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Annual Financial Report 2011 Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. / Annual Financial Report 2011 Contents Page Business review Chairman’s statement 4 Chief Executive Officer’s review 6 Corporate Social Responsibility 10 Financial review 14 Risk management 61 Governance & oversight The Board & Executive Committee 201 Report of the Directors 204 Corporate Governance statement 207 Supervision & Regulation 218 Financial statements Accounting policies 227 Consolidated income statement 254 Consolidated statement of comprehensive income 255 Consolidated statement of financial position 256 Statement of financial position of Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. 257 Consolidated and Company statements of cash flows 258 Consolidated statement of changes in equity 260 Statement of changes in equity - Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. 262 Notes to the accounts 264 Statement of Directors’ responsibilities in relation to the Accounts 423 Independent Auditor’s Report 424 General information Additional information 426 Glossary of terms 448 Principal addresses 452 Index 453 1 Forward-looking information This document contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the US Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with respect to the financial condition, results of operations and business of the Group and certain of the plans and objectives of the Group. In particular, among other statements in this Annual Financial Report, with regard to management objectives, trends in results of operations, margins, risk management, competition and the impact of changes in International Financial Reporting Standards are forward-looking in nature. These forward-looking statements can be identified by the fact that they do not relate only to historical or current facts. Forward-looking statements sometimes use words such as ‘aim’, ‘anticipate’, ‘target’, ‘expect’, ‘estimate’, ‘intend’, ‘plan’, ‘goal’, ‘believe’, ‘may’, ‘could’, ‘will’, ‘seek’, ‘continue’, ‘should’, ‘assume’, or other words of similar meaning. Examples of forward-looking statements include among others, statements regarding the Group’s future financial position, income growth, loan losses, business strategy, projected costs, capital ratios, estimates of capital expenditures, and plans and objectives for future operations. Because such statements are inherently subject to risks and uncertainties, actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking information. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve risk and uncertainty because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that will occur in the future. There are a number of factors that could cause actual results and developments to differ materially from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. These are set out in ‘Risk factors’ on pages 62 - 68.These factors include, but are not limited to the Group’s access to funding and liquidity which is adversely affected by the financial instability within the Eurozone, contagion risks disrupting the financial markets, constraints on liquidity and market reaction to factors affecting Ireland and the Irish economy, the Group’s markets, particularly for retail deposits, at risk from more intense competition, the Group’s business being adversely affected by a further deterioration in economic and market conditions, general economic conditions being very challenging for our mortgage and other lending customers and increase the risk of payment default, the depressed Irish property prices may give rise to increased losses experienced by the Group, the Group faces market risks, including non-trading interest rate risk, the Group is subject to rigorous and demanding Government supervision and oversight, the Group may be subject to the risk of having insufficient capital to meet increased regulatory requirements, the Group’s business activities must comply with increasing levels of regulation, the Group’s participation in the NAMA Programme gives rise to certain residual financial risks, the Group may be adversely affected by further austerity and budget measures introduced by the Irish Government, the value of certain financial instruments recorded at fair value is determined using financial models incorporating assumptions, judgements and estimates that may change over time, or may ultimately not turn out to be accurate, the Group’s deferred tax assets depend substantially on the generation of future profits over an extended number of years, adverse changes to tax legislation, regulatory requirements or accounting standards could impact capital ratios, the Group is subject to inherent credit risks in respect of customers, the Group faces heightened operational and reputational risks, the restructuring of the Group entails risk, the Group’s risk management strategies and techniques may be unsuccessful, risk of litigation arising from the Group’s activities. Any forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of the Group speak only as of the date they are made. AIB cautions that the foregoing list of important factors is not exhaustive. Investors and others should carefully consider the foregoing factors and other uncertainties and events when making an investment decision based on any forward-looking statement. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events discussed in this Annual Financial Report may not occur. The Group does not undertake to release publicly any revision to these forward-looking statements to reflect events, circumstances or unanticipated events occurring after the date hereof. 2 Financial highlights 2011 2010 € m € m Results Total operating income/(loss) 4,340 (3,357) Operating loss (5,108) (12,124) Loss before taxation from continuing operations (5,108) (12,071) Profit after taxation from discontinued operations 1,628 199 Loss attributable to owners of the parent (2,312) (10,232) Per ordinary/CNV share Loss – basic from continuing operations (1.6c) (571.1c) Loss – diluted from continuing operations (1.6c) (571.1c) Earnings – basic from discontinued operations 0.7c 7.1c Earnings - diluted from discontinued operations 0.7c 7.1c Dividend -- Dividend payout -- Net assets € 0.05 (€ 0.04) Performance measures Return on average total assets (1.66%) (6.21%) Return on average ordinary shareholders’ equity (48.8%) (222.5%) Statement of financial position Total assets 136,651 145,222 Ordinary/CNV shareholders’ equity 10,963 (80) Shareholders’ equity 14,463 3,659 Loans and receivables to customers 82,540 86,350 Customer accounts 60,674 52,389 Capital ratios Core tier 1 capital 17.9%(1) 4.0% Total capital 20.5% 9.2%(2) (1)At 31 December 2011, under the Central Bank’s Financial Measures Programme (“FMP”), AIB is required to report its core tier 1 capital with 50:50 supervisory deductions now being applied to the core tier 1 capital calculation. These deductions were previously deducted from tier 1 capital. This methodology is consistent with that used to calculate capital shortfalls for participating institutions in the Prudential Capital Assessment Review (“PCAR”) 2011. (2)At 31 December 2010, the Group, on a consolidated and individual basis, benefited from derogations from certain regulatory capital requirements granted on a temporary basis by the Central Bank of Ireland. The requirement for derogations arose as a result of loan impairment provisions at 31 December 2010. These derogations remained in place until the completion of the liability management exercise on 24 January 2011. 3 Chairman’s statement AIB started 2011 by coming to terms with the massive standards which are part of a rapidly evolving regulatory shock that had overtaken the Irish economy. The year saw a environment. We are ensuring AIB has the structures, continuing decline in property values and a flat business processes and people in place to meet these new demands. environment and this has made recovery challenging. Another issue for us was overseeing the disposal and The early recognition by the Irish Government and the acquisition of a number of major businesses as well as capital Central Bank of Ireland of a need for a substantial raising exercises. recapitalisation of the banking system provided an The AIB Board also had a role in overseeing the opportunity to focus on the recovery of AIB and the support establishment and implementation of AIB’s non-core strategy, and service of its customers. the NAMA transfers, restitution projects and data Although the staff of the bank had worked hard to deal remediation. with the evolving impact of the crisis, the bank as an organisation was challenged to deal effectively with the Board changes increase in the numbers of customers in difficulty. I would like to thank Stephen Kingon, Anne Maher and A significant amount of change had to be planned and David Pritchard – who stepped down from the AIB Board in implemented before a more effective focus on customers July – for their contribution to the bank. could be achieved. The impact of this new focus only began In June 2011, Bernard Byrne, Director of the Personal & to be felt in the second half of 2011. Business Banking business, joined the AIB Board as an AIB has moved away from its old structure of entirely executive director. separate businesses and is moving towards a coordinated During the year, a new Executive Committee (“ExCo”) ‘OneBank’ model. was established to run AIB, albeit with a number of interim This new structure aims to put the customer at the heart appointments
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