Reclaiming the Homeland
A Case Study of The Gambian Diaspora
Jankeh Jobe
International Relations Department of Global Political Studies Bachelor Programme – IR103L 15 credits Spring/2018 Supervisor: Michael Strange
1 Abstract
This thesis seeks to analyse the role of the Gambian diaspora activists in Gambian politics particularly during the December 1st, 2016, Presidential election in which the long-time dictator Yahya Jammeh was defeated by the less experienced and known Adama Barrow. Despite an extensive mobilization effort over the past twenty-two years, spanning across continents, the fragile and disorganized Gambian diaspora has been unable to exert influence in Gambian politics due to unfavourable domestic conditions such as the unwillingness of the opposition to unite as well as state repression. However, the formation of coalition 2016 provided the diaspora activists an opportunity to engage effectively in mobilizing against the Jammeh regime through their online media platforms as well as financial contribution. By using a multi-level research design using interviews and document analyses, the thesis explores the mobilization strategies of the Gambian diaspora as means of influencing at both the homeland and international levels.
Key Words. Diasporas, The Gambia, Influence, Social Movement, Framing, Political Mobilization.
Word Count: 15203.
2 Table of Contents
Chapter One: Introduction ...... 4 1.0 Introduction ...... 4 1.1 Purpose and Relevance of the study ...... 6 1.2 The Research Question ...... 8 1.3 Structure of the thesis ...... 9
Chapter Two: Previous Research, Concepts, and Theories ...... 9 2.0 Introduction ...... 10 2.1 Diaspora Defined ...... 10 2.1.1 Defining Diasporas in International Relations ...... 11 2.2 Diaspora in International Politics ...... 16 2.3 Theoretical Framework: Diaspora as Social Movements ...... 17 2.4 Conclusion ...... 20 Chapter Three: Method and Research Design ...... 21 3.0 Introduction ...... 21 3.1 The Case Study ...... 22 3.3 Material / Data Collection ...... 24 3.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews ...... 24 3.3.2 Secondary Data ...... 26 3.4 Data Analysis ...... 27 3.5 Challenges ...... 27 3.6 Summary ...... 28
Chapter Four: Reclaiming the Homeland: Analysis of The Mobilization Structure of The Gambian Diaspora ...... 28 4.0 Introduction ...... 28 4.1 Politics under Jammeh 1994-2016 ...... 29 4.2 Framing Issues Around Human Rights and Democracy ...... 33 4.3 Mobilizing against the regime ...... 35 4.4 Conclusion: Reclaiming the Homeland ...... 39
5. Biblography ...... 43
3 Chapter One: Introduction
1.0 Introduction
International Relations as a field of study has acknowledged the ever-expanding salience of non- state actors in international politics but studying diasporas as non-state actors is just burgeoning in political science (Koinova, 2010). Diasporas are now seen as an example of non-state actors who influence politics in diverse forms. The literature on the role and importance of the diasporas in International relations is becoming increasingly broader as they have the same features as other more studied non-state actors such as being transnational, autonomous and ability to exert their influence to impact political change (Koinova, 2010:149). Latha Varadarajan (2010) argues the diasporas have changed the “narrative of politics as usual”. Similarly, Fiona Adamson (2016) argues, that not only do diasporas challenge the traditional state system but they also form global identities that “transcend” them (Adamson, 2016:291). She further argues that “diasporas are omnipresent and part and parcel of everyday politics around the world (Adamson, 2016: 291).
Similarly, Shain and Barth (2003:49) elaborated on the growing scholastic acknowledgment about the significance of the diasporas in “international behavior” in reference how diverse diasporas such as the Armenian, Chinese, Jewish, Iranian and Cuban among others have had a profound impact on international affairs in both positive and negative ways. As mobilized groups with a sense of identity, diasporas do play a significant role both in domestic and international politics. As far as local politics is concerned, they may influence both the internal policies of their homelands and host states regarding issues that are of interest to them. In the realm of international relations, they have the power to influence both national foreign policy decisions and the decisions of international organizations. Coban-Ozturk (2015) studied the influence and role of the diaspora using a constructivist approach to Turkish and Armenian relationship and concluded that the diaspora has a significant impact on both nations foreign policy and bilateral relations.
The increasing involvement of the diaspora in both foreign and home politics has led to the diasporas receiving considerable attention from both policymakers and scholars around the world. Nations and policymakers (both public and private) can no longer ignore the importance
4 of the role that diasporas play in foreign relations, economic development and to both domestic and international relations. However, the role of diasporas in international relationships tends to be ignored or understudied regardless of the influential voices of diaspora organizations and their impact on national and international politics. In classical realism and neorealism state- dominated global system, diasporas remain to be seen as substantial political actors. However, “certain realist theorists have attempted to place diaspora within a realist analytic framework by considering it an extension of the homeland state whose role is to promote the homeland’s national interests” (Sheffer, 2006).
This thesis uses social movement theory in an attempt to examine how diasporas engage in transnational politics by studying Gambian diaspora mobilization strategy. Using the Gambian diaspora in Europe and North America as a case study, the thesis seeks to understand the different mechanisms the Gambian diaspora used to mobilize Gambians and non-Gambians in their campaign to “restore democracy” in the Gambia. The interest in Gambian diaspora stemmed from two significant events and the role the diaspora played in them. The first event was the planned military takeover on December 30th 2014 by a group of Gambians, mostly ex- military officers based in the US and Germany and led by a Gambian-American property developer Cherno Njie. The attackers attempted to forcibly overthrow the government of Yayha Jammeh. The coup was thwarted by the State Guard Battalion of Gambia Armed Forces resulting in the death of four people. The dissidents that survived returned to the US where they were arrested and charged in the US under the Neutrality Act. This event not only positioned the Gambian diaspora as an active force in Gambian politics, but forced the US government to get involved by invoking the neutrality act that has not been used for a long time.
The second event that informed my interest in the Gambian diaspora is the role that the diaspora is perceived to have played in the outcome of the December 2016 presidential elections. Members of the diaspora were the primary source of finance for the opposition coalition. In fact, some argue that the successful formation of the Coalition 2016 should be credited to the diaspora activists who first attempted to unite the opposition in 2001 when the electoral laws were changed. According to them, this was an affront on the side of Jammeh who came through a military coup in 1994 ending Gambia’s long history of multiparty democracy for his own benefit. Although initial attempts in 2001, 2006 and 2011 failed, 2016 was seen as the “do or die” year for the diaspora. Equally, this period was also a very brutal period as Jammeh and his security apparatus arrested and tortured some protesting members of the
5 opposition. Hence, the diaspora contributed money to finance the opposition and also engaged the use of the social media and other online mediums to intensify their agitation against Jammeh and his APRC government. Jammeh was eventually defeated by Adama Barrow flag bearer of the coalition camp in a three man race that resulted in the incumbent Jammeh losing.
While the dictatorship in Gambia curtailed the political opposition groups, the most formidable challengers to his rule has been the diaspora. As suggested, the diasporas have over time changed the narrative of politics (Varadarajan, 2010) primarily using the internet as well as financial resources. Adamson and Demetriou (2007:491) argue that the term diaspora is “being adopted by both non-state political entrepreneurs, and state elites who are taking advantage of new technologies to use transnational practices of diaspora mobilization as a means of generating material resources and political support in an increasingly integrated global economy.” The mobilization strategy of the Gambian diaspora as an attempt to influence regime change in the Gambia is the focus of this thesis.
1.1 Purpose and Relevance of the study
In April 2016, two crucial non-violent protests erupted in Serekunda, The Gambia. The first demonstrations led by late Ebrima Solo Sandeng of the United Democratic Party (UDP) demanded electoral reforms as the December 2016 elections loomed near. This group of protesters were unceremoniously rounded up by the paramilitary police who used force to disperse the small gathering of mostly UDP supporters. Few arrests were made and that included Solo Sandeng, the ringleader who was tortured to death by the security forces. Following Sandeng’s death, a new wave of protests was championed by the leader of the opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) Ousainou Darboe demanding for Solo’s body “death or alive.” Similarly, the paramilitary forces arrested about 50 individuals most of whom were executive members of UDP. The group was arraigned before the courts, charged and later sentenced to three years in jail. The heavy-handedness of the state was criticized globally by mostly human rights organization such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch Article 19 among others.
While these events were erupting in Gambia, there was also a wave of protests by Gambian migrants in many European and American cities not only demanding for electoral reforms but
6 for the former president Yahya Jammeh to step down (#JammehMustGO). One of the most visible groups was the Scandinavian Gambian diaspora group. They organized protests in Oslo, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. The demonstrations were meant to expose the human rights atrocities of the Jammeh regime by garnering international support. Whether these protests had any bearing on the government at home at the time is debatable. However, one can argue that it exposed the regime’s human rights violations more broadly.
In the Sub Saharan Africa, although evolving, few studies exist that explore diaspora activism. The works of Jenny Kuhlmann, who explores politically active Zimbabweans in UK, give us an idea or an opening to this debate from the African diaspora perspective. Secondly, Victoria Bernal’s work on Eritrean diaspora equally supports our interest. While this study is also a country specific it hopes to add to this relatively new but growing literature on diaspora activism and transnational politics in Sub Saharan Africa and their role in international relations.
Over the past decades, the diasporas have had an increasing influence in politics both at their countries of origin and host countries. The rising sway of the diaspora has had an enormous impact on policymakers when making their policy decisions because they have to factor in the diasporas, irrespective of their countries of origin or host countries. Thus, this thesis aims to explore the mobilization strategy of the Gambian diaspora in the West towards their homeland (Gambia) politics. More research needs to be done on the diaspora phenomenon in international relations as their increasing influence is having an unprecedented impact on both domestic and international politics. Notably, there is a need to study specific diaspora groups as many previous studies focused on the diasporas as one whole entity without taking many accounts of particular diaspora groups effect on both domestic and international politics. This case study aims to explore the mobilization strategy of the Gambian diaspora in West and the impact it has in Gambian electoral politics, particularly in the December 2016 presidential election.
Historically, the first Gambian diaspora communities started in Scandinavia, Sweden, and Norway precisely. However, today, there are many diaspora communities in many parts of Europe and North America as well as other African countries. While acknowledging the role played by different diaspora communities in Gambian politics, this thesis focuses on those communities based in the West. The aim is to understand and bring to the table how the politically active Gambian diaspora operates in the international political system through their
7 mobilization efforts against the regime of Yahya Jammeh. The size of the Gambian diaspora has probably rendered it irrelevant to study for other political scientists, but this thesis takes the position that while small in comparison to other diasporas such as the Eritrean and Zimbabwean there should be more attention given their role in the social, political and economic developments in their homeland. This thesis aims to join the works of (Jenny, 2010b, Jenny, 2010a, Bernal, 2005, Bernal, 2006) to delve into African diaspora activism.
1.2 The Research Question
The gap in African diasporic literature is what this thesis aims to contribute to as diasporas from the African continent are becoming more relevant in International Relations as they blur the lines on the interaction among states in the international political system as a non-state actor. There is little doubt that the role of non-state actors has achieved remarkable attention within political science scholarship. A growing amount of literature is now focusing on effects and influence of diaspora mobilizations and their increasing political importance (Vertovec 2005). There is a proliferation of diaspora groups actively involved in politics with increasing influence especially aided by globalization and technological developments which enables them to influence policies by attracting the attention of both state and non-state actors (Adamson, 2016:291). Sheffer (2003) argues that due to their size, the different levels that they operate in and various other factors, diasporas have achieved a significant role as political actors in both homeland and host nation politics. According to Sheffer (2003), diaspora groups operate on five different levels in politics, at the domestic, regional, trans-state levels and the level of the whole diaspora and the homeland politics level. In each of these levels, the role of the diaspora is preservation, defense, and promotion of the interests of its communities (Sheffer, 2003). Therefore, this thesis explores the question, in what ways did the Gambian diaspora mobilize against the Jammeh regime and what impact did their mobilization strategies have on Gambian politics, particularly outcome of the December 1st, 2016 presidential elections.
The scope of this question might seem broad since it deals with diasporas as a network of actors. However, we want to take a slightly different approach by examining the politically active diaspora groups. Thus, the focus of this study will be the mobilization strategy of the Gambian diaspora and how it informs on domestic Gambian politics. It also considers how and if the outcome of the December 1st, 2016 Presidential election in The Gambia was influenced
8 to an extent by such non-state actor (diaspora). The Gambian diaspora has since the aftermath of the 1994 military takeover led by Yahya Jammeh undertaken mobilization efforts via the use of the creation of advocacy groups, online radios, and newspapers to mobilize and influence Gambian politics.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
In chapter one, I presented an introduction to this thesis and made an argument for the relevance of studying diasporas in International Relations. In chapter two, I will introduce the previous research on diasporas and provide a working definition of the term for this thesis. I will also engage in the debate on the meaning of the word and discuss the different approaches and theories applied to the study of diasporas, a discussion on the theoretical framework for this thesis will follow. In chapter three, I explain the research design and the methodology that was used in gathering the data and how the data was analysed. The choice of case selection and the limitations is also discussed. In chapter four, I will analyse the findings of the thesis looking at the mobilization structure of the Gambian diaspora and if by exploring political opportunities, framing issues and mobilization strategies they achieved influence.
Chapter Two: Previous Research, Concepts, and Theories
9 2.0 Introduction
This chapter delves into the scholarly debate regarding the definition of the concept of diaspora, the essentialist and constructivist discussion and engages with previous research that has been done by other International Relations (IR) scholars on the role of diasporas in politics. It also presents the debate regarding theories best suited to study diasporas and lay the foundation for my choice of the argument for this thesis. The first part of the chapter starts with a conceptual definition of the term diaspora. This is followed by a literature review of the role the diaspora play in international politics. The final part deals with the theoretical framework used in this thesis.
2.1 Diaspora Defined
The literary debate on the definition of diaspora is split into two different camps, those who see diaspora as a descriptive and analytical category (Sheffer 2003) and those who view diaspora as a social construct which are created from an ideological standpoint (Brubaker 2005). Scholars such as Sökefeld using a constructivist framework of identity take the viewpoint that diasporas are not an inevitable result of migration but rather the product of “specific processes of mobilization” that should happen for diasporas to be created. The proponents of the essentialist debate such as Sheffer argues that diasporas are formed via a process of migration. The critics of this view such as Sökefeld employ a constructivist viewpoint that while crossing national borders is, in fact, a part of the diaspora creation process that alone does not qualify the use of the label diaspora. They argue that the actual creation of a diaspora involves certain actors undertaking the task of social and political mobilization and creating identity frames that result in diasporas (Sökefeld 2006; Sökefeld 2008; Adamson 2012).
To conceptualize the reach and significance of diaspora one must begin with a definition of the term. According to Adamson and Demetriou (2007), a diaspora can be defined “as a social collectivity that exists across state borders, and that has succeeded over time to sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland.” Other scholars have defined diaspora as a “stance, and as a social construct, Vertovec (1997) notes that ‘diaspora is the term used today to describe practically any population which is considered “deterritorialized” or “transnational.” A clear example of this is that as of May 2013 some 42,597 Journal Storage
10 (JSTOR) citations included the use of the term, this variety in use of the idea is equally numerous and points to why International Relations can no longer ignore these groups in society (Dodson, 2014: 48).
2.1.1 Defining Diasporas in International Relations “If words could change the world, the diaspora is one of those terms that promised much but delivered little” (Virinder et al., 2005: 8). What constitutes a diaspora, how are they created, and why are they essential in International Relations? The role diasporas play in international relations is that as groups with strong ties to both homeland and host nations they have the power to influence both national and international policies. In recent times, there has been a proliferation in the use of the term diaspora in both academic and policy circles (Kee, 2014). This interest has become a springboard to the recent literature on the influence and impact of diasporas on their homeland political processes.
Shain and Barth (2003) agree that diasporas defy the “traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty” and thus play an essential role in the interplay between domestic and international politics. Liberalism is an IR theory that is cognizant of the role non-state actors’ play in international relations. More specifically the ascendance of neoliberalism has given attention to the interdependence of state and non-state actors acting through various channels in ways that reflect the activities of diasporas (Keohane and Nye 2000). International Relations has gotten more complicated due to actions of transnational political activism undertaken by diasporas, relations between diasporas, homeland and their countries of settlement result in an intricate, interdependent relationship between these three poles (Wahlbeck, 2002:229).
Braziel and Mannur (2003) posit that the term diaspora is very difficult to define, similarly, William Safran (2005:36) shared such an opinion. He asserted that the term diaspora was studied for a long time almost exclusively about the Jews and was largely ignored by both political scientists and historians because it was taken to apply only to the specific case of the dispersion of Jews from the Holy Land. Originating from a Greek noun which means “the shattered” or “dispersed people, it was first widely used to refer to the Jews who were displaced from their homeland (Wahlbeck, 2002:229). As Sheffer (2003) states, the definition of the term was as recently defined as “the dispersion of Jews among the gentile nations” and has since then been used in a wide range of disciplines to explain various movements of people.
11 I differ from the view that diasporas should refer only to Jews or other people who have been forcibly dispersed from their original homelands. There are voluntary migrant communities that have shown significant attachment to the home such as the Gambian diaspora. Cohen (2008) argues that the concept of diaspora is mostly used to relate to transnational migrants, but specific criteria must be fulfilled to be labeled a diaspora. Vertovec (1997) argues that ‘diaspora is the term used today to describe any population which is considered “deterritorialized” or “transnational.” This is something that Safran agrees with as he argues that the proliferation of the use of the term has seen it been used in a wider variety of people (Safran, 2008:39). As he puts it, the diaspora is now used as “a metaphoric designation' to describe different categories of people “expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities tout court.” People who are dispersed for various reasons not related to “catastrophic events” or forced dispersal have come to call themselves diaspora (Van Hear, 2014). Equally, Amirth (2011:57) shares the same perspective stating that “at its most imprecise, the diaspora has become synonymous with migration; almost any migrant group is now labeled a diaspora.”
The overuse of the term has created confusion and debate within scholars of humanities and social sciences which cannot seem to agree on the definition of the word, its features, limits and social dynamics (Vertovec, 2005:2). As Roger Brubaker argues “If everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so.” Scholars such as Fiona Adamson (2012) are of the opinion that diaspora is not a term that simply describes but is also a prescriptive term that can be used to explain the creation of a “deterritorialized, social, cultural or political community.” This explanation of the diaspora aligns with the view of this thesis that migrant groups can redefine themselves and create a community that extends beyond borders of a particular state and use the label of diaspora. A key characteristic of diasporas is indeed in “trans political linkage to the homeland,” and this takes several different forms be it cultural economic and demographic influences (Safran, 2008:45)
The subject of diasporas encompasses a range of debates within International Relations that will be addressed in this section of the paper. Adamson and Demetriou (2007:492) state that the role that the study of diasporas accords to IR theorist is that serves a means to “empirically” investigate the correlation between the “structural and material aspects of “stateness” and the ideation and cultural aspects of “nationess.” The authors argue that the minimal literature in IR
12 regarding diasporas has so far mostly been written from a postmodernist perspective with the aim of bringing attention to “marginalized identities or practices as a means to critiquing hegemonic conceptions of state and the hegemonic discourse in IR” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007:495). Shain and Barth (2003) looked at the different roles diasporas play in international relations, with the intention of integrating them in IR theory. To explain the part of the diasporic actor, they suggest that even though diasporas are always located outside of their home county, diasporas expand the meaning of the term “domestic politics to include politics not just inside the state but the people”.
This gap in the discourse of diasporas is the foundation for a discussion on the relevance of diasporas in International Relations. By using a constructivist framework and a case study methodology, the authors concluded that diasporic practices and identities need to be explored together with “important factors that challenge the organizational and spatial logic of the contemporary state system” (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007). Proponents of the constructivist approach to the study of diasporas see them as social constructs that are engineered by “cultural engineers” (Sheffer, 2003:19).
Safran (1991) endeavored to come up with a “closed conceptual model” for the definition of diasporas; this was done to the limit the use of the term to groups who exhibited some of six characteristics. The first of which was that the group had to have been dispersed to two or more countries. The second was that the group had to have a common memory of the homeland, thirdly the group must feel that they will not be accepted by the host county, fourthly that the group must have an idealized memory of their homeland. The fifth and sixth is that members of the group should have a duty to protect the homeland and to have continued relations with their homeland respectively. While it is commendable that Safran endeavored to come with the characterization of diasporas especially considering the current “misuse” of the word, some of his characterization of what makes a diaspora is problematic, and scholars such as Cohen (1996) have also disputed some of his conceptualization. Not all his characterization hold true across all diasporas. My disagreement with some of Safran´s characterization is that for starters the dispersion does not have to be to more than one land.About his second characteristic, I argue that the group does not have to have a collective memory of the homeland, some might have a positive memory of the motherland while others have less positive memories, a fact that characterizes the Gambian diaspora. While those that were forced to migrate shared a contrary
13 notion about the homeland and mostly the regime, others that had it easy are somehow indifferent. The third point that the group must feel unaccepted by the host country does not hold true as there are many examples of current day diasporas who are very much integrated into their host countries and many host countries that undertake different programs and initiatives to ensure that diasporas feel welcome and as part of the society. For instance, Sweden has a robust multicultural society were diasporas are very much appreciated due to decades of Sweden adopting multicultural policies. Fourthly, the idea that one must have an idealized notion of the homeland is another point that varies from individual to individual. I agree with his fifth characterization but it is true that diaspora almost universally do have an interest in their homelands while the sixth is also something that holds true for most diasporas.
Cohen (1996) agreed with Safran on three of his characterizations of diasporas, made changes to two of them and added to four more characterizations for what “common features” constitutes a diaspora. Both scholars agree that the dispersion should be from the homeland to two or more foreign lands, I disagree with both Cohen and Safran on this point. While I agree that there should be a dispersion to a foreign land it does not have to be to more than one foreign land. The second which holds true for most diasporas is the movement of people in pursuit of work, trade or to “further colonial ambitions” does not cover the vast range of reasons why people migrate from their homelands both voluntarily and involuntarily. Both scholars agree that there should be a shared memory of the homeland and as earlier stated there do not have to be a uniformity in the memories of the homeland. The fourth feature that there has to be an “idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety, and prosperity, even to its creation” (Cohen, 1996:525), this is a something that is common for most diasporas. The fifth feature that there has to be the development of a return movement that gains approval is present in some diasporas especially diasporic communities that are as a result of the conflict in their home state, but it is not a characteristic of all diasporas. The sixth feature is one that most scholars agree on; this is a characterization that there should be a “strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and the belief in a common fate” is a characteristic of most diasporas. However, this is equally problematic. For instance, while such may hold for diaspora such as the Jews that are of the same ethnicity, it might be different from that of Gambians due to the fact the Gambia was a colonial creation with more than ten ethnic groups cohabiting.
14
The seventh feature is the existence of “troubled relationship” with the host state, implying a lack of acceptance in the host state but this is not a characteristic that is reflective of all diasporas. Some diasporas enjoy very harmonious relationships with host states. A sense of “empathy and solidarity with other co-ethnic members in other countries” which is Cohen's eight feature does not apply to all diasporas but does exist in some diasporas such as anti-regime diasporas who develop a sense of kinship with other members across geographical boundaries who share their political stance. The ninth feature which is the existence of a possibility of a “distinctive yet creative life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism”, this feature is real for all diasporas that end up in countries with tolerance for pluralism such as the United States and Sweden as examples. Cohen’s scholastic input on the study of diasporas is especially significant considering the contested nature of the diaspora studies but as Cohen himself acknowledges no one diaspora can exhibit all the nine features (Cohen, 1996).
Another definition of diasporas is given by Adamson and Demetriou: (2007:497) who defined diasporas as follows. “A diaspora can be identified as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and has succeeded over time to: (i) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (ii) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collective through a developed internal organizational frame- many scholars adopt work and transnational links” as one that adeptly defines diaspora. Michel Bruneau (1995) labeled diaspora into three different categories namely, entrepreneurial diasporas, religious diasporas and political diasporas in referral to the diverse reasons for dispersion that diasporas exhibit.
As we can see from the scholarly debate about the term diaspora, the discussion primarily revolves around the question of whether it is a constructed concept or is it a natural consequence of migration or dispersion. It is the view of this thesis that diasporas are not a predictable result of movement but rather that it is a construct. As Martin Sökefeld argues the creation of a diaspora community does not have to emerge because of dispersion but that it can sometimes take many years or not happen at all (Sökefeld, 2006:275). Due to the complexity in what is a diaspora, it is imperative to be specific on which definition of diaspora I intend to use for this research.
15
This thesis shares the view of Brubaker (2005) that instead of taking diasporas a substantive we should take diasporas as a claim, a stance. This thesis thus defines diaspora as a socially constructed stance created by political entrepreneurs who employ identity frames, and the people who subscribe to and identify themselves to such structures are members of that diaspora.
2.2 Diaspora in International Politics
Diasporic and ethnic interest groups influence on IR is an issue that has aroused a lot of contention and attention. Scholars have endeavoured to come up with analytical frameworks that could account for diasporas current rise in influence and impact. This subject has been studied from several perspectives one of which is from the context of ethnic lobbying with scholars such as Ambrosio 2002 stating that diasporas become successful in their home land- related issues by employing the use of three significant tools, framing, information and policy analysis and policy oversight. For Shain and Barth (2003) the ability by diasporas to exert influence occurs when motive and opportunity exists, this means that diasporas themselves must have both the desire to have impact and the capability to do so. Huntington (1997); Ambrosio (2002) and Lyons and Mandaville (2012) point that diasporas have a significant impact on homeland and host state politics while Collier and Hoeffler (2000) have studied how diaspora play a role in financing homeland conflicts.
Smith (2003), Itzighson (2000) and Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003) argue that the increased influence of diasporas can also be attributed to weak states that court their diasporas to ensure that remittances flow into their countries as diasporas serve as a valuable source of funds. This dependence on remittances serves as motivation for these developing nations to listen to the members of their diasporas thus giving them influence in shaping policies.
McCormick (2012) states that for a diaspora to be successful in influencing policy the group must have the organizational capacity and capability to get its message across to both policymakers and its supporters. Martha Koinova (2012) using an example of the Iranian diaspora argue that “diasporic institutions have different autonomy in their ability to solicit funds, instrumentalize interests, and frame meanings vis-a-vis homeland politics.” Using their global media presence, they act as political entrepreneurs aiming to bring about regime change
16 in Iran. Adamson (2005) has also elaborated on how globalization has resulted in increased ability for groups such as diasporas can achieve influence by trying to engage with a wider audience in a bid bring attention to their causes and engage with others, which could lead to being able to bring “political change in the target state” and by linking their causes to existing discourses which can result in both political and material support.
Shain (1994) argues that ethnic groups can have significant roles in the democratization of their native countries. This influence is achieved via contesting the regimes legitimacy on the international level, challenging the regimes efforts to suppress dissidents, bringing attention to human rights violations committed by the regime, putting obstructions to the government maintaining friendly relations with other nations through effective lobbying and also via supporting and actively participating in the building of domestic opposition. He further argues that the ability of diasporas in the United States to influence foreign policy was helped by the fall of communism which made it more “complex” for the United States to differentiate between friends and foes (Shain, 1994: 812). By applying pressure on decision makers on issues such as democratization and human right abuses existing in their home countries, diasporic groups take on the role of being a moral compass for American foreign policy. Ambrosio (2002) argues that there is not enough attention accorded to the legitimacy of diaspora and ethnic group influence on foreign policy and that this growing influence should be further studied, and that case study analysis is required to do so as it enables us to see why and how individual diasporas can influence at the policy level. 3741667
Vanderbush (2014) used the example of the Iraqi diaspora and their success in convincing both the public and the Congress of the United States of the benefits of getting rid of Saddam Hussein as an example of how influential diaspora groups can be.
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Diaspora as Social Movements
Building on the existing research on the subject of diasporic influence in international politics, the theoretical framework for this study will be outlined in this section of this chapter. The scholarly attentions accorded to the diaspora from various disciplines have used a wide range of theories to study, but a few have used social movement theory as a means to explore them with a few exceptions such as Fiona Adamson (Adamson 2005; Adamson 2013). Social movement theory will be used as the theoretical bridge that links diaspora activities with the research question of what role they play in homeland politics.
17 Social movement theory offers a beneficial framework for studying diaspora movements. Social movements have been defined as the systematic and collective efforts to create or to resist “large-scale change in the social order by non-institutionalized means”. Scholars such as Della Porta and Diani proposed four characterizations of social movements, informal interaction networks, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action focusing on conflicts and use of protest. They further define social movements as “networks of interaction between different actors which may either include formal organizations or not, depend on shifting circumstances” (Della Porta and Diani, 2004:15-16). Applying these definitions to diasporas, one sees why social movement theory as proposed by Sökefeld (2006) and Adamson (2008) offer an excellent framework to study diaspora groups. Social movements are agents of change who challenge the status quo by raising new ideas, demanding action and finding new ways to initiate action (Sökefeld, 2006:268). Sökefeld (2006, 2008) state that the concept of the collective identity which is paramount in all diaspora groups mirrors that same processes as social movements.
Thus, social movement theory will be the point of departure for this thesis, working with the premise that political opportunities, mobilizing structures and practices and framing applied to diasporas studies can also show how they mobilized against the Jammeh regime. The use of social movement as mentioned earlier in this thesis is not commonly used in diaspora studies, but scholars such as Sökefeld (2006) have advocated for applying social movement theory to study diaspora formation. However, this thesis will go beyond the formation process of diaspora and will also use social movement theory as a valuable tool in understanding how diasporas mobilize against autocratic regimes. The issue of framing which is one of the leading features of social movement comes into play with non-state actors producing influence in international politics. Through making conditions into problems that require action and defining grievances, diaspora groups like social movements have an impact on both national and international politics.
According to Diani (1992), all social movements share three criteria "a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, and organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity"(Diani, 1992:1).
Social movement framework which has been touted by scholars such as Adamson (2008) as a great tool to understanding diaspora as is based on three variables, political opportunities, mobilizing structures and practices and framing (Sökefeld, 2006:269). Adamson (2008) and Sökefeld (2006) posit that the use of social movement theory is best applied to the
18 study of diasporas. Adamson (2008) seeks to explain how using this argument enables us to see diasporas as a form of transnationalism that develops from a process of “strategic social construction and framing” which is undertaken to create a sense of shared identity. Such a task involves the participation of people who employ ideologies that serve as the framework for identification by members of different social networks. The concept of diaspora centers on the issue of identity, people have to identify as members of a certain diaspora for that particular diaspora group to exist. Therefore, the question becomes who creates these identifiers and what measure is undertaken to “mobilize” people who then accept that identity (Sökefeld, 2006:266). Thanks to new modes of communication and globalization it has become much more comfortable to mobilize people for forms of community and identity to be created (Sökefeld, 2006:269).
Sökefeld defines diasporas as “imagined transnational communities” with people from different locations brought together as an imagination of a shared community, this definition has been used to study the many diasporas using the concepts from social movement theory and constructivism to explore how and under which circumstances groups have created a diaspora and influenced politics. There is a vast literature on social movement and these centers on three variables, political opportunities, mobilizing structures and practices and framing (Sökefeld, 2006:269). Much of the literature on the influence of non-state actors in the policy formulation is derived from one of the concepts of a social movement which is the issue of framing. This relates to the conscious strategizing undertaken by people to “fashion shared understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam 1996: 6).
Political opportunities refer to the conditions, structural as well as institutional that have to exist to facilitate the creations of social movements. Scholars such as Sidney Tarrow have emphasized the importance of such opportunities and stress that social actions are not a natural result of grievances but that “contextual and structural conditions” are necessary to enable these grievances to be expressed and turned into social movement (Sökefeld, 2006:269). Political opportunity allows the examination of circumstances that explain the creation and success of social movements.
Framing which as earlier mentioned refers to the conscious strategizing undertaken by people to “fashion shared understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” refers to specific ideas that create a shared understanding of a movement by giving particular events meaning that establishes a common framework of
19 interpretation and representation. These are the ideas that construct certain conditions into issues that articulate the grievances and make them into a call to action.
The mobilizing structure and practices centers on structures that serve as “collective vehicles informal as well as formal through which people mobilize and engage in collective action,” such can help people who are bounded by a specific issue or grievance. It can also take the form of a more organized and formal structure created to take a stance on a particular problem or issue. These structures also enable targeted practices that would allow individuals to partake and thus become part of the movements; such methods can take the form of demonstrations, online campaigns, etc. (Sökefeld, 2006:269).
For a social movement to be called prosperous, it should attain the position of being seen as a valid representative of a cause by political adversaries. So, a successful movement is based on the idea of acceptance by political actors and the acquisition of “new advantages” (Gamson, 1990:28-29). For this thesis, I will use political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing as advanced by Sökefeld, (2006) to illustrate how Gambian diaspora activists mobilized against the regime.
2.4 Conclusion This chapter has endeavoured to engage with the debate regarding diasporas, from the meaning of the term, to their role in international politics. I have also presented my theoretical framework of studying the Gambian anti-regime diaspora as a social movement. Mainly, I am interested in their mobilization structure, framing and the political opportunities that provided them with the tools to engage in homeland politics.
20
Chapter Three: Method and Research Design
3.0 Introduction
The choice of research method and design rests on the phenomenon one wants to study, and the specific research question(s) asked. This thesis in its bid to explore the mobilization strategy and success of Gambian diaspora activists employed purely qualitative data to describe the activities of the politically engaged Gambian diaspora activists and their mobilization strategies. For more than two decades, the Gambian diaspora has been actively engaged in homeland politics. First, they lobbied the government of their host states to take action against the dictatorial regime of Jammeh through letters and petitions. Secondly, they partnered with
21 international human rights organization to highlight the human rights violation in the Gambia. Thirdly, they worked with opposition political parties in Gambia to agitate for regime change through opposition unity. Finally, they engaged directly through military means to topple the regime of Jammeh as well as using social media to mobilize against Jammeh.
This research has an interpretive approach, meaning that this thesis agrees with the school of thought that the social world is “subjectively created” (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 40). In this research, I argue that “knowledge of the social world can be gained through interpreting the meanings which give people reasons for acting” (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 6). As mentioned earlier this thesis views diaspora as a phenomenon that is socially constructed by political entrepreneurs.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the research strategy employed, which adopts a case study design. The second deals with how data was collected and the final part discuss how data was analyzed as well as the challenges that I confronted during this research project.
3.1 The Case Study
The choice of a case study for this thesis was not random as mentioned earlier in the literature review. The term diaspora has become so overused that there are so many groups that are identified as diaspora, so, it is virtually impossible to study diasporas as a whole. An advantage of using a case study research method is that it allows me to focus and to intensively examine the phenomena of how the Gambian diaspora mobilized against the Jammeh regime (Halperin and Heath, 2012:206). Creswell (2012:97) argues that a case study can be seen as a methodology that covers questions of scientific inquiry at a broader level rather than just being seen as a method. A case study is considered to be good if it fulfils two characteristics; the first being that it should say something interesting about the phenomena being studied and that should contribute to the academic literature on the subject matter (Halperin and Heath 2012:205).
This case study of the Gambian diaspora is a case of how a diaspora can become a player in homeland politics using strategic mobilization, framing, and utilizing political opportunities in the international arena to impact homeland politics. The use of case study in this thesis is "as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident" (Yin,
22 2003:13). My approach in this thesis is to explore the role of the politically active diaspora in Gambian politics particularly how their mobilization efforts impacted on the December 2016 presidential elections that ousted the former dictator Yahya Jammeh and his Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) that have ruled the Gambia for two decades. I posited that within this discuss, the role of the diaspora is a construct of the phenomenon of political competition in the Gambian setting. Specifically, the diaspora activists as a unit of analysis with multiple actors, as highlighted above consist of many interests. It is worth mentioning that diasporas are not homogenous entities who act in once voice (Vertovec, 2005) and that are therefore why this thesis will focus on a specific segment of the Gambian diaspora.
The unit of analysis in this work is focused on the anti-regime segment of the diaspora which takes the form of several individuals, groups, online media houses and organizations who share the common interest of the “liberalization” of The Gambia. From an outside perspective, one can observe that these various groups and interests work in the form of network (Castell). It is important to state this as not all members of the Gambian diaspora are politically active or have shown a vested interest in the politics of the homeland.
The case study accords the opportunity to apply theories and concepts that have been previously used to study other diasporas and see if they will also hold true in the case of the Gambian diaspora. In studying diaspora activism, one needs to pay attention to four different variables, these variables are origin, form, role and goals of the diaspora. These variables can sometimes be interconnected and it is best to study specific segments of diasporas rather than diasporas as a whole thus the relevance of choosing to focus on the Gambian politically active diaspora. By specifically looking at Gambian anti-regime diasporic group and paying attention to their aims and rhetoric it is possible to see how and if their political mobilization works and if the theoretical framework of social movements fits in this case. A critique that has been labeled by using a single case study in research is the problem of generalisability that can arise due to the small number of cases under observation (Halperin & Heath 2012:172). While I agree that this can be true, I also think case studies can help us to compare various cases through the varied perspectives used in analysing a phenomenon. Flyvbjerg (2006:230) agrees with this characterization stating that case studies can act “the force of example” as they can provide detailed and extensive knowledge of the phenomenon studied.
23 3.3 Material / Data Collection
According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:78-80), there are three elements to take into consideration when gathering material for research. Selection bias should be avoided and thus ensure that the content collected is relevant to the question, the credibility of the content must be unquestionable to the validity of the research and lastly that the documents should be accessible. In this study, data collection was done using primary data, which consisted of mostly semi-structured interviews of key members of the diaspora activists including members of political parties in the diaspora party branches. Secondary data such as newspaper articles and publications by mostly the diaspora groups were used to corroborate the information gathered from the interviews.
3.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
The primary data for this study as noted above was based on in-depth interviews with leaders of the five most visible diaspora political groups, ten individuals randomly selected through Facebook and three members of political party branches in the diaspora.
The first groups of individuals interviewed were the head or key members of the most visible Gambian diaspora groups. Two are based in the US and three in Europe. However, most of these groups have branches both in Europe and US. I see these organizations more like a network and that the selection strategy was done strategically and due to some personal connection with a member of one of the groups. The individuals that were interviewed were randomly selected on Facebook as most of the engagement against the regime was done on social media. I noticed that Facebook became a handy mobilization tool for the activist or the anti-Jammeh protesters. Whether the same individuals would have protested while in Gambia was not clear. The third group that was interviewed are individuals leading political party branches in the diaspora. These party surrogates have some influence on the parties at home. Hence, talking to them availed me the opportunity to understand how the diaspora influence the political parties.
The interviews were conducted between February and August 2017. The interviews conducted for this thesis were semi-structured and opened ended which helped in delving deeper on topics ranging from the motivation of joining the anti-Jammeh movement to the various strategies used. Open-ended questions also contribute in maximizing the response validity of interviews (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). Semi-structured interviews have the
24 advantage of according the researcher the opportunity to delve deeper into the experiences of the interviewee, which in turn leads to data that is more valid but it also has the disadvantage of making it more difficult for the researcher to generalize because the data collected is not standardized due to the fact the question asked to different subjects can vary (Halperin and Heath, 2012:258). The fact that data from these interviews cannot be quantified or re-tested has the effect of making it less reliable (ibid).
The selection of these interviewees based on their elite status with prominent diaspora movements and their positions in the movements makes them a source of superior and even privileged information. When using elite interviews, sampling can be done by selecting key individuals who are in positions of importance and thus are perfect for getting specific insights (Björnehed, 2012: 68). Being a Gambian and having a bit of a social contact within certain diaspora political organizations played a role in my ability to get access to these particular individuals.
As most of the elite members of the diaspora organizations including the political party surrogates that I interviewed were based in the United Kingdom and the United States, I talked them via telephone calls mostly using “WhatsApp.” As Halperin and Heath (2012) states telephone interviews allow for people from the world over to be interviewed if they own or can have access to a telephone. Since members of the diaspora interviewed were not located in one place and it was not possible to travel halfway around the world to talk to them so the use of telephone interview was best suited, cost and time are two factors that a researcher needs to take into consideration when deciding what type of data collecting method to choose (Halperin and Heath, 2012:259).
A disadvantage of telephone interviews is that it can be a little impersonal and it might be impossible to ask lengthy questions as the subjects might not have too much time to talk and body language cannot be gauged. During my conversations with them, it was easy to build a rapport due to the sense of kinship based on our shared nationality and discussions regarding the regime change in The Gambia, but I was very conscious not to show any political leanings. I made sure to ensure that the topic and aim of the thesis was articulated to them at the beginning of the conversations and that they had the option of declining to answer any question that they felt uncomfortable answering.
25 Before the interviews, I had created a set of questions that served as a guide for the discussions, and while there were instances where we diverted from the topic at hand, the interview guide enabled me to guide the conversations back to the aim question of this thesis. The interviews were conducted in mostly in English and but we occasionally resorted to our local Gambian language, Wolof. Regarding the types of question asked Leech (2002: 667-668) advises the use of different kinds of questions in interviews to get more from the interviewee and this is something that I used in my discussion by applying a combination of “grand tour questions and “example questions.” Example questions were asked by asking them to provide specific instances of their activism.
One of the diaspora organisations elites that I interviewed was based in Helsingborg, Sweden which is also where I reside. This enabled me to have the opportunity of a face to face interview. The use of face to face interview allowed for in-depth conversations regarding the issues. Face to face interviews allow for more extended and detailed inquiry and serve as a rich source of data (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 254). In analysing the findings from the interviews, I also paid attention to specific words that were used directly or indirectly by the political elites I interviewed such as patriotism, regime change, democracy, dictatorship, freedom of expression, human rights, responsibility to ask further questions and to delve deeper.
The ten individuals randomly selected were interviewed using Facebook messenger and WhatsApp. Each interview lasted about 30 minutes and the selected individuals are people that I have followed on Facebook, monitored over a period time as they engaged in homeland politics from there bases in the West. These interviewees are people I will describe as being “highly involved” political entrepreneurs. Due to the fact, we shared some mutual friends and some of them I had as friends on my Facebook network so it was easy to engage with them. While it can be argued, this has a potential to influence the data, access to these individuals was paramount for this research.
3.3.2 Secondary Data
As briefly mentioned above the secondary data used in the thesis include newspaper articles mostly authored by the activists as well as the various press releases that the groups organized. I followed the discussion keenly on the internet mainly on the diaspora newspapers that were used by the activist to write against the regime. It is important to note that while such a technique was employed, the rationale was to be able to corroborate the information that was given to me during the interviews and in some cases to identify and verify names of individuals
26 and ascertain dates of events. I was also able to access some internal documents of the organizations and supplied by the activists. Similar to the articles, such materials including press releases, minutes of meetings, petition letters, etc. were used to corroborate the interviews.
3.4 Data Analysis
As shown above that this thesis employed two sets of data gathering technique. While interviews were the primary source of information, content analysis of newspaper articles and publications were used as supplementary with the aim of corroborating the data gathered from the interviews. The data collected from the two techniques were triangulated to answer the research question as well as address the issue of validity.
The analysis was done after each stage of the interview. The interviews were recorded using voice phone voice recorder. The voice notes were later transcribed and manually coded descriptively along topics such as movement goals, motivations, strategy, etc. Such coding makes it easier to trace the origin and the various strategies used by the activists and more so, how they engage directly with homeland politics.
3.5 Challenges
Although I have shown that gathering data was done through phone calls and sitting in my room, I confronted challenges that were very normal in doing elite interviews. The issue of time for some activists was a considerable challenge. In many cases, schedule interviews were canceled due to other engagements of the selected informants. This significantly affected my data collection timeline but at the end of it all, I was able to interview all the selected individuals. The other challenge experienced had to do with the difficulty in transcribing some of the messages that were said in my local langue Wolof due to my low level of understanding of some words. However, some of the words, I didn’t understand, I sent an email for clarification, which I found to be very helpful to my research.
27 3.6 Summary
In this chapter have explained the decisions that were taken in the course of this project. A case study approach was adopted as I want to bring to the table new knowledge about the Gambian diaspora and Gambia’s political history. I have also shown how data was collected. Primary data was collected through interviews and essential activist’s documents including petition letters etc. Secondary data was collected through the review of online newspaper articles and diaspora news sites. Additional data was also collected on social media particularly facebook. The two data sources were corroborated to inform the analysis.
Chapter Four: Reclaiming the Homeland: Analysis of The Mobilization Structure of The Gambian Diaspora
4.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the analysis of the thesis using social movement theory: political opportunity structure, framing and mobilization structure. It is divided into three parts; the first part explores the political opportunity structures that made the diaspora mobilization possible. Tarrow (1998) defines political opportunity structure as those “dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action”. In this thesis, the opportunity structures are those conditions that encouraged the diaspora to mobilize. This is presented through brief background of the Gambian diaspora
28 looking at factors such as the political situation in Gambia that contributed to the process of diaspora formation. Such a background is important in understanding the diaspora activism in the Gambian context. The section argues that the human rights abuses under Jammeh was the primary political opportunity structure that informs diaspora mobilization.
The second part discusses the framing and mobilizing structures of the Gambian diaspora activists I have discussed before that Jammeh’s poor human rights record provided the political opportunity structure for the diaspora to engage. Events such as the murder of Osuman Koro Ceesay, Student Protest in April 10 and 11, 2000, murder of Deyda Hydra and recently the Solo Sandeng murder were used by the diaspora activist to inform their mobilization strategy. I argue that the regime repression against human rights activists over the years informed diaspora framing. Frames are “emergent action-oriented set of beliefs that inspire meaning and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns” (Benford, 1997:416). Basically, the struggle against the regime of Jammeh was framed along human rights violations. This enabled the diaspora activists to mobilize using the internet and other opportunity structures such as International Human Rights Organizations to mobilize against the Jammeh regime. The final part concludes the chapter. It gives a quick run-down of the thesis and summarizes the main arguments.
4.1 Politics under Jammeh 1994-2016
The Republic of The Gambia is one of the world’s smallest countries; the country gained independence from British rule in 1965 and has for a long time been one of the most stable countries in Africa. From 1965 to 1994, the Gambia under the leadership of Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara and his People Progressive Party (PPP) was known as one of the longest surviving multiparty democracy in Africa. However, in 1994, the democratically elected government of Jawara was overthrown by a group of junior army officers led by Yahya Jammeh who ruled until he was defeated in the December 2016 presidential election by Adama Barrow. The coup leaders’ validation for the necessity of such a move was anchored on “an anti-corruption effort aimed at a stagnant elite” (Hultin et al., 2017). The coup was surprisingly well received by the citizens of The Gambia and even more so by the young people who had grown up knowing only one president in their lifetime. Some political elites at that time also had a favourable response to the change of government albeit it was a coup (Perfect, 2010:54). Promises of
29 infrastructural reforms, revamping of government service including putting an end to corruption and the commitment of handing back power to a civilian government after four (later changed to two) years in power endeared the coup leaders to the Gambian populace.
In 1996, Yahya Jammeh resigned from the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) and formed his Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) to contest the elections as a civilian candidate. He won the election and the three elections that followed in 2001, 2006 and 2011 respectively. After his election success, the romance between the Gambian public and the newly elected president was short lived as Hultin et al. state, "Jammeh quickly developed a persona as a classic African ‘Strongman' with a paternalistic, patriarchal and devoutly Islamic identity; democratic trappings aside, his record was that of a bullying autocrat a brutal demagogue, and he embraced the title dictator"(Hultin et al., 2017: 2).
Under Jammeh’s rule, media houses and journalist were routinely harassed and imprisoned, and there have been instances where journalists have disappeared without a trace and other cases murdered. A case in point is the disappearance of journalist Chief Ebrima Manneh, and in 2004 the Managing Editor of The Point Newspaper was shot dead by unknown assailants. The government denied any involvement in the murder but had a very lacklustre attitude in investigating the shooting and continued its hostile relationship with the local press (Perfect, 2010: 58). Journalists who wrote about President Jammeh’s comments and attitude about the murder of the newspaper editor were sentenced to jail and fined before they were later pardoned (ibid). In 2015, the Information and Communication law was introduced which allowed for the imprisonment of journalists who the state deemed as guilty of “spreading false information” to up to 10 years in jail. Suspected sympathizers of opposition parties have disappeared without a trace and members of their families threatened and tortured (Embiricos, 2016).
Tensions in the Gambia have been building for a few years caused by repressions, poverty, and unemployment; the Country ranks last regarding GDP in West Africa. Disgruntlement was largely kept in check by the government by using several tactics including the Indemnity Act which was signed into law in 2001 to ensure that security forces could not be prosecuted for quelling “unlawful assembly.” The catalyst for the introduction of the Indemnity law was the murder of 14 students the previous year who were protesting the rape and murder of a female student and torture to death of a male student respectively. The brutal crackdown on the young students led to widespread condemnation from both the national and international spheres
30 (Smith, 2016) including the Gambian diaspora. In fact, I argue that such blatant disregard for human rights by the Jammeh government helped diaspora to frame issues around human rights and this has informed their mobilization strategy. Multinational donors such as the EU and governments of other countries such as the US, UK as well as international human rights organizations have condemned continuously the human rights violations in The Gambia raising concerns about the lack of accountability for abuses committed by members of the state security forces who were empowered by the former President of The Gambia (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
The Jammeh regime undertook measures to ensure that it was almost impossible for it to be unseated in elections and cut down on possibilities or avenues that meant it control total power on the affairs of the country, legal, legislative, judiciary and even religious arms of the government were firmly controlled by the regime (ibid). For instance, the electoral laws have been changed several times to benefit Jammeh. A case is in point is the 2015 amendment to the electoral act. The new law increased the deposit to be paid by presidential aspirants from D10, 000 to D1 million. Equally, the deposit for new political parties was increased to D1 million. Parliamentary election deposit was also raised to D100,000 from D5000. The national mobilizer for the ruling APRC party Yankuba Colley was quoted on national TV defending the monetary increase. He argued that the presidency should not be for every Tom, Dick and Harry. The monetary increase was seen by the opposition as well as the diaspora activists’ tactical move to starve the already weak and fragmented opposition and by extension to eliminate potential opponents. The already existing electoral laws prohibited political parties in the Gambia from receiving funding from corporate bodies and individuals that are non-Gambian, while the APRC extensive enjoy state resources which were mostly used in their electioneering campaigns.
The Jammeh government did not only stop at starving opposition parties of finances, but was held bent on arresting opposition leaders too. In numerous occasions opposition figure heads have been arrested for challenging government policies. For instance, Halifa Sallah and other colleagues from the People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS) were arrested after criticizing Jammeh’s policy to get rid of “witches” in Foni. Equally, Solo Sandeng of the United Democratic Party (UDP) was arrested and tortured to death after leading a public protest of about fifty people demanding for electoral reforms. His arrests and torture was followed by the arrest of the party leader of the UDP with almost all
31 members of their executive. They were arraigned before the courts with bogus charges and ultimately sentenced to three years in prison. Also, there have been instances were opposition members, academics and other human rights activists as well as journalist were arrested and held incommunicado without access to legal counsel. These cited examples resulted in a political environment that was both hostile and unconducive for democracy thus catalysing diaspora mobilization against the regime.
The relevance of such political opportunity is very salience in the case of the Gambian diaspora as I have shown above the authoritarian nature of the Jammeh regime has created situations that have led to numerous people harbouring grievances that have given rise to their later activism outside the shore of The Gambia. Authoritarian systems such as the Jammeh regime of The Gambia can lead to a relocation of politics to borders outside of the nation-state because such governments ensure that dissidents, opposition, and resistance can only occur in other places other than the country of origin (Betts and Jones, 2016:1). Fear of repression and inability to efficiently mobilize in home countries means that specific diaspora groups sometimes fill in the vacuum and help to formulate many of the ideas and political moves that become “adopted” local politicians in the homeland (Lyon, 2006:269).
The view of this thesis is that the creation of the Gambian diaspora was not as a result of the movement of people from one place to another but as the outcome of strategic social mobilization undertaken by specific actors who constructed a discourse that gave rise to the creation of what I call the anti-regime diaspora. Fiona Adamson states that diasporas are social constructs and that “one can hypothesize that they are constructed by political entrepreneurs who are acting rationally and strategically through the strategic deployment of identity frames and categories” (2012:32).
While it is evident that there are many politically charged Gambian diaspora organization, this thesis focuses on those associations that are more visible and have been engaging in contentious politics with the Jammeh regime. These politically charged organizations can be grouped into two: Civil Society Organizations and Political Parties branches. The difference between the two groups is that while the CSO are nonpartisan, the political party branches work to advance the interest of their political parties in the diaspora. In this thesis, most emphasis has
32 been put on the CSO such as Save the Gambia Democracy Project (STGDP) Democratic Union of Gambians (DUGA), Coalition for Change Gambia (CCG), Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in the Gambia (CORDEG), Gambia Democracy Fund (GDF). The primary aim of all these various groups was to restore democracy in the Gambia through regime change. The online media houses such as Freedom Radio, Gainako, Fatu Network, and all the other online platforms are also under the CSO category. This characterization of the Gambian diaspora reflects Sydney Tarrow’s definition of organization as “collective action at the point of contact with opponents” (Tarrow, 1998). According to him this form of organization can take various forms such as “temporary assemblies of challengers to informal networks, to formal branches, clubs and even military like cells. They can be either controlled by formal organizations, by coalitions of organization, or by one in particular” (ibid). This thesis, defines the anti-Jammeh activists as a social network, which serve as the mobilization base.
4.2 Framing Issues Around Human Rights and Democracy
So far, I have given an overview of The Gambia political situation during the Jammeh era as it is important to get an overview of the political situation that gave rise to mobilization goals of the Gambian diaspora. In this section of the study, I will discuss diaspora framing of issues together with the mobilization efforts. According to Sydney Tarrow “Social movements do not depend on framing alone; they must bring people together in the field, shape coalitions, confront opponents, and assure their own future after the peak of mobilization has passed” (Tarrow, 1998).
At the centre of contentious politics is the issue of symbolic mobilization, which according to (Tarrow, 1998) has accompanied every social movement throughout history. He argues that symbols are used by movement leaders to gain support and help legitimize their collective actions. The use of symbolic politics is important as movements seek to challenge/replace a dominant view with an alternative belief supports collective action (ibid). Similarly, Snow and Benford (1992) observed that frames are strategies use to “underscore and embellished the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefined as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable”. Manuel Castells notes that the “fundamental power struggle is the battle for the construction of meaning in the minds of the people” (Castells, 2012) He argues that “for the network of counter power to prevail over the
33 network of power embedded in the organization of society they will have to reprogram the polity, the economy, the culture or whatever dimension they aim to change by introducing in the institutions programs as well as in their own lives, other instructions including in some utopian versions, the rule of not ruling nothing” (ibid, 17). This thesis is concerned with the reprogramming of the The Gambian polity through the transnational activities of her citizens living abroad. Gambian anti-regime diaspora was created as a result of strategic socially constructed frames undertaken to make claims on behalf of Gambians with the goal of ridding The Gambia of a brutal dictator. I argue that the contention between the regime of Jammeh and the diaspora was framed along human rights violations and “injustice in the homeland” by the diaspora. Such discursive practices of framing the situation in the Gambia was evident in the texts analysed during this research as the need for saving the “homeland from injustice and to restore democracy was continuously articulated by the political entrepreneurs to create a sense of community and urgency. Such was a catalyst for a lot of Gambians in the diaspora to mobilize in the quest to end the dictatorship.
The Gambian diaspora established online media houses including newspapers and online radios as a strategy to build consensus as to what the best strategy of action is or to expose corruption and detention of other citizens by the regime. The media houses reported on issues that were critical of the government and mostly to expose human rights violations. The fact, that media houses in Gambia were muzzled to the extent that tighten self-censorship. As such the only available tool was to use the internet. I observed that the internet was very central to both their mobilization goals. In fact, the internet was the locus of activity, it was the space were most of the anti-regime framing and mass mobilization took place. Media Houses such as Freedom Newspaper, Fatu Network occasionally publish breaking news stories that were either meant to discredit Jammeh or demystify him. Over the years, these media houses have been the go to for any news about Jammeh and his activities. All the online media outlets also have strong social media following, particularly on Facebook. For instance, Fatu Network has close to 300,000 followers on Facebook. The new tools provided by Facebook such as live video enabled her to interact directly with her followers. Usually these videos were also shared by some of the followers and it always becomes viral each time in the Gambian social media landscape.
34 However, I note that such interest was built through time as per the previous events that took place since 1994. For example, the period immediately after the coup, a counter coup was orchestrated which saw the murder of many young soldiers. This was the beginning of further human rights violations by the Jammeh regime. In 1995, Ousman Koro Ceesay the finance minister was murdered and all fingers pointed to the Jammeh regime. All these events were constantly use by the activist as crimes committed by Jammeh against the Gambian people. These two examples informed the early stage of the protest movement as early records in the Gambia L listserv suggests. However, the framing of political events along human rights violations by the Gambian anti-regime diaspora became very strong after April 10th and 11 Student protests. The murder of 14 students by the Jammeh security forces for the first time publicly exposed the brutality of the regime. No action was taking to bring to book those found culpable by the commission of inquiry that was setup by the regime to investigate the death of the 14 students. In 2001, and indemnity act was passed and applied retrospectively to protect the security officers that killed the students. This blatant action by the Jammeh regime was interpreted as justice denied. Furthermore, the murder of Deyda Hydara in 2004, the execution of the 9 prison inmates in 2012 added to the growing list of human rights violations under the Jammeh regime. According to Macadam (1982) collective action can only occur when the people define their situation as unjust. The list of human rights abuses over the two decades of the Jammeh regime created righteous anger that provides the base for diaspora mobilization. While framing is important for diaspora mobilization that confident political entrepreneurs take the initiative to construct a shared and collective identity, it is less efficient when it comes across as being personally motivated.
4.3 Mobilizing against the regime
The continued brutality and crackdown on dissidents of the Jammeh regime led to further mass migration of the educated and politically active elites out of The Gambia. Located outside the borders of their home country and in diverse parts of the world, some of these elites undertook measures to create movements with the aim of helping to bring about democracy through regime change in The Gambia by rallying Gambians spread across the world and within as well as bringing international attention to the Gambia. Motivated by the goal of “liberating The Gambia from dictatorship” (Interviewee 1, USA) there was a proliferation of groups who all seemingly had the same aim- remove Jammeh and restore democracy in the Gambia.
35
The politically liberal countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden that this elite ended up in exile became ground zero for their mobilization efforts. The multitude of these groups meant that while they all purported to have the same agenda competition and frictions between them hindered the impact of their mobilization efforts over the past two decades. Groups such as Gambia Democracy Fund, Democratic Union of Gambian Activists (DUGA), etc. all stated that they had the mission of working to ensure that The Gambia became “free” of President Jammeh but as scholars such as Sheffer (2003) and Brubaker (2005) have noted diasporas rarely are homogenous.
“There were certain individuals who thought for whatever reasons that they had to be at the head of the organizations and each assumed that their strategy and past experiences made them the best candidates” (Interviewee 1)
The above sentiment was echoed by another diaspora activist who along with other activists decried the confusion and lack of impact that was caused by the multitude of groups this led to the creation of a committee whose mandate was to “coordinate unity of purpose” among the pro-democracy and regime change groups. Meetings between the groups and representatives of different groups led to the later creation of Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia (CORDEG) (Nyang, 2014) which helped in the mobilization of Gambians who were previously not very politically active. I argue that the recognition of the adverse effects of such divide and taking steps address them had an impact on the success of the mobilization and this was confirmed to me by the elite activists. They all seem to agree that there was a need for the various groups to be united in purpose. However, it is important to note that even though such efforts were made, it did not last long due to disagreements.
The Gambian diaspora mobilized at two different levels. On one hand was what I call “internal mobilization”. This process was directly targeted at Gambians at home and abroad. It involves using their media platforms and CSO organizations to directly engage and share information about the regime. The other aspect was also to create a platform from which the dissidents will strategically engage through news releases and talk shows that exposed the Jammeh regime. In some instances, phone calls interviews were conducted with regime supporters and top government officials without their knowledge. This strategy helped the activities to gather reliable information. At one point, the Vice President was recorded an
36 engage on the issue of the April 10th 2000 student protest. The process also involves mobilizing political leaders to form a united front against the regime. Since, the media houses in the Gambia due to self-censorship were careful not to air views of the opposition, the diaspora media houses were the go to place for them to speak to Gambians and share their plans and programs. Over the years, this has created a strong relationship between the diaspora activists and the opposition politicians. They have organized conference and meetings in USA and Europe where these politicians were invited to. For instance, the meeting that gave birth to the 2016 Coalition was hosted in Raleigh, North Carolina in 2013.
The External mobilization efforts include mobilizing international human rights organization and host governments to condemn the human rights violation in Gambia and most importantly to put pressure on the regime even through targeted sanction. In the course of this study, I observed that the activists were more successful at recruiting international human rights organization to buy into their cause than their host states. One reason could be the different interest attached to Gambia. While I contend that the Gambia position as a geopolitical interest has evolved over the years, it size and small population and lack of resources, did not make it an attractive interests to the US or UK. On the other hand, the human rights organization advocacy work on this small piece of land was informed mostly by humanitarian drive. Hence, they were able to forge strong partnership with the dissidents to bring global attention to Gambia. By partnering with the human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the dissidents were able to access global news media networks. For instance, since the Solo Sandeng protest in April 2016, there was an increasing international media coverage on Gambia, particularly Al Jazeera. The protest was framed alongside the Arab Spring ideal or the wind of change that was also beginning to challenge dictatorship in Africa. Working with the human rights organizations also helped the diaspora activists to network with other activists from other countries doing the same work. They share strategy and provide support to victims of the regime.
The process of the Gambia anti-regime diaspora being able to lobby host countries and international organizations was inadvertently helped by President Jammeh who had a penchant for making bold and unsubstantiated claim against foreign governments. Such practices are something that diaspora activist have usually seized upon sometimes even bringing his statements to the attention of the countries concerned.
37 “What certain national chapters of the diaspora movement have tried to do it so engage local politician in the countries that we live in to bring attention to the issues in the Gambia. Jammeh has operated on a system of information blackout and jailing anyone who dares to question him” (Interviewee 6, USA ). An example of this was the effort of Alieu Badara Ceesay of the Campaign For Human Right in the Gambia (UK) an activist living in the UK who called on actions to be taken against Jammeh by engaging his local MP to bring attention to human rights abuses happening in the Gambia, this leads him to take action to raise concern about the situation “The UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations raised his concerns with the United Nations Secretary-General and other Permanent Representatives based in New York, we also continue to liaise closely with our international partners about the situation in The Gambia”. By engaging other governments who then, in turn, put pressure on the Gambian government diaspora activists aim to push the scope of their influence.
The subjects of my interviews and the articles that I read during my research all point to the fact that most if not all the political entrepreneurs located outside the shores of The Gambia harboured desire to “return home” and thus expended a chunk of their time in creating online newspapers, online radios and mobilizing other countrymen to their cause of “liberating” The Gambia. This homeland orientation by the Gambian diaspora is something that Saffran (1991) asserts are some crucial criteria of Diasporas. The goal for them was not just to be able to go back home to The Gambia but also to go back home to a democratic country where there was a democracy, justice, freedom of speech and equal rights to all citizens. I argue that such a desire must do with socialization in the host country.
When asked about challenges encountered in the quest for mobilization the problem of funding was something that almost all of my interview subjects mentioned. Critical to the success of any mobilization is the issue of the financing and for them, this was a problem that they encountered chiefly caused by the initial lack of unity in the different movements. In the case of the Gambian diaspora crowdfunding was the most widely used tool for raising funds and funds were also contributed by confident political entrepreneurs who took it upon themselves to see that regime change could be attained in Gambia.
38 4.4 Conclusion: Reclaiming the Homeland
By applying frames of fighting for democracy in the Gambia and getting rid of an authoritarian regime, such democracy discourses became a vital framing tool for the movement. The need and desire for democracy for all has appeal at an almost universal level, and such discussions and commitment has enabled and gave both legitimacy and support for the causes of the anti- regime diaspora. There is a recurrent theme of the quest for democracy and free and fair elections as the reason for the “struggle” as a frame to explain their aim for a democratic Gambia and as a tool for soliciting international support for their cause.
In addition to trying to get the message across via the internet and social media, the group also coordinated protests to show their commitment to their cause and even to get attention from both the media and policymakers in the host countries. In July 2014, the arrival of President Jammeh for the US-Africa Summit accorded the activists to organize protest outside his hotel in Washington, chanting slogan and expletives outside the hotel he was staying at such as “Yayha Jammeh is a murderer”, Enough is Enough” and “USA must not reward tyranny in the Gambia with military aid” (Kaironews.com, 2014). Such framing was important and effective for the activists to make the United States government aware of the atrocities committed by President Jammeh and thus influencing the perception of people and policymakers regarding him. So, riled up were the diaspora activists who had travelled from different states in the United States to Washington that President Jammeh did not leave his hotel room to attend to other functions.
The success of this demonstration served a dual effect of not only expressing a political message to the United States government, but it also created a sense of solidarity between the different anti-regime movements. As in social movements the importance of political opportunities came into play during this protest, the President himself is in Washington as a guest of the President of The United States of America gave the demonstrations more direct impact and attention. Equally, the rally, which was shared on social media helped to demystify Jammeh as a mystical figure. I posit that the fact that he was kept a hostage in his hotel room suggested to many Gambians in the country that have feared him for long began to see his weak side.
39 The lead up to the December 2016 election became a central issue of contention for the anti- regime diaspora and accelerated their activities to impact the polls in the Gambia mostly by encouraging the opposition political parties to form a coalition. “In this 21st Century, for any president to seek a fifth term in office is like a Muslim man seeking a fifth wife. It is wrong; it is illegal, it is greediness, it is unjust, it is unfair, and it is unacceptable” (Lamin Gano, 2016).
Having experienced past elections in The Gambia, the anti-regime diaspora did not want to take any chances. “we all knew that we had to take measures to ensure that we did not end up with Jammeh winning the elections again” Interview 4, UK). Taking advantage of political opportunities, the diaspora segment that was based in the United States aligned themselves and enlisted the help of a Washington based consultancy to help in their transnational efforts to influence the election in Gambia. Jeffery Smith, an American national became a central part of the Gambian anti-regime diaspora providing information and “counter-narrative during Jammeh’s information blackouts.” “To a point, he became a member of the Gambian diaspora,” says activist Dr. Amadou Janneh, who was imprisoned, tortured and exiled during Jammeh’s regime (Mayol, 2017). Working strategically with diaspora activist they devised plans to support a political candidate for the election. Impact of social movements is always greatly helped by having support from within great circles. Smith served as a “hype man” for the anti- regime diaspora groups bring attention to the issues that they were fighting against by penning op-eds in such publications as Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. I argue that alliance was one of the best moves the diaspora activist took and it has contributed immensely to the success of the campaign to unseat Jammeh from power.
The diaspora also raised money through GoFundMe and other crowdsourcing platforms to raise money for the coalition government. The diaspora through is Gambia Democracy Fund GoFundMe account raised huge sums of money which was used to finance the political campaign. Primarily, the diaspora both as a collective and individuals financed the political parties as well as individuals that could not afford to replace their voters’ cards. This help increase interest in the elections. The diaspora also contributed to the elections through supporting in the drafting and publishing of the Coalition Manifesto. Selected members of diaspora groups created website for the coalition and for Barrow. This website was the source of information for many during the campaign.
40 As Shain and Barth (2003) state when both motive and opportunity exists diasporas acquire the ability to exert influence. Direct lobbying and awareness raising became an essential part of the diaspora activists’ daily lives. When asked if they thought their efforts had any impact all the elites interviewed in this research agreed that they have registered remarkable progress and that their efforts brought down a dictator. However, it is difficult to substantiate this claim because this paper did not sound the opinion of the populace on the ground as to what influenced their voting pattern. Nonetheless, the efforts of the diaspora to a greater degree have internationalized Gambian politics attracting varied interests as well as global media to the events on the ground. This sentiment seems to hold true as a visit to the official website of the current president contains a letter addressed to diaspora activists. In the open letter, President Adama Barrow wrote;
“as the brutality and totality of Yahya Jammeh’s militarized rule became evident, these exiles used a multitude of the internet and social media platforms to organize themselves into activists and pro-democracy organizations across the world. They created internet email lists such as Gambia-L and Gambia-post; AOL Messenger chat rooms, internet radios, Facebook and Twitter, to keep each other and the world informed about the events in their homeland. They organized themselves into global non-partisan organizations to advocate for human rights and for a union of pro-democracy opposition parties in the Gambia to take on Yahya Jammeh’s increasingly brutal dictatorship” (President Barrow, 2017).
With the ever-expanding importance of diaspora politics (Adamson 2016), this thesis added to the growing literature by focusing on a little-known diaspora whose influence could be easily overlooked in the international relations literature. It has also shown how strategic framing and capitalizing on political opportunities have succeeded in shaping Gambian anti-regime diaspora as an actor in both homeland and international politics. Discourses on liberation and democracy were recurrent themes that were used to garner support and motivate action. At the same time, framing Gambian issues mostly along human rights abuses by the Jammeh regime enabled the diaspora to mobilize for international assistance.
Looking at the crucial role the diaspora played in the election, the diaspora has presented itself as pro-democracy movement willing to invest in consolidating democracy through supporting political parties and candidates as well as the providing them with access to their
41 media houses. While this thesis attempts to explore the mobilization strategies of the Gambian diaspora, it recommends for further studies to consider the extent of diaspora influence in homeland politics. Diasporas are willing participants in the development of their homelands and have over the years acquired skills and connections in their host countries that can be utilized in the homeland. There is a need for greater policy focus on the connection between diasporas and international relations.
Finally, the thesis concludes by situating the Gambian diaspora within the framework of international politics as both a political actor and a lobbying force in the domestic and international politics. I have shown that the Gambian diaspora as a social network of organizations, media houses and political party branches used lobbying and framing as tools to mobilize against the Jammeh regime in the international system. They lobbied both host governments and international human rights organizations. I have shown that their organization structure, which is a loose network of actors, enabled them to engage at different locations internationally. This helped in intensifying the voices of the diaspora but more so created the needed impact. For instance, I have shown in situations where diaspora organizations jointly organize events with leading human rights organizations working on Gambia such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Freedom House, Article 19 etc. they always succeed in getting international actors to react and act in their favour.
42
5. Biblography
Adamson, F. B. (2012) Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements,
Adamson, F. B. and Demetriou, M. (2007) 'Remapping the Boundaries of 'State' and `National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing.', European Journal of International Relations, 13(4), 489-526. Anthias, F. (1998) 'Evaluating `Diaspora`: Beyond Ethnicity?', Sociology, 32(3), 557-580.
Amrith, S. S., (2011) Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Antwi-Boateng, O. (2012) 'The Transformation of the US-Based Liberian Diaspora from Hard Power to Soft Power Agents', African Studies Quarterly 13(1-2), 55-74.
Al-Ali, N., Black, R., & Koser, K. (2001) 'Refugees and transnationalism: The experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4).
Baser, B. & Ashok S., (2008) 'Diasporas as Peacemakers: Thrid Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts', International Journal on World Peace, 25(3), 7-28.
Benford, R. (1997) 'An insider’s critique of the social movement framing perspective', Sociological Inquiry, 67(4), 409-430.
Bruneau, M. (2010) 'Diasporas, transnational spaces and communities', in Baubock, R. and
Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., (2009) 'Creating an Enabling Environment for Diasporas’ Participation in Homeland Development', International Migration, 50(1), 75-95.
43 Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M., (2011) 'Diasporas and Conflict Societies: Conflict Entrepreneurs, Competing Interests or Contributors to Stability and Development?', Conflict, Security & Development, 11(2), 115-143.
Butty, J., (2014) Gambian Diaspora Leader Welcomes Alleged Coup Plot, Voice of America [online], available: http://www.voanews.com/a/gambian-diaspora-leader-welcomes-alleged- coup-attempt/2580089.html [Last accessed: 3/4/2018].
Brubaker, Rogers, (2005) 'The ‘diaspora’ diaspora', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 1-19.
Castells, M. (2012) Networks of outrage and hope: social movements in the internet age, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ceesay, A. (2016) Gambia: Unprecedented Diplomatic Action in New York on Gambia’s Human Rights Situation, Freedom Newspaper [online], available: http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/gambia-unprecedented-diplomatic-action-in-new-york- on-gambias-human-rights-situation/ [Last accessed: 30/3/2018].
Clemens, M. and Pettersson, G. (2006) Medical Leave: A new database of health professional emigration from Africa, Working Paper Number 95, August, Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
Collier, P. and Hoeffler. A. (2000) Greed and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355, Washington DC: World Bank.
Cohen, R. (2008), Global Diasporas: An introduction, Routledge.
Cohen, R. (1996) ‘Diasporas and the nation-state: from victims to challengers,’ International Affairs, 72(3), 507-520.
Cordova, A. and Hiskey, J. (2015) 'Shaping Politics at Home: Cross Border Social Ties and Local Level Political Engagement', Comparative Political Studies, 48, 1454-1487. Creswell, J. (2012) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches, 3rd ed., Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Davis, R. (2012) 'African Diasporas, Development and the Politics of Context', Third World Quarterly, 33(1), 91-108.
Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2004) Social Movements: An Introduction, Blackwell Publishers, 15-16.
44 Faist, Thomas, (2010). 'Diaspora and Transnationalism: What Kind of Dance Partners?', in Bauböck, R. and Faist, T., eds Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 9-34.
Faist, T., ed. Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 35-50.
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006) “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research", Qualitative Inquiry, (12:2), pp. 219-245.
Gamson, W. (1990) The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed., Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub Co.
Halperin, S. and Heath, O. (2012) Political Research: Methods and Skills, Oxford: University Press. HULTIN, N., JALLOW, B., LAWRANCE, B. N. & SARR, A. (2017) 'Autocracy, migration, and The Gambia's ‘unprecedented’ 2016 election', African Affairs, 116, 321-340.
Integrated Regional Information Networks (2009) 'Gambia: African leaders must stand up to Jammeh, say lawyers, 24 September.'.
Itzighson, J. (2000) 'Immigration and the boundaries of citizenship: the institutions of immigrants’ political transnationalism', The International Migration Review, 34(4), 1126 - 1154.
Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, 1st ed., London: SAGE Publications.
Jobe, A. (2015) The Gambia: 50 Years of Independence, 20 Years of Terror, [online], available: http://fatunetwork.net/the-gambia-50-years-of-independence-20-years-of-terror/ [Last accessed: 10/4/2018].
Keck, Margaret E. & Kathryn Sikkink, (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Keohane, R, and Nye, J. (2009). “Realism and Complex Interdependence.” In Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, eds. The Globalization Reader. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Pp. 70- 77.
Koinova, Maria, (2010). “Diasporas and International Politics: Utilising the Universalistic Creed of Liberalism for Particularistic and Nationalist Purposes”, in Bauböck, Rainer &
45 Thomas Faist (eds.) Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods. Amsterdam.
Leech, Beth L., (2002). “Asking Questions: Techniques for Semi Structured Interviews”, PS: Political Science and Politics 35(4): pp. 665-668.
Lyons, Terrence, 2006b. “Transnational Politics in Ethiopia: Diasporas and the 2005 Elections”, Diaspora 15(2-3): pp.265-284. terdam University Press, pp. 149-165.
Lyon, T. and Mandaville, P. (2012) Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks, London: Hurst & Co.
Mayol, T. (2017) HE HELPED UNSEAT THE GAMBIAN DICTATOR — WHO'S NEXT? (Online), Available: http://www.ozy.com/rising-stars/he-helped-unseat-the-gambian-dictator- whos-next/75821.
Mahr, K. (2017) “How an American Consultancy Helped Oust Gambian Dictator”, NEWSWEEK.
McCormick, J. (2012) “Ethnic Interest Groups in American Foreign Policy” Iowa State University.
SAINE, A. (2000) 'The Gambia's foreign policy since the coup 1994 – 99', Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 38 , 73 - 88.
SAINE, A. (2009) The Paradox of Third - Wave Democratization in Africa : The Gambia under AFPRC - APRC Rule, 1994 - 2008, Lanham: Lexington Books.
SÖKEFELD, M. (2006) 'Mobilizing in transnational space: a social movement approach to the formation of diaspora', Global networks, 6, 265 - 284.
Lobbies and the US Government: Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy, edited by Josh DeWind and Renata Segura, 211–35. New York: NYU.
Van Hear N. (1998) New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus, Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities, London: UCL Press.
46 Van Hear, N., Pieke, F., & Vertovec, S. (2004). “The Contribution of UK-Based Diasporas to Development and Poverty Reduction”, University of Oxford, ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS).
Vertovec, S. (2004). “Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation”, International Migration Review, 38 (2), pp 970-1001.
Vertovec, Steven. (2005). “The Political Importance of Diasporas.” ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper, no. WP-05-13.
Vertovec, Steven (1997) ‘Three Meanings of “Diaspora”, Exemplified Among South Asian Religions’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 6(3): pp 277–299.
Vertovec, S. (1999). Conceiving and researching transnationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(2), pp. 447-462.
Yin, Robert K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE.
47