COLLECTIVE : A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND PERPETRATORS OF MASS POLITICAL , 1980-2003

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Jennifer Lynn Green, M.A.

****************

The Ohio State University 2006

Dissertation Committee: Approved by:

Dr. J. Craig Jenkins, Advisor

Dr. Kazimierz Slomczynski ______Advisor Dr. Pamela Paxton Graduate Program in Sociology

Copyright by Jennifer Lynn Green 2006

ii

ABSTRACT

Collective rape has garnered considerable worldwide attention in recent years but

systematic documentation and empirical research are still lacking. Basic questions about when and where collective rape has occurred and what factors contribute to this crime

remain unanswered. This project addresses those questions through a cross-national cross-time study of collective rape episodes from 1980 to 2003. Collective rape is defined as a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated on by agents of a state or political civil group and measured through two indicators of occurrence or non- occurrence in various countries and years. Data was collected from three news sources—

World News Digest Facts on File, , and Reuters Business Briefs— and information of the timing, location, perpetrators and victims was recorded. In total

37 episodes of collective rape were identified. Episodes were more prevalent in Africa and Asia, and the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. The perpetrators were most often agents of a government (such as the ), but political civil groups also participated.

Collective rape has been perpetrated widely through all segments of the population

(women are the overwhelming majority) but, in some episodes, victims were targeted

based on their ethnicity or political affiliations. The literature on collective rape,

interpersonal rape and political violence suggested seven theoretical models of collective ii rape occurrence. Analysis found full or partial support for the hypotheses that gender inequality, militarization, armed conflict, ethnic cleavages, economic development and state structure contribute to the presence of collective rape in a country. High levels of state , or government-sponsored murder, , and imprisonment—was the most consistent predictor of collective rape. These results show that collective rape, while pervasive across time and regions, may be more likely to occur in some societies than others. Suggestions for further research include improved data on collective rape occurrence and severity, additional tests of some hypotheses, and analysis of government versus non-government perpetration.

iii

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my mother— who instilled in me a social conscience and love of education

And to the many victims of collective rape— who I hope may one day benefit from the values my mother gave me

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to first thank my advisor, Craig Jenkins, for his unwavering support,

encouragement and enthusiasm. He had faith in me and this project when few others did and without him this research would have never reached fruition. He has provided

countless suggestions and insights over the years while still fostering my own

sociological independence and growth. I could not have asked for a better advisor.

I also wish to thank Pam Paxton for being a committee member, mentor and

friend. My confidence and skill as a researcher have been greatly improved through my

work for her and with her. She is a role model for the kind of sociologist I hope to be.

I extend my thanks to Maciek Slomczynski for his years of support through my

coursework, exams and dissertation. He has constantly challenged me to be the best

thinker and researcher I can be. His lessons will stay with me always.

I owe a great deal of thanks to the many people who assisted in the data collection

and analysis for this project. Students Justine Grubb, Emily Rose, Claire Friedman,

Kevin McCance, and Greg Matthews spent countless hours turning thousands of news

stories into usable data. Colin Odden shared his time and skill to create an amazing

database of information. Drs. Robert Kaufman and Paul von Hippel provided invaluable

statistical support. Perhaps most of all, I owe thanks to all of my friends—especially v Donna Bobbitt-Zeher, Lisa Garoutte, Lisa Hickman, Clayton Peoples, Jim Sutton, and

Dan Tope—for listening to my ideas, questions and complaints, and providing many of the answers. Each of these people has contributed some heart and soul to this project, and I am eternally grateful.

Finally, I thank the National Science Foundation, the Coca-Cola Critical

Difference for Women Dissertation Fund, the Mershon Center, the Department of

Sociology and The Ohio State University for providing financial support.

vi

VITA

May 8, 1978 ...... Born—Fort Worth, TX

1998...... B.A. Women’ Studies and Sociology Wichita State University Wichita, KS

1999-2001 ...... Graduate Assistant Wichita State University Wichita, KS

2001...... M.A. Sociology Wichita State University Wichita, KS

2001-2006 ...... Graduate Teaching and Research Assistant The Ohio State University Columbus, OH

PUBLICATIONS

1. Green, Jennifer. 2004. “Uncovering Collective Rape: A Comparative Study of Political Sexual Violence.” International Journal of Sociology. 34(1): 97-116.

2. Green, Jennifer. Review of Buck, Pem Davidson. (2001). Worked to the Bone: Race, Class, Power and Privilege in Kentucky. Contemporary Sociology. 32(2): 159-160.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Sociology vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... v

VITA...... vii

LIST OF TABLES...... x

LIST OF FIGURES ...... xii

CHAPTERS:

1. Introduction...... 1

2. Literature Review...... 16

3. Theoretical Framework...... 29

Gender Inequality ...... 30 Militarization ...... 32 Armed Conflict...... 34 Ethnic Cleavages ...... 36 Economic Development ...... 38 World Culture ...... 40 State Structure...... 42

4. Data and Methods ...... 45

A Definition of Collective Rape ...... 46 viii Data Collection...... 52 Dataset Structure ...... 65 Collective Rape Variables...... 66 Independent Variables ...... 69 Missing Data...... 80

5. Descriptive Analysis ...... 87

Stories ...... 87 Time...... 104 Regions...... 116 Perpetrators ...... 124 Victims...... 131

6. Time Series Analysis ...... 136

Model Specification ...... 136 Gender Inequality ...... 138 Armed Conflict...... 140 Militarization ...... 143 Ethnic Cleavages ...... 147 World Culture ...... 149 Economic Development ...... 153 State Structure...... 155 Full Model...... 156 Quality Controls...... 162

7. Conclusion ...... 165

Appendix A...... 174

Reference List ...... 179

ix LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

4.1 Components and Measures of Three Gender Inequality Variables, CIRI Human Rights Database 2004...... 71

4.2 Measurement of Armed Conflict Variables, State Failure Project 2004 and Uppsala PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2005 ...... 75

4.3 Dependent and Independent Variables: Measurement, Sources and Descriptive Statistics...... 82

5.1 Distribution of News Stories by Source and Episode...... 90

5.2 Distribution of News Stories by Source and Year...... 95

5.3 Distribution of Stories, Unidentifiable Dates and Unidentifiable Perpetrators by Episode...... 101

5.4 Distribution of Total Years of Collective Rape at Various Specificity Levels, by Episode...... 107

5.5 Distribution of Collective Rape Episodes at Various Specificity Levels, by Year...... 113

6.1 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Gender Inequality Variables...... 139

6.2 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Armed Conflict Variables ...... 142

6.3 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Militarization Variables...... 145

6.4 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Ethnic Cleavages Variables...... 148 x

6.5 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on World Culture Variables ...... 150

6.6 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Economic Development Variables...... 152

6.7 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on State Structure Variables...... 154

6.8 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on All Theoretical Variables ...... 158

6.9 Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Quality Control Variables ...... 163

xi LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

5.1 Total Number of Stories by Episode...... 91

5.2 Percent of Total Stories from Each Source, by Episode...... 92

5.3 Total Number of Stories by Year, Disaggregated by Source...... 96

5.4 Percent of Total Stories from Each Source, by Year...... 97

5.5 Percent of Total Stories with Unidentifiable Dates, by Episode ...... 102

5.6 Percent of Total Stories with Unidentifiable Perpetrators, by Episode ...... 103

5.7 Total Number of High Specificity Years, by Episode ...... 108

5.8 Total Number of High, Medium, and/or Low Specificity Years, by Episode...... 109

5.9 Total Number of Episodes over Time, by Specificity Level ...... 114

5.10 Total Number of Episodes over Time, Two Specificity Levels ...... 115

5.11 Percent of Episodes in Each Region ...... 119

5.12 Percent of Countries in Each Region with Episodes ...... 120

5.13 Percent of Total Years in Each Region...... 121

5.14 Total and Average Number of Years by Region ...... 122

5.15 Number of Episodes by Year, Disaggregated by Region ...... 123

5.16 Participation of Government and Non-Government Groups in Total Episodes ...... 127 xii 5.17 Number of Perpetrator Groups per Episode...... 128

5.18 Percent of Perpetrator Groups in Total Episodes...... 129

5.19 Total and Average Number of Years, by Perpetrator Group...... 130

5.20 Number of Victim Groups per Episode ...... 133

5.21 Percent of Victim Groups in Total Episodes ...... 134

5.22 Total and Average Number of Years, by Victim Group...... 135

xiii

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In September 1998, Jean Paul Akayesu was convicted of rape as a crime against humanity for his actions during the 1994 in . The indictment against him described his involvement in the sexual assaults of multiple women:

“12. As bourgmestre, Jean Paul Akayesu was responsible for maintaining law and public order in his commune. At least 2000 were killed in Taba between April 7 and the end of June, 1994, while he was still in power. The killings in Taba were openly committed and so widespread that, as bourgmestre, Jean Paul Akayesu must have known about them. Although he had the authority and responsibility to do so, Jean Paul Akayesu never attempted to prevent the killing of Tutsis in the commune in any way or called for assistance from regional or national authorities to quell the violence. 12A. Between April 7 and the end of June, 1994, hundreds of civilians (hereinafter "displaced civilians") sought refuge at the bureau communal. The majority of these displaced civilians were . While seeking refuge at the bureau communal, female displaced civilians were regularly taken by armed local militia and/or communal police and subjected to sexual violence, and/or beaten on or near the bureau communal premises. Displaced civilians were also murdered frequently on or near the bureau communal premises. Many women were forced to endure multiple acts of sexual violence which were at times committed by more than one assailant. These acts of sexual violence were generally accompanied by explicit threats of death or bodily harm. The female displaced civilians lived in constant fear and their physical and psychological health deteriorated as a result of the sexual violence and beatings and killings. 12B. Jean Paul Akayesu knew that the acts of sexual violence, beatings and murders were being committed and was at times present during their commission. Jean Paul Akayesu facilitated the commission of the sexual

1 violence, beatings and murders by allowing the sexual violence and beatings and murders to occur on or near the bureau communal premises. By virtue of his presence during the commission of the sexual violence, beatings and murders and by failing to prevent the sexual violence, beatings and murders, Jean Paul Akayesu encouraged these activities.” (Prosecutor versus Jean Paul Akayesu 1998a, 1.2.12)

Akayesu had participated in the armed conflict that included the murder, torture, and rape of thousands of Rwandan citizens, primarily Tutsis, between April and June of 1994. In the aftermath of the conflict, it has been estimated that 800,000 people were killed and

250,000 to 500,000 women were raped (Pavon 2004). In October of 1998, Akayesu was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for the rape conviction, in addition to several life sentences for genocide and extermination (Prosecutor versus Jean Paul Akayesu 1998b).

This was the first ever conviction and sentence for rape as a crime of humanity.

Lawmakers, legal scholars, human rights activists and feminists all heralded

Akayesu’s conviction as a significant step forward in producing international acknowledgement and action against mass sexual violence by political actors, hereafter referred to as collective rape. This crime, involving a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated on civilians by agents of a state or political civil group, had not received much international attention before the 1990s. Further progress in international law was made in 2000 when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia opened the first trial focused only on charges of sexual violence. In this case, three Bosnian Serb soldiers were accused of gang raping Bosnian Muslim women and forcing them into (Simons 2000). During the trial, sixteen victims testified against Dragoljub

Kunarac, a former commander of the Bosnian Serb army; Radomir Kovac, a former paramilitary commander; and Zoran Vukovic, also a former paramilitary commander.

2 One fifteen year old girl, known as Witness 50 in the trial, recounted how she had been raped repeatedly—sometimes by four or five assailants at a time— for several months and eventually became pregnant while being held in a “quasi-brothel”. After five years of investigations and nearly a year of trial, all three men were found guilty of multiple crimes. Most notably, two of the three were convicted of for holding women captive “for up to eight months, abusing them sexually, forcing them to do domestic work for their captors, and renting and selling them to other soldiers.” (Simons

2001, 1) These convictions again challenged and expanded the existing definitions of rape as a crime of .

As much as these convictions demonstrated progress in the awareness and redefinition of mass political rape, they also highlighted the incredible lack of information and understanding of this crime. Similar crimes in the past—such as the rape of Belgian women by German soldiers during I (Brownmiller 1975), the of “” by the Japanese army during World War II (Chang 1997), or the and raping of Cambodian villages by South Vietnamese forces in 1970

(Brownmiller 1975)—were never addressed by international courts. Consequently, women’s groups in Europe and the felt compelled to lobby the organizers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to ensure that rape charges would be investigated and prosecuted (Simons 2001). Even when an episode of collective rape has been widely acknowledged by the international academic, activist, and legal communities, information can still be lacking. European investigators who visited the former Yugoslavia in 1992 estimated that 20,000 women were raped in that year

3 alone, but the absence of long-term investigations has made the total number of victims

during the entire 1992-1995 conflict more difficult to calculate (Simons 2001). Victim

counts in Rwanda are also based on estimates from medical reports, witness testimonies

and human rights agencies’ inquiries.

Nor is it known why the assaults in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda share

some characteristics and patterns but vary in other aspects. In both of these episodes, the magnitude of the sexual violence was extraordinary. Thousands of women, children, and

sometimes men were assaulted, and many were assaulted multiple times by multiple

perpetrators. Also, in both locations the primary perpetrators were members of the

military, paramilitary, police and security forces. But how the perpetrators gained access

to their victims differed between the two episodes. In Rwanda, most

victims were attacked in the streets, their homes, or while seeking refuge, as discussed in

the indictment above. Victims of Akayesu had willing congregated in community

buildings in hopes of protection but were then found and attacked by militia and police.

Some Yugoslavian victims had similar experiences, but many others were held in “rape

camps” like those described in the testimony of Witness 50 (see also Allen 1996;

Stiglmayer 1994). In the rape camps, Bosnian Muslim women were often raped

successively until they became pregnant or died from malnutrition, illness or their

injuries (Allen 1996). No similar behaviors with the intent of impregnating victims were

reported in Rwanda, even though a significant number of rape victims there also died

from rape-related injuries, HIV infections or intentional murder (Pavon 2004).

4 The similarities, differences, and lack of information extend beyond these two episodes of collective rape. Elisabeth Wood points out a number of inconsistencies between several episodes of collective rape in the twentieth century. For example, widespread rape and forced impregnation was used by Serbs as a tactic of to remove Bosnians from the land in the former Yugoslavia. These tactics were not seen in the ethnic cleansing violence of Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine or Nazi

Germany (Forthcoming 2006). Also, in some cases of collective rape, victims seem to have been targeted based on ethnicity or religion while in other cases perpetrators chose victims based on opportunity. Serbs in Bosnia directed almost all of their violence against Bosnian Muslims and Croatians but fifty years earlier U.S. troops indiscriminately raped many women throughout France and . Furthermore, some political groups may choose to rape civilians during the course of an armed conflict while others do not. Security forces in , Chile, and other Latin American countries raped women suspected of supporting insurgent groups; insurgent groups in these countries were not known for raping supporters of the government.

A review of the small but growing literature on collective rape reveals even more questions. Almost all of the academic research and non-academic reports focuses on rape in the context of war, even calling it “wartime rape” or “sexual violence in war.” But if we conceptualize collective rape by the definition given above—as a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated on civilians by agents of a state or political civil group—then can collective rape occur outside of the parameters of war? Is collective rape just a subset of the violence of war, or is war perhaps an independent cause for the occurrence collective

5 rape? Similarly, much of the literature focuses on soldiers as perpetrators of collective

rape without acknowledging the other political groups who may or may not participate in

collective sexual violence (Wood Forthcoming 2006 is one exception). Is this because

soldiers are the most common perpetrators of collective rape or has the conceptualization

of this crime as “sexual violence in war” biased research to this conclusion? If soldiers

are the most common perpetrators, why are governments committing sexual violence

against their own citizens? Is there variation between states that might explain this

behavior?

Finally, the literature is dominated by studies of historical cases (such as episodes in Europe, World War II Asia, and 1970’s ) and studies of the former Yugoslavia, with relatively little analysis of other more recent episodes. Is this because there are few recent episodes to analyze, or is the lack of data on these episodes restricting their examination? Would a comparison of episodes, from different countries and different times, reveal more about the causes and patterns of collective rape?

Human rights agencies and international governmental organizations echo this concern over the lack of information on collective rape. The Security

Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security states that,

“during conflict, women and girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and exploitation, including torture, rape, mass rape, , sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and trafficking” (2002, 1) but that, “while the knowledge about these gender-based differences and inequalities is increasing rapidly, it

6 is still far from comprehensive.” (2002, 2) For its inaugural Human Security Report for

2005, the Human Security Centre notes the significant number of documented collective

rape episodes in recent years but then cautions that “No one knows if the incidence of

sexual violence in war is increasing or decreasing.” (2005, 108) By 2004, Human Rights

Watch had documented so many cases of sexual violence in war that the relationship

between the two seemed to be “predictable,” but the organization was still left

questioning “Why are women so consistently targeted for this specific type of assault?

Ultimately, can be prevented?” (Jefferson 2004, 326)

Answers to all of these questions would be beneficial to organizations, researchers

and the legal community alike. Agencies like need to know when

and where collective rape episodes have occurred and are likely to occur in order to

accurately inform the public and governments on these violations. Other organizations,

like Doctors Without Borders, could use that same information to direct their relief

efforts to populations in need or medical assistance. Researchers from many fields,

including sociology, political science, women’s studies, and law could benefit from

knowing what state-level characteristics, such as social, economic, and political factors,

are associated with the occurrence of collective rape in various countries. Knowing how

and why collective rape is used by political actors could help future International

Criminal Tribunals to identify and prosecute the perpetrators.

But these questions remain unanswered, in part, because of the theoretical and methodological limitations of the current literature on collective rape. In regards to theory, the study of collective rape is so new (any bibliographic search of the terms

7 “rape” and “war” will demonstrate that the vast majority of results were published after

1990), that theoretical positions are just now developing. In fact, the newness of this venture has dictated that a large proportion of the literature be devoted to purely uncovering and documenting episodes of collective rape, including those that happened several decades ago. ’s influential book, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten

Holocaust of World War II, which exposed the horrific physical and sexual of

Chinese citizens by the Japanese army in 1937, was published less than ten years ago in

1997. Other histories of collective rape episodes include Beverly Allen’s Rape Warfare

(1996) on the former Yugoslavia, George Hicks’ The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal

Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War (1995), and the edited volume

Rape: of Terror (2000) that discusses collective rape episodes in more than ten countries. These histories of collective rape episodes have significantly advanced our awareness of collective rape, but contributed little to a theoretical understanding of the causes of collective rape.

Another portion of the literature has focused on the need to recognize rape as a human rights violation, a crime of war, and a punishable offense under international laws like the Geneva Convention and . Legal scholars, such as Mary

Ann Tétreault (1997) and Catherine Niarchos (1995), and human rights agencies, such as

Human Rights Watch and , have tackled this topic. Both Tétreault and Niarchos disputed the conceptualization of rape as a side effect of war or a crime against the honor of the victim’s family, and instead argued that collective rape is a strategic act by political actors and a prosecutable offense. These discussions were

8 desperately needed before and during the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda

and the former Yugoslavia in order to get rape charges included in the trials. Because

those tribunals are still ongoing, and similar prosecutions are being considered for rape

crimes committed in and East , this literature remains relevant.

However, it does not often address the central questions of how and why collective rape

occurs.

That portion of the collective rape literature that does address these questions and

seeks to develop theoretical explanations is small but certainly growing. Many researchers have examined the relationship between gender inequality and collective rape, finding that collective rape seems to occur where women have fewer rights and less standing in society (Copelon 1994; Hague 1997; Salzman 2000; Zarkov 2001; all referring to the events in the former Yugoslavia). Others have suggested that military culture, when added to gender inequality, further increases the risk of collective rape

(Enloe 2000; Hansen 2001). Turshen, in studying the assaults in Rwanda and

Mozambique, proposed that perpetrators used collective rape to gain access to land traditionally held by women (2001). Albanese (2001) and Hague (1997) add that ethnic

divisions between perpetrators and victims must also be considered as possible facilitators of collective rape.

However, reviewing these theories underscores the primary methodological limitation of the current literature: the focus on uncovering and documenting individual episodes of collective rape. As Wood states, “the puzzling variation in the extent and

form of sexual violence in war…has not been adequately explained in the literature,

9 much of which focuses on single cases rather than comparison across cases.”

(Forthcoming 2006, 2). Such comparison is necessary to determine if factors present in

one episode—such as the former Yugoslavia—are present in another episode—such as

Rwanda, and that when present these factors have the same effect on collective rape

occurrence. Outside of Turshen (2001), Gottschall (2004), Lilly and Marshall (2000), and

Wood (Forthcoming 2006), there is little theoretical or empirical work that has

considered a range of collective rape episodes in developing or testing theory. Turshen

considers only two episodes—Rwanda and —both from Africa and during

the 1990s. Wood, Lilly and Marshall, and Gottschall analyze more episodes but rely on

the published case studies for their data. Therefore, their findings may be biased toward

cases that prior researchers have chosen to investigate or have been able to investigate.

Furthermore, Wood (2006) is the only researcher to consider negative cases, or situations

where factors such as war and gender inequality were present but collective rape did not

occur (or was less severe). The inclusion of negative cases is essential to truly test any of the relationships suggested above.

Combined, the theoretical and methodological limitations of the current literature and the numerous unaddressed questions about collective rape clearly indicate a need for new, innovative, and progressive research on this crime. Research is needed that identifies multiple episodes of collective rape using common criteria from a reliable and broad data source, making side-by-side comparison possible. With such data, the

diversity and similarity across cases needs to be examined to find patterns and anomalies

in collective rape occurrence, perpetrators and victims. Theoretically, the relationships

10 proposed in existing literature need to be tested and new theories need to be developed to understand why collective rape occurs. Each of these hypotheses needs to be analyzed using comprehensive data on the occurrence and non-occurrence of collective rape in various political, social, and economic situations.

In this dissertation, I developed and implemented a research strategy to address these needs. To identify a sample of collective rape episodes I began by creating a parsimonious but comprehensive definition of collective rape, focusing on the political nature of the perpetrators and the multiplicity of the assaults. Using that definition, I sought to isolate all recorded episodes of collective rape occurring around the globe between 1980 and 2003. This data comes from stories filed with three international news sources—The New York Times, World News Digest Facts on File, and Reuters Business

Briefs. Identifying cases involved searching the archives of these sources for relevant stories and coding the selected stories for information on the episodes’ timing, location, perpetrators and victims. In total, almost 1,400 stories were collected and coded from the three sources. From the stories, I was able to identify and describe 37 episodes of collective rape from 37 different countries between 1980 and 2003.

To uncover patterns and anomalies, I examined all 37 episodes with particular attention to the time duration of the episodes, the location of affected countries in regions of the world, the political status and affiliations of the perpetrators, and the social statuses of the victims. I also consider patterns in the three news sources regarding the prevalence and quality of reporting on collective rape episodes and the spread of that reporting over

11 time and sources. Finally, I compare the patterns and anomalies of episodes, occurrence, perpetrators, and victims found in my data to those described in the current literature.

To develop and test a theoretical framework for understanding collective rape, I began with the existing literature on this crime but incorporated hypotheses from other areas of violence research. In particular, I draw from studies of armed conflict, political violence, genocide, and interpersonal rape. Integrating these literatures produced a more detailed and comprehensive set of hypotheses than has been tested in collective rape research before. This new framework allows me to consider the possible effects of several social institutions, including political structures, the economy, gender, race/ethnicity, militarization and globalization. I test the effects of these hypotheses on the occurrence of collective rape for 24 in 176 countries. This sample includes many countries which who did not have reported episodes of collective rape, so negative cases

are considered in this research.

This project makes three significant contributions to study of collective rape but

also to the fields of political violence research and sociology overall. First, it produces

one of the first cross-national cross-time datasets of collective rape episodes for

comparative research. Extensive cross-national data exists on many other related topics

(e.g. internal war, political violence, geno/politicide) but not for collective rape. It

provides a basis for assessing the “byproduct of war” thesis and for comparing collective

sexual violence to other forms of violence. However, it is quite clear that such a dataset

that includes comparable measures of occurrence, timing, perpetrators and victims is

needed to understand how and why collective rape occurs in some situations but not in

12 others. In the future, this dataset could also be useful for analyzing other social phenomena, such as women’s status in post-war countries, the effects of various forms of violence on victims’ health, or the strategic choices of violent political groups.

Second, this project considers and tests the effects of many structural or country- level factors on the presence of collective rape. This represents a departure from much of the other research being done in this area, which often focuses on the effects of individual- or group-level factors on collective rape prevalence and incidence. Price

(2001) and Hague (1997) both argue that we must consider the motivations and justifications of those individuals who participate in collective rape or encourage its use.

Wood advocates for future research to consider “small-group dynamics” (Forthcoming

2006 31) and to “compare patterns of sexual (and other) violence not just between factions and over time, but across sub-units of the armed factions, thereby clarifying the causal force of factors at different levels.” (Forthcoming 2006, 30) If research at different levels is desirable, then research on the causal force of country-level factors would seem worthwhile. Moreover, the extensive amount of variation Wood found between countries (in addition to that found between armed factions within countries) further supports this endeavor.

Third, in considering country-level factors I draw heavily from research on other forms of collective violence, such as ethnic war, genocide, state repression and .

Numerous theories have been proposed to explain these forms of collective violence, some of which consider the effects of race/ethnicity or class stratification as predictors of violence. However, the possible effects of gender stratification on collective violence

13 have been all but ignored in this literature. By testing these theories on a form of

collective violence that is inherently gendered, i.e., rape, these theories are being

challenged and the collective violence literature expanded in a new direction. Similarly,

research on sexual violence has largely considered it an interpersonal crime and not a

product of collective or political behavior. Even research on (usually small

groups, like fraternities or sports teams, assaulting one or more victims) has mostly

conceptualized the violence as individual perpetrators acting to fit into the group, and not considered how the group might be acting together in an institutional and cultural context

to achieve a group purpose. By studying mass political sexual violence strictly as a form

of collective action, and not individual action, this project challenges and expands the

rape literature as well.

In the following chapters, I discuss each of the steps involved in completing this

research project. In Chapter 2, I review and summarize the existing literature on

collective rape. Although this literature is limited, it suggests several new directions for

collective rape research. Chapter 3 takes the theories proposed in the previous chapter

and develops them into testable hypothesis. I also develop hypotheses of collective rape

occurrence from similar studies of other forms of violence. The result is a theoretical

framework that considers the effects of gender inequality, armed conflict, militarization,

world culture, state structure, economic development and ethnic cleavages on collective

rape occurrence. Chapter 4 describes the creation of the collective rape episode dataset,

including the coding of news stories and the construction of quality control measures.

This chapter also describes the measures used and methods used to test the hypotheses

14 mentioned above. Chapter 5 focuses on the collective rape episodes identified in the

dataset and the patterns found among the episodes. This chapter demonstrates the

similarities and differences between 37 episodes, as well as some patterns new to the

collective rape literature. In Chapter 6, I discuss the results of an empirical analysis on

the effects of country-level factors on collective rape occurrence. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the key conclusions drawn from data collection and analysis, and explores the implications of these findings.

15

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In 1975, helped open the door for discussion of mass political

sexual violence1 with her influential book, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape.

Brownmiller examines several historical episodes of mass rape beginning with World

War I. From historical volumes and records of witness reports, we know that German

soldiers were involved in the of Belgian women starting in August 1914

(1975, 40-42). Some of the victims were assaulted by multiple perpetrators and others

were bayoneted after being raped. This behavior continued as the Germans moved into

France in September. In more than twelve towns throughout France, mass rape was

reported. The sexual violence seemed to abate at the end of 1914. Writers of the time,

like Arnold Toynbee, suggested that this showed a change in German strategy and that the assaults had been “’the result of policy, deliberately tried and deliberately given up.’”

Brownmiller agrees that the seem to have been deliberate (or perhaps “not

1 It would be good to get this definition covered in the introduction “Collective rape” is a term and concept unique to this dissertation that includes all episodes of multiple sexual assaults with political perpetrators. Most of the current literature only discusses episodes that occur during armed conflicts, something often called “mass rape.” To distinguish between my concept and that in the prevailing literature, I will use the term “mass rape” in this chapter about the existing literature and the term “collective rape” in later chapters when referencing my own research. 16 discouraged”) but notes that the cessation of sexual violence coincided with a move away

from a marching army and toward stationary by the Germans (1975, 43).

The extent of sexual violence against civilians by the Germans and reason for its decline

continues to be debated today.

Brownmiller (in addition to Eva Figes and Kate Millett) contend that the

motivation for German soldiers to rape in World War II was much clearer:

“…it was perfectly logical within the framework of fascism that rape would be employed by the German soldier as he strove to prove himself a worthy Superman. In fact, it would be highly illogical if rape were not in the German soldier’s kit bag of . Rape for the Germans, and to a similar extent for the Japanese, played a serious and logical role in the achievement of what they saw as their ultimate objective: the total and destruction of ‘inferior peoples’ and the establishment of their own master race.” (Brownmiller 1975, 49; emphasis original)

Reports of the mass rape of Jewish women during riots began in 1938. According to

Brownmiller, this began a pattern for German military violence. Throughout Poland and

Russia, when the army invaded a village, one of their first acts was to single out Jewish girls for rape and torture—especially in front of their families (1975, 50). The mass killings and expulsions of Jews usually occurred weeks after this initial round of

violence. Because sexual contact between Aryans and Jews was actually prohibited by a

policy against “racial defilement,” the sexual abuse of Jews also included forced

undressing, naked dancing, and the whipping of breasts (1975, 51-52). The sexual violence was not restricted to only Jews. Nuremberg records reveal, for example, that in one Ukrainian village “the fascists violated every one of the women and girls.” (9175, 55)

The Nuremberg Tribunal also exposed the sexual violence perpetrated by the

Japanese in their capture of Nanking, although no Japanese (or German) soldiers were

17 ever prosecuted by the tribunal for rape. During their of this city, Japanese

soldiers seemed to have committed massive and horrendous acts of violence against the

trapped Chinese citizens. Reports submitted by missionaries to the Japanese authorities

during the invasion cited an average of at least ten gang rapes a day (1975, 60; see also

Chang 1997). The Nuremberg judgment ultimately estimated that 20,000 cases of rape

occurred in Nanking during the first month of the Japanese occupation in 1937 (1975,

61).

Brownmiller points out that nations who judged the Japanese and Germans for

their actions were also known to have committed mass rape. Russian soldiers raped many German women when they entered the country in 1944-1945 (1975, 66-72).

General George S. Patton gave one of the most infamous quotes about mass rape in his

memoirs when discussing the North African campaign. Patton told the Sultan of

Morocco that “’in spite of my most diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some

raping’” of civilians by American soldiers (1975, 73). Moroccan troops were accused of

raping civilians themselves when they invaded Sicily later on.

Brownmiller completed her discussion of wartime rape with two more recent

episodes of mass rape. In late 1971, after the Indian Army had brought an end to the

West Pakistani crackdown against newly independent Bangladesh, news agencies began

to report on the mass rape of Bangladeshi women (1975, 78). These reports gained

credence in early 1972 when a relief agency official publicly estimated that 200,000

women had been raped and thousands impregnated during the nine-month conflict (1975,

79). Later estimates suggest that as many as 400,000 Muslim, Hindu and Christian

18 women were assaulted by Muslim Pakistani soldiers and Bangladeshi collaborators

(1975, 80). Many women were raped in their homes; others were held for extended

periods in military barracks. It is reported that “girls of eight and grandmothers of

seventy-five” were among the victims, suggesting that victims were not singled out

always for their beauty or child-bearing ability (1975, 82). The consequences of the

violence lasted long after the nine-month invasion ended—many victims were ostracized

from society and as many as 25,000 women were forced to raise or abort the children of

their rapists (1975, 84).

The Bangladeshi episode was well documented by the local government and relief

agencies and well reported by the media. In comparison, at the time of Brownmiller’s

writing, the sexual violence that occurred during the War was just being exposed. In 1972, Brownmiller interviewed reporter Peter Arnett and learned that he

“had never filed a rape story from Vietnam, but like the rest of the press corps he had certainly been aware of its incidence.” (1975, 87) In particular, South Vietnamese troops had “freely looted and raped in every village they passed through” when invading

Cambodia in 1970 (1975, 88), and sexually tortured female political prisoners who were held in Saigon interrogation centers. American soldiers were known for gang raping suspected civilians and participating in the extensive prostitution system. Unlike the

South Vietnamese, who seemed to have committed most of their assaults as individuals and in private, American soldiers raped “on a squad level.” (1975, 98) Reporter Dan

Rather, who was in Vietnam for two years but also never filed a story on rape, nevertheless heard of many cases of rape. He said, “’I would have to say that the

19 Americans and the Korean troops were probably the worst…Vietnam was a loosely

organized gang war, and the women caught it from all sides.” (1975, 92) It seems,

however, that the North Vietnamese committed very few incidences of rape throughout

the many years of the war.

Through extensive historical research, Brownmiller was able to document

Vietnam and several other episodes of mass rape in the twentieth century. Unfortunately,

over the next fifteen years few researchers followed up on Brownmiller’s work and

advanced the study of mass political sexual violence. There are, perhaps, several reasons

for this. First, the study of rape itself was just beginning in the 1970s thanks to the advocacy of third wave feminists. In these early years, researchers were not yet distinguishing between different forms of rape such as , , gang rape

and mass rape. Brownmiller herself used the episodes of mass rape she found to lead into

a discussion of interpersonal rape in 1970’s America. This lack of focus on mass rape as

a distinct social phenomenon may have stalled its research progress. Second, the

research that was being conducted on rape in the 1970’s and 1980’s was primarily

focused on the consequences for victims and social change. Psychologists wrote

extensively on women’s experiences with rape and its effects on their lives, while sociologists and political scientists wrote about the need for rape crisis centers and

changes in law. Again, determining the extent and causes of events like political sexual

violence was not the focus. Finally, most of the work on rape was being done by

researchers in Western countries. But as Brownmiller’s book showed, the episodes of

mass rape occurring in the 1970’s and 1980’s were located elsewhere, in developing

20 countries. Western researchers might have had little knowledge or interest in these

events as compared to the cases of interpersonal rape that were occurring in their home

countries.

The emergence of a literature devoted to mass rape in the early 1990’s was most

likely precipitated by two events. In December 1991, 35 Korean plaintiffs arrived in

Japan and demanded an apology and compensation for the abuse they suffered as

“comfort women” during World War II (Ogoshi and Shimizu 2000; Seaton 2006). Other similar suits had been filed in the past but this 1991 case marked the first time a plaintiff used her real name. This generated only moderate media and international attention until a month later when a Japanese professor found government documents proving the

Japanese military’s involvement in the running of “comfort stations” (Seaton 2006, 103).

Prior to this discovery, the Japanese government had always denied involvement and supported that based on the absence of any official documents. The discovery forced the Japanese government to reverse their position and issue an apology to the estimated 200,000 victims. However, the government continued to insist that all matters

of compensation for “comfort women” victims had been settled in prior treaties between

Korea and Japan (Ogoshi and Shimizu 2000; Seaton 2006).

At the same time that feminists and activists began to express outrage for the

comfort women issue, reports of mass rape in the former Yugoslavia began to appear. In

June 1992, fleeing Bosnia-Herzegovina into Croatia were among the first to

report rapes of civilians (Stiglmayer 1994). In August, the first story detailing the rapes

of Muslims by Serbians appeared in . By October, The New York Times had

21 published a story saying that at least 150 women and girls had been raped and impregnated by Serbian nationalists fighters (Burns 1992). Journalists continued to follow these reports and many more stories were published before the end of 1992. This reporting continued in spite of the fact that major non-governmental organizations, such as the International Red Cross, stated that they only knew of isolated cases of rape scattered throughout the former Yugoslavia (Stiglmayer 1994). Thanks to the publicity of the press coverage, in December of 1992 the U.N. Commission of Refugees admitted that it was receiving “’continual reports of rape from Bosnian refugees’” and that the rapes seemed “’widespread.’” (Stiglmayer 1994, 26). Over the next three years as the war in the former Yugoslavia continued, the news coverage of rape became overwhelming.

These news stories, combined with reports from international governmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and other individuals, has easily made the sexual violence in Bosnia2 the best documented episode of mass rape in history. In addition to the traditional news stories, evidence of sexual violence has been provided by organizations like the U.N. Commission on Refugees,

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. In 1993, the U.N. Commission on

Refugees sponsored the investigation that produced the first estimates of the number of victims from Bosnia--20,000 in 1992 alone. In January 1993, INGOs Helsinki Watch and

Human Rights Watch began interviewing women throughout the former Yugoslavia who

2 While the armed conflict in 1992-1995 occurred in three regions of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia—each of which would later become independent states) it became clear early on that the vast majority of rapes had occurred in the region of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the vast majority of rape victims were Bosnian. Therefore, most literature discusses this episode as occurring in “Bosnia” rather than “the former Yugoslavia.” 22 had been raped in Bosnia and published their first report in March. During that year they

continued to travel in the area, interviewing victims and witnesses and publishing several

more reports. Amnesty International released their first report, titled Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, in January 1993. All three of

these INGOs continued to document and expose violence against civilians over the

remaining three years of the conflict. In 1994, freelance journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer

published the first book about the sexual violence in Bosnia. The edited volume included

a chapter summarizing the violence Stiglmayer had seen and documented in her news

pieces from 1992 to 1994. In 1996, professor Beverly Allen published her own book on

the Bosnia case after conducting research with survivors, witnesses, relief workers and

government officials in the various parts of Europe. The first journal articles began appearing in 1994 and 1995 in journals like Human Rights Quarterly, Terrorism and

Political Violence, and Criminal Law Forum. By 1999, Inger Skjelsbaek had compiled a bibliography of more than 80 documents from IGOs, INGOs, and academic journals on mass rape, and more than half of these documents discussed only the episode in Bosnia.

Other recent episodes that have been documented and discussed in literature include

Rwanda, Mozambique, Indonesia, , and (Barstow 2001; Fredrick et al

2000; Turshen 2001).

It’s not surprising, then, that research on mass rape has focused so heavily on the

Bosnian episode. Most literature on the causes and predictors of mass rape has created hypotheses based on the cultural and social characteristics that were present in Bosnia at the time. From this small but growing literature, one dominant theory of mass rape has

23 evolved. Researchers suggest that gender inequality, combined with military culture and

armed conflict situations, produce mass rape. The culture of and structure of

gender inequality is perhaps the most salient precondition discussed in the literature.

Several authors have suggested that perpetrators of mass rape in Bosnia held very traditional (or archaized), very patriarchal gender beliefs. These beliefs included the ideas that men and women do not share the same rights and status in society, that women were

not independent human beings but the property of their (male) family, and that women’s

places in society were as wives, mothers and daughters (Albanese 2001; Allen 1996;

Copelon 1994; Hague 1997; Stiglmayer 1994). Moreover, women were valued for their

reproductive abilities and sexual purity, and the violation of that sexual purity through rape brought dishonor to the family and community3. These beliefs made rape an

especially effective weapon for Serbian armed forces against Muslim groups. Muslim

women and girls who were the targets of rape, gang rape and forced impregnation

suffered personal humiliation and trauma but also were considered defiled or traitors

within their communities. This effect was heightened when women were assaulted in

front of spouses, children, family members and neighbors (Allen 1996; Stiglmayer 1994).

Perpetrators also used gendered epithets like “bitch” and “whore” to further subjugate

their victims (Stiglmayer 1994). In the Serbian “rape camps,” the victimization was

extended to offspring through forced impregnation. Goldstein (1993) has identified four

3 This belief was also reflected, until recently, in the international community by standards such as the and 1977 Protocols (Copelon 1994). Under the Geneva Conventions, rape was considered a crime against the honor and dignity of the . Copelon points out how this definition is problematic, as it places value on chastity and not on a woman’s “autonomy, integrity, selfhood, security and self-esteem.” (p.200) This precedent was changed by the International Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, which gave rape the status of a crime against humanity, akin to genocide and torture.

24 motives for forcibly impregnating Muslim women: to maximize the pain and

consequences of the assaults; to dishonor the victims’ families and communities; to

destroy the ethnic identities of the woman and child; and to enslave the victims. Women who returned to their communities raped and/or pregnant were often considered unmarriageable or rejected by their husbands. As such, the victim was then “homeless in her own body” (Copelon 1994) and a “cancer” in her community, the effects of which can still be seen in the former Yugoslavia today.

Thus, because of gender inequality, women were easy and even appropriate victims for violence and rape was an effective and devastating weapon.

However, Cynthia Enloe cautions against drawing too direct a relationship between archaized gender ideologies and mass rape:

“Assuming that such a diffuse and elemental is the sufficient cause of wartime rapes carries with it yet another risk: paying dangerously little attention to the war-waging objectives to which rape is put by strategists and to the specific gender division of labor undergirding the definition of those objectives.” (2000: 134)

The probability of violence that is ever present and ever justified in gender-divided

environments is amplified through military culture and strategy (Salzman 2000). Hague

explored this process in the Serbian army, where military and policy created

a very polarized and violent gender ideology (1997). The Serbian and Bosnian-Serb

encouraged compliance of masculinity identity that emphasized ,

violence, dominance and power. All who did not accept this version of masculinity were

deemed “feminine,” a label denoting passivity, subjugation, and worthlessness. Through

the rape of Bosnian-Muslim women, soldiers were able to prove their masculinity with

25 violence and assert Serbian dominance. Serbian soldiers were able to further prove their

masculinity and strengthen interpersonal ties through gang rapes, where one victim was

shared by several assailants. Such “male-bonding” is not uncommon and has been

documented in other groups that stress strength, power and masculinity such as

fraternities (Boswell and Spade 1996), sports teams (Crosset, Benedict and McDonald

1995; Ehrhart and Sandler 1985), and military schools (Kimmel 1993).

Soldiers have the opportunity and need to fulfill their violent masculine identities in armed conflict situations, when their power and control is being challenged (Enloe

2000; Hague 1997; Salzman 2000). In the Yugoslavian conflict, Serbians wanted to control the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and remove Bosnians from the area to make

it an ethnically “pure” state. This meant that the armed conflict was directed, to some

extent, against the Bosnian civilians who were occupying the territory Serbians wished to

claim. To undermine the ethnic solidarity of the Bosnians and act out the violent

masculinity promoted by the military, Serbian soldiers raped Bosnian women and tried to

impregnate some. The babies born of these rapes would be considered Serbian and

destabilized the enemy Bosnian forces. Had these two groups not been at war with each

other, however, gender inequality and militarization alone would not likely have

produced mass rape.

Thus the mass rape literature identifies three primary causes of mass political

sexual violence: gender inequality, militarization, and armed conflict. This is not the

limit of the literature, however—other possible contributors have been discussed. In the

Yugoslavian conflict, for example, the Bosnians and Serbs were ethnically divided and

26 Serbian military ideology stressed “ethnic cleansing” and “nationalism” along with hyper-masculinity (Albanese, 2001, Hague 1997). Victims of mass rape were identified as much for their gender as for their ethnicity. The ethnic motivation was further evidenced by the attempts to impregnate Bosnian women with Serbian babies. In addition, some Bosnian men were raped despite the fact that they could not be made pregnant and forced to carry the enemies’ children. Hence, ethnic cleavages in a society may also contribute to the instigation of mass rape.

Finally, in a departure from research on the former Yugoslavia, Meredith Turshen has suggested that the economic development of a society may cause armed conflict participants to commit mass rape. Turshen looked at three episodes of mass rape in

Africa—Rwanda, Mozambique and —where civil war occurred in the aftermath of colonialism (2000, 2001). In theses highly agricultural societies, women were seen as sexual assets and as labor assets. Women worked in the home as wives and mothers but also in the fields as farmers. In Rwanda they were sometimes called umusanzu, meaning

“contribution to the war effort.” (2001, 60) Subsequently, during the , women were captured and raped but also forced to work as cooks and farmers for their captors.

Armies used rape to strip women of their reproductive and productive power—more so when the victims were forced into mock marriages with their perpetrators as happened in

Rwanda. These marriages gave some legitimacy to the sexual and of the victims, but also gave the perpetrators access to the land the women owned or farmed.

Since many of the were poor, uneducated, and unlanded, acquiring access to land through rape was often a very fruitful strategy. In Mozambique, rape was used to

27 sever some women’s connections to their land and farms. If a raped women returned to

her community, especially with an child born from the enemy, she was often rejected by

her family and lost all rights to the land she had once farmed with her husband (2001,

64). Thus rape was used as a way of redistributing land access and food production

(especially away from women and to men) in countries where agriculture was the primary means of economic production. Turshen’s work has suggested a fifth possible predictor of mass rape—the level of economic development—that has not been discussed by others.

Because Turshen studied Rwanda, Mozambique and Uganda instead of Bosnia

(the source of most other causal hypotheses on collective rape) it is not yet known if economic development was a factor only in those two episodes or possibly others as well.

This again demonstrates the need for (1) comparative studies across many countries with and without collective rape episodes, and (2) a more comprehensive theoretical model that considers the effects of all of these potential predictors at the same time. In the following chapter I develop a theoretical model of causes of collective rape occurrence that incorporates all five factors suggested above, as well as two more factors suggested by related literature.

28

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The predictors of collective rape suggested in the last chapter suggest a few

explanations of this crime, but as of yet there has been no empirical research to support or

refute these ideas. To shape these preliminary ideas into concrete hypotheses appropriate

for a quantitative cross-national cross-time study, I turn to the related literatures on

interpersonal rape and political violence. Both literatures are needed since collective rape is, at the same time, a crime of gender and a crime of politics. Sexual assault (one component of the definition of collective rape used in this study) is the most gendered of all crimes with the vast majority of victims being women and an equal majority of perpetrators being men. My definition also requires that the perpetrators be political actors, so politics is a necessary dimension to consider in collective rape. Moreover, the two literatures are complementary to creating a theoretical model of collective rape—the research of interpersonal rape has largely ignored political conflict as a predictor, and the research on political violence has virtually nothing to say about the possible effects of gender. Combining these two areas will assuredly produce a more thorough and complete model for understanding the causes of collective rape.

29 Gender Inequality

Studies of collective rape episodes in Bosnia, Rwanda, Mozambique and a few

other countries has suggested that inequality between men and women helps to create

collective rape. Specifically, it has been proposed that women’s positions and status are

restricted to reproductive units and carriers of culture or ethnicity, rather than fully independent actors in society (Allen 1996; Copelon 1994; Stiglmayer 1994; Turshen

2000, 2001). Therefore, because women are objects and not subjects, violence against

them is acceptable and perhaps even encouraged (in circumstances such as war).

Similar ideas have been proposed and tested in the interpersonal rape literature.

Liberal feminists have hypothesized that when women have equal opportunity to succeed

alongside men in work, education, politics, etc., they face less discrimination based on

gender. More equal treatment in the public sphere should lead to less victimization,

including a reduction in rape (MacKinnon 1989; Martin, Vieraitis and Britto 2006;

Messerschmidt 1986). Similarly, radical feminists extend that argument to say that more

equal opportunity and achievement in the public sphere reduces the risk of victimization

through changing culture. When women are limited to the private sphere as sexual

objects and family property, it promotes the acceptability of and aggression

against them. When women achieve social parity with men, it weakens the social support

for rape (Eschholz and Veriaitis 2004; Griffin 1979; MacKinnon 1989; Russell 1975).

This position has been called the ameliorative hypothesis, and has received some support in research. Several studies of rape rates in America have found that the rates were lower in cities with higher income, educational, and/or legal equality between the

30 genders ( 1999; Baron and Straus 1987, 1989; Whaley 2001). However, other studies (and some of the same studies) have found the opposite relationship: that rates were higher in cities, metropolitan statistical areas, or states were was

higher (Austin and Kim 2000; Bailey 1999; Baron and Straus 1984; Peterson and Bailey

1992; Whaley 2001). For example, Eschholz and Vieraitis found that relative college

educational attainment between the genders was related to higher rape rates in U.S. cities

(2004).

This positive relationship between gender equality and interpersonal rape is

hypothesized to be a backlash—men’s violent response to women’s intrusion in the

public sphere (Austin and Kim 2000; Russell 1975; Whaley 2001). According to the

backlash hypothesis, men feel threatened by women’s new achievements in the public

sphere and use rape to encourage them to go back to the private sphere. Studies that

include measures of work equality (i.e., women’s labor force participation, women’s

representation in male-dominated fields, gender gaps in occupational prestige) sometimes support the backlash hypothesis but are other times not significant (Austin and Kim 2000;

Baron and Straus 1987; Ellis and Beattie 1983; Eschholz and Vieraitis 2004; Peterson

and Bailey 1992).

Extending these findings on interpersonal rape to collective rape suggests that

gender inequality may have either a positive or negative effect on the occurrence of mass

political sexual violence. However, there are two problems with making this leap. First,

the studies of interpersonal rape have all looked at the effects of gender inequality on

rape rates—or the prevalence of rape in a population. Since some number of

31 interpersonal rapes occur in all populations, the effects of gender inequality have not been

tested on an absence of rape, which may be case in this study of collective rape

occurrence or non-occurrence.

Second, almost all of the studies discussed above were limited to geographic units

within the United States and have not looked at variation across countries. Sanday

(1981) and McConahay and McConahay (1977) have done cross-cultural studies of

multiple tribal societies and found a negative relationship between women’s greater

status and rape (supporting the ameliorative hypothesis), but the only cross-national study

has been Austin and Kim’s. They instead found a positive relationship between gender

equality and rape rates in 56 countries (2000). This gives a slight advantage to the

backlash hypothesis in predicting collective rape (since Austin and Kim’s study is the

most similar to the analysis performed later), but the overall variation in gender

inequality and rape rate studies suggests that the most prudent hypothesis for this study is

a neutral one.

Hypothesis 1: Gender inequality may have either a positive or negative

effect on collective rape. Higher levels of gender inequality may increase

or decrease the probability of collective rape occurrence across country-

years.

Militarization

The collective rape literature posited that the hyper-masculine, hyper-violent ideology found in militaries (most notably in the Serbian military and paramilitaries) helped lead to collective rape occurrence. Feminist research on military ideology and

32 practices outside of Bosnia would support this position. Anecdotal evidence shows that militaries encourage their soldiers to be “masculine,” “manly,” and “macho,” and to refrain from being compassionate, empathetic or kind (Enloe 2000; Goldstein 2003;

Morris 1996). These exact same values have been found to be correlated with the propensity and willingness to commit rape or aggressive sexual behavior (Malamuth

1981; Malamuth et al. 1991; Quakenbush 1989). Similarly, militaries support male promiscuity, sexual aggressiveness, and definition of women as sexual targets kind

(Enloe 2000; Goldstein 2003; Morris 1996). These attitudes, too, have been linked with past rape behavior and the willingness to commit rape (Malamuth 1981, 1991;

Quakenbush 1989).

In practice, militaries have higher rates of rape and sexual abuse when compared with the general population. The Japanese military forced thousands of women into sexual slavery as “comfort women” during World War II (Barstow 2001; Brownmiller

1975) and the U.S. military has been responsible for the institutionalization of prostitution in many areas of Southeast Asia (Barstow 2001; Brownmiller 1975; Enloe

2000). Statistical analysis reinforces these patterns. In wartimes, militaries often commit rapes at much higher rates than civilians or themselves in peacetimes. During World War

II, for example, the U.S. military’s rape rate was 260% of the civilian rape rate but the rate of murder by the military was 47% the civilian rate for murder (Morris 1996). In peacetimes, the rate of rape by military personnel is generally lower than the rate by civilians, but the differential is not as great as it is for other crimes. For example, between 1987 and 1992 the ratio of violent crime by the U.S. Army to violent crime by

33 civilians was .18, but corresponding ratio for rape was .47. Therefore, it seems that in

both ideology and in practice, the military has a positive relationship with interpersonal

rape that may extend to a positive relationship with collective rape.

Additional support for this hypothesis can be drawn from the literature on political violence. Militaries have the legitimate power to use violence, which may at

times be used against civilians or the government. Jenkins and Kposowa’s work on

African military coups d’etat found strong support for the contention that military centrality (military size and defense budget) contributes to coups (1990, 1992). If

militaries are likely to commit one form of political violence—coups d’etat—they may be

likely to commit another unexamined form of political violence—collective rape.

Hypothesis 2: Military presence and strength will have a positive effect on

collective rape. As military strength and power increases, the likelihood

of collective rape occurrence will increase.

Armed Conflict

One related factor was discussed in the prior chapter as related to collective

rape—the presence of armed conflict(s). The collective rape literature assumes a perfect

relationship between mass rape and armed conflict: by most other authors’ definitions,

mass rape is something that only occurs within or as a part of, an armed conflict (though

not all armed conflicts have mass rapes). Moreover, the only international standard for

defining mass sexual violence—the statute used by the International Criminal

Tribunals—applies solely to identified war criminals. But this assumed relationship is

both presumptive and unnecessary. Using the definition created in this study, collective

34 rape episodes may occur before, during, after, or apart from armed conflicts as long as the

perpetrators are political actors. Or episodes may occur in political conflicts that do not

meet the measurement requirements of armed conflict definitions. In the State Failure

Task Force data, for example, an ethnic war is not included in the dataset unless it meets

one of two thresholds: each party mobilized at least 1,000 people or there was at least

1,000 conflict-related deaths over the course of the conflict and at least one year were the death toll exceeded 100 (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/sfcodebk.htm#20). For these reasons, the relationship between war and collective rape must not be assumed but rather tested to determine its strength and direction.

Prior research in the study of another form of political violence, geno/politicide, has found war to be a significant precondition. Krain’s (1997) study determined that civil war was the most consistent predictor of the onset of geno/politicides and both war and civil war were significant predictors of the severity (intensity) of the crimes. Harff discovered that states with a high magnitude of political upheaval had nearly twice the risk of geno/politicide than did low magnitude states (2003). She also found that the risk of a new geno/politicide was more than three times greater when a country experienced state failure and had already had a prior genocide in the last 15 years. Given that war, civil war and prior genocide are significant preconditions for one form of mass violence on civilians, it is reasonable to expect that political violence will strongly affect the probability of collective rape. It should be noted, however, that the relationship between political violence and collective rape might change considerably over time. For example,

Marshall has concluded that “the global trend in major armed conflict has continued to

35 decrease markedly in the post- era both in numbers of states affected by major

armed conflicts and in general magnitude. According to our calculations, the general

magnitude of global warfare has decreased by over fifty percent since peaking in the mid-

1980s . . .” (Marshall and Gurr 2003: 12) Consequently, my longitudinal analysis may reveal a varying effect of armed conflict through the 1980s, 1990s and into the new century.

Hypothesis 3: Armed conflict will have a positive effect on collective rape.

As the intensity of armed conflict increases, the probability of collective

rape occurrence will increase.

Ethnic Cleavages

The studies of the Bosnian and Rwandan collective rape episodes mentioned previously point to the significance of ethnic/nationality divisions in generating mass sexual violence. In both of those episodes, two or more ethnic groups were engaged in armed conflict and victims of rape were targeted based on their ethnicity: Muslims primarily in Bosnia and Tutsi primarily in Rwanda. But this is not necessarily true of collective rape episodes: women of all ethnic groups have been raped “indiscriminately” in Sierra Leone and (Wood Forthcoming 2006). And some ethnic armed conflicts do not lead to collective rape: only a few cases of rape have been documented in the years of violence between Israelis and Palestinians (Wood Forthcoming 2006).

Some studies of gender inequality and interpersonal rape in the U.S. have also controlled for race, and the results indicated that there are some race-related differences.

Gender income equality, for example, significantly increased the rape rate for white

36 women in one study but did not significantly affect the rate for Black women (Eschholz and Vieraitis 2004). Whaley found that ethnic heterogeneity had a positive and significant effect on the rape rate in the U.S. in 1970 and 1990 (2001). This suggests that racial or ethnic cleavages may have some effect on the occurrence of collective rape even when controlling for gender inequality, though none of the interpersonal rape research was cross-national.

The presence and status of ethnic minorities are sometimes found to be a precursor of civil wars, rebellions and geno/politicides in cross-national research

(Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Gurr 2000; Harff 2003). Several studies resulting from the

Minorities at Risk Project (including Gurr 2000) have demonstrated that severe ethnic discrimination (political, economic or cultural) against ethnic minorities can increase the probability of political violence. But Harff used the same measure of ethnic discrimination and found no significant effect on geno/politicides (2003). The only salient effect of ethnic diversity on geno/politcides in her study was in countries where the political elite was mainly or entirely part of an ethnic minority group. Similarly, ethnic diversity and discrimination did not affect the occurrence of civil war in Fearon and Laitin’s 2003 study, and religious diversity had only a weak relationship with ethnic war.

Olzak (1992) was influential in developing the ethnic competition argument, which states that decreasing inequality between ethnic groups spurs violence.

Desegregation (in jobs, for example) increases competition for scarce resources between groups and contributes to violence. This most often occurs when minority groups grow

37 in relation to the majority group. Those who were previously privileged are especially

likely to commit violence. Her research concluded that immigration and migration of ethnic groups along with economic declines were highly correlated with collective violence.

Hypothesis 4: Ethnic diversity and ethnic competition are expected to have

positive effects on collective rape. In country-years with more ethnic

diversity and competition, the likelihood of collective rape occurrence will

be greater.

Economic Development

Meredith Turshen introduced the idea of a relationship between economic development and collective rape with her studies of episodes in three African countries

(2000, 2001). She concluded that perpetrators kidnapped and raped women, in part, to separate them from their land and food production. Victims could not contribute to their family’s (the enemy’s) farming during the time of their capture and sometimes forever after, when they are shunned by their former husbands and families. If the women had legal access to the land, they were sometimes forced to marry their perpetrators so the men could take over that land as well as the products of the victims’ labor. Turshen concluded that, for African women whose economic self-sufficiency is dependent on access to land and good standing in the community, the effects of collective rape were devastating.

The one cross-national study available in the interpersonal rape literature did include measures of urban population and gross domestic product (GDP), but there is

38 never a significant relationship between these indicators and the rape rate for any model

run (Austin and Kim 2000). Studies of rape rates in the U.S. have included measures of

individual poverty and family poverty in the cities or metropolitan areas of study, with

typically positive effects. The rape rate is higher where the rate of poverty is also high.

But since this relationship between economic development and rape was only found in the U.S. and not cross-nationally, its applicability to the study of collective rape is suspect.

In the political violence literature, dependency and world systems theories suggest that the level of economic development in a country can affect its likelihood of experiencing civil war, or territorial conflicts (Gurr 1970; Jenkins and Schock

1992; Moaddel 1994). Moaddel’s study found that economic inequality (measured by the top quintile share of the national income) within a state had an independent and positive effect on political conflict. He also found that economic dependency (i.e., foreign capital penetration) had an indirect effect on political conflict through income inequality. Other

studies (Delacroix and Ragin 1981; Dixon 1984; Jaffe 1985) have found that export

dependency lowers the quality of life, which may contribute to rebellion. Finally, the

State Failure Project has consistently shown that poor countries are more likely to incur

armed conflicts and regime changes (Goldstone, et al 2002).

Furthermore, Peter Uvin has suggested that the influx of development aid to

Rwanda contributed to the onset of genocide in that country (1998). Uvin contends that

development aid can aggravate or increase structural inequalities when it is distributed unequally (in the Rwandan case, between and Tutsis) and thus lead to political

39 violence. Although this argument has not been extended to many other cases of genocide

or political violence, the presence of collective rape in Rwanda warrants its inclusion in

this study.

Hypothesis 5: Economic development will have a negative effect on

collective rape. As the level of economic development increases, the

likelihood of collective rape occurrence decreases.

World Culture

Although not directly mentioned in the collective rape literature, the possible

negative effects of world culture can be seen in descriptions of collective rape episodes

and perpetrators. Serbian rapists, for example, endorsed a hyper-masculine, hyper-

violent and hyper-nationalist ideology that stressed the destruction and removal of non-

Serbs through mechanisms like genocide and rape (Hague 1997; Salzman 2000;

Stiglmayer 1994). Their goal was an ethnically-pure nation that included the Bosnian

land but not the Bosnian people. But the work of world culture theorists suggests that

nationalist and archaized gender ideologies may be declining as world culture and

globalization spreads (Foot 2000; Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 1997). While

struggles to create “hetero-national” states (such as that waged by Serbia) exist, world

culture works to expand and standardized more isomorphic and tame nation-states that

respect and protect vast human rights (Meyer, et al. 1997). Nationalism is replaced with

statelessness, and social hierarchies are challenged by “standard definitions of the civil,

political, and social rights of citizens.” (Ramirez and Meyer 1998: 59) Women, in

particular, have benefited through the spread of formal principles of citizenship and the

40 extension of these principles to both sexes (Ramirez and Meyer 1998). Where world

culture has taken hold, women have achieved varying degrees of access to education,

work, politics, and protection from violence.

Evidence of world culture can be seen in several different arenas. Boli and

Thomas’s research shows that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs)

have established “universalism, individualism, voluntaristic authority, rational progress,

and world citizenship as central elements of world culture.” (1997: 171) Within states,

INGOs institutionalize rationality, guide social change and encourage governments to follow the principles of world culture. Therefore, the existence and quantity of INGOs within a state may be a deterrent for collective rape. Among states, human rights treaties,

especially those related to gender, may also inhibit mass sexual violence. The

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

(CEDAW) encourages states to eradicate discrimination against women in education, work, politics, health and law and to protect the human rights of women

(http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/econvention.htm). But research on the impact and effectiveness of other human rights treaties has shown that treaties rarely

correspond to any actual improvement in the human rights situations of signing nations

(Keith 1999; Neumayer 2005). On the other hand, the world polity took significant

action to discourage collective rape in September 1998, when the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda passed down the first conviction for rape as a . Likewise,

more than ten war criminals have been convicted of rape by the International Criminal

Tribunal for Yugoslavia; two were convicted of crimes amounting to sexual slavery for

41 holding women in “rape camps” and then selling them to other soldiers. Recently, the

Special Court for Sierra Leone handed down several indictments on rape for participants in that country’s bloody civil war. These indictments and convictions suggest that world culture may be a strong deterrent of collective rape.

Hypothesis 6: World culture will have a negative effect on collective rape.

Where mechanisms of world culture are strong, the probability of

collective rape occurrence will be reduced.

State Structure

One final cause of collective rape is suggested by a careful reading of the existing

literature. In almost all of the episodes currently identified, the government was involved

in perpetrating sexual violence on civilians. This includes the military in Bosnia,

Rwanda, Mozambique and Indonesia, paramilitaries in Bosnia and Mozambique, police

and security forces in Bosnia and El Salvador, and government supporters in Indonesia.

Given that the government is so often involved, knowing more about the structure of the

state—where collective rape has and has not occurred—may generate more knowledge

about collective rape. States with certain characteristics may be more likely to commit

collective rape than states without these characteristics or with other structures.

These possibilities have not been tested in the interpersonal rape literature. Since

most of the research has been conducted in the U.S., there has been no country-level

variation to analyze and city-level measures of political structure have not been included.

The limited cross-cultural and cross-national research on rape rates has not yet

incorporated measures of state characteristics into their models.

42 Therefore, only the political violence literature can suggest possible relationships between collective rape and state structure. Political opportunity theory argues that political violence is more likely when there are openings or changes in the political structure, such as regime changes, state repression, state capacity changes and elite divisions. In the study of rebellions and geno/politicides, several authors have found level of power concentration within a state and the level of state repression to have linear or curvilinear effects on violence. Gurr’s work on regime structures supports a curvilinear relationship, with the intensity of protest and rebellion being greatest in elitist systems and lowest in autocratic states (1989). Rummel’s work on state-sponsored genocides (what he calls democides) shows a more linear relationship—the more democratic a state is the less internal violence it is likely to have (1994, 1995). Likewise,

Harff finds that failures in autocratic states were three and a half times more likely to lead to geno/politicides than in democratic states (2003: 66).

Also, state repression (or state terrorism) may have a linear or curvilinear relationship with violence (Hibbs 1973, Gurr 1980, Muller and Weede 1990). Hibbs found that negative sanctions by the government had the single strongest effect of all variables tested and increased the occurrence of political violence. But Gurr suggested and Muller and Weede found support for an inverted U-shape relationship between repression and political violence (Gurr 1968, 1970; Muller and Weede 1990). Under nonrepressive regimes, the costs of peaceful collective action are lower and chance of success is high so violence is unlikely. Under highly repressive regimes, the costs of political action are high and chances of success are low so all political action is

43 suppressed. Under semi-repressive regimes, the success rate of peaceful action may be

low so violence may be preferred. Other studies have found that erratic or indiscriminate state repression can create more severe rebellion (Zimmerman 1980, Lichbach 1987).

Hypothesis 7: Power concentration and repression by the state will have a

positive effect on collective rape. Those states that use repression and are

less democratic will have higher likelihoods of collective rape occurrence.

While the literature on collective rape is limited, research into interpersonal rape and political violence has helped to generate a substantial and well-rounded group of hypotheses for testing on measures of collective rape. Testing these theories in relation to collective rape could also lead to new insights. The theories discussed above were designed to explain either non-political interpersonal rape or political violence without considering gender. Applying these theories to a new phenomenon could expand their explanatory power or uncover weaknesses in their presumptions. Therefore, the theories, as well as their resulting hypotheses, are being put to the test in this study. The following

section details the definition and measurement of collective rape and

variables involved in this study.

44

CHAPTER 4

DATA AND METHODS

The hypotheses stated in Chapter 3 chapter suggest that variation in political, social, and economic structures might affect the occurrence and perpetration of collective rape. Testing these hypotheses, therefore, requires a dataset of social units (for example, countries), including units that have and have not experienced collective rape, and that have varied political, social, and economic structures. In addition, because collective rape is an episodic event that occurs over time rather than instantaneously, the dataset must be longitudinal to account for the fact that countries may move in and out of collective rape episodes, and that perpetrators participation in collective rape may change over time. To my knowledge, no such dataset is currently available for public use.

Subsequently, I have created a database of collective rape episodes and related measures using media data and other secondary sources for 160 countries and the years 1980 to

2003.

In this chapter, I describe the process of constructing and analyzing this dataset, and the unique challenges it has presented. The first step was to create a parsimonious but comprehensive conceptual and operational definition of collective rape. Existing

45 definitions have been created to describe individual episodes of collective rape or to meet legal standards, so a rethinking of the collective rape was required. Secondly, I needed sources of information on collective rape episodes (or the absence thereof) that would cover all 160 countries and years between 1980 and 2003. Although it has some limitations, news source data has proven to be an accessible and useful reservoir of data.

With the news stories in hand, the third step was to construct reliable and valid indicators of collective rape occurrence and perpetrator participation. Additional measures of collective rape episodes and some data quality codes were also created and used in some analyses. In the final step of data construction, I incorporated available measures of political, social and economic structures into the database of collective rape information.

When needed, missing data techniques were used to complete these predictor measures.

To test the effects of predictors on the presence or absence of collective episodes, I use pooled probit regression with a dichotomous dependent variable. The regression models are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

A Definition of Collective Rape

In both the political world and the scholarly world, the language and definition of collective rape is still in flux. Some of the terms used to describe this phenomenon include “mass rape,” (Stiglmayer 1994; Turshen 2001) “,” (Allen 1996)

“wartime rape,” (Brownmiller 1975) and “sexual violence in war” (Human Security

Centre 2005; Wood 2005). Mass rape is perhaps the most commonly used term for political advocates, scholars and journalists as well. While this term connotes the great number of the assaults that often occur in collective rape episodes, it does little to

46 distinguish these events from other events in which multiple people are involved in a

sexually violent act. For example, in 1991 male secondary students at the St. Kizito

School in Kenya invaded the girls’ dormitory and raped 70 female students (Steeves

1997). During the night-long incident, 19 girls were suffocated as they crowded into

small rooms while trying to avoid the attacking male students. The boys reportedly

were organizing a strike at the school over living conditions, and were angered when the girls refused to participate. Their anger grew into violence. In March 2006, in another district of Kenya, 15 students from a girls’ school were raped by villagers as they marched through the village at night.

These incidents could be considered and have been called mass rape (see Steeves

1997; Kariuki unpublished), but were not episodic or politically-motivated as the sexual violence that occurred in Bosnia or Rwanda was. To distinguish between mass rape events like those in St. Kizito from the widespread political sexual violence found in

Rwanda, I use the term “collective rape.” The word “collective” connotes the number of victims and perpetrators involved, but also indicates the collective identity and collective

goals of the perpetrators who are part of a political group. Identifying the perpetrators as

political actors who may or may not be involved in armed conflict is what differentiates

the term “collective rape” from the terms “mass rape” or “wartime rape.”

Consequently, in this project, collective rape is conceptually defined as a pattern

of sexual violence perpetrated on civilians by agents of a state, political group and/or

politicized . This definition is relatively consistent with those created by other scholars, researchers and activists (see Allen 1996; Skjelsbaek 2001; U.N. Security

47 Council 1992). It is somewhat different from the legal definition—Article 3 of the

Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which concerns crimes

against humanity, defines rape as

“a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. This act must be committed: (a) as part of a widespread or systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population; (c) on certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial or religious grounds. (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 1998)

This definition is comprehensive and appropriate for a criminal prosecution, but needs to

be somewhat adjusted for the purposes of a sociological research project.

First, the legal definition is used to prosecute individual perpetrators for specific

assaults. Therefore, any one act of rape, if committed as part of a widespread or

systematic attack of violence on civilians, would qualify as a case under this rule. But as

the evidence against Jean-Paul Akayesu demonstrated, in collective rape there are

multiple offenders assaulting multiple victims. So, one act of rape in the midst of other

forms of violence does not qualify as collective rape. The multiplicity of assaults is what

defines the incident as collective and separates it from other, individual incidents of rape.

Under the sociological definition of collective rape, a series or pattern of rapes make up

the widespread and systematic attack whether or not they are accompanied by other forms of violence.

Second, the statute specifically states that the victims must be members of

national, ethnic, political, racial or religious group. This clause is similar to one in the

48 legal definition of genocide, which singles out violence against members of a “national,

ethnical, racial or religious group.” (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 1998) Several

genocide researchers have challenged this definition, saying it excludes victims of other

groups such as social, political or economic groups (Fein 1993; Harff 2003; Jonassohn

1992). While the rape statute has been expanded to include political groups it still has

some rather restrictive specifications. Jonassohn advocates a more inclusive description

of victims, identifying them as members of a group, “as that group and membership in it

are defined by the perpetrator.” (1992, p. 19) To avoid the issue of whether victims meet

the legal criteria or even if they are members of a group that is readily identifiable by

observers, the sociological definition used herein simple requires that the rapes (or majority of rapes) are perpetrated on civilians.

Third, the legal statute is only enacted to prosecute war criminals who committed or participated in rapes during sizeable and bloody wars or armed conflicts. This means that collective rape is conceptualized as an element of war, one part of a larger outbreak of violence. By this definition, the only collective rapes that can legally be recognized are those that occurred in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. But given that similar events have been reported in India, Haiti and Indonesia, the sociological definition of collective rape challenges that assumption. Instead, collective rape in this definition is viewed as form of, rather than an element of, political violence that may occur before, during, after or independently of wars and armed conflicts.

Operationally, collective rape is identified by four parameters: the acts, the magnitude, the perpetrators, and the victims.

49 The Acts

Although scholars and journalists alike often use the word “rape” to describe the assaults perpetrated on victims, both the legal statute and sociological definition above recognize the violence takes many forms. This may include, but is not limited to, rape, attempted rape, , sexual slavery and sexual battery. These definitions also recognize that each of these crimes is defined differently in every society, and there is no international consensus even on what constitutes rape. But that is not really the issue, as “the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts.” (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 1998) Rather, the focus is on the fact that violence was committed with the intent to harm the victim.

Therefore, in this study, any physical violence that is primarily sexual in nature fulfills the definition of collective rape.

The Magnitude

As stated above, an episode of collective rape must include a pattern of assaults and not simply an aggregate of random assaults occurring at the same place at the same time. A pattern of assaults would consist of members of the same group committing multiple rapes with similar features. Some studies of other forms of political violence have used magnitude measures to define the incidents. In the International Peace

Research Institute Armed Conflict 1946-2001 dataset, for example, armed conflicts are divided into three categories—minor conflicts have less than 1,000 total deaths, intermediate conflicts have more than 1,000 total deaths, and wars have more than 1,000 deaths per year (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002). Given

50 the nature of collective rape, how it is reported and recorded, trying to create a

quantitative measure of assaults is unfeasible. As one human rights worker stated, “’How do you put a number on 5 women being raped by 12 guys?’ he said. ‘How do you put a number on a woman being raped daily for six months? How do you put a number on one girl being raped by three guys for five nights?’“ (Mydans 2001) Instead, the magnitude of an episode of collective rape in this study is confirmed by having multiple victims and multiple perpetrators.

The Perpetrators

As noted above, the legal definition required that victims be part of some discriminated group; however, this is too limiting and prejudges the question as to whether ethnic discrimination contributes to collective rape. There are many ethnic minorities that are not known for being subjected to collective rape. Moreover, the political characteristics of the perpetrators should be of more interest than those of the victims. Prior studies of collective rape and genocide have concentrated on perpetrators who are agents of the state, such as militaries and police. This ignores the fact that other political groups might use violence, and collective rape in particular, as a means to accomplish their goals. Consequently, under the definition given above, offenders may be agents of a state, political civil group. State agents include members of the military,

paramilitary, police, security forces, and government officials like Jean-Paul Akayesu.

Political civil groups include guerilla armies, terrorist groups and other insurgents that

share a racial, religious, ethnic, national, or other social identity, such as the in

Rwanda, the Muslim and Hindu extremists in India and the clan in Somalia. In

51 order for an episode to qualify as a collective rape, a majority of the perpetrators must be

identified in the data as agents of a state or political civil group. But these groups do not

exist in isolation, so within any one episode of collective rape there may be more than

one set of perpetrators. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, Serbian soldiers and

paramilitaries, Bosnian Muslim soldiers and Croatian soldiers were all accused of

committing collective rape (Allen 1996; Stiglmayer 1994).

The Victims

Part of the horror of collective rape is that the victims in any case are largely

civilians and not fellow combatants or violent offenders. In some cases victims are

members of a political or politicized group that is in competition with the perpetrators, as

in the women who were raped in Haiti for being Aristide supporters (Flanders 2000). In

many other incidents of collective rape all those who were not part of the perpetrators’ group were subject to sexual violence. The victims may be residents of a community that is being invaded, internal refugees trying to escape the violence, or neutral citizens caught in the crossfire. The majority of victims are women, though men and children have also been assaulted (Hague 1997). As with the perpetrators, the data must confirm the civilian status of the victims to meet the definition of collective rape.

Data Collection

The data used in this project is very different than that used by most previous studies of collective rape. As described in Chapter 2, the majority of research on collective rape has focused on only a few well-known episodes and data has come from official reports, interviews with victims and perpetrators, INGO investigations, and

52 historical artifacts. But these sources of information are inconsistent and have limited

availability. Some governments, such as Indonesia’s, have chosen to investigate allegations of collective rape and issued official reports of their findings, but many other governments have not. Interviews with victims and witnesses are excellent sources of information but are not available for very many episodes and may not be the most appropriate data for a study of country-level differences in collective rape. INGOs, like

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, focus on countries and do thoughtful investigations of many kinds of human rights violations, but the organizations often do

not have the resources to ensure complete coverage of collective rape in all countries or

all years. Moreover, their interests and needs change over time—the Women’s Division

of Human Rights Watch, for example, viewed collective rape a priority in the mid-1990s

but since changed their focus to economic discrimination against women (Walsh 2005).

Historical artifacts, like diaries and pictures, were useful to Susan Brownmiller and Iris

Chang when writing their books but are not always accessible to the general public or

available across episodes.

The best option, therefore, for a cross-national, cross-time study of collective rape

that seeks to identify all possible episodes around the globe between 1980 and 2003 (and

subsequently code which countries and years had collective rape and which did not), is

news source data. News stories have already been used in many studies of collective rape

(see Allen 1996; Brownmiller 1975; Chang 1997; Hague 1996; Salzman 2000;

Stiglmayer 1994) and have established some validity as a data source. It has also been

used in many studies of collective political violence. Media-based data is often used to

53 study political events for which no reliable or comprehensive data already exists

(Davenport and Ball 2002; Earl, Martin, McCarthy and Soule 2004; Woolley 2000).

International news agencies report on all areas of the globe and have existed throughout

the 24-year period of this study, so data availability should be better than with other potential sources. Perhaps more importantly, as the descriptions of episodes in Chapter 2 demonstrated, journalists are often the first to document the existence of collective rape episodes when evidence comes to light. In the case of Bosnia, for example, it was early news reports of mass rapes and forced pregnancies that encouraged IGOs and INGOs to begin investigating and documenting the violence in that country. Since this project is concerned with coding when, in addition to where, collective rape has occurred, using news source data may be a distinct advantage. (The limitations of using news source data are discussed in the following section)

The data in this project comes from news stories filed or published with three

English language international news sources: World News Digest Facts on File (WND

Facts on File), The New York Times, and Reuters Business Briefs. Each of these organizations serves a different purpose; this diversity should increase the reliability of the ensuing data. In fact, those who study media-based data suggest minimizing the impact of selection and descriptive biases by using and comparing several sources:

“When possible, scholars should use multiple sources to create event counts, striving to offset the known or suspected biases.” (Woolley 2000, 158) Using three different sources should help reduce the effects of certain biases, as discussed below.

54 WND Facts on File is a news clearinghouse—it publishes reports of key factual information gleaned from more than 50 English language newspapers and periodicals.

WND Facts on File news editors determine events of historical significance and then write fact-based summary reports from the information provided by the primary sources.

These reports usually reference the primary sources so readers can access the original information if they choose. The principal benefit of WND Facts on File is, as their website states, “Because they have access to so many different accounts of the same event, the Facts on File News Services publications can achieve levels of accuracy and comprehensiveness of coverage unrivaled by any individual news source.”

(http://www.facts.com/facts-faq-info-000.htm)

The New York Times has been published since 1851 and has stories archived by

Lexis-Nexis Academic from June 1, 1980 through to the present. In addition to reporting on local and regional news, The New York Times has been considered a preeminent source of international news. It has been the primary source of data for other political violence-related projects, such as The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators for the years 1968 to 1982 (Taylor and Jodice 2000) and a database of U.S. political protest events, 1960-1995, collected by McAdam, McCarthy, Olzak and Soule (Earl,

Soule and McCarthy 2003).

Reuters is an international news wire service, and currently has approximately

2,300 editorial in 196 bureaus around the world (http://about.reuters.com

/aboutus/worldwide.asp). As a news service, it provides reports from around the world to newspapers and broadcasters, in addition to supplying financial markets with products

55 and information. The archives of Reuters news reports are not available to the public, but

can be accessed through private agencies like Reuters Business Briefs. Reuters Business

Briefs can perform searches of Reuters stories and provide data to outside consumers.

Unlike WND Facts on File and The New York Times, both of which were available for the entire 24-year period of this study, Reuters Business Briefs only has access to Reuters stories from the Europe/ section from 1985 onward, and the full international archives from 1991 onward.

The data collection procedure followed a four-step process: a series of electronic

searches were performed using keyword search terms concerning rape and sexual

violence; those stories matching a keyword were scanned by hand to determine if they

met the four criteria of the definition; the stories were coded for information on the

timing, location, perpetrators and victims of collective rape; this story-level information was aggregated to country-level data. Keyword search terms were chosen from a perusal of the current collective rape literature and pre-tested on two of the three news sources:

WND Facts on File and The New York Times. Fourteen keywords4 were tested, and six

selected for the final process. The final list of truncated keywords was: rape?; rapist?;

raping?; sex? assault?; sex? viol?; and sex? abus?. More than 95% of stories concerning

collective rape used some variation of the term “rape” at least once in the story text.

Additional search terms were used for The New York Times. This newspaper reports on

4 All three news sources allowed truncation in keyword searches, meaning a root of a word could be searched and all words with that root would be found. For example, a root keyword of “rape” would return results with the words rape, raped, and rapes. The original list of truncated keywords was: rape; raping; rapist; sex? assault; sex? violence; sex? violation; sex? abuse; sex? crime; sex? criminal; sex? slave; sex? enslave; force? sex?; women victim?; female victim?; The later two terms were found to be far to generalized to be useful and quickly eliminated. 56 local and regional events in addition to international events, so searches using only the six keywords returned thousands of stories on interpersonal rape rather than collective rape. To combat this, search terms for each sovereign nation were included in the searches. For example, the truncated keywords France? and French? were included in a

search to find stories related to collective . Even with these additional

parameters, searches of The New York Times still returned large numbers of unrelated

stories. This type of search has been called a “generic event descriptor” search and is

considered appropriate when there is no prior knowledge of or external source of

information on the range of episodes (Maney and Oliver 2001), as is the case with

collective rape. One disadvantage to this search strategy is news stories that do not use

one of the keywords will not be picked up by the search. Because there is no established

language for describing or discussing collective rape, this disadvantage could potentially

be a serious form of bias in the research.

In the second step of the process, I and four research assistants read each of the

stories identified in a keyword search to see if it met the five criteria: some form of

sexual violence had occurred; the violence included multiple victims or multiple

perpetrators; the perpetrators were members of a government group or political civil

group; the victims were civilians; and the country in which the violence occurred was

identified. The first four criteria match the definition of collective rape given at the

beginning of this chapter, and the fifth criteria was necessary to code the data into a

country-level dataset. In theory, stories needed to meet all five criteria to be retained for

coding, but such strict standards were often unfeasible. For example, some stories do

57 discuss who the victims were and only say that, e.g., “soldiers have been accused of rape, torture, and murder.” In other stories, only one sexual assault is mentioned or the assaults occurred in the context of a political conflict but the exact perpetrators were not identified. If a story met the first and fifth criterion mentioned above but failed in any of the other three, it was usually still retained for coding. Then, if necessary, it could be excluded from the process of aggregating the data into country-level variables. Appendix

A contains four examples of news stories retained for coding.

All retained stories were given identification numbers and coded for information on the timing of assaults, perpetrators and victims. Timing was coded in one of three ways: unknown date prior to story publication; assaults within a range of years given in the story; or year-specified events. The first story in Appendix A is an example of an unknown date for the sexual assaults. Villagers had reported that rape occurred, but when these rapes occurred is unknown. Based on the date of the story, the rapes had to have occurred prior to January 12, 2003, but whether they occurred one day before or one year before cannot be determined. Stories such as these were coded as “Unidentifiable dates” in the country-level dataset.

The second sample story is an example of a year range for assault occurrences.

An INGO was reporting that 625 women had been raped between 1990 and 1996.

Although it is likely that some portion of the total rapes occurred in each of the seven years mentioned, the news story does not provide enough information to verify that proposition. So this story is coded, but with some degree of uncertainty.

58 The third sample story discusses an incident of multiple rapes that can be dated.

In January 1981, four women were raped and killed in El Salvador before their bodies were dumped. This kind of news story is the most desirable because it meets all five criteria for selection; unfortunately, it is also the least common with undated or year range stories being more frequent.

The names and descriptions of any perpetrator groups and victim groups were also coded from each story, as well as any estimates of the number of perpetrators or victims involved. Some additional information was coded from each story, but was not used in any later research. Given the possibility of human error involved when I and the research assistants completed the second and third data collection steps of retaining and coding the news stories, several inter-coder reliability checks were performed. There was

93% reliability between all five persons and across all three news sources for the selection of stories for coding. There was 96% reliability between four persons (one did participate in this step) across a random selection of 50 stories in the coding of timing, perpetrators and victims. These statistics indicate that the possibility of error was well within acceptable limits.

Given the nature of the data and collection procedures, there are several other potential sources of bias in this study. This project is prone to some of the same problems found in other studies of political violence, but also subject to others that seem unique to the topic. In the study of collective rape, the limitations on the data derive from three main areas: victim silence, non-governmental organization bias and news source bias.

59 Victim Silence

For many episodes of collective rape there are no estimates of the number of victims. While it may be known that there were multiple assaults and victims, no agency or group has been able to exhaustively document the cases. There are a number of reasons why estimates can’t be calculated, but one of the most salient is the problem of victim identification. Unlike in studies of genocides or refugees where estimates can be generated through the arduous but still possible method of counting bodies (Harff and

Gurr 1996; Rummel 1994), studies of collective rape must rely on victims to report their assaults. And the unfortunate truth is that many victims either choose not to or are unable to report their victimization.

The reasons for underreporting may be complicated but four general causes can be identified. First, a great many victims choose not to report their assaults because of shame, guilt and/or fear (Brownmiller 1975; Buchwald, Fletcher and Roth 1993; Koss,

Heise and Russo 1994). This effect on reporting is well documented in the study of interpersonal rape, and is apparent when looking at crime statistics. In the US, for example, 90,863 sexual assaults were reported to police in 2001 (United States

Department of Justice 2002a), but 240,980 rapes were recorded in a crime victimization survey in the same year (United States Department of Justice 2002b). Victims of rape may be too embarrassed to discuss the details of what was done to them, or find it too painful to relive the experience. They may feel that they were responsible for the attack and should have done something to prevent it. Also, victims may be afraid of retribution, further attacks by their offenders or the labels given to raped women. The negative

60 consequences of reporting are especially powerful in societies where women’s value is determined by their fidelity and virginity and patriarchal gender norms are robust (Allen

1996; Hague 1997).

Second, victims may want to report but find that there are no agencies to report to.

In war-ravaged areas, the justice systems may be corrupted, unmanned or defunct

(Brownmiller 1975). Frequently, accounts of collective rape do not surface until a human rights organization begins an independent investigation or a humanitarian aid agency reaches the civilian population and begins offering medical or psychological treatment.

Recently, aid workers in the Democratic Republic of Congo reported that thousands of women were seeking treatment in the health centers and that some had “walked 200 miles with burst bladders, broken legs and bullet wounds to their genitals.” (“Aid Workers

Report Thousands of Rapes” 2003)

Third, victims may find it dangerous to report because the local officials are part of or related to the perpetrators. In several incidents of collective rape the perpetrators of collective rape are agents of the state (see Figure 5.16). In fact, government buildings and properties may be the very sites where women are taken and raped. Akayesu was found guilty of rape, in part, because the assaults took place in his presence at the bureau communal of the town where he was mayor (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 1998).

The danger of reporting is also evident outside of collective rape. Victims of whose spouses are police officers and city officials recount being threatened with , discrimination, legal troubles and further violence if they try to report

(Tobar 1997).

61 Fourth and finally, it is likely that many sexual assaults pass unnoticed because

the victim is murdered during or after her assault. In the Akayesu case, the court found

that several Tutsi women were raped next to mass graves just before they were killed

(Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 1998). One Bosnian Serb fighter admitted that he and

other Serbs were encouraged to rape women and then kill them in deserted places (Burns

1992). It is also possible that some of the women left alive later commit and that

others kill themselves to avoid being assaulted (Bumiller 1999). While these victims’

bodies serve as glaring evidence of genocide, their bodies alone cannot tell the tales of

collective rape.

Non-governmental Organization Bias

Because of the many forms of silence imposed on victims it is often the task of

others to expose collective rape. Human rights workers are often the second outsiders,

after journalists, to reach victims and bring their stories to the public. It is, perhaps, only because of the intervention of human rights agencies that we have any idea of the severity and consequences of many episodes of collective rape. For some human rights INGOs, like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, it is their mission to uncover and investigate crimes like collective rape so that justice and change can be implemented.

However, the INGOs’ interest in exposing human rights violations can also be a potential source of bias. Davenport and Ball (2002) found that human rights INGOs are more likely to report on cases when many people have been killed, but less likely to cover an

event when the perpetrators are already identified. This suggests that human rights

INGOs are invested in documenting the largest, but also the most obvious, episodes.

62 This bias could affect the data in this study because news reporters sometimes use INGO

statements and reports as sources. Therefore, the bias could be passed on through news agencies.

A second potential problem with data from human rights INGOs is the variety of agencies documenting collective rapes. Articles in the New York Times data used information from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, World Food Program, the Shan Women’s Action Network and WorldVision, among others. These INGOs, like researchers themselves, may have varying definitions and conceptualizations of collective rape and diverse methods for collecting information on it—all of which may reduce reliability and consistency in their reports. In the case of the Shan women in Myanmar, for example, three different agencies have investigated the collective rape in this community. The Shan Women’s Action Network documented 173 incidents of rape and

625 victims during the years 1992-2001. The US State Department documented 12 victims in five years. Most recently, the group Refugees International documented 43 rapes among various ethnic groups.

News Source Bias

The potential biases and inconsistencies inherent to human rights data may filter into news stories, but news data has its own potential problems. First, news coverage may be subject to selection bias (Earl, Martin, McCarthy and Soule 2004; Woolley 2000).

News agencies are not able to report on all events that actually occur so only a subset of events make it to print. Factors such as “competition over newspaper space, reporting norms and editorial concerns” may affect a story’s fate (Earl, Martin, McCarthy and

63 Soule 2004). Studies of selection bias in news articles covering protest events have

found that events considered more newsworthy (i.e., larger, more intense, more violent

and geographically closer to the news agency) are more likely to be reported (Earl et al.

2004, Mueller 1997). These factors may mean that some incidents of collective rape are

more likely to be reported than others.

Collective rapes are generally more intense and more violent than other forms of

rape so it is reasonable to assume that collective rape is more newsworthy, and therefore, more often reported than other rapes. Also, all three news sources in this study have international reporting ranges and readerships so they are less likely to be affected by the geographic proximity bias. Still, limitations of visibility, geographic proximity and severity might affect the availability of data. Smaller and less violent collective rapes happening in remote corners of the world might not be considered newsworthy enough to make it into circulation. Or, incidents in which the scope and severity of the violence are better hidden may be less likely to receive attention. Lastly, violence perpetrated by regular, well-trained armies may be less anticipated and less visible than that committed by irregular, unruly or criminal armies.

Selection bias can also be the result of trends in reporting, or the media attention cycle (Earl, et al. 2004). Studies have found that those events that resonate more with general social concerns are more likely to get reported. It is possible that a media attention cycle encouraged the reporting of collective rapes in recent years. The increase in international concern for (demonstrated by the passing of the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1990

64 and discussions of violence in the Platform and Declaration for Action in 1995) may have pushed the issue of collective rape into the media attention cycle during the mid-1990s.

Finally, selection bias may be a factor when news agencies have limited access to events (Earl, et al. 2004). Some events might occur where no journalists are present and other events might occur where journalists aren’t allowed. This is a particular problem in areas like North Korea that are closed to the international media. It is possible that collective rapes are occurring in these areas but the information cannot reach the public.

Any such incidents are subsequently excluded from this dataset that is reliant on media sources.

A second issue is description bias in news coverage. In this case the concern is whether events are being reported accurately and thoroughly. Several researchers have investigated the veracity with which events are reported and their findings suggest that

“hard news,” or the “who, what, when, where and why” of events is usually well reported

(Earl, et al. 2004; Woolley 2000). This should mean that most of the information gathered on the presence of sexual violence, and the timing, perpetrators and victims of collective rape in this study is less likely to contain bias. On the other hand, the “soft news,” or journalists’ comments and inferences, is subject to more bias. This may be an issue in how the perpetrators are identified or the magnitude of the crime portrayed.

Dataset Structure

Despite the possibility of several forms of bias, the selection and coding of 1,387 news stories produced a great deal of usable and original information on collective rape

65 episodes. In the final step of data collection, this information was aggregated to country- level measures in a time-series dataset and combined with measures of gender inequality armed conflict, militarization, ethnic cleavages, economic development, world culture and state structure from outside sources. In this final dataset, every country that was sovereign between 1980 and 2003 was included and an observation was included for every year of its sovereignty. For most countries, this meant a total of 24 years each, but for those countries that dissolved before 2003 (like Yugoslavia) or became sovereign after 1980 (like Bosnia) the number of observations was less. In addition, countries with populations of less than 500,000 in 2003 were excluded from the dataset for all years.

Variables on gender inequality, etc. are often not available for small population countries so their removal was necessary. This resulted in a total of 3,487 country-year observations in the final dataset.

Collective Rape Variables

This dataset contains 20 variables on collective rape: five measures of collective rape occurrence; six measures of perpetrator group identity; four measures of victim group identity; and five measures of data quality. The five measures of collective rape occurrence are each dichotomous variables: “1” if there is evidence that collective rape did occur in that country-year, and “0” if there is no evidence or insufficient evidence of collective rape. Five measures were needed to distinguish between levels of certainty, or specificity, in the evidence. For the highest level of certainty, High Specificity (HS), one or more stories identified multiple sexual assaults in a given country and year. So, for example, based on the third sample story in Appendix A El Salvador would be coded “1”

66 in 1981 for the HS variable. At the next level, Medium Specificity (MS), one or more

stories identified multiple sexual assaults in a range of five years or less. In the fourth

sample story of the appendix, the INGO Africa Watch indicated that rapes had occurred

in 1988 and 1989. Based on this story alone, Somalia cannot be coded positively for HS

level but can be coded “1” for the years 1988 and 1989 at the MS level. The Low

Specificity (LS) variable allows for year ranges of longer than five years. In the second

sample story, the estimate of victims provided by The Banda Aceh Legal Aid Foundation

covered seven years, so Indonesia is coded “1” for all years between 1990 and 1996 on the LS variable. The remaining two measures of collective rape occurrence are combinations of the HS, MS and LS variables. The measure High and/or Medium

Specificity (HMS) is coded “1” for all years that a country had evidence of high or

medium specificity dates in the relevant news stories. The last measure—High, Medium

and/or Low Specificity (HMLS)—is coded “1” for any year previously coded “1”on the

HS, MS or LS variables. Only two measures are used in time series analysis: the most

stringent measure of date certainty—the HS variable, and the least stringent measure of date certainty—the HMLS variable. The mean, standard deviation and skewness statistics for these two variables are given in Table 4.3.

A dichotomous variable was created for each of six perpetrator identity groups: military; police or security forces; paramilitary; foreign military; other government group; non-government group. If one or more stories indicated that a perpetrator group had been involved in collective rape assaults in a given year or year range, the appropriate variable was coded “1” for that country-year(s). Subsequently, based on the

67 description in the third sample story, the military variable would be coded “1” in El

Salvador in 1981. It is possible for more than one perpetrator group to have participated

in collective rape in any given country or year, so multiple perpetrator variables may be

coded “1” in a country-year observation. These variables were only used in descriptive

analysis and are not included in Table 4.3.

Similar measures were constructed for four victim groups: political group;

religious group; ethnic group; and men. The same process of dichotomous coding was

used for determining these variables as the perpetrator variables. The victim group

variables are also used in descriptive analysis only and are consequently excluded from

Table 4.3.

Finally, five measures of data quality were constructed distribution of stories and sources. One is a measure of the total number of stories related to collective rape

included in the database for each of the 160 countries in the analysis. Another measure

gives the yearly total number of stories for each country and each of the 24 years of the

study. A third measure indicates how many of the three sources—WND Facts on File,

The New York Times, and Reuters Business Briefs—provided stories to the yearly count.

The two remaining measures are ratios of the stories that had incomplete data to the total

number of stories overall. The unidentifiable date ratio measures the number of stories

that did not include enough information to be coded as HS, MS, or LS, relative to the

total number of stories for each country. The unidentifiable perpetrator ratio measures

the number of stories that did not include enough information to identify the perpetrators

in one of the six categories, relative to the total number of stories for each country. These

68 two ratios and the overall story total measure are time-invariant and have the same value for each year that a country is in the dataset. The annual number of stories and annual number of sources measures vary across countries and years.

Independent Variables

The measures of gender inequality, armed conflict, militarization, ethnic cleavages, economic development, world conflict and state structure used in later analysis come from a variety of outside sources. The analysis performed in this project is original and exploratory, so none of the hypotheses about these seven models has ever been tested before. Therefore, to ensure that each hypothesis was well and thoroughly tested, several variables will be used for each of the seven models.

Gender Inequality

Research on interpersonal rape and gender inequality has used a myriad of measures of women’s equality and status, including college education attainment, occupational prestige, median wages, and women’s representation in male-dominated occupations. But, as most of these studies were restricted to the U.S., the same measures may not be available or appropriate for this study of 160 countries. The only research to look across countries, Austin and Kim’s 2000 cross-sectional study, included four measures of gender inequality: female education, female labor force participation, the percent of parliamentary seats held by women, and female occupational status. An index of the first three measures was used when modeling all 65 countries included in the study, but that number had to be reduced to 40 countries when including female occupational status due to missing data.

69 This study of collective rape seeks to use a much larger sample of 160 countries,

so Austin and Kim’s measures could not be replicated exactly. I include two individual

measures of women’s educational equality: the schooling ratio, or ratio of girls to boys in

primary school; and the literacy ratio, or ratio of functionally literate women to men aged

15-24 (see Table 4.2 for more information). These measures are more appropriate than

college education attainment when considering countries with a range of development

levels, and are similar to the measures used by the U.N. Development Programme to

construct its Gender Development Index5. To measure women’s equality in other areas,

such as politics, the economy, the family and legal system, I use three indices of women’s

rights: the Women’s Political Rights Index; the Economic Rights Index; and the Social

Rights Index. Details about these indices can be found in Table 4.1. These indices cover

some of the same dimensions used in other measures, as well as adding new dimensions

to the measurement of gender inequality. Finally, I include two measures of women’s

reproductive choice: contraceptive usage, or the percent of women age 15 to 49 using

contraceptives; and the fertility rate, or estimated number of total children based on

prevailing rates. These two measures have not typically been included in studies of

interpersonal rape but their applicability has been indicated. The radical feminist position

holds that change in the “intimate spheres of marriage and procreation” (Austin and Kim

2000, p. 206) must occur with change in the public sphere for there to be a reduction in

rape. Furthermore, the inclusion of these two measures is supported by the emphasis in

the collective rape literature on women as victims due to their reproductive capacities.

5 The Gender Development Index is only available for 1995, 2000, and 2004, so could not be used in this study. 70 Women's Political Rights Index Women's Economic Rights Index Women's Social Rights Index • The right to vote • Equal pay for equal work • The right to travel abroad • Free choice of profession or employment • The right to enter into marriage on a basis of • The right to run for political office without the need to obtain a husband or male equality with men relative's • The right to gainful employment without the

71 • The right to hold elected and appointed • The right to participate in social, cultural, need to obtain a husband or male relative's government positions and community activities consent

• The right to join political parties • Equality in hiring and promotion practices • The right to obtain a passport

• Job security (maternity leave, • The right to confer citizenship to children or • The right to petition government officials unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or a husband layoffs, etc...) • Non-discrimination by employers • Freedom from forced sterilization • The right to be free from • The right to own, acquire, manage, and retain

in the workplace property brought into marriage • The right to work at night • The right to equal inheritance • Freedom from female genital mutilation • The right to work in occupations classified (FGM) of children and of adults without their as dangerous consent • The right to work in the military and the • The freedom to choose a residence/domicile police force • The right to an education • The right to initiate a divorce

Table 4.1: Components and Measurement of Three Gender Inequality Variables, CIRI Human Rights Database 2004

71 Table 4.1 Continued

Women's Political Rights Index Women's Economic Rights Index Women's Social Rights Index There are no economic rights for women There are no social rights for women under None of women’s political rights are under law and systematic discrimination law and systematic discrimination based on guaranteed by law. There are laws that based on sex may be built into the law. The sex may be built into the law. The 0 completely restrict the participation of government tolerates a high level of government tolerates a high level of women in the political process. discrimination against women. discrimination against women. 1 There are some economic rights for women There are some social rights for women Political equality is guaranteed by law. under law. However, in practice, the under law. However, in practice, the However, there are significant limitations in government DOES NOT enforce the laws government DOES NOT enforce these laws practice. Women hold less than five percent effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. effectively or enforcement of laws is weak.

72 of seats in the national legislature and in The government tolerates a moderate level The government tolerates a moderate level other high-ranking government positions. of discrimination against women. of discrimination against women.

Political equality is guaranteed by law. There are some economic rights for women There are some social rights for women Women hold more than five percent but less under law. In practice, the government under law. In practice, the government 2 than thirty percent of seats in the national DOES enforce these laws effectively. DOES enforce these laws effectively. legislature and/or in other high-ranking However, the government still tolerates a However, the government still tolerates a government positions low level of discrimination against women. low level of discrimination against women.

Political equality is guaranteed by law and in All or nearly all of women's economic rights All or nearly all of women's social rights practice. Women hold more than thirty are guaranteed by law. In practice, the are guaranteed by law. In practice, the 3 percent of seats in the national legislature government fully and vigorously enforces government fully and vigorously enforces and/or in other high-ranking government these laws. The government tolerates none these laws. The government tolerates none positions. or almost no discrimination against women. of almost no discrimination against women.

72 Militarization

The collective rape and interpersonal rape literatures have relied mostly on anecdotal evidence from military documents, speeches, posters, propaganda, and interviews with soldiers to demonstrate military endorsement and support for sexual assault (Brownmiller 1975; Enloe 2000; Goldstein 2003), but that kind of information is not available for enough countries to be appropriate for this study. Likewise, Morris found significant differences in rape rates across four branches of the U.S. military but these divisions may not exist in other military bodies. More appropriate measures of military influence are suggested by prior cross-national studies, such as Jenkins and

Kposowa’s work on coups d’etat (1990, 1992). They found that the number of troops and security forces and the defense budget as a percent of the gross national product helped facilitate coups in several African countries. I use similar measures in this study: the percent of the total population working in the military, and the percent of the gross domestic product spent on defense. I add one additional measure of military strength— the presence of a military officer as the chief executive of a country—for two reasons.

First, this variable was available for more years and more countries in the analysis than military personnel or military spending and may, therefore, be more valid. Second, collective rape researchers have suggested that collective rape is sometimes strategic, or purposely selected as a military tactic and encouraged among the troops by higher- ranking officers (Albanese 2001; Allen 1996; Brownmiller 1975; Wood 2006). Including military leadership as a predictor may provide some test of this idea. Further information on these variables is located in Table 4.3.

73 Armed Conflict

The collective rape literature does not specify a relationship between collective rape and different types of armed conflict, but episodes have occurred in a variety of conflict situation. The episode in Bosnia took place during an ethnically-motivated civil war. In Rwanda, it was a very short but very brutal ethnic genocide. In Haiti, collective rape occurred in the years after the military assumed control of the state when political civil groups tried to reinstate the former president. In Indonesia, internal secessionist movements prompted the Indonesian army to use collective rape. Moreover, as Wood

(Forthcoming 2006) points out, some armed conflicts have included collective rape and some have not. Ethnic and territorial violence in has lead to collective rape while ethnic and territorial violence between Israel and Palestine has not. Based on this case study evidence, it is obvious that a test of the relationship between collective rape and armed conflict should include a number of measures for various forms of conflict.

Luckily, the research on armed conflict is extensive and several databases of armed conflict measures exist. I use six measures from two databases: interstate conflict, internal conflict and internationalized internal conflict from the Uppsala PRIO Armed

Conflict Database; and ethnic war, revolutionary war, and geno/politicide from the State

Failure Project. PRIO defines interstate conflict as conflict between two or more states

(i.e., and in the Gulf War); internal conflict as between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states (i.e., conflict between Islamic militants and the government in Angola); and internationalized internal conflict as between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with

74 Ethnic War and Interstate, Internal and Geno/Politicide Fatality Revolutionary War Internationalized Internal Measure Fatality Measures Fatality Measures

0 No Fatalities No Fatalities No Fatalities 1 Less Than 100 Less than 300 1-25 1.5 300-1,000 2 100-1,000 1,000-2,000 26-999 2.5 2,000-4,000 3 1,000-5,000 4,000-8,000 1,000 or More 3.5 8,000-16,000 4 5,000-10,000 16,000-32,000 4.5 32,000-64,000 5 More than 10,000 64,000-128,000 5.5 128,000-256,000 6 More than 256,000

Table 4.2: Measurement of Armed Conflict Variables, State Failure Project 2004 and Uppsala PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2005

75 intervention from other states (i.e., fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo has

involved troops from Angola, , Namibia, Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe)

(Gleditsch et al 2002). State Failure defines ethnic war as episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities

(ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status (i.e., tribal violence in Somalia); geno/politicide as events involving the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non communal group (i.e., Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda); and revolutionary war as episodes of violent conflict between

governments and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region

(i.e., Contras and Sandinistas in Nicaragua) (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2001). For each of these types of conflict a measure of the number of conflict-related deaths was used in analysis. Table 4.2 describes the measurement of these variables.

Ethnic Cleavages

Based on the ethnic divisions between perpetrators and victims of collective rape in Bosnia, Rwanda, and several other episodes, collective rape researchers have proposed that ethnic cleavages contribute to mass political sexual violence. Political violence research has tested and supported this notion—finding in some studies that ethnic diversity contributes to political violence, and, in other studies, that ethnic competition contributes. To capture both possibilities, I use four measures of ethnic cleavages. Three

76 variables measure diversity through the number of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups

(that comprise 5% or more of the total population) present in a country year. These variables range from 1, meaning only one (ethnic/religious/linguistic) group exists, to 8 for when there are 8 (ethnic/religious/linguistic) groups that include at least 5% of the population each. To measure competition, I include a time-invariant measure of heterogeneity created by Vanhanen using data from 1990 to 1996. This variable is the sum of three percents: the percent of the population that is not in the ethnic majority group; the percent that is not in the linguistic majority group; and the percent that is not in the religious minority group. As this sum grows, minority groups get larger relative to the majority group and competition may result. Table 4.3 provides more information on the measurement and sources of these variables.

Economic Development

Turshen suggested that an agricultural economy contributed to collective rape in three countries, but cross-national studies of interpersonal rape and political violence have typically used other measures of economic development. Austin and Kim’s (2000) cross-national study of rape rates used gross domestic product to measure economic progress (but found no significant effect on rape rates), and GDP has been used in studies of genocides and civil wars (Goldstone et al 2002; Krain 1997). Some studies also use infant mortality as a measure of poverty and quality-of-life, since it consistently has a significant effect on state failure (Goldstone et al 2002). Similar measures are used to construct the Human Development Index and Gender Development Index used by the

U.N. Development Programme. Therefore, I include GDP per capita and infant mortality

77 in my analysis of collective rape. To make the results for GDP easier to read, I divide

this variable by a factor of 100. Finally, I include the annual amount of development

assistance per capita in U.S. dollars in order to test Uvin’s proposed relationship between

aid and violence. Sources and descriptive statistics for these three variables are given in

Table 4.3.

World Culture

World culture arguments have not been developed or tested in the collective rape

or interpersonal rape literatures, but have been explored in political violence research.

Several studies have found that trade and economic investment between nations had significant effects on genocides, revolutions and civil wars (Goldstone et al 2002; Harff

2003; Moaddell 1994; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993) Consequently, I include trade openness as a predictor in my models.

I also include the number of international non-governmental organizations

(INGOs), divided by a factor of 100 for easier interpretation. World culture theorists believe that INGOs are some of the primary carriers of human rights and gender equality values to member nations, and INGOs are responsible for the spread of these values throughout the world (Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 1997). Moreover, these organizations provide international political linkages that countries may call upon for help in managing political conflicts; these linkages also put pressure on countries to comply with human rights standards (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer, Boli, Thomas and

Ramirez 1997; Reimann 2006). Its expected that these effects will extend to episodes of collective rape.

78 International treaties also establish human rights standards, link nations,

encourage compliance with world values. The Convention on the Elimination of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was created in 1979 to establish guidelines

for granting political, social and economic rights to women. Follow-up with nations that have ratified CEDAW has found that the treaty has contributed to legislative reform in

Australia, Finland, Japan and , and to the development of Jamaica’s National

Policy on Women and National Plan of Action (Heyns and Vilijoen 2001). These connections do not indicate that CEDAW has produced any real change in gender violence, but that change is advocated by the treaty. I, therefore, measure the presence or absence of CEDAW ratification for each country (see Table 4.3 for more information).

State Structure

Prior research on political violence has suggested that power concentration in the government elite and repression by the state have significant effects on the genocides, rebellions and revolutions (Hibbs 1973; Gurr 1980, 1989; Muller and Weede 1990;

Rummel 1994, 1995). To measure power concentration, I constructed measures of democratic, anocratic, and autocratic regimes. Using the Polity IV indicator of regime characteristics, which ranges from +10 (fully institutionalized democracy) to !10 (fully institutionalized autocracy), I create a dummy measures for each regime type (see Table

4.3 for details). In analysis, anocracy is the deleted group and the effects of democracy and autocracy are compared to this reference group. To test repression, I include Gibney and Dalton’s Political Terror Scale measures. They created two measures of state terrorism—one from Amnesty International reports and one from U.S. State Department

79 Annual Human Rights reports. I average these two measures into one indicator of the level of state-sponsored and state-perpetrated murder, torture, and political imprisonment.

Missing Data

Unfortunately, many of the variables described above and in Table 4.3 were not available for all country-years included in the present study. This is a common problem for cross-national research and is exacerbated by a cross-time research design. For some variables, data is available for most countries but begins or ends within the 24 years of this study. The CIRI data on women’s rights, for example, does not begin until 1981 while Ellingson’s ethnicity data ends in 1994. For other variables, data is scattered across countries and years so that only a few countries are available in any given year. The contraceptive usage and infant mortality variables fit this pattern.

There are several options for dealing with missing data. When missing data is not extensive, incomplete observations may be deleted from the analysis through listwise deletion. In this study, listwise deletion would reduce the number of country-years by more than half when modeling all independent variables. Other options, such as pairwise deletion and dummy variable substitution, are only appropriate for linear models and may produce biased estimates (Allison 2001). Instead of deleting observations that have missing data, I choose to use interpolation, extrapolation, and multiple imputation to fill in the missing values.

I first interpolated between available yearly data points for each country. If, for

example, El Salvador had data on contraceptive use for the years 1980, 1985, and 1990-

2000, I interpolate values for the years 1981-1984 and 1986-1989. For continuous

80 variables like contraceptive usage, I performed a linear growth interpolation between

available data points. For non-continuous variables, I use a step method by which the missing years are all assigned the value of the last available year for that country.

I next extrapolated for years before or after available data points to fill in missing

values at the beginnings or ends of each country’s time span. In the hypothetical El

Salvadoran example given above, this would use data from 2000 to create values for the years 2001-2003. I again used a linear method for continuous variables and a step method for non-continuous variables.

Finally, I used multiple imputation to fill in all remaining missing values. With multiple imputation, copies of the incomplete data set are created and relationships

between the missing data and complete data are used to impute values for the missing

data points (Allison 2001). Random variation is also introduced when creating the new

values to reflect uncertainty. The now-complete copies of the data are then combined in

analysis. These three methods combined eliminated all the missing data points from the original variables.

Although these steps were required to make analysis possible, they also introduce a considerable amount of potential bias to the data. For a few variables, as much as 40% of the data points had to be created—opening the door for significantly over- or underestimated values. As data quality improves for cross-national cross-time measures, this issue may be resolved. For now, the results reported in Chapter 6 must be interpreted with caution and awareness of the possibility of bias due to data manipulation.

81 Standard Variable Measurement Source Mean Skewness Deviation Collective Rape Collective Rape, High Date 0=no evidence of episode, 1=confirmed Green 2006 0.025 0.155 6.130 Specificity episode Collective Rape, High, 0=no evidence of episode, 1=suggested Medium and/or Low Date Green 2006 0.104 0.305 2.593 episode Specificity Total number of stories for each country Number of Stories Green 2006 8.132 25.498 4.982 . Total number of stories for each country by Annual Number of Stories Green 2006 0.394 3.465 21.146 year Annual Number of Sources 1=one source provided stories for an country in a given year, 2=two sources, 3=three Green 2006 0.111 0.439 4.549 sources

82 Ratio of the number of stories that could not Date Unidentifiable Stories be coded with a date specificity to the total Green 2006 0.073 0.183 2.575 Ratio number of stories Ratio of the number of stories that could not Perpetrator Unidentifiable be coded with a perpetrator identity to the total Green 2006 0.026 0.085 4.403 Stories Ratio number of stories

Table 4.3: Dependent and Independent Variables: Measurement, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics

82 Table 4.3 Continued

Standard Variable Measurement Source Mean Skewness Deviation Gender Inequality Women's Political Rights CIRI Human Rights See Table 4.1 1.661 0.661 -0.839 Index Data Project 2004 Women's Economic Rights CIRI Human Rights See Table 4.1 1.281 0.630 0.189 Index Data Project 2004 CIRI Human Rights Women's Social Rights Index See Table 4.1 1.199 0.808 0.489 Data Project 2004 Schooling Ratio World Development Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary 89.304 17.841 -1.081 education Indicators 2000 UN Common Literacy Ratio Ratio of literacy rates, women to men aged 15- 0.882 0.210 -0.920

83 24 Database 2004 World Development Contraceptive Usage Contraceptive prevalence, percent of women 42.749 27.508 0.003 ages 15-49 Indicators 2004 Total fertility rate representing the number of children that would be born to a woman if she World Development Fertility Rate 3.922 1.976 0.245 were to live to the end of her childbearing Indicators 2004 years and bear children in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates

83 Table 4.3 Continued

Standard Variable Measurement Source Mean Skewness Deviation Militarization World Development Military Spending Military expenditures as percentage of GDP 1.292 0.622 1.057 Indicators 2004 Military personnel as percentage of total World Development Military Personnel 0.833 0.574 1.288 population Indicators 2004 Chief Executive as Military 0=not an officer, 1=chief executive is an Database of Political 0.229 0.419 1.291 Officer officer Institutions 2002 Armed Conflict Ethnic War State Failure Project See Table 4.2 0.375 1.038 3.319 2004 State Failure Project

84 Revolutionary War See Table 4.2 0.267 1.005 5.032 2004 State Failure Project Geno/Politicide See Table 4.2 0.133 0.716 5.686 2004 Uppsala/PRIO Interstate Conflict See Table 4.2 Armed Conflict 0.079 0.444 5.797 Dataset 2005 Uppsala/PRIO Internal Conflict See Table 4.2 Armed Conflict 0.368 0.852 2.162 Dataset 2005 Uppsala/PRIO International Internal Conflict See Table 4.2 Armed Conflict 0.183 0.678 3.552 Dataset 2005

84 Table 4.3 Continued

Standard Variable Measurement Source Mean Skewness Deviation Ethnic Cleavages Number of ethnic groups that account for 5% Number of Ethnic Groups Ellingson 2000 2.257 1.312 1.284 or more of the population Number of religious groups that account for Number of Religious Groups Ellingson 2000 1.873 0.818 -0.109 5% or more of the population Number of linguistic groups that account for Number of Linguistic Groups Ellingson 2000 2.233 1.537 1.405 5% or more of the population Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic Sum of the percents of the population not in Heterogeneity the largest ethnic, religious and linguistic Vanhanen 1999 45.937 34.591 0.697 groups 85 Economic Development World Development Infant Mortality Infant mortality per 1,000 live births 57.463 46.811 0.677 Indicators 2004 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity and World Bank 2004 66.110 71.249 1.327 divided by a factor of 100 Aid per capita (total aid divided by midyear World Development Aid per Capita population), including both official 2.823 1.276 -0.420 Indicators 2000 development assistance (ODA) and official aid

85 Table 4.3 Continued

Standard Variable Measurement Source Mean Skewness Deviation World Culture Number of international non-governmental INGOs organizations of which a country is a member, Paxton 2004 6.947 7.118 1.832 divided by a factor of 100 U.N. Division for the CEDAW Ratification 0=not ratified, 1=ratified by this year or earlier Advancement of 0.647 0.479 -0.668 Women 2005 Trade Openness Total trade as a percentage of GDP in constant Penn World Tables 58.606 2.161 -0.279 prices 2001 State Structure

86 0=Polity Score of less than or equal to 5 ; Democracy Polity IV 2003 0.448 0.497 0.209 1=Polity Score of greater than 5 0=Polity Score of less than 0 or greater than 5; Anocracy Polity IV 2003 0.051 0.221 4.065 1=Polity Score of 0-5 0=Polity Score of greater than or equal to 0; Autocracy Polity IV 2003 0.501 0.500 -0.003 1=Polity Score of less than 0 Ranges from 1 (torture, political murder, and imprisonment are rare) to 5 (disappearances, Gibney and Dalton State Terrorism 2.5547 1.1257 0.37702 torture, and murders are spread throughout 2004 population)

86

CHAPTER 5

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

The data collection process described in the previous chapter produced a dataset

of 1,387 stories related to collective rape and 37 confirmed episodes of collective rape

between 1980 and 2003. Many of these stories and episodes have never before been

discussed in the collective rape literature. The events in Burundi, the Philippines, or

Angola, for example, are absent from existing studies. It is not within the parameters of

this dissertation to discuss each episode individually, but as a comparative study it is

important to examine the similarities and differences across episodes and stories. I begin

with a look at the news stories, their distribution across episodes and time, and the

prevalence of unidentifiable dates and perpetrators. I then examine the 37 episodes and

consider their distribution across time and regions. Lastly, I discuss trends in the perpetrators and victims of collective rape.

Stories

Table 5.1 summarizes the 1,387 stories contained in the database. By each episode in alphabetical order, the table lists the total number of stories that were coded for each episode, the number of stories from each of the three sources, and what percent

87 of the total stories came from each source. At the bottom of the table is given the mean

and median for each of these values. The mean number of total stories coded for an

episode is 37, but the median is much lower at 16. The mean is skewed to the right

because there are a small number of episodes (namely Bosnia, Democratic Republic of

Congo, Indonesia and Serbia) that had more than 100 stories. Most other episodes had

far fewer stories than these four cases. Figure 5.1 shows this distribution in a graph.

Here, the episodes are sorted from least number of stories to the greatest. Not surprisingly, the episode with the greatest number of stories was Bosnia-Herzegovina at

230. Indonesia, an episode that has been documented but not analyzed in the literature, had the second greatest number with 158. On the lower end, there were three episodes

(Congo, Nigeria, and the Solomon Islands) for which only five stories were coded. A low number of stories was not uncommon—over half of the episodes had 20 stories or less.

Overall, Reuters Business Briefs produced the most stories per episode and World

News Digest Facts on File the least. Looking at Table 5.1, Reuters produced a mean

number of 25 stories per episode, The New York Times a mean or 10, and Facts on File a

mean of 3. These numbers are again skewed somewhat to the right, since the median

number of stories for both The New York Times and Reuters was just seven. Reuters also

contributed the most stories relative to the other two sources. On average 57% of stories

per episode came from Reuters, 33% came from The New York Times, and 9% came from

Facts on File. Figure 5.2 demonstrates this finding. In this graph, the episodes are sorted

by lowest percent from Reuters to highest percent from Reuters. Although there is one

88 episode for which Reuters contributed no stories, Guatemala, there are many episodes for which Reuters contributed the majority of stories and two episodes for which Reuters

contributed all stories, Congo and the Solomon Islands. Other than those two episodes,

The New York Times contributed some percent of stories to all other episodes. In

addition to Congo and the Solomon Islands, there were four additional episodes for which

Facts on File contributed no stories—Bangladesh, Kenya, Sri Lanka and .

89 Total World News The New York Reuters Country Number of Digest Facts on Times Business Briefs Stories File

Afghanistan 47 1 2.1% 13 27.7% 33 70.2% Algeria 13 1 7.7% 3 23.1% 9 69.2% Angola 8 1 12.5% 4 50.0% 3 37.5% Argentina 7 1 14.3% 1 14.3% 5 71.4% Azerbaijan 10 1 10.0% 6 60.0% 3 30.0% Bangladesh 9 0 0.0% 1 11.1% 8 88.9% Bosnia 230 27 11.7% 46 20.0% 157 68.3% Burundi 9 1 11.1% 1 11.1% 7 77.8% Chile 6 1 16.7% 0 0.0% 5 83.3% Congo 5 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 100.0% DR Congo 104 3 2.9% 12 11.5% 89 85.6% El Salvador 23 5 21.7% 14 60.9% 4 17.4% Guatemala 6 2 33.3% 4 66.7% 0 0.0% Haiti 12 4 33.3% 7 58.3% 1 8.3% India 60 1 1.7% 26 43.3% 33 55.0% Indonesia 158 9 5.7% 22 13.9% 127 80.4% Kenya 16 0 0.0% 1 6.3% 15 93.8% Kuwait 26 1 3.8% 11 42.3% 14 53.8% Liberia 38 1 2.6% 8 21.1% 29 76.3% Mozambique 17 1 5.9% 10 58.8% 6 35.3% Myanmar 26 4 15.4% 7 26.9% 15 57.7% Nicaragua 26 3 11.5% 20 76.9% 3 11.5% Nigeria 5 1 20.0% 2 40.0% 2 40.0% 7 1 14.3% 3 42.9% 3 42.9% Philippines 12 1 8.3% 7 58.3% 4 33.3% Russian Fed. 40 2 5.0% 2 5.0% 36 90.0% Rwanda 90 4 4.4% 22 24.4% 64 71.1% Serbia 125 2 1.6% 11 8.8% 112 89.6% Sierra Leone 95 8 8.4% 18 18.9% 69 72.6% Solomon Islands 5 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 100.0% Somalia 16 4 25.0% 5 31.3% 7 43.8% Sri Lanka 31 0 0.0% 11 35.5% 20 64.5% Sudan 9 1 11.1% 4 44.4% 4 44.4% Turkey 9 1 11.1% 5 55.6% 3 33.3% Uganda 42 7 16.7% 17 40.5% 18 42.9% Uruguay 6 0 0.0% 3 50.0% 3 50.0% Zimbabwe 39 6 15.4% 25 64.1% 8 20.5% Mean 37 3 9.9% 10 33.1% 25 57.0% Median 16 1 8.4% 7 31.3% 7 57.7%

Table 5.1: Distribution of News Stories by Source and Episode

90 225

200

175

150

125

100

75 Total of Number Stories 50 91

25

0 Haiti Peru India Chile Kenya Serbia Sudan Congo Kuwait Liberia Turkey Bosnia Angola Algeria Nigeria Burundi Uganda Somolia Rwanda Uruguay Myanmar Sri Lanka Argentina Indonesia Nicaragua Zimbabwe DR Congo DR Azerbaijan Philippines Guatemala El Salvador Bangladesh Sierra Leone Mozambi que Solomon Islands Russian Federation

Country

Figure 5.1: Total Number of Stories by Episode 91 100%

80%

60%

40% Percent of TotalStories

20% 92

0% Haiti Peru India Chile Kenya Sudan Serbia Congo Kuwait Liberia Turkey Bosnia Algeria Angola Nigeria Burundi Uganda Somolia Rwanda Uruguay Myanmar Sri Lanka Argentina Indonesia Nicaragua Zimbabwe DR Congo DR Azerbaijan Philippines Guatemala El Salvador Afghanistan Bangladesh Sierra Leone Mozambi que Solomon Islands Russian Federation Country

WND Facts on File The New York Times Reuters Business Briefs

Figure 5.2: Percent of Total Stories from Each Source, by Episode 92 The distribution of news stories also varies across time. Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 illustrate the total number of stories and the number of stories from each source by each

year between 1980 and 2003. The total number of stories by year varies considerably

over time. In the 1980s, there were never more than 35 stories published about collective rape in a single year. However, this dataset only contains stories that reference collective rape episodes occurring between 1980 and 2003, so it is not surprising that there were few stories in the early years that captured these events. As discussed in the previous chapter, many stories are written years after the episodes begin and wouldn’t appear in news reports until the 1990s. By 1990, the total number by year had climbed to 37 stories but then dropped to just three in 1991. After this brief drop the total number of stories began to climb again and jumped considerably in 1998. In that year there were

177 stories published, five times the number of stories in 1988. In the last year of the study, 2003, there were 227 stories about collective rape published.

Although Facts on File consistently reported on collective rape, it never published a great number of stories in any one year. At it’s greatest it produced ten stories in 1998 and at it’s lowest it produced no stories in 1980 and 1991. The New York Times produced at least a few stories on collective rape in every year. The lowest-producing years for this source were also 1980 and 1991, and the greatest number of stories (27 per year) was published in 1998 and 1999. Most of the variation in news story totals is caused by

Reuters. Stories filed before 1985 are not available through Reuters Business Briefs so this source contributed no stories for the first five years of research. Between 1985 and

1991, Reuters only archived stories from its North American and European outlets so

93 coverage is not as complete for those years. As can be seen in the table and figure,

Reuters contributed some stories between 1985 and 1994 but increased its reportage greatly in the later years of the study.

This trend is illustrated more easily in Figure 5.4 which shows the percent of total stories contributed by each source over time. Between 1980 and 1995, the majority of stories usually came from The New York Times, with Facts on File and Reuters contributing small percents or no stories. That changed dramatically in 1995 when

Reuters began filing a much greater number of stories. From that year on, Reuters produced the majority of stories including sometimes contributing more than 80% of the total number of stories.

94 Total World News The New York Reuters Year Number of Digest Facts on Times Business Briefs Stories File 1980 2 0 0.0% 2 100.0% 0 0.0% 1981 8 2 25.0% 6 75.0% 0 0.0% 1982 8 2 25.0% 6 75.0% 0 0.0% 1983 13 2 15.4% 11 84.6% 0 0.0% 1984 19 5 26.3% 14 73.7% 0 0.0% 1985 32 6 18.8% 22 68.8% 4 12.5% 1986 22 3 13.6% 16 72.7% 3 13.6% 1987 23 1 4.3% 13 56.5% 9 39.1% 1988 35 3 8.6% 17 48.6% 15 42.9% 1989 26 3 11.5% 13 50.0% 10 38.5% 1990 37 3 8.1% 18 48.6% 16 43.2% 1991 3 0 0.0% 3 100.0% 0 0.0% 1992 17 3 17.6% 11 64.7% 3 17.6% 1993 34 8 23.5% 23 67.6% 3 8.8% 1994 16 5 31.3% 10 62.5% 1 6.3% 1995 51 7 13.7% 14 27.5% 30 58.8% 1996 43 3 7.0% 11 25.6% 29 67.4% 1997 42 7 16.7% 14 33.3% 21 50.0% 1998 177 10 5.6% 27 15.3% 140 79.1% 1999 200 7 3.5% 27 13.5% 166 83.0% 2000 148 9 6.1% 24 16.2% 115 77.7% 2001 108 5 4.6% 15 13.9% 88 81.5% 2002 96 5 5.2% 14 14.6% 77 80.2% 2003 227 7 3.1% 21 9.3% 199 87.7%

Mean 57.79 4.42 7.6% 14.67 25.4% 38.71 67.0% Median 33 4 12.1% 14 42.4% 9.5 28.8%

Table 5.2: Distribution of News Stories by Source and Year

95 225

200

175

150

125

100

75 Total of Number Stories

96 50

25

0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year

WND Facts on File The New York Times Reuters Business Briefs

Figure 5.3: Total Number of Stories by Year, Disaggregated by Source 96 100%

80%

60%

40% Percent of Total Stories 97

20%

0% 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year WND Facts on File The New York Times Reuters Business Briefs

Figure 5.4: Percent of Total Stories from Each Source, by Year 97 In addition to coding the total number of stories and the number of contributing sources as quality controls for each episode, I also coded stories with missing variables of interest. As mentioned in the previous chapter, episodes can be coded positive for collective rape based on three levels of data specificity. With high specificity, the stories have indicated that collective rape occurred in one specific year. With medium or low specificity, stories give a range of years in which collective rape occurred. An alternative code is needed for those stories that discuss acts of multiple sexual assaults by political groups on civilians, but do not indicate in what year or year range these assaults occurred.

These stories were coded as having “unidentifiable dates.” Other stories have

“unidentifiable perpetrators,” in which the identity of the perpetrating group (as either military, police/security, paramilitary, foreign military, or non-government) cannot be determined. This usually happens in stories that discuss multiple groups committing acts of violence but do not specify which group was responsible for the rapes, or in stories that discuss sexual assault in political conflict situations (like wars, repressions, or riots), but do not name the political group that was responsible for the assaults. If it is not clear from the text of the story what political group was responsible, the story is coded as

“unidentifiable perpetrator.”

Table 5.3 lists the 37 episodes of collective rape in alphabetical order, the total number of stories per episode, and the rates of “unidentifiable date” and “unidentifiable perpetrator” by episode. Also given are the means and medians for these rates. Figure

5.5 illustrates the percent of total stories with “unidentifiable dates” sorted from lowest to highest and Figure 5.6 gives the percent of total stories with “unidentifiable perpetrators,”

98 sorted the same way. On average across episodes, 30% of stories did not specify when

the collective rape occurred. For five episodes (Bangladesh, Chile, Congo, Kuwait, and

Peru) this problem never occurred—all stories specified a date or date range. On the higher end of the scale, 86% of Argentina’s and 77% of Nicaragua’s stories were date nonspecific. There seems to be no relationship between the total number of stories and the frequency of unidentifiable dates. Four out of the five episodes with perfect date specificity had 15 or less stories, and four out of five episodes with the highest date unspecified ratios had 15 or less stories. The remaining two episodes (Kuwait with 0% unidentifiable dates and Nicaragua with 77% unidentifiable dates) each had 26 total stories.

On average, the issue of unidentifiable perpetrators was less problematic. The mean percent of unidentifiable perpetrators across all episodes was 11%. As shown in

Figure 5.6, 14 episodes had no stories with unidentifiable perpetrators. For another ten episodes, the percent of stories with unspecified perpetrators was 10% or less.

Combined, these episodes make up two-thirds of the sample. For the remaining third of the sample the percent of stories with unidentifiable perpetrators was 40% or less, except for one case. In Indonesia, 64% of stories did not identify the perpetrators of collective rape. These stories mainly refer to one incident of collective rape during a 14-year long episode in Indonesia. Over three days in 1998, approximately 66-168 ethnic Chinese women were raped during political riots in and around the capital city of (Mydans

1998). Many of the victims were unable or unwilling to identify their perpetrators, although some victims saw police and military uniforms on or near their perpetrators

99 during the attacks. In the months that followed the assaults, news agencies continued to report on the incident but focused mainly on the victims and their ethnicity, without mentioning the perpetrators. A government-sponsored investigation later determined that the Indonesian military was responsible for instigating and organizing the violence, but their actual participation in the rapes was not established.

100 Total Unidentifiable Country Number of Unidentifiable Dates Perpetrators Stories Afghanistan 47 21 44.7% 3 6.4% Algeria 13 9 69.2% 5 38.5% Angola 8 3 37.5% 3 37.5% Argentina 7 6 85.7% 0 0.0% Azerbaijan 10 2 20.0% 2 20.0% Bangladesh 9 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Bosnia 230 56 24.3% 27 11.7% Burundi 9 5 55.6% 1 11.1% Chile 6 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Congo 5 0 0.0% 1 20.0% DR Congo 104 39 37.5% 31 29.8% El Salvador 23 2 8.7% 0 0.0% Guatemala 6 4 66.7% 2 33.3% Haiti 12 8 66.7% 0 0.0% India 60 27 45.0% 4 6.7% Indonesia 158 32 20.3% 101 63.9% Kenya 16 1 6.3% 0 0.0% Kuwait 26 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Liberia 38 14 36.8% 8 21.1% Mozambique 17 11 64.7% 1 5.9% Myanmar 26 15 57.7% 0 0.0% Nicaragua 26 20 76.9% 1 3.8% Nigeria 5 3 60.0% 0 0.0% Peru 7 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Philippines 12 1 8.3% 1 8.3% Russian Federation 40 1 2.5% 3 7.5% Rwanda 90 2 2.2% 20 22.2% Serbia 125 7 5.6% 21 16.8% Sierra Leone 95 3 3.2% 9 9.5% Solomon Islands 5 1 20.0% 0 0.0% Somalia 16 7 43.8% 1 6.3% Sri Lanka 31 1 3.2% 0 0.0% Sudan 9 3 33.3% 1 11.1% Turkey 9 2 22.2% 0 0.0% Uganda 42 15 35.7% 2 4.8% Uruguay 6 2 33.3% 0 0.0% Zimbabwe 39 6 15.4% 4 10.3% Mean 37 9 30.1% 7 11.0% Median 16 3 24.3% 1 6.4%

Table 5.3: Distribution of Stories, Unidentifiable Dates and Unidentifiable Perpetrators by Episode

101 100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

Percent of Total Stories Total of Percent 30% 102

20%

10%

0% Haiti Peru India Chile Kenya Serbia Sudan Congo Kuwait Liberia Turkey Bosnia Algeria Angola Nigeria Burundi Uganda Somolia Rwanda Uruguay Myanmar Sri Lanka Argentina Indonesia Nicaragua Zimbabwe DR Congo Azerbaijan Philippines Guatemala El Salvador Bangladesh Afghanistan Sierra Leone Mozambique Solomon Islands Russian Federation Country

Figure 5.5: Percent of Total Stories with Unidentifiable Dates, by Episode

102 100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

Percent of Total Stories Total of Percent 30% 103

20%

10%

0% Haiti Peru India Chile Kenya Sudan Serbia Congo Kuwait Liberia Turkey Bosnia Angola Algeria Nigeria Burundi Uganda Somolia Rwanda Uruguay Myanmar Sri Lanka Argentina Indonesia Nicaragua Zimbabwe DR Congo Azerbaijan Philippines Guatemala El Salvador Bangladesh Afghanistan Mozambique Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Russian Federation Country

Figure 5.6: Percent of Total Stories with Unidentifiable Perpetrators, by Episode 103

Time

Despite the presence of some stories with unidentifiable dates, there was sufficient information in the dataset to identify and date 37 episodes of collective rape.

Each episode had at least one year of collective rape that could be dated at high, medium or low specificity. At HS, news stories indicated that multiple sexual assaults on civilians by political groups occurred in one specific year, such as the attacks on ethnic Chinese in

Indonesia in 1998 or the rape of Kuwaiti women by Iraqi soldiers in 1990. At medium specificity, stories indicate that collective rape occurred within a range of years, and that range is five years or less. In 1985, for example, Americas Watch issued a report that was picked up by The New York Times, stating that the Nicaraguan government and rebels had been raping citizens since 1984. A 2003 story in The New York Times cited and U.N. investigation that found rapes had been occurring since 1998 in Congo. Low specificity stories indicate that collective rape episodes occurred during a range of years of six years or more. A 2001 Reuters story reported that conflict had persisted in Sri

Lanka since 1983 and many rapes had been committed during in the intervening years.

Because it cannot be determined from the story in what years or how many years between

1983 and 2001 collective rape had been committed this story has low specificity for a period of 18 years.

Table 5.4 lists all 37 episodes and the total number of years that could be determined at each specificity level. It also lists the number of years for two combined specificity levels. High or medium specificity encompasses all years that stories reported

104 high and/or medium specificity. The final column reports all years that stories reported high, medium and/or low specificity. This final measure is not a sum of the years reported in the high, medium and low specificity columns individually because years at each coding level often overlap. The collective serves as a good example. In this country, a total of five years were coded as HS: 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2003. A total of six years of medium specificity were coded in two periods: 1992-

1995 and 2001-2002. But because some of the years of HS are contained within the periods of medium specificity, the total number of years for the combined high and/or medium specificity code is nine years. At the low specificity level, 17 total years were reported: 1980-1985 and 1991-2001. Again, because many of the years at the high and medium levels overlap with years coded at low specificity, the total number of years for

Afghanistan is 20 years when high, medium and/or low are combined.

In the next chapter, I test possible predictors against two levels of collective rape date specificity: high specificity and high, medium and/or low specificity. These two measures of collective rape are used because they represent the most restrictive coding and the least restrictive coding. HS coding requires that news stories confirm collective rape within one specific year so it represents the most restrictive coding. High, medium and/or low specificity contains years in which collective rape was known to occur and year ranges in which collective rape may have occurred, so it represents the least restrictive coding. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate these two coding levels. In Figure 5.7, episodes are sorted by lowest number of HS years to highest. For five episodes, no years of HS could be coded from the stories. For these episodes, all years come from medium

105 or low specificity coding. At the high end, India had seven years of HS coding. There were dated collective rape incidents in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and

2003.Years coded at HS are sometimes clustered—like with India, and sometimes scattered—like with Afghanistan. The average number of HS years across episodes was

2.38.

Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of years across episodes for the least restrictive coding, sorted from lowest to highest. Two episodes, Guatemala and Rwanda, had just one year of collective rape total. Rwanda experienced collective rape during the three month genocide in 1994. Guatemala had many years of political conflict in the 1980s, but only one year of collective rape could be confirmed. Fifteen episodes had five total years or less of collective rape, showing that some episodes of collective rape are relatively short. On the other hand, the Philippines had 24 years (the maximum number possible in this study) and two episodes, Kenya and Uganda, had 23 years. For all three of these episodes the majority of years were coded at the low specificity level so the pervasiveness of collective rape in each and every year reported is somewhat suspect.

But both the Philippines and Uganda had at least one year of HS coding so collective rape was known to have definitely occurred in the date range. The mean number of years at this combined specificity level across all episodes was 9.95.

106 High, High and/or High Medium Low Medium Country Medium Specificity Specificity Specificity and/or Low Specificity Specificity Afghanistan 5 6 17 9 20 Algeria 0 6 6 6 7 Angola 1 0 20 1 21 Argentina 0 0 4 0 4 Azerbaijan 2 0 0 2 2 Bangladesh 2 0 0 2 2 Bosnia 4 4 0 4 4 Burundi 1 4 11 5 11 Chile 0 4 11 4 11 Congo 1 3 11 3 11 DR Congo 6 6 0 7 7 El Salvador 5 4 0 8 8 Guatemala 1 0 0 1 1 Haiti 0 4 0 4 4 India 7 5 10 9 14 Indonesia 5 2 10 5 14 Kenya 0 5 23 5 23 Kuwait 2 2 0 2 2 Liberia 3 2 15 4 15 Mozambique 1 3 0 3 3 Myanmar 3 3 14 5 14 Nicaragua 1 3 0 4 4 Nigeria 0 3 0 3 3 Peru 4 0 20 4 20 Philippines 2 6 24 8 24 Russian Fed. 2 4 0 4 4 Rwanda 1 0 0 1 1 Serbia 2 2 0 2 2 Sierra Leone 5 0 11 5 11 Solomon Is. 1 4 0 4 4 Somalia 1 2 15 2 15 Sri Lanka 3 0 19 3 19 Sudan 4 0 17 4 18 Turkey 3 2 0 5 5 Uganda 4 8 21 10 23 Uruguay 1 0 6 1 6 Zimbabwe 5 11 0 11 11 Total 88 108 285 160 368 Mean 2.38 2.92 7.70 4.32 9.95 Median 2 3 6 4 8

Table 5.4: Distribution of Total Years of Collective Rape at Various Specificity Levels, by Episode 107 8

7

6

5

4

3 Number of Years Number 108 2

1

0 Haiti Peru India Chile Kenya Serbia Sudan Congo Kuwait Liberia Turkey Bosnia Angola Algeria Nigeria Burundi Uganda Rwanda Somolia Uruguay Myanmar Sri Lanka Argentina Indonesia Nicaragua Zimbabwe DR Congo Azerbaijan Philippines Guatemala El Salvador Bangladesh Afghanistan Mozambique Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Solomon Russian Federation Country

Figure 5.7: Total Number of High Specificity Years, by Episode

108 25

20

15

10 Number of Years Number 109

5

0 Haiti Peru India Chile Kenya Sudan Serbia Congo Liberia Kuwait Turkey Bosnia Angola Algeria Nigeria Burundi Uganda Somolia Rwanda Uruguay Myanmar Sri Lanka Argentina Indonesia Nicaragua Zimbabwe DR Congo Azerbaijan Philippines Guatemala El Salvador Bangladesh Afghanistan Sierra Leone Mozambique Solomon Islands Solomon Russian Federation Country

Figure 5.8: Total Number of High, Medium and/or Low Specificity Years, by Episode

109 The Human Security Centre noted recently that “No one knows if the incidence of

sexual violence in war is increasing or decreasing” because comparative statistics across

time and across episodes have not been available (2005, 108). Although this dissertation

cannot determine if the number of collective rape victims has increased or decreased in

recent years (since news reports are just as bad as agency statistics at tracking the number

of victims), it can shed some light on the prevalence of collective rape episodes between

1980 and 2003. Table 5.5 shows the distribution of collective rape episodes over time,

using each specificity coding measure. At the HS level, the number of episodes

identified ranges from one to nine episodes. Higher numbers of episodes were identified in later years, especially 1999 through 2003. At the medium specificity level, no episodes were identified by this coding in 1980 and a maximum number of episodes, seven, was achieved in 2000 through 2002. Because the low specificity measure allows so many more episodes to be coded, the number of episodes at this level over time is generally higher. Seventeen episodes were coded at this level for every year between

1993 and 1997.

Figure 5.9 illustrates the number of episodes across time for these three levels

(high, medium and low). At HS, the number of episodes in the 1980s never exceeds three; but counts at medium or low specificity suggest that many more episodes, as many as may have occurred in the mid-1980s. HS episode reach a momentary peak in 1992

(the same year as the beginning of the Bosnia episode) before dropping off and rising again in 1997. The highest number of episodes at this coding level was counted in the last year of the study, 2003, with nine. Medium and low specificity counts actually have

110 the opposite trend and their numbers drop in 2003. As compared to 17 low specificity

episodes in 1997, there were only four low specificity episodes coded in 2003. This drop

may reflect the nature of the related stories and not a drop in actual episodes. Because

medium and low specificity episodes are coded from stories that report collective rape in

a range of years, these stories are often not written until years after the collective rape

occurs. So the medium and low specificity stories written in 2003 after often reporting

on episodes from the 1990s. Low and medium specificity stories about episodes occurring in 2003 have most likely been written in 2005 or 2006, after data collection stopped on this project.

Figure 5.10 shows the number of episodes occurring in each year for the two specificity levels used in later analysis. The low specificity counts are the same as those

shown in Figure 5.9. With high, medium and/or low specificity coding the highest

number of episodes occurring in a single year was 21 in 1994. The lowest number of

episodes was in 1980 with only nine. Although the number of episodes at this coding

level does drop after 2000, it drops to just 12.

Overall, the number of collective rape episodes was higher in the 1990s than in

the 1980s. After a peak in the mid-1990s, there was a decline in episodes ending in 2002.

This pattern mimics the trend in armed conflicts for the same period. Armed conflicts

around the world were increasing in the 1980s, peaked in 1992, and then decreased

sharply (Human Security Centre 2005). These two similar patterns show early support

for a relationship between armed conflicts and collective rape. But this evidence should

be interpreted with caution, since reporting characteristics and date specificity coding

111 could also be affecting the declining trend in collective rape episodes. Identifying episodes based on MS or LS year ranges requires news stories written after, usually years after, the episodes began. Data collection on this project stopped in the year 2003 so there are few MS- or LS-coded stories for the years 2000 to 2003. Therefore, it’s possible that the declining trend in episodes is the result of story availability rather than a true decline in collective rape.

112

High, High and/or High Medium Low Medium Year Medium Specificity Specificity Specificity and/or Low Specificity Specificity 1980 1 0 8 1 9 1981 2 1 9 2 10 1982 3 2 9 5 12 1983 2 4 11 5 13 1984 3 4 10 6 12 1985 3 6 10 9 14 1986 1 6 8 7 12 1987 3 4 9 5 12 1988 3 5 10 8 15 1989 4 3 12 6 15 1990 3 3 13 3 14 1991 2 3 14 3 16 1992 5 4 15 6 19 1993 2 6 17 7 20 1994 3 6 17 7 21 1995 2 5 17 6 20 1996 1 4 17 5 17 1997 4 5 17 8 18 1998 5 6 16 10 20 1999 6 6 15 9 19 2000 8 7 11 11 17 2001 7 7 11 12 19 2002 6 7 5 9 12 2003 9 4 4 10 12

Mean 3.67 4.50 11.88 6.67 15.33 Median 3 4.5 11 6.5 15

Table 5.5: Distribution of Collective Rape Episodes at Various Specificity Levels, by Year

113 18

16

14

12

10

8

6 Number ofNumber Episodes

114 4

2

0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 High Specificity Medium Specificity Low Specificity

Figure 5.9: Total Number of Episodes Over Time, by Specificity Level 114 25

20

15

10 Number of EpisodesNumber 115 5

0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992Year1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 High specificity High, Medium and/or Low Specificity

Figure 5.10: Total Number of Episodes over Time, Two Specificity Levels

115 Regions

From the available literature on collective rape episodes in the twentieth century,

we know that collective rape occurred in Europe (Germany, , the former

Yugoslavia or Bosnia), Asia (China, Japanese military stations, Bangladesh), and Africa

(Rwanda, Mozambique). Little has been written about collective rape in North America,

South America, or the Middle East—which may indicate that some regions are more

prone to collective rape than others. However, some of the previously documented

episodes occurred before 1980, the beginning of this dissertation study, so the distribution

of collective rape episodes across regions may have changed in recent years. This section

examines the distribution of collective rape episodes across six regions: Africa, Asia,

Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and Western Europe/USA/Canada.

Figure 5.11 shows percent of all 37 episodes that occurred in each region. Africa had the most episodes, 14—which makes up 37% of the total during 1980-2003. Asia

and Latin America each had eight episodes and together comprise 44% of episodes.

Eastern Europe had four episodes over the years and the Middle East had three. No

episodes of collective rape were reported in Western Europe/USA/Canada for any of the

24 years in this study.

These numbers would suggest that collective rape is most prevalent in Africa and least prevalent in the Middle East. However, Africa is a large region with many countries while the Middle East is smaller. Therefore, the prevalence of collective rape episodes may be different when calculated relative to the number of countries in each region.

Figure 5.12 demonstrates the percent of countries in each region that experienced

116 collective rape during the study period. One-quarter of sovereign countries in Africa and one-quarter of countries in Latin America had collective rape, but a higher percent, 31%, of Asian countries had collective rape episodes. This figure indicates that, even though

Africa had six more episodes of collective rape than Asia, the impact of collective rape in the region of Asia may have been greater.

Another measure of impact and prevalence would be the number of collective rape episode years in each region. Using the high, medium and/or low specificity coding, there were 368 total years of collective rape across all episodes. Of those 368 years, nearly half of them occurred in Africa (see Figure 5.13). A somewhat smaller percent,

30%, took place in Asia. Together, more than three-fourths of all collective rape years occurred in these two regions. Only 3% of years took place in Eastern Europe and 4% in the Middle East.

Figure 5.14 also illustrates this pattern in actual number of years. The left bar represents the total number of collective rape years in each region and the right bar represents the average number of years per episode (in Africa, 173 years divided by 14 episodes). As this figure shows, Asia and Latin America had the same number of episodes but Asia had almost twice as many years of collective rape than Latin America.

Asia had a high number of years despite having a moderate number of episodes. Because of this high number of years, the average collective rape episode lasted 1.5 years longer than the average episode in Africa. Again, this suggests that the impact of collective rape in Asia may have been stronger than in Africa.

117 Finally, Figure 5.15 demonstrates the distribution of collective rape episodes in

different regions over time. The regions of Africa and Asia had at least one collective rape episode ongoing in every year of the study. The number of episodes in each region increased in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. Latin America had several episodes in the 1980s and a couple lasting into the 1990s. By 2000, there were no episodes in Latin

America. Eastern Europe, on the other hand, had no episodes until 1988 and most of its episodes in the mid- and late-1990s. The Middle East experienced most of its episodes in the early- to mid-1990s. There were only five years in which every region experienced at least one episode of collective rape: 1992-1995 and 1998. By 2003, only Asia and Africa were still experiencing collective rape.

118 8%

Africa

22% 37% Asia

Eastern Europe

Latin America

Middle East

11%

22%

Figure 5.11: Percent of Episodes in Each Region

119 50%

45%

40%

35%

31% 30%

26% 25% 24% 120 20% Percent of Total Countries 16% 15% 13%

10%

5%

0% Africa Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Middle East Figure 5.12: Percent of CountriesRegion in Each Region with Episodes

120 4%

16%

Africa

3% Asia

47% Eastern Europe

Latin America

Middle East

30%

Figure 5.13: Percent of Total Years in Each Region

121 180 173

160

140

120 111

100 122

80

Years (High, and/or Medium Specificity) Low 58 60

40

20 12.36 13.88 12 14 7.25 3.00 4.67 0 Figure 5.14: Total and Average Number of Years by Region Africa Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Middle East Region122 25

20

15

10 123 Number ofNumber Episodes

5

0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year Africa Asia East Europe Latin America Middle East

Figure 5.15: Number of Episodes by Year, Disaggregated by Region

123 Perpetrators

The focus in the prior literature on sexual violence in war has forced the notion

that most perpetrators of collective rape are militaries. Is this a fact or just a consequence

of limited conceptualization? In this study coded perpetrators into six categories:

military, police/security, paramilitary, foreign military, other government group, and non-

government group. The first five categories all act as agents of a state and can be

combined into the category of government groups. Figure 5.16 shows that, in 84% of

episodes, agents of the government committed sexual assault on the population.

Overwhelmingly, if a civilian is the victim of political rape they suffered at the hands of

their own government. In 46% of episodes, one or more of the five government groups

were the sole perpetrators of collective rape. In an additional 38% of episodes,

government groups perpetrated collective rape in the same countries where non-

government groups also committed sexual violence. In this 38% of episodes, citizens

were caught between two warring parties that both committed violence on the common people. In only 16% of episodes was the government not involved.

Figure 5.17 shows how often multiple government or non-government groups commit collective rape. In 45% of episodes, only one group was responsible for the assaults. Typically, when only one group was involved, that group was the military or a

non-government faction. In 55% of episodes, multiple groups engaged in collective rape

at some point in the years of violence. Shockingly, in 11% of episodes there were four groups all committing collective rape. It is easy to imagine that, in these cases, the

civilian population had little safety anywhere.

124 Figure 5.18 shows how often each of the six perpetrator categories was

responsible for collective rape. The military was the most frequent perpetrator, in 26 of

the 37 episodes. The military was also a perpetrator in all five regions of the world where

collective rape occurred. Police and security forces have participated in one-third of

episodes. Often these groups committed collective rape while using sexual assault as a

form of torture during interrogations. In addition to the Iraqi , foreign

militaries have also engaged in rape in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri

Lanka and Afghanistan. In the two episodes of collective rape where other government

groups were involved, these groups were supporters of the government who held no official positions. Non-government groups, the second most frequent perpetrator, include

Islamic terrorists in Algeria, rebel fighters in Congo, leftist revolutionaries in El

Salvador, and a political/religious cult in Uganda.

Militaries were involved in the most episodes of collective rape, and they were also responsible for the most years of collective rape, as shown in Figure 5.19. Out of

368 total years coded at the HMLS level, the military participated in 197, or 54%.

Averaged over the 26 episodes with military involvement, this group averaged 7.6 years of assaults per episode. While non-government groups participated in 6 fewer episodes, they were involved in almost as many years as the military. This means that non- government groups generally committed for longer periods of time, an average of 9.6 years. So even though non-government groups may be less willing to use collective rape, when started, their violence may be more sustained and persistent. Police/security forces, paramilitary, and foreign military averaged fewer years per episode—5.2, 6.1, and 7.2

125 years respectively. Of the two other government groups that committed collective rape, one participate for two year and one participated for 3 years. Based on their low level of participation, it would seem that other government groups rarely use sexual violence against their fellow civilians.

126 38% Government Groups Only

46% Non-Government Groups Only

Government and Non- Government Groups

16%

Figure 5.16: Participation of Government and Non-Government Groups in Total Episodes

127 11%

1 Group

22% 2 Groups 45%

3 Groups

4 Groups

22%

Figure 5.17: Number of Perpetrator Groups per Episode

128 80%

70% 70%

60% 54%

50%

40% Percent of Episodes 129 32%

30%

19% 20% 16%

10% 5%

0% Military Police or Security Paramilitary or Militia Foreign Military Other Government Non-Government Forces Group Group Figure 5.18: Percent of Perpetrator Groups in Total Episodes Perpetrator Groups 129 197 200 192

180

160

140

120

100 130

80 Years (High, and/or Specificity) Medium Low 62 60

43 43 40

20 9.6 7.6 5.2 6.1 7.2 5 2.5 0 MilitaryFigure Police or Security5.19: TotalParamilitary and Average or Militia Number Foreign Military of Years, Other by Government PerpetratorNon-Government Group Forces Group Group Perpetrator Group130 Victims

In some of the collective rape episodes examined in the prior literature, sexual

assault was committed most often against members of certain groups. In the former

Yugoslavia, for example, Bosnian Muslim women were singled out by Serbian soldiers

for rape and forced impregnation. Although Croatians, Serbians, and non-Muslims were

also raped, the great majority of victims were Bosnian Muslims. In Rwanda, Tutsi

women seem to have suffered sexual assault in greater numbers than Hutu women when

Hutus led the genocide against Tutsis. In fact, Hutu leaders encouraged their fellow

fighters to rape Tutsi women because they were “whiter” and “more beautiful” (Turshen

2001). In El Salvador, most victims of collective rape were suspected political dissidents

or family members of political activists.

In other episodes, perpetrators raped indiscriminately among the general

population. German soldiers in Belgium, Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh, and rebels in

Mozambique all committed sexual violence without much concern for the race/ethnicity,

religion or political affiliation of their victims. So collective rape may at times be used to

oppress or demoralize a specific group, but in other times be a violation on an entire society.

Unfortunately, news stories do not consistently document the identity of the victims. In many stories, the victims are referred to only as “women.” In others, the focus is on perpetrators and their history of “raping and killing” citizens, with no mention of the victims of these crimes. From the stories that do identify the victims, four categories have been coded: political victims, religious victims, ethnic victims, and men.

131 Figure 5.20 demonstrates what percent of episodes had an identified victim group. In

nearly half of the episodes, collective rape was not focused on any particular group. Of

the remaining episodes, one group was singled out for assault and suffered a

disproportionate number of rapes. In 8% of episodes, a combination of victim group

categories was affected by collective rape.

Of the four victim groups, racial/ethnic groups were targeted in the most episodes

(see Figure 5.21). In 13 episodes from various regions, racial and ethnic minorities were the victims of sexual assault. This includes the Tutsis in Rwanda, the Ogoni people in

Nigeria, and the Karen, Shan and Karenni tribes of Myanmar. Political victims were identified in 19% of episodes. Many of these cases occurred in Latin America, in places like Haiti, Uruguay, Chile and Peru where revolutions have led to violence. Only one episode contained any mention of men being the victims of collective rape. A few stories reported that Chechen men had been sexually assaulted by Russian soldiers while being interrogated or held in prison.

In terms of years, political groups have been the most victimized. As shown in

Figure 5.22, political victims were reported for a total of 50 years of collective rape, averaging 7.1 years in each episode. Racial/ethnic victims were identified in more episodes but seem to have suffered less total years of violence. On average, racial/ethnic groups victimized for less than three years per episode. Unfortunately, the lack of consistent reporting on victim identities may mean that the violence perpetrated on various groups may be inadequately estimated.

132 8%

0 Group 46%

1 Group

2 Groups

46%

Figure 5.20: Number of Victim Groups per Episode

133 40%

35% 35%

30%

25%

20% 19% 134 Percent of Episodes 15%

10%

5% 5% 3%

0% Political Group Religious Group Racial/Ethnic Group Men Victim Group Figure 5.21: Percent of Victim Groups in Total Episodes

134 50 50

40

35

30 135

20 Years (High, and/or Medium Specificity) Low

10 7.1

3 2.7 1.5 2 2.0 0 Figure 5.22: Total and Average Number of Years, by Victim Group Political Group Religious Group Racial/Ethnic Group Men Victim Groups 135

CHAPTER 6

TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

In this chapter I test the hypotheses proposed earlier in Chapter 3. In particular, I

test the possible effects of gender inequality, armed conflict, militarization ethnic

cleavages, world culture, economic development and state structure on the presence of

collective rape in a given country and year. Modeling these effects poses two challenges:

the dependent variables (presence of collective rape—HS, and presence of collective

rape—HMLS) are binary; and the data include multiple observations of the same

countries over several years. Each of these challenges must be addressed to produce

consistent and unbiased estimators of the independent variables’ effects.

Model Specification

When the dependent variable is continuous, or has an unlimited range of values, the best model is typically ordinary least squares regression. But this study utilizes limited dependent variables where the value of the variable can only be 0 if collective rape did not occur or 1 if collective rape did occur. With limited dependent variables, an ordinary least squares model can produce biased and inconsistent coefficients (effects), standard errors, and t-tests. Coefficients may be biased and inconsistent because the

136 constraints on the values of the dependent variable cause a systematic relationship, or

correlation, between independent variables and the errors. Standard errors and t-tests may be biased and inconsistent because the effects are not linear but instead change as a function of the independent variables, causing the effects and error variance to be heteroskedastic. Additionally, trying to model a linear relationship with a dependent variable may produce a bad model fit and predicted values of the dependent variable outside the range of 0 or 1. To address these potential issues, I instead use a probit model where the independent variables affect the probability of collective rape occurrence as a cumulative probability function.

Heteroskedasticity can also be a problem with time-series data such as those used in this project—where the same 160 countries are measured across 24 years. When the same countries are used for multiple observations, the observations may be correlated with one another. Sets of correlated errors from multiple observations violate the assumptions required for most analyses. To correct for this issue, I assume that the errors are correlated within each country but not correlated with other countries and use random effects to model this correlation. Alternatively, I could model a fixed effect for each country but this would not allow for any time-invariant independent variables since these variables would be perfectly correlated with the fixed effects. Since my models do include time-invariant variables, random effects are the appropriate choice.

Using a pooled probit model with random effects, I first test the effects of each theory segment on two measures of collective rape. As discussed earlier, I focus on the most restricted measurement of collective rape—high specificity (HS)—and the least

137 restrictive measure— (HMLS). Out of the five possible collective rape measures

available, HS is expected to have the most validity but the lowest reliability and HMLS is

expected to have the least validity and the most reliability.

Gender Inequality

Table 6.1 shows the effects of six gender inequality variables on the two measures

of collective rape. Prior research had suggested the possibility of either positive effects

or negative effects of gender inequality on collective rape. If greater equality between

men and women encourages men to respect women’s rights and ameliorates women’s

power and status in society, then high gender inequality should have a positive effect on

collective rape. If however, greater equality between the sexes encourages a backlash by men against emancipated women, then higher gender inequality should have negative effect on collective rape. The model using HS collective rape shows support for neither

hypothesis since no independent measures had a significant effect on collective rape.

This suggests that the levels of gender inequality in countries and years where collective

rape was known to occur were not significantly different from the countries and years

where collective rape was suspected to have occurred or did not occur. The model using

HMLS collective rape, on the other hand, showed two significant relationships. There

was a moderately significant and negative relationship between contraceptive use by

women and the presence of collective rape. In country-years where women’s

contraceptive use was higher, the probability of collective rape was reduced. This

supports the ameliorative hypothesis since access to contraceptives is a sign of women’s

power over their bodies, sexuality, and . The other significant

138 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Contraceptive Use-0.011 -0.016 ** 0.007 0.006 Fertility Rate -0.041 0.153 0.103 0.097 Literacy Ratio 0.206 1.275 0.840 0.753 Primary Schooling Ratio 0.015 0.021 ** 0.008 0.007 Women's Economic Rights -0.339 -0.234 0.180 0.139 Women's Political Rights -0.146 -0.195 0.124 0.106 Women's Social Rights -0.021 -0.123 0.164 0.133 Constant -3.127 ** -4.676 *** 1.028 0.884 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -325.909 -525.433 Wald χ2 17.40 ** 58.47 *** ρ 0.513 0.760 0.063 0.031 χ¯2 116.80 *** 1084.09 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.1: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Gender Inequality Variables

139 relationship, between the sex ratio in primary schooling and collective rape, had a positive effect. In country-years where the ratio of girls to boys in primary school was

higher, the probability of collective rape was also higher. This supports the backlash

hypothesis, suggesting that when women have access to education and therefore more job

opportunities, men may feel threatened and respond with sexual violence. Having results

that support both hypotheses is not uncommon in studies of interpersonal rape (see

Whaley 2001 for a discussion). In this study of mass political sexual violence, the results

suggest that some of the same factors that predict non-political rape also predict political rape. However, some measures that are usually significant in the prior studies (such as women’s political and economic rights) were not significant in this model. This lack of significance suggests that there may be factors important for predicting collective rape

that are not important for predicting interpersonal rape.

Armed Conflict

Table 6.2 shows the results of some of these possible additional factors in the

relationships between six measures of armed conflict and collective rape. The literature

on mass rape discussed in Chapter 2 has focused only on episodes of mass political

sexual violence that have occurred during wars and therefore predicts a very strong and

positive relationship between armed conflict and collective rape. The literature on

interpersonal rape has found a similar relationship between interpersonal violence (i.e.,

homicide) and interpersonal rape (Austin and Kim 2000; McConahay and McConahay

1977; Sanday 1981). Subsequently, I hypothesized that armed conflict, and particularly

high rates of violence in armed conflict, would increase the probability of collective rape.

140 This hypothesis is well supported in both models. With HS collective rape, all measures

of armed conflict fatalities had a strongly or moderately significant and positive effect on

the probability of collective rape occurrence, except for interstate conflict. In situations

of internal conflict, internationalized internal conflict, ethnic war, genocide, or

revolutionary war, as conflict-related fatalities increased so did the probability of

collective rape. There was no significant relationship between interstate conflict and

collective rape. This most likely reflects the changing nature of armed conflict. First, the number of armed conflict between two sovereign states has dramatically decreased over the past twenty years. In the time period of this study, there have been only a handful of interstate conflicts as compared to the hundreds of internal conflicts. Second, the strategies and mechanisms of interstate conflict have changed in ways that may reduce their possibility of producing collective rape, as compared to the interstate wars of 50 years ago. Compare, for example, the Vietnam War to Operation Desert Storm. Much of the Vietnam War involved combat in villages and rural areas throughout Vietnam where soldiers had extensive contact with civilian populations (Citino 2004). As a matter of sheer access, the potential for collective rape was there. An estimated 3.4 million troops served in Vietnam (http://www.nvf.org/facts.html). By comparison, an estimated

697,000 troops served in Desert Storm. The military was able to accomplish many of its objectives in this conflict with remote weapons and less soldier presence on the ground

(Citino 2004). It would suggest that, if these changes are true of interstate conflict

overall, then the possibility of troops committing mass sexual violence on civilians in interstate wars has been greatly reduced

141 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Interstate Armed Conflict 0.229 0.195 0.136 0.135 Internal Armed Conflict 0.318 *** 0.462 *** 0.078 0.073 Internationalized Internal Armed Conflict 0.214 ** 0.349 *** 0.078 0.078 Ethnic War 0.252 *** 0.383 *** 0.053 0.061 Genocide 0.158 ** 0.060 0.060 0.063 Revolutionary War 0.146 ** 0.266 *** 0.049 0.062 Constant -3.395 *** -3.326 *** 0.221 0.119 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -268.338 -429.773 Wald χ2 100.52 *** 204.20 *** ρ 0.399 0.725 0.074 0.033 χ¯2 59.55 *** 716.22 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.2: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Armed Conflict Variables

142 In the HMLS model, internal conflict, internationalized internal conflict, ethnic war and revolutionary war all had positive and strongly significant effects on the probability of collective rape occurrence. Like with the HS model, this lends strong support to the armed conflict hypothesis. The only notable difference between these two models is the lack of a significant effect between genocide and collective rape in the latter model. The number of genocide-related fatalities had a significant positive effect on collective rape presence when using only confirmed years, but did not have a significant effect when looking at all possible years of collective rape. I suspect this may be because collective rape is more noticeable when genocides are occurring because of the newsworthiness of extensive genocidal deaths. When reporters arrive to document specific genocide deaths, they may become aware of and also document incidents of mass political sexual violence. This would lead to a relationship between genocide and HS collective rape—which is based on specific and dated news stories, but no relationship between genocide and HMLS collective rape—which includes less specific stories of political sexual violence.

Militarization

The strong results of armed conflict on collective rape suggest support for the next hypothesis: a positive relationship between militarization and collective rape. Given that militaries are involved in most armed conflicts, a relationship between armed conflict and collective rape is preliminary evidence of a relationship between militarization and collective rape. This relationship is expected by the collective rape, interpersonal rape and political violence literatures. Collective rape scholars believe that militaries used

143 sexual violence as a strategic tool to obtain their objectives. Interpersonal rape research

has shown that militaries promote violent masculinity and use rape as a bonding strategy.

Studies of political violence have found that a strong military contributes to the formation

of political coups (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992). Therefore, it is expected that the

presence and strength of the military will have a positive effect on collective rape.

Table 6.3 shows the results of three militarization measures applied to collective

rape. At the HS level, both the size of the military and military spending had a

significant relationship with collective rape; at the HMLS level, military size, military

spending and military leadership all had significant effects. The consistent and positive relationship between military spending and collective rape supports the proposed hypothesis. Although only significant in the latter model, the positive relationship

between military leadership and collective rape also supports the hypothesis and one

proposition in the collective rape literature. Collective rape studies often try to prove that

sexual violence is strategic and not random or individually-motivated by stating that

military leaders choose rape as a weapon and order their subordinates to rape citizens.

This statement is difficult to substantiate, however, since leaders and subordinates are

reluctant to admit to outsiders that they knowingly chose to rape citizens en masse as part

of a military plot. Now, a significant relationship between having a military officer as

chief executive lends some small support to the idea that military political leadership

encourages collective rape.

The surprising result is the relationship between military size and collective

rape—it is significant but in the opposite direction. As military size increases, the

144 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Percent of Population in the Military -0.651 ** -1.130 *** 0.219 0.213 Percent of National Budget Spent on Defense 0.726 *** 1.609 *** 0.144 0.161 Chief Executive is a Military Officer -0.119 0.568 *** 0.180 0.139 Constant -3.255 *** -3.957 *** 0.294 0.211 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -319.909 -486.449 Wald χ2 27.57 *** 109.97 *** ρ 0.486 0.760 0.072 0.031 χ¯2 100.64 *** 1020.28 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.3: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Militarization Variables

145 probability of collective rape decreases. While this relationship is unexpected, it is not

inexplicable. Andreski’ (1968) argued that the larger the military the more

institutionalized it is and thus the more likely to instill social discipline, create social cohesion and integration and impart job and social skills; if larger armies are more disciplined than smaller ones, then they may be less likely to commit collective rape.

The unfortunate truth is that a large military is not necessary to commit . One man is capable of raping several women a day, and the anecdotal evidence shows us that has often been the case. Assaults in many different episodes have included

gang rapes with multiple perpetrators and multiple victims. In fact, a sexually aroused

male soldier is not even required as victims have been assaulted with weapons, sticks,

bottles and other foreign objects. Moreover, a small military may have more reason for

choosing collective rape as a group strategy. For all its devastating consequences for

victims, rape is a relatively safe crime for the perpetrator. Victims rarely fight back and

weapons do not need to be involved, so except for the possibility of sexually transmitted

diseases there is little physical risk for the perpetrator. In a small military, maintaining

troop numbers may be more important than inflicting fatalities on the enemy. Finally,

there is some evidence that militaries are more prone to collective rape when they feel

ineffective or disenfranchised. This explanation has been used in reference to American

soldiers in Vietnam (Brownmiller 1975) and Japanese soldiers in the occupation of

Nanking (Chang 1997). If a military is small, rather than large, in relation to its enemy,

this might generate feelings of ineffectiveness or disenfranchisement that would lead to

collective rape.

146 Ethnic Cleavages

The “us” versus “them” mentality fostered in most militaries may be amplified if

there are other pre-existing cleavages in the society. Several authors’ work on the former

Yugolsavian collective rape has suggested that divisions and racism between Serbs,

Bosnians, Muslims and Croats exacerbated the violence in that region. Many studies of

political violence have found ethnic divisions to be predictors of civil wars, rebellions

and genocides. Based on these studies, it is expected that strong ethnic divisions within a

country will have a positive effect on collective rape.

Table 6.4 contains the results from testing this hypothesis. The one measure of diversity that was significant for the HS model had the opposite than expected effect—as the number of religious groups in a society increased, the likelihood of collective rape occurrence decreased. This might suggest that when there are only a few large religious groups, they are more confrontational with one another and may choose to use sexual violence in their confrontations. This idea is further supported by the additional significance of the ethnic heterogeneity variable. Where the percent of the population in non-majority ethnic, religious and linguistic groups was higher, the likelihood of collective rape was also higher. So having large minority groups is associated with an increased risk of mass political sexual violence, as suggested by the ethnic competition hypothesis.

147 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Number of Ethnic Groups 0.000 -0.030 0.081 0.070 Number of Religious Groups -0.297 ** -0.193 * 0.113 0.091 Number of Linguistic Groups 0.009 0.186 ** 0.080 0.069 Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.014 *** 0.011 *** 0.004 0.003 Constant -3.048 *** -3.084 *** 0.334 0.233 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -325.629 -541.930 Wald χ2 16.18 ** 26.09 *** ρ 0.527 0.760 0.065 0.031 χ¯2 113.13 *** 1049.69 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.4: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Ethnic Cleavages Variables

148 The same results were found for the HMLS model, with the addition of one more

significant predictor. In this model, the number of linguistic groups had a positive effect

on collective rape—more linguistic groups led to more risk of violence. It would seem

that, at least with linguistic divisions, diversity in a society can contribute to collective violence. Since both the idea that having many diverse (linguistic) groups and the idea

that a large minority population relative to the majority contribute to collective rape were supported by the results, further analysis of the relationship between ethnic cleavages and collective rape seems warranted.

World Culture

I next consider the possible effects of world culture variables on the probability of collective rape occurrence. Collective rape scholars suggest that traditional gender beliefs and violent nationalism help to produce collective rape, but world culture works counter to these ideas. Through channels like international governmental organizations

(IGOs), international non-governnmental organizations (INGOs), compulsory education and global commerce, world culture pushes values of statelessness, equality and human rights. With regard to collective rape, the presence of world culture channels should decrease the likelihood of violence occurring.

Table 6.5 illustrates the results from testing that argument. None of the three measures had a significant relationship with collective rape when measured at the HS level. With the expanded HMLS measure, INGO memberships and ratification of the

(CEDAW) were significant predictors. The INGO measure supported the hypothesis: more INGO memberships produced a lower probability of collective rape occurrence.

149 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity CEDAW Ratification 0.311 0.294 * 0.029 0.126 Trade Openness 0.010 0.008 0.029 0.022 INGO Memberships -0.015 -0.036 * 0.018 0.017 Constant -3.569 * -2.991 * 1.730 1.264 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -332.806 -548.797 Wald χ2 3.7 7.34 ρ 0.535 0.769 0.061 0.030 χ¯2 134.98 *** 1191.94 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.5: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on World Culture Variables

150 The CEDAW measure does not support the hypothesis. Ratification of CEDAW is

supposed to discourage collective rape but instead it has a positive effect. Other studies

expecting human rights treaties to disuade violence or inequality have found similar

puzzling effects (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005), and a couple explanations can be found. First, while the CEDAW treaty strongly encourages national governments to take steps to eliminate gender discrimination, there is very little enforcement behind the language. The United Nations, creator of CEDAW, has neither the capacity nor the desire to force countries to enact legislation or change customs. Therefore, CEDAW may have little direct effect on the occurrence of collective rape in various countries. Second, CEDAW was designed to direct countries in need of gender equality action in their efforts. One would expect, then, that many of the countries that have ratified CEDAW are countries that have significant problems of gender discrimination, possibly including collective rape. If gender discrimination and gender violence is strongly present in countries that have signed CEDAW, than a positive relationship between the treaty and collective rape is understandable.

However, we must be cautious of interpreting the effects reported in Table 6.5 because the Wald χ2 tests for both models are not significant. Wald χ2 tests measure if the slopes, or effects, of the independent variables are significantly different from zero.

Since the test indicates that the slopes are not significantly different from zero, these models should not be considered good models of collective rape probability. It is possible that including the world culture predictors in a larger model will eliminate this problem.

151 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Gross Domestic Product Per Capita -0.000 ** -0.000 *** .000 .000 Official Development Assistance Per Capita (logged) -0.241 ** -0.390 *** 0.077 0.068 Infant Mortality 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 Constant -1.935 *** -0.886 *** 0.378 0.334 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -323.668 -513.255 Wald χ2 19.58 *** 94.06 *** ρ 0.522 0.770 0.067 0.030 χ¯2 107.30 *** 969.06 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.6: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Economic Development Variables

152 Economic Development

Having already considered the effects of gender and race/ethnicity on collective rape, I now consider the effects of class or economic stratification on my dependent variables. It was readily obvious from the analysis of regional variation in the previous chapter that collective rape had not occurred in any high-income country between 1980 and 2003. Furthermore, political violence research has found low levels of economic development have been associated with a variety of violent conflict situations.

Consequently, low levels of economic development are expected to have a positive effect on the presence of collective rape.

Three measure of economic development were used and the results are shown in

Table 6.6. The effects are nearly identical in both models, though the significance of the effects is stronger for the HMLS model. As gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increases, the probability of collective rape decreases. This result is in line with the hypothesis. It was expected that official development assistance (ODA) would have a positive effect, meaning that poor countries who receive a lot of aid would have a higher probability of collective rape. Instead, the opposite effect was found. Those countries that receive more ODA have reduced probabilities of mass political sexual violence.

Receiving ODA is definitely a sign of low economic development, but it may also be a sign of world culture that would produce a negative relationship. ODA is money given from high-income countries to low-income countries and may be influence by the political and economic ties that exist between countries. If a country is receiving a high amount of ODA, it may mean that it is well connected to other countries and therefore

153 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Democracy 0.152 0.462 0.294 0.320 Autocracy -0.093 0.680 * 0.276 0.311 State Terrorism 1.010 *** 1.442 *** 0.106 0.094 Constant -6.000 *** -7.801 *** 0.552 0.469 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -259.442 -359.342 Wald χ2 91.03 *** 244.22 *** ρ 0.359 0.756 0.078 0.030 χ¯2 47.64 *** 814.72 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.7: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on State Structure Variables

154 well integrated into world culture. In return for ODA, the benefactor countries might expect recipient countries to develop values of freedom and human rights. As such, ODA would have a negative effect on collective rape.

State Structure

One final theoretical model was tested. There are many theories and studies on state structure and its effects in the political violence literature. One of the most salient findings is that states that respect the rights and representation of the people are less likely to have political violence. For example, democracies are far less likely than autocracies to have internal violence with and among their citizens. But when states ignore individual rights and repress or terrorize their peoples, violence is more likely to occur (though this may be a curvilinear relationship where extreme repression stops the people from organizing into violence). Given this information, it is expected that democratic and non-repressive state structures will have a negative effect on collective rape.

The effects of three state structure measures on collective rape are detailed in

Table 6.7. Only the level of state terrorism is significant in the HS model. This strongly significant and positive relationship holds in the HMLS model, lending credence to the hypothesis of a linear relationship between repression and violence. Not surprisingly, if states are willing to commit other various forms of violence and repression on their citizens then they are also more likely to commit collective rape. And when political civil groups are subjected to repression, they may respond with violence (even though that violence is directed toward fellow citizens). In the HMLS model, autocracy also has

155 a significant positive effect. This result means that, relative to anocratic states, autocratic

states are more likely to commit collective rape. Again, this is the expected result,

demonstrating that states who do not respect their citizens’ rights to participate in

government also do not respect their rights to be protected from violence.

Full Model

Testing each theoretical model individually has provided some interesting results.

Some hypotheses were supported; some were not; and some results suggested entirely

new hypotheses that challenged the existing ones. In at least one case, testing the world

culture argument, tests suggested that a fuller model with more control variables would

be warranted. Furthermore, a complete model of all hypotheses would be the first time

that explanations from three different literatures—collective rape, interpersonal rape, and

political violence—have been combined to explain one phenomenon. As such, a

complete model might provide the best insight into the factors that create collective rape.

Table 6.8 contains the results for a full model of all independent variables. The

effects of gender inequality have changed somewhat from their independent model. The

ratio of girls to boys in primary schooling is again positive and significant (this time for

both dependent variables), providing further support for the backlash argument. The

ameliorative hypothesis also finds support but from a different variable. Contraceptive usage is no longer significant in the HMLS model but women’s political rights are.

Saying that the granting and defending of women’s rights to vote, stand for election, etc.

has a negative effect on the probability of collective rape, this effect sustains the

156 liberal/radical feminist position and the ameliorative hypothesis. So gender inequality maintains its somewhat contradictory but expected relationships with collective rape.

The effects of armed conflict somewhat mimic those of the earlier models.

Internal, internationalized internal, and ethnic war continue to be significant predictors for both dependent measures, but revolutionary war is no longer significant. Also, the differing effects of genocide between the HS and HMLS models remains. Even though the statistical significance of the effects has waned, the fact that three measures of armed conflict are significant and in the expected direction for both models greatly suggests that armed conflict is an important predictor of collective rape.

The significant effects of militarization persist for the HMLS model, but do not for the HS model. Military size continues to have a negative effect while military spending and military leadership have positive effects. Given the inclusion of so many other variables in these models, it would seem that militarization definitely is an important precondition for collective rape.

The effects of ethnic cleavages have changed substantially since the individual model. Previously, the number of religious groups had a significant negative effect while the number of linguistic groups and the ethnic heterogeneity measure both had significant positive effects. In the full model, of those three measures, only the number of linguistic groups is still significant (in the HMLS model only). And, the number of ethnic groups now has a significant and negative effect on both collective rape variables. Why ethnic group diversity would decrease the likelihood of collective rape while linguistic group diversity would increase that same likelihood is not expected or easy to explain with the

157 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Gender Inequality Contraceptive Use 0.006 -0.002 0.008 0.009 Fertility Rate -0.191 0.296 0.128 0.156 Literacy Ratio 0.479 1.439 0.929 1.162 Primary Schooling Ratio 0.022 * 0.024 * 0.009 0.011 Women's Economic Rights -0.274 -0.050 0.218 0.199 Women's Political Rights -0.078 -0.480 ** 0.161 0.160 Women's Social Rights 0.093 0.119 0.195 0.160 Armed Conflict Interstate Armed Conflict 0.250 0.110 0.157 0.175 Internal Armed Conflict 0.205 * 0.196 * 0.082 0.091 Internationalized Internal Armed Conflict 0.180 * 0.177 * 0.088 0.097 Ethnic War 0.157 ** 0.191 ** 0.059 0.073 Genocide 0.193 ** 0.091 0.064 0.081 Revolutionary War -0.026 0.165 0.060 0.088

Table 6.8: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on All Theoretical Variables

158 Table 6.8 Continued

Militarization Percent of Population in the Military -0.758 ** -1.323 *** 0.278 0.352 Percent of National Budget Spent on Defense 0.278 1.006 *** 0.167 0.226 Chief Executive is a Military Officer -0.113 0.638 ** 0.229 0.229 Ethnic Cleavages Number of Ethnic Groups -0.189 * -0.266 * 0.087 0.108 Number of Religious Groups -0.117 -0.046 0.112 0.142 Number of Linguistic Groups 0.059 0.332 ** 0.077 0.112 Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.005 Economic Development Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 0.002 -0.008 * 0.003 0.004 Official Development Assistance Per Capita (logged) 0.036 -0.067 0.098 0.101 Infant Mortality 0.012 * -0.006 0.006 0.007

159 Table 6.8 Continued

World Culture CEDAW Ratification 0.490 * 0.347 0.229 0.220 Trade Openness 0.006 -0.006 0.041 0.033 INGO Memberships -0.021 0.067 0.033 0.039 State Structure Democracy 0.100 0.651 0.315 0.357 Autocracy 0.001 0.553 0.302 0.351 State Terrorism 0.709 *** 1.108 *** 0.129 0.121 Constant -7.891 ** -10.968 *** 2.897 2.650 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -223.134 -300.256 Wald χ2 115.05 *** 284.98 *** ρ 0.234 0.726 0.075 0.034 χ¯2 15.90 *** 458.32 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed text)

160 current available literature. Overall, it is difficult to draw a conclusion about the effects of ethnic cleavages on the likelihood of collective rape occurrence from the full model results.

The effects of economic development on collective rape in the full model are also somewhat changed relative to the earlier model of these predictors alone. Previously, for both HS and HMLS collective rape, GDP and development aid had significant and negative effects but infant mortality was not significant. In the full model, GDP is still significant and negative for only the HMLS outcome. Development aid is no longer significant for either outcome, but infant mortality now has a somewhat significant and positive effect on HS collective rape. Even though the exact relationships have changed in transition to a larger model, the overall meaning is the same. Greater economic development (through mechanisms like a higher GDP and a lower infant mortality rate) is associated with lower risk of collective rape, as expected by prior research.

In the full model, none of the world culture measures are significant for either model. When controlling for other factors, such as armed conflict and gender inequality, these measures cease to have an effect on collective rape. Despite some significant and interesting results in the individual models, and world culture does not seem to be as

important a factor in the prediction of collective rape as they are for other forms of

political violence.

Lastly, two of the relationships between state structure variables and the

dependent variables in the prior models are maintained in the full model—the strong

effect of state terrorism is still present for both HS and HMLS collective rape.

161 Autocracies are no longer significantly different from anocracies in their risk of collective

rape, suggesting that the power structure of the government is less important than its propensity to use violence against its citizens. The strong positive effect of state terrorism seems to be one of the most salient findings of this analysis.

Quality Controls

As a final check of robustness, I modeled both of my collective rape on five quality control measures. These variables are intended measure the quality of the dependent variables, as they were created from news stories. The process of coding collective rape occurrence in country-years from news stories was complicated and untried, so the possibility of bias in the dependent variables exists. If bias is present, it may be affecting the relationships found between predictors and collective rape.

As shown in Table 6.9, three of the five quality control measures were significantly associated with collective rape. The percent of stories with unidentifiable dates and the percent of stories with unidentifiable perpetrators each had a positive effect in the HMLS model. Most “undateable” stories were written retrospectively, after incidents of collective rape had occurred and not by reporters on the spot during events.

It is not necessarily surprising, then, this variable would be positively associated with

HMLS collective rape. HMLS collective rape is often coded from similar retrospective stories, except that those stories contained year ranges from which country-years could be coded. The number of sources (WND Facts on File, The New York Times, and Reuters

Business Briefs) contributing stories each year also had a positive effect on collective rape at both HS and HMLS levels. This relationship means that the sources reporting on

162 High, Medium High Specificitya and/or Low a Specificity Total Number of Stories 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.005 Total Stories by Year -0.002 -0.005 0.010 0.010 Percent of Stories with Unidentifiable Dates 0.622 3.828 *** 0.445 0.703 Percent of Stories with Unidentifiable Perpetrators 1.049 3.517 * 0.927 1.389 Number of Sources by Year 1.219 *** 0.852 *** 0.108 0.096 Constant -3.047 *** -3.435 *** 0.190 0.155 N 3487 3487 Log Likelihood -200.955 -453.433 Wald χ2 206.39 *** 179.92 *** ρ 0.195 0.668 0.071 0.039 χ¯2 14.08 *** 686.11 *** a Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors reported *p≤ .05 **p≤ .01 ***p≤ .001 (one-tailed test)

Table 6.9: Unstandardized Coefficients from the Probit Regression of Two Collective Rape Measures on Quality Control Variables

163 mass political sexual violence, the more likely I was to code the existence of a collective rape episode. This relationship is understandable and expected. These findings combined with the sometimes surprising results of the theoretical models strongly advocates for additional research on the predictors of collective rape occurrence.

164

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Collective rape has received greater public attention in the last ten years, but

empirical data about the crime still lags behind. As The United Nations Security Council

stated, “the knowledge about these gender-based differences and inequalities is

increasing rapidly, it is still far from comprehensive.” (2002, 2) Despite work by the legal community, human rights agencies, investigative journalists and academic researchers, some basic questions about collective rape remain unanswered. The Human

Security Centre noted that “No one knows if the incidence of sexual violence in war is increasing or decreasing.” (2005, 108) And Human Rights Watch asks “Why are women

so consistently targeted for this specific type of assault? Ultimately, can wartime sexual

violence be prevented?” (Jefferson 2004, 326) The current literature on collective rape

has been unable to address these questions because it has focused so heavily on historical

episodes and only a limited number of more recent cases, ignoring the larger universe of

cases that might exist. Their theoretical explanations, therefore, have also been limited in

scope and largely untested through rigorous research.

165 To address this need, I developed this dissertation project. The project had three goals: first, to identify the key elements found in all episodes of collective rape and then create a parsimonious and comprehensive operational definition that could guide research on a larger number of cases; second, to create a database of that larger number of cases by identifying and coding all reported cases for a 24-year period; and third, to develop and test several theoretically-driven hypotheses about the structural-level causes of collective rape occurrence.

I accomplished the first goal through a careful study of the available collective rape literature and well-documented cases, resulting in a better-articulated definition of collective rape—as a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated on civilians by agents of a

state or political civil group. This definition identifies four key elements: many forms of

sexual violence are possible; the assaults are multiple and not random; the assailants are

political actors; and the victims are non-combatants. This definition is different from

those in the current literature because it does not assume a relationship between collective

rape and armed conflict, and is applicable to many international cases of collective rape

and not just the Bosnian case or those cases recognized by the International Tribunals.

Using this new definition, I tackled the next goal of creating a cross-national

cross-time database of collective rape episodes. Since news stories have been used in

prior research on collective rape and in creating databases of other forms of political

violence, I chose three news sources (World News Digest Facts on File, The New York

Times, and Reuters Business Briefs) to provide data for this project. Nearly 1,400 news

stories were identified through keyword searches and hand-coded for information on the

166 timing, location, perpetrators and victims of collective rape episodes. In the end, 37

episodes were detected across 160 countries through the years 1980 to 2003. Several of

these episodes had never before been discussed in the collective rape literature, and new

patterns in the timing and location of episodes became evident. Through descriptive

analysis, for example, it was discovered that the number of episodes worldwide grew

between 1980 and 1994, but may have declined somewhat between 1994 and 2003/ At

its peak in 1994, 21 countries were simultaneously experiencing collective rape—a

staggering statistics considering that less than 21 episodes have been documented well in

the existing literature. Unfortunately, trends in collective rape reporting may mean that

the number of episodes in later years is underestimated, since stories often refer to events

in years past. But this opens the door for continued data collection, since the overall

quantity of stories on collective rape has increased dramatically since 1998.

Descriptive analysis also revealed that collective rape has had the strongest

presence in Africa and Asia, and the weakest presence in Western Europe and North

America, where no episodes were counted. Africa experienced the most collective rape

episodes, but only a few more total years of collective rape than Asia, showing that both

regions have been affected by the crime. Latin America experienced several episodes in

the 1980s and early 1990s, but none after 1999, whereas the Middle East and Eastern

Europe experienced most of their episodes after 1990.

As had been suggested but not confirmed in the existing literature, the government was frequently responsible for sexual assault on citizens. In 84% of

episodes, government groups participated in collective rape. Of those groups, the

167 military was the most frequent assailant. But 54% of episodes also included non-

government groups as perpetrators, indicating that civil groups may choose

independently or in response to state repression to commit mass sexual violence of their own. Victims of collective rape can come from any race, ethnicity, religion, political ideology or gender and assaults are often indiscriminate. When victims are targeted because of their group identity, they are most often targeted for their ethnic or political connections.

Descriptive analysis revealed a great deal of new information that was augmented by completion of the third goal—testing seven hypotheses about the causes of collective rape. Collective rape researchers have already suggested that gender inequality, militarization, armed conflict, ethnic cleavages, and economic development may lead to collective rape but have been unable to test these ideas with the available limited data.

Comparison to research on interpersonal rape and political violence confirmed these hypotheses and further suggested that world culture and state structure might influence

collective rape occurrence. Each of these hypotheses was tested using pooled probit

analysis of two indicators for the country-years in which collective rape did and did not

occur. Results revealed that gender inequality, especially in the area of political rights, may contribute to the perpetration of political sexual violence. On the other hand, women’s educational gains also contributed to collective rape occurrence—perhaps suggesting that equality may cause a backlash of violence against women. Militarization, through the mechanisms of military spending and military leadership, had strong effects on collective rape. But contrary to expectations, nations with smaller militaries had

168 higher likelihoods of collective rape occurrence than those with large militaries. This

means that militaries of all shapes and sizes are capable of collective rape, and those

interested in eradicating this crime should be aware of organizations’ propensity to mass

political sexual violence.

Collective rape was more likely to occur during armed conflicts such as internal

armed conflicts, internationalized armed conflicts, ethnic wars and genocides. These

findings support the presumption in the existing collective rape literature that mass

political sexual violence is a product of war and sometimes an integral component of war

strategy. Moreover, this demonstrates that civilians, and women especially, have

frequently been the unwitting victims of the political conflicts happening around them.

Their risk of victimization may increase if ethnic cleavages are present, though the

relationship between ethnic/religious/linguistic divisions and collective rape is not clear.

Diversity in ethnic groups decreases the likelihood of collective rape while diversity in

linguistic groups increases it. How exactly these cleavages affect collective rape should

be explored in further research.

The spread of human rights and gender equality norms through world culture was

expected to discourage collective rape, but the indicators used in this study had little

effect. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against

Women (CEDAW) was actually associated with a higher risk of collective rape, perhaps

demonstrating that signing countries already practice discrimination against women that includes sexual violence. It is very clear from the consistently strong and positive effects of state terrorism that states who practice repression on their citizens are more likely to

169 perpetrate collective rape on their citizens. Since the military may be one of the government groups enacting the terrorism, this demonstrates how collective rape can occur outside of armed conflict situations.

These results suggest several new directions for research on collective rape. As stated above, the relationship between ethnic cleavages and collective rape remains unclear. Also, the hypothesized negative effect of world culture on collective rape received no support so further research, perhaps with different indicators of world culture, seems warranted. Other researchers of collective rape have strongly asserted that gender inequality leads to mass political sexual violence but that idea received only partial support in this study. One issue may be the difficulty of measuring gender inequality across countries, where data quality is notoriously bad and the mechanisms of gender discrimination can vary so widely across societies. But it is also possible that gender inequality truly has little effect on the occurrence or non-occurrence of collective rape—just as interpersonal rape is present in nearly all societies regardless of gender norms and practices, so may collective rape be a pervasive form of violence.

Arguably, the area where further research could achieve the most improvement would be in the measurement of collective rape itself. Analysis showed that the measurement used in this study has significantly affected by the quality of news stories available for coding. It may be possible to reduce some of this effect by substituting or supplementing news stories with other data sources. Alternatives might include reports by IGOs and INGOs such as the U.N. Security Council, U.S. State Department Human

Rights Division, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Preliminary data

170 collection from these last two agencies shows that they have data on many (though not

all) of the same episodes discussed in this study. This difference is largely because of

one of the main drawbacks to this approach: reports from the State Department, Human

Rights Watch and Amnesty are only available from the mid-1990s onward. So although

data quality might be increased by using these sources, data quantity would likely be

decreased.

Another area for potential collective rape measurement improvement would be in

victim magnitude estimates. Most datasets of armed conflict events include ordinal measures of conflict fatalities, such as those shown in Table 4.2. These measures help to demonstrate how severe the violence was, an improvement over simply measuring the presence or absence of violence as was done in this study. Construction of severity measures in this study wasn’t possible because victim estimates were rarely and inconsistently reported in the news stories (see Chapter 4 for potential reasons why), but data collection efforts in the future should strive to include these measures.

In addition to exploring severity as an outcome in future research, the differences

between perpetrator participation should be explored. Not all collective rape episodes

have been committed by the government or military as has been suggested by the existing

collective rape literature. Non-government groups also participate in mass political

sexual violence, and enact that violence against their fellow citizens. Why civil groups

would do that, and whether the same structural factors that cause civil group participation

also cause government participation, would be valuable information to researchers and

activists alike.

171

Despite its limitations and the need for improvement, this project has made several

significant contributions to study of collective rape and other forms of violence and to general knowledge of this crime. This project has identified and analyzed several new episodes of collective rape that greatly increase our awareness and understanding of mass political sexual violence. It has developed and tested multiple causal explanations of collective rape to demonstrate what may and may not lead to the crime’s occurrence. It has challenged theories and research on interpersonal rape and political violence to explain the hybrid crime of collective rape. This is perhaps this project’s most significant contribution to the field of sociology. Research on interpersonal rape has been largely limited to studies of the U.S. and has ignored the possible effects of country-level differences on sexual assault. The results shown here of country-level differences

between episodes of collective rape clearly indicate that research on interpersonal rape

should be expanded to cross-national studies and hypotheses of economic development and militarization. The literature on political violence is cross-national but has been ignorant of any possible relationship between gender and collective violence. Theories

exist that suggest ethnic inequality and class inequality cause political violence, but no

theory or research has yet acknowledged the possible effects of gender inequality on

political violence. This is not surprising considering that the field of political violence

research has not recognized collective rape as a form of political violence. Measures of

armed conflict focus on the number of dead, not the number of raped; indicators of state

terrorism measure the levels of murder, torture, and imprisonment in the population but

172 ignore the levels of sexual violence perpetrated on the populace. This in political violence research can no longer be tolerated. This dissertation has clearly demonstrated that multiple societies have experienced mass political sexual violence and that brutality was conducted in the same contexts and by the same actors as other forms of political violence, so the field of political violence research needs to be expanded to incorporate the reality of sexual and gender-based violence by political groups.

Overall, this project has accomplished its goals and provided answers to some of the outstanding questions about collective rape. Collective rape is not rare or mysterious—it is pervasive social phenomenon generated by structural factors of gender divisions, militarization, armed conflict, economic underdevelopment and state terrorism.

It has occurred in 37 nations in the past 25 years and is likely occurring in several countries at the writing of this dissertation. It has affected the lives of thousands of victims and will continue to do so as long as little is known about its prevalence and causes. This project, in combination with other current and future research, may help to address that issue and provide some recommendations for correcting a serious and devastating worldwide problem.

173

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE NEWS STORIES

174

Reuters 1/12/2003 “UN investigates reports of Cannibalism in Congo.”

Villagers backed up reports of rape, looting and cannibalism in the northeastern part of Congo, the United Nations said Saturday following a weeklong investigation in the region.

"The team interviewed victims as well as witnesses of atrocities who spoke of cases of wholesale rape, of looting ... and also cases of forced cannibalism," said Patricia Tome, the UN spokeswoman in the Congo.

The mission was prompted by reports that two groups, the rebel Congolese Liberation Movement of Jean-Pierre Bemba and its allied Congolese Rally for Democracy-National, had turned viciously on civilians in the course of fighting.

Tome said the investigators sought out Pygmies, who went deep in hiding in the forests there. Pygmies are believed to be the earliest inhabitants of Central Africa, and around 600,000 live in Congo.

A Catholic cleric in the province, Monsignor Melchisedec Sikuli Paluku, told The Associated Press that rebels forced the Pygmies and others to eat human flesh. Some Pygmies taken prisoner were even forced to eat parts of their own bodies, he said.

The report will be presented to United Nations officials, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the high commissioner for human rights. Vieira de Mello is expected in the capital Kinshasa on Sunday.

175

Reuters 8/15/1998 “Military torture, rape and murder terrorises province, says investigator.”

The armed forces have systematically violated human rights in the province of Aceh and should be brought to justice, a member of a fact-finding team said yesterday.

Parliamentarian Ghazali Abbas Adan said the military was involved in illegal kidnappings, torture, extrajudicial killings and rapes in the North Sumatran province.

"We are naive if we think they are just procedural violations," said Mr Adan, just returned from a five-day visit to Aceh.

It was declared a area in 1991.

The military brought in red-beret Special Forces troops to fight the Free Aceh Movement.

The local parliament has listed 1,679 people who have disappeared in the resource-rich region. The Ummat Muslim weekly magazine reported yesterday that between 1,000 and 1,420 bodies were buried in mass graves at 10 locations in Aceh.

A local farmer, Ismail, told a human rights forum in Aceh last week he saw masked men dump 17 naked bodies into a river at Bukit Tengkorak in North Aceh in 1990.

Ummat said between 250 and 315 skeletons were dumped at the site, known as Skeleton Hill.

However, Colonel Dasiri Musnar, military commander of Lilawangsa region in Aceh, said: "There is no forensic evidence that the killing fields exist."

The Banda Aceh Legal Aid Foundation reports 625 women were raped and tortured in Aceh between 1990 and 1996.

A woman from Ujong Leubat village, identified as C. S., told the fact-finding team she was raped by three soldiers in 1992. "After I was raped I fainted. In the morning I was kicked out and pushed to a river. I was asked to swim," said C. S., whose husband was suspected of supporting the Free Aceh Movement. Her husband, Yunus, was arrested at the same time and disappeared. Sources told C. S. her husband was executed in public by the military.

Amnesty International says up to 2,000 civilians and members of the Free Aceh Merdeka movement were killed between 1989 and 1993.

176

The New York Times 1/11/1981 SALVADORAN REBELS SAY STARTS

SAN SALVADOR, Jan. 10 - Salvadoran soldiers dumped the bodies of 22 young people in a pile on the asphalt parking lot behind the six story judical center in the capital last night.

The victims, who appeared to be in their early 20's, were dressed in civilian clothes. Many were barefoot, others were wearing rubber thongs or tennis shoes.

A civilian guard said there were 18 men and 4 women. He said the women had been raped. Several showed signs of having been shot at close range.

Military sources said the victims were subversives. The killings occurred yesterday afternoon in a gully of mud and stucco shanties just off the main highway, seven miles north of the center of the city. Witnesses said today that the victims were eating in a house when a patrol of soldiers surrounded it at about 3:30 P.M. yesterday.

Standing in front of her house across the alley, a neighbor said soldiers had fired automatic weapons and had thrown two grenades. There were thick pastes of dirt and blood on the cement floors in two of the five rooms. Clothes and papers were strewn about two other rooms. The walls were filled with bullet holes. There was no evidence that the victims had returned the fire.

The military reported no casualties of its own in the attack although two soldiers were reportedly injured in fighting in another neighborhood.

177 WND Facts on File 02/09/1990

Somalia: 50,000 Civilian War Deaths Reported

The armed forces of Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre's regime had killed an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 civilians in two years of civil war in northern Somalia, according to a report issued January 18 by the U.S.-based human rights group Africa Watch. [See 1989 Somalia: Unrest Threatens Government; Other Developments]

The report said that the Siad Barre government was effectively "at war with its own people." Frustrated at its failure to defeat the rebels of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the army had allegedly turned to indiscriminately bombing and shelling civilian areas suspected of sympathizing with the guerrillas, as well as shooting many noncombatants at point-blank range.

Troops had also sowed landmines across wide areas and deliberately destroyed water reservoirs and livestock, the report said. Members of the Issaq clan (the major ethnic group of northern Somalia that provided the SNM with its base of support) had been systematically persecuted, according to the 183-page survey, which was based on interviews with Somali refugees.

"Entire regions have been devastated by a military . . . resembling a foreign occupation force that recognizes no constraints on its power to kill, rape or loot," the report charged.

The fighting had forced nearly half a million refugees to leave the country--most of them to --and displaced another 400,00 people inside Somalia.

Government atrocities had reportedly spread from the north to central and southern Somalia in 1989, as Siad Barre's regime was confronted with two more : the Somali Patriotic Movement, based among the Ogadeni clan, and the United Somali Congress, based among the Hawiye clan.

Africa Watch also criticized the SNM for executions of civilian and military officials and attacks against Ethiopian refugees. In addition, the report faulted the U.S., Somalia's main arms supplier, for failing to condemn the latest government abuses.

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