FINO Annual Activity Report 1
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Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy
NIKO KOLODNY Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy What is to be said for democracy? Not that it gives people what they want. Not that it realizes a kind of autonomy or self-government. Not that it provides people with the opportunity for valuable activities of civic engagement. Not, at least not in the first instance, that it avoids insulting them. Or so I argued in the companion to this article.1 At the end of that article, I suggested that the justification of democ- racy rests instead on the fact that democracy is a particularly important constituent of a society in which people are related to one another as social equals, as opposed to social inferiors or superiors. The concern for democracy is rooted in a concern not to have anyone else above—or, for I am grateful for written comments on this article and its companion (as well as on their distant ancestors) from Arthur Ripstein, Japa Pallikkathayil, Samuel Scheffler, Jay Wallace, Fabienne Peter, Adam Hill, Dylan Murray, Joseph Raz (and his seminar), Jerry Vildostegui, Amanda Greene, Alan Patten, Liz Harman, Peter Graham, Samuel Freeman, Joseph Moore, Mike Arsenault, Mike Diaz, Dan Khokhar, Dustin Neuman, Ben Chen, Nick French, Daniel Viehoff, and two anonymous referees for Philosophy & Public Affairs. I am also grateful for responses from participants at BAFFLE at Berkeley in fall 2010; Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Nagel’s Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy at NYU in fall 2010; my graduate seminars at Berkeley in spring 2011 and 2014; Joseph Raz’s seminar at Colum- bia Law School in fall 2011; a Political Philosophy Colloquium at Princeton in fall 2011;a colloquium at the Ohio State University in 2011; the Darrell K. -
Curriculum Vitae for Liam Philip Shields
17/12/18 Curriculum Vitae for Liam Philip Shields Contact Details 4.027, Arthur Lewis Building, Website: www.liamshields.com Oxford Road, Telephone: 0161 2754887 Manchester, Email: [email protected] M13 9PL U. K. Employment August 2018 – Present: Senior Lecturer in Political Theory Politics Department, University of Manchester January 2012 – August 2018: Lecturer in Political Theory Politics Department, University of Manchester September 2013 – August 2014: Spencer Foundation Postdoctoral Scholar, Buzz McCoy Family Centre for Ethics in Society, Stanford University October 2011 – December 2011: Early Career Fellow, Institute of Advanced Study, University of Warwick Education September 2008 – September 2011: Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick PhD in Philosophy Thesis title: The prospects for sufficientarianism Supervisors: Prof. Andrew Williams and Prof. Fabienne Peter 17/12/18 Examiners: Prof. Adam Swift and Dr. Zofia Stemplowska October 2007 – October 2008: Department of Politics, University of York M. A. in Political Philosophy (the idea of toleration) Awarded C and J. B. Morrell Scholarship Dissertation title: The role of intuitions in moral and political philosophy Supervisor: Prof. Matt Matravers September 2004 – September 2007: School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment, Keele University B. A. in Politics and Philosophy Dissertation title: Sufficiency versus Priority: a competitive comparison Supervisor: Prof. John Horton Research Monographs 1. Just Enough: Sufficiency as a Demand of Justice, Edinburgh University Press, 2016. Paperback issued in Feb. 2018. Google Scholar: cited by 13. Reviewed in Ethics, “Just Enough is an excellent contribution to the debate on distributive justice. Anyone trying to defend or refute sufficientarianism must take seriously Shields’s sufficientarian framework and his arguments for it.” Symposium held at Université Catholique de Louvain, Dec. -
'What We Do: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on The
4-5th April 2014 1051 Budapest, Nádor utca 9 Gellner Room 'What We Do: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on the Aims and Methods of Philosophy' 5th International Graduate Conference of the Department of Philosophy of Central European University 4th April, 2014 Friday 09:00 Registration & Coffee 09:30 Welcome Sebastian Wyss (University of Zurich) Comments: 09:40 - 10:30 "Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy: Colin McCullough-Benner Negativism and Value" Stephen Ryan Comments: 10:30 - 11:20 (University of Edinburgh) Róbert Mátyási "Reliance on Intuitions: A Response to Cappelen" Break Matti Heinonen (University of Helsinki) Comments: 11:50 - 12:40 "Collective Intentional Action and the Naturalist’s John Michael Dilemma" Lunch Felicity Loudon Comments: 14:20 - 15:10 (University of St. Andrews) David Weberman "Engaging Philosophically with Past Philosophy" Anna Christen (University of St. Andrews) Comments: 15:10 - 16:00 "On the Significance of Geistesgeschichte within László Kajtár Contemporary Philosophy" Informal Pizza and Drinks Dinner 1 4-5th April 2014 1051 Budapest, Nádor utca 9 Gellner Room 5th April, 2014 Saturday 10:00 Coffee Keynote Fabienne Peter 10:30 - 12:00 (University of Warwick) "Justification in Moral and Political Philosophy" Lunch Ali Emre Benli (LUISS University) Comments: 13:30-14:20 "Problem of Consent: Theorizing Justice and Orsolya Reich Political Guidance in Contemporary Democracies" Kevin Tobia Comments: 14:20 - 15:10 (University of Oxford) Anton Markoč “Moral Intuition, Expertise, and Methodology" Break -
CFZ Short CV.Pdf
Christopher F. Zurn Department of Philosophy University of Massachusetts Boston Wheatley Hall 05-007 100 Morrissey Blvd. Boston, MA 02125 [email protected] http://faculty.www.umb.edu/christopher.zurn Employment Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Boston 2015 — present Affiliate Faculty, McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies, UMB 2012 — present Gastwissenschaftler, Institut für Sozialforschung, Frankfurt am Main, Germany 2015 — 2106 Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Boston 2010 — 2015 Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Boston 2010 Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Kentucky 2006 — 2010 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Kentucky 1999 — 2006 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Ohio University 1997 — 1999 Instructor & Teaching Assistant of Philosophy, Northwestern University 1991 — 1997 Education Northwestern University M.A. 1993, Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1999 Dissertation: “Competence and Context: Conceptions of the Self in the Critical Social Theories of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor” Wesleyan University B.A. with Honors in Philosophy, 1989 Areas of Specialization Areas of Competence Social and Political Philosophy Ethics Philosophy of Law Aesthetics Contemporary European Philosophy History of Philosophy Publications Monographs 1. Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review (Cambridge University Press, 2007; paperback 2009). https://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521867344 Argues that a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review, and argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multilocation structure across constitutional courts, the legislative and executive branches, and civic constitutional forums. Nine chapters; 366 pages. Reviewed in Cambridge Law Journal, Constellations, Ethics, Law & Politics Book Review, and Social Theory & Practice. -
1 Pure Epistemic Proceduralism Fabienne Peter [email protected]
Pure Epistemic Proceduralism Fabienne Peter [email protected] Paper published in Episteme 5 (1), 2008, pp. 33-55 (special issue on epistemic democracy, guest-edited by David Estlund) Abstract In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism – the view that political equality is only instrumentally valuable. I reject instrumentalism on two grounds: (i) because it fails to respect reasonable value pluralism and to recognize the constitutive role of democratic procedures for legitimacy in pluralist societies, and (ii) because it neglects the constructive function of democratic decision-making. I then consider two alternatives to pure epistemic proceduralism: David Estlund’s version of epistemic proceduralism and a Deweyan account of epistemic democracy. I argue that only pure epistemic proceduralism can make good on both shortcomings of instrumentalism, whereas the other two approaches each only makes good on one and neglects the other. 1. Introduction In the recent literature, theories of epistemic democracy have again become important. One interpretation of epistemic democracy has been particularly influential. I shall call this the 1 “standard account of epistemic democracy”. Christian List and Robert Goodin (2001: 277) give the following brief but representative characterization: “For epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth.’ For them, democracy is more desirable than alternative forms of decision-making because, and insofar as, it does that.