Preaching Politicians

The Development and Relevance of Dutch Small Orthodox Protestant Parties

M.D. Appelman 10003305 Research Master Social Sciences

dhr. dr. D.J. Bos dhr. prof. dr. W.G.J. Duyvendak

18-08-2017 Amsterdam Abstract Until well into the 1990’s, Small Orthodox Protestant Parties (SOPP’s) in the Netherlands were regarded as politically irrelevant, utterly predictable and even interchangeable, being dubbed the “small Christian right”. In recent years this has changed, however. Since the ChristenUnie (CU) entered government in 2006 and the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) participated in the so-called “backseat consultations” of 2012, these parties have been closer to political power than ever before. There are also signs of ideological divergence: while the SGP is generally still considered a right-wing Orthodox party, the CU has become more moderate, describing itself as “Christian-social”. This thesis identifies the defining characteristics of both parties – explaining how they differ from mainstream political parties and from one another, and how they developed into the parties they are now – by analyzing historical literature on these parties through the lens of political scientific framework on party typologies. Furthermore, a content analysis of speeches given by the SOPP’s during the Algemene Beschouwingen (General Debate) from 1990-2016 will be conducted, analyzing the most recent developments. It is argued that the SOPP’s once represented clearly demarcated quasi-ethnic social bases in society that provided them with natural electoral support. The CU’s connection to such a natural social base has weakened, however, creating the necessity to seek support from new electoral groups and to distinguish itself politically from other religious parties. The SGP on the other hand shows more signs of continuity, although recent developments might herald similar changes in the future.

Key terms: CU; GPV; RPF; SGP; Small Orthodox Protestant Parties; Dutch Politics; Party Typologies; Algemene Beschouwingen; Content Analysis

2 Introduction Dutch politics is changing. For decades, it was known for its political stability, (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014), but now extreme volatility characterizes it. At the 2017 Parliamentary elections, the social-democratic Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party; PvdA) lost 29 of its 38 seats; the biggest electoral loss ever witnessed in Dutch Parliamentary history (Houten, 2017). For many years the PvdA, the conservative-liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy; VVD), and the Christian-democratic Christen- Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal; CDA) (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014) won most of the votes, but now these parties hold just over 40 percent of the seats. The new government coalition will need at least four parties to reach a majority, a situation not witnessed in the Netherlands for decades. An indirect effect of this increasing volatility and fragmentation is that the Small Orthodox1 Protestant Parties (SOPP’s) – the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party; SGP) and the ChristenUnie (ChristianUnion; CU) – have gained manifest political relevance (cf. Sartori, 1976/2005). The CU already showed its relevance in 2006, when it became part of the then government coalition, but the more Orthodox SGP has also become relevant by participating in the so-called “backseat consultations” with prime minister Mark Rutte in 2012 (Visser, 2012) and aiding the former government coalition Rutte II in 2013 when it needed its numbers in the senate to pass the parliamentary budget, resulting in the so-called “autumn agreement” (Vliegenthart, 2013). It is quite a change compared to the 1990s, when the SGP and the predecessors of the CU – the Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (Reformed Political League; GPV) and the Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie (Reformatory Political Federation; RPF) – were lumped together under the label “small Christian right” and characterized as utterly predictable and relatively powerless. They now do

1 “Orthodox” can be understood as “closely following the established beliefs of a religion” (Merriam-Webster, 2017). In the SOPP abbreviation it will be used to distinguish religious political parties that explicitly use religion as their guiding principles, like the SGP and the CU, from those religious parties that have become more general and secular, like the CDA. It will also be used – cf. Bos (2010) – to contrast a sub-group of Reformed Christians that emphasize their “societal responsibility” (Orthodox Reformed) with a sub-group that emphasizes the inner and personalized experience of the faith (Pietistic Reformed), even though the latter group technically also closely follows the established beliefs of their religion.

3 not only have direct political influence, but are also different ideologically. The SGP is still considered an Orthodox right-wing party, but the CU has become a more environmentally oriented, economically middle-of-the-road party (Hippe & Voerman, 2010). They do no longer fit under one label. Because of their SOPP’s alleged “irrelevance”, political and social scientists tended to leave this subject matter for historians and theologians to research (e.g. Fieret, 1990; Zwemer, 1992; Klei, 2011; Mulligen, 2014b). With their newfound political influence, however, there is an increased urgency to gain insight into their goals and nature. To fully understand them, however, it is first necessary to seek out the factors explaining different trajectories the SOPP’s took since the 1990’s. The main research questions are therefore:

1. Which factors contributed to the different trajectories of the SOPP’s since the 1990s? 2. What are the defining characteristics of the CU and SGP; how do they differ from mainstream political parties, and from one another?

For answering these questions, a mixed methods design will be applied. In the Theoretical Framework, scholarly literature on party typologies will be discussed, seeking out the different functions and characteristics that distinguish parties from one another. There will be special attention for the specific nature of Dutch politics and the atypical parties it might produce. Given the limited political and social scientific literature on SOPP’s, historical literature on the histories and development of the SGP and CU – including its predecessors: GPV and RPF – will be analyzed in the Historical Framework through the lens of the content discussed in the Theoretical Framework. To extend the analysis into the present, a content analysis of political speeches held by the SOPP’s during the Algemene Beschouwingen (General Debate) will be covered in the Methods and Results sections. The Discussion section will integrate the historical and content analyses, answering the main research questions. The thesis will end in the Conclusion, summarizing the main findings.

4 Theoretical Framework In the literature on political parties, we can roughly distinguish three ‘families’ of party typologies. The first is based on the genesis and ideological base of political parties, and is heavily inspired by the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) on “cleavage theory”. The second is functionalist and focuses on the organizational structure of parties and their relation to civil society. Finally, there is an approach that combines aspects of the other families. They will be discussed consecutively. The chapter ends with some remarks on the specific nature of Dutch politics and the special party types it produces.

The First Family: Cleavages and Ideology The first type of typology is based on cleavages, the idea that voters can be divided into oppositional voting blocks. While there were numerous cleavages present in western societies, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that political parties in 20th century Western Europe were the product of four “basic” cleavages. Two emerged due to the process of state centralization: the central elites vs. subjects in the periphery, and the nation-state vs. the church. The others emerged due to the industrial revolution: landed interests vs. industrial entrepreneurship, and capital vs. labor. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) saw the Netherlands as a prime example of institutionalized segmentation based on such cleavages, dividing society amongst religious and economic class lines.2 Von Beyme (1985) elaborated upon this line of thinking by arguing that because these basic cleavages were the same across Western European countries, they should also produce similar types of parties. He classified parties into different Party Families, – Liberals, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, etc. – a now common way to describe and compare parties across countries. Further elaborations in this branch of literature often seek to prove or disprove the emergence or disappearances of specific cleavages. Inglehart (1977), for example, argued that a new cleavage emerged due to a generational distinction between materialist and post-materialist values, leading to the establishment of new party families like the Greens/Environmentalists. More recently, scholars have argued that globalization has caused a new cleavage, dividing society into

2 See Historical Framework: Pillarization

5 those who do and do not benefit from it, explaining i.a. the success of right-wing populist parties (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2005; Milanovic, 2016). This branch of literature has also seen some criticisms, however. Although there is general agreement that social cleavages could once explain a great deal of variance in party choice in western democracies – around 30 percent in most countries until the 1960s (Franklin, Mackie & Valen, 1992) –this has decreased to around 10 percent in the mid-1980s, and for most countries below 10 percent by 2004, showing that individuals are voting less based on group loyalties (Franklin, 2009). It is furthermore unclear whether voters in new voting blocs, organized around new cleavages, are aware of their objective positions and shared interests, and if political parties specifically represent the interests of these groups. If these conditions are not met there is a great chance that people vote for different reasons that just happen to be coterminous with their “group membership”, at which point the cleavage theory of Lipset and Rokkan offers little explanatory value (Franklin, 2010).

The Second Family: Organization and Civil Society The second type of typology finds its genesis in the work of Weber (1919/1946), who made a distinction between parties that had a basis in local organizations of notables and elites, and parties that were based on thick bureaucratic machines. Duverger (1959) used this distinction to differentiate between Cadre Parties led by individuals of high socioeconomic status, and Mass Parties that mobilized broad sections of the electorate through the development of large and complex organizations. Kirchheimer (1966) elaborated on this line of thinking by proposing an additional party type, the Catch-All Party (comparable to the Electoral-Professional Party cf. Panebianco, 1988), characterized by the fading role of strong ideology and the appearance of strong leadership, attempting to secure support from different social classes. Katz and Mair (1994; 1995) argued that most party types appeared in reaction to other party types, while not necessarily replacing each other. They see it as an evolutionary process, which may be simplified as containing four different stages characterized by a gradual shift in the functions of parties as actors between state and civil society. The Cadre Party arose in the late

6 19th/early 20th century when voting rights were limited and civil society and the state were overlapping in practice. In this era, “… parties were basically committees of those people who jointly constituted both the state and civil society” (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 9). The second stage saw the introduction of the Mass Party, representing and emancipating existing, well-defined social groups left underrepresented by the Cadre Parties. The Mass Parties served as a bridge between civil society and the state, with politicians acting as delegates instead of trustees. The successes of the Mass Parties, however, also led to their demise. With the battles for social and political rights won, the welfare state implemented and economic growth secured, the unifying aspects of their social bases started to weaken. The rise of mass media furthermore enabled political elites to directly communicate with voters without the intercession of extensive bureaucratic party apparatuses typical of these mass parties. The appearance of the Catch-All Party characterized this third stage, recruiting members based on policy agreement rather than social identity, acting as a broker between state and civil society rather than having direct relations with civil society (Katz & Mair, 1995). Katz and Mair (1995) also proposed a fourth party type, the Cartel Party, as a representative of their final stage. It arose in the 1970’s and is characterized by the interpenetration of party and state and extensive cooperation between ostensible competitors. Due to ideological conversion amongst the major parties, politics had become a profession instead of an ideological battleground, making parties interchangeable and replicable. Parties lost their connection with civil society and became extensions of the state, seeking to implement state resources to guarantee their collective survival and prevent newcomers from entering politics. Katz and Mair received criticisms for their thesis, most notably from Koole (1996), who i.a. argued that they described a political strategy at the state level rather than the emergence of a new party type. Katz and Mair (1996), responded that the characteristics of the parties participating in the cartel have changed strongly enough to justly speak of a new party type, and furthermore argued that recent developments corroborated their arguments (Katz & Mair, 2009).

7 The Third Family: Integrating the Others Gunther and Diamond (2003) noted two main problems with the former typologies. Firstly, they were mostly derived from studies on West European parties from specific time periods. Recent and non-western parties may be difficult to incorporate in these typologies without running the risk of “concept stretching”. Secondly, because these typologies are based on different criteria they are not compatible with one another. Besides the two families described above, there are other, less commonly used typologies based on different criteria – e.g. Kitschelt’s (1989) ‘logic of electoral competition’ parties vs. ‘logic of office- seeking’ parties; and Wolinetz’ (2002) ‘policy-seeking’, ‘vote seeking’, and ‘office seeking’ parties – which would also need excessive concept-stretching if they were to be implemented in these two families. Gunther and Diamond (2003) therefore proposed a new typology that combined elements from the other families, resulting in a typology that is more detailed and accurate, albeit at the loss of parsimony. They distinguish 15 types of parties “… on the basis of three criteria: (1) the nature of the party organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic orientation of the party (ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and (3) whether or not these parties are tolerant pluralistic (or democratic) or proto- hegemonic (or anti-system)” (Gunther & Diamond, 2003, p. 167): the Traditional Local Notable, Clientelistic, Class-mass, Leninist, Pluralist-Nationalist, Ultranationalist, Denominational, Fundamentalist, Congress, Ethnic, Catch-all, Programmatic, Personalistic, Left-Libertarian, and Post-industrial Extreme-Right parties. For this thesis’ purposes, it serves to focus on the religious and ethnically based parties. Gunther and Diamond (2003) distinguish two parties with religion as their programmatic basis, both mass-based parties. The Denominational Party is pluralist, democratic and tolerant. It is distinct from secular parties because it is not fully in control of its own core ideological precepts since these are linked to religious values. Examples are the many Christian democratic parties found in Western Europe and elsewhere. The Fundamentalist Party seeks to reorganize society and the state around a strict reading of religious doctrinal principles. In its worldview, there is no separation between state and religion; religious norms

8 should be imposed on all. Its organizational structure is extensive, hierarchical, undemocratic, and even absolutist, their members disciplined, devoted, encapsulated in a distinct subculture, and disproportionally recruited from the lower and lower middle classes. Examples are Algeria’s Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front; FIS) and Turkey’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party; RP). The ethnically based parties lack the extensive organizations of mass- based parties but are noticeable for their political and electoral logics: they do not advance a program for all of society but seek to promote the interests of an ethnic group. The Ethnic Party seeks to mobilize the votes of its own ethnic group only, demarcating and emphasizing ethnic boundaries while lacking functional interests, an ideological agenda, or the will to attract voters from other segments of society. Examples are the Romania’s Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania; UDMR) and South Africa’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The Congress Party is a coalition of ethnic parties that may also take the form of a single, unified party. It appeals to national unity, integration, ethnic sharing, and coexistence, and ensures the mutual security of its groups within its broad organization. The archetype of this model is the Indian National Congress (INC) during the first two decades of India’s independence (Gunther & Diamond, 2003). A recent typology that elaborates on Gunther and Diamond (2003) by specifying different religious parties is Ozzano’s (2013). He distinguishes five religiously oriented party types – conservative, progressive, nationalist, fundamentalist, and camp – based on “… six criteria: their organizational model, their ideology (and particularly their attitude towards democratic pluralism), their relation with interest groups, their social base, their goals, and their influence on democratization processes” (Ozzano, 2013, p. 810). The Conservative Party includes the well-known denominational mass parties that may show some features of (interdenominational) catch-all parties. They appeal to all voters except for the convinced anti-clericals. Examples are the Christian-democratic parties, the USA’s Republican Party (GOP), and the early years of Turkey’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party; AKP). The Progressive Party is least commonly seen since religious politics is often associated with right-wing conservatism while progressive parties

9 traditionally face religion as one of their core obstacles. When it appears it is often small, resembling the Cadre Party in size. The party combines the desire to widen the role of religion in society with an orientation for social justice, civil rights, peace, and pluralism, although the former is secondary to the latter. This may result in some forms of socialist thought and the will to seek alliances with secular parties. Its voter base is small, consisting mainly of the educated and urban middle class. Israel’s Meimad party is an example (Ozzano, 2013). The Religious Nationalist Party subordinates its religious orientation to strong nationalist sentiments. It is often the product of social structures where ethno-religious divides are significant. It is frequently organized as a mass party and may have (symbolic) militia engaged in struggles to control physical space and/or public institutions against other (ethno-)religious communities. It may take different economic stances since economics is secondary to its other interests. Israel’s Kach (This Way), India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party: BJP) and the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are examples. The Fundamentalist Party is comparable to Gunther and Diamond’s (2003), with the addition that its unapologetic, anti-systematic, sometimes even anti-democratic stances often sends the party underground, in banishment, or a state of isolation. The Camp Party takes some characteristics from Gunther and Diamond’s (2003) Ethnic Party. It seeks to represent the interests of a specific religious community – which may coincide with a specific ethnic group – rather than putting forward a generalist ideology. It seeks the preservation and separation of its group in a pluralistic society; it does not seek conflict with other communities and/or political institutions. Examples are found in Northern Ireland, where the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin (We Ourselves; SF) support the maintaining of segregated education (Ozzano, 2013). A final point that both Gunther and Diamond (2003) and Ozzano (2013) make is that their typologies conceptualize ideal types. They are useful because they present easy to understand factors, but limited because real-world parties may not conform to all criteria and/or have elements belonging to multiple categories.

10 Political Relevancy & Dutch Party Concepts Before going forward two points should be addressed. First, the Dutch political system is characterized by proportional representation in combination with an extremely low threshold.3 This has led to an average of 10.5 parties in parliament since 1918.4 To classify and determine the nature of different party systems, Sartori (1976/2005) suggested that we need to count the number of parties in a system, since it shows the extent to which political power is fragmented and influences the tactics of party competition and formation of government coalitions. Not every party has a direct influence on these matters, however, so Sartori included a criterion of “relevancy” to determine which parties to count. According to this criterion, parties are considered relevant when they have the potential to participate in governing coalitions or when they have “blackmail potential”: the ability to affect the tactics or alter the direction of the party competition of governing-oriented parties.5 These criteria were not necessarily exhaustive. Hertzog (1987), for example, argued that small parties are also relevant if they affect the behavior of larger parties, e.g. by “testing” extreme ideas that may become incorporated into the larger party’s platform. Discussing small (Dutch) political parties, Lucardie (1986) noticed a similar phenomenon which he named prophesying at the frontier, the difference being that the latter is mainly used to inspire and motivate the party’s social base, as actually influencing larger parties often proved unsuccessful. He also saw two other functions. On the condition of an ideological kinship between two parties, the smaller can act as the political conscience of the the larger by emphasizing the latter’s principle program. Parties must make concessions when in government, so they are vulnerable when called out on their principles. Lucardie’s final function was representing

3 Contrary to commonly held beliefs, the Netherlands has a de facto electoral threshold of 0.667% of the vote, corresponding to one seat in parliament. In practice, this means that if a party does not reach the threshold, it can also not apply for so-called ‘remainder seats’ (using D’Hondt method) (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). This situation creates an incentive for smaller parties with similar ideologies to come out with a common electoral list, offering a shared political program, increasing the chance they will pass the threshold. This goes especially for elections where few seats are divided (e.g. elections to the European Parliament) or where parties might have lower electoral support (e.g. specific municipality elections). 4 Calculations done using data from Andeweg and Irwin (2014, p. 60) and Kiesraad (2017). 5 Due to difficulties in assessing blackmail potential, Sartori (1976/2005) suggested that it might also be measured through the veto-potential of a party.

11 minorities, which can be done both to win votes and gain political influence. It is a function expressed by both Ethnic (cf. Gunther & Diamond, 2003) and Camp Parties (cf. Ozzano, 2013). Even without direct access to political power parties can thus be relevant. Even though Sartori (1976/2005) used his criterion to determine the nature of party systems, it is safe to assume that SOPP’s have been generally ignored due to their perceived irrelevance. There is some literature on smaller parties in the Netherlands (e.g. Daalder, 1965; Lucardie, 1986; Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008), but they all leave the specific natures of the parties undertheorized. Still, because of their presence, concepts emerged to describe these parties. They are ill-defined in scientific literature, but well-known throughout Dutch society. The second point that needs to be addressed is properly defining these concepts. The “Beginselpartij”, or Principle Party, is described by The Van Dale dictionary (1984) as a party whose policies are based on fixed principles, as opposed to more pragmatic parties. Wikipedia describes it as a typically Dutch phenomenon – appearing due to the low threshold and proportional representation – and defines it as a party that focuses on its principles instead of current events or government participation. They offer i.a. the SGP, RPF, and GPV as examples. A local CU (2007) website describes principle parties as those parties with a principle program, a document containing the party’s ideological assumptions. It acknowledges, however, that many parties generally not considered principle parties have such programs. It states that in practice, the term is mostly used to describe parties that are primarily guided by their principle program, in contrast to those parties that are primarily guided by their most recent election program. Here this last definition will be used, since it offers a clear distinction and best describes how the concept is used in practice. Secondly there is the “Getuigenispartij”, or Testimonial Party. Wikipedia considers it the same as the Principle Party; although the concepts are often confused, they are not the same. The Van Dale Dictionary (1984) defines the Testimonial Party as a party with message, a party that wants to testify, which in turn is defined as “defending an ideal”. Wiktionary defines it as “a political party that doesn’t seek participation in government but only serves to express its principles”. This definition is an improvement because it offers a clearer

12 distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial parties while also differentiating it from the principle party. It is too strong, however, since testimonial parties does not necessarily shun government participation. A testimonial party finds its raison d’être in using politics as a platform to express its political ideals; consequently, its political success is not determined by the achievement of policy oriented goals. In its function, it is comparable to Lucardie’s (1986) prophesying at the frontier.

13 Historical Framework In this section, an historical overview of the SOPP’s through the lens of the Theoretical Framework will be given. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to present a general overview of the Dutch political system.

Pillarization With its multi-party system, the Netherlands is first and foremost a country of minorities. In parliament, this is visible by the fact that there was never one party with a full majority. To understand Dutch politics is to understand how these minorities interact and try to reach compromise, even though at times they hold strongly different opinions (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). From the end of the 19th century until the late 1960s, Dutch society was characterized by a strong politico-denominational segmentation known as “pillarization”. Using the metaphor of a Greek temple, society was comprised of four “pillars” – subcultures demarcated by socio-economical and/or confessional differences (Lijphart, 1967; 2008) – characterized by separate newspapers, broadcasting organizations, healthcare organizations, hospitals, schools, universities, trade unions, etc. Although the starting point of the process leading up to this state of pillarization is contested, scholars tend to view the 1917’s pacification – a political agreement between religious and secular parties leading to the implementation of universal suffrage, proportional representation, and equal state funding for both public (secular) and private (religious) schools – as its conclusion (Lijphart, 2008). During pillarization, the Dutch political system could best be described as a five-party system, given that between 1918 and 1963 five parties held between 84 and 92 percent of the vote (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014).6 Extending the metaphor of the Greek temple, the political elite not only represented the four pillars segmenting Dutch society, but acted as its temple roof, bringing society together: segregation at the base (civil society) and cooperation at the top. After WWII the following parties represented the pillars: the Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party; KVP) for the Catholic pillar, the Anti-Revolutionaire

6 Until 1939 the liberals were not particularly strong; they were dispersed over several parties. They are counted here as a single party.

14 Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party; ARP) and the Christelijk-Historische Unie (Christian Historical Union; CHU) for the Protestant pillar, the PvdA for the social-democratic pillar, and the VVD for the liberal/general pillar (Sartori, 1976/2005; Lijphart, 1967). Whereas the ARP had strong ties with the mainline Neo-Calvinist Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands; GKN), the CHU was connected to the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church; NHK), a broad protestant church with different modalities (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). From 1967 the dominance of the five parties waned and their share of the electoral vote dropped to 72% in 1971. This decline should be understood as part of a broader process of depillarization: the demarcating role of religion and ideology, strong organizational infrastructure of the pillars, and social apartheid were disappearing (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). In response to their electoral losses, the protestant and catholic parties sought closer cooperation, resulting in an official alliance in 1973 and a merger into the CDA in 1980. From then on, the now three largest parties (CDA, PvdA, and VVD) managed to hold around 80 percent of the vote until 1989, after which they suffered heavy losses, fluctuating around 60 percent until 2012, currently holding just over 40 percent of the vote.

Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij The SGP was founded in 1918 by a group of people mostly belonging to the Pietistic Reformed Gereformeerde Gemeenten (Reformed Congregations; GerGem), but its main initiator was Rev. G.H. Kersten.7 To understand the SGP is to understand the Pietistic Reformed in general, and Kersten specifically (Fieret, 1990). The Pietistic Reformed constitute a group of Orthodox Christians within the Calvinist tradition. As a social group, they are discernable because of their almost uniform lifestyle, predominantly rural background, old traditions, and ambivalence towards society at large, usually accepting technological developments but rejecting cultural changes. Geographically they have their

7 This thesis covers a long time-period, during which the proper way to refer to someone has changed. In this thesis people will be referred to in a pragmatic style, using initials if that is generally done in other sources, and writing the first name in full if it is commonly known. Once a person is introduced, they will generally only be referred to with their last name.

15 stronghold in the “Dutch Bible Belt”, Figure 1: The Dutch Bible Belt an area ranging from the province of Zeeland in the southwest to the province of Overijssel in the northeast (see Figure 1; Snel, 2007). Theologically they distinguish themselves from other Reformed by emphasizing the inner and personalized experience of the faith. Their theological foundation lies in the Further Reformation: a Dutch puritan movement (1600-1750) in which Note: The purple area represents the percentage Christians started applying systematic of voters voting SGP. SGP-voting is often used as a proxy measurement for the number of Pietistic and unbiased self-examination to find Reformed in a municipality, as it serves as an effective form of self-ascription. The map shows out whether their faith was pure and if that even in the Bible Belt, the Pietistic Reformed they were predestined to enter entertain a minority position, giving the Dutch Bible Belt a different character than dominant, heaven (Klinken, 2007). This sometimes aggressive majority culture that characterizes the better-known American Bible emphasis on an inner and belt (Snel, 2007). Source: Wikipedia. personalized experience of the faith had political consequences: where Abraham Kuyper’s – GKN Reverend and ARP- leader – dogma of presumptive regeneration8 gave his followers the optimism and faithfulness to try and change society for the better, the Pietistic Reformed saw “the world” and “political business” as something dangerous which could lead one astray from the true path towards salvation (Fieret, 1990). These different approaches towards society still characterize these groups to this day (Bos, 2010).

8 The dogma of presumptive regeneration is a dogma within the Calvinist doctrine on predestination. The doctrine of predestination teaches that God has predetermined who will enter heaven and who will not. People who are considered predestined are regenerated through the Holy Spirit and are “born again”. The question then arises how believers can be certain that they are indeed predestined, and thus born again. The dogma of presumptive regeneration teaches that everyone is born-again unless the contrary becomes apparent (e.g. a baptized child leaving the church at a later age). The Pietistic Reformed argued against this dogma because they believed it gave people a false sense of security. Instead, God should present itself to the believer through a revelation to let him know he is predestined. The validity of this revelation could consequently be measured through objective criteria.

16 This raises the question why these “world- Figure 2: Rev. G.H. Kersten shunning” people would want to establish a political party in the first place. The answer to this paradox can be found in the person Kersten (Figure 2), a charismatic pastor with strong organizational talents. In 1907, when he was only 25, he convinced his older peers to unite two church denominations into the GerGem, which gave him a great deal of authority amongst his people. Where most of Kersten’s beliefs were Source: Photo Archive exemplary for the Pietistic Reformed, his views on Spaarnestad politics were an exemption. He did not view it as a potential evil, but thought that Christians were given a task to defend the Word of God in politics. When the 1917’s Pacification led to the introduction of the proportional system, he took his chances and founded the SGP. The party gained a seat in 1922 and has since been present in Dutch politics (Fieret, 1990).9 Their political representation further strengthened the Pietistic Reformed group identity (Fieret, 1990). Besides Kersten’s wish to politically unite his community, objections against vaccinations, social insurance laws, universal (i.e. women’s) suffrage, and the ARP’s and CHU’s – in their eyes – foundational decay were other motifs to enter politics. The SGP’s primary goal became the utterly unrealistic pursuit of a bibliocratic10 society. Instead of focusing on achievable goals the party preached in parliament, publically calling for repentance, becoming a testimonial party avant la lettre. This style suited them rather well since most of their politicians were pastors by profession (Fieret, 1990; Post, 2009). The SGP was furthermore nationalistic and anti-Catholic, arguing that the Dutch genesis – especially its independence from Catholic Spain – was guided by God’s will. They were against the League of Nations because they believed closer

9 The fact that Pietistic Reformed voted for the SGP despite their dislike of politics probably has to do with the fact that 1917’s Pacification also introduced “attendance duty”, a form of compulsory voting where people legally obligated to show up at the polling stations without being obligated to vote. It was introduced in 1917 and abolished in 1970 (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). 10 Fieret (1990) distinguishes bibliocracy from theocracy, stating that in a bibliocracy the Bible is the guiding principle for all policies, whereas in a theocracy God himself is the primary ruler of the state, as was the case in Israel in the stories of the Old Testament.

17 international cooperation was based solely on overoptimistic trust in human action. The ARP – ideologically closest to the SGP – received fierce criticisms because of Kuyper’s “antithesis” – a political strategy to form a united front with the Catholics against secular parties (Fieret, 1990). Article 36 of the Nederlandse Geloofsbelijdenis (Belgic Confession; NGB) – one of their doctrinal standard documents – states that it is the government’s task to eradicate “false religions”. The SGP counted Catholicism among them, since the Heidelberg Catechism – another doctrinal standard document – described it as “cursed idolatry”. Its focus on these documents made the SGP a principle party, and since the GKN and ARP subscribed to the same documents, the SGP could act as the ARP’s political conscience (cf. Lucardie, 1986). The SGP would often accuse the ARP of watering down its principles11 when the latter participated in coalitions with the KVP (Fieret, 1990). Because of its uncompromising principles the SGP found itself in an almost absolute state of isolation. Amongst the Pietistic Reformed the party instilled a lot of authority; outsiders hardly took them seriously. When Kersten spoke other politicians often left the room for a cup of coffee, leaving him behind to preach for the converted (Klei, 2014). The SGP did revere the authority of the state, however, which it saw as Gods servant after Romans 13.12 This respect for state authority went so far that that Kersten described the Nazi-occupation of the Netherlands as God’s punishment, which had to be suffered patiently, arguing against joining resistance movements (Fieret, 1990). While its ideals could be described as fundamentalist, the SGP’s small size and obedient attitude ensured that it would never revolt against the state to try and implement its bibliocratic ideals. The label fundamentalist (cf. Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Ozzano 2013) would thus be an ill fit. Still, it is wrong to state that the SGP had no political influence at all. Kersten gave his party an interdenominational basis, which succeeded precisely

11 Kuyper convinced the GKN to remove the paraphrased passage from Article 36 NGB in 1905, since it was in his opinion not applicable in a society that was no longer characterized by one encompassing church (Zwaag, 1999). Twists over the status of this article always prevented closer cooperation between the SGP and the ARP/CHU, even directly after WWII when the call for unity was widely spread (Zwemer, 1992). 12 1Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. … 4For the one in authority is God’s servant for your good. … (Rom. 13:1, 4 New International Version).

18 because of Pietistic Reformed world-shunning. What separated them theologically did not need to separate them politically, because faith was something primarily experienced personally and in church (Bos, 2010). Even the 1953 schism within the GerGem did not lead to overt political divisions (Zwemer, 1992). Furthermore, its interdenominational basis made the SGP attractive for Protestants from churches with different modalities, like the Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerken (Christian Reformed Churches; CGK) and NHK; the SGP was attractive for conservative ARP-voters with the opinion that the ARP had become too pragmatic. Even though the SGP could not directly influence its policies, the ARP was aware of their electoral potential and kept listening to their criticisms to prevent conservative ARP from defecting (Fieret, 1990; Vossen, 2003). These characteristics typified the party until the early 1960’s. Because of his obedient attitude towards the Nazi occupants, Kersten was not allowed to return to parliament after WWII. Rev. P. Zandt replaced him and ensured that the testimonial character of the party remained its prime feature (Fieret, 1990). Or as Zandt himself put it:

Even if all people turned away from the message we preach, still we cannot stop preaching, for it is the will of the Lord; we cannot stop preaching, even if the government stops listening; we cannot stop preaching even if it will lead to isolation in parliament and will result in hostility, mockery, and ridicule. It is an important task to testify. (as cited in Fieret, 1990, p. 273)13

The SGP also started representing minorities in the 1930s – the years of the great depression – by fiercely criticizing the government’s protectionist measures, which limited the freedom of farmers (Fieret, 1990). The ARP was a party of mass integration, whose main goal was the emancipation of Orthodox Reformed belonging to the (lower) middle class, also known as Kleine Luyden (Little People) (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). If the ARP represented Kleine Luyden, it would be just to state that the SGP represented Extremely Kleine Luyden. It

13 All translations of quotations are done by the author unless indicated otherwise.

19 represented the (lower) middle class, but also had strong ties with the agricultural sector, representing farmers, farm laborers, and other peasants (Fieret, 1990; Vossen, 2003). In his discussion of the Hervormd Gereformeerde Staatspartij (Reformed Reformed State Party14; HGS, est. 1922) – a principle and testimonial party acting as the political conscience of the CHU – Vossen (2003) argued that it is the combination of preaching and representing a distinct (agricultural) social base that laid foundations which ensured the SGP’s survival. The HGS was comparable to the SGP in almost every way except for this representational function. Attempts to rebuild the HGS after WWII failed. This raises the question to what extent the Pietistic Reformed belong within the Protestant pillar. Fieret (1990) explains that they avoided institutions religiously influenced by either GKN or NHK. In the case of education, for example, Pietistic Reformed preferred public schools because they were afraid their children would be influenced by “wrong” theological teachings of other Christian schools. Using Blom’s (1975) conception of “mini-pillars” – organizational structures for small subsections of the populations that did not fit within the “large pillars”, e.g. communists, national-socialists, and Jews – Fieret (1990) argued that there could be a Pietistic Reformed mini-pillar: they had their own churches, political party, political paper, and schools. On the other hand, using Kuiper’s (1987) “plural Protestant pillar” – a pillar combining three different societal views, namely the ARP’s, CHU’s, and Ultra-Orthodox/Pietistic Reformed, nuancing the dominant image of homogeneity within the pillar – the Pietistic Reformed could also be considered a current within the broader pillar. Fieret (1990) believes that both approaches do justice to their distinct character. Lijphart (1967, p. 165) once described the SGP (and GPV) as “… representing the most orthodox, fundamentalist, and anti-Catholic of the Calvinist”. He was right to a certain extent. While the SGP represented a specific subsection of the (Calvinist) population, it also remained an attractive party for disgruntled conservative ARP-voters (Fieret, 1990). Although there remains

14 The name of this party is rather difficult to translate, since it refers to two different branches of Reformed Calvinism – hervormd (NHK) & gereformeerd (GKN) – for which the English language has but one translatable word. The party sought to unite these two strands in its theological battle against Catholicism (Vossen, 2003).

20 ambiguity about the degree to which the SGP Figure 3: SGP Election represented a distinct minority, its broader Poster 1971 attractiveness differentiates the party from the ethnic (cf. Gunther & Diamond, 2003) or camp (cf. Ozzano, 2013) ideal types. Its relation with the ARP changed in the 1950’s when the ARP increasingly regarded the SGP a party with a distinct social basis and ideology instead of a lost ARP-wing (Zwemer, 1992). Their distance grew further when the country started to depillarize. The ARP (and CHU) sought closer Source: Documentatiecentrum cooperation with the KVP, resulting in their Nederlandse Politieke Partijen eventual merger into the CDA in 1977. The Pietistic Reformed opted for another strategy: segregation. To put it more aptly, one could say that the pillarization processes of the Pietistic Reformed and the Vrijgemaakten (Liberated)15 gained a second wind. The Pietistic Reformed mini-pillar strengthened and expanded in the seventies with the foundation of new schools and a newspaper: the Reformatorisch Dagblad (Dutch: Reformed Daily; RD). The pillar reinforced and protected their identity; the Pietistic Reformed were now, more than before, clearly distinguished from broader society, forming their own quasi-ethnic community16 (Zwemer, 1992). Their “new” pillar was different from the “old” pillars, however: it did not contribute to a temple, there was no roof connecting it with other pillars, no cooperation at the top. This pillar can best be described as a lonely column in a Greek ruin, standing tall while the rest of the temple has collapsed. Being a principle party, the SGP’s substantive message was consistent over time, but the way in which the party testified changed depending on its leader. When H.G. Abma became leader in 1971 he took more policy-oriented approach, ending the SGP’s extreme isolation by seeking (limited) political cooperation with the GPV. This led to protests of the party’s more conservative members who wanted to remain true to the uncompromising style of Kersten

15 See Historical Framework: ChristenUnie: Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond. 16 “Quasi”, because the community was artificially created, but nonetheless “ethnic”, because it was clearly distinct from the rest of society through social and cultural experiences.

21 and Zandt. An internal conflict arose lasting many years, ending only with the nomination of Bas van der Vlies as party leader in 1986. Van der Vlies was one of the more conservative members of the party; his appointment was meant to satisfy some of the protesters. He conducted policy-oriented politics in the style of Abma, however, appealing to the younger, better-educated GerGem- generation that preferred a more managerial style. His political style was appreciated by outsiders and colleagues, but conservative party members longing for return of Kersten or Zandt were disappointed; some left the party (Zwemer, 1992; Klei, 2014). Recent years have shown substantive changes, however. Although the party was founded in rejection of women’s suffrage and continues to officially reject it (Post, 2009; Willems, 2013), it was forced in 2012 by the European Court of Human Rights to remove its formal barriers against women’s suffrage. Since then one SGP-women has been elected to a city council (Schuyfel, 2014). Its relation to popular media also changed. Where most Pietistic Reformed denominations used to ban the “worldly” television, they had willy- nilly allowed the introduction of (filtered) Internet. While discussions on euthanasia and same-sex marriage defined 1990’s politics, the rise of right-wing populist parties – e.g. the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List; LPF) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom; PVV) – and debates on immigration, integration and Islam characterized the 2000’s. The SGP’s youth grew up with Internet, Facebook, Twitter, and online forums; they entered the public debate and, in accordance with the Zeitgeist, emphasized the SGP’s conservative, non- religious aspects, engaging with left-wing, liberal, and Islamic groups. Orthodox Catholics are now even regarded allies in a strife against Islam (Klei, 2014). There are discussions in Catholic newspapers on the question if Catholics should vote SGP (e.g. Ten Hove, 2012; Ten Heuvel, 2012), and although the party still subscribes to the Heidelberg Catechism and Article 36 NGB and refuses them membership, increasing numbers find their way towards the SGP (Veenhof, 2012). Kees van der Staaij became the emblematic figure of these changes when he took over leadership in 2010. He continues emphasizing the party’s policy- oriented side by i.a. helping the former government to reach majorities in the

22 Senate bringing his party closer to power than ever Figure 4: SGP Logo’s 1990- before (Vliegenthard, 2013; Klei, 2014). Its 2016 (above) and 2016- Present (below) reluctance of television once made the SGP quite camera shy, but Van der Staaij has appeared in one of the Netherlands’ most popular talk shows to promote his campaign against “Second Love” – a website supporting adultery (NOS, 2016) – and he actively employ social media for promotional ends. The new party logo (Figure 4) also speaks volumes. Furthermore, against the wishes of several conservative members, the party deleted passages Note: The triangle (above in referring to the rejection of gay marriage and the orange, below in white) has become a common element in implementation of the death penalty from their SGP propaganda. It stands for the triad “family, politics and most recent election manifesto (Loon, 2017); health” (Terpstra 2016). Van der Staaij mentioned on the SGP- officially not because it reconsidered, but because website that the triangle the issues explicit mentioning would only generate represented the direction in which the party wants to move: negative publicity in the media, which would be forward! (SGP, 2016). Still, it would be hard not to also notice difficult to campaign with (RD, 2017), showing that the likeness of a “play-button”, like the one of the YouTube video the party valued a good campaign above announcing their new logo, embedded on the same webpage. uncompromisingly expressing its ideals. Or as one Source: Wikipedia SGP’er put it:

“No one can deny that the SGP has developed from a pure testimonial party into a more government-oriented political party. … Everyone can understand that it is difficult to combine the slogan “Vote for Life” with a plea for the reimplementation of the death penalty. How can you explain that you are against abortion and euthanasia, but at the same time in favor of the death penalty? That’s very difficult to do when your campaign message has to be short and catchy.” (Bosma, 2017)

23 ChristenUnie The CU (est. 2000) is a relatively young party; to understand it, one should look at its parents: the GPV (est. 1948) and RPF (est. 1975). In this section, their histories, the process leading up to their merger, and the CU’s recent history will be discussed.

Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond It is argued above that the SGP can only be understood through the denominational nature of its followers. This goes even more for the GPV. Whereas the SGP represented many, the GPV represented only one denomination, the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (vrijgemaakt) (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands [liberated]; GKv). This denomination was established in 1944 because of a schism within the GKN.17 The immediate cause was a heated conflict about the dogma of “presumptive regeneration”. Before, the Reformed Synod allowed members to hold different opinions on the dogma, but in 1944, against the strong wishes of some, it was declared that pastors were no longer allowed to preach anything in conflict with it.18 In the midst of WWII, when the Nazi occupation was at its fiercest, GKN-members had to choose to either follow the synod’s decision, staying in the GKN under their authority, or to “liberate” themselves from the synod’s authority, joining the GKv (Kuiper, 1994; Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011). Both denominations considered themselves the true continuation of the GKN and harshly rejected each other’s existence; the conflict was so heated that it tore family bonds and long-held friendships apart. Initially the denominations claimed the same name, but because the group renouncing the synod’s authority was smaller than the group accepting it – ca. 10% of GKN-members joined the GKv – the former soon got the parenthetical addition “vrijgemaakt”,

17 To this day the GKN/GKv-schism remains a heated, controversial topic. It is to the best effort of the author to present it as neutrally as possible. 18 There were also other factors contributing to the conflict – i.a. conflicts about the church order (should the national synod [GKN] or the local church [GKv] have the final say in important matters) and polarizing appearances of important individuals, most noticeably Rev. K. Schilder (GKv) (Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011) - but it would go beyond the purposes of this thesis to discuss them all in detail.

24 distinguishing them from the latter group.19 They soon became known as the Vrijgemaakten,20 while they in turn started referring to the latter group as Synodalen (Synodicals)21 (Kuiper, 1994; Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011).22 The denominational conflict had political consequences. In contrast to the Pietistic Reformed, Orthodox Reformed have always emphasized the societal responsibility of Christians (Bos, 2010). GKN-members were not only politically active in the ARP, but also saw political and societal activity as an important extension of their faith. The gravity of the schism ensured that many Vrijgemaakten felt they could no longer work together with Synodalen in Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) and the ARP; they felt they could not act “as if nothing had happened”. This so-called “ethical conflict” led to the formation of a new mini-pillar, with its own newspaper (Gereformeerd Gezinsblad [Reformed Family Paper], later Nederlands Dagblad [Netherlands Daily; ND]), schools, and political party: the GPV (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, 2011; Mulligen, 2014a). The GPV’s history can roughly be divided in four periods. The first (1948- 1963) was characterized by the fact that the party had no political representation in parliament; a time in which the identities of the Vrijgemaakten and the GPV were shaped. The party was more akin to an ecclesiastical men’s association than a political party; it lacked a leader and even a political program. This did not bother most members, however, because they believed their primary goal was not to win seats but to testify: entering elections was seen as a testimony in itself. Besides, Vrijgemaakten were expected to vote GPV no matter their political stances: there was a moral compulsion to do so (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, 2010; 2011; Mulligen, 2014a).

19 In earlier years, the parenthetical addition “onderhoudende Artikel 31 Kerkorde” (entertaining Article 31 Church Order) was also used, referring to the article of their church order that was at the center of the dispute. As such, the Vrijgemaakten also used to be known as Artikel 31-ers (Kuiper, 1994; Staalduine, 2004; Klei, 2011). 20 It is important to note that in this context Vrijgemaakten means “those who have freed themselves” or “those who have cut themselves loose”. It should not be understood in a passive sense, i.e. “those who were liberated by others”. 21 Another term commonly used to refer to the Synodalen was “Gewoon Gereformeerd” (Ordinarily Reformed), emphasizing their status as members of the mainline/largest Gereformeerde denomination in the Netherlands. 22 Both terms have and may still evoke negative associations. There is unfortunately no neutral way to describe these groups, since every term chosen implies a position taken. It is without ulterior motives that these terms are used here.

25 The second period lasted until Figure 5: GKv Overview of Schisms in the the early 1970s. The party gained its Netherlands first representation in parliament in 1963 under the charismatic leadership of Piet Jongeling. The GPV accepted a political program in 1966 and became a principle party pur sang: “compromise” was a dirty word (Klei, 2011). It took the meaning of testimonial party to its extreme, strengthened by the amongst Vrijgemaakten now widely accepted “one true church”-dogma (see Figure 5). The dogma gave the GKv, and by Note: The GKv used this scheme, and variations of extension GPV, an exclusivist, quasi- it, to teach church history. The “one true church”- ethnic character (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, dogma holds that only the GKv teaches the “true” gospel and administers sacraments correctly. All 2011). Although the decentralized other denominations were false, while the GKv was a direct continuation of the teachings of structure of the GPV left membership- Christ (Kuiper, 1994; Klei, 2011). Here, a black, straight line represents the GKv. Over many years, decisions to local electoral several churches, including the GKN, – here referred to as “Syn. Kerk” (Synodical Church) – associations, the dogma’s widespread had left the “one true church”. acceptance ensured that only GKv- Source: Bosscha, 2015. members could become (active) GPV-members: local congregations and electoral associations often completely overlapped (Klei, 2011). The GPV profiled itself as the political conscience of the ARP and CHU, defending right-wing conservative viewpoints from its principle program on issues where these parties had become more progressive, e.g. transnational cooperation, apartheid, and sexuality. Its small but loyal supporters base ensured that the GPV – in similar fashion to the SGP – became a small but stable faction in parliament, distanced from the struggles of political power games. Jongeling profiled himself as the “moral conscience” of parliament, telling it like it is when other parties were constrained by coalition agreements or their own credibility. The party also – unsuccessfully – tried to be a force against the 1960’s cultural revolution and the ongoing secularization (Klei, 2011).

26 In 1967 another schism occurred, sparked by Figure 6: GPV Election a debate on whether the 1944 schism was the will of Poster 1963 God or the result of human conflict and, consequentially, if the “one true church”-dogma was true or false. The GKv-synod defrocked the pastors holding the latter position; these pastors and their followers – ca. 25% of GKv-members – founded the Nederlands Gereformeerde Kerken (Netherlands Reformed Churches; NGK) (Kuiper, 1994). This schism can best be understood against the backdrop of ongoing secularization. In a society becoming increasingly less religious, the Vrijgemaakten felt it Note: The text in orange is a reference to the Dutch national was of the utmost importance to remain “pure”. In a anthem. Translation: Loyal to the fatherland… similar fashion to the Pietistic Reformed, their The fortress (here in white) was a common element in GPV pillarization process gained a second wind, posters. It is a reference to a transforming the mini-pillar into an independent well-known hymn of Martin Luther: “A Mighty Fortress Is column (Klei, 2011). Our God” (Klei, 2011). Source: Documentatiecentrum The third period took place between the Nederlandse Politieke Partijen early 1970s and early 1990s, a period of consolidation in which the position of the GPV became taken for granted. A new generation not involved in the 1944 schism and the creation of the Vrijgemaakte mini-pillar slowly took over. They professionalized the party, which became more policy-oriented: compromise was no longer a dirty word. Although the party remained denominationally exclusivist, it slowly became acceptable to work together with the SGP and the newly founded RPF. From the 1980s onward, for example, these parties presented common electoral lists in certain elections. They also used combined lists to increase their chances of gaining remainder seats (Klei, 2010; 2011). Although the party internally lost some of its élan, it was more appreciated by outsiders. It tried to act as the political conscience of the newly formed CDA, which only occasionally succeeded. On many religiously inspired issues – e.g. euthanasia – the CDA did not really care what the GPV thought. On several other issues, however, its political opponents took them much more seriously. Gert Schutte, party leader since 1981, proposed many technical

27 amendments on legislative proposals, even proposals he disagreed with. Because the GPV’s distanced from political power games, Schutte became known as the parliament’s “constitutional conscience”. During this period, the GPV broke with its testimonial style (Klei, 2011). The final phase started in the early nineties and lasted till 2000. It is marked by a gradual loss of identity, the breakdown of the Vrijgemaakte pillar, and the merger with the RPF into the CU.

Reformatorische Politieke Federatie The RPF was founded as a federation of four organizations of concerned Orthodox Christians with ties to the ARP and/or GPV. The most important one was the Nationaal Evangelisch Verband (National Evangelical Connection; NEV), founded in 1966 by ARP-members who felt the ARP had become too pragmatic. The GPV remained true to the original ARP foundations, but because ARP- members were no GKv-members they could not join the GPV. They founded the NEV with the intention to support the GPV in all ways possible and eventually merge with it. Their love was completely one-sided, however. The GPV only became more exclusivist over the years and never had any real intention to merge. What made it worse was that with the 1967 schism NGK-members were forced to leave the GPV. Many of them became NEV-members, which brought the tensions between the GPV and NEV to a boiling point. In 1972 the GPV officially cut all ties with the NEV. In response, they sought cooperation with other organizations (Klapwijk, 1998; Mulligen, 2010; 2014a). One of these organizations was the Gespreksgroep van AR-gezinden (Discussion Group of AR-minded), established in 1971 under the leadership of elderly professors from the VU University, holding the opinion that the ARP had come under too much influence of a small, radical left-wing group. Another group was the Antirevolutionair Jongerencontact (Antirevolutionary Youth Contact; ARJC), a youth movement that was fearful of the same left-wing influences on society and the official youth movement of the ARP: ARJOS. The NEV succeeded in severing both organizations from the ARP: the ARJC even changed its name to Reformatorisch Politiek Jongerencontact, (Reformatory Political Youth Contact; RPJC) emphasizing its independence from the ARP.

28 Together with a group of local independent electoral Figure 7: RPF Election associations called the Reformatorisch Politiek Poster 1981 Contact (Reformatory Political Contact: RPC), they founded the RPF in 1975 (Haasdijk, 2003; Mulligen, 2010). Due to the NEV’s historical ties with the GPV, the RPF’s political program was an almost exact copy of the GPV’s. The main distinction between the parties lay in their electoral lists: the RPF accepted candidates from different denominations, including NGK-members. Because the RPF also appealed to Source: Documentatiecentrum GKv-voters, the relation between both parties Nederlandse Politieke Partijen became outright hostile (Mulligen, 2010). The RPF’s biggest problems were internal, however. Its first attempt at parliamentary representation was unsuccessful, but in 1981 the party got two seats. One of its parliamentarians was Aad Wagenaar, an old RPJC-chairman and RPF-founder. He wanted to conduct politics in the GPV-manner: professional and policy-oriented. The other was Meindert Leerling, a newcomer to politics, who previously made a career as television programmer and sports journalist. He wanted to get rid of the RPF’s old, conservative, old-fashioned image and make it fresh, modern, dynamic, and confrontational. He rather testified by preaching the Gospel than conduct policy-oriented politics, which gave his appearance an Evangelical vibe. Leerling was made party leader at the expense of Wagenaar, and soon a conflict between the two constrained the party (Mulligen, 2010; 2014b). Factions formed around the politicians. Wagenaar was supported by the traditional, Orthodox Reformed, who worried about the “evangelicalicization” of the party. The Dutch evangelical movement strongly grew in the 1950s due to missionary work of American evangelists. The movement appeared especially attractive for Christians fearful of modernization, depillarization, and secularization. They organized themselves with several Orthodox Reformed and founded their own broadcasting organization (Evangelische Omroep [Evangelical Broadcasting; EO]), journalistic papers (e.g. CV-Koers [CT-Course], later De

29 Nieuwe Koers [The New Course]), and schools. The connections between these institutions and the individuals belonging to this Evangelical-Reformed base were weaker than the Pietistic Reformed and Vrijgemaakte; there was no integrated complex and thus no (mini-)pillar. It is best to speak of an Evangelical-Reformed “core” (cf. Stoffels, 1995) (Mulligen, 2010; 2014b). From the 1970s onwards evangelicals joined the RPF, which by extension became part of the Evangelical-Reformed core. While Wagenaar feared this development because it meant a watering down of Orthodox Reformed principles, Leerling, with support of the Federation Board, actively sought to appeal both Orthodox Reformed and Evangelicals, being more ecumenical in his convictions (Mulligen, 2010; 2014b). The conflict became extremely hostile and only ended when the board expelled Wagenaar in 1985. While this decision brought back party unity, it also meant the loss of ca. 20% of its members – amongst them influential founders of the RPF. Leerling came out victorious, but his position as leader was severely damaged. The party lost a seat in 1986, and what Leerling won in Evangelical voters, he lost in Orthodox Reformed. Only when he left the party in 1994 did the RPF expand and achieve broader electoral successes (Mulligen, 2010).

Merger Ideologically there were almost no difference between the GPV and RPF. Both parties were right-wing and in favor of small government – i.e. against a generous welfare state – and laws based on Christian values. In 1987 the GPV even outright stated that it had no real principal or ideological differences with the RPF. However, given their troubled history and differences in political style – policy-oriented vs. testimonial, respectively – there remained a strong animosity between them (Mulligen, 2010; 2014a). That they nonetheless merged into the ChristenUnie can be understood through two factors (Hippe, 2010). In 1994-2001 the Netherlands were governed by two successive “purple” cabinets, consisting of the VVD, PvdA, and social-liberal Democraten 66 (Democrats 66; D66).23 These coalitions were made possible by the CDA’s massive loss and D66’s gain at the 1994 elections. For the first time since 1918, a

23 The coalition was named after the political colors of the two largest parties contributing: the blue VVD and the red PvdA.

30 government coalition without a confessional party was formed. The SOPP’s did not benefit from the CDA’s loss. They realized that the Netherlands had become a secular country and that their ability to change this shrank. Purple’s introduction of progressive legislation on i.a. euthanasia, prostitution, and marriage equality, only further strengthened the feelings of crisis within the SOPP’s (Hippe, 2010; Klei, 2011). Secondly, the Vrijgemaakten started to depillarize in the 1990s.24 Organizations broke their exclusive ties with the GKv and the “one true church”- dogma started to wear and tear, especially amongst the younger generations that had not experienced the 1944 schism. They considered the rigid, exclusivist views of the older generations unappealing and believed that other Orthodox believers – e.g. those from the NGK – could also be considered “true” Christians. They furthermore appreciated certain evangelical elements of the Christian faith, like active evangelization and contemporary gospel songs. The Vrijgemaakte pillar did not disappear completely; it fused with the Evangelical-Reformed core, creating a new, broader, and more flexible core, attractive for both Orthodox non-GKv-members and younger GKv-members (Klei, 2010; 2011; Hippe, 2010). While the GPV lost most of its élan during their years of policy-oriented politics, the RPF, under the leadership of Leen van Dijke, gained the image of a young and lively party in the eyes of the Orthodox Reformed youth. The RPF kept its testimonial characteristics, opting for a polarizing confrontational style, but it also promoting social issues, like poverty reduction, environmental protection, and foreign aid. The party called itself “Christian-Social” and presented itself as a “social” alternative for the CDA and a Christian alternative for the secular green progressive GroenLinks (GreenLeft; GL).25 This confrontational strategy strained its relationship with other parties and the press, but at the 1994 elections the RPF did win three seats, becoming the largest of the SOPP’s. The Vrijgemaakten began to think that the interdenominational approach of the RPF might be a

24 It is important to note that this process of depillarization did not go hand in hand with a demise of religiosity, as was the case with the mainline depillarization in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The Vrijgemaakten remained just as religious as before (Hippe, 2010; Klei, 2010; 2011). 25 It would go too far to consider the RPF left-wing, however, since it still explicitly rejected the notion of a “socially engineered society” in its principle program and argued that the brokenness of God’s Creation could not be healed though human efforts; the government only had a task where private initiatives failed (Harinck & Scherff, 2010). It is the changing emphasis in its conveyed message that is important.

31 better answer to the demise of confessionalism in the Netherlands than the GPV’s exclusivism. The GPV’s natural support dwindled, the moral compulsion to vote GPV waned; its survival as a political party was no longer guaranteed (Hippe, 2010; Mulligen, 2010; 2014; Klei, 2011). The RPF had always sought closer cooperation with all other SOPP’s. Until the mid-1990’s it cooperated with the SGP, but the distance between both parties grew when the latter kept refusing women full membership while the RPF placed women on prominent electoral positions. Meanwhile, the distance between the RPF and GPV shrank, but whereas the RPF proved to be strongly in favor of a merger – a long-held wish of the NEV – prominent GPV-members kept having objections due to their traditional, exclusivist focus on the GKv. The RPF was in favor, the GPV was divided; some of the Vrijgemaakten welcomed the merger, others saw it as a bitter necessity (Hippe, 2010; Mulligen, 2010). During the formation of the ChristenUnie, there was some ambiguity about its potential voter base. This can be seen in the name of the party. While the names of both old parties referred to their Orthodox Reformed background – Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond & Reformatorische Politieke Federatie – the CU used the term “Christian” instead, suggesting it wanted to reach out all Christians. This was partly logical, since the CU did not want to show Evangelical RPF-members the door, but the name was misleading since the party still did not allow Catholics to become members. The CU argued that Catholics were accountable to the pope, which was incompatible with its Reformed tradition. The party thus remained an SOPP; the name ProtestantUnion would have been more fitting (Hippe, 2010; Mulligen, 2014a).

Union The CU’s first years were difficult. It had to find a balance between its enthusiastic RPF-wing and the somewhat uncertain GPV-sections, whom they were afraid to lose to the SGP. Substantively there were no problems. The CU used an old RPF slogan – “not left, not right, but Christian-social” – which justly represented its socio-economic position, left-wing only in comparison to other Christian parties (Oomkes, 2012; Oxfam Novib, 2017). Its new political style proved more difficult. The CU tried to combine its predecessors’ styles, both

32 testifying and policy-oriented politics. It explicitly itself as a potential governing party, hoping to win a few seats, feeling strengthened by the five seats it already held after the merger (Voerman, 2010). Things turned out differently. The polls had been favorable, but the 2002 elections brought the CU back to four seats in parliament, one of them a remainder seat. Its people had strategically voted CDA in fear of the potential success of the newly established LPF. The new CDA-leader Jan Peter Balkenende was a GKN-member with a “Reformed appearance”, which especially appealed to potential CU-voters (Voerman, 2010). This electoral loss led to unrest within the party. There was uncertainty about its political style and its party leader: the old GPV/RPF-division reemerged. After months of struggle, the ex-RPF-member André Rouvoet became party leader: he opted for a full testimonial style. During the 2003 elections the party lost another seat. An internal report showed that the main reason for its loss lay in CU-voters (especially ex-RPF-voters!) defecting to the CDA because of its access to political power (Voerman, 2010). The CU entered a period of professionalization. The party decided to run a “permanent campaign”, seeking publicity outside election periods by actively participating in different segments of civil society. Going further than the RPF, it successfully reached out to new categories of potential voters: women, Evangelicals, and Christian immigrants. Rouvoet gave the party new élan by successfully campaigning against the European constitution in 2005, appearing as a skilled, competent politician in televised debates (Voerman, 2010). In the run-up to the 2006 elections, the CU build on these successes by presenting itself as a reasonable alternative for larger parties, taking away potential objections against principle/testimonial parties (See Figure 8). The election program showed substantive changes: theocratic residues were removed and the party no longer explicitly campaigned for bans on abortion, same-sex marriage, and euthanasia – all of which made it a more eligible coalition partner. This strategy proved fruitful, resulting in six seats – more than the GPV and RPF ever held together – and government participation with the CDA and PvdA (Voerman, 2010; Mulligen, 2014a).

33 The results of the CU’s governing experience Figure 8: CU Election Poster were mixed. Obviously, the party could not abolish 2006 important medical ethical issues, but it did manage to promote so-called “alternatives”, e.g. adoption, outreach programs for prostitutes, and palliative care. CU-voters were divided. Some argued that it was no longer possible to impose biblical norms and values in a secular society. In their eyes, the CU’s performance was the best possible combination of testifying and governing. Others, however, criticized the CU’s willingness to compromise and argued that the party had achieved little concrete results. They Translation: André Rouvoet: Vote Strategically Vote feared the CU would turn into a smaller version of ChristenUnie! Source: Documentatiecentrum the CDA, without clear-cut Christian principles Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (Voerman, 2010; Mulligen, 2014a). Their government participation generated lots media attention, which, while having its positive sides, also meant that every controversy was widely publicized, especially a painful internal debate regarding party-membership for homosexuals.26 Of the three politicians becoming cabinet members, only Rouvoet left a positive impression, and he was, unfortunately, only a Minister of the newly founded “special ministry” for Youth and Families;27 an important position for his supporters, but a relatively powerless one nonetheless. At the start of its governing period the CU was appreciated, reaching nine seats in the polls, but the party fell back to five seats in the 2010 elections, a result that was repeated in 2012 and 2017 (Voerman, 2010; Mulligen, 2014a). To this day the CU is characterized by internal contradictions; the main question remains which voters it seeks to attract. Dwindling numbers of supporters share a coherent ideological vision; on CU-meetings, positions ranging from Christian feminism or socialism to Christian liberalism can be

26 In the end, it was decided that they theoretically could become members, but that the final decision lay with the local electoral associations, meaning that it remained all but impossible in practice (Voerman, 2010). 27 A special ministry is a broad policy program guided by a Minister with its own portfolio, using the facilities of other ministries. The said Minister thus has no de facto ministry (Jeugd en Gezin, n.d.).

34 heard. The party even attracts progressive Christians that previously voted PvdA or GL in dislike of the old SOPP’s right-wing profiles. In addition, Catholics – both left-leaning and conservative – have discovered the CU as an alternative to the CDA, which they deem either too right-wing or too secular (Mulligen, 2014a). In 2015, the CU even removed its official barriers preventing the admission of Catholics. An overwhelming majority of the party supported this decision (RD, 2015). Everything taken together, the CU is in a difficult position. If it emphasizes its social profile, it loses Orthodox voters to the SGP. If it emphasizes religious conservatism, it loses progressive voters to the PvdA and GL. As off now, the CU keeps performing better in the polls than in actual elections.

35 Methodology To extend the analysis into the present, a classical content analysis through means of a codebook was conducted on speeches held by the SOPP’s during the Algemene Beschouwingen.28 Being held in response to the Troonrede (King’s Speech) since 1905, the Algemene Beschouwingen have been the yearly debate where both the National Budget and the governments (socio-economic) plans for the coming years are discussed (Grootveld, 2013; Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2015). Until 1995 the debate was combined with the Algemene Financiële Beschouwingen (General Financial Debate), but they were split out of the common desire to have a debate solely with the parliamentary leaders29 and the prime minister about general policy plans (Grootveld, 2013). The debate itself is divided in two terms. In the first term, parliamentary leaders hold speeches one after another and ask the prime minister questions about the National Budget and governmental policies. They may interrupt each other to ask questions or enter a short debate. The largest oppositional party starts the debate, followed by the largest coalition party, the second largest oppositional party, second largest coalition party, etc., leaving the smallest parties for last (Parlement en Politiek, n.d.b). Speaking times are negotiated beforehand;30 larger parties are allocated the most, but relative to their size smaller parties have an advantage (Parlement en Politiek, n.d.b).31 The next day, after the parliamentary leaders have finished their speeches, the prime minister answers questions brought forward, while the parliamentary leaders may again interrupt. Then the second term begins, and parliamentary leaders may react and introduce motions, – usually propositions for political inquiry or budgetary

28 When studying temporal changes within and between political parties, scholars often opt to analyze election manifesto’s (e.g. Rooduijn, 2013). While this has its advantages, a problem of election manifesto’s is that voters rarely read them; their main purpose seems to be providing material for the media to analyze during election campaigns (Bara, 2005). When analyzing short- term shifts in a party’s strategy to please or bring in new voters, analyzing recurring, direct source of communication is arguably better. 29 While parliamentary leaders are often also their party’s leader, this is not necessarily so. It may happen, for instance, that a party leader becomes a minister, leaving the position of parliamentary leader for someone else to fill. Parliamentary leaders are always, however, important, well-known political figures. 30 Parties are usually allocated speaking times for all budgetary debates taken together, leaving them the freedom to decide how to divide their time across the debates. 31 Example from 2015 (total number of minutes for all budgetary debates): VVD: 41 seats, 400 minutes; CDA: 15 seats; 230 minutes; SGP: 3 seats; 130 minutes (Parlement en Politiek, n.d.b.).

36 changes – which will be voted upon Figure 9: Number of Viewers of Live- after the prime minister has answered Broadcastings of the Algemene Beschouwingen, 1995-2016 their questions and given his opinion on the motions. After the voting, the Algemene Beschouwingen are closed (Parlement en Politiek, n.d.a.). The Algemene Beschouwingen generate a lot of media attention: since 1993 the debate is broadcasted live on television (Braak, B. van den

[Parlement en Politiek]; personal Note: The parliament only started reporting television ratings since 1995. In recent years the communication; July 11, 2017) (see debate is also steamed Online viewing numbers could not be retrieved, however. Figure 9), and it has been a common Source: Stafdienst Communicatie Tweede Kamer practice to repeat fragments in news der Staten-Generaal (1995-2011); Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2013-2016). broadcasts and talk shows – both radio and television – for decades.32 Parliamentary leaders not only use their time to criticize or praise the government’s policies, but they also use the media attention to profile themselves and their parties (Parlement en Politiek, n.d.a.; Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2015). Parties share (fragments of) their speeches on social media; Winners and Losers of the debate are chosen by the press, and debate prices are awarded (Nederlands Debat Instituut, 2016). It is one of the highlights of the political year (Parlement en Politiek, n.d.a.). The first term SOPP’s speeches are the unit of observation. Their content is prepared beforehand, and as such offer a good overview of the issues a party deems most important to communicate. Answers to potential interruptions will be excluded from the analysis, as they often reflect issues the interrupter, not the interrupted finds important. The SOPP’s are the unit of analysis. The period analyzed is 1990-2016, presenting the opportunity to study the SOPP’s when they were still jointly considered the “small Christian right”, while also including the entire governing period of the CDA-PvdA government

32 The Algemene Beschouwingen have, unfortunately, not been systematically archived; the oldest television fragment that could be retrieved was from 1965 (Beeld en Geluid; personal communication; July 11, 2017).

37 coalition Lubbers III.33 The 2012 Algemene Beschouwingen were cancelled due to the fall of Rutte I, bringing the total amount of speeches analyzed to 62.34 Codes were added measuring the four basic cleavages of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as well as cleavages on materialism/post-materialism and national/global values.35 Based on the historical framework, codes were also added on individualism/communitarianism and Catholicism/Protestantism. The totality of a speech was taken into consideration; if the cleavage was discussed it was judged if this was done neutrally or in favor of one of the groups. Codes on Islam and Judaism/Israel were also added, judging if they were discussed positively, neutrally, or negatively. Based on the second family, codes were added looking if parties defended or presented themselves as representatives of specific communities. Binary codes were added on “Representing Orthodox Christianity” and more generally on “Representing a minority culture”. Representation of farmers/agriculture was measured through the landed interest/industrial needs cleavage. Codes on CSO’s (pro-life organizations, labor unions, employers’ organizations, etc.) were inductively added, as was a binary code measuring criticisms against alleged cartel parties. Because the third family is based on the other two, most of its content is already measured. A pluralism/proto-hegemony code was added, just as a binary code measuring if the parties were representatives of a majority culture, furthering nationalistic sentiments. Political relevance cf. Sartori (1976/2005) is difficult to measure through speeches as it primarily about influencing policies or other parties. What could be measured, was the length of speeches and the number parties interrupting an SOPP. The former reflects a party’s seats and influence during speaking time negotiations; the latter may be interpreted as a sign of how serious other parties take the SOPP’s.

33 This may be important, because otherwise all the GPV/RPF data would be from the “Purple” period, potentially influencing the results. 34 10 GPV; 10 RPF; 16 CU; 26 SGP. 35 These items are used to elucidate (changes in) issues or voting groups that SOPP’s find worthwhile pursuing, not to prove the electoral relevance of these cleavages, since voter might vote for other reasons than their “group membership” (see Franklin, 2010).

38 Regarding Lucardie’s (1986) prophesying at the frontier, binary codes were inductively added measuring the presence of salient themes. Themes were also added if they highlighted remarkable differences between SOPP’s, or helped to illustrate other codes. Acting as a political conscience was inductively measured by adding the four category codes each time a party was mentioned. Testifying, i.e. defending religious ideals by either preaching, calling for repentance or explicitly using them as a justification for (a call for) political action, was measured through a binary code. Finally, the number of references to Bible/Authoritative Religious Texts (ART’s) were measured, as was the potential presence of a religious conclusion. The way in which the data is gathered has up and downsides. The quantitative way of coding allows for clear comparisons between parties, showing the number of references on each item and in some cases also allowing for comparison between types of references (e.g. positive, neutral, and negative). The amount of attention an item received in a speech was not measured, however. For instance, a party spending half its speech on Fetus Rights and one only casually mentioning it will receive the same positive scores. For a complete picture, a qualitative interpretation remains necessary.

39 Results Table 1 shows the different Cleavages and Other Characteristics mentioned the SOPP’s speeches. Of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), four basic cleavages, the Labor/Capital Cleavage is mentioned least with no clear preference for either the worker’s or the employer’s side. The Center/Periphery Cleavage was not prevalent in the 1990’s became important for the CU. SOPP’s almost exclusively defend the periphery and take agricultural side in the Land/Industry Cleavage. The GPV’s references are low, the RPF discussed it in over half its speeches, the CU percentage falls in between, and the SGP mentions it the most, showing a slight decrease over time, like the SGP’s decrease in the Religious/Secular Cleavage, dropping from the 1990s 90% to 69% in 2000-2016. The RPF hardly discusses this, the GPV mentions it half of time, and the CU discusses it in a quarter of its speeches, taking religion’s side half of the time; other SOPP’s exclusively defend religion. The Materialism/Post-Materialism Cleavage is mentioned in all SOPP’s speeches except for the 2000-2016 SGP, mentioning it 69% of the time. The CU and RPF were most often post-materialist, the GPV neutral, and the SGP divided between neutral and post-materialist stances. In 2000-2016 SOPP’s could be sporadically materialist. The National/Global Values Cleavage is mentioned in most speeches, but more so in the 1990’s than in 2000-2016. The GPV is often neutral, the RPF equally divided amongst the three sub-categories, and the SGP and CU take the national values’ side about half of the time; while the CU is takes the global values’ position a third of the time, the SGP is more often neutral. The Individualism/Communitarianism Cleavage is mentioned in practically all speeches; the SOPP’s almost always taking communitarianism’s side, being sporadically neutral. The Protestant/Catholic Cleavage is referenced only once, by the CU; Islam is referenced mainly by the SGP, criticizing it. Judaism/Israel is mentioned by all SOPP’s, but the 2000-2016 SGP references it the most by far, being more pro-Judaism/Israel than other SOPP’s. Representing Orthodox Christianity and Representing a Minority Culture are themes hardly mentioned. As Table 2 shows, Specific CSO’s are also hardly mentioned, CNV and FNV most often, but still only respectively 6 and 5 times.

40 Table 1: Percentages of SOPP’s Speeches in the First Term of the Algemene Beschouwingen Containing Mentioned Cleavages or Other Characteristics, 1990- 2016 GPV RPF SGP CU SGP SGP 1990- 1990- 1990- 2000- 2000- 1990- 1999 1999 1999 2016 2016 2016 N 10 10 10 16 16 26 Center vs. Periphery 10% 10% 20% 50% 25% 23% Defending Periphery/ 100% 100% 100% 88% 100% 100% Criticizing Center Neutral - - - 12% - - Religious vs. Secular 50% 10% 90% 25% 69% 77% Defending Religion/ 100% 100% 100% 50% 91% 95% Criticizing Secularism Neutral - - - 50% 9% 5% Land vs. Industry 20% 60% 90% 38% 69% 77% Defending Agriculture/ 100% 100% 89% 100% 100% 95% Criticizing Industry Neutral - - 11% - - 5% Labor vs. Capital 30% 20% 10% 38% 13% 12% Defending Workers/ 33% - - 50% - - Criticizing Employers Defending Employers/ - - 100% - 50% 67% Criticizing Workers Neutral 67% 100% - 50% 50% 33% Materialism vs. Post- 100% 100% 100% 100% 69% 81% materialism Defending Materialism/ - - - 6% 9% 5% Criticizing Post-Materialism Defending Post- Materialism/Criticizing 20% 80% 60% 81% 55% 58% Materialism Neutral 80% 20% 40% 13% 36% 38% National vs. Global Values 80% 90% 90% 75% 75% 81% Defending National Values/ 25% 33% 56% 50% 42% 48% Criticizing Global Values Defending Global Values/ - 33% 11% 33% 17% 14% Criticizing National Values Neutral 75% 33% 33% 17% 42% 38% Individualism vs. 100% 90% 90% 94% 94% 92% Communitarianism Defending Communitarianism/ 100% 89% 100% 93% 100% 100% Criticizing Individualism Neutral - 11% - 7% - - Protestant vs. Catholic 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% Islam 0% 10% 0% 6% 50% 31% Criticizing Islam - 100% - - 75% 75% Neutral - - - 100% 25% 25% Judaism/Israel 20% 30% 30% 31% 63% 50% Defending Judaism/ Israel 50% 33% 67% 60% 90% 85% Neutral 50% 67% 33% 40% 10% 15%

41 Table 1 (Continued) GPV RPF SGP CU SGP SGP 1990- 1990- 1990- 2000- 2000- 1990- 1999 1999 1999 2016 2016 2016 N 10 10 10 16 16 26 Representing Orthodox 0% 0% 10% 0% 6% 8% Christianity Representing a 0% 0% 20% 6% 13% 15% Minority Culture Criticizing Alleged 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Cartel Parties Pluralism vs. Proto- 60% 40% 100% 50% 56% 73% Hegemony Pluralism - - - 75% 11% 5% Proto-Hegemony 67% 100% 90% - 78% 84% Neutral/Both 33% - 10% 25% 11% 11% Representing a 0% 0% 10% 0% 6% 8% Majority Culture Testifying 60% 60% 100% 13% 88% 92% Religious Conclusion 30% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Note: N = Number of speeches analyzed. The percentages reported in black represent the percentage of speeches containing the mentioned cleavage. The percentages reported in gray represent how the percentages in black are construed.

The general Labor Unions and Employers’ Organizations are mentioned more often, the former more than the latter. Back at Table 1, it is also clear that Criticizing Alleged Cartel Parties is a theme absent in speeches. The 1990’s SGP references Pluralism/Proto-Hegemony in all its speeches while other SOPP’s do it about half the time. With exception of the CU, being often pluralist, they all prefer proto-hegemonism. Representing a Majority Culture was something done only, and only sporadically, by the SGP. Figure 10 shows the Speeches’ Length; Figure 11 the number of different Parties Interrupting. In 1990-2005 speeches were of comparable lengths, fluctuating between 2000-3000 words. There is a slight drop for all SOPP’s in 1993, a large CU-peak in 2007-2009 and a smaller one in 2013-2014, corresponding with peaks in Figure 11. From 2006, both the CU’s and SGP’s speech length and the number of parties interrupting them increase steadily, the CU showing more dramatic peaks. Table 3 reports the Salient Themes. Environmental Policies/Climate Change is mentioned almost always, except for the 2000-2016 SGP. With 80%

42 the RPF mentioned Developmental Aid Table 2: Number of SOPP’s Speeches in twice as much as other SOPP’s in the the First Term of the Algemene Beschouwingen Containing References to 1990’s; the CU mentions it 69% of the CSO’s, 1990-2016 time while the SGP dropped to 19%. N 62 Labor Unions 21 Except for the 1990’s SGP at 90%, all Employers’ Organizations 15 SOPP’s mentioned Norms and Values CNVa 6 FNVa 5 around 70% of the time. With 81%, Salvation Army 4 Fetus Rights were mentioned most in VNGb 4 KNMGa 3 the 1990s by the SGP; the GPV and CIOc 2 RPF respectively scored 31 and 21 Gevangenzorg Nederlandd 2 GreenPeace 2 percent-points lower. It is referenced RMUae 2 more in 2000-2016, the SGP VBOKf 2 VNO-NCWe 2 mentioning it always. Conversely, Note: N = Total number of speeches analyzed. Euthanasia was mentioned more in The “Labor Unions” and “Employers’ Organizations” items represent the total amount the 1990s. All SOPP’s score relatively of speeches containing either specific or general references to respectively labor unions and high except for the CU, staying at 31%. employers’ organizations. If only a CSO representing both workers and employers (e.g. The SGP references Marriage Sanctity the RMU) or the term “Social Partners” was used in over half its speeches; other parties in a speech, both items were scored positive. Christian CSO’s are reported in gray. reference it less, the CU the least. Only CSO’s mentioned more than once are reported here. Labor Unions or Employers’ Sunday Rest is referenced most by the Organizations mentioned only once are included in the calculation of their respective general SGP at 69%, a bit by the GPV, and the items. aLabor Unions CU and RPF practically ignore it. bUmbrella organization for municipalities c Alcohol Abuse is rarely Umbrella organization for churches and synagogues mentioned; the SGP does it most often. dVoluntary organization supporting (ex-) prisoners and their families A similar pattern is noticeable in Drug eEmployers’ Organization fPro-life Organization Abuse, Gambling, Blasphemy, Porn(ification), and Prostitution. Of these themes, Drug Abuse is referenced the most; Blasphemy is mentioned in half the SGP’s speeches but ignored by the GPV and RPF; and Prostitution became an important theme for both the CU and 2000- 2016 SGP. The SGP shows an increase in Single Earners references, going from 10% to 69%. The GPV and CU score around 40%, the RPF 20%. Voluntary Work shows a similar pattern, although the GPV, RPF, and 2000-2016 SGP all mention it half

43 Figure 10: Length of SOPP’s Speeches Figure 11: Number of Different Parties in the First Term of the Algemene Interrupting SOPP’s in their Speeches in Beschouwingen, 1990-2016 the First Term of the Algemene Beschouwingen, 1990-2016

Table 3: Percentages of SOPP’s Speeches in the First Term of the Algemene Beschouwingen Containing References to Salient Themes, 1990-2016 GPV RPF SGP CU SGP SGP 1990- 1990- 1990- 2000- 2000- 1990- 1999 1999 1999 2016 2016 2016 N 10 10 10 16 16 26 Environmental Policies/ 90% 100% 90% 88% 38% 57% Climate Change Developmental Aid 40% 80% 40% 69% 19% 27% Norms and Values 70% 70% 90% 69% 69% 77% Fetus Rights 50% 60% 81% 80% 100% 92% Euthanasiaa 80% 80% 100% 31% 69% 81% Marriage Sanctityb 30% 20% 60% 13% 56% 57% Sunday Rest 30% - 80% 6% 63% 69% Alcohol Abuse 10% 10% 30% 19% 25% 27% Drug Abuse 40% 40% 60% 31% 38% 46% Gambling 20% 10% 40% 13% 6% 19% Blasphemy - - 50% 6% 13% 27% Porn(ification)c 10% 20% 30% 13% 56% 46% Prostitution 10% 10% 10% 44% 63% 42% Single Earners 40% 20% 10% 38% 69% 46% Voluntary Work 20% 10% 10% 44% 31% 23% Judeo-Christian - - 10% 6% 25% 19% Tradition Political Trust 30% - 50% 44% 38% 42% Note: N = Number of speeches analyzed. aIncluding discussions on palliative care and assisted suicide bAlso including remarks on divorce rates, (marriage registrars with conscientious objections against) same-sex marriage, and registered partnerships. cPornification meaning the increasing visibility of sexuality in society, e.g. in television commercials or on billboards. The item also contains references to child pornography.

44 as much. The “Judeo-Christian Table 4: Number SOPP’s Speeches in the First Tradition” is mentioned Term of the Algemene Beschouwingen Containing References to Other Political Parties, sometimes by the 2000-2016 1990-2016 SGP, but otherwise almost Positive Neutral Negative Total CDA 4 18 8 30 completely ignored. Political GPV 1 3 1 5 RPF 1 3 - 4 Trust is brought forward in CU 1 4 5 9 30%-50% of the speeches, the SGP 1 8 2 10 PvdA 7 11 6 24 exception being the RPF, which GPV - 5 1 6 RPF 2 2 2 6 does not mention it. CU 1 1 2 4 SGP 4 3 1 8 Table 4 shows the VVD 1 9 12 24 number of References to Other GPV - 1 - 1 RPF 1 2 2 5 Parties. The CDA is referenced CU - 3 8 11 SGP - 4 3 7 the most, in almost half the D66 1 7 6 14 speeches, closely followed by the GPV - - - - RPF - - 3 3 PvdA and VVD. Then follows a CU - 3 3 6 SGP 1 4 0 5 gap, D66 being referenced 14 CU 2 4 - 6 times total, after which follows GL 2 2 2 6 PVV - 2 4 6 another gap, with the CU, GL, SP 1 2 3 6 LPF - 1 1 2 PVV, and the democratic SDAPa - 2 - 2 socialist Socialistische Partij 50+ - 1 - 1 CHU - 1 - 1 (Socialist Party; SP) each NMPb - 1 - 1 referenced six times. While most PvdDc - 1 - 1 parties are predominantly SGP 1 - - 1 Note: The numbers reported in black report the total discussed in neutral terms, the amount of references to political parties in the analyzed documents (self-references excluded). VVD, D66, and PVV are also The numbers reported in gray report by which SOPP’s these references were made. discussed more negatively, the The total number of speeches analyzed was 62: 10 GPV; 10 RPF; 16 CU; and 26 SGP. CU making the most negative aSociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij remarks. When SOPP’s refer to (Social Democratic Workers’ Party) bNederlandse Middenstands Partij each other they are more (Dutch Middle Class Party) cPartij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals) positive. The final section of Table 1 shows the SGP Testifying in most of its speeches, the GPV and RPF in 60%, and the CU in only 13%. Table 5 elaborates on the item by reporting a division by speakers instead of parties and showing

45 the speeches’ pluralist/proto- Figure 12: Number of Bible/ART’s hegemonic character. RPF-leader References in SOPP’s Speeches in the First Term of the Algemene Leerling testified proto-hegemonic in Beschouwingen, 1990-2016 all his speeches, while his successor van Dijke testified less and non-proto- hegemonic. GPV-leader Schutte testified in most his speeches, either proto-hegemonic of neutrally. CU- leaders Rouvoet, Slob, and Segers never testified. SGP-leader Van der Staaij testified in two thirds of his speeches, less than his predecessor Van der Vlies who testified in all his. His were predominantly proto-hegemonic, while Van der Staaij’s were all neutral. Figure 12 shows Bible/ART’s references over time, elucidating that they were most often made in the early 1990’s. The SGP makes the most references. There is a downwards trend, but recent years may hint at a reverse. This goes especially for the CU, which made no Bible/ART’s references in 2004-2013. Finally, Table 1 reports that with exception of the GPV all SOPP’s always ended their speeches with a religious conclusion.

Table 5: Testifying and Pluralism/Proto-Hegemony s in SOPP’s Speeches in the First Term of the Algemene Beschouwingen, 1990-2016 Schutte Leerling Dijke Rouvoet Slob Segers Vlies Staaij 1990- 1990- 1994- 2003- 2007- 2016 1990- 2010- 2000 1993 1999, 2006, 2009, 2009 2016 2001, 2010 2011- 2002 2015 GPV/ RPF/ RPF CU CU CU SGP SGP CU CU N 11 4 8 5 7 1 20 6 Testifying 64% 100% 38% 0% 0% 0% 100% 67% Pluralism ------Proto- 43% 100% - - - - 80% - Hegemonism Neutral/Not- 57% - 100% - - - 20% 100% Present Note: N = Number of speeches. The percentages reported in black represent the percentage of speeches containing testifying statements. The percentages reported in gray represent how the percentages in black are construed.

46 Discussion This thesis started with two questions: which factors contributed to the different trajectories of the SOPP’s since the 1990s; and what are the defining characteristics of the CU and SGP. The answer of the first question lies mainly in the SOPP’s relations with their social bases. While the Pietistic Reformed could once be understood as an integrated part of society, a current within the broader Protestant pillar, this changed in the 1970s when their and the Vrijgemaakte mini-pillar expanded, creating quasi- ethnic communities. During this period, the SGP and GPV were mere extensions of their pillars. They did not follow conventional electoral logics because their support was naturally given; they did not need to win votes because their pillars naturally supplied them. The parties bore some characteristics of the Ethnic and Camp Parties, but deviate from the ideal types because successfully representing the interest of their groups lay in bringing forward a generalist ideology; it lay in testifying. The RPF did not belong to a pillar, but because the NEV was one of its most important founders, the party can partly be interpreted as a by-product of the 1967 schism, i.e. the Vrijgemaakte pillarization process. Because it had less natural support it was more exposed to electoral fluctuations than other SOPP’s, a weakness turning out to be a strength when the Vrijgemaakten depillarized. It is difficult to give an all-encompassing explanation about why only the Vrijgemaakten and not also the Pietistic Reformed depillarized in the 1990s, but religious differences between the groups probably played a huge role. The Pietistic Reformed world-shunning characteristic supported the perpetuation of their quasi-ethnic community, while the Vrijgemaakte societal responsibility was a structural weakness in their segregation. The GPV had to merge with the RPF, while the SGP could continue as usual. Its loss of natural support became evident through the CU’s electoral losses. The party had to attract new voters, find a niche, and distinguish itself from other parties. The CU left its right-wing profile behind, favoring an economically middle of the road profile with addition of several “left-wing issues”, all while remaining clearly religious.

47 The content analysis largely corroborates these party profiles. Under Van der Vlies the SGP remained an Orthodox testifying party; the GPV was more policy-oriented style; the RPF combined testifying with “new” issues like environmentalism; and the CU combined such issues with a policy-oriented approach. The items measured can be roughly grouped into three categories: references to distinct social bases, religion, and “new” themes. Starting with the first, it is remarkable that SOPP’s hardly ever Represent Orthodox Christianity or positioned themselves as Representatives of a Minority Culture (Table 1), but other items nuance the story. All SOPP’s score high on Defending Communitarianism, which often took the form of lamenting individualization while demanding reappreciation of the nuclear family. It can be interpreted as indirectly defending traditional families that often support SOPP’s; the Single Earners36 and Voluntary Work37 items (Table 3) corroborate this. Agriculture (Table 1) is defended by all, but where the SGP specifically defends small agricultural businesses – their traditional base – other SOPP’s only defend the overall sector. Since 2007 the CU increasingly Defended the Periphery, often by lamenting an exclusivist economical focus on the Randstad,38 sometimes by explicitly defending the economic interests of smaller cities with significant Christian poluations, like Hoogeveen and Hardenberg (Slob, 2013).39 Based on this alone urban Christians cannot be labelled a new voter base, but the attention is interesting. The Labor/Capital Cleavage is discussed less, unsurprisingly, since unions belonging to the Pietistic Reformed and Vrijgemaakte pillars – respectively the Reformatorisch Maatschappelijke Unie (Reformed Societal Union; RMU) and Gereformeerd Maatschappelijk Verbond (Reformed Societal League; GMV),

36 Single-earning families are usually families where the husband works full-time while the wife stays at home, a traditional role distribution more often found in Orthodox Christian families. 37 Christians and the economically inactive – e.g. stay at home parents – make up a large part of voluntary workers (Hart, 1999; Ingen & Dekker, 2010). 38 A megalopolis consisting primarily out of the four biggest Dutch cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. 39 All references and citations of politicians in this chapter are from the Algemene Beschouwingen, unless indicated otherwise.

48 currently CGMV40 – have always represented workers and employees, believing conflicts should be solved in harmony rather than through conflict (e.g. strikes) (RMU, n.d.; CGMV, n.d.). Their ambivalent attitude is also shown through low number of CSO References (Table 2). Unions are hardly mentioned; Christian not more than non-Christian. Of the 22 CSO’s mentioned once (not reported in the table) 7 are Christian, not being indicative of a distinct social base. SOPP’s discuss religion differently. The SGP discusses the Religious/Secular Cleavage and Testifies more than other SOPP’s (Table 1), but it is the style in which SOPP’s do so that shows their fundamental differences. Take Van der Vlies:

We need a government that guides the country based on firm principles. No neutrality, but fundamental guidance in principal and ethical dilemmas. ... A powerful countermovement is necessary. That is why we call upon the government as God’s servant. … It is in our deepest conviction that the lack of [God’s] love is at the root of the moral decay in our country… It is better to turn at half than to get lost altogether. Such a return is necessary, that is the remedy. … God, after all, will not be mocked. There will be consequences. (Van der Vlies, 1996)

When the SGP testifies, Orthodoxy is presented as the guideline for society: repent or meet the consequences. In 2001, for example, the September 11 attacks were compared to the apocalypse, stating that Babylon fell because of its sins, and that we need to understand “the signs of the time” in this light.41 The GPV testified differently:

40 The name-change of the CGMV – like the name change of the ND – is indicative of the depillarization of the Vrijgemaakten. For many Vrijgemaakte organizations, the “G” of “Gereformeerd” has become problematic. They tend to remove it, or, like in this case, make it “silent”. 41 Although “the signs of the time” were not made explicit in the 2001 speechs, it is hard not to read it in the light of the marriage equality (law passed 2001) and euthanasia (law passed 2002) discussions of the time, which did take a central place in the rest of this his speech (Van der Vlies, 2001).

49 Whoever wants to limit ‘God’s government over all’ to the private domain deprives himself of solid ground, of the support for his policies. The consequences are visible in this government’s policies. I’m not only thinking of discussions about the Sunday or the protection or the protection of life. (Schutte, 1997)

Schutte also wanted to extend “God’s government”, but he generally did not call for repentance nor mention things like “the end of times”. He continued by summing up policies he wanted to change, showing above all his policy-oriented style. This was also visible in his speeches endings. While other SOPP’s always had a Religious Conclusion (Table 1), often taking the form of asking God’s blessing for the government’s work, the GPV often left the lectern after it finished its list of political topics. The RPF was sharper, but less religious:

Is the Purple polder not an Easter Island too?42 … After three years, my observation is that this government, like the residents of Easter Island, tends to ignore many developments. It is apparent that this government hardly wants to take responsibility for matters that are less easily traced back to the economy; matters that cannot be measured, weighed or counted. … Let the prime minister, for example, ask the elderly and the disabled if they also think Purple is doing well! (Van Dijke, 1997)

The RPF hardly ever positioned seculars against religious, but they were quite polarizing. In Dutch politics, it was unusual – at least until the LPF’s appearance – to be overtly negative about other parties, because its tradition of coalition governments has always forced parties to cooperate: today’s enemy is tomorrow ally (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). Comparing Purple’s economic boom with the collapse of Easter Isle is not something which would leave you many friends.

42 Easter Island (Dutch: Paaseiland; here jokingly/mockingly pronounced as “Paa(r)seiland”, [“Purple Island”]) is an isolated Chilean Island famous for its moai: monolithic human figures. In the beginning of his speech Van Dijke argues that its isolation in combination with limited natural recourses forced its people to rely on each other, but that infighting ultimately led to the downfall of the isle.

50 Testifying was done mainly by old party leaders (Table 5). From Rouvoet onwards, the CU did not testify anymore; since Van der Staaij, the SGP testifies less. This brings forward another important distinction: while the SGP remained largely Proto-Hegemonic, the CU became Pluralistic (Table 1):

What we want to achieve – I also say this to mr. Wilders43 – is a society that does not exclude citizens or groups of citizens, but a society that has the power to deal responsibly with differences. What we want to achieve, is a society that offers people and organizations the opportunity to use their convictions and ideals as a basis to unite themselves and engage in education, welfare and healthcare. (Slob, 2009)

The CU often makes pluralistic pleas, asking for room for all religions. Contrarily, the SGP’s proto-hegemonic statements, which once took the form of arguing against state neutrality, are now driven by anti-Islamic viewpoints (Table 1). In 2014, for example, Van der Staaij uses the Parable of the Good Samaritan to warn against the dehumanization of others, but in the same speech also warned against the “war religion of the radical Islam”. In 2016, he argued that “Christmas has another status than the Sugar Feast44 because of Dutch historic identity. Polygamy does not belong here, neither do arranged child marriages”. Neither statements are unambiguously proto-hegemonic: “radical Islam” is not “general Islam” and “polygamy and arranged child marriages” might refer to “non-Dutch” instead of “Islam”. Still, the SGP never makes pleas for pluralism, focusing on these issues instead. The Judaism/Israel item brings less differences to light, although the SGP is certainly the biggest Israel fan. Statements are usually made either about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or against (rising) anti-Semitism. This is somewhat surprising, since anti-Semitist sentiments are often found amongst Orthodox Christians (Konig, Eisinga & Scheepers, 2000; Koopmans, 2015), but recent studies (Koopmans, 2015) and the public debate (e.g. Visie, n.d.) point towards

43 PVV party-leader. This quote is a partial response to the anti-Islamic rhetoric of Wilders, who spoke directly before Slob and used his time to i.a. propose his infamous “kopvoddentax” (head rag tax): a taxation on wearing headscarves. 44 Eid al-Fitr

51 anti-Semitism amongst Muslims, which might explain the SGP’s increasing attention. The Protestant/Catholic Cleavage has lost its power. It is brought forward only once, by the Slob in 2015, discussing an encyclical of Pope Francis on environmental issues, stating: “I would have never thought that I, [as a Protestant], would become such a fan of the pope, but with this one it really is the case”. The SOPP’s also differ in religious(ly inspired) issues brought forward, as shown by the issues of Fetus Rights to Prostitution in Table 3. These are mentioned most by the SGP, showing it is clearly the most Orthodox SOPP. With exception of Prostitution and Fetus Rights, the CU mentions these items less than its predecessors, showing it has become less Orthodox, while not abandoning these issues completely. A similar development can be seen in the Bible/ART’s References (Figure 12), with the SGP making the most and the CU making less than its predecessors. It is hard to say if its recent peak is indicative of a new trend, but it might be part of an effort to further promote the party’s religious aspects. Final differences are found in the “new” themes SOPP’s bring forward. First, no criticisms of Party Cartelization were found (Table 1). A more general item measuring lamentations of low Political Trust was also included (Table 3), but, besides the low RPF score, it did not deliver noteworthy results. The party was sharp, but commented on the government in other ways. Representing a Majority Culture is also absent in speeches (Table 1). References of a Judeo- Christian Tradition (Table 3) did become part of the SGP’s lexicon, but it hardly takes nationalist forms, being primarily used to criticize Islam. Differences are found in the National/Global Values and Materialism/Post- Materialism Cleavages, which are both often brought forward. SOPP’s are critical of global institutions like the EU – the CU more so than its predecessors – but they are not complete opponents. When it is to their advantage they do not shy away from promoting international regulations; they are very pragmatic in this sense. The latter cleavage shows the RPF being far more post-materialist than the GPV, the CU continuing in the RPF’s style. Post-materialism was expressed through either religious-ethnical or environmental issues.

52 All SOPP’s, with exception of the 2000-2016 SGP, focused on Environmental Policies (Table 3), but the way in which they did differed. It was a pivotal point for the RPF, often spending much of its time, proposing far-reaching legislation. The SGP and GPV more casually mentioned the subject in the same period. Because the 1990s economy was booming parties “sought” non- economic issues to discuss, explaining the SGP’s fall after 1999. Developmental Aid shows a similar development, scoring higher for the RPF than the GPV, the CU following the RPF’s example, and a significant SGP drop after 1999. Norms and Values, conversely, remain important for all SOPP’s. The CU’s and SGP’s defining characteristics become clearer when they are analyzed with the party typologies. Gunther and Diamond (2003) and Ozzano (2013) stressed that they described ideal types, that real-world parties might not conform to all criteria and/or have elements belonging to multiple categories. That is certainly the case here. With the Vrijgemaakte depillarization the CU can no longer truly be regarded an Ethnic or Camp Party; it comes closest to Ozzano’s (2013) Progressive Party. It is small, wants to widen the role of religion in society, deems this desire secondary to pluralism, and promotes left-wing issues like climate change prevention and developmental aid. Based on this analysis it is difficult to judge if its voter base consists of the higher educated and/or urban middle class. The SGP is harder to typify. It still bears some Ethnic/Camp characteristics, but is also comparable to the Fundamentalist party in that it promotes and follows strict religious principles. It is not hierarchical, however, has bibliocratic ideals but a democratic practice, and is not necessarily in a state of isolation. Figure 10 shows the overall length of SOPP’s speeches is increasing; there is a strong peak for the CU in their governing years, but even without these years the general trend is upwards. Figure 11 furthermore shows that other parties have always been interrupting SOPP’s and that the number of interruptions has increased, both for the governing CU and the non-governing SGP. The SGP may find little support for its bibliocratic ideals, but the party is not isolated, certainly not in recent years. Both parties have furthermore lost their functions as political consciences of other parties. Table 4 shows that SOPP’s mainly refer to governing parties; the

53 CDA is mentioned most, but also participated in most cabinets since 1990, six of the nine. Only the 1990 SGP remark can be interpreted as acting as a conscience, when Van der Vlies worried about the vagueness of the “C” in “CDA”. In 2008 Krouwel and Lucardie typified the CU as a Challenger of the CDA, a party that sought to maintain or renew the CDA’s ideology, but this analysis shows no such relation. Following conventional electoral logics the CU has found its own niche and gained a clear, distinct profile; it is not in one-way competition with the CDA, but is also attractive for SGP and left-wing voters. The CU’s negative remarks about the VVD further illustrate their relative left-wing profile. An indirect effect of the CU’s repositioning is that it also created a niche for the SGP. While it still has a strong connection to a distinct social base, it has also become the only remaining right-wing SOPP. With the CDA’s secularization and the CU’s relative left-wing profile, the SGP has become attractive for Orthodox Christians that are not Pietistic Reformed, even when the SGP does not actively reach out to them.

54 Conclusion While SOPP’s were considered politically irrelevant and interchangeable in the 1990’s, they currently play an important role in Dutch politics and have distinct political profiles. To find out their defining characteristics and factors contributing to their different developments, historical literature on SOPP’s through the lens of a political scientific framework on party typologies and a content analysis of their speeches in the 1990-2016 Algemene Beschouwingen were analyzed in a mixed methods fashion. Results show that the depillarization process of the 1970’s coincided with a strengthening of the Pietistic Reformed and Vrijgemaakte pillars, leading to the formation of quasi-ethnic communities, with the SGP and GPV as their political extensions. It is argued that due to differences in theological views on the relation between society and faith, the Vrijgemaakten depillarized in the 1990’s – leading i.a. to the establishment of the CU – while the Pietistic Reformed pillar endured. With its natural support dwindling and a wish to gain manifest relevance (cf. Sartori, 1976/2005), the CU actively reached out to new groups of voters, and sought its own niche, differentiating itself from other parties by combining Orthodox religiosity on issues like abortion and euthanasia, with middle of the road economics and “left-wing issues” like environmentalism and pluralism. Its new profile gives the party a larger potential voter base, while its policy-oriented profile makes it a viable coalition partner. Although the SGP generally kept its right-wing Orthodox profile, recent developments, hint at fundamental changes. The party testifies less and is milder when it does, Catholics have become potential allies, and the Pietistic Reformed youth has become world-shunning. Although it remains speculation, the party might be well on its way to disconnect itself from its pillar, becoming an SOPP for Pietistic and non-Pietistic Reformed alike. Only time will tell.

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61 Pennings, P., & Keman, H. (2008). The changing landscape of Dutch politics since the 1970s: A comparative exploration. Acta Politica 43(2-3), 154-179. Post, H.A. (2009). In strijd met de roeping der vrouw: De Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij en het vrouwenkiesrecht. (Doctoral dissertation, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam). Reformatorisch Dagblad (June 13, 2015). ChristenUnie stemt royaal in met nieuwe grondslag. Reformatorisch Dagblad. Retrieved from https:// www.rd.nl/christenunie-stemt-royaal-in-met-nieuwe-grondslag- 1.476318 Reformatorisch Dagblad (January 3, 2017). SGP moet besluiten over doodstraf in verkiezingsprogramma. Reformatorisch Dagblad. Retrieved from http:// www.rd.nl/vandaag/politiek/sgp-moet-besluiten-over-doodstraf-in- verkiezings-programma-1.1363801 Reformatorisch Maatschappelijke Unie (n.d.). Harmoniemodel. Retrieved August 18, 2017, from http://www.rmu.nu/waaromrmu/harmoniemodel Rooduijn, M. (2013). A populist Zeitgeist? The impact of populism on parties, media and the public in Western Europe. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam). Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Colchester: ECPR press. (Original work published 1976). Schuyffel, N. (March 19, 2014). SGP-vrouw schrijft geschiedenis in Vlissingen. De Volkskrant. Retrieved from http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2784/ Verkiezingen/article/detail/3618631/2014/03/19/SGP-vrouw-schrijft- geschiedenis-in-Vlissingen.dhtml Snel, J.D. (2007). Waarom daar? De Refoband of Refogordel als onderdeel van de Protestantenband. In Lieburg, F. van (ed.), Refogeschiedenis in perspectief: Opstellen over de bevindelijke traditie (pp. 51-91). Heereveen: Uitgeverij Groen. Staalduine, T.J.S. van (2004). Om de lijn der afscheiding: Prof. dr. G.M. en Hartogh en de Vrijmaking van 1944. (Doctoral Dissertation, Protestant Theological University, Kampen). Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (January 15, 2016). Nieuwe Huisstijl. Retrieved from https://www.sgp.nl/actueel/nieuwe-huisstijl/87

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64 List of Abbreviations ARJC Antirevolutionair Jongerencontact (Antirevolutionary Youth Contact). See RPJC. ARP Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party; 1879-1980). A protestant Christian-democratic party, which merged with the KVP and CHU to form the CDA. It was most closely connected to the GKN. CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian-Democratic Appeal; 1980- present). A broad Christian-democratic party formed from a merger of the KVP, ARP and CHU. CGK Christelijk Gereformeerde Kerken (Christian Reformed Churches; 1892-present). A Reformed denomination with different modalities, both pietistic and orthodox. Its voters were attracted to different Orthodox Protestant parties. CGMV Christennetwerk|GMV (Christiannetwork|GMV; 1952-present). Formerly known as GMV. A mainline Christian union, formerly closely connected to the GKv and GPV. CHU Christelijk-Historische Unie (Christian-Historical Union; 1908- 1980). A protestant Christian Democratic Party, which merged with the KVP and ARP to form the CDA. It was most closely connected to the NHK. CSO Civil Society Organization. CU ChristenUnie (ChristianUnion; 2000-present). An Orthodox Protestant political party formed from a fusion of the GPV and RPF. They attract mainly Orthodox Reformed and evangelical voters. D66 Democraten 66 (Democrats 66; 1966-present). A social-liberal, progressive party. GerGem Gereformeerde Gemeenten (Reformed Congregations; 1907- present). A Pietistic Reformed church founded as a federation by Rev. G.H. Kersten. Politically most closely connected to the SGP. GKN Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands; 1892-2004). A mainline Neo-Calvinist denomination

65 founded out of a schism with the NHK. Politically most closely connected to the ARP. GKv Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (vrijgemaakt) (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands [Liberated]; 1944-present). An Orthodox Reformed denomination founded out of a schism with the GKN. Politically most closely connected to the GPV. GL GroenLinks (GreenLeft; 1989-present). A green progressive party. GMV Gereformeerd Maatschappelijk Verbond (Reformed Societal League). See CGMV. GPV Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (Reformed Political League; 1948- 2003). An Orthodox Reformed political party, which merged with the RPF to form the CU. They exclusively sought support from GKv- members. HGS Hervormd Gereformeerde Staatspartij (Reformed Reformed State Party; 1921-1940). An Orthodox Protestant Party. KVP Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party; 1945-1980). A Catholic Christian-democratic party, which merged with the ARP and CHU to form the CDA. LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List; 2002-2008). A right-wing populist party. ND Nederlands Dagblad (Netherlands Daily; 1944-present). Formerly known as Gereformeerd Gezindsblad (Reformed Family Paper). A mainline Christian newspaper, formerly closely connected to the GKv and GPV. NEV Nationaal Evangelisch Verband (National Evangelical Connection; 1966). Supporters’ organization of the GPV until 1972. Merged with the “Gespreksgroep voor AR-gezinden”, RPJC, and RPC to form the RPF. NGB Nederlandse Geloofsbelijdenis (Belgic Confession, 1561). A doctrinal standard document to which many Reformed denominations subscribe. NGK Nederlands Gereformeerde Kerken (Netherlands Reformed Church; 1967-present). An Orthodox Reformed denomination

66 founded out of a schism with the GKv. Politically most closely connected the to RPF. NHK Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church; 1571- 2004). A broad Protestant denomination with different modalities. Its voters were attracted to different political parties. PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party; 1946-present). A social- democratic party. PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom; 2006-present). A right- wing populist party. RD Reformatorisch Dagblad (Reformed Daily; 1971-present). A Pietistic Reformed newspaper politically most closely connected to Pietistic Reformed denominations and the SGP. RMU Reformatorisch Maatschappelijke Unie (Reformed Societal Union; 1983-present). A Union most closely connected to Pietistic Reformed denominations and the SGP. RPC Reformatorisch Politiek Contact (Reformatory Political Contact). Merged with the NEV, “Gespreksgroep voor AR-gezinden”, and RPJC to form the RPF. RPF Reformatorische Politieke Federatie (Reformatory Political Federation; 1975-2003). An Orthodox Reformed political party formed from a merger of the NEV, “Gespreksgroep voor AR- gezinden”, RPJC, and RPC. It later merged with the GPV to form the CU. They attracted support from different Orthodox denominations, amongst which the NGK, and were the first Orthodox Protestant party to seek electoral support from the Evangelical voters. RPJC Reformatorisch Politiek Jongerencontact (Reformatory Political Youth Contact). Formerly known as ARJC. Merged with the NEV, “Gespreksgroep voor AR-gezinden”, and RPC to form the RPF. SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party; 1918- present). A Pietistic Reformed political party, most closely connected to Pietistic Reformed denominations like the GerGem

67 and Pietistic Reformed modalities within broader Protestant churches like the CGK and NHK. SOPP Small Orthodox Protestant Parties. The SGP, HGS, GPV, RPF and CU are examples. SP Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party; 1971-present). A democratic socialist party. VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy; 1948-present). A conservative-liberal party.

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