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Party Financing and Referendum Campaigns in Eu Member States

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Party Financing and Referendum Campaigns in Eu Member States DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS PARTY FINANCING AND REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS IN EU MEMBER STATES STUDY Abstract This study has been prepared by the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), part of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam (UvA). It comprises 1) an up-to-date inventory of party finance rules within the EU Member States, 2) an overview of the regulations on referendum and issue campaigns, 3) an investigation into actual spending on the EU referendum, national election, and EU election campaigns, and 4) remarks concerning AFCO’s amendments to the proposed Statute for European Political Parties based on collected data. PE 519.217 EN THIS DOCUMENT WAS COMMISSIONED BY THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS AUTHOR(S) Dr. M. van Klingeren M. Orozco, M.Sc. Dr. J. van Spanje LL.M. Prof. Dr. C. de Vreese Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam. RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR Mr Petr Novak Policy Department Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN ABOUT THE EDITOR Policy Departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny. To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its monthly newsletter please write to: poldep- [email protected] European Parliament , manuscript completed in March 2015. © European Union, Brussels, 2015. This document is available on the Internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/supporting-analyses-search.html DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. Party financing and referendum campaigns in EU Member States ____________________________________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 7 LIST OF FIGURES 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 12 1. INTRODUCTION: REGULATIONS FOR PARTY FINANCING 15 1.1. MAIN FINDINGS 15 1.2. COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FINANCING, BANS AND LIMITS ON FUNDING AND LEVEL OF TRANSPARENCY 17 1.3. REGULATIONS ON PARTY FINANCING IN 28 MEMBER STATES 20 1.3.1. Details of Public Funding 24 1.3.2. Limits and Bans 30 1.3.3. Transparency 34 1.3.4. Financial Monitoring 38 2. REFERENDUM AND ISSUE CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS IN 28 MEMBER STATES 44 2.1. INTRODUCTION 44 2.2.TRANSNATIONAL CAMPAIGN DONATIONS 44 2.3. COMPARISON FINDINGS OF CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 45 2.4. REGULATIONS ON REFERENDUMS AND ISSUE CAMPAIGNS 46 2.4.1. Referendum Financing 51 2.5. REFERENDUMS AT THE LOCAL/REGIONAL LEVELS 59 3. PARTY EXPENDITURES IN 7 MEMBER STATES 61 3.1. INTRODUCTION 61 3.1.1.Methodology 61 3.1.2. Main findings 61 3.2. BULGARIA 67 3.2.1. Party expenditures during general and European elections in Bulgaria 67 3.3. CROATIA 68 3.3.1. Party expenditures during general and European elections in Croatia 68 3.3.2. Party positions during EU referendums in Croatia 68 3.4. DENMARK 69 3.4.1. Party expenditures during general and European elections in Denmark 69 3.4.2. Party positions during EU referendums in Denmark 70 3 Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 3.5. LATVIA 70 3.5.1. Party expenditures during general and European elections in Latvia 70 3.5.2. Party expenditures during the EU referendum in Latvia 71 3.5.3. Party positions during the EU referendum in Latvia 72 3.6. THE NETHERLANDS 72 3.6.1.Party expenditures during general and European elections in the Netherlands 73 3.6.2. Party expenditures during the EU referendums in the Netherlands 73 3.6.3.Party positions during the EU referendums in the Netherlands 74 3.7. SPAIN 74 3.7.1.Party expenditures during general and European elections in Spain 74 3.7.2.Party expenditures during EU referendums in Spain 74 3.7.3.Party positions during EU referendums in Spain 75 3.8. UNITED KINGDOM 75 3.8.1.Party expenditures during general and European elections in the UK 75 4. COMPARISON WITH PROPOSED STATUTE FOR EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES 77 4.1. AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES 17 AND 18 77 4.2. REGULATION EFFECTS 77 REFERENCES 81 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 89 4 Party financing and referendum campaigns in EU Member States ____________________________________________________________________________________________ LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CC Criminal Code c2d Centre for Research on Direct Democracy CEC Central Electoral Commission (Bulgaria/Lithuania) CNCCFP La Commission Nationale des Comptes de Campagne et des Financements Politiques (National Accounts and Political Campaign Funding Commission) CPI Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) DO Designated Organisation DR Desk Research EP European Parliament ES Expert Survey EPVPA Election of President and Vice-President Act (Bulgaria) Greco Group of States against Corruption IFRS International Financial Reporting Standard LFP Law on Financing and Financial Control of Political Parties and Political Campaigns (Lithuania) MGS Minimum Gross Salary (Romania) MP Member of Parliament NAO National Audit Office NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NRA National Revenue Agency PEA Permanent Electoral Authority (Romania) 5 Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ PP Permitted Participants PPA Political Parties Act PPERA The Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (UK) PPP Purchasing Power Parity SAO State Audit Office SGI Sustainable Governance Indicator SIPO Standards in Public Office Commission (Ireland) SMD Single Member District STI State Taks Inspectorate (State Tax Inspector) VZW De Vereniging Zonder Winstoogmerk (i.e., NGO) YPEE The Ministry of Economy and Finance (Greece) ZVRK Elections and Referendums Campaign Act (Slovenia) Political parties Bulgaria ATAKA Bulgarian Nationalists BSP Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiya (Bulgarian Socialist Party) GERB Grazhdani za evropeysko razvitie na Balgariya (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) KzB Koalitsiya za Bulgaria (Coalition for Bulgaria) NDSV Nacionalno dviženie za stabilnost i văzhod (National Movement Simeon II) Croatia HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) HL-SR Hrvatski laburisti - Stranka rada (Croatian Labourists – Labour Party) 6 Party financing and referendum campaigns in EU Member States ____________________________________________________________________________________________ HNS Hrvatska Narodna Stranka (The Croatian People's Party – Liberal Democrats) HSS-HSLS Hrvatska seljačka stranka - Hrvatska socijalno liberalna stranka (Croatian Peasant Party - Croatian Social Liberal Party) SDP Socijaldemokratiska Partija Hrvatske (Social Democratic Party of Croatia) Denmark EL Enhedslisten (Socialists, Red-Green Alliances) RV Det Radikale Venstre (Radical Right) SD Socialdemocraterne (Social Democrats) V Venstre (full name Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti) (Left Liberals) Latvia LPP/LC Latvia's First Party/Latvian Way NA National Alliance PCTVL Latvian Russian Union SC Harmony Centre TB/LNNK The Conservative For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative Party TP The People’s Party V Unity ZZS Union of Greens and Farmers Netherlands CDA ChristenDemocratisch appèl (Christian Democrats) CU ChristenUnie (The Christian Union) PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party) 7 Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, Right Wing) VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Liberal Right) Spain PP People’s Party PSOE Socialist Party UK: Con Conservatives Lab Labour UKIP United Kingdom Independent Party 8 Party financing and referendum campaigns in EU Member States ____________________________________________________________________________________________ LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 Two dimensions of party financing regulations, status of all 28 EU Member States 18 FIGURE 2 General Description of political party systems in all 28 Member States in alphabetical order 19 FIGURE 3 Details of public funding for all 28 Member States in alphabetical order. 23 FIGURE 4 High Limits and Bans 30 FIGURE 5 Medium Limits and Bans 31 FIGURE 6 Low Limits and Bans 33 FIGURE 7 High Transparency 34 FIGURE 8 Low Transparency 37 FIGURE 9 Details about financial monitoring 39 FIGURE 10 Summary regarding the situation of referendums in all 28 Member States, and the conditions necessary for them to take place (when applicable) in alphabetical order. 47 FIGURE 11 Transnational Donations 62 FIGURE 12 Standardised campaign expenditure in Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Latvia, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK (divided by PPP and converted to euros). 68 FIGURE 13 Standardised campaign expenditure in the most recent general elections in Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Latvia, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK 69 FIGURE 14 Standardised campaign expenditure in the second-most-recent general elections in Bulgaria, Denmark,
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