Lehtonen Thesis 2.3.2009 FINAL
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Department of Political and Social Sciences Small States – Big Negotiations Decision-Making Rules and Small State Influence in EU Treaty Negotiations Tiia Lehtonen Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Florence, March 2009 EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE Department of Political and Social Sciences Small States – Big Negotiations Decision-Making Rules and Small State Influence in EU Treaty Negotiations Tiia Lehtonen Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (Supervisor) Professor Derek Beach, University of Aarhus Professor Jonas Tallberg, University of Stockholm Professor Jacques Ziller, Univ. Pavia/formerly EUI, Law Department © 2009 Tiia Lehtonen No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author Lehtonen, Tiia (2009), Small States – Big Negotiations: Decision-Making Rules and Small State Influence in EU Treaty Negotiations European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/2709 CONTENTS (i) Abstract (ii) Acknowledgements (iii) List of Tables 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Research Questions 5 1.2 Conceptualization of the Study 7 2 SMALL STATES – A DISCIPLINE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 2.1 Defining Small: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches 10 2.2 Small and Large in the European Union 12 2.3 Existing Studies of Small States and the EU Decision-Making Structures 15 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 19 3.1 Cooperative Bargaining with Distributive Outcomes 20 3.2 Explaining the Impact of Institutional Preconditions 23 3.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism 24 3.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 26 3.2.3 Asymmetric Interdependence 30 3.3 The Formal Decision-Making Rules 32 3.3.1 Unanimity – Bargaining Power Based on a Veto Right 32 3.3.2 Restricted Consensus – Quasi Unity Between the Negotiators 35 4 TWO TYPES OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 40 4.1 The IGC Method 40 4.1.1 The Negotiation Process and Levels of Meetings 41 4.1.2 Bargaining through Concessions and Side-Payments 43 4.2 The Convention Method 46 4.2.1 The Composition, Stages and Working Rules 46 4.2.2 Dynamics through Deliberation and Arguing 49 4.3 Bargaining and Deliberation Modes of Conflict-Resolution 53 4.3.1 Normative Insight on Decision-Making Rules and Processes 55 4.3.2 The EU Context – Common Lifeworld or Competing Goals? 58 Lehtonen, Tiia (2009), Small States – Big Negotiations: Decision-Making Rules and Small State Influence in EU Treaty Negotiations European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/2709 5 METHODOLOGY 60 5.1 Hypotheses, Variables, Selection of Cases and Methods for Analysis 60 5.1.1 The Unit of Analysis 60 5.1.2 The Hypotheses, Variables, Empirical Indicators and Sources of Bias 62 5.1.3 The Selection of Small States 67 5.1.3.1 Belgium – Pro-European with Few National Interests 69 5.1.3.2 Denmark – EU’s Difficult Partner 70 5.1.3.3 Finland – Striving to the Core 73 5.1.3.4 Ireland – Pragmatism as a Driving Force 74 5.1.4 The Selection of Negotiation Outcomes: Institutional Issues 76 5.1.4.1 The Composition of the Commission 78 5.1.4.2 The Extension of Qualified Majority Voting 79 5.1.4.3 The Council Presidency 82 5.1.5 Conceptualizing the Interstate Bargaining Process 84 5.1.5.1 National Preference Formation 85 5.1.5.2 Strategies – Calculated Shifts or Ad hoc Moves? 87 5.1.5.3 Operationalization of Arguing and Bargaining 89 5.1.5.4 The Origins of Actor Influence and Position-Changes 93 5.1.5.5 Negotiation Analysis by Process Tracing 95 5.1.6 Confirmation and Disconfirmation of the Hypotheses 97 5.2 Data and Sources 100 5.2.1 Archival Material and Literature 101 5.2.2 Interviews and the Selection of Informants 103 6 REFORMING THE TREATIES: PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES 107 6.1 The Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference in 1996-97 107 6.1.1 National Positions, Preferences and Contributions 107 6.1.1.1 Utilitarian and Pragmatic Belgium 110 6.1.1.2 Denmark in Maastricht’s Aftermath 113 6.1.1.3 Finland’s Aim: Association of Independent States 117 6.1.1.4 Irish Emphasis on a Successful Presidency 120 6.1.1.5 Large Member States 125 6.1.2 Negotiating under Unanimity Rule: The Process and Outcome of the Amsterdam IGC 126 6.1.2.1 First Requirements for Reforming the Commission 129 6.1.2.2 Impressive Leftovers in Extending the Scope of QMV 131 6.1.2.3 The Rotating Presidency 132 6.2 The Nice Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 133 6.2.1 National Positions, Preferences and Contributions 134 6.2.1.1 Belgium’s Concern in an Appropriate Agenda 134 6.2.1.2 Denmark Drifting away from Small State Line 137 6.2.1.3 Finnish Suspicious and Satisfaction 140 Lehtonen, Tiia (2009), Small States – Big Negotiations: Decision-Making Rules and Small State Influence in EU Treaty Negotiations European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/2709 6.2.1.4 Ireland Rejecting the Treaty 143 6.2.1.5 Large Member States 147 6.2.2 Negotiating under Unanimity Rule: The Process and Outcome of the Nice IGC 149 6.2.2.1 The Second Dispute over the Commission Size 151 6.2.2.2 Enabling the Enlargement by Further Extension of QMV and Another Exclusion of the Council Presidency 153 6.3 The Convention on the Future of the EU in 2002-03 156 6.3.1 National Positions, Preferences and Contributions 156 6.3.1.1 Belgium’s Focus in the Convention Method 157 6.3.1.2 Danish Substance in Presidency Reform 161 6.3.1.3 Finland: Dealing with Increasing Skepticism 166 6.3.1.4 Ireland in the Aftermath of Nice Referendum 171 6.3.1.5 Large Member States 176 6.3.2 The Process and Outcome under the Rule of Restricted Consensus 177 6.3.2.1 A Two-Tier Commission 183 6.3.2.2 The QMV and Abolishment of Luxembourg Compromise 185 6.3.2.3 Towards an Elected President? 186 6.4 The Intergovernmental Conference 2003-04 189 6.4.1 National Positions, Preferences and Contributions 189 6.4.1.1 A ‘Balanced Political Compromise’ for Belgium 190 6.4.1.2 Cautious Denmark 192 6.4.1.3 Finland: “Outcome Better than in the Convention” 197 6.4.1.4 The Irish Presidency: Assessing the State of the Play 198 6.4.1.5 Large Member States 199 6.4.2 Negotiating under Unanimity Rule: The Process and Outcome of the IGC 2003-04 199 6.4.2.1 The Commission of the ‘Two-Thirds’ Principle 201 6.4.2.2 The Extension of QMV 203 6.4.2.3 The Presidency of the European Council and the Council of Ministers 204 7 DISCUSSING THE TYPES OF TREATY-MAKING METHODS AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROCESSES 206 7.1 The Intergovernmental Arenas 209 7.1.1 The Means of Reasoning: Arguing or Bargaining? 211 7.1.2 Adaptation of Strategic Positions 215 7.1.3 ‘Something for Everyone’ through Package-Dealing 218 7.1.4 Small States’ Key Success Factors in the IGCs 220 7.1.5 The IGCs: Confirming and Disconfirming the Hypotheses 227 7.2 The Convention as an Exceptional Experience 235 7.2.1 The Weakened Role of the Member State Governments 238 7.2.2 Artificial Consensus from a Collective Disharmony 239 7.2.3 The Failure of Deliberative Democracy? 241 Lehtonen, Tiia (2009), Small States – Big Negotiations: Decision-Making Rules and Small State Influence in EU Treaty Negotiations European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/2709 7.2.4 The Evolution of Positions and the Main Success Factors 244 7.2.5 The Convention: Confirming and Disconfirming the Hypotheses 246 8 CONCLUSIONS 249 8.1. Negotiation Dynamics and Factors Dominating the Small State Influence 251 8.2. Theoretical and Conceptual Closing 258 8.3. Routes for Further Research 263 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY 266 9.1 Primary Sources 266 9.1.1 Interviews 266 9.1.2 Documents from National and EU Sources 267 9.2 Secondary Sources and Literature 276 ANNEX 1: Questionnaire 293 Lehtonen, Tiia (2009), Small States – Big Negotiations: Decision-Making Rules and Small State Influence in EU Treaty Negotiations European University Institute DOI: 10.2870/2709 Abstract This study examines the impact of the decision-making rules, procedures and practices of the European Union on the ability of small Member States to influence Treaty negotiation outcomes, and assesses the causality of this influence in Treaty-revision. Within Treaty- making processes, actor influence is here expected to vary according to the institutional preconditions, and small states are presumed to benefit from particular type of decision- making rules to the disadvantage of others. The fundamental aim of the study is therefore to investigate the conditions under which small state influence increases in European Union Treaty-negotiations. To explain this puzzle, a distinction is made between two types of Treaty-making processes, those of the Intergovernmental Conferences and the Convention, which allows for subsequent comparisons between the decision-making rules of unanimity and restricted consensus. In order to empirically test the underlying hypotheses, explicit units of observation are chosen from the IGCs of Amsterdam, Nice and 2003-04, and the Convention on the Future of the EU. In-depth comparisons are made between four small Member States – Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Ireland – and their de facto influence is process-traced through three substantial issues of the institutional reform: the composition of the Commission, the extension of qualified majority voting and the reform of Council Presidency.