a backbench opposition MP, Ngata promoted his policies on Maori land development through

78 J. Simon, "The Place of Schooling in Maori-Pakeha Relations", PhD Thesis. pp. 95-101 ; R. Shuker, The One Best System?, pp. 198/199 ; J. M. Barrington and T. H. Beaglehole, Maori Schools in a Changing Society. pp. 170-190. 79 M. King, Between Two Worlds, in W. Oliver (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 293.

171 hIS close relatIOnshIp wIth Coates. Dunng the 1920s the Crown passed a senes of legIslation to enable Maori to loan money_ for develop-ment. Finally, in 1928 C9ates passed legisl~tion to enable the Government to advance money to individual Maori farmers. For the fITSt time, the Crown was making money available to finance Maori land development80.

Consolidation In North Auckland. During the 1920s, growing support for Maori land development led the Crown to again address the difficulties caused by the fragmentation of Maori land holdings under the Native Land Court system. This time the Crown attempted to overcome the problem through a policy of consolidating individual interests in Maori land.

As early as 1907 the Stout I Ngata Commission had recommended that, in order to facilitate the consolidation of individual interests in Maori land, the legislature enable large scale exchanges to take place, and "the Native Land Act, 1909" had in fact implemented this proposal81 . Nevertheless, consolidation required more than just legislative assent It was a potentially huge task:

... a major legal and administrative operation, often involving hundreds of acres of land organised into scores of blocks with hundreds, even thousands, of interests to be considered and consolidated into the most sensible arrangement82.

Prior to the 1920s the Crown did not provide the political and economic impetus necessary to facilitate the large scale consolidation of Maori land. During the 1920s, increased support for Maori land development finally gave consolidation this impetus.

In July 1926 Acheson, the president of the Tokerau Maori Land Board, lodged an application for consolidation of the interests of Te Kao residents around their papakainga. Acheson intended consolidation to be a necessary precursor to the development scheme his board planned for Te Kao. He believed it was crucial to the success of the proposed dairying scheme that something was done to better define individual holdings83.

80 Butterworth, Maori Affairs, p. 72 ; Butterworth JPS, pp 169-174. 81 Stout/Ngata: G-IC, p 19 ; Butterworth, Maori Affairs, pp. 66/67. 82 Ibid, p. 73. 83 Acheson to The Native Minister 10 July 1926, in MAlI 29/2/5 [Doc Bank].

172 The Native Land Court, presided over by Acheson himself, heard the application in December 1927 and proceeded with the consolidation of interests in Te Kao papakainga. The Court gave each family what it considered to be a sufficient area of land for a small dairy farm with access to the main road. Because of the urgency of the Te Kao scheme and the magnitude of the task of consolidation, the Court confined its operations to the papakainga area and consolidated outside interests in a composite block with a view to later settlement84.

By 1927, under the influence of Ngata, the Government were also contemplating a large scale consolidation programme in North Auckland. Ngata, like Acheson, saw consolidation as a necessary precursor to land development By aggregating all the scattered holdings held by an individual into one block, the problem of uneconomic shares would be overcome. In addition, tenure would be clarified and made more secure, an advantage both to the prospective farmer and to any agency that might lend money for development:

... in regard to farming the handicaps of promiscuous occupation inherent in the communal system might be reduced to a minimum, if not removed; and in regard to financial assistance the security of the land might be made available to the fullest extent by the users, being themselves in fact the owners, to any lending institution that might favour it8S.

From the Crown's point of view, large scale consolidation was also a response to the considerable pressure exerted by local bodies over Maori non-payment of rates. The Crown intended consolidation of the North Auckland area to create an aggregation of individual interests so that local taxation liability could be attached in "as clear and as defmite a manner as in the case of European holdings". Local bodies in North Auckland supported consolidation, believing that it would remove many of the difficulties over the effective collection of rates86.

In 1927 Coates appointed a Commission, headed by Ngata, to oversee consolidation work and negotiate with local bodies for rates compromises to clear rating charges on Maori land. In order to cope with the magnitude of the task Ngata organised a special staff, culled primarily from his East Coast consolidation schemes, and attached them to the Native Land Court Office

84 Ibid. 85 Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes", AJHR, 1932, G-lO, pp. 3/4 [Doc Bank]. 86 Ibid.

173 at Sl.U',",IU

Ngata's staff began a preliminary survey of the problem in early 1928, tabulating infonnation about value, liabilities, manner of occupation, and the proposals of interested groups. They divided the North Auckland District into four consolidation schemes; the northernmost of which, the Mangonui Consolidation scheme, included Mangonui and Whangaroa Counties. According to Ngata, the Mangonui scheme comprised 131442 acres of Maori land, 1082 separate titles and 19760 owners. The name of anyone individual appeared on possibly many titles, often their share being so small as to be completely useless for economic purposes87.

One of the first priorities for the Consolidation Board was to reach an arrangement with local bodies over outstanding rates. In the Mangonui Consolidation Scheme alone, Maori land owed a total of £12194 from the six years previous to 31 March 1931. The local bodies concerned agreed to write off £8208 and in return the Crown paid the remaining £3986 from the Native Land Settlement Account, which had previously been used exclusively for the purchase of Maori land. Consolidation staff were required to apportion to each title the amount paid on its behalf by the Crown and this land was then aggregated along with any other interests acquired by the Crown88.

In November 1930 representatives of Treasury, the Land Department and the Native Department held a conference to deal with the other major liability of lands under the consolidation schemes: the charges from survey liens which had been accumulating on Maori land with every attempt of the Native Land Court to individualise title. The conference reported that the liabilities from survey liens were providing insuperable difficulties to the success of the consolidation schemes. Although section 32 of "the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act, 1927", provided for the remission of survey liens in certain cases, it relied on each individual block being brought before the court and a separate recommendation being made. As there were thousands of blocks involved the provision was totally inadequate89. The conference concluded that Native lands legislation was clearly to blame for the situation that had arisen:

87 Butterworth JPS, p. 174 ; Butterworth, Maori Affairs, pp. nn3 ; Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native­ Land Development Schemes", 1932, pp. 3/4. 88 Ibid, p. 4 ; Ngata to Buck, 24 March 1928. Sorrenson (ed), Vol 1, p. 81. 89 "Report and Recommendation of Conference of Deparmental Officers with Regard to Extinguishment of Survey Liens on Native Lands", AJHR, 1932, G-7, p. 3 [Doc Bank].

174 The position has arisen oul of the functioning of the Native Land Settlement Act, 1909, which ... has proved administratively defective in that it has enabled such substantial sums to be charged against loan-moneys, the security for which is demonstrated as futile ... Unquestionably, the discretion exercised by the Couns, &c., in the past has been divorced from commercial responsibility, and not subjected to such ordinary precautions as deposits, or the economic capacity of the land in question90.

A subcommittee for the North Auckland area reponed that an amount of £6339 principal and £3676 interest (total £10016) was due on Maori land in the Mangonui Consolidation Scheme91 . The committee commented on the special problems faced by Maori lands in the North, which were generally difficult and costly to develop and could not stand too great an overhead in addition to the cost of development. They pointed out in addition that those lands against which a survey lien still remained were in the main the poorer lands which were not producing revenue92.

The conference recommended that survey liens should be remitted to the extent of all interest plus 43 % of the principal and that in future the cost of surveys should be paid in advance93. In a memorandum to the Minister of Finance, the Secretary of Treasury stated the rationale of the proposal: "one of land-settlement promotion and Native welfare, the economic aspect being that the security for the liens is practically unenforceable and partially non-existent"94.

Meanwhile consolidation staff proceeded with the enormous task of investigating and tabulating infonnation about the land under the consolidation schemes, and in September 1928 the Native Land Coun furnished the Under Secretary with a list of all Mangonui lands to be dealt with under the schemes95.

90 Memorandum for the Hon. the ACTING MINISTER OF FINANCE, 29 November 1930, Ibid, p. 1. 91 Ibid, p. 8. 92 Ibid, pp. 9/10. 93 Ibid, p. 7. 94 Memorandum for the Hon. the ACTING MINISTER OF FINANCE, 29 November 1930, Ibid, p. 1. 95 Registrar to Under Secretary, 5 September 1928, MA 29/2/1 Vall.

175 Problems with Consolidation. In the 1920s and 19305' the idea of consolidation received widespread support from Maori in the North. They appreciated its potential as a means to overcome the crippling problems of land fragmentation and enable them to farm economic units. Maori supported consolidation because they saw it as a necessary precursor to land development. And, in fact, consolidation did open up substantial areas of Muriwhenua land to development.

There were, however, a number of problems with the consolidation schemes. First, and most fundamentally, consolidation was an individualistic response to the problem of title fragmentation. In general tenns, the Crown had two options in dealing with title fragmentation. On the one hand the Crown could create a legal basis for group based economic activity, for example through incorporations. On the other hand, the Crown could reorganise individual land holdings and thus accept the basic premise of the imposed European system of land tenure: that land should be held and worked by the individual. By encouraging consolidation, Ngata accepted and promoted an individualistic response to the problem of uneconomic and fragmented interests in Maori land

This approach could only provide a temporary solution to the problem of title fragmentation. As long as the Native Land Court continued with its succession policy, Maori land holdings would continue to be refragmen ted. In addition, much of the land in Muriwhenua was not suitable for the type of small scale individual development envisaged under consolidation. The supposedly economic units defined by consolidation in the 1930s often turned out to be not so economic after all.

The Crown's reluctance to include private or Crown lands in consolidation procedures worsened this situation. During the 1930s, Muriwhenua Maori made many requests for such land to be included, either in exchange for Maori holdings or as a contribution from the Crown to boost uneconomic holdings and provide for landless Maori. In 1936 the Registrar wrote in regard to such requests:

... consolidation officers should report what additional private and crown lands are needed to facilitate consolidation in this area and should indicate what assistance from the Department is required for the purchase of these lands and generally in which way advances for that purpose could be repaid. In the case of Crown areas, blocks available in exchange should be set forth so that the matter could be

176 discussed with the Lands Department96.

The next year, however, the Registrar claimed that the department had been unable to get Crown lands available for consolidation purposes97.

During the 1930s Hone Wi Kaitaia wrote twice suggesting that the Crown purchase a section adjoining the Peria Block for consolidating the interests of the Peria owners. He claimed this would be:

... a great help to the Peria Units under the Development Scheme as some of these U nits have practically developed their small holdings and are waiting for the finalisation of Consolidation98.

In reply Langstone admitted that the purchase would be of assistance but argued that no funds were available for such a purchase and that it was considered preferable to spend money on developing Maori lands. "It can hardly be expected that the Government will purchase land to meet the requirements of all the Maori people,,99.

Consolidation proceedings also created a large, autocratic and potentially dangerous machinery for dealing with the administration Maori land. Although I did find a number of muted references to opposition in North Auckland from "certain sections of ratanaites", I did not find much evidence of Maori dissent to consolidation proceedings during the 1920s and 1930s1OO. On the contrary, Muriwhenua Maori recognised that consolidation was a necessary precursor to land development and were anxious that it should proceed as quickly as possible. Perhaps this lack of dissension might in part be attributable to the presence of Acheson as judge and president of the board. It is likely that under Acheson, consolidation proceeded with a certain amount of care and sensitivity 10 1. For example, consolidation records show that Acheson divided Mangonui into thirteen subseries and attempted to consolidate as far as possible within

96 Registrar to Under Secretary, 16 October 1936, MA 29/2/1 Vol 2. 97 Registrar to Under Secretary, 13 April 1937, Ibid. 98 Hone wi Kaitaia to Minister Native Affairs, 2 August 1938, Ibid. 99 Langstone to Hone wi Kaitaia, 5 October 1936, Ibid. 100 Huihana Rauna to Native Minister, 6 May 1929, MA 29/2/1 Vol 1 ; Wm Cooper to Under Secretary, 21 May 1929, Ibid; "Bay of Islands Development Scheme" MA ACC 1369 box b [Doc Bank]. 101 See Chapter 6 on Acheson.

177 these smaller areas, giving preference to the wishes of resident owners, before dealing with outside interests..

Nevertheless, the machinery created by consolidation was potentially lethal. In his history of the Maori Affairs Department Butterworth described consolidation as:

...a major social revolution by which whanau would have to give up interests in some land with ancestral significance to gain an economic farm. Some would have to relocate to farm their block and might have to leave the village community to work as a separate, even isolated, farmer102.

The concept of a state administrated consolidation scheme created the idea that Maori could be moved around, uprooted and replaced at will, without regard to traditional and historical associations with the land. In the hands of an authority insensitive to Maori needs, this machinery was extremely dangerous.

Although I have been unable to research Muriwhenua consolidation in the 1950s, I did find some indication that it was a more autocratic process than it had been previously. In his 1956 thesis on Maori land in the Far North, Frazer claimed:

In the past the powers of the courts were so limited that progress was very slow, and sometimes halted where one of the shareholders refused to sell or co-operate. Today they have greater powers, and progress is probably speeding upl03.

The treatment of Maori under consolldation schemes in the 1950s is one that certainly needs to be investigated.

The other funjiamental problem with consolidation during the 1920s and 1930s was that Ngata and his colleagues did not manage to maintain the initial enthusiasm and pace of the proceedings. Given the disordered state of Native land holdings the job of consolidation was absolutely huge. In 1932 Ngata described the complexity of the task:

When it is understood that these proposals might in the case of a single individual involve interests in twenty or more separate blocks of land distributed over two or

102 Butterworth, Maori Affairs, p. 73. 103 R. M. Frazer, "Maori Land in the Four Northernmost Counties of New Zealand", MA Thesis, pp. 55/56.

178 more counties, and that with those of his wife or children or grand-children these interests might comprise twice as many areas again of divers quality and value with liabilities for rates and survey liens to be assessed in detail the enonnous difficulties of the work may be visualized and appreciated104.

Consolidation proceedings also lost some of their impetus after Native Department land development schemes started in 1929. Whereas the Coates administration envisaged consolidation as a necessary prerequisite to Maori land development, Ngata believed that this would cause unnecessary delays in land development, and that the two should proceed side by side. While it is true that consolidation could have delayed development by years, the Native Land Courts were simply not adequately staffed to deal with both consolidation and development. As energy was increasingly concentrated on land development schemes, consolidation got left by the wayside.

As early as April 1929 Acheson wrote to the Native Department complaining that at that time there were no staff provided for consolidation in Mangonui and that major delays were occurring. Acheson urged the Department to continue with consolidation arguing that "Defmite promises are said to have been made by the original Consolidation Committee to the Natives and to the County Councils". Acheson argued that many Mangonui Maori were living in distressing conditions and that they were anxiously awaiting consolidation so that they could obtain assistance from the board to take up dairying:

From a Court and Board point of view, I am anxious that the Natives in the far North should have equal treatment with that given to Natives in the Bay of Islands district. They are in much poorer circumstances than the Bay of Islands Natives, and in my opinion they have not in the past received the consideration to which they were entitled 105.

During 1930 consolidation did proceed further, with applications for consolidation of land in the Rangiawhia, Parapara and Ahipara areas being heard by the Courts106. Four years later, however, owing to the intrusion of development and unemployment work and lack of staff, Mangonui consolidation was still incomplete and regular complaints were being received from

104 Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes", 1932, p. 5. 105 Acheson to Under Secretary, 22 Aprill929, MA 29/2/1 Vol l. 106 Acheson to Native Minister, 31 March 1930, Ibid; Acheson to Native Minister, 31 May 1930, Ibid; Acheson to Native Minister,9 October 1930, Ibid.

179 Maon 107. The 1934 NatIve Affarrs ComnusslOn saId of consolIdation:

The policy of consolidating titles is, of course, a very valuable one, but it has proved too slow in some districts and impracticable in others. Survey fees are often prohibitive, having regard to the small subdivisional areas involved. In some districts certain sects are averse to consolidation and make it impracticable. In many cases consolidation cannot be completed without delayl08.

During 1935 Acheson was still agitating for staff to push through with Mangonui Consolidation 109.

The delays in consolidation caused problems for Maori. With consolidation pending Maori were reluctant to put any improvements on the land for fear that it would not be allocated to them. For example, J. N. Berghan, a member of the "Maori Advancement League" asserted in 1929 that Maori around Ahipara had fencing wire and manure on the ground but could not proceed because their boundaries were undefined, or were putting on manure but didn't know whether the land would be allocated to them 11 O.

On the other hand, unofficial promises were made under consolidation proceedings that were never followed up. This happened in the case of Allotment 50, Taipa Parish, a 75 3/4 acre block which had been occupied since 1911 by the Nutana (Newton) family. The Nutanas thought they owned the land, until in 1931 Consolidation Officers found that it was in fact Crown land. Nevertheless it was decided, out of fairness to the occupants, not to press the Crown's claim to the land and to award title to the Nutanas under the Consolidation Scheme. In the event, the scheme was never completed and in 1948 the Land Board, under the erroneous impression that no one had any claim to the land, alloted it to a returned serviceman. When the matter was investigated it was decided that, despite various improvements that had been made, the present claimants, the children of the 1931 occupants, did not have a very strong claim 111:

[In 1931] The Lands Department refrained from exercising its unquestionable right on account of the inconvenience which might have been caused to the old people,

107 Wm Cooper to Registrar, 22 March 1934, Ibid. 108 "Native Affairs Commission", p. 41. 109 Registrar to Under Secretary, 21 August 1935, MA 29(2/1 Vo12. 110 The Northlander, 16 October 1929, MA 291211 Vol 1. 111 Registrar to Under Secretary, 14 January 1948, MA 2912/1 Vo12 ; Riki Nutana to Minister, 5 June 1948, MA 29/2/1 Vol 3 [Doc Bank]. 180 but it is under no obligation to the sonl12.

The Nutana brothers were infonned that if they wanted to remove the cottage they had built on the land they were welcome to, but that over and above that they had no rights to the land 113.

By the 1950s consolidation appears to have been as far from completion as ever. In 1956 Frazer commented that:

... complete consolidation will be a long and an expensive process. Many blocks remain in an undeveloped state, and the number of shareholders concerned may be up to and over a thousand 114.

Conclusion. In his 1931 statement on the land development schemes, Ngata listed three possible devises to overcome the difficulties of communal title: vesting in a statutory body, incorporation of owners, and consolidation of individual interestsl15. During the period 1890-1930 the Crown tried all three of these in an effort to overcome the crippling legacy of the Native Land Court system in Muriwhenua.

Vesting of Maori land in a statutory body, as proposed by the Rees Commission and incorporated into law in 1900, was an authoritarian and paternalistic solution to title fragmentation. Its implementation in Muriwhenua deprived Maori on the Aupouri Peninsula of control over 57306 acres of their ancestral lands.

The incorporation of owners provided a more attractive solution to the problem of multiple ownership, in that it enabled Maori owners to retain control and management of their lands. The use of such incorporations was encouraged by Stout I Ngata in 1907, and received widespread support from owners of Muriwhenua land. In 1908, however, there was no infrastructure to support Maori land development under such incorporations. Stout / Ngata's initiative thus came to nothing.

112 Under Secretary to Minister, 26 April 1948, MA 29/2/1 Vo12. 113 Minister to Rori Nutana, 2 November 1948, MA 29/2/1 Vo13. 114 Frazer, pp. 55156. 115 "Native Land Development", AJHR, 1931, G-lO, p. it

181 During the 1920s, mcreasmg acceptance of the value of Maon land development amongst officialdom led the Crown to embark on a large scale consolidation scheme in North Auckland. ___ .. ______Consolidation was an incredibly complex procedure which was based on the premise that Maori land should be held and worked by the individual. As long as the Native Land Court continued to refragment Maori holdings, consolidation could not provide a permanent solution to the problem of uneconomic shares. Nevertheless, consolidation did prepare the way for state-aided development in Muriwhenua.

182 CHAPTER SIX: LAND DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES IN MURIWHENUA.

Introduction. Large scale consolidation in North Auckland during the 1920s prepared the way for the development of Maori land. This chapter discusses the Crown"s land development schemes in Muriwhenua, first under the Tokerau Maori Land Board at Te Kao, and after 1930, under the Native Department

The Political Context of Land Development. Despite the considerable incentives offered to Pakeha settlers, prior to 1920 the Crown did not provide any assistance to Maori farmers to develop their lands. As already discussed, a number of political and economic changes led to the increasing acceptance and support of Maori land development during the 1920s1.

In 1922 the Government passed legislation which enabled the Maori Land Boards to lend money to Maori farmers. From 1926-1929 further legislation extended the potential role of the Maori Land Boards in the development of Maori land. For the first time loan money, albeit Maori money, was being made available to Maori farmers. Then, in 1928 Coates passed legislation to enable the Government to advance money through the Land Boards to individual Maori farmers 2 .

In 1928 the United party gained power and Ngata was appointed Native Minister. The next year Ngata pushed through "the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act", which enabled the Minister of Native Affairs to directly develop Maori land. Legislation in 1930 and 1931 extended th~se powers.

At the same time, the onset of the 1929 Depression gave Maori land development the political profile it really needed. As Butterworth argues, Maori, who dominated peJjpheral unskilled and

1 See Chapter 5: The Changing Political Climate.

2 "Native Affairs Commission", AJHR,1934. G-ll. pp. 9/10 [Doc Bank] ; G. V. Butterworth, rt A Rural Maori Renaissance?", JPS • Vol 81. No 2, June 1972, pp. 173/174.

183 seasonal labour, were the worst effected by the depression. Government retrenchments to ( public works worsened·the·situation~ All the worst fears· about-Maori flooding the towns and- ...... becoming a drain on Pakeha charity threatened to become a reality. Land development schemes were seen as a means to absorb Maori into quasi-productive labow3.

The Tokerau Maori Land Board in Te Kao. In the Far North conditions had reached crisis point long before 1929. In 1924 the gum economy was hit by a severe slump and prices dropped so low as to make it virtually impossible to earn a living. The situation was particularly bad on the Aupouri Peninsula where, with the exception of the few Maori in receipt of government pensions, digging provided virtually the only source of income. By mid-1925, traders had cut off all credit and were refusing to buy gum at any price. As a result, the whole community was poised on the brink of starvation. In July 1925 Coates, then Native Minister sent F. O. V. Acheson, the new judge of the Tokerau District Maori Land Court, to Te Kao to report on the problem4.

After seeing fIrst hand the extreme poverty in Te Kao, Acheson reported to the Department that Maori around Parengarenga were in need of urgent practical assistance. Acheson also claimed on behalf of the board a particular responsibility towards Maori at Te Kao and Te Hapua because of "the misfortunes they have suffered through the leases arranged by the Board in 1907,,5.

Acheson proposed a far reaching solution: the incorporation of lands at Te Kao and the establishment of a dairying industry using Maori Land Board funds to develop the land. Although Acheson's proposals related specifically to the Te Kao papakainga, he argued that the government should support the growth of dairying as an alternative to gum digging throughout the Aupouri peninsula. Acheson concluded:

Unless the dairying industry be established in the Parenga district, practically the whole of the Native population in the Far North will almost immediately become a charge on the general finances of the Dominion. It is no exaggeration to say that

3 Ibid, p. 175 ; Butterworth, Maori Affairs, p. 74. 4 "Native Affairs Commission", p. II ; Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, MNI 19/1/548 Part III, p. 1 [Doc Bank] ; 1. Henderson, Te Kao 75, pp. 22/13 ; Petition 1936 to Savage, MA 19/1/210 [Doc Bank]. 5 Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, Op cit, p. 2.

184 <.Ln ''"',].Ll Y at the end of their resources. Board is certain that it ( can remedy their troubles without undue risk to the Board funds. As President of the Board I am quite prepared to take the responsibility for the success of the Scheme and to be judged by the results6.

The Te Kao Dairy Scheme was the first attempt by the Tokerau Maori Land Board to develop Maori land for the benefit of Maori owners 7. It was also the start of a long personal association between Acheson and the Te Kao community. Acheson's proposal was unanimously accepted by the community at Te Kao and, at his insistence, Mr A. H. Watt, the Te Kao school teacher agreed to take over the supervision of the scheme8. Once the board had obtained further reports from an expert from the Department of Agriculture and the Chief Drainage Engineer, the development works proceeded9.

The board paid the Te Kao people a subsistence wage of 6/- a day (4/- for single men) to undertake drainage works and, when these had been completed, to clear and grass their own holdings to. Over the next fifteen years the Tokerau Board advanced thousands of pounds towards Te Kao development By 31st March 1931 the board was assisting 51 units at Te Kao ( and had already advanced £27245 towards the scheme11.

The intended economic unit of Te Kao Dairy Scheme was the family. The scheme was divided into individual holdings or "units" with the costs apportioned out to these holdings. As already discussed, Acheson considered it crucial to the scheme that something was done to better define these individual holdings, and in July 1926 lodged an application forconsolidation of the interests of Te Kao residents around their papakainga. The Court gave each family what it considered to be a sufficient area of land for a small dairy farm with access to the main road 12.

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid; Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 23. 8 Ibid. 9 "Native Affairs Commission", p. 1 L 10 Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, Op cit, p. 2 ; Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 23 ; Petition 1936 to Savage, Op cit. 11 Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes", AJHR, 1932, G-10, p. 3 [Doc Bank]. 12 Acheson to The Native Minister 28 December 1927, MA 29{2/5 [Doc Bank].

185 AldlOugh the scheme proceeded on me basis of mdividual farming operatiOns, If also provided a basis for community _activities. By 1926 the Te Kao scheme had grQwn enough. grass to ( support a few cows and. because the Dairy Company refused to carry the small quantity of cream to the factory, the board had to confront the problem of transport The board bought a one-ton Morris truck and in August 1927 established their own cream run. The board also established a community hall and a community store to under cut the exorbitant prices charged by European storekeepers 13.

The Te Kao Scheme Under Attack. While in Te Kao, the inception of the dairy scheme was met with unqualified enthusiasm, it was not long before the financial operations of the board were subject to official criticism. In September 1927 the Native Department sent Mr C. 1. Hamblyn, an officer of the Department of Agriculture, to Te Kao to inspect the scheme. Hamblyn reported that the scheme was a financial disaster and that the board would have to expend a great deal more money before it . would have a renumerative asset.

Hamblyn attributed the so-called failure of the scheme to the poor quality of the land, severe flooding during the previous year, poor preparation of the land after ploughing, breakdown of the truck and lack of qualified supervision. He also attributed it to "the failure the Natives to realize the need for economy and for work: without immediate reward save sustenance [and] the fact that the habits of gum-digging life made it difficult for the Natives to be persistent". Hamblyn advised that for the next three years the scheme should be limited to 500-600 acres with yearly top dressing, and that Te Kao Maori should be provided with close supervision and on the spot instruction 14.

The Department did not act on Hamblyn's advise. They did not provide further supervision nor did they attempt to limit the scheme in any way. The minister continued to approve advances to a total of £14712 by October 1928. In February 1929, after a change of government, Ngata approved a further £3000 expenditurel5.

13 Petition 1936 to Savage. Op cit; Henderson.Te Kao 75, p. 27 ; Ibid, p. 42 ; "Native Affairs Commission", p. 13. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid, p. 14.

186 In August 1929 Ngata stopped further expenditure of the board pending investigation of the ( scheme. Supervisor Barry inspected the scheme in October and reported that it was not a business success. The board had expended £24489 and the total value of the scheme was only £13700. Barry estimated that the board would need another £12000 to make the scheme self supporting. Ngata decided that the board should incur no further expenditure until provision could be made for proper management and, in February 1930, the Department appointed M R. Findlay as supervisor. Ngata visited Te Kao himself in April 1930 and concluded that the management of the scheme had been seriously mishandled. The Department continued to restrict further expenditure to the scheme16.

In June 1932 Ngata again met with Te Kao Maori at Ahipara and, reversing his policy of restricting the scheme, decided to bring new areas into development. He advised Te Kao Maori that fencing material, grass seed and manure would be available for any land they broke in by their own efforts. Apparently this promise of further supplies was never kept. "The Native Land Amendment Act, 1932" and "the Native Purposes Act, 1933" gave the Native Land Settlement-Board substantial control over the financial operations of the scheme. In 1933 the Board took control and passed a resolution that the only funds available for Te Kao development would be those derived from the scheme's own activities 17.

The National Expenditure Commission, which investigated the financial operations of the board in 1932, blamed Judge Acheson for the scheme's financial difficulties. The Native Department also blamed Acheson. In his defense Acheson argued that he was prepared to take full responsibility for the scheme up until the end of 1929. After that the department removed his authority to expend money on the scheme and allowed the scheme to deteriorate. They had provided inadequate supervision and had allowed land that had already been prepared to revertl8.

By 31 March 1934, there were 50 units at Te Kao only seven of which were able to meet their interest charge in full from the proportion of the cheque retained by the board. The board's accounts showed that £33147 had been expended on the scheme. In contrast the valuation of

16 Ibid, pp. 14/15; Ngata to Buck, 22 May 1930, M P. K. Sorrenson (00), Na T~ Hoa Aroha, Vo12, p. 33. 17 "Native Affairs Commission", p. 9 ; Ibid, pp.15/16. 18 Ibid, p. 10.

187 the scheme, including the land on which money had been expended, was a mere £10000.

( Supervisors Findlay-and·Wallace·reported.that the scheme· was hopeless fmm a·businesspoint . of view 19.

During 1934, the Native Affairs Commission conducted a detailed investigation into the Board's operations and concluded that there had been serious mismanagement of the Te Kao scheme. The commission argued that the root of the scheme's failure lay in the lack of a comprehensive plan of development and expenditure laid down at its commencement20. The chief responsibility lay, they argued, with the Native Minister and Under Secretary from 1926- 1928 as well as with the President of the Maori Land Board21.

The commission argued that Acheson, deeply moved by the conditions at Te Kao and determined to alter them, had deliberately misled the department with regard to the total funding

that would be necessary to make the scheme self-supportin;'2:

.' .. by failing to keep a sense of proportion with regard to the needs of the Te Kao Natives, [he] made it difficult for his superiors to discharge the duty of control over him, involved in the approval of advances for a dairy scheme23.

They also argued that Acheson had consistently refused to accept the recommendations of experts and thus further contributed to the failure of the scheme24.

After September 1926, however, the minister had a statutory responsibility to approve advances to the scheme and the whole responsibility no longer lay with the board. The commission argued that before giving approval to the board to expend its funds the minister had an obligation to evaluate whether further expenditure was necessary and justified. This obligation had not been discharged, despite the expert advise received from Hamblyn in 192725. In addition, the commission believed that the present minister, Apirana Ngata, had

19 Ibid; Ibid, p. 16. 20 Ibid, pp. 10111 ; Ibid, p. 16. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid, p. 12. 23 Ibid, p. 16. 24 Ibid, p. 15. 25 Ibid, p. 12; Jbid p. 14.

188 contributed to the scheme's failure by not following a consistent policy of restricting the area for development26.

During the 1930s, growing criticism of the Tokerau Board's management was paralleled by the extension of departmental control over the scheme. Up until 1929 the Native Minister. although required to give statutory approval for all advances to the scheme. did not interfere substantially with the boards operations. Under the Ngata administration. the department made its presence increasingly felt, restricting expenditure to the scheme and providing departmental supervision. By 1930 the board had, at any rate, exhausted its own funds so was not in a position to provide further large scale expenditure, even if it had been authorised27.

Although the department extended its control over expenditure. the board remained officially in control of the farming operations of the scheme for some years. In 1939 the department finally took over full control of the farm activities at Te Kao and eventually reimbursed the board its expenditure. The board remained in control of the cream service, hall and store, and their finances28; c

The Role of Acheson. Since much of the criticism of the Te Kao scheme was directed at Acheson as president of the board, it is important to understand his personal role in the proceedings. Just as Ngata had for the East Coast, Acheson pioneered land development schemes in the Far North. The Te Kao scheme, which was very much his personal brain child, pre-dated state-assisted development in Tokerau by five years. Nor was the board's assistance limited to Te Kao. By 31 March 1931, the Tokerau Board was assisting 120 units throughout Tokerau from its comparatively meagre funds and its advances stood at £43900. Out of this, 51 units and £27245 were accounted for by the Te Kao scheme29.

Nevertheless, from the first Acheson aligned himself personally with the interests of Maori on the Aupouri peninsula. When he visited the peninsula in 1925 he was appalled at the conditions

26 Ibid, p. 16. 27 Ibid, pp. 11-16. 28 Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 42. 29 "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes'" 1932, p. 3.

189 he found there and detenruned to find a long term solutIon to the problem. He champIoned their

( cause consistently over- the next-twenty years -at- no small persoaal cost.· In contrast Ngata was almost blase about conditions on the Aupouri peninsula. Te Kao Maori told J. M. Henderson, when he was researching his history of the Te Kao school, that Ngata once said on a visit to the North that he was going to cut off the tail of the fish off and let it rot30.

A. H. Watt, the Te Kao school teacher and scheme supervisor described Acheson as a man with "a full knowledge of the inertia, political and official, that he overcame or by-passed - sometimes by the most unorthodox methods .. 31. There is little doubt that Acheson was far from honest with the department in his dealings over Te Kao. As he freely admitted to the 1934 Commission:

I knew that I would be squashed flat by the Department in Wellington if I dared to suggest £15,000 or £20,000 for a start. So I started and recommended £1,000 and that was approved, and Mr. Coates kept giving further and further approvals, and I may as well say that occasionally I overstepped the authority and went ahead32.

Acheson also told the department that "within five years time the Te Kao Natives can become prosperous dairy farmers", a totally unrealistic assessment of the situation33. There is little doubt that, had Acheson accurately assessed the extent of the project he was embarking on, the department would indeed have turned him down flat. Development work of the size and expense undertaken at Te Kao was not envisaged by the department even under its 1929/1931 legislation. Probably, had it not been for the actions of the board, the Native Department would have offered Maori at Te Kao as little as was offered to their relatives at Te Hapua.

Tensions within Te Kao. Acheson embarked on the Te Kao scheme against numerous odds: inexperience, transport problems, lack of equipment and poor land. Acheson was also faced with a great deal of political opposition, both from without and within. The Te Kao community itself was divided religiously and politically. In his history of the Ratana movement J. M. Henderson notes that

30 Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 42. 31 Ibid, p. 27. 32 Acheson quoted in "Native Affairs Commission", p. 12. 33 Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, MN1 19/1/548 Part IlL p. 3 [Doc Bank].

190 from 1924-27. (he period during which Acheson was estab1ishing the 'fe Kao scheme, tensIOn between Ratana and Anglican churches was so great that the meeting house was cut in half with ( axes. An anicle in the Dominion in 1927 noted that Ratana members of the community refused to join the board's scheme34.

In 1936 Mark Hoggard, apparently at the request of Ratana followers, investigated the Te Kao scheme and reported that the board was discriminating against Ratana followers. Ratana followers were not paid in cash for contract work but in tickets for Te Kao store. The store, having a monopoly, charged what it liked:

... the Natives must payor they are starved out of the settlement. Mussolini has nothing on this.

According to Hoggard, the underlying motive for this was "to prevent the Ratana followers from sending money away to Ratana's campaign funds,,35.

In replying'to these charges the Acting Registrar replied that Hoggard had "been the victim of a ( little quiet leg-pulling". No ticket system, existed and both factions were given the same treatment. The Registrar also defended the Te Kao store:

Before the Board Store started, the Natives had to pay exorbitant prices to private storekeepers - i.e. 35/- a bag for sugar. The Board greatly reduced prices. It runs the Store at a small yearly profit. It holds all profits in trust for the Te Kao Natives. It is a model store which might well be copied throughout New Zealand in the interests of the people36.

Regardless of the substance to Hoggard's claims this episode is indicative of obvious tensions within Te Kao that the board had to contend with.

Community Hostility to the Te Kao Scheme. Whatever the internal tensions were, however, the Te Kao scheme received a more dangerous challenge from outside forces. There was considerable hostility from the buropean community

( 34 Henderson, RatafUl. The Man. the Church. the Political Movement. p. 81. 35 Mark: Hoggard to Hon M. J. Savage, 1 January 1936, p. 2, MA 19/1/210. 36 Acting Registrar to Head Office, 18 February 1936, Ibid.

191 in Mangonui to Maori economic initiative in Te Kao. By the late 1920s the Mangonui County ( Council supported Maori land consolidation and development as a means of making Maori land ratable. This support did not, however, extend to economic initiatives that were seen to potentially replace European endeavour. During the early 1930s much of this hostility was directed towards the operations of the board truck:.

The board established its cream run in 1927 because no one else was prepared to cart the small quantity of cream produced on the Aupouri peninsula. By 1929 the board was carting cream from Te Kao, Houhora and Waiharera Districts in its two and a half ton Graham truck, the "Aupouri". In its early years the board cream service faced enormous difficulties. The road from Te Kao to Awanui was so bad that the round trip to Awanui took two days and was inoperable in bad weather37. In addition, the road was classified as fifth class and the truck could only run with special authority from the Mangonui County Council and on payment of an extra license fee. The truck was taken off the road at the end of each season at the discretion of the CounciL During 1929 some £3000 was spent by the Public Works Department in improving the state of the road, but even so the road conditions were appalling. In 1930 an agent from the Colonial Motor Company described the road as four miles of metal to Waipapakauri and then 38 miles of rough undulating sandstone with intennittent stretches of heavy loose sand, "quite the worst we have ever seen,,38.

Despite these problems the truck service was a financial success. In 1930 Acheson reported that the service paid the board and Maori handsomely and that one more season would wipe off the cost of the truck. In addition the post office was willing to pay the board a subsidy for carting mail39.

In June 1930, however, Council and setder interests in Mangonui complained that the "Aupouri" was too heavy and was doing excessive damage to the road. They decided that the truck should either be replaced with a lighter one or that the Kaitaia Dairy Board should be asked to call tenders for cartage40.

37 Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 27. 38 Organisers General Report, Colonial Motor Company Ltd, 18-11-1930, in MA/l,'I9111697. 39 Under Secretary, Native Department to Under secretary. Public Works. 17-9-31, MN1, 19/1/697 ; F. W Acheson to Chief Clerk, Native Department 20-7-1930, Ibid. 40 Article in Northlander, Weds July 2 1930, MA I, 19/1/697 (not copied).

192 The bomd tlicd a lighlel 30 eM FOld twek: btlt it proyed too small aRd frngile for tHe conditions. There followed a twelve month battle to get the "Aupouri" back on the road. ( Continued opposition to the truck from the Mangonui County Council threatened the successful operation of the dairy scheme, as well as the expansion of the business into areas such as mail carting and passenger service. Eventually the situation became so desperate that the board was forced to refuse to cart cream from European settlers on the peninsula. Soon after the livelihood of European settlers was thus threatened, the council reached an arrangement with the board to allow the truck back on the road during the peak season and reserve the lighter vehicle for winter use41 .

The Mangonui County Council's motives in objecting to the truck service were somewhat dubious. As Acheson argued, the truck service was an absolute necessity to economic development on the peninsula:

The Board asks what the road is for if it is not to serve the actual needs of the struggling settlers of the Far North. Common sense demands an efficient service .for cream cans, mail, passengers, and freight Such a service can not be given by a light truck, and nothing that any engineer can say will alter this fundamental fact. The Board's actual experience is more reliable than theories or assumptions.

In the past the council had largely ignored economic development on the peninsula and had spent little money north of Houhora, despite the fact that the board properties paid large sums in rates each year42. Any improvements to the roads had been done by the Public Works Department. The council's sudden interest in the state of the roads on the peninsula thus seemed somewhat misplaced. In addition Acheson believed that the council had allowed heavier loads on other fifth class roads and that its policy was thus discriminatory43.

In fact, Acheson argued, objections came in the main from people who had either been doing a great deal of carting on their own account and wanted the board blamed for the state of the road, or who desired to get the benefit of the cream carting contract over the much improved road, having allowed the board to bear the burden of carting over bad roads for several seasons. The objectors' agenda was, he believed, "to crowd the Board and the Natives off the

41 MA 1, 1911/697. ( 42 Under Secretary Native Department to Under Secretary Public Works, 17 September 1931, in MNI 19/1/697 {Doc Bank] ; Acheson to Under Secretary, 6 October 1931, Ibid. 43 F. W Acheson to The Under Secretary Native Department, 5 November 1930Jbid. 193 road": ( My temporary departure from the district was taken advantage of by the enemies of the Te Kao Scheme (there are many semi-successful white people up North who are openly jealous of and hostile to the progress of the Natives in recent years) and a determined attempt was made to push the Board out of the Cream Carting service44.

According to Acheson, some members of the Mangonui Council were openly hostile to anything for the benefit of Maori:

To refer a matter like this to them is like delivering the Natives into the hands of the Philistines45.

Nor was there much factual basis to the council's contention that the "Aupouri" was doing excessive damage to the road. In July 1931 the Kaitaia Dairy Factory passed a resolution specifically absolving the Te Kao truck for responsibility for the state of the road during the 1929 winter and asserting that it was the only type of vehicle suited to the roading conditions in the area:

... on account of the exceptionally heavy pulling caused by the drifting sand a high-powered and weighty vehicle is in their opinion, a necessity in the running of this service46.

Four years later, when board contemplated the purchase of a new heavy truck, Acheson reported:

No difficulties will be experienced with the local Licensing Authority with regard to the use of the road and the limit of weight. The Public Works Engineer, Mr Ronayne, has assured the Board that he has no objection whatever to the type and weight of truck proposed. He says he is satisfied the Board's heavy truck has helped to improve the road. The Solicitors to the County Council have advised the Council that it has no power to interfere with the running of the Board's truck, and no complaints have been received from the Council for two years past47.

44 Acheson to Chief Clerk, Native Dept, 20 July 1930, Ibid. 45 Acheson to Under Secretary, 6 October 1931, Ibid. 46 Secretary, Kaitaia Dairy Co to President, Tokearau Maori Land Board, 15 July 1931, Ibid.

194 Relations with the Native Department. ( While interference from local Pakeha could cause considerable short term interruption to the scheme the hostile attitude of the Native Department to Board activities caused far greater problems. As Native Minister from 1929-1934, Ngata was overtly hostile to Acheson and the board. Ngata believed tha.t the Te Kao scheme revealed many factors to be avoided in future development:

over-equipment, over-building, too early allotment of sections removing the spur to group action, insufficient consultation with the Maori owners or those capable of accommodating practice to th~-Maori psychology and over-zealous irresponsible pakeha contro148.

Indeed, Ngata's lack of confidence in the board's operations was such that he deliberately "starved" the Tokerau district of development assistance during the first year of state-funded development49.

The failure'of the Tokerau Board and the Native Department to achieve a satisfactory working relations,hip caused major problems for the Te Kao scheme. From 1929 onwards the department asserted its control over the expenditure of the scheme. Although the board theoretically continued to control farming operations until 1939 the department, through its control of expenditure, in fact held the reins. This created an anomalous situation. While Acheson and the board were theoretically responsible for the scheme and its associated assets they had no real power. Because of this, Acheson told the 1934 Commission that he was not prepared to accept any responsibility for the scheme after the end of 1929. At that time the department removed his authority to expend money on the scheme and, in his opinion, allowed already developed lands to revert50. Assertion of control by the department and the obvious hostility that the department felt towards Acheson and his activities made his position almost untenable.

The department also extended its control of expenditure to the truck service, despite the fact that

47 Acting Engineer-in-Chief, Public Works Depart,ment to Under Secretary, Native Department, 13 February 1936, ibid. 48 Ngata to Buck, 22 May 1930, Sorrenson (ed), Vol 2, p. 33. 49 Ibid. 50 "Native Affairs Commission", p. 10.

195 the sel vice, which the boald opelated independently of fmm opelatiulls and Oil its owns

separate acc(~)Unt, was a financial success. Departmental control of expenditure led to lengthy ( bureaucratic delays whenever spare parts, repairs or new vehicles were needed. These delays consistently hampered the ability of the board to keep the truck on the road, an absolute necessity to the day to day running of the dairy scheme.

The Native Department consistently refused to listen to the advise given by Acheson, Watt or the board in relation to the truck service. For example, in 1935 the board applied to the department for permission to purchase a new truck from its account. By the time the department processed and acted on the information, however, the pending breakdown of the service had necessitated the old truck being reconditioned at some expense. In addition the truck that the department finally purchased on behalf of the board was totally unsuitable for the conditions, despite the fact that Watt had provided the department with detailed information about the type of truck required. The situation was summed up by the board's acting registrar:

In recommending a "REO" with strengthened chassis, the Tokerau Board in its . memorandum of the 24th. May 1935 acted upon reliable advice from competent

( men who knew the road and the requirements. The difficult road conditions were V quoted, and referred to again and again in the Schedule. The Board aimed at securing a suitable truck nearly one ton lighter than the "Graham". Instead, and entirely against its wishes, the Board was supplied with an unsuitable "Leyland" about a ton heavier than the "Graham" ... As the Tokerau Board was not consulted and was even denied information about the "Leyland' until it was too late, the Board disclaims any share in the responsibility for what has happened51.

The Native Department refused to take responsibility for this fmancial blunder, and eventually the board was forced to yield and bear financial responsibility for the truck52. Administrative bungles of this kind were the rule rather than the exception in the board's dealings with the department over the truckS 3 .

After 1929 the Tokerau Board thus had limited power over the operation of the Te Kao scheme and its associated assets and was forced to take responsibility for the bureaucratic bunglings of the Native Department These bureaucratic hassles were extremely disIlJptive, and threatened

I 51 Acting-Registrar, Tokerau MLB toUnder Secretary Native Dept, 28 January 1936, MNI 19/1/691. \ 52 Registrar Auckland to Under Secretary Native Department, 11 June 1936, Ibid. 53 For example, Acting Registrar, Tokerau MLB to Under Secretary. Native Department, 22 February 1936, Ibid; Registrar, Auckland to Under Secretary, Native Department. 10 June 1936, Ibid. 196 the ongoing survival of the struggling business. It is no wonder under these circumstances that ( Acheson bypassed the Native Department whenever possible.

Tension between the board and the department were also felt over the issue of supervision. In 1925 Acheson made his support of the scheme contingent on the appointment of A. H. Watt as supervisor. Acheson argued:

He has the unbounded confidence of the Natives, based on 10 years residence among then at Te Kao, and tIle Board is quite satisfied as to his integrity. ability and enthusiasm. He is a practical man with a very wide experience and is quite a fair engineer54.

In one sense Watt's appointment was a fortuitous one. He had, as Acheson pointed out, been the schoolteacher at Te Kao for ten years, during which time he had been heavily committed to the welfare of the people. He played an important role in Te Kao as mediator between local Maori and the cumbersome structures of government bureaucracy. In addition his mechanical abilities proved useful in keeping the Board truck on the road. (

Watt was the first to admit, however, that he did not have the necessary experience to supervise farming operations in Te Ka055. While he was able to provide much in the way of help, advise and understanding. he could not give the expert advise that was needed. In September 1927. Hamblyn reported that the scheme was hampered by "the lack of continual personal supervision by a qualified instructor; and the fact that the schoolmaster, who acted as supervisor, had not had the necessary farming experience,,56.

In February 1930 the department appointed its own supervisor, Findlay, to oversee the Te Kao scheme. Findlay's supervision was fraught with tensions. He was unable to cooperate with Acheson and by the end of 1930 had refused to have anything more to do with Te Kao "until some better system of control had been arranged". Findlay appears to have resumed supervision in the middle of 1931. but came into conflict with Mr. Watt57. In these clashes

54 Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, MNI 19/1/548 Part III, p. 3. 55 Henderson, Te Kao 75. 56 "Native Affairs Commission~, p. 13. 57 Ibid, p. 15.

197 bet~een depMtmenta:l ft:fl:d bottrd offieia:ls, it was Te Kae Maori \'lRO were catlght in the ClOSS fire. (

Success or Failure? The question remains, was the Tokerau Board's administration of the Te Kao scheme a success or a failure?

While expenditure on the Te Kao scheme during its early years was certainly large, it must not be forgotten that most of the funds in the Tokerau Board's account were in fact derived from leases on the Parengarenga lands vested in the Maori Land Council in 1904. Maori at Te Kao thus had a particularly strong claim to benefit from these funds58.

The Te Kao scheme also produced a number of indirect economic benefits for the Crown. By relieving the economic plight ofTe Kao Maori, the scheme saved the government considerable expenditure. Up to 31 March 1934, the Crown paid Te Kao Maori only £222 lOs in form of unemployment subsidies, as compared with some £7000 already spent on relief works at Te Hapua. The 1934 Commission recommended that on account of these savings, the government should pay the board £10000 from the consolidated fund in reduction of its advances to Te Kao Maori. The commission also recommended that the the Health Department and any other department that was indirectly relieved of expenditure through the board's operations should pay the scheme an ongoing subsidy59.

The scheme also benefitted European settlement in the area The 1934 Commission claimed that the cream-lorry service had enabled some forty European families to take up dairying along the road to Awanui and thus saved the Government considerable amounts in European relief during the Depression60. Historians of European settlement on the peninsula also admit the widespread influence of the Te Kao store and cream / bus service in opening up the area for both Pakeha and Maori settlement61.

The Board continued to expand its community businesses in Te Kao during the 1940s. By

58 Ibid, p. 1 L ( 59 Ibid, pp. 15-17. 60 R. Wagener, Gumfileds of Aupouri, p. 20. 61 Ibid, p. 20. 198 a general store. a passenger. cream a motion picture ( theatre. a refreshment canteen. an accommodation house. and an electric lighting plant62. The board thus continued to play an important role in the proVision of community amenities at Te Kao.

While the financial success of the scheme may have been limited, the social benefits were considerable. In 1936 Ern Ihaka wrote of the scheme:

We have our farms, our stock. our store, our Cream Service, but most of all our health and our happiness. The school role has increased from 60 to 100. Had we been left to work on roads as were our Te Hapua relatives we would like them have little to show today for all the relief money expended63.

Twenty years later the effects of the board's development in Te Kao were still apparent. In 1956 in his MA thesis on Maori land in the four northernmost counties, R M. Frazer wrote that Te Kao was the best and largest settlement arising out of the department's land development programme. Frazer noted that most of the soils at Te Kao were not naturally fertile and that, with the exception of a narrow strip. "the difficulty of keeping the pastures in good heart has been considerable". Nevertheless, he claimed the settlement was a pleasing site64.

Nevertheless there were enormous problems with Acheson's administration of the scheme. As Henderson comments, he embarked on the project "with enthusiasm and energy but not always with discretion,,65. The fundamental problem was that Acheson simply did not have the understanding and knowledge of fa.rming to administer such a scheme. As the 1934 Commission argued, no doubt with Acheson in mind, the President of a Maori Land Board, while able to exercise a strong influence in creating the right atmosphere for land development, did not have the necessary training and experience to control farming operations66.

From the first Acheson's forecasts about the scheme were total unrealistic. In 1925 Acheson

62 MAIl 19/1/548 Part III. 63 Petition 1936 to Savage, Op CiL 64 R. M. Fr~er. ~Maori Land in the Four Northernmost Counties of New Zealand", MA thesis, p. 53. 65 Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 42. 66 "Native Affairs Commission", pp. 24/25.

199 told the Native Minister: ( The total area of fertile flats and rich swamps around Parenga Harbour which might be brought into the scheme later on will run into some thousands of acres, more than sufficient for the permanent future requirements of all the Natives in the Far North67.

Because of the poor nature of remaining Maori lands in the Far North, dairy development was in fact unlikely to provide a final solution to the needs of an increasing population. Acheson did not have the expertise to assess the potential of the scheme, nor to supervise the farm operations. Nor was the Board able to provide the Te Kao scheme with more expert supervision. As already discussed, Watt did not have the agricultural expertise necessary to supervise the scheme.

While his commitment to Maori in the Far North was unquestionable there is no doubt that Acheson's enthusiasm led him at times to serious mismanagement of the scheme. Henderson tells of how during the 1940s, as a board and community activity, Acheson embarked on a c scheme for growing potatoes on a dry lake bed near Wairahi and for catching sharks in the harbour and extracting their oil:

The potato scheme had its genesis in a sale by Mr Joe Conrad at a fantastic figure (£150 ton about), on a bare Auckland market, of a small quantity of new potatoes. Acheson thought he had struck a "bonanza" in potatoes and oil, but events proved he was in error and several thousand pounds of the people's and.Board's money were lost before a halt was called. These losses were the cause of much hardship in the settlement and years were to pass before the debts were paid68 .

One of the elders to whom Henderson apparently spoke described Acheson as Ita genuine genius at leading us from one disaster to another,,69.

In addition Acheson and the board can be accused of paternalism towards Te Kao Maori. Although there was little doubt where Acheson's sympathies lay, he styled himself as a knight errant, fighting battles on behalf of Te Kao Maori without actually involving them in the

67 Acheson to Hon. Native Minister, MNI 19/1/548 Part III, p. 3. 68 Henderson, Te Kao 75, p. 43. 69 quoted in Ibid, p. 42.

200 decision making process. While on one level Maori at Te Kao benefitted from Acheson's paternalism, on another they were left as powerless and as economically dependent as when he started. When, in the 1950s, government policy dictated that farming and allied business carried on by the Maori Land Boards should be handed over to control of the Maori owners, neither the Native Department nor the Te Kao community felt they had sufficient expertise to run the community store. Te Kao Maori were forced against their wishes to sell the stock and lease the premises 70.

Maori Land Development under the Native Department. Although the Tokerau Board's involvement in Te Kao continued into the 1950s, during the 1930s the Native Department extended complete control over the dairy scheme. In 1936 Watt resigned his position, and in 1939 the scheme was completely transferred to the Department Meanwhile, under the legislation of 1929 and 1931, the Native Department began to fund its own Maori land development scheme in the Far North.

Because of Ngata's criticisms of Acheson and the Tokerau Maori Land Board operations, North Auckland did not receive any assistance during the first year of development operations. In 1930 N gata confided to Peter Buck,

The operation of the Board in regard to Te Kao lands and sundry loans had not inspired the Head Office or myself with any confidence, and for twelve months the North was starved in order to bring those responsible up ~o the mark71.

By 1930, however, the effects of the Depression were adding fresh impetus to the push for Maori land development in the North. Public works operations had tailed off, causing much hardship for northern Maori. The resources of the Maori Land Board were practically exhausted, and the Native Department was receiving regular requests for assistance under the 1929 legislation72.

At the end of April 1930, Ngata toured the Tokerau district with consolidation officers and

70 MN1 19/1/548 Part III. 71 Ngata to Buck, 22 May.30, in Sorrenson (ed), VoL 2, p. 33. 72 Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes", 1932, pp. 3-6.

201 devised a plan of action for northern land development. Because of the scattered nature of fair

( to good partially-developed-land-inTaiTokerauNgatadecidedthatitwould-be-impracticalto·_----_·_-­ apply the type of organisation to development schemes that had been used elsewhere in the country. Further south, the provisions of the 1929 Act had been applied to large blocks of developable land, each of which were divided into units. Development had proceeded based on close connection and cooperation between the units, much as has occurred at Te Kao. Instead, Ngata conceived of a distinct form of organisation for North Auckland, using the same regional structure as the consolidation schemes and linking in closely to consolidation activities. All Maori owned land within the schemes (other than that leased to Europeans or mortgaged) was gazetted under section 23 of the 1929 Act. On the recommendation of a supervisor, the Crown then provided development assistance to individual units within the scheme. In the Mangonui Consolidation Scheme an area of 127500 acres of land was gazetted, much of which was totally unsuitable for dairy farming. Within this scheme, development units were separated both geographically and administratively. The object of the North Auckland schemes as distinct from elsewhere was thus "a development of separate and distinct farms by separate and independel)t individuals,,73.

I~ No doubt because of the work of the Board in encouraging land development, Ngata noted that many northern Maori had already done a great deal of clearing, fencing and grassing of their land in preparation for development assistance. Ngata noted that self-help "to an extent beyond what obtains in any other district among any other Native community" was a greater factor in North Auckland than anywhere else:

Nowhere was there so much co-operation among individuals and families;so great a determination to reduce to a minimum the call on outside capital, or to suffer the inconvenience of poor housing or indifferent equipment. The northern tribes describe this characteristic by saying that they work for one meal a day and themselves provide even that74.

Ngata thus believed that, although the cost of administrating the North Auckland scheme would be higher than elsewhere, much money would be saved in labour and material costs. He decided that development assistance in the North should be concenu-ated on establishing already partially developed farms on a productive and paying basis. Other applicants would be

73 Ibid, p. 6 ; "Bay of Islands Development Scheme" MA ACC 1369 box b [Doc Bank]. 74 Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes", 1932, p. 6.

202 rsq1:lired ~a 1:lse their aVIs labOl-lf, free of cost, to J3fSJ3af@ H@'lI areas for a&'/@loJ3fBest: Fttftdin:g would thus be limited to the provision of seed, material, manure, stock, dairy utensils~ implements, and in some cases, the discharge of liabilities75:

The requirement were modest, a little grass seed, some fencing wire and staples, manure and cows for ready made pastures - taken over the whole area meant that the available money would go further than anywhere else and be within a short time on a refund basis76.

N gata also decided to limit the subsequent farm activities of the Board -to lands for which Board loans had already been authorised. Further advances to make them efficient would be matters for supervisors to advise on and for sanction of Head Office within the available finance. Ngata could have chosen within the provisions of the legislation to delegate his powers to develop Maori lands to the Board. In the case of Tokerau, he chose not to do so 77.

In 1930 the Department placed Findlay, who was already supervising the Te Kao scheme, in charge of the supervision of the Tokerau, with Mangonui as his special charge. Two other men were appointed to supervise the schemes further South. From May to August 1930 they toured the area in conjunction with consolidation officers and investigated claims for assistance78. By 31 March 1931, 79 units in the Mangonui Consolidation Scheme had been recommended and approved for assistance. The units covered an area of 6625 acres, not all of which was considered developable. 2325 acres was in pasture and was supporting 251 cows79. During the next twelve months a further 52 units received assistance. This brought the total area under development up to 11664 areas80. In Muriwhenua, units received funding'from Ahipara and Manukau' on the West Coast to Karikari in the East.

U ntiI the winter of 1931 the Department did not pay Maori in the northern development schemes any wages. At the beginning of winter 1931 the closing down of public works, the slump in dairy prices, the inability of European farmers to provide work and the failure of

75 Ibid. 76 Ngata to Buck, 22 May 1930, Op cit. 77 Ibid; "Bay of Islands Development Scheme", Op Cit. 78 Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes", AJHR, 1931, p. xvi [Doc Bank] ; ( Ibid, 1932, p. 6 ; Ngata to Buck, 22 May 1930, Op cit; "Bay of Islands Development Scheme", Op cit. 79 Apirana Ngata, "Report on Native-Land Development Schemes", 1932, p. 7. 80 Ibid, p. 8.

203 kumera and potato crops led the northem tribes to seek relief. The Native Department set up its own unemployment branch which received grants from the Unemployment Board to provide relief for Maori. Unemployment contracts were subsidised on the basis of the Unemployment Board's No. 4b Scheme, some on official development schemes and others for private employers. The unemployment grant thus served a dual purpose. It met the immediate needs of the more than 3/4ths of the adult male Maori population of New Zealand who were unemployed; and at the same time contributed to the development of Maori landSI.

Criticism of N gala. While Ngata had been quick to criticise Acheson, the same claims of mismanagement were soon leveled against him. Like Acheson, Ngata loathed bureaucratic red tape, which he saw as obstructing his development schemes and wasting Maori money. In 1931 he confided to Buck that he had no hesitation of "sending the regulations to the devil" in cases where Maori dollars were concerned82.

( During the 1930s Ngata came increasingly under attack and, in 1934, a Native Affairs ~. Commission was set up to examine the administration of the development schemes. The commission criticised Ngata on a number of counts: disregarding head office; supporting Native over European supervisors regardless of who was right or wrong; disregarding ordinary channels of communication; and not properly accounting for state funds. His attitude to red tape, they claimed, "was such as to render regular departmental administration impossible,,83. The commission concluded:

We agree that a Native-land development administration must be sympathetic, patient, and friendly, but we are clear that no such administration supported by the funds of the State is justified which fails to ensure as part of the process of development (1) Proper accounting for Government moneys and stores; and (2) Administration which is subject to proper departmental check and which 84 ------is of such a kind that it may be carried on by successive Governments . 81 Apirana Ngata, .. Native Land Development", AIHR, 1934, G-IO, p. 1 [Doc BankJ. 82 Ngata to Buck, 27 July 1931, in Sorrenson (ed), Vol. 2, p. 194. 83 "Native Affairs Commission", p. 38. 84 Ibid, p. 40.

204 personal criticism N gata was to resign as ( Native Minister, the commission gave the thumbs up to the land developmentin general. After Ngata's resignation, development continued under the direction of the newly constituted Board of Native Affairs85. By 1935 there were 172 units in the Mangonui Scheme supporting 920 dependents and 3805 dairy stock. A total of £42158 had been spent on development in the Mangonui District86.

Problems with the Development Schemes. There were, however, a number of problems with land development in the Far North. Much of the land in Muriwhenua was simply not suitable for the type of development envisaged by the Native Department. Although in theory, Ngata claimed that communalism was one of his basic tenets of land development, in North Auckland development proceeded on the basis of small, individual farms87. The 1934 Commission supported this type of assistance and argued that it had proved much more useful than the development of comparatively large areas:

( Where a Native or his immediate family group is the owner of a comparatively ~ small area capable of profitable improvement, he requires assistance only to clear, develop, fence, and stock his small property. In a comparatively short time, under competent supervision, he is earning income from his land, is able to sustain himself and his family in a reasonable manner, to meet his interest, and, in many cases, to make repayments on account of capital. He acquires a sense of responsibility and of the need for persistence in his efforts, In addition, the land ceases to be a prolific source of noxious weeds and a breeding-ground for rabbits. It becomes able to bear the burden of local rates, and is an asset to the country88.

In fact, much of the remaining Maori land was not suitable for this type of small scale indi vidual development. The 30 to 40 acres farms of created by the consolidation schemes and developed under the Department frequendy turned out to be uneconomic.

It appears that the rationale of small scale farming was as much cultural as economic. The 1934 Commission claimed:

85 "Report on Native Land Development", AJHR, 1935. G-lO, p. 2 [Doc Bank]. 86 Ibid, p. 4. 87 Ngata to Buck, 16 July 1930, in Sorrenson (ed), Vol. 2, pp. 43/44. 88 "Native Affairs Commission", p. 26.

205 Settlement on theJand.as fanners.of dairy_cattle and. sheep ....will constitute a--- __ ( \ powerful influence towards a completely European mode of life, particularly where it involves the settlement of units in separate homes on separate areas which are expected to pay their way as a part of the modem industrial system of New Zealand89.

The development of unsuitable Maori land was also encouraged by the depression. According to Butterworth, Ngata had to expand the development scheme artificially rapidly. to meet the needs of the depression:

Much land that was, in fact, marginal was brought into production, and there were too many subdivisions into peasant's holdings of the 40 acres and 20 cows variety that were soon to prove uneconomic90.

In addition, much of the land in Muriwhenua was also unsuitable for the concentration on dairy farming under the land development schemes. In his 1956 thesis on Maori land in the four northernmost counties, Frazer noted Maori dependence on dairying to the exclusion of more

~.' suitable forms of farming. He claimed that Maori were dairying on steep slopes, frequently in excess of 20% and sometimes over 50%, that on Pakeha farmed land would be used by dry stock:

Thus there appears to be a general tradition of dairying, and this type of land utilization is unsatisfactory for many classes of land in the four counties... So many farms which are being run in this manner are showing the effects of an unsuitable economy, and in consequence, difficulty is being found in holding pasture on land which is too steep to plough or fertilize by mechanical means91.

While this emphasis on dairying in part reflected the general direction of New Zealand farming at that time, there were other reasons why dairying particularly appealed for Maori land development schemes. The initial financial output for establishing dairying farms was relatively low, and financial renumeration, in the form of the cream cheque, was regular. The Department could appropriate the monthly cheque and thus secure regular repayments on its loans. Dairying, by its very nature, also leant itself to small scale family farrns., and thus encouraged

89 Ibid. p. 37. 90 Butterworth IPS. p. 175. 91 Frazer, Op cit, p. 34.

206 ( Most fundamentally, Muriwhenua development schemes suffered from the lack of farmable land still in Maori ownership. Concentration on the development of remaining lands disguised the basic fact that by the 1920s and 1930s there was simply not enough land remaining in Maori ownership to support the increasing Maori population.

As already noted, Maori made frequent requests to the Crown to include extra lands in the consolidation and development schemes to provide for landless Maori and boost uneconomic holdings92. In 1936 Wairama Maihi te Huhu and 154 others petitioned the Government on behalf of the Rarawa tribe. Te Huhu expressed, first and foremost, the urgent need for vacant land to develop for the rapidly increasing population:

Most of the best lands were sold to Europeans and to the Crown by our tupunas generations ago; and the price received was only a few pence per acre. But most of this land is still unoccupied and undeveloped. Can we get it back?93

In relation to this, te Huhu complained of the treatment of their returned servicemen under the Discharged Soldiers Settlement AcL He commented that, whereas Maori had helped to prepare the sections for returned soldiers, none had actually been allotted to Maori.

It is true we are employed to develop Small Farm Sections and undertake diffIcult work on drains and stop banks. But our workers and our landless people do not get the Small Farms. We think the Lands Department has been administering all these matters for the benefit of Pakehas alone. We ask therefore that a fair proportion of all vacant and usable Crown land be handed over to the Native Department to meet the special needs of those of us who are landless through no fault of our own94.

Rarawa requested assistance for their returned soldiers: itA number are in poor circumstances,

unable to get pensions but visibly cracking up from the effecrts of their war serviceff95 .

92 Ngata to Buck, 22 May 1930, In Sorrenson (ed), Vol 2, p. 34; Hone wi Kaitaia to Minister Native Affairs, 2 August 1938, in MA 29/2/1 Vol2. 93 Wairama Maihi te Huhu and others to Prime Minister, 6 January 1936, MNI 19/1/210. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid.

207 The Crown did not respond to these requests, consldenng It preferable to spend money on

( developing Maori lands. Langstone__ wrote in ..1936,: ~'It can_ hardly_ be ..expected that. .the _. __ Government will purchase land to meet the requirements of all the Maori people,,96.

If the Native Land Department development schemes were characterised by unsuitable use of the land, they were also characterised by harsh treatment of people. Maori on Mangonui land development schemes functioned to all intents and purposes as tenants of the Department97. They were virtually in the thrall of the Native Department through the Department's appropriation of the monthly cream cheque. This caused many Jv1aori much hardship. The attitude of many Muriwhenua Maori towards Native Department supervision was indicated by the reluctance of Te Kao returned soldiers to go under Native Deparment control When Hemi Manuera met with the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Lands in 1944 to discuss the situation he stated, "These boys want to be free,,98.

In addition, Native Department schemes failed to address the dreadful social conditions experienceQ. by many Muriwhenua Maori. While the schemes concentrated on utilisation of the land, the communities continued to suffer from poor diet, bad housing and crippling health problems. In 1936 when Te Huhu petitioned the government, he noted the terrible state of the housing and its effect on health condition. Te Huhu commented that whereas the lands had been improved for their cows, the owners of the cows lived in continual discomfort99.

The same year, Te Kao Maori also petitioned the government for improvement to their living conditions:

Our houses are shacks made of rusty iron used many times over and badly holed. They are not fit for human beings to live in ... We beg you to help us get them before next winter. Last winter was very wet and we all suffered HX).

96 Langstone to Hone wi Kaitaia, 5 October 1936, in MA 29/2/1 Vo12. 97 "Bay of Islands Development Scheme" MA ACC 1369 box b. 98 Notes of interview, 7 September 1944, MNI 19/1/553 [Doc Bank] ; Notes on meeting with Minister of Lands, 7 September 1944, Ibid. 99 Wairama Maihi te Huhu and others to Prime Minsister, Op cit. 100 Petition 1936 to Savage MA 19/1/210.

208 Frazer on Land Development Schemes_ In his 1956 thesis on Maori land in the four northernmost counties, Frazer summed up the state of the Department's development schemes by the 1950s. Frazer noted the problems of Maori fanning in the four counties: poor subdivision (ie fencing) leading to bad grazing control, absence of buildings, absences of mechanical aids, particularly notab;e in the application of fertiliser, bad roads and consequent isolation insecurity of tenure, part time farminglOl.

Frazer calculated from the returns of three dairy vactories that over 1/2 the suppliers were producing less than 3000 pounds of butterfat pa (a gross annual return of £400) He concluded from this that suppliers must either be supplementing their incomes or existing at a very low standard of living. Less than one tenth earned in excess of 8000 pounds( £1000 pa) from which, after farm expenses subtracted, mights still leave as little as £500 pa Thus only a small proportion of Maori would have enjoyed an income regarded as adequate by Pakeha standards 102.

Frazer noted that the isolation and lack of roads caused great hardship to Maori farmer: "This involves daily sledging of the cream, or carrying it on horseback. for distances up to a mile, and on many such farms dairying ceased, and in some cases the fann has been abandoned,,103. He concluded,

Uneconomic farms are frequently th eresult of isolation and under-development. Often they are so small or so poor, that no matter how efficiently they were farmed, they would not produce a satisfactory income .. Some of these are alegacy from the economic depression of the nineteen-thirties when the immediate aim of the Department of Maori Affairs was to provide work and at least a bare living for these hard-hit communities. The other cause appears to be deeply rooted in a combination of overpopulation and a tradition that lands should be divided equally among the children ... Where these uneconomic fanns are near sources of casual work, a distinctive pattern has arisen. Around Kaikohe and Kaitaia, the number of "billy suppliers" is indicative of the number of small holdings which are milking a few cows, growing a few vegetables, and generally comprising a base from which to work at locallabouringjobs104.

101 Frazer, pp. 36-42. 102 Ibid, p. 43.

103 Ibid, p. 39. 104 lbid.

209 IlIleviewillg the histolY of DepaItamelit of Maoli Affairs involvement in development Ftazer

acknowledged that their activities had left many problems. The choice to ~evelop "subsistence­ ( sized" farms has led many to be abandoned as levels of living have risen post depression. In addition much of the land developed was not suited in soil or slope for the dairy economy105.

Conclusion. The preceding analysis of Maori land development schemes has been somewhat rushed. The treatment of both Maori land and Maori themselves under the Native Department's administration is an issue of great importance, and I would suggest is an area for further extensive research.

~" ...

(

105 Ibid, p.S1/52.

210 CHAPTER 7 : PROTEST OVER -SURPLUS -LANDS •

I nlroduc lion. The term "surplus lands" refers to those Crown lands created as a result of the Old Land Claims Commissions which investigated pre-1840 transactions over land between Maori and settlers. In 1927 Mr Meredith, appearing as Crown Counsel before the Sim Commission, summarised the process by which the Crown acquired such lands:

... all lands which had been purchased from natives prior to Hobson's arrival were declared demesne of the Crown, not only by Hobson's proclamation but under subsequent ordinance. The claims were inquired into and such grants were given to them [the Pakeha claimants] by the Crown as appeared to be in confonmty with justice and fairness, the resultant land which they did not get reverting to the Crown and constituting that form of land which is known as "surplus lands" 1.

In his most recent report, Barry Rigby asserts that the Old Land Claims Commissions investigated 123791 acres of Muriwhenua land. Of this land, they awarded 23636 acres to the Pakeha claimants and reserved 786 acres to the Maori "vendors". The Crown retained 39207 acres as surplus lands2 [Figure 1].

The surplus lands question is primarily related to the pre-1865 period of Crown / Maori interaction in Muriwhenua. Because of the long term history of Maori protest over surplus lands, however, the issue is also of major significance to any study of the post-1865 period.

In this chapter, I outline the tradition of protest over surplus lands during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and discuss the Crown's attempts to respond to such protest. In particular, I focus on the history of protest and response over Motuopao and Tangonge, both of which Maori claimed were not in fact surplus lands.

1 Petition No 52, Herepeti Rapihana re Kaitaia Block, in Minutes of Evidence before Royal Commission sitting at Russell, 11/12 April 1927, MA 85/5 [Evidence: Sim Commission], p. 424 [Doc Bank]. 2 B. Rigby, "A Question of Extinguishment: Crown Purchases in Muriwhenua 1850-1865", p. 72 [Wai 45].

21 1 The chapter is limited as far as possible to a discussion of the surplus lands issue as it relates to the post-l 865 period. I do not deal in any depth with the complex legal issues involved in the Crown's appropriation of "surplus land". Nor do I discuss in any detail the evidence of the 1948 Surplus Lands Commission. These issues will be the subject of a separate submission.

The Crown's Position on Surplus Lands. The Crown's alleged right to surplus lands was based on the fact that under international law all the territory of a ceded nation belonged to the Crown. Crown agents conceded that, in relation to land in Maori possession at 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi may have somewhat modified this position. As far as lands to which Maori had already parted possession were concerned, however, at the date of cession they passed immediately to the Crown. In 1887 John Cumin, the Attorney General outlined the Crown's position:

The question of surplus lands must not be debated in relation to the Natives, but really in relation to the Crown. For it is indisputable that all lands bought by individuals from Natives in New Zealand become absolutely the property of the Crown on the Treaty of Waitangi, or even before that; and that it was out of the pure bounty and equity of the Crown that the old land claimants were granted some land, which no doubt they had originally bought, but which equally without doubt belonged to the Crown by right ofinternationallaw3.

The Crown's position was based on the assumption that the pre-1840 transactions over land were full and final sales, and that all Maori rights to the land concerned were extinguished prior to 1840. Mr Meredith, appearing before the Sim Commission argued:

There can be no complaint by the Natives concerned of any injustice done to them by reason of the surplus lands passing, because they had prior to colonisation, parted with those lands to Europeans ... When Great Britain took over New Zealand, colonisation could not be expected to alter that position as between them and the Europeans to whom they had sold, and if there had been no taking over by Great Britain the lands would equally have gone4.

3 Mr John Cumin to Assistant Surveyor-General, 15 April 1887, cited by Judge MacCormick, "Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act, 1924" [MacCormick Hearing], AJHR, 1925, G-6B, p. 2 [Doc Bank]. 4 Evidence: Sim Commission, p. 424.

212 The Maori Position on Surplus Lands. To those who opposed the Crown's claims, the creation of surplus lands embodied a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Old Land Claims Commissions had determined the amount of land to be granted to Pakeha claimants "in conformity with justice and fairness" on the basis of the amount of money they had paid for the land5. The Crown created surplus lands when it did not consider that Maori had been adequately renumerated for the amount of land claimed. To those who opposed the Crown's position, its retention of surplus lands thus seemed paradoxical: if the Maori owners had not been adequately paid for the land then it should rightfully be returned to them. If they had been, then the land belonged to the European claimants, not to the Crown. Reynolds stated the case before the Sim Commission:

I suggest in all equity that if on the details of the purchase being gone into it was found that the Natives were not sufficiently paid, then it was only equitable that any surplus that was cut off that purchase should revert to the Natives: otherwise why should a scale of purchases be set out, and why should the area be worked out on a basis of money or land6.

More than this, though, the Crown's retention of surplus lands was based on the doubtful assumption that pre-l 840 transactions over land were full sales in the European sense of the word and that Maori had no continuing rights to the land. The only acknowledgement of continued Maori rights was the creation of three reserves, amounting to a mere 786 acres. As Rigby I Koning point out, these reserves were designed to segregate Maori within Pakeha society rather than to integrate Pakeha into Maori society, and they thus violated the whole spirit of pre-l 840 land transactions7.

Indeed, the whole idea of surplus lands completely negated the Maori concept of these transactions, which symbolised an ongoing relationship between Maori owners and particular Pakeha settlers. The appropriation of this land by a third party (the Crown) completely violated the Maori understanding of such trans action s8 .

5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, p. 431. 7 B. Rigby & J. Koning, "Muriwhenua Land Claim: A Preliminary Report on the Historical Evidence [Preliminary Report], p. 88. [Wai 45]. 8 Evidence of Dr Margaret Mutu, "Tuku Whenua or Land Sale?" [draft], Section 2: Tuku Whenua, pp. 7/8 [Wai 45J.

213 Gi v en the inconsistencies afld cOflfl:lsiofl Sl:lffOl:lfldiflg the Old LaM Claims Commissions and the creation of surplus lands, there was often some delay before Maori claimants became aware of the Crown's claims to such lands. When they did become aware of such claims, the surplus lands issue became a major source of grievance. In 1870 White noted the very bad feeling that the possibility of the Government laying claim to Muriwhenua North on surplus lands grounds had engendered9.

When Maori attempted to have the Mangatete block heard before the Native Land Court in 1882, Percy Smith, the Chief Surveyor, noted the high profile of the surplus lands question:

My opinion is that this is an attempt to again raise the question of the validity of the Crown's title to the "Surplus Lands", a question which is constantly cropping up and giving rise to endless trouble lO,

Three years later the Mangonui Resident Magistrate noted that the surplus lands issue was still attracting much attention:

The Maoris have a fixed idea that it is possible for them to recover possession of these lands, and in some cases considerable sums of money have been collected in order to enable these claims to be prosecuted. I do not think, however, that anything has so far been done in the matter, beyond bringing the occasional case before the Native Land Court11,

Motuopao and Taylor's Claim. By the 1880s Muriwhenua Maori had thus identified the surplus lands issue as a major source of grievance. While Maori in Muriwhenua objected to the Crown's acquisition of surplus lands per se, the many inaccuracies and inconsistencies surrounding the creation of surplus lands worsened the situation. Such inconsistencies led to a major controversy over the ownership of Motuopao, the island off the coast of Cape Maria van Diemen and part of Rev. Richard Taylor's original claim to Muriwhenua North.

9 White to Under Secretary, 16 September 1870, Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, p. 155 [Doc Bank]. 10 S. P. Smith, 23 August 1882, MA 91, quoted in Preliminary Report, p. 92. 11 Bishop Report, 30 April 1885, AJHR, 1885, G-2, No 3, p. 4 [Preliminary Report Supporting Documents [PR Doc], Vol 1: B15]. 214 In 1843 Commissioner Godfrey heard Taylor's claim to over 65000 acres of Muriwhenua

North, and recommended that Governor 'Fitzroy grant Taylor 1704 'actes~ As the land had n6t been surveyed this grant, which was issued to Taylor on 22 October 1844, described the boundaries of the entire Muriwhenua North area but specified only 1704 acres. Taylor eventually selected his grant at Kapowairua. Over the next thirty years, the Crown did not assert its claim to the surplus land created from Taylor's claiml2.

During the 1870s Maori claimants brought most of the land within the boundaries of Taylor's original claim before the Native Land Court. After some consideration, the Crown decided not to oppose Maori rights to this land. There were a number of good reasons for this decision. First, Taylor had expressed the clear intention that the land be kept for the benefit of the Aupouri people. Second, there was some doubt as to whether all the legitimate claimants to the land had been involved in the initial transaction. Third, the Crown had not asserted its right to the land in the intervening years 13. For these reasons W. B. White, who advised the Government on its possible course of action, feared that the Crown's case before the Court might not succeed:

Then again the deed of sale attached to the papers is only a copy, that coupled with the expressed intentions of the purchaser, will, I fear, tell with the Court against the Government claim, and I am most anxious to prevent an adverse decision by the Court, the effect upon the native mind would be such as to induce them to oppose every inch of land they have hitherto sold 14.

In addition, the poor quality of the land in question led White to doubt whether Muriwhenua North was worth the controversy that the Crown's claim was already causing. White therefore concluded, "unless the Government case is a very good one, I would certainly recommend that we should make a virtue of necessity and abandon the case altogether" 15.

12 B. Rigby, "The Muriwhenua North Area and the Muriwhenua Claim" [Muriwhenua North Report], pp. 24-27 [Wai 45] ; Ibid, p. 32. 13 Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, pp. l37-155 ; Muriwhenua North Report; Henare to Herries 20 July 1917, pp. 53-55, Dept of Cons Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island. 14 White to Under Secretary, 11 November 1870, Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, pp. 150/151. 15 White to Under Secretary, 16 September, 1870, Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, p. 155.

215 When the 57000 acre Muriwhenua Block carne before the Court in 1870, the Crown thus followed White's advise and did not oppose the claim. Nor did it oppose Maori claims to any of the other Muriwhenua North blocks that passed before the court over the next few years.

Although clearly part of Taylor's original claim, Maori excluded Motuopao from the Muriwhenua block they brought before the Native Land Court in 1870. As the Court minutes were subsequently destroyed, there is no contemporary evidence about this hearing. In 1907, however, witnesses who gave evidence before the Houston Commission argued that Maori had left the island out of the Muriwhenua block adjudication in order to retain it as a wahi tapu. One of the witnesses, Mehana te Rau, who had been present at the actual survey of the Muriwhenua block, described how the owners agreed to except Motuopao from the survey. When Maori took the Muriwhenua Block to Court they already intended to sell, and they clearly wished Motuopao excluded from this sale 16.

There was certainly no reason why either Crown or Maori should have believed that the Crown's claim to Motuopao was any different from the rest of Muriwhenua North. The Crown appeared to have renounced its surplus lands claim to the entire area. In 1874, however, the Crown began to investigate the possibility of acquiring Motuopao from local Maori in order to erect a lighthouse on the island. When notified of the Crown's intention to purchase, White claimed that the island was surplus land from Taylor's purchase and that therefore Maori had no rights to it:

... there can be no doubt that it was part of the Revd Mr Taylor's purchase, a portion of which, with the consent of the Government, I assisted the Natives to pass through the Native Land Court for their especial benefit. I do not think therefore that the Natives should be called upon to convey property which must be legally vested in the Governmentl7.

In March 1875, acting on \Vhite's advise, the Crown issued a proclamation extinguishing Native title to the island and gazetted the land as a lighthouse reserve 18.

16 Minutes of Evidence, "North of Auckland Surplus Lands" [Houston Commission], A1HR, 1907, C-18, pp.2-4 [Doc Bank]. 17 White to H. T. Kemp, 21 October 1874, Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, p. 119. 18 Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, p. 112.

216 Whue's advIse was ITIlsleadmg. By 1874, not Just a "portion" but most of Taylor's claim baa passed through the court in,several different adjudications. In alLthesecases the~CmWllracting ___ ~ " _, __ ,. on White's earlier advise, had not opposed Maori claimants. Nor, with the exception of Motuopao, did the Crown ever assert any surplus land claim in Muriwhenua North. For example on 1 May 1875, less than two months after the Crown extinguished title to Motuopao on the grounds that it was"surplus lands, the Mokaikai block passed through the court unopposed by the Government. At least part of this block was within the boundaries of Taylor's original claim. There was no apparent reason for White to think that the status of Motuopao should be any different from that of the mainland 19.

In addition, White did not mention the reasons why the Government had not pressed its original surplus lands claim to Muriwhenua North, reasons which four years earlier had led him to doubt whether the Native Land Court would accept the Crown's case20.

In following White's advise, the Crown did not inform local Maori of the decision, let alone consult with them. In one of the many ensuing petitions, Maori claimed that they were not aware that the Crown had acquired the land until they "saw the light burning on it,,21.

Maori Protest Over Motuopao. By 1877, however, Maori were aware that their rights Motuopao had been transgressed. On 5 March 1877, Maori brought the island before the Native Land Court at Mangonui. The district officer objected to the claim on the grounds that the island was "granted land", and Monro dismissed the case22.

Local Maori then began what was to become a forty year quest to establish on what grounds the Government claimed the island, and to seek compensation. The Crown's appropriation of the island upset Maori for two reasons. First, there were wahi tapu on the island which they wished to have protected. Second, they objected as a matter of principle to the fact that the

19 Muriwhenua North Report; Mokaikai Block, 1 May 1875, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 64 ; Ibid. pp. 69nO. 20 White to H. T. Kemp. 21 October 1874, Op cit, p. 119. 21 Hohepa Paraone Ngauhe and 5 others, 12 July 1886, Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, p.74. 22 Motuopao, 5 March 1877, Northern Minute Book 1, p. 141.

217 crown did not acknowledge their rights to the land. OVer the next five years they sent at least four letters and two petitions to various Crown representatives, asserting their ownership rights to the island and objecting to its appropriation23. This correspondence shows that Maori were confused about the grounds on which the Government claimed the land. For example, in one letter they surmised that perhaps Jones and Yates had sold the island to the Government, as they had not24.

If Maori were confused, Crown agents seemed equally so. In 1881 the Maori Affairs Committee finally investigated the issue. They reported that Motuopao was part of the land granted to Taylor in 1844 and that it had subsequently become Crown property25. This was patently inaccurate. Although Motuopao had been described in the unsurveyed boundaries of Taylor's 1844 grant, the small grant in fact taken by Taylor was at Kapowairua, several miles away from Motuopao. The Crown's claim, for what it was worth, was based on surplus lands from Taylor's grant, not from some later purchase. This report only served to increase the confusion over the issue.

The Committee also argued that "No claim was raised to the Land [ie by Maori] until the light­ house was erected". They did not point out that the Crown had let its own claim to the island lapse for thirty years: from 1844 to 187426.

In 1882 Maori again petitioned parliament. This time the Native Affairs Committee admitted to its original error and declared that Motuopao "was surplus land from Taylor's purchase, and so declared, and has been so treated throughout". The Committee argued that the Government had allowed the mainland to pass through the Court as a "matter of grace" but that Motuopao was not included in the subsequent Crown grant27.

23 Nopera Mumu and two others to Fenton (translation), 6 September 1877, Dept of Cons: Reserves­ Nature, Motuopao Island, p. 109 ; Mihaka Kingi Wiremu and others to Sheehan (translation), 29 November 1877, Ibid, p. 105 ; Rewiri Hongi to Sheehan, 5 June 1878, Ibid, p. 100; Rewiri Hongi to Sheehan, 29 Akuhata 1878, Ibid, p. 98 ; Nopera Mumu and others, 5 May 1879, Ibid, p. 95/96 ; Rewiri Hongi and 36 others,S Sept 1881, Petition No 99, Maori Affairs Committee Report of 1881 , Ibid, p. 90. 24 Mihaka Kingi Wiremu and others to Sheehan (translation), 29 November 1877, Op cit, p. 105. 25 Rewiri Hongi and 36 others,S Sept 1881, Op cit, p. 90. 26 Ibid.

27 Petition No 282, 1882, Hongi Keepa and 7 others, Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, p. 89.

218 In 1883 Rev. Matthew Kapa wrote to Bryce suggesting a compromise over the Motuopao controv~rsy. He-suggested that in-order to defuse -thesituatioIl; the Grown- grant Maori a small--· piece of land on the island as an acknowledgement of their rights. Although this could have been done without any interference to the lighthouse, the Crown refused Kapa's suggestion outright28.

Although the Crown now considered the matter closed, Maori continued to agitate for the Crown to acknowledge their rights to Motuopao. During the rest of the century there was a finding of the runanga at Kaipara in favour of Maori rights to Motuopao, and at least three more petitions to parliament, one of which attempted to have the island gazetted for a Native Land Court hearing. The Crown refused to reconsider the matter, arguing that it had already been dealt with in 1881. Crown officials also continued to misinform Maori, quoting from the incorrect 1881 Native Affairs Committee report. Maori claimants thus continued to be unsure under what authority the Government actually claimed the land29.

Protest over Tangonge. Ariother block which excited a great deal of Maori protest was Tangonge, an area of approximately 1000 acres adjoining and including a portion of the Tangonge Lake. The Tangonge controversy looms large in the history of Crown / Maori interaction in Muriwhenua. Maori sent at least five petitions to the government and it was considered by three Crown commissions during the twentieth century, as well as by the Native Land Court.

Like Motuopao, the Crown claimed Tangonge as surplus lands but local Maori argued that it was not.They believed that, although originally sold to Rev. Joseph Matthews, the block had been returned to their matua, Puhipi te Ripi, prior to the Old Land Claims adjudication. It was not until the 1890s when gum was discovered in the area and Timoti Puhipi attempted to lay claim to the royalties, that local Maori discovered that the government claimed to own the block30.

28 Rev Matthew Kapa to Bryce (translation), 30 August 1883, Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, pp. 86/87 ; Dept of Cons: Reserves-Nature, Motuopao Island, p. 83. 29 Ibid, pp. 65-82. 30 Timoti Puhipi and 20 Others, No 402 1893, Tangonge Petition Claim 328, File "E", Surplus Land Commission [Surplus Lands: File E], p. 22 [Doc Bank] ; Timoti Puhipi and 5 Others, No 734, 1894, Ibid, p. 25 ; Timoti Puhipi, Houston Commission, p. 2.

219 In 1893 Puhipi sent the first of numerous petitions to the Native Mfairs Committee, asking for an investigation of the issue. Matthews himself signed the petition. The Committee recommended that the Resident Magistrate instigate an inquiry into the matter31.

Initially, however, the Government referred the matter to Stephenson Percy Smith, the Surveyor General. Percy Smith claimed that the land in question was surplus lands, included in the boundaries of Matthews' old land claim. He advised that an investigation by the Resident Magistrate could be a very "risky business":

... if this course is pursued it seems to me there is great danger of the title of the Crown to the surplus land being disputed for the want of. sufficient evidence or knowledge on the part of those who should make the inquiry32.

On Percy Smith's recommendation, the Crown let the matter drop.

In 1894 Puhipi sent a second petition to the Native Affairs Committee, again apparently signed by Matthews himself. The Committee recommended that, as the grievance was of a "long standing nature", the Government should appoint the Stipendiary Magistrate of the district to inquire into the matter. Again the Crown appears to have let the matter drop33.

In 1906, Timoti PUhipi and 29 others petitioned the government a third time. This time the Committee referred the petition to the Commission set up to investigate the general question of North Auckland surplus lands. By this time Matthews' death had removed one of the most crucial witnesses34.

31 Timoti Puhipi and 20 Others, No 402 1893, Op cit, p. 22 ; Timoti Puhipi and 20 Others, No 402, 1893, "Reports of the Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1893, 1-3, p. 21 [Doc Bank]. 32 Surveyor General to Hon. Minister of Lands, 9 December 1893, Surplus Lands: File E, p. 24. 33 Timoti Puhipi and 5 Others, No 734, 1894, Ibid, p. 25 ; Timoti Puhipi, Houston Commission, p. 2 ; Timoti Puhipi and 5 Others, No 734, 1894, in "Reports of the Native Affairs Committee", AIHR, 1895, 1-3, p. 6 [Doc Bank]. 34 Timoti Puhipi and 29 Others, No 207, 1906, in "Reports of the Native Affairs Committee", AIHR, 1906,1-3, p. 12 [Doc Bank].

220 The Houston Commission. In March 1907, as a result of frequent-petitions to-pariiament,-the Crown·appointed-a one man··· commission to inquire into the question of North of Auckland surplus lands. The Commissioner was R. M. Houston, the MP for Bay of Islands, member of the Native Affairs Committee and former chairman of the Mangonui County Council. He heard evidence with regards to six blocks of land in North Auckland, including both Motuopao and Tangonge. As a result of his inquiry, which took place from 10-20 May 1907, Houston found that there were portions of undisposed surplus lands in the investigated areas and that it would be an "act of grace" for the Crown to confer portions of such lands on landless Maori. He recommended that legislation be introduced to enable such lands to be set aside for Maori, and that the Native Land Court should decide which Maori, either the occupiers or the original native owners, should most suitably be granted title35.

Although sympathetic to Maori, Houston's findings were essentially weak. While he recognised and acknowledged the problem of landlessness amongst northern Maori, he challenged neither the legality nor even the justice of surplus lands. Indeed he stated very clearly that his recommendations, if acted upon, would be "without prejudice" to the Crown's legal right to such lands36.

With regard to Motuopao, Houston failed to identify the specific issues which distinguished the island from the general surplus lands question. As Maori were themselves confused about the grounds on which the Crown claimed ownership of the block, they were obviously unable to clarify the issue. Houston did not take Maori up on their challenge to show them how the Government had acquired the land. He provided no specific analysis or recommendation with regard to the block37.

The long term out come of the Houston Commission in relation to Motuopao was not favourable to Maori. With regards to three of the blocks dealt with by Houston, the Crown appears to have negotiated a compromise settlement and returned some of the land to Maori. None of these blocks were in Muriwhenua38. Motuopao remained in Crown ownership and

35 Houston Commission, p. 1. 36 Ibid, p. 1. 37 Rewiri Hongi, Ibid, pp. 2-4. 38 Evidence: Sim Commission, p. 416.

221 Maori received neithet compensation nOI pIocectiolI of [lten wahi tapa. Also, tlrey remained as confused as ever about how the Crown claimed to have acquired the island During the decade following the Houston Commission, Maori continued to call for compensation or for a papatupu investigation of the block39.

Houston on Tangonge. Houston gave more substantial findings, however, with regard to the Tangonge block. He found that Matthews had indeed given the land back to the Native owners and that it was not included in Matthews' claim before the Old Land Claims Commission. The block, Houston argued, should still be Native land vested in the Native owners40.

Unfortunately, although Houston supported the Maori position on the ownership of Tangonge, he left little evidence as to how he reached this decision. The published minutes of evidence contain three short statements from Timoti Puhipi, Riapo Puhipi and Herepete Rapihana outlining the Maori position: that the land had been gifted back by Matthews; that they had been unaware of the Government's claim until the issue of gum royalties surfaced in 1893; and that Matthews himself had encouraged them to petition the government41 . Beyond these statements it is impossible to tell what evidence Houston had before him. Reynolds asserted before the Sim Commission in 1927 that Richard Matthews, the eldest son of Rev. Matthews, was on record as giving evidence before Houston, but this was certainly not included in the published minutes. If there were unpublished records of the commission they do not appear to have been preserved42.

Nor was Houston's analysis of the evidence any more illuminating. His entire report on Tangonge is two sentences long. In the long run this lack of analysis weakened the Maori case for Tangonge. When MacConnick heard the case for Tangonge before the Native Land Court in 1924, he criticised Houston on the grounds that the Lands Department were not represented and that the proceedings were ex parte. He also argued that Houston was a layman and had no one to direct him to the legal position43.

39 Wairama Maihi, A1HR, 1915,1-3, p. 25 [Doc Bank]; Henare to Herries, 20 July 1917, Op cit, pp. 53- 55. 40 Houston Commission, p. 1. 41 Ibid, p. 2. 42 Evidence: Sim Commission, p. 416. 222 The Government did not act on' Houston's recommendations over Tangonge. Moreover, because it had oeen singled oilt; it did not receive the consideration given to the 'other five blocks. Reynolds pointed out to the Sim Commission the irony of this situation: whereas in the case of three blocks heard before Houston a compromise had been reached and some of the land returned, in the case of Tangonge, nothing had been done. In spite, indeed because of the fact that the case for Tangonge was perhaps stronger, it had missed out entirely on any remedy44.

A Settlement over Motuopao. Ten years after the Houston Commission, the Crown and Maori finally compensated Maori for the loss of Motuopao. In 1917 Tau Henare reviewed the Motuopao controversy and reported to Herries in favour of the Maori claimants. Unlike Houston, Henare went through the government files on Motuopao and managed to identify the many inconsistencies in the Crown's case. He concluded, "it is easy to see how inconsistent and unsatisfactory these reports are and shows either a carelessness of search or an attempt to bolster up a bad case". Henare concluded that the land was obviously not, as the Crown had frequently claimed, part of Taylor's grant and that there was some doubt as to whether all the owners had actually sold to Taylor in the first place. He recommended in favour of Maori requests for equitable compensation and the right to reserve off burial grounds or exhume their ancestors' remains45.

As a result of Henare's report the Crown decided as an "act of grace" to compensate Maori for the loss of the island. They did not accept the legitimacy of the Maori claim, but merely offered compensation as a means to quieten discontent and finally settle the dispute. In 1920 parliament authorised the payment £150 pounds under the Native Land Amendment and Native Lands Claims Adjustment Act. £100 went to the trustees of the Ngapuhi Patriotic Fund. The remaining £50 went to Rev Mutu Kapa, Eru Ihaka and Murupaenga Rewiri of Te Ka046. The adequacy of this compensation might well be questioned, as might the choice of beneficiaries.

43 MacCormick Hearing, p. 1. 44 Evidence: Sim Commission, p. 416. 45 Henare to Herries 20 July 1917, Op cit, pp. 53-55. 46 Min of Lands to Henare, 17 December 1917, Ibid, pp. 40/41. ; Under Sec. Lands and Surveys to Com. Crown Lands Auckland, 5 July 1920, Ibid, p. 34.

223 Nevertheless, the payment was at least some acknowledgement of Maori rights to the island, and produced -a partial resolution to an issue that had been troubling Muriwhenua Maori for forty years.

The Tangonge Dispute Continued: The MacCormick Hearing. In regards to Tangonge, a resolution was less forthcoming. ,In the years following the 1907 Commission, Houston's decision added fuel to Maori claims over Tangonge. Claimants continued to petition parliament and make trips to Wellington, attempting to get Houston's recommendations upheld47.

Finally in 1924, seventeen years after Houston's decision, the Native Affairs Committee referred the issue to parliament for favourable consideration. Parliament in turn passed legislation referring the matter to the Native Land Court48. On 20 February 1925, Judge MacCormick heard the case at Ahipara. Mr Reynolds appeared for the claimants and Mr Darby for the Crown Lands Department. MacCormick reversed Houston's decision.

Although MacCormick accepted that Matthews probably had promised to return part of the land to Maori, he argued that he in fact had no legal power to do so. MacCormick outlined the basis of the Crown's claims to surplus lands: that on the cession of New Zealand all lands that Maori had already alienated passed to the Crown. Thus, MacCormick argued, it followed that Matthews' promise had no legal basis: "It is quite clear that no verbal or written promise, nor even a deed, by Mr Matthews could have any effect against the Crown".

Having dismissed the legal grounds to the Tangonge claim, MacCormick asserted that it would be inappropriate for him to offer an opinion on whether the Crown should, out of bounty and equity, make a concession to Maori. He did point out, however, that the whereas some of the land was unimproved swamp land, readily drainable given the current drainage operations on Tangonge Lake, the greater part consisted of poor hills of little value except their proximity to Kaitaia. The implication, presumably, was that the Crown would have little to lose by gifting

47 Evidence: Sim Commission, pp. 416/417 ; Riapo Timoti Puhipi and 4 Others, No 47, 1917, in "Reports of the Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1919,1-3, p. 20 [Doc Bank]. 48 Herepeti Rapihana, No 162, 1924, "Reports of the Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1924,1-3, p. 35 [Doc Bank] ; Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act, NZS, 1924, No 45, pp. 332/333 [Doc Bank].

224 Although the MacCormick decision was unsatisfactory from the Maori point of view, it did leave open the question of whether the Crown's acquisition of surplus lands was in fact equitable. In 1926 Maori claimants again petitioned parliament over Tangonge, and this time they addressed the larger question of the equity of the Crown's appropriation of surplus lands per se. By then all but one of the witnesses that had appeared before Houston were dead making it that much harder for them to present their case50.

The Sim Commission. In 1927 the Crown appointed a three man commission to examine the issue of confiscated lands. The commission also had power to inquire into a number of unrelated petitions, one of which dealt with the Tangonge block. On 11 April 1927, "the Royal Commission to Inquire into Confiscations of Native Lands and Other Grievances Alleged by Natives" (the Sim Commission) sat in Russell and heard evidence about the Tangonge Block51.

Mr Meredith appeared as Counsel of Crown. Meredith clearly outlined the Crown's position on surplus land: that on cession such lands passed automatically to the Crown and that Maori thus had no legal claim. In addition, Meredith produced the Old Land Claims file on Matthews' claim, which had not been available at any past hearing. According to Meredith, the file showed that Tangonge had been part of the Old Land Claims adjudication. He thus concluded that no gift had in fact been made52.

The question of whether the land Matthews brought before the Old Land Claims Commission in fact corresponded with the land claimed by Maori is dependent on a close reading of the Old Land Claims files, and is one I have not dealt with. Regardless of the answer to this question, Maori still had a strong claim to Tangonge. As already discussed, the Crown's claim to Tangonge was based on the assumption that the transaction between Maori and Matthews was

49 MacCormick Hearing, pp. 1/2. 50 Herepeti Rapihana and 10 Others, No 275, 1926 and Hati Rapihana and Another, No 278, 1926 in "Reports of the Native Affairs Committee", AJHR, 1926, 1-3, p. 7 [Doc Bank] ; Evidence: Sim Commission, pp. 412-414. 51 "Confiscated Native Lands and Other Grievances" [Sim Commission], AJHR, 1928, G-7, pp.I-5. 52 Evidence: Sim Commission, p. 424-9.

225 a full and final sale in the European sense. If, as claimant historian Margaret Mutu suggests, it was in fact a tuku whenua, a temporary allocation of land rights by the tribe to a specified individual, then the Crown's rights to the land are less strong. The fact that Maori believed Matthews had "gifted" the land back strengthens this case, and is not necessarily negated by the possibility that the block was included before the Old Land Claims Commission. In addition the Crown's failure to press its title to the block until the 1890s must further weaken its case. In replying to the Crown's claims however, Reynolds, again appearing for the petitioners, put a very weak case. In the face of the Crown's evidence Reynolds virtually conceded that Matthews had not gifted back the land and that at the most Matthews had perhaps told Maori that he would do his best to see they got it back. He agreed that the block was in fact surplus land and argued that Maori had misunderstood the situation because the Crown never pressed its title53.

Reynolds also agreed with Judge MacCormick's conclusion that under international law the land belonged to the Crown. Regardless of whether Matthews had meant to gift back the land, Reynolds conceded, in fact he had no power under international law to do s054.

Reynolds thus supported the Crown's contention that, as a question of law, the block could rightfully be claimed by the Government as surplus land. The only case he in fact put for the Crown to return the land to Maori was one of "good conscience and equity". In this respect Reynolds referred to the several blocks elsewhere in North Auckland that had been returned to Maori as a result .of the Houston Commission. He pointed out the injustice of the fact that, because Tangonge had been singled out for consideration, it had missed out on any remedy55:

I submit that if there was a promise then we are entitled to very favourable consideration. If it is simply a case of ordinary surplus land we should be in no worse position than the present position of blocks which were returned to the Natives56.

Reynolds' submissions illustrate the very poor representation Maori could be subjected to in

53 Ibid, p. 430/431. 54 Ibid, p. 416. 55 Ibid, p. 413 ; Ibid, p. 416. 56 Ibid, p. 419.

226 having their grievances heard by the Crown. It is hard to belive that the petitioners would have accepted the case -presented by -Reynolds. Indeed; Reynolds' submissions'- summed- up- the - _. views of the Crown more clearly than those of the Maori claimants.

Not surprisingly, the commission accepted the Crown's view of events. The commission argued that Tangonge was included in the block adjudicated by the Bell Commission, and was not gifted back to Maori:

From the evidence produced at the hearing of this petition it is evident that the Tangonge Block was sold by the Maori owners to the Rev. Joseph Matthews, and the petitioners have failed to prove that Mr. Matthews agreed to give any part of the block back to the vendors... if Mr Matthews had made any promise, he had no lawful right to do so, because it was not his to give. But as a matter of fact, Mr Matthews never could have made any such promise5?

The Sim Commission, like MacCormick, raised the issue of whether the Crown's retention of surplus lands was "equitable", but did not consider this question within their jurisdiction:

It is a question whether or not, in good conscience and equity, "surplus lands" in purchases of that kind should be treated as belonging to the original Native owners and not to the Crown, and we do not express any opinion on that question58.

The Surplus Lands Commission. The surplus lands issue continued to be a major source of grievance to Murlwhenua Maori, and was the subject of numerous petitions to the Crown. For example, in 1936 as a result of a hui with elders from throughout the Muriwhenua area, Wairama Maihi te Huhu petitioned the government on behalf of the Rarawa tribe. He listed amongst their concerns the desire to have the surplus lands issue settled after proper inquiry:

These lands are rightfully ours, though held by the Crown. The Crown did not pay for them59.

57 Ibid, p. 429 ; Sim Commission, p. 35. 58 Ibid. 59 Wairama Maihi te Huhu and others to Prime Minsiter, 6 January 1936, MNI 19/1/210 [Doc Bank].

227 In 1946, after numerous more petitions on the question, the Crown finally appointed a three man commission to investigate the question. The commission was instructed to deal specifically with a number of petitions to parliament on the surplus lands issue and to investigate the justice of Maori claims to surplus lands and if necessary recommend compensation.

The Surplus Lands Commission, made up of Sir Michael Myers, Hanara Tangiawha Reedy and Albert Moeller Samuel, met in Auckland and then in Kaikohe, refusing requests to sit at Mangonui or Kaitaia, and finally reported in 1948. The findings of the commission were presented in two conflicting reports, a minority one by Myers and a majority one by the other two.

With regards to the issue of Tangonge, the commission upheld the decision of Sim and MacCormick that Matthews had never given the land back to Maori and treated the block as a straightforward case of surplus land. Nor did the commission question the strict legality of the Crown's appropriation of surplus land. Rather, the commission saw as its goal to find on the question expressly reserved by Sim and MacCormick: whether in good conscience and equity the land should revert to Maori. On this issue alone, the commission found that not all surplus lands appropriation had been equitable, and recommended that compensation should be given for the benefit of Maori or Maori institutions in the districts effected.

While the commission agreed that the Crown had appropriated 87582 acres of surplus land in Tokerau they differed on the question of how much had been unjustly taken and thus how much compensation should be given, Myers recommending £15000 and Samuel and Reedy £61307, or 14s an acre as a full and final setdement60.

It is not my intention to examine the findings of the Surplus Lands Commission in any detail as this will be the subject of separate submissions to the tribunal. In the Oruru report, however, Barry Rigby identifies the following general criticisms of the commission: First, despite the precedent provided by earlier commissions such as the Sim Commission, the commission chose not to encourage Maori to present oral testimony. Second, the commission's choice of counsel, H. O. Cooney, did not assist the petitioners in preparing their case and did not represent their specific interests in particular areas. He presented the case in general terms of

60 "Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into Surplus Lands", AIHR, 1948, G-8 [Doc Bank].

228 eqtlity lathe! than in specific local and histOlical teItHS. Thhd, dle cOlllmission did not appoitn a:

qualified historian to assist them, and struggled to make sen~e of the bulky and often complex documentary evidence. Partly as a result of these problems the commissions report suffered from lack of historical analysis and lack of comprehensiveness. The in globo compensation that resulted remained a source of dissatisfaction to Muriwhenua people61.

Although the Surplus Lands Commission thus provided some acknowledgement of the injustice of the Crown's appropriation of surplus lands, Maori claimants did not receive recognition and compensation for their specific surplus lands claims. In the following decades, the surplus lands issue continued to be a major source of grievance for Muriwhenua people62.

Conclusion. Throughout the period 1865-1990, the surplus lands issue has remained a major source of conflict between Muriwhenua Maori and the Crown. While Maori objected to the creation of surplus lands per se, the inconsistencies and inaccuracies surrounding the Crown's appropriation of these lands further complicated and confused the issue. This was particularly true in the case of Motuopao and Tangonge, both of which were the subject of a string of petitions throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite numerous inquiries, the Crown failed to deal with the grievances relating to either of these blocks to the satisfaction of Maori claimants.

The Crown and Maori reached a partial settlement first of the Motuopao controversy in 1917 and then of the general surplus lands question in 1948. In both these cases, however, the Crown failed to fully address the historical and legal issues involved or to provide adequate compensation. The surplus lands issue thus remained a major source of dissatisfaction for specific Muriwhenua claimant groups.

61 Rigby, "The Oruru Area and the Muriwhenua Claim", pp. 53-57 [Wai 45]. 62 No 36, Hori Tamali Rapihana and 222 others,"Praying for amendment to the Taitokerau Maori Trust Board Act to protect the interests of beneficiaries to the Taitokerau Surplus Lands Compensation Money". No recommendation: "Maori Affairs Committee''. AJHR, 1957,1-3, p. 4 [Doc Bank]. 229 CONCLUSION.

For Muriwhenua Maori, the period 1865-1920 was characterised by the continued alienation of the land base, the fragmentation of remaining Maori land holdings, poverty, disease, debt and increased dependence on a seasonal labouring economy.

The Crown not only failed to recognise or protect Maori interests in the area but were also the principle cause of many of these problems. Both Crown purchase agents and the Native Land Court operated to dispossess Maori of remaining Muriwhenua land, without proper regard to first establishing the rights of all the owners, the desire of owners to sell, adequate prices for the land, or the needs of present and future generations. Equally detrimental in the matter of land, the Native Land Court presided over the fragmentation of remaining Maori land into uneconomic holdings and the stockpiling of debt on these holdings.

The Resident Magistrates, the principle agents of the Crown in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth century, were totally embroiled in this land purchase system. In so far as they defined Maori interests at all, it was in terms of assimilation into the European culture. Even then the purpose of assimilation was limited, envisaging a future for Maori as the social and economic subordinates of Pakeha. Education officials carried on in this assimilationist tradition, working to disinherit Maori from their language and culture and train them for a subordinate economic role.

By the 1920s, however, the Crown was forced to acknowledge the problems it, itself, had caused during the preceding 60 years and attempt to deal with them. The Crown's response to these problems, however, was limited by its continued support of the ethic of individualisation, regardless of its appropriateness to Muriwhenua economic conditions. In addition, the Crown concentrated its reforms almost entirely on encouraging Maori to utilise their remaining land and, in doing so, failed to confront the even more fundamental problem of landlessness.

From the mid-1940s onwards, the Crown's failure to respond successfully to the economic plight of Muriwhenua Maori led to a mass migration to the towns and cities.

230 BIBLIOGRAPHY.

A: Primary Sources, l.Unpublished (Official). Internal Affairs (lA 104): National Archives Wellington. Justice Depannent Series 1. Registered Correspondence, 1893-1900: National Archives Wellington. Maori Affairs Department ( MA): National Archives Wellington. Maori Land Purchase Department (MA I MLP):National Archives Wellington. "Bay of Islands Development Schemes", MA ACC 1369 box b. Education Files (BAAA 1001): National Archives Auckland: Lands and Surveys Department (LS-A): National Archives Auckland. Northern Minute Books 1-3: Maori Land Court Whangerei. "Correspondence re Tokerau District Native Land Commission Reports", 19 Misc: Maori Land Court Whangerei. Dept of Cons- Reserves Motuopao: Department 0/ Conservation.

2. Unpublished (Private). Extracts from W. G. Puckey, Journals and Letters, Vo11, 1831-1852, Alexannder Turnbull Library.

3.PubIished Primary Sources. Appendices the Journal 0/ the House 0/ Representatives. Appendices the Journal o/the Legislative Council. Kai Tiaki, The Journal of the Nurses of NZ, 1908-1929. New Zealand Gazettes. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates New Zealand Statutes. Pope, J. H., Health/or the Maori, Wellington 1901 [Third Edition]. Sorrenson, M. P. K. (ed.), Na To Hoa Aroha. The Correspondence between Sir Apirana

231 Ngata and Sir Peter Buck, 1925-50, Auckland 1988. Turton, H. H., Maori Deeds ofLand Purchases, Vol 1, Wellington 1877. Turton, H. H., Plans ofLand Purchases, Vol 1, Wellington 1877. Turton, H. H. An Epitome of Official Documents, Wellington 1883.

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l.Books. Asher, G. and Naulls, D., Maori Land, Wellington 1986. Barrington, J. M. & Beaglehole, T. H., Maori Schools in a Changing Society, Wellington 1974. Butterworth, G. V., Maori Affairs, Wellington 1990. Cyclopedia ofNew Zealand, Vol 2, Christchurch 1902. Firth, R. W., The Kauri-Gum Industry: Some Economic Aspects, Wellington 1924. Hayward, B. W., Kauri Gum and the Gumdiggers, Auckland 1982. Henderson, J. M., Ratana. The Man, the Church, the Political Movement, Polynesian Society Memoir, Vol 36, 2nd Edition, 1932. Henderson, J. M., Te Kao: 75, Kaitaia 1957. Kawharu, 1. H., Maori Land Tenure, Oxford 1977. Keene, F., To The Northward, Whangarei. Keene, F (ed) Rangatirafrom Aupouri, Whangarei. McKenna, N. C., Mangonui, Gateway to the Far North, Kerikeri 1990. Oliver, W. H. (ed), Oxford History of New Zealand, Oxford 1981. Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Environmental Management and the Principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi, Wellington 1988. Plucknett, T., A Concise History of the Common Law, London 1956 [5th Edition]. Pool, D. 1., The Maori Population ofNew Zealand 1767-1971, Auckland 1977. Shuker, R., The One Best System?, Palmerston North 1987. Smith, N., The Maori People and Us, Wellington 1948. Wagener, R., Gumfields of Aupouri, Northland 1977. Ward, A., A Show of Justice. Racial Amalgamation in Nineteenth Century New Zealand, Canberra 1974.

232 2.Articles. Ballara, A., "The Pursuit of Mana? ARe-evaluation- of the Process -of Land Alienation by- the Maori, 1840-1890", Journal of Polynesian Society, Vol 91, No 4, Dec 1982. Butterworth, G. V., "A Rural Maori Renaissance? Maori Society and Politics 1920 to 1951 ", Journal of Polynesian Society, Vo181, No 2, June 1972. King, M., "Between Two Worlds", W. H.Oliver,(ed), Oxford History of New Zealand, Oxford 1981. Parsonson, A., "The Pursuit of Mana", in W. H. Oliver (ed), Oxford History of New Zealand, Oxford 1981. Sorrenson, M. P. K., "Land Purchase Methods and their Effect on Maori Population, 1865- 1901", Journal of Polynesian Society, 1956, 14(3).

3. Unpublished Thesis. Frazer, R. M., "Maori Land in the Four Northernmost Counties of New Zealand", MA Thesis in Geography, University of New Zealand 1956. Lange, R.T., "The Revival of a Dying Race.", MA Thesis, Auckland 1972. Simon, J. A., "The Place of Schooling in Maori-Pakeha Relations", PhD Thesis, Auckland 1990.

4. Tribunal Reports and Submissions. Armstrong, D. A., "Crown Actions in Respect ofWaipoua-Maunganui, 1874-1876" [Wai 38] Colqhoun, D., "The Waipoua-Maunganui Claim: A Preliminary Report", [Wai 38] Oral Evidence of Ross Gregory, Monday 4 March 1991, Tribunal Hearing on Te Wharo Oneroa a Tohe [Wai 45]. Metge, A. J., "Evidence of Alice Joan Metge", [Wai 45: Doc #C20]. Muriwhenua Fishing Report [Wai 22]. Evidence of Dr Margaret Mutu, "Tuku Whenua or Land Sale", Draft, [Wai 45]. Newell, 1., "Muriwhenua Socio-econornic Profile Report", prepared for the Waitangi Tribunal Division, 28 March 1990. Ngai Tahu Report [Wai 27]. Orakei Report [Wai 9]. Rigby, B. & Koning 1., "Muriwhenua Land Claim: A Preliminary Report on the Historical

233 Evidence", December 1989 [Wai 45]. Rigby, R, "The Muriwhenua North Area and the Muriwhenua Claim", November 1990 [Wai 45]. Rigby, R, "The Druru Area and the Muriwhenua Claim", February 1991 [Wai 45]. Rigby, R, "A Question of Extinguishment: Crown Purchases in Muri when ua 1850-1865", Apri11992, [Wai 45] Williams, D. V., Working Copy, [Wai 38: #AI9]

234