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Javakheti One Year After the August War Executive Summary

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Javakheti One Year After the August War Executive Summary Policy Review October 2009 Javakheti One Year after the August War Archil Abashidze Assistant Professor, Ilia Chavchavadze State University Executive Summary Content Executive Summary • Problem descrip- 1 Because of its ethnic composition, Javakheti is often considered a politi- tion and perti- cally problematic region for Georgia. This situation is aggravated by se- nence vere social and economical conditions arising from the relatively harsh cli- • Methodology mate (cold winters) and economic underdevelopment which dates back to • Javakheti during the Soviet period. the August war • Problems of the region After the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the region once again be- • Conclusion and came the focus of political speculation. It was openly said in newspapers and Recommenda- public speeches of some politicians that there are anti-Georgian forces in the tions region seeking exploit existing problems in order to harm Georgian interests. The present political analysis focuses on problem areas which were present in the region long before the 2008 war, including issues relating to the law- enforcement and judiciary systems; employment and migration; disputed churches and the repatriation of Muslim Meskhetians. The analysis reveals that despite achievements in some areas, the majority of problems persist. The paper concludes with recommendations for the central and local authorities, and NGOs and international agencies work- ing in the region. The paper is published with the financial support of the Think Tank Fund of the Open Society Institue-Budapest. The opinions it contains are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the OSI TTF. 1 By Javakheti we mean the part of Samtskhe-Javakheti region which includes the municipalities of Aspindza, Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda. In the latter two, citizens of Armenian ethnicity make up over 95% of the local population. A total of 210,000 people live in Samtskhe-Javakheti, out of which 54.5% are Armenians, 43% – Georgians. The region is also home to small communities of Russians, Ossetians, Greek and Ukrainians: http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti (28.02.2009) CIPDD Policy Review, October 2009 Problem description and pertinence will try to settle the Karabakh conflict and Since the August war, the issue of Javakheti instead stoke conflict in Javakheti. This will has been regularly covered in the Georgian seriously endanger the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline press. For instance, in January 2009 the Versia and other regional projects.5 newspaper reported that Russia was encour- aging the Armenian government to become Javakheti is considered by many to be a more active in Javakheti. According to Versia, weak point of the Georgian state, where the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin dis- chances of another Russian strike are high. cussed a potential Georgian-Armenian armed The question is: will this region, with its conflict with the presidents of Armenia and severe political, economic and social prob- Azerbaijan while hosting them in Kremlin. lems, become an Achilles’ heel of the Geor- The newspaper said that Yerevan refused, gian state in the wake of the 2008 war? But though it questioned how long Armenia would the present analysis doesn’t aim at assessing be able to resist the pressure from Moscow.2 outside threats. The objective is to evaluate the status of traditional problems in the re- Versia also cited Russian and Azerbaijani outlets gion based on the trends that have taken as saying that Russia supplied Armenia with arms shape after the 2008 war. in December 2008. In newspaper interviews, Georgian military experts presumed that these One of the indirect consequences of the 2008 arms may be intended for another anticipated war was the warming of Turkish-Armenian conflict. According to them, there is information relations. Although what will result from this that the Russian defence minister assured his process is still unclear, it may have conse- Azerbaijani colleague that weapons will not be quences for the Javakheti region. If the used against Azerbaijan and that they were given Turkish-Armenian border is opened, negative to Armenia for a different purpose.3 effects may include the weakening of Georgia’s transit function, directly influenc- In January 2008, the 24 Saati newspaper ing the Javakheti region, e.g. the Kars- published an article by local analyst Andro Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway project. In Barnov based on a study4 conducted by the addition, the government of Armenia may Center for Strategy and Development. Ac- become more active in discussing the prob- cording to the article, Russia tries to thwart lems of the people of Javakheti; for instance, NATO’s efforts to gain a foothold in the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan made a Caucasus and to this end will try to fully statement that he would support granting control Georgia and Armenia by any means Armenian the status of official regional lan- and isolate Azerbaijan from Turkey. Russia guage in Javakheti.6 On the other hand, the 2 „Putin offers Armenia to start war against Georgia“, Versia, January 28-29, 2009, Agency Medianews. Newspaper Kviris Palitra published a comprehensive article on the same topic on November 9, 2009. Also, see Caucasian Integration, Liberal September 9, 2009. 3 „Putin offers Armenia to start war against Georgia“, Versia, January 28-29, 2009, Agency Medianews. 4 Full text of the study: http://stand.ge/?page=11&lang=geo&content=148 5 Andro Barnov, “Caucasian Geo-politics and Geo-strategy”, 24 Saati, January 17, 2009. 6 Sargsyan made this statement during a meeting with Armenian diplomats on September 1, 2009 – see Armenian president speaks about the need of Armenian as regional language, http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=21721&search=javakheti. 2 Javakheti One Year after the August War fears Javakhetians have long had about Tur- One of the indirect consequences of the 2008 key will probably decrease. war was the warming of Turkish-Armenian relations. Although what will result from this process is still unclear, it may have consequences Methodology for the Javakheti region. The present study used materials about the Javakheti region published in print and elec- opinion, according to which Russia was tronic media and the materials provided by named as reason of war, and the Georgian the regional partners of the Caucasus Insti- government was only responding to provo- tute for Peace, Democracy and Development. cation. Many saw the war as an expression On June 15, 2009, CIPDD hosted a round of the global antagonism between Washing- table where invited experts and civil society ton and Moscow. representatives shared their views regarding the issues discussed in the present analysis. When Russian air forces started attacking The present study includes views expressed and bombing residential buildings, the fear during the round table event. emerged among the Javakheti population that Russians would launch airstrikes on the closed Russian military base in Akhalkalaki. Javakheti during the August war Many fled to villages, some left for Arme- The August war horrified Javakheti society nia. The panic was aggravated by misinfor- as much as that of all other Georgian re- mation spread by electronic media that Ar- gions: everybody’s concern was “Russian menian youth were forcibly and hastily (at aggression”. Despite the fact that the ma- night) conscripted into the Georgian armed jority of the population condemned Russia’s forces and that Georgian-Armenian border invasion, there was disagreement over the was closed to young men. Rumors spread causes of the war. It must be noted that that Russia was going to deploy its forces this disagreement led to tension between from its base in Gyumri, Armenia and open citizens of Armenian and Georgian origin. a third front. In fact, Russian helicopters Presumably the reason for this was that the which entered from Armenia did fly over main sources of information for the non- the region several times. Another rumor was Georgian population were Russian televi- spread that Russian politicians had said on sion channels and internet sites. Consider- TV that Russian military forces would do no ing that before and during the August war harm to Javakheti population. This created these media channels maintained aggressive some tension between the local Armenian- and and targeted anti-Georgian propaganda, it Georgian-speaking populations. Later, local is clear how the opinion of the local popu- authorities and state agencies assured the lation was formed regarding the ongoing population that the spread of Russian aggres- situation. In addition, Georgian TV news sion to the region was unlikely. were broadcast on local channels only dur- ing evenings (after the war one of the TV War-induced emotions declined after French channels resumed broadcasting only on Au- President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Russian gust 12), and telephone communication was counterpart Dmitriy Medvedev concluded a limited due to overload. cease-fire agreement on August 12, yet dis- cussion resumed, albeit quietly, after Russia It should be pointed out that the Russian recognized the independence of Abkhazia and propaganda was partly effective: the Rus- South Ossetia on August 26. Russia’s disre- sian view of the conflict instilled the fear gard for the international community and among the Armenian population that next recognized norms was viewed in the target of the Georgian administration would Caucasus as a show of force and a “lesson be their region. However, there was another given” to the West. Population of Samtskhe-Javakheti is 210, 000, of which 54.5 % are ethnic Armenians, 43 % – Georgians. In the region there are also living small communities of Russians, Ossetians, Greeks and Ukrainians. Source: http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti 3 CIPDD Policy Review, October 2009 It should be pointed out that the Russian arrested at a local cemetery, during a fu- propaganda was partly effective: the Russian neral. The next day, locals, mainly young view of the conflict instilled the fear among the people, held a small protest rally, though Armenian population that next target of the most Javakhetians chose to wait for the trial.
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