The Electoral System and British Politics
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Unit 7 Electoral Systems and Electoral Processes
Electoral Systems and Electoral UNIT 7 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND Processes ELECTORAL PROCESSES Structure 7.0 Objectives 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Classification of electoral systems 7.3 Majoritarian Systems 7.3.1 First-Past-the-Post/ Single-Member Plurality system 7.3.2 Second Ballot System 7.3.3 Alternative Vote (AV)/ Supplementary Vote (SV) system 7.3.4 Condorcet Method 7.4 Proportional Representation Systems 7.4.1 Single-Transferable-Vote (STV) System 7.4.2 Party-List System 7.5 Mixed Methods 7.5.1 Mixed-Member Proportional or Additional Member System 7.5.2 Semi-Proportional Method 7.5.3 Cumulative Vote System 7.5.4 Slate System 7.6 Comparative Assessment of Majoritarian and PR Systems 7.7 Let Us Sum Up 7.8 References 7.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises Dr. Tulika Gaur, Guest Faculty, Non-Collegiate Women's Education Board, University of Delhi, Delhi 97 Representation and Political 7.0 OBJECTIVES Participation An electoral system does not only set rules for election, but also plays crucial role in shaping the party system and political culture of the country. This unit focuses on electoral systems and processes. After going through this unit, you should be able to: Define electoral system, Identify the various dimensions of an electoral system, Assess combinations of electoral methods used by different countries in their national or local elections, Examine the advantages and disadvantages of different kinds of electoral systems, and Analyse the links between parties and electoral process. 7.1 INTRODUCTION The electoral system refers to a set of rules through which people get to choose their representatives or political leaders. -
Citizen Engagement in Voting System Reform
Renewing Canadian Democracy: Citizen Engagement in Voting System Reform Phase One: Lessons from Around the World Law Commission of Canada/Fair Vote Canada Joint Research Project March 2002 Prepared by Dennis Pilon York University This paper was prepared for the Law Commission of Canada under the title “Renewing Canadian Democracy: Citizen Engagement in Voting System Reform. Phase One: Lessons from Around the World." The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission. The accuracy of the information contained in the paper is the sole responsibility of the author. ii Summary The voting system as a particular component of democratic practice has come under increasing scrutiny in the last decade. Reform of existing voting systems in countries like New Zealand, Italy and Japan, along with the rebuilding of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America, has focused popular and academic attention on how different voting systems work and what effects they may have on democratic processes. Lessons from Around the World, prepared by Dennis Pilon, York University, reviews the relevant experience with voting system reform from around the world, both past and present, and the degree and nature of citizen engagement involved. The objectives of the paper are threefold: to demonstrate how voting system reforms have occurred historically and the specific political conditions that have facilitated them; highlight the role of citizen participation in the process, both its limits historically and potentially today; and, draw out some of the practical lessons from this experience to help determine how voting system reform might become and issue in Canada, and how citizens might best become involved. -
THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY and MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election
THE SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY AND MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : Different Concepts of an Election by James C. Anderson A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2006 © James C. Anderson 2006 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Library and Bibliotheque et Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-23700-7 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce,Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve,sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet,distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform,et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. -
Subsidies and Funding from Some of the Largest UK Industries, She Also Signalled a Break with the Idea of the Economic State
James Webber All Change? UK State Aid after Brexit What Law? Whose Courts? Copy Proof POLITEIA A FORUM FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC THINKING POLITEIA A Forum for Social and Economic Thinking Politeia commissions and publishes discussions by specialists about social and economic ideas and policies. It aims to encourage public discussion on the relationship between the state and the people. Its aim is not to influence people to support any given political party, candidates for election, or position in a referendum, but to inform public discussion of policy. The forum is independently funded, and the publications do not express a corporate opinion, but the views of their individual authors. www.politeia.co.uk All Change? UK State Aid after Brexit What Law? Whose Courts? James Webber POLITEIA 2020 First published in 2020 by Politeia 14a Eccleston Street London SW1W 9LT Tel: 0207 799 5034 Email: [email protected] Website: www.politeia.co.uk © Politeia 2020 ISBN 978-1-9993662-9-2 Cover design by John Marenbon Politeia gratefully acknowledges support for this publication from The Foundation for Social and Economic Thinking (FSET) Printed in the United Kingdom by: Millnet Limited 6-7 Princes Court 11 Wapping Lane London E1W 2DA Foreword State Aid, the EU and the UK Economy Different Systems, Different Rules Sheila Lawlor, Director of Politeia The battle and its background.1 Very shortly the next battle with the EU will begin over an unlikely battleground: what rules should govern UK State aid and what are their implications for a trade deal with the bloc? For the UK, a country that, more than most others, has championed free trade, unfettered and competitive markets and an economy under the rule of law, the subject seems uncontentious. -
Jo Swinson: the New Liberal Democrat Leader
Jo Swinson: the new Liberal Democrat Leader 22 July 2019 Who is Jo Swinson? Jo Swinson was born in 1980, growing up and going to school in East Dunbartonshire, which she now represents in Parliament. Her mother was a primary school teacher while her father worked in economic development. She cites her earliest political experience as signing petitions against animal testing in the Body Shop. A Liberal Democrat supporter since she was at school, Jo joined the Liberal Democrats aged 17, while studying Management at the LSE. During her time at university, she worked as a Research Assistant for the Employers’ Forum on Disability. After graduating, Swinson moved to Hull, working as Viking FM’s Marketing & PR Manager. Aged 21, she stood against John Prescott at the 2001 general election in Hull East. Relocating back to Scotland, she worked as Marketing Manager for SpaceandPeople Plc and then as Communications Officer for the UK Public Health Association prior to her election as an MP. In 2011, she married Duncan Hames, who was the Liberal Democrat MP for Chippenham from 2010 to 2015, and is now an anti-corruption campaigner. The couple have two sons. What is Jo Swinson’s political background? Swinson was successfully elected to Parliament in 2005, winning East Dunbartonshire from Labour. In the Commons, she became a Lib Dem whip and spokesperson for culture, media and sport, before being promoted to Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland in 2006. Swinson gained additional responsibility in 2007 becoming Shadow Women and Equality Minister. She returned to the backbenches later that year, before becoming Shadow Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in 2008, retaining this role until the 2010 election. -
Assessing the Quality of Democracy
Assessing the Quality of Democracy A Practical Guide Assessing the Quality of Democracy A Practical Guide David Beetham Edzia Carvalho Todd Landman Stuart Weir © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2008 International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council Members. Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of this publication should be made to: International IDEA SE -103 34 Stockholm Sweden Graphic design by: Santángelo Diseño Printed by: Bulls Graphics Cover illustration © Alberto Ruggieri/Illustration Works/Corbis/Scanpix ISBN: 978-91-85724-43-7 Foreword: the state of democracy Democracy is the predominant form of government in the world to- day. For the greater part of the world democracy has been a rare or re- cent phenomenon, but successive waves of democracy throughout the 20th century meant that by the new millennium more countries were governed through democratic than through non-democratic forms of rule. Various attempts to enumerate democracies in the world agree that more than 60 per cent of all countries today have in place at least some form of minimal democratic institutions and procedures. The Community of Democracies lists more than 100 countries while the United Nations International Conference on New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) has grown in depth, breadth and importance since it was inaugurated in 1988 as a forum for global democratic de- velopment. Increasingly, governmental, intergovernmental and non- governmental organizations emphasize that democracy is an end in itself, as well as an important means to other ends, such as economic development, poverty reduction and greater protection of interna- tionally recognized human rights. -
Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1
1 Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1 Richard B. Darlington Cornell University Abstract For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly discusses about 20 systems. Comments invited. [email protected] Copyright Richard B. Darlington May be distributed free for non-commercial purposes Keywords Voting system Condorcet Minimax 1. Many thanks to Nicolaus Tideman, Andrew Myers, Sharon Weinberg, Eduardo Marchena, my wife Betsy Darlington, and my daughter Lois Darlington, all of whom contributed many valuable suggestions. 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction and summary 3 2. The variety of voting systems 4 3. Some electoral criteria violated by minimax’s competitors 6 Monotonicity 7 Strategic voting 7 Completeness 7 Simplicity 8 Ease of voting 8 Resistance to vote-splitting and spoiling 8 Straddling 8 Condorcet consistency (CC) 8 4. Dismissing eight criteria violated by minimax 9 4.1 The absolute loser, Condorcet loser, and preference inversion criteria 9 4.2 Three anti-manipulation criteria 10 4.3 SCC/IIA 11 4.4 Multiple districts 12 5. Simulation studies on voting systems 13 5.1. Why our computer simulations use spatial models of voter behavior 13 5.2 Four computer simulations 15 5.2.1 Features and purposes of the studies 15 5.2.2 Further description of the studies 16 5.2.3 Results and discussion 18 6. -
Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation
The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation Benoit S Y Crutzen Hideo Konishi Erasmus School of Economics Boston College Nicolas Sahuguet HEC Montreal April 21, 2021 Abstract Under closed-list proportional representation, a party’selectoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party list create incentives for candidates that may push parties not to rank candidates in decreasing competence order. We examine this trade-off in a game- theoretical model in which parties rank their candidate on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We show that the trade-off between competence and incentives depends on candidates’objective and the electoral environment. In particular, parties rank candidates in decreasing order of competence if candidates value enough post-electoral high offi ces or media coverage focuses on candidates at the top of the list. 1 1 Introduction Competent politicians are key for government and democracy to function well. In most democracies, political parties select the candidates who can run for offi ce. Parties’decision on which candidates to let run under their banner is therefore of fundamental importance. When they select candidates, parties have to worry not only about the competence of candidates but also about incentives, about their candidates’motivation to engage with voters and work hard for their party’selectoral success. -
The European Commissioner for Trade in 2010-2014 (Barroso II Commission) Cecilia Malmström
Торговельна політика ЄС Що Карел залишає Сесилії? Роберт Хорольський, к.ю.н., радник Юридичної фірми «ОМП» 24 вересня 2014 року, м. Київ Karel De Gucht • Born 1954, a Belgian politician • Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE), liberal • In 2009-2010, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid (Barroso I Commission) • The European Commissioner for Trade in 2010-2014 (Barroso II Commission) Cecilia Malmström • Born 1968, a Swedish politician • Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE), liberal • In 2010-2014, European Commissioner for Home Affairs (Barroso II Commission) • The European Commissioner for Trade in 2014-2019 (Juncker Commission) European Commissioners for Trade since 1957 Jean Rey Belgium 1957–1962 Hallstein Commission I 1962–1967 Hallstein Commission II Jean-François Deniau France 1968–1970 Rey Commission Ralf Dahrendorf W.Germany 1970–1972 Malfatti Commission 1972–1973 Mansholt Commission Christopher Soames UK 1973–1977 Ortoli Commission Wilhelm Haferkamp W.Germany 1977–1981 Jenkins Commission 1981–1985 Thorn Commission Willy De Clercq Belgium 1985–1988 Delors Commission I Frans Andriessen Netherlands 1989–1992 Delors Commission II Leon Brittan UK 1993–1995 Delors Commission III 1995–1999 Santer Commission Pascal Lamy France 1999–2004 Prodi Commission Danuta Hübner Poland 2004 Prodi Commission Peter Mandelson UK 2004–2008 Barroso Commission I Catherine Ashton UK 2008–2009 Barroso Commission I Benita Ferrero-Waldner Austria 2009–2010 Barroso Commission I Karel De Gucht Belgium -
The Impact of UK Electoral Systems
Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts The impact of UK electoral systems Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Dunleavy, Patrick and Margetts, Helen (2005) The impact of UK electoral systems. Parliamentary affairs, 58 (4). pp. 854-870. DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsi068 © 2005 Oxford University Press This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3083/ Available in LSE Research Online: February 2008 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. Forthcoming in Parliamentary Affairs, September 2005 THE IMPACT OF THE UK’S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS* Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts In the immediate aftermath of the general election the Independent ran a whole-page headline illustrated with contrasting graphics showing ‘What we voted for’ and ‘What we got’, followed up by ‘…and why it’s time for change’.1 The paper launched a petition calling for a shift to a system that is fairer and more proportional, which in rapid time attracted tens of thousands of signatories, initially at a rate of more than 500 people a day. -
Who Gains from Apparentments Under D'hondt?
CIS Working Paper No 48, 2009 Published by the Center for Comparative and International Studies (ETH Zurich and University of Zurich) Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt? Dr. Daniel Bochsler University of Zurich Universität Zürich Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt? Daniel Bochsler post-doctoral research fellow Center for Comparative and International Studies Universität Zürich Seilergraben 53 CH-8001 Zürich Switzerland Centre for the Study of Imperfections in Democracies Central European University Nador utca 9 H-1051 Budapest Hungary [email protected] phone: +41 44 634 50 28 http://www.bochsler.eu Acknowledgements I am in dept to Sebastian Maier, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Peter Leutgäb, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Alex Fischer, who provided very insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Manuscript Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt? Apparentments – or coalitions of several electoral lists – are a widely neglected aspect of the study of proportional electoral systems. This paper proposes a formal model that explains the benefits political parties derive from apparentments, based on their alliance strategies and relative size. In doing so, it reveals that apparentments are most beneficial for highly fractionalised political blocs. However, it also emerges that large parties stand to gain much more from apparentments than small parties do. Because of this, small parties are likely to join in apparentments with other small parties, excluding large parties where possible. These arguments are tested empirically, using a new dataset from the Swiss national parliamentary elections covering a period from 1995 to 2007. Keywords: Electoral systems; apparentments; mechanical effect; PR; D’Hondt. Apparentments, a neglected feature of electoral systems Seat allocation rules in proportional representation (PR) systems have been subject to widespread political debate, and one particularly under-analysed subject in this area is list apparentments. -
Nickersonanita-E.Pdf
Submission to ERRE by Anita Nickerson In this brief I speak only for myself. My opinions are in no way a reflection of the views of Fair Vote Canada. Their views are well set out in this submission to ERRE. Sections In this brief you will find the following: About the Author The Case is not Black and White, But It’s Real Why PR What System I Prefer What System I Hope You Adopt Special Issues: ● Simplicity ● Competition/Collaboration in Multi-Member Ridings ● Local Representation ● Familiarity Bias about Systems ● Referendum, Media and Mandate Who am I? I am a 42 year old woman who lives in Kitchener, Ontario. I have bachelor degrees in Psychology and Social Work, and a college diploma in Drug and Alcohol Counselling. I worked as an addictions counsellor for 8 years. I have been at home with my 15 year old daughter with special needs (we homeschool) since 2006. My husband of 16 years is a Registered Practical Nurse. For the past year, I have been employed part time by Fair Vote Canada. I’ve been working with FVC first on a local and then on a national level since 2008. I support volunteers, help coordinate national actions, and have contributed to almost every other aspect of our national campaign. This cause is my full time passion. Around 2007 I was like most Canadians - I voted, but I paid very little attention to politics between elections. I made voting decisions based on clips of leaders I saw on TV or something I read in the paper.