2. Aegean Region, Aydin, Balikesir, Burdur, qanakkale, Denizli, Isparta, izmir, Manisa and Mugla.
3. North Central Anatolia Region
KUtahya, Nevgehir, Usak and Yozgat.
73 NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
' 4. South Central Anatolia Region
Afyon, Aksaray", Kayseri, Karaman', Konya and Nigde.
5. East Central Anatolia Region
Amasya, Elazig, Malatya, Sivas, Tokat and Tunceli.
6. Black Sea Region
Ordu, Rize, Samsun, Sinop, Trabzon and Zonguldak.
7. Mediterranean Region
Adana, Antalya, Gaziantep, Hatay, igel and Kahramanmarag.
8. Northeastern Anatolia Region
Agri, Artvin, Erzincan, Erzurum and Kars.
9. Southeastern Anatolia Region
Sirnak', Urfa and Van.
diverse rural region" in terms of culture and ethnicity. He delimits eastern Turkey
consisting of 14 provinces, adding some modification to the official regional break-
down above.
extensive area as the east than Magnarella does. First of all, I demarcate the east
in accordance with its linguistic diversity shown in the Turkish census of 1965 which
is the last one to include questions concerning the mother tongue.5 As table 2 shows,
in all the provinces of the Southeastern Region the principal language of communica-
tion is Kurdish. In most provinces of the Northeastern Region, Kurdish is in common
Region, Gaziantep and Kahramanmaras. have some Kurdish population. Hatay
74 NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle EastStudiesEast Studies
Kurdish. However, its social structure is quite similar to that of the east in which
wealthy landowners, tribal leaders and religious sheikhs have a great influence on
5ibutheastern Ragion Turkish Kurdish Arabic Other
BingOl 41.6% 58.3% BitlisDiyarbakir 36.4% 61.3% 2.1%O.5% 37.5% 61.8% Hakkari 12.3% 86.2% Mardin 8.9% 66.7% 20.0% MusSiirtUrfaVan 55.6% 42.0% 1.8%14.5%11.3% 17.6% 67.8% 46.1% 42.6% 44.4% 55.4%
IVbrtheastemRagion Turkish Kurdish Other AgriArtvin 36.5% 63.3% 90.5% O.02% 3.7% (Georgian) 15.8% (Laz) Erzincan 94.3% 5.7% Erzurum 88.5% 11.4% Kars 77.7% 22.1%
Etzs'tCeniml Ragion Turkish Kurdish Other
Adiyaman 53.5% 46.4% Amasya 98.0% O.8% EIazigMalatya 75.6% 22.1% 82.7% l7.2% SivasTokatTunceli 92.0% 7.4% o.L3%(Circassian)
97.7% O.8% 2% (Circassian) 78.2% 21.7%
75 NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
Mediterranean Ragion Turkish Kurdish Arabic Other AdanaAntalya 96.0%100.0% O.9% 2.5%
Gaziantep 95.9% 3.9% O.2%29.3% HatayigelK. 69,2% 1.1% 97.8% O.2%10.6% 1.8%
Mara" 88.0% 1.0%, (Circassian)
The East Central Region seems less diverse linguistically ; however, the Shiite
Muslims in Turkey(the Alevis), both Turks and Kurds, are concentrated in this
region. Although the Turkish censuses have been entirely silent on the distinction
between Sunni and Alevi," Alevi Turks are said to be widespread in Sivas, Tokat,
Yozgat, Nevsehir, Corum, Amasya, Kahramanmaras and Erzjncan. Alevi Kurds are
distributed mainly in Adiyaman, Bingdl, Tunceli, Erzincan, Sivas, Yozgat, Elazig,
Malatya, Kahramanmaras and Kayseri.iO The estimate of the total Alevi population
varies, ranging from 3 to 18 million.ii In terms of this religious diversity, all the
provinces of the East Central Region can be regarded as constituting a significant
"diverse" part of the east. Since some provinces adjacent to this region, such as
Corum, Yozgat and Kayseri, have some Alevi population, a blurred western frontier
of eastern Turkey can be drawn across these provinces. In this paper, eastern
Turkey refers to a quite wide area as shown on map 1.
2. Geographical features of Eastern Turkey
In eastern Anatolia,i2 mountain ranges, high plateaus and deep-set valleys are
the main landscape units. The semi-continental climate of this region is very severe
and subject to extreme fluctuations in temperature. Most of this mountainous region
is covered in snow for half the year. Whereas the main stay of agriculture in this
region is raising livestock, cotton, rice and tobacco are produced in irrigated broad
river basins of the Euphrates, The lower plateaus that extends towards the Syrian
frontier is one of the driest and hottest part of the country due to low annual rainfall
and intense summer heat. But soi]s of this area are quite fertile as part of the
"Fertile Crescent" of the Middle East.i3 In the 1980's the Turkish government
76
NII-Electronic Library Service Japan AssooiationAssociation for Middle East Studies
Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey （Natsume ）
ヒ 「
冠 ●補 ’ 叉’ 4 著 ．． 4、 ● 」 ° 、ヤ 転 b 呻 Φ ｝ 雷 ’ 、 Ω 讐 賦 ．、 O 穿 ● 罵 冂 、 z
！ 彑 硬 ト 屮 と ゜ シ 巳°、疏 手 h 竃 oり 」 陀と 饗 三
． 券 ー ← 喃 ミ 。 N と、 触 ． てヒ 亀 電 煙 三 罵 冖3 メ 読 叉 ーミ 噌 と ，、 ’ め N 》 馳マ ー も 『 ． 、 ， ｝． 4 Φ ’ ‘ ！ と ． ノ 1 「 ’ ● 噛 § ， 8 、 芒 を ， ご ’ 宀♂ ＝ ’ ¶ ． ° 層咢 ▼、● 、 、【 ト ト β 7 孚」 ヤ． 胃 、 ゜ マ ． コ 、 ゜ ’ E 、 ℃ ゜ ＼ 罵 Φ 、く 、 「 ● ｝ ．舜 畧、 7 、 マ ぢ ’ ミ 爬 」 σ 」ゴ 蟄 Oh ヒ ，・ 国 リ 《 ’， o ． 了 曳 ヤ ’ こ 、● ● 。 ｝． 「 ち 」 こ C ■ ． ヒ 、 、 ン， O 寓 、 ⊂ 《 （● S 。 、 と ご ζ 、 「 ▼． ‘ ゜ヒ’、● 署「 コ ヨ そ V 馳 賦 マ
… O 『● 8 毒 ● 。 ・ ・ お エ ° ＝ 臨 《 ． め 茎 」 σ ε f じ ー」 罵 Φ 軌 ， 丶 、 （ し ◎ 1 瞹 o ’ 辜 54 も ．、 妄 瀕 Φ ミ 、 ’ ニ き ， ．， 餐 ’鹽 O ， 史 ト 」 ト ミ ｛ 「0｛ 罵 、 ・ マ ， 1 」 ’． 、 ’ 、 ゜葩 し ．、 ， 《 ♂ ご 冨 ノ 亀 も ■ こ て ≒ ∂ 讐 、． ξ ， 、 ’ ∵ う ▼． 蔵 て 『幾 −． 囲 ｛ ’ ， マ． 《 ． ● γ 0 ． ＝ を 3 鰭 し 斥「 ’． r 唱， 、ヤ ． 」 、 虔 曳 「 ■ ’亀 O 鶚 ’ 膚 《 責 も． ， ▼． 邸 h ． 陸 篤 「 く 《 O 、 《 ， Σ ト 覧 ヤ’． げ． 腰 s ◎ 認
77
NII-ElectronicN 工 工 一 Library ServiceServioe JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
launched the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) which included the construction
of 22 dams on the Euphrates and Tigris.i` The largest of these, AtatUrk Da'm began
operations in late 1994. Since the climate and configuration of the East Central 'moderate Region is more than eastern Anatolia, more intensive agriculture is
possible. Cereal yields are relatively high and grapes, fruit and sugar beets are produced,'S Hatay and Gaziantep provinces are subject to Mediterranean climate and densely populated and highly developed parts of Turkey. The large port of iskenderun is important as a terminal of oil-pipe]ines coming from both Batman and
northern Iraq.'6
3. Historical background of Eastern Turkey
In August 1071, the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan defeated the Byzantine troops at
Manzikert near Lake Van, Thereafter Anatolia was opened to full-scale invasion
and settlement by the Turks. By the middle of the twelfth century Anatolia became
the domain of a new Turkish dynasty, the Seljuks of Rum whose capital was Konya.
The Seljuks' incursion caused not a few changes on the ethnic and political
map of Anatelia. The repeated attacks of the Turcoman ghazis destroyed the
Arnienian kingdom of Ani on the eastern frontier in 1064. The Armenians emigrated
to Cappadocia as well as the Mediterranean coast, Cilicia, where they attained the
revival of the ancient Lesser Armenia. This Armenian kingdom of Cilicia lasted
almost three centuries until the Mamluks took possession of it in 1375.i7 A single
"Kurd" "an ethnical term began to be applied to amalgamation of Iranian or iranic-
ized tribes" during the Arab conquest of the seventh century when the conversion of
``Kurdistan," the Kurds to Islam occtired.ia But the term which designated the lands
extending ftom Azerbaijan to Luristan and the west of the Zagros, is said to have
been invented by the Seljuks.i9 The Kurds were often enrolled as professional
soldiers in the Seljuk army. The Germiyan, a group of warriors installed in western
Anatolia by the Seljuks, seems to have been Kurdish and Turkish half-breecls.20
Cahen sketches out an ethnic demographic map of Anatolia in the Seljuk
period as follows, The great majority of Armenians had remained in eastern
Anatolia'whereas an Armenian Principality took shape in Cilicia. Seutheastern
Anatolia had been widely populated by the Kurds. In the frontier area with Syria,
especially near Mardin, the Monophysites had kept their small communities. The
78
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
Greeks and Hellenized populations dominated along all the coastal regions as well
as the very heart of Cappadocia and the Anatolian plateau. Cahen says that this
distribution of ethnic groups in Anatelia was by and large maintained up to the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, even though invasiens, wars and government
policies changed the demographic features of certain regions.2i Nevertheless, the
Turkification and Islamization of Anatolia made progress at the expense of indige-
nous society, because it was the Turks alone who were present in all parts. The
ethnic intermixture inevitably caused alteration of the Turkish type, as well.22
In 1243 the Mongols defeated the Seljuks at the battle of K6ge Dagi in eastern
Anatolia. The Seljuk governrnent gradually crumbled away and eventually
disappeared in 1308. The ghazis' activity in the frontier regions was resumed, being
accelerated by the arrival of new Turcoman tribes who were driven away by the
Mongols, All Anatolia fell into a state of anarchy in which various new Turcoman
principalities emerged.Z3
By the middle of the fourteenth century, one of these principalities, the
emirate of Osman, stood out frem others for the vigorous conquest of northwestern
Anatolia and the Balkans. As a ghazi state the Ottomans were destined for perpet-
"provide ual conquest and constant expansion of the territory to new outlets for the
energies of the ghazis."2` They rnaintained two military fronts, one on both the west
and the east. Their,expansion to the east had been prevented by the Karamanids
who had centered in Konya and contended with the Ottomans for control of central
- Anatolia. After the conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453, Sultan Mehmet
II (1･451-1481) subjugated the Karamanids and annexed their lands in 1468. Still
eastern and southeastern Anatelia were under the control of two different Turcoman
principalities, the Akkoyunlu and the Zulkadirs.Z5
After surviving a series of expeditions of Timur, the two rival Turcoman
dynasties, the Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu, emerged as ruling elernents in eastern
Anatolia in the late fourteenth century. The Karakoyunlu had their center in the
Tigris-Euphrates basin, while the Akkoyunlu occupied the regions around Diyar-
bakir. The two dynasties engaged in an embittered struggle, and in 1467 the strong
ruler of the Akkoyunlu, Uzun Hasan, defeated the Karakoyunlu. Uzun Hasan
subdued all of eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan and most of Iran in the following years.26
The Akkoyunlu hegemony was replaced by the newly rising Safavid dynasty by 1503.
79
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
The Safavid ruler, Shah Ismail, developed an extremist heterodox sufi order into a
militant Shiite state. The Safavids conducted religious propaganda and succeeded
in converting many Turcoman and Kurdish tribes, especially in the provinces of
Sivas, Erzurum, Diyarbakir and Harput.2' The followers of Safavid Shiism came to
be known as Ktzzlbafi (redhead) because of their red headgear. The Kizilbas, also
called Aievis,2" began to instigate religious revolts against the Sunni Ottomans in the
reign of Beyazit II (1481-l512) in compliance with the Safavid expansive ambitions.
Selim I (1512-1520) hunted and persecuted some 40,OOO Kizilbas in eastern Anatolia
soon after his enthronement, and then set out to campaign against the Safavid. In
1514, Selim crushed the Safavid at 9aldiran northeast of Lake Van which resulted in
bringing all of eastern Anatolia under Ottoman control. Selim I also defeated the
Zulkadir and the Mamluks in the carnpaign of 1516-1517 and made himself the
master of Syria, Egypt and the Hejaz as well as southeastern Anatolia.2"
Selim, who found that the Kurds were hostile to the Safavid, decided to apply
an autonomous administrative system to newly conquered eastern Anatolia. This
system was maintained for four centuries with only minor changes. By the middle
of the seventeenth century when the Ottoman-Safavid frontier had been by and large
demarcated, eastern Anatolia were divided into six eJ,alets : Erzurum, Kars, 9ildir,
Diyarbakir. Van, and 6ehrezur. Whereas the first two eyalets were divided into
ordinary sancaks, each of the four others constituted some ordinary sancaks gover-
`irregular' ned by centrally-appointecl sancakbays and other sancaks (called ocaklzk,
yurtluk or Ekrad bayligt) that remained in the hands of the Kurdish ruling families.
These Kurdish sancaks comprised timars and zeamets whose holders (sipahis) had
to join military campaigns under the command of the beylerbayi and transfer part of
the revenue of the sancaks to the state treasury as all sipahis were obliged to do.
The beylerbeyis were always appointed by the Ottoman government and given the
right to replace the sancakbeys. In replacing Kurdish sancakbeys, however, the new
appointee had to be chosen from the sarne ruling family. In addition to these
sancaks, there were autonomous Kurdish emirates called IfrZrt hiZletimeti in these
eyalets. These emirates owed neither tribute to the state treasury nor regular
military service to the sipahi army, and their lands were never made into timars and
zeamets. The positions of Kurdish ernirs were hereditary. The sultans occasionally
required them to contribute a fixed number of troops to the army. But to what
80
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
extent the Kurdish emirs fulfilled their duties depended upon the strength of the
sultan's authority,30 The same system was extended to the former domains of the
Zulkadirs around Maras and the eyalet of Sivas.3i
This Ottoman administrative system determined the political features of
eastern Anatolia. Benefiting from the rivalry between the Ottomans ancl the
Safavids, the Kurdish emirs succeeded in maintaining a high degree of political
`states independence and establishing their own sovereignty like within the state.'
Their leadership was based on tribal confederations and subjugated non-tribal
Kurdish peasants and Christian minorities, Armenians and various groups of Eastern
Christians.32 The internal social structure of the Kurdish emirates was divided into
two groups : rulers and ruled (asken' and re'caya) that coincided with the distinction
between tribal and non-tribai. Tribesmen were nomads and warriors, while non-
tribesmen, whether Kurdish or Christian, were peasants deemed unfit to fight and
thus forced to rely on the tribesmen for their security. These non-tribal peasants
were not far removed the state of Medieval European serfs. Seme nineteenth
century Western travelers in eastern Anatolia reported that Christian peasants were
bought and solcl by Kurdish tribal chieftains together with the land on which they
Worked.3,3
Kurdish feudal autonomy in eastern Anatolia came to an end when the
Ottoman Empire embarked on efforts of modernization and centralization in the
nineteenth century. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, almost all of
Anatolia had fallen into the hands of semi-independent local rulers, derebel,s.
Mahmud II (1808-1839) suppressed the derebeys as well as the Kurdish emirs in a
series of military actions, althoygh two Kurdish emirs, Mir Muhammad of Ruwan-
cluz and Bedr Khan Beg, resisted persistently to the last.3` Mir Muhammad of
Ruwanduz brought most of what is now northern Iraq under his control by the
middle of that century. But his ambition was foiled by Mahmud II in 1836 when he
attempted to conquer Nusaybin and Mardin and make contact with Ibrahim Pasha
of Egypt35 who had been granted the governorship of Damascus and Aleppo.36 The
other emir, Bedr Khan Beg, conquered the vast area roughly between the line
Diyarbakir-Mosul and the Persian border, taking advantage of the defeat of the
Ottomans at the hands of Ibrahim Pasha's Egyptian troops in 1839.B' However, the
massacre of the Nestorians carried out by his tribal troops led the Ottoman govern-
81
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
ment to punish and defeat Bedr Khan Beg in 1847. All eastern Anatolia was now put
under the direct control of the Ottoman government. Ottoman authority was,
however, never fully exercised and consequently a chaotic political vacuum
prevailed all over eastern Anatolia.38
In this political situation the sheikhs of the sufi orders rose as political leaders
in the Kurdish areas. Due to the absence of the strong authority formerly provided
by the Kurdish ernirs, tribal conflicts and feuds suddenly increased. The Ottoman
governors, who hacl neither knowledge of local affairs nor legitimacy, were in-
capable of settling them. Sheikhs, however, could bring these conflicts to an end by
virtue of their being outside the tribal organization, They gradually began to wield
great power by manipulating tribal rivalries and intermarriage with daughters of
tribal chieftains and built up wealth. The sufi orders that formed networks spread-
ing across the whole of Ottoman Kurdistan were the Kadiri and the Nakgibendi. The
Nakgibendi, in particular, spread rapidly in the nineteenth century and exceedecl the
Kadiri in numbers of the followers thanks to vigorous missionary work of a Kurdish
sheikh Mawlana Khalid and flexibility of its organizational sturucture, Sheikhs thus
became the most influential indigenous leaders of Ottoman Kurdistan.3g
In the meantime, two wars between the 0ttoman Empire and Russia were
fought on the soil of eastern Anatolia in 1828-1829 and 1877-1878. As a result, the
Ottomans had to accept Russian acquisitions in the Caucasus, including Georgia and
the areas of Nahgivan and Erivan, and cede the regions of Kars, Ardahan and
Batumi. In addition, the Congress of Berlin forced the Ottomans to promise to
introduce reforms in areas inhabited by the Armenians and ensure civil and religious
equality in the Empire,`O
The wars with Russia brought about an influx of refugees into the Empire
from the 1840's. They came frorn the Turkish, Tatar and Circassian lands conquered
by the Russians north and west of the Black Sea and the Caspian, After the war of
1877-1878 refugees from the Balkans joined as a consequence of the Congress of
Berlin by which autenomy was granted to Bulgaria and Rumania, Austria took
administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and northern Dobruca and
northern Macedonia were ceded to Rumania and Serbia respectively. With the 'Kbmisyonu) establishment of a Refugee Commission (Muhacirin the Ottoman gov-
ernment settled these millions of refugees widely through the Empire. Shaw suggests
82
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
"persecution that some Muslim settlers who remembered the that had driven therri
from their homes in Christian lands" played a leading part of the Armenian massa- ･1896.4i cres in 1894
The Armenians in eastern Anatolia gradually avvoke to the idea of national-
ism and started to make contact with Russia to get assistance and protection during
the Russian occupation of eastern Anatolia. AbdUlhamid II, who was fully aware of
the grave situation of eastern Anatolia, decided to establish Kurdish tribal cavalry
"increase corps called Htzmiddye in 1891 so as to the efficiency of the Kurdish tribes
in the event of another war with Russia and to provide at the same time a mechanism
for supervision and control,"`2 The Hamidiye was not only the chief instrument iri
suppressing the Armenian nationalist activities but also a deliberate device to divide
Kurdish tribes, stir up tribal rivalry and prevent unity and collective resistance by
the Kurds to the Ottoman government. The tribes enrolled in the Hamidiye were
limited to those of the Sunni sect in accordance with AbdUIhamid's Pan-Islamic
policy. Consequently, the power of the Alevi tribes was weakened and hostility
between the Sunnis and the Alevis was increased.`3
Three Armenian nationalist parties were active in the Ottoman Empire and
Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. These were the Armenakan,
the Htznchak and the Dczshnafe parties. The Hunchak party, in particular, had a
socialist orientation influenced by the Russian Al?irodnihi and advocated terrorizing
the Ottoman government to win the independence of Arrnenia.`4 In 1894 seme
members of the Hunchaks set out to instigate a rebellion in Sassun in the vildyet`5 of
Bitlis. It was started with Armenian villagers' refusal to pay tribute to Kurdish
tribal cheftains. After an attack by tribal Kurds was repelled by armed Armenian
villagers, the Harnidiye regiments as well as regular troops from Bitlis and Mus
garrisons, joined by reinforcements from the Fourth Army Corps, were sent in and
a large scale massacre followed,`6 Yet the Hunchaks continued provocative agita-
"Armenian tion to fix the attention of the Powers on the Question." A protest march
to the Sublime Porte staged by the Hunchaks in Septernber 1895 turned into severe
fighting and violence. Soon thereafter, massacres occurred all over the Empire, but
especially in the six vilayets of Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, Harput, Sivas and Diyarbakir
in the winter of 1895-l896. The occupation of the Ottoman Bank in istanbul by
young members of the Dashnaks in August 1896 aggravated the situation. After the
83
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996-
occupiers were al]owed to escape to France, angry mobs began to attack the
Armenians in istanbul.`' Melson, citing various figures of the Armenian victirns
"if estimated by a number of schelars, suggests that one assumes low figure a of 50 ,
OOO dead and high figure of 300,OOO dead, between 2 percent and 12 percent of the
Armenian population was killed during the massacres."`8
The outbreak of World War I turned eastern Anatolia into a battlefield with
Russia once again, In the initial stages of the Caucasus campaign opened by the
Russian attack in November 1914, the Ottoman Third Army led by Enver Pasha lost
over three-forth of its so]diers. The Arrnenian volunteer units from the Caucasus
fought along with the Russian army and the Ottoman Armenians quite willingly
evacuated to the areas occupied by the' Russians so as to clear the areas for battle.
Witnessing this Armenian cooperation with Russia, in May 1915 the Ottoman
government decided to demobilize the Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army and
to deport Armenians from eastern Anatoiia to the Mosul area of northern Iraq and
also those from Cilicia and northern Syria to central Syria. During the deportation,
a substantial proportion of the Armenians became victims of murder, pillage, hunger
and disease.`' McCarthy, who painstakingly studied the population of Anatolia at
"of the end of the Ottoman Empire, says that the one and a half million Armenians
who had lived in Anatolia before World War I, only about 70,OOO remained in the
"a Turkish Republic of 1923." Thus people who had lived in eastern Anatolia since
before reeorded history were sirnply gone."50 The Revolution of 1917 prevented
Russia from carrying on the war. At the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the
Bolsheviks agreed to evacuate eastern Anatolia, including Ardahan, Kars and
Batumi which were ceded to Ru$sia in 1878.5i
The war came to an end on 31 October 1918 with the Armistice of Mondros
that meant an unconditional surrender of the Empire to the Entente Powers. The
Treaty of Sevres stipulated that the Armenians be granted to have an independent
state whose boundary might be drawn in the vilayets of Trabzon, Erzurum, Van and
"the Bitlis,52 The Kurds were to have local autonomy to south of a still-to-be
established Armenian frontier."53 This treaty was never imp]emented. The Turkish
War of Independence had already started in eastern Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal,
an Ottoman military hero in the war. He began to organize national resistance
forces in May 1919, The Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia
84
NII-ElectronicNII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
convened regional meetings in Erzurum and Sivas and declared its intention to fight
against the occupying forces for the protection of its territorial integrity and
national independence. The last Ottoman parliament that adopted the National Pact
based on the declarations of the Erzurum and Sivas congresses was prorogued by the
A]lied forces. In March 1920, however, Kemal announced that the Turkish nation
established its own parliament in Ankara, the Grand National Assernbly, which
should be censidered the sele legitimate representative of the Turkish people,S`
In eastern Anatolia the fight against the French and the nevLrly established
Armenian Republic in the Caucasus was going on. By the end of 1920, however,the
Armenian Republic was forced to retreat and sign a peace treaty which was soon
superseded by the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in March 1921.55 This treat.y
enabled the Ankara government to concentrate its military forces upon the fight
against the Greeks. The Turks finally turned a seemingly hopeless losing battle into
a heroic victory by putting the Greeks to flight from tzmir in September 1922. The
Armistice of Mudanya was signed between the Ankara government and the A]lies on
"re- 11 October 1922. With thg Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey won the
establishment of complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty"56 in all the territory
of the present Turkish Republic except for the Hatay and Mosul areas.
The new government instituted secular reforms to reduce the role of lslam in
public life as well as to eradicate the remnants of Ottoman authority. The Caliphate
was abolished in March 1924. The closing down of the office of Seyh-if1-Islam, the
Seriat courts and the medreses followed. Among the six principles of the Republic
stipulated in the 1924 Constitution, Nationalism and Populism aimed at preventing
the class struggles and ideological divisiveness, creating national solidarity and
rejecting irredentist aspiration.5' These policies caused a sense of uneasiness among
Kurdish notables, tribal chieftains and religious sheikhs in eastern Anatolia. Most
of them had taken part with Mustafa Kemal in the War of Independence because
they not only saw him as the most likely person to protect Kurdish lands from
Arrnenian claims but also responded to Kemal's appeal to Muslim solidarity to
"liberate their Caliph from captivity."5S The moves towards secularism and the
threat to Kurdish identity caused a series of Kurdish rebellions.
In February 1925 wi.despread revolt broke out under the leadership of a
Naksibendi sheikh, Said of Piran. Altheugh the revolt was prepared by the Society
85
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
for Kurdish Freedom or A2adi, a clandestine organization founded by Kurdish
officers in the Eighth Army of Erzurum in 1923, the organization designated Sheikh
Said as the leader because of his great influence among the Zaza-sPeaking5Y tribes in
the northeast of Diyarbakir.fiO The revolts swept over about one third of eastern
'national' Anatolia and mobilized 15,OOO Kurdish fighters, but it never captured
"the support from the Kurds in other areas. From the very beginning, it was Sunni/
Naksibendi/ Zaza-led rebellion," The Turkish government sent 52 ,OOO soldiers and
quelled the revolt in April.6i The rebellion provided the government with an opportu-
'Law nity to eliminate all opposition groups. The Assembly rushed for the Mainte-
'independence nance of Order' through and subsequently special tribunals' were
' establishecl. Sheikh Said and 52 of his followers were sentenced to death by an
independence tribunal' in Diyarbakir and hanged in September. The Progressive
Republican Party, founded in 1924 as an experimental opposition party, was closed
down. Furtherrnore, the religious activities of all the sufi orders were banned.G2
But soon another Kurdish revolt broke out at the foothills of Mount Ararat.
It was led by a new Kurdish organization abroad, Khayboun (Independence) based
in Lebanon and Syria, The insurgents gained the support of the Armenian Dashnak
party as weil as the Shah of Iran. Although they had seized control of an area
stretching from Mount Ararat to the northern parts of Van and Bitlis by the end of
1929, the revolt was supressed by 65,OOO soldiers in 1930. The punitive measures
came down on all the Kurdish regions in eastern Anatolia, not just those involvecl in
the revolts. Mass deportation was erganized by a law of 5 May 1932 which divided
`evacuation' the Kurdish regions inte four zones and stipulatecl systematic in accor-
"the dance with density of the population having a Turkish cu]ture" in the regions.
From 1932 to 1935 a substantial number of Kurds were deported from eastern
Anatolia to the western part of the country. The revolt of Dersim began in 1936 as
a resistance to an order of total evacuation and lasted until 1938. The Turkish
government was forced to concentrate three Army divisions and most of its air force
in Dersim. The region was entirely devastated and remained under martial law until
1946. This series of the revolts determined the Kurdish policy of the Turkish
government. The use of the Kurdish language was banned and the Kurds began to
"mountain be referred as Turks." The entire area beyond the Euphrates was off
limits to foreigners until 1965.63
86
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Vating Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
Meanwhile, the disagreement between Turkey and Britain regarding the
Turkish-Iraq border in the Mosul province was resolved by a treaty signed in June
1926. Turkey surrendered all rights to Mosul in return for ten percent of the oil
produced in the area and the British promised to refrain from agitation on behalf of the Kurds or Armenians in the future. The province of Hatay whose population was
equally divided between Turks and Arabs had been placed under French rule as an
autonomous region since 1921. IIewever, when France promised Syria its full
independence, including Alexandretta (Hatay), AtatUrk claimed that Alexandretta
ought to be given its own independence. TurkeyTs claim was admitted by the League
of Nations and an independent Alexandretta held a general election which resulted
in a Turkish majority in the Assembly. The new state petitioned Ankara for union,
and France finally agreed to annexation in 1939. This c6nflicting process of incorpo-
ration of Hatay, however, caused a prolonged border dispute with Syria.6` The 1940. The geographical sphere of eastern Turkey was officially dernarcated by populatien of the east remained politically invisible until the start of multi-party
politics in 1950.
II. Voting Behavier of Eastern Turkey in Past Elections
1. In the 1950s
Parliamentary democracy based on a multi-party system was introduced in
Turkey after the end of World VLrar II. Changes in the ruling order was primarily
encouraged by the international situation in which Turkey chose economic and
military alliance with the West in order to defend itself against Stalin's expansiomst
- + by policy. President Ismet In6nU also needed to channel popular discontent caused
mubilization and severe economic measures such as Capital Tax (Vkerlzk Vergisi)
during the war.65 Turkey had been governed by the single-party rule of the
Republican People's Party (RPP) founded by Kemal AtatUrk from 1923 to 1945.
During this period there were two brief experiments to create an opposition party,
the Progressive Republican Party in 1924-1925 and the Free Republican Party in
l930, but both parties were quickly banned without contesting any legislative elec-
tions. The elections under single-party rule were carried out basically under the 1908
Ottoman law which had provided for indirect (two-stage) elections, although the
tax-paying requirement was abolished in 1923 and women were given the right to
87
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
vote and stand for election as deputies in 1934. In these noncompetitive elections,
nomination by the RPP automatically meant election to the Grand National Assembly.66
In January 1946, the Democrat Party (DP) was established by four RPP
dissidents: Ce]al Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat KOprUIU. . 'loyal Although InOnU hoped the DP would become a opposition,' popular hostility to
twenty-seven years of Republican rule had reached a critical level. The DP skMfully
exploited it and gained wide support. In the first direct competitive election in 1946,
however, the RPP won 390 of the 465 seats while the DP won only 65 and indepen-
dents 7. The DP claimed that large-scale electral frauds occured.67 Nevertheless,
multi-party politics offered political channels through which social differences
within Turkey's population began to express themselves. The peasant began to
"the sense vital importance of his vote which those in power are now asking for
instead of contemptuously telling him how to vote."68 The Republicans had to step
out of their rigorous adherence to secularism and etatism in 1946-1950 so as to
anticipate their rival's program. The DP's claim forced the RPP government to
introduce the secret ballot as well as a system bf judicial supervision of electoral administration.6g
The 1950 election took place in total calm with 89.3 percent participation.
The DP won 53.3 percent of the vote and 408 out of 487 parliamentary seats while
the RPP gained 39.9 percent of the vote but only 69 seats. The Nation Party that
was formed in 1948 by conservative dissidents of the DP received enly a single seat.
The Turkish electorate clearly expressed its demand for a change. The dispropor-
tion between the number of seats and the share of the vote was a product of a
so-called simple majority system in which each administrative province served as a
constituency and the party gaining the most votes in a province won all the seats to
which that province was entitled.70
The DP regime in the 1950s implemented extensive mechanization in the
agrarian sector with generous assistance and loans granted by the US Marshall Plan.
Many tractors and harvesters were introduced to the fields. The land brought under
cultivation doubled from 1948 to 1959.7' Thanks to favorable weather conditions, the
post-war demand for food in Europe and the economic boom stimulated by the
Korean War, Turkey experienced an unprecedented level of economic development
88
NII-ElectronicNII-ElectroniF Library Service
JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
in the first half of the l950s. Agricultural mechanization, however, drove many
sharecroppers out of the countryside to the cities in search of work. The shanty
towns (gecekondu) in the environs of large cities inhabited by the rural migrants
gradually took shape in the 1950s. Landowners who prevented the DP frorn im-
plementing any effective land reform were able to accumulate small plots which
were not economically feasible for the use of a tractor and increase the size of their lands.72
"economic The 1954 general election was held in the middle of this miracle."
The DP enjoyed an even greater triumph than jn the former election. The DP's seats
in the Assembly increased from 408 to 503 while the RPI"s representation dropped
from 69 to 31. Soon the econemy began to show signs of stagnation. Cheap farm
credits, government-supported prices for agricultural products and virtua] tax
exemption ef agricultural incomes had brought prosperity to the countryside. But a ･a growing demand and excessive consumptiun resulted in overall inflation and lack
of foreign exchange. By the late 1950s the DP government could no longer centrol
the economy in spite of an emergency loan offered by the Western powers. In
addition, the Dernocrats undermined political freedom and democracy by passing
repressive legislation directed against the opposition. They liquidated the RPP's
assets ip 1951, closed down the Nation party and amended the press law in 1954 to . silence the press criticizing the DP government.
In the 1957 election, the Turkish electorate, frustrated by the economic
mismanagement and heavy-handed rule of the Dernocrats, inflicted punishment on
them. Although the DP maintained its majority in the Assembly with 424 seats out
of 610, the Republicans increased their share of the vote from 34.8 percent to 40.6
percent and their seats from 31 to 178. The new Freedom Party (FP), founded by
the liberal faction of the DP in 1955, gained 4 seats. The opposition was now joined by intelligentsia, government officials, milita'ry officers and workers on fixed income
who suffered most from the DP's economic policy. They desPaired of changing the
government through legal channels. The tensions between the government and the
opposition. finally led a military coup in May 1960.73 The DP was closed down and
its leading members were brought to trial. Prime Minister Menderes was executed
along with his foreign and finance ministers in 1961.
In the three elections in the 1950s, eastern Turkey had been continuously the
89
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
stronghold of the RPP while the rest of the country gave overwhelming support to
the DP. The number of the RPI' deputies sent from the east to the Assembly were
44 out of 69 in 1950, 25 out of 31 in 1954 and 103 out of 178 in 1957. However, a close
examination reveals that the party support of each eastern province vacillated. Only
Kars and Malatya faithfully supported the RPP throughout the I950s; Erzurum,
Agri Amasya, Siirt, Diyarbakir and Gaziantep never changed their allegiance to the
DP ; the rest of the eastern provinces shifted their support between the two, although
most of them returned to the RPP in the 1957 election. It was assumed that support
of the RPI' in the east was in part strengthened by the existence of a large Alevi
"the population because the Alevis feared that freedom of religious activities promis-
ed by the Democrats" would lead to Sunni oppression of the Alevis ; therefore, they
voted for the secular Republicans.'4
2. In the 1960s
The political circumstances of Turkey in the 1960s can be largely attributed
to the 1961 Constitution whose primary aim was to guarantee civil rights and
freedom against the power of the state, The 1961 Constitution stipulated that the
legistrative and executive be divided and subject to control by a judiciary so as to
save them from being monopolized by a particular political party, A bicameral
parliament was established, The lower chamber, the National Assembly, consisted
of 450 members elected every four years by proportional representation (d'Hont
system) . The Senate consisted of 150 members elected for a term of six years. The
1961 Constitution granted the Turkish people a greater degree of freedom of organi-
zation and expression, Universities had greater autonomy and various kinds of
student associations were established. VLfurkers were given the right to strike. The
liberal atmosphere created by the Constitution broadened the Turkish spectrum of
political ideologies both to the left and right. The proportional representation
system not only enabled small parties to win seats in the Assembly bttt also the
electorate to vote for alternatives other than the two major parties. At the same
time, it created government instability since it was designed to prevent an majority
from clominating the Assembly.
The first half of 1960s can be regarded as a period in which Turkish politics
recovered from the abrupt end of the DP by military coup and ascertained who
90
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Votins' Behavior of E-astern Turkey (Natsume)
would be the real heir of the DP. Four parties contended in the election of October
1961. The Justice party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP), claiming to be the
heir of the DP, gained 34.8 and 13.7 percent of the vote and 158 and 65 seats
respectively. The RPP won 173 seats with 36.7 percent of the vote, while the
Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP)'5 gained 54 seats with 14.0 percent of
the vote. The general interpretation of this election result was that the former DP
still emanated formidable power through its offshoots. As for the eastern provinces,
Elazig. Amasya and Kahrarnanmaras supported the JP and Agri gave partial
support to the RPNP, while all other provinces voted either for the RPP or the NTP.
The NTP's strength was clearly concentrated in the east where 43 out of its 65
deputies were elected. The NTP established in 1961 by a dissident of the DI' was
"the 'intellectua]', said to represent elitist, and urban wing of the former DP."7E
"any However it failed to get marked ideological identification" and behaved like
"an alliance of independents, effectively relying on Iocal pockets of personal influence,"77
After the first coalition government between the RPP and the JP failed, the
second coalition was formecl by the RPI', NTI' and RI'NI' in May 1962. In this
coalition, the NTP rewarded the electorate of the east for their support. Yusuf
Azizoglu, a NTP deputy from Diyarbakir, became Minister of Health and had many
hospitals and dispensaries built in the eastern provinces.'S This government also
permitted 55 landowners who were expelled by the military junta in 1960 to return
to eastern Anatolia.79 But in 1963, due to the bad performance of the NTP and
RPNP in the local election, this gevernment was replaced by the third RPP coalition
with independents. The third coalition government, which had to cope with the
Cyprus crisis throughout 1964, was taken over shortly before the 1965 election by
Suat Hayri Urguplu, an inclependent senator on the JP list.
In the 1965 election the JP had itself acknowledged as the true heir of the DP,
winning 52.9 percent of the vote and securing an absolute majority with 240 seats.
This victory enabled SUIeyman Demirel, elected leader of the JP in 1964, to form a
"stable" government until the next election in 1969. The RPP which declared itself
"left of center" along the line of the Social Democratic parties of Western Europe
lost, decreasing its votes to 28.7 percent and its seats to 134.80 The votes for the
NTP and RPNP also declined drastically, but new participants, the Nation PartySi
91
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
and the Turkish Workers' Party (TWP), won 6.3 percent with 31 seats and 3.0
percent with 14 seats respectively, thanks to the national remainder election system
that strongly favored small parties.82 The TWP was founded by a nurnber of trade
unionists in 1961 and introduced an ideological debate into Turkish politics for the
"left first tirne. The RPI"s of center" proclamation was precipitated by the TWP
which attracted urban intellectuals who had been traditional supporters of the
RPP.S3 Although the TWP gained no remarkable support from the east, it had many
Kurdish members and 5 out of the 14 TWP deputies were sent from the eastern
provinces. The TWP adopted a resolution which recognized the existence of the
Kurdish people in eastern Turkey at its fourth congress in 1971 and this caused its
dissolution. In the 1965 election the votes of some southeastern previnces were
divided among three or four parties while most of the northeastern and east central
provinces returned to the JP. The NTP still maintained strength in Hakkari,
Diyarbakir. Agri and Kars.
In the late 1960s Turkish workers had become more politicized by the parlia-
mentary representation of the TWP and more militant by staging strikes and
demonstrations. In 1967 a group of unions broke away from the pro-government - t confederation, TUrk-Ig, and established the radical confederation DISK. In 1968
American sailors from the visiting Sixth Fleet were attacked by leftist youths who
were strengthened in their anti-Americanism by witnessing the hostile attitude of the
United States and the notorious letter of President Johnson during the Cyprus crisis.
The right was radicalized as well. The rightist youth, organized by TUrkes of the
clash with NationalAction Party (NAP), began to the Ieft.B`
The 1969 election took place in the middle of a political crisis with the
participation ef eight parties. The most significant facts in this election were the
decline of the voting rate (64.3 percent, the lowest between 1950 and 1991) and the
victory of thirteen independent candidates, both of which indicated widespread
public despair and lack of confidence in the parties.8S The JP and the RPP share of
the votes fell from 52.9 to 48.5 percent and from 28.7 to 27.4 percent despite an
increase in seats from 240 to 258 and from 134 to 143 respectively, This was largely
due to a change of the election system from national remainder for d'Hont, aiming
at elimination ef the TWP from the Assembly, While the fragmentation of the vote
in the east continued, 12 out of the 13 independent candidates were elected from the
92
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
east.86 Besides, all 6 deputies of the NTP and 6 ef the 8 Unity Party deputies were
sent from the east. The Unity Party (UP) founded in 1966 by a deputy of the Nation
Party is widely known to have attracted the votes of Alevis, although its program
and public statements do not have a denominational tone but show a socialist orientation to the left of the RPP.S' AII of the eastern provinceS which elected UP -Sivas, candidates Amasya, 9orum, Malatya and Tokat- had a large A]evi popula- tion.
"Occupation The 1969 election was not able to stop the political deterioration.
of land by peasants, factories by workers and campuses by students" continued.
Clashes between the left and the right intensified and blood was regularly shed in
street violence. When a political motivated bank robbery and the abduction of US
military personnel happened successively, the Chief of Staff and commanders of the
Arrned Forces issued a memorandum demanding the resignation of the government
on 12 March 1971.SS
3. In the 1970s
Turkish politics in the 1970s was characterized by fragmentation of the party
system and ideological polarization among the parties. These trends had already
become noticeable in the 1960s. Yet in the 1970s not only ideological differences but
also religious (secular versus pro-Islamic), sectarian (Sunni versus Alevi) and
intra-communal factional cleavages were directly translated into party politics.
Polemical exchanges between party elites in which the rhetoric concerning anti- Communisrn and anti-Fascism Was frequently employed led to political violence of
extremist groups which survived the military repression in 1971. Due to the prolifer-
ation of parties and fragmentation of the vote, no party was able to have a majority
in the Assembly. Inevitably all the governments formed in the 1970s were either
coalition or minority except for the nonpartisan, techflocratic governments installed by the military between l971 and 1974. Minor coalition parthers, especially the NAP
maj and the NationalSalvationParty (NSP), frequentlythreatened their or partners,
the RPP and the JP, with non-cooperation or withdrawal from the coalition govern-
ments. In so doing both the NAP and the NSP managed to get desirable ministerial
posts. The Islamic propaganda spread by the NSP as well as the terrorist activity
organized by the NAP were overlooked by the government. Political instability
93
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
dragged the country into a state of anarchy and terrorism by the end of the decade.
The successive coalition governments which entangled themselves in partisan strug-
gle took little responsibility for managing the national economy that was severely
affected by the oil price increase of 1973, the Cyprus invasion of 1974 and the
resultant sanctiens of Europe and the US which blockecl all aid and loans. The
decline of remittances from Turkish emigrant workers in Europe, a shortage of
foreign exchange and accumulation of debt fina]ly forced Turkey to accept the
standard agreement with the IMF that meant a declaration of default to the worid.
'coup The leaders of the by memorandum' of 1971 gave priority to the restora-
"the tion of law and order which directly meant repression of any group viewed as
leftists."89 The TWP was closed down in July 1971, trade unions were pacified, and
the autonomy of univetsities was curbed. Freedom of civil society was again
circumscribed within narrow bounds by Constitutional amendments. The political
parties continued to split, merge and transform themselves as the election scheduled . for October 1973 approached. The leadership of the RPP was transferred from Ismet
.In6nU to BUIent Ecevit, a young journalist who ensured the RPP's new ideological
position as the social democratic left. Disagreement about Demirel's leadership of the JP led to the establishment of the Democratic Party (Deml') by dissidents in
1970.90 In 1972 the Reliance Party (RP) gained strength by a merger with the
Republican Party, a splinter from the RPP, and changed its name to the Republican
Reliance Party (RRP).9] The National Order Party founded in 1970 by Professor
Necmet Erbakan was dissolved for its Islamic orientation by the Constitutional
Court in 1971, however he succeeded in reestablishing it undera different name, the
National Salvation Party (NSP), in the following year.
Eight parties competed in the 1973 election and the RPP emerged the strongest
party, increasing its share of the vote from 27.4 to 33.3 percent and its seats from
143 to 185. The JP, by contrast, suffered a massive setback, reducing its share of the
vote from 48.5 to 29.8 percent and its seats from 256 to 149. Both theDemP and the
NSP garnered nearly 12 percent of the vote and just under 50 seats. While the RRP
secured 13 seats, the UP, the NAP and independent candidates had only a handful of
"a 'critical seats. Between 1969 and 1973 Turkey went through period of realign-
ment' in which the pattern of support for political parties changed."9Z The RPP had
"a been regarded as party of the intelligentsia and bureaucracy in the urban areas
94
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavier of Eastern Turkey (Nat$ume)
and of local notables and more traditional landowning elements in the countryside,"
"parties whereas the DP and the JP had been considered ef the peasantry, market-
oriented landowning greups, commercial and entrepreneurial elements especially in
small towns and of lower income groups in urban area."9" But in the 1973 election,
"lower the JP suffered heavy losses in cities since income groups in urban area"
(gecekondu dwellers) dramatically shifted their support from the JP to the RPP.
The RPP showed its greatest strength in the most highly urbanized provinces such - - -the as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, while its support in the least developed provinces
east which had been its stronghold in the 1950s- dropped sharply.94 In this election,
two major parties competed in the modernized provinces while minor parties gener-
ally received their support in less developed provinces.95 In fact, the NSP performed
distinctly better in the eastern provinces. The Nakeibendi order had functioned as
a significant source of collective votes conducted by sheikhs and agas in the east.96
The AJtzrcu movement, founded in the Republican period by Said Nursi who claimed
to interpret the Quran in the light of twentieth century,"' also exerted influence over
party politics. Said Nursi was a Kurd born in Bitlis in 1873 and strongly influenced
by the Naksibendi order. The Nurcu movement expanded its organizational net-
wQrk, intertwining with the tribal structure and the Naksibendi order in eastern
Anatolia.9S In the 1973 election, the NSP succeeded in capturing these religious votes
that had been casted for the DP in the 1950s and the JP in the 1960s.99 The support
"return of the East Central Region fer the RPP was explained as the to the RPP of
Alevi voters who had swung to the Unity Party in 1969."iOO
The RPP's victory, however, was 41 short of the 226 necessary for a majority
in the Assembly. The newly rising NSI' was chosen as coalition partner despite
radical ideological differences with the RPP. The RPP-NSP coalition government
led by Ecevit carried out the intervention in Cyprus in l974. Ecevit's resignation due
to a disagreement with Erbakan was followed by a period of 241 days before the first
`Nationalist Front' government, consisting of the JP, NSP, NAP and RRP, was
formed by Demirel in 1975. Under this coalition, the NAP began to extend its control
over the Ministry of Education as well as the Ministry of Customs which was used
to facilitate the import of arms for the rightist terrorist groups,iOi Workers and
DiSK began to voice protests against high unemployment, rampant inflation and
declining wages despite the harsh repression of the military-backed governments in
95
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMES No.11 1996
the early 1970s. Political terror of both the right and left escalated when an early
election was announced for June 1977, and climaxed on May Day 1977. A huge rally organized by DiSK was disrupted by riot police and 36 people died.i02
Six out of eight contending parties gained seats in the Assembly in the 1977
elections, but almost 90 percent of the seats was won by two major parties.i03
Although this indicated a return by the Turkish electorate to the predominance of
two major parties, neither the RPP nor the JP secured a stable majority in the
Assembly. The RPP won 41.4 percent of the vote and 213 seats which was the
party's largest representation in the Assembly since 1950. The JP showed an
impressive recovery with 36.9 percent of the votes and 189 seats by recapturing the
votes that had drifted to the DemP and NSP in 1973. The NSP shrank by half with
24 seats while the NAP performed surprisingly well, increasing its seats from 3 to 16
despite the militant violence of its youth organization known as the Bozkurt (Gray
Wolves) . The strength of both the RRP and DemP was dwindling. But in the eastern
provinces, the NSP, RRP and independents still performed well compared to the rest
of the country which primarily supported the RPP and JP,
From this election until the military intervention in 1980, Ecevit and Demirel
formed either coalition or minority governments twice each. The political and
economic situation of the country was more and more aggravated under these
governments, In 1978 a series of massacre of Alevis took place in eastern Turkey.
In September and October 1978, the NAP's Gray Wolves, denouncing the Alevis as
communists, attacked them in Malatya, Sivas and BingUi. In December Kahraman-
maras was assaulted. The armed forces were sent and martial law was declared in
13 provinces. But similar violence erupted in qorum in 1980, In the Kahramanmarag
incident alone, 109 were killed, 176 seriously wounded, and 500 hottses and shops
destroyed,iO` Those provinces where the Alevis were largely concentrated consistent-
ly supported the RPP in the 1970s, whereas the NAP made its biggest gains in the
eastern provinces between 1973 and 1977. In the 1977 election nine of the sixteen
NAP deputies were elected, appealing to Sunni prejudice against the Alevis, from the
eastern provinces of 9orum, Elazig, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, Sivas,
"weak Tokat, Yozgat and Kayseri.]05 The worst pbriod for Turkey led by and
indecisive governments totally lacking in direction" was ended by the military
`[much intervention of 12 September 1980 to the relief of most Turks."i06
96
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
4. In the 1980s
The Nationai Security Council (NSC), a military junta which ruled Turkey
until the 1983 election, convicted politicians, trade unionists and Ieaders of all kinds
of political institutions of dragging the country into anarchy and terrorism.
Members of the NSC also considered the liberal and pluralist tendencies of the 1961
Constitution and the election law to be institutional evils. Just after the intervention,
the Constitution was suspended, parliament was dissolved, political parties were
"every closed down and trade unions were suspended. Then the NSC set out to crush
manifestation of dissent from the left, including revolutionaries, social democrats,
trade unionists, and even members of the nuclear disarmament organized as the
Peace Association."iO' The extreme right and Islamists represented by the NAP and
the NSP were also repressed. However, purge of the leftists from all bureaucratic
and educational institutiens was more relentless and conclusive. The Law of Higher
'de-politicizing' Education was enacted with the aim of the universities and replacing
'nationalist-conservatives.' all adherents of the left with the It was reported that
thousands of people were arrested, detained and tortured in prison without sufficient
evidence as the army's control extended to the whole country.
Political and institutional restructuring began with three measures: first,
drafting of the new 1982 Constitution and the following referendum for popular
approval ; second, amendment of the election law to facilitate one-party, majority
government ; third, banning of all pre-1980 political parties and proscribing their
leaders. The 1982 Constitution stressed presidential and governmental authority
against legistrative unruliness in contrast with the 1961 Constitution. In the election
law, the proportional representation (d'Hont) system was maintained but political
parties were obliged to win more than 10 percent of the national vote to get seats in
the Assembly. Furthermore, parties with less than the average necessary for seat
allocation in an electoral district were also excluded from seat allocation in that
district.i08 The new constitution was approved by the referendum in October 1982,
winning 91.37 percent of the votes cast. This automatically meant that the Chief of
Staff Kenan Evren, leader of the coup in 1980, assumed the office of president for a
seven year term. President Evren announced that a general election would be held
in October 1983. All deputies of the 1980 parliament were already prohibited from
, 97 NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
'
political activity for five years and all party leaders for ten years. New parties could
not be established with the bulk of their membership drawn from the old ones.'09 Out
of seventeen parties founded before the election, only three were permitted to
participate : the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) , the Populist Party (PP) and
`state the Motherland Party (MP). The NDP was the party' loyal to the 12
September regime. The PP was formed with the aim of taking over the support
formerly given to the RPP. The MP was established by Turgut Ozal, deputy prime
minister in Bulent Ulusu's government set up by the NSC in 1980 and the person
'24th responsible for implementing the January Measures' required by the IMF to
"synthesis restore the Turkish economy. The MP was known to represent a of the
pre-1980 ideological strands of liberalism, social democracy, nationalism, and
Conservatism."11n
The 1983 election aroused little public interest although it recorded an
extremely high voting rate of 92 .3 percent due to imposition of a fine upon those who
abstained from voting. The MP won 45.1 percent of the vote and 211 seats while the
PP gained 30.5 percent and 117 seats and the NDP 23.3 percent and 71 seats. In this
election all thre'e parties lacked an organizational network in the country and
appeared to rely on local families to deliver the vote. This method worked favorable
for the NDP in the east, obtaining more than 30 percent of the vote in 10 provinces :
Adiyaman, Agri Bitlis, Hakkari, Kars, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, $anliurfa and Van.
In the 1984 municipal election, however, the PP and the NDP performed sp poorly whereas two new parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the True
Path Party (TPP), emerged as the second and third parties after the MP. The SDP,
founded by Professor Erdal inUnU, a son of ismet tn6nU, was regarded as the true heir
of the former RPP. The TPP was a direct continuation of the JP behind which stood
SUIeyman Demirel.
Ozal's economic policy in the 1980s included a number of significant innova-
tions which totally altered economic principles upheld since the establishment of the
republic, First of all, it was decided that the state should withdraw from the
principal industries except for infrastructure in order to encourage free competiti,on
of private enterprises as well as participation of foreign capital. The State Eco-
nomic Enterprises (SEE) were privatized. The traditional imporVsubstitution policy
was replaced by an export-oriented strategy so as to open up the Turkish economy
98
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
to the world market and make Turkish industry more competitive, efficient and
capable of producing high quality goods. Thanks to phased devaluation of the
Turkish lira, setting up of export incentives and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War,
Turkey's exports surprisingly increased frorn 2.3 billion in 1979 to 116 billion in 1989.
"the Turkey enjoyed an economic boom called export miracle" with an average
GNP growth rate of 4.3% between I980 and 1989. But the dynamic and competitive
nature of the economy inevitably resulted in the thriving of large companies with
ample funds such as Kog Sabangi and Enka at the expense of smaller enterprises.
Peasants and workers were also excluded as beneficiaries of the free market
economy. The workers' right to strike was severely restricted by the NSC and the
new constitution. In order to maintain competitive prices of products, employers as
well as the government made every effort to keep wages low. The budgetary
allocation for subsidies to agricultural products was also cut down. In the meantime,
the inflation rate went up from 36.8% in 1981 to 75.4% in 1988, with the result that
real wages declined by about 45% after 1980. Turkey, of the 1980s was full of
"upwardly wonderful success stories of the mobile, enterpreneurially minded, prag- ･
matic, modernist group"ii2 living in urban areas, but this was causing huge income
disparities between winners and losers. Therefore, had the NSC not crushed almost all the political institutions that would have raised objections, Ozal's' economic policy
could not have been implemented.i'3
The central issue of the l987 election was whether the MP would be able to
hang on to the major status of the right because all political parties which had
represented the political spectrum in the 1970s returned in this election under new
names. Shortly before the election, a referendum to restore the political rights of the
old politicians was approved by less than a 1 percent margin, They returned to the political arena as leaders of their parties : Demirel led the TPP, Ecevit the Demo- cratic Left Party (DLP), Erbakan the Welfare Party (WP), and TUrkeg the
'catchall Nationalist Labor Party (NLP). The MP had functioned as a genuine
"no party' for which single occupationa}, educational, or income group appeared to
"the have decisively refrained from voting."ii` Above all, the MP responded to
optimistic view of the future, aspiration for social mobility and demands for tangible
services"ii5 of the urban middle class and migrants with a policy of Westernism,
"getting liberalism and things done." But by the time of election, the MP had failed
99
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
to control inflation, unemployment and income redistribution, and its share of the
votes sharply dropped from 45.1 to 36.3 percent. The number of the MP seats,
however, increased from 211 to 292 because of the amended election Iaw, The NDP
was dissolved and its members absorbed into either the MP or the TPP. The SDP
became the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) by merging with the PP and
won 24.8 percent of the votes and 99 seats; the TPP gained 19.1 percent and 59
seats. The WP, NLP, DLP and another party of the conservative right, the Reformis-
t Democratic Party (RDP), failed to clear the 10 percent electoral threshold.' The
contradiction between the MP's share of the votes and number of seats aroused
controversy and doubt about the legitimacy of Ozal's government.
As we compare election results in the eastern provinces with those in Turkey as a whole, the result was as follows (the national average in parentheses): MP 34.7% (36.3%) ; TPP 16.7% (19.1%) ; SDPP 23.7% (24.8%) I WP11.5% (5.5%) i DLP 7.1% (10.0%) ; RDP 1.0% (O.7%) ; NLP 3.7% (3.8%). The religious bas-
tion founded by the NSP was revitalized by the WP,'i6 In Bing61, Bitlis, Diyarbakir
and Siirt, the WP gained more than 20 percent of the votes. The SDPP also appeared
to be establishing an ethnic and sectarian base of support in the east. It gained more
than 20 percent of the votes as well as the seat allocation in qorum, Diyarbakir.
Erzincan, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kars, Malatya, Kahramanmarag, Mardin, Sivas, Tokat
and Tunceli. These provinces contain either an Alevi or a Kurdish population. Ayse
Ayata points out that the SDPP won support from Kurdish migrants in three large
urban centers, istanbul, Ankara and izmir, as well.ii'
The gravest clomestic political problem in the late 1980s was the Kurdish
problem in the east or the guerrMa war with the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).
The PKK was established by Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan, a student in the Political
Science Department of Ankara University in 1978. In the 1970s, advocating Marxist
ideology, it mostly attempted a series of assassinations of tribal and feudal landlords.
Although other Kurdish organizations, such as the Socialist Party of Turkish
Kurdistan(SPTK)and the KurdishDemocraticParty of Turkey (KDPT), emerged
in the radicalism of the 1970s, the PKK cou]d neither ally with them nor gain popular
support due to its violent tactics. The military junta of the 1980 coup charged 3,177
'separatist suspects with activities,' but Ocalan himself fled to Syria. In 1983, PKK
members started to kill Turkish soldiers. This led immediately to the first of many
100
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behaviur of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
air and ground strikes by the Turkish armed forces across the border in Iraq.
'hit Thereafter the and run' attacks of the PKK and retaliation by the Turkish armed
1989. forcescontinued, resulting inthe deathof more than 1 ,500 peop]e by September
The PKK's targets were not only Turkish soldiers and Kurdish landlords but also
Kurdish villagers who were recruited into the village guard system created by the
government in 1985. The Kurdish people faced a dilemma because the PKK some-
times carried out massacres of whole families of village guards, including women
and children, while the Turkish gendarmes conducted harsh interrogatiens and
tortured villagers who were suspected of being PKK collaborators.ii8 In the mean-
time, an influx of 60,OOO Kurdish refugees from Iraq following the end of the
Iran-Iraq War and Iraq's attack with chemical weapons upon them drew the world's
attention to the plight of the Iraq Kurds as well as the state of civil war between the
PKK and the Turkish armed forces. Some Kurdish deputies of the SDPP gradually
revealed openly their ethnic identity. Seven of them attended a conference held in
"cultural Paris in 1989 on identity of Kurds and Human rights" and were immediate-
ly expelled from the party.'t9
As President Evren's term of office was coming to an end in 1989, the main
political concern in the country shifted to who would succeed, In October 1989 the
Assembly elected Turgut Ozal Turkey's eighth president, despite the boycott of
election by the opposition. Ozal designated Yildinm Akbulut as the prime minister.
5. Critique of conventional analyses of voting behavior in Eastern Turkey
The people of the east had strongly supported the RPP throughout the 1950s, although their voting pattern showed some vacillation in accordance with the economic perferrnence of the DP government. Karpat attributes it to the disparity
of economic deveiopment between the west and the east under the DP rule.i20
Ozbudun and Tachau explain that the exceptional support in the east for the RPP
appeared as a transitional political phenomenon in the breakdown of the traditional
alliance between the central bureaucratic elite and'local notables out of which the
RPP had been born.i2' This alliance was initiated by the circumstances of the
Turkish War of Independence, since the military-bureaucratic elite and the local
notables had not only the greatest interest in maintaining an independent Turkey but
also the capability to mobilize the peasant majority in the war. After the establish-
101
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1so6
ment Qf the Republic, an implicit agreement was made between them. The provin-
cial notables, who had constituted a class of large landlords, supported the moderni-
zation efforts of the national elite in exchange for the neglect of any land reform by
the Republican government. However, this alliance began to break apart in the mor'e
modernized and industrialized west where industrialists, smaller business interests,
industrial workers and the professions had emerged. The electorate of the west,'
"DP-sponsored which had been freed from the authority of local notables, supported
departures from the state-centered policies."ri2 In the east, by contrast, the tradi-
tional alliance was still alive and the local notables could contol and deliver large
blocs of votes to the RPP.
The voting behavior of the east in the 1960s drew the attention of a number
of scholars for its tendency to support minor parties as well as independents and for
its sudden and non-ideological shifts of party support. The relative weakness in the
east of the two major parties, JP and RPP, has also been pointed out. Magnarella
finds that in the l961 election in which the JP and the NTP contended as heirs of the
i`the DP, western and central portion of Turkey voted for the JP, while the east
backed the NTP." He aiso points out that in the 1965 election the JP and the RPP
"only obtained a majority of the vote in most provinces while in the east did third
parties figure significantly in the voting." Magnarella hypothesizes that political
parties represent cleavages within society and thus the exceptional and fragmented
voting of eastern Turkey shows its cleavage from the rest of the country plus its own
internal cleavages. He tries to explain these cleavages in the east in terms of ethnic
and religious diversity, feudal structure of the society, and linguistic and geographi-
cal barriers of communication. He concludes that people in the east have been
"political isolated and neglected; thus, many of them rejected parties which have
done little for them in the past" and pinned their hopes on a new party, the New
Turkey Party.i23
Kudat and Sayari argue that the voting behavior of the east reflects patron-
"the client relationships. They say that decision of patrons, relig{ous leaders, tribal
chiefs and family heads are usually unquestioning]y followed by clients, believers
"the and junior family members."i2` Ozbudun also says that rural client who follows
the wishes of his patron does not care much about the party or candidate he votes
for, nor is he concerned with the policy outcome of his choice."i25 This principle of
102
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavier of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
patron-client relationship makes either sudden and non-ideological shifts of party
support or success of independent candidates possible in the east.i26 Leder cites an
extreme example of a non-ideological shift of support from the JP to the TWP which
was observed in the east,i27
bzbudun, an experienced analyst of Turkish elections, tries to prove his
"low hypothesis that levels of socio-economic development are associated with
mobilized and deferential participation" by making the most use of statistical
expertise. He succeeds in proving that those provinces with the highest proportion of combined JP and RPP vote are generally in the more developed western regions,
while the lowest combined strength of these parties is usually found in the less
developed eastern provinces. He also confirms that the NTP and independents
received dispreportionately stronger support from the provinces with a Kurdish
population. However, Ozbudun rejects an assumption that the disenchantrnent with
the existing party system is expressed as abstention in the more developed provinces,
whereas, in the more backward areas, it is channeled by the traditional elite toward
either personalistic minor parties or independent candidates.i2ti Hale's argument is on the line of Ozbudun. Hale focuses on particularistic (e.g. primary and religious loyalty) and universalistic (e.g. interest groups and political parties) elements of political processes as a means of distinguishing
between the modem political system and the more primitive social order. He says
that in Turkey both stages of the political processes appear simultaneously in
"the different regions and political developmental process can thus be seen in Turkey
to stretch over a space as well as a time continuum."i29 Hale makes observation
about the 1969 election that the tendency of the east to support minor parties is a
result of the efforts that minor parties made to win favor of a class of agas and
"the sheikhs in the east. He says that sma]1 parties are assumed to lack the
wherewithal to gain votes from their larger rivals in the more sophisticated western
and coastal provinces of Turkey, but can capitalize on the easterner's feeling of
separateness and his predisposition to follow the wishes of tribal sheikhs to whom the small parties, for lack of anything better, can in turn offer parliamentary
Seats."13o , Yalgm-Heckmann criticizes Kudat, Sayari and bzbudun in respect to their
assumption that clients follow the commands of their patron en masse and almost
103
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
blindly, being either threatened by coercion or induced by material benefits. She
turns down a monolithic and inflexible unity of the tribes as a totally non-practical
"it hypothesis, citing the fact that in Hakkari is not uncemmon for different lineages
to support different political parties and vote for their own party's candidate who
may belong to another tribe."i3i She argues that tribal clients, rather than simpl-y
obeying their patrons, utilize the political skills of their patrons in accordance with
their calculation of individual or collective interests. In this respect, a tribal aga is
"somebody to acknowledge but not to become servile to," She also criticizes Hale
and 02budun's view that correlates the form of political participation in the east
'evolutionist' with its level of socio-economic development as an model.'32
Still a fundamental question remains unanswered. What is a political motive
for the exceptional voting behavior of eastern Turkey? These scholars shed light on
the political and economic structure of the east that is Iikely to induce collective and
acquiescent vot]ng patterns. Yet no one but Magnarel]a dares to interpret the voting
behavior of the east as a certain political expression. If the local notables in the east
had kept the alliance with the central bureaucratic elite through their support for the
RPP until the end of the 1950s, why did they switch their support to minor parties in
the 1960s and 1970s? In terms of national politics, the political leverage of minor
parties was supposed to be weak and peripheral ; and these parties were not able to
offer material benefit to the extent that the two major parties did. It might be
inferred that participation of minor parties in coalition governments gives them
opportumties to exert a political influence out of proportion to their representation
in the Assembly. This was certainly realized by the NTP in the 1960s and the NSP
in the 1970s which brought about substantial benefits to the east,i33 Nevertheless, it
must have been hard to predict at the time of the elections whether or not the minor
parties to which the east gave support would participate in coalitions. Moreover, the
minor parties are likely to become extinct in the short term or merge into the major
parties. For instance, 66 percent of the NTP deputies and 72 percent of the NTP
senators later joined the JP.i3`
`imprudent' `diverse Most scholars seem not to be so as to consider the east
en bloc and try to read the political will of the east into its voting behavior. They
`evolutionist' "if rather take the view that socioeconomic development begins to
accelerate in the least-developed eastern regions, these discrepancies might begin to
104
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
decline."i3S In other words, this is just a transitional stage of the east which is
supposed to attain perfect political and social integration into the national system in
the end. Until then it can be left and neglected as such. We cannot help but be
'evolutionist' surprised that this discourse is strikingly similar to the official stand of
'center.' the traditional Turkish A perspective which both parties have neglected to
take into account is one which accepts the peculiarities of the periphery. Seeking to
understand the political meaning of the periphery's peculiar dispositions is a means
of idelltifying ways in which the various segments of the society function as signifi-
cant and integral elements of plurarism. In the 1991 electi6n, the electorate of the
east articulated that such negligence of the periphery would come at a high cost to
the country.
III. Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey in the 1991 Election
Ozal's election as President in October 1989 worsened unpopularity of the Motherland Party (MP). Ozal's nepotism was becoming intolerable to the public,
While the party's administration was dominated by the Ozal family, the portfolios of
Ozal's cabinets were ofte,n given to friends and relatives. Wealth and corruption of
`Ozal dynasty' made the public furious,i36 Severe criticism of the MP burst out in the
1989 local elections in which the MP mayors who had been very popular for their
dynamic city planning were miserably defeated by the opposition. The MP's share
of the vote dropped from 36 percent in the 1987 election to 22 percent.i3' Prime
Minister Akbulut, nominated by Ozal without being elected a new leader at the MP
convention, also lacked legitimacy. Akbulut, a weak and indecisive prime minister,
"man was always seen as a in the pocket of the president."iSS
The Gulf crisis which began in August 1990, however, gave Ozal an opportu-
nity to show his unchallenged leadership to the Turkish peeple as well as world
leaders. He bypassed the government and the Assernbly and carried on direct
telephone diplomacy with the White IIouse. While his personal and secret diplomacy
again became the object of opposition criticism, Ozal was praised for his quick and
firm decision to stand against Iraq and act as a member of the Western allies. On
7 August, supporting the UN sanction, Turkey closed dewn the pipeline which
carried l.5 million barrels of oil a day from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean port of
Yumultahk. Although Turkey did not send her own troops to the war area, it
105
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
permitted the Allies' air force to carry out bombing in Iraq from a Turkish air base.
The Gulf War, which started on I6 January 1991, was quickly over after the US
troops showed the awesome capacity for destruction of its high-tech weapons.i39 In
March the Kurds in Iraq started a spontaneous popular rising against the weakened
Iraq government. But soon Iraqi troops began a counter-offensive, and US president
Bush's refusal to intervene led to a debacle for the Kurdish troops by the end of
March. Thousands of Iraqi Kurds, terrified of chemical weapons with which the
Iraqi government once attacked them in 1988, were fleeing towards Turkey and Iran.
Hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees reached the Turkish border in April and
were stranded in the severe winter weather. The suffering of the Kurdish people was
reported by the foreign press which covered all the stories concerning the Gulf War
and drew the attention of the world. A rising public outcry urged the leaders of the
'safe Western allies to propose the establishment of havens' for the Kurds in northern
Iraq protected by the Allied forces. President Ozal, who opposed the fragmentation
of Iraq and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, agreed due to the
international pressure on Turkey.i`O
Turkish domestic policy towards its own Kurdish population gradually began to change on Ozal's own initiative for the most part. In February 1991, the Council
of Ministers decided to lift the restriction on spoken Kurdish with the repeal of law
number 2932 which was adopted in 1983 by the military junta.i4i Abuse of human
rights in Turkey, particularly regarding the Kurds, became the object ,of criticisrn by
the western public, and the prospects of Turkey's entry into the European Commu-
nity (EC), for which it had officially applied in 1987, was partly contingent on an
'safe improved human rights record.i`2 With regard to the establishment of the
havens' for Kurds, President Ozai astonished the Turkish people by revealing that he
had already started contact with the leaders of Iraqi Kurds ; Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kuydistan (PUK) and Masud Barzani, the leader of
the Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) .i`3 Ozal stated that Turkey would not
"by-stander be a as regards the future of Iraq."i"
In June the ruling Mothe,rland Party elected a new chairman, Mesut Yilmaz, in the party congress, Akbulut, who represented the party's nationalist-religious
faction was defeated. The task of Yilmaz's new cabinet was to hold the general
e]ection a year earlier before his party's image became worse. The cabinet decided
106
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
on 20 October 1991 as the election date and had amendments of the election law
passed in the Assembly. The main pillar of the amendments was adoption of a
"preference "bonus system" which would provide seats" to the party winning the
most votes in certain constituencies.i"5
As the election approached, a series of mergers and electoral alliances
between the parties took place, main]y with the aim of clearing the 10 percent
electoral threshold. The Democratic Center Party (DCP) founded by ex-MP mayor of istanbul, Bedrettin Dalan, merged with the True Path Party (TPP) . The People's
Labor Party (PLI') ancl the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) agreed on an
electoral coalition under which both would present joint lists of candidates to the
voters in a number of eastern provinces. The PLP was founded in 1990 mainly by 'of ex-deputies the SDPP whe were expelled because of their participation in the
'Kurdish' conference in Paris. Their expulsion produced a wave of resignations by
those who represented the eastern Kurdish provinces at both the central and regional
"on leve]s of the SDPI'.i`6 The forrnation of a political party basis of race" was
prohibited in Turkey by various laws. Therefore, the PLP declared itself one of the
"pro-Kurdish" "pro-PKK" social democrat parties, yet it was regarded as a or party
by the Turkish public from the very beginning. But thiS electoral coalition complete-
ly met the interests of both, because the SDPP wanted to regain support in the
eastern provinces while the PLP could not participate in the election due to both the
10 percent electoral threshold and lack, of an established organizational
framework.i`' Finally, an electoral alliance among the far right parties was announ-
ced. The Welfare Party (WP), the Nationalist Labor Party (NLP) and the
Reforrnist Democracy Party (RDP) were united to clear the threshoid. This caused
a serious reaction especially in the eastern provinces. Since Alparslan TUrkes, the
leader of the NLP, has advocated ultra-Turkish nationalisrn which has a strong tone
of racism against other ethnicities, all the members of the WP in the eastern Kurdish
provinces were upset.i`S Nonetheless, the alliance of the three parties was
maintained, and the WP was expected to lose considerable votes in the east.
The election campaign took the form of two separate battles, one on either
'right-of- side of the main political divide. The MP contended with the TPP for the
'left-of-center' center' vote whereas the SDPP fought the battle for with the Demo- cratic Left Party (DLP) led by Ecevit. The SDPP leader Erdal in6ntt and other
107
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMES Ne.11 1996
SDPP officials had hoped to unite all the social democratic votes by a merger
between the SDPP and the DLP some day.i`9 But in this election campaign, Ecevit
"party accused the SDPP of coming to terms with the PLP, a at the convention of
which slogans backing Kurdish terrorism had been chanted," lnonti, for the first
time, criticized Ecevit openly, saying that Ecevit's attitude was ethnocentric and
resembled TUrkeE's ultra-Turkish nationalism. Indeed, Ecevit's speech was notable
for his outspoken support for ethnic Turks in neighboring countries in distinction to
his silence on the Kurdish problems in eastern Turkey.'50
The inflation rate in 1990 was still hovering at around 50 percent and the
unemployment rate in urban areas hit 13 percent.i5i From 1987 onward, the number
of strikes increased rapidly, Workers began to reassert themselves to win back the
rights they lost after the 1980 coup and to demand higher wages so as to adjust the
enormous income disparity. 50,OOO coal-miners in Zonguldak, who launched a strike
in November l990, marched toward Ankara demanding a wage hike, although they
were finally intercepted by the army in January l991. TUrk-is (Confederation of
of million members went Workers' Unions of Turkey) claimed that 90percent its1 .5
on a general strike on 3 January 1991,i52
The election debate largely concentrated on economic issues, The MP,
emphasized the prosperity and progress which Turkey had made in the last decade
and tried to remind the electorate of the MP's accomplishment. The TPP appointed
a young female professor of economics, Tansu 9iller, as its deputy chairman and had
her explain the economic proposal of the DP at a press conference. An attractive
"two slogan of keys for each family,'' which meant the TPP would enable each
family to own a home and a car, and 9iller's performance, which was rarely seen in
masculine-dominated Turkish politics, drew the electorate's attention. However, according to economists, Ciller was simply presenting warmed-over ideas of the MP
that had already become bankrupt.i53
As far as the election manifesto$ of ail parties except the WP-NLP-RDP
alliance were concerned, neither the headings nor the promises themselves varied
"the very ,much. The issues mentioned by these manifestos included transition to a
genuine market economy, the protection of secularism, improving income distribu-
tion, reducing the tax burden on employment, raising levels of technology, improving
the stock exchange, bringing the education system up to date, reforming higher
108
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Vottng Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
education, proving more and better health care, providing for industrial peace,
extending trade union rights and the right to strike, protecting the consumer,
supporting the farmer and the small businessman, caring for the environment,
revising the state personnel regime, ensuring effective national defense while reduc-
ing the length of military service, ensuring freedorn of opinion, press and broadcast-
ing and the independence of the judiciary, countering monopolies, fighting corruption
and bringing the voting age down to 18."i5` All the parties agreed that the main
problems of the Turkish economy were the high rate of inflation and public finance
deficits, even though none of them could offer a remarkable remedy for them. Only
"its the SDPP was conspicuous for claim to be able to solve the troubles in the
Southeast and specific mention of various rights of Kurdish citizens."i55
The WP leader, Erbakan, claimed that the ideal future of Turkey was to be
"great a Islamic commune where taxes are non-existent, interest is banned and the
family protected." According to him, Turkey should form a part of an Islamic
commen rnarket and an Islamic defense pact instead of the European Community.
The WI' applied an Islamic rhetoric for the Kurdish problem that Kurds were
Muslims rather than a different ethnic group. Among the minor parties, the scale of
the WP's election campaign was conspicuously large and sophisticated. Many kinds
of their election posters highlighted the lament of the people who suffered frorn the
social injustice created by the MP regime and stressed how the rnoral code of Islam
'gift ceuld heal the country. They distributed a kind of package' containing religious
booklets or the like to the electorate. It could easily be assumed that the WP had
a source of ample funds. As mentioned before, the traditional sufi orders such as the
Nakgibendi, but also the Kadiri, Rufai and others, and the religious movements of
republican origin such as the Nurcu, Sttleymanci and Isikgi had voted for specific
parties en bloc.i57 Some of these organizations were known to be financed by
Rabimtizl Alemdil lslam (Union of the World of Islam) whose headquarters were in
Saudi Arabia.i58 Although the WP did not enjoy the support of all these organiza-
tions, it certainly made the growing political influence of Islam felt.
Terrorism of unidentified Islamic groups began to threaten Turkish society in
the early 1990s. In l990 alone, a number of prominent journalists and scholars were
"Islamic killed in istanbul and Ankara by groups calling themselves Mevement" or
"Islamic Liberation Arrny."i59 In the east more dreadful and mysterious murders of
109
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
sorne officials of the PLP and human rights activists occurred one after another in
1991, They were abducted from their homes, tortured and killed by unknown groups
"Turkish which later on began to be called Hizbollah." Villages known to sympa-
thize with the PKK were also raidecl by these groups. Since the culprits claimed to
be the police and were never arrested, the local population suspected that they had
some kind of link with the state security forces. At least 90 people were killed in
1991 under similar controversial circumstances.i60
In the 1991 election the TPP emerged the winner with 27.0 percent of the vote
and 178 seats. The MP performed well with 24.0 percent of the vote and 115 seats
despite factional conflicts between liberals and conservatives. The SDPP suffered a . major erosion of support in the three metropolitan areas of Istanbul, Ankara and
･Izmir which once had been the bastions of the SDPP, mainly due to mismanagement
of the SDPP mayers elected in the 1989 local election and suspicion of urban
population about the party's real intention to ally with the PLP. The SDPP share of the vote was 20.8 percent and the number of their seats was 88. The DLP, which fa{led to clear the 10 percent threshold in 1987, gained 10.8 percent of the vote and
7 seats in the Assembly. The WP-NLP-RDP alliance won 16.9 percent of the vote
and 62 seats. However, the three parties' combined share of the vote in past elections
rernained at the same level in the 1991 election, It is also likely that none of them
could have secured 10 percent of the vote if they had not been allied.'6" The alliance
itself dissolved soon after the Assembly convened.
The regional distribution of the vote for each party did not change for the
most part between the 1987 and 1991 elections. In 1987 the Motherland party's
performance was almost uniform throughout the country except for the southeast
and Thrace.i62 In 1991, while the MP surrendered central Anatolia to the WP-NLP- - - RDP alliance, it secured support from two rnetropolitan areas, Istanbul and Izmir,
and the eastern Black Sea region. Its pockets of extremely high support were
Hakkari with 43.0 percent; Malatya, President Ozal's birthplace, with 41.1 per-
cent ; and Rize, Prime Minister Yilmaz's constituency, with 47.5 percent.i63 In the
1987 election, the TPP did particularly badly in the metropolitan areas, failing to
collect a single seat in either Ankara or istanbul. In 1991 its support came from the
Aegean, western Black Sea and Mediterranean regions while its presence remained
low in central and southeast Anatolia. The province of Isparta, party chairman
110
NII-Electronic Library Service Japan AssoolatlonAssociation for MlddleMiddle East StudlesStudies VQting Behavior of Eastern Turkey （Natsume）
d9 1 ち ε ◎ ＞ 旧弓 訳 O 」 霜 O 鵠 邑
診 話 ξ 閃 一 O 50 〇 」 」 の U O 言 帽 ＞ ］ ∈ O “ 篝 課 鬮 圃
°°
罷 20 詫 ＞ ー oッ ＝ コ 靉 らり O 匡 巉
ζ O 韆 胃 02 窶
凵 鎹
尸 爨 ¢ 5 ． 尸ロ 一 d 塞 ユ ・ O Σ ［ 凵
ユ ユ ト
睾 ［ 凵
111 一 NII-ElectronicN 工 工 Eleotronlo LibraryLlbrary Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
Demirel's constituency, gave an overwhelming 62.6 percent support to the TPP.i6`
The SDPP was very strong in the three metropolitan areas in 1987, receiving support
from the industrial working class, urban poor and migrant urban Kurdish commu-
nities, In 1991 the SDPP became the third party even in party chairman in6ntt's
constituency, tzmir, while it emerged the strongest party in the southeast, thanks to 'support the electoral coalition with the PLP. Its extremely high came from
Diyarbakir 49.9%; Mardin 53.9%; Mus 41.8%; Batman 52.8%; Sirnak 61.2%
and Tunceli 57.9%.i65 The WP's support in the l987 election was concentrated in
central Anatolia around the religious city of Konya, eastern Anatolia and the eastern
Black Sea, even though it failed to win seats in the Assembly. This pattern appeared
in a similar fashion in 1991.i66 The DLP's support was limited to several provinces
both in 1987 and 1991. In the 1991 election seven deputies of the DLP were elected
from Edirne, istanbul, Zonguldak and newly created Bartiri.i6'
What was happening in each province of the east in the 1991 election cam-
paign? The istanbul newspaper Cumhu7dyet published a series of reports of the
election campaign by province in September and October 1991. In accordance with
the accounts of these reports, we shall try to analyze the 1991 election in the east.
In east central Anatolia, there is a complicating juxtaposition of Sunnis and
Alevis, but also Turks and Kurds. The Alevis have been loyal supporters of the RPP
since the mid-1960s. In the 1970s these ethnic and sectarian cleavages were exploited
by political parties of both sides and triggered a series of riots. The Nationalist
Action Party appealed to the Sunnis and made its biggest gains in this region. The
National Salvation Party also did well in the same context, In the 1980s these
nationalistic Sunni votes appeared to have gone to the Motherland Party, while the
SDPP inherited the Alevi votes from the defunct RPP. It also began to be noticed
that the Welfare Party was strong arnong Sunni Kurds.i6S
In the 1991 election, the most decisive factor in this region still seemed to be
the Alevi-Sunni cleavage. The main battle was fought between the W.P-NLP-RDP
alliance and the SDPP for the sectarian votes.. The alliance worked very well here,
since the Sunnis and Turks always constitute the majority in this region and both the
WP and NLP simply activated their strongholds founded by their predecessors in the
1970s. Cumhendyet mentioned another demographic factor which would effect the
SDPP unfavorably. In the aftermath of the 1978 attacks by Sunni mobs on Alevi
112
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting BehaviDr of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
communities in Sivas and Kahramanmaras, most Alevis in these cities emigrated to
urban areas and Germany, or switched their support to other parties due to discon-
tent with the RPP that failed to prevent the attacks. The TPP's Iow profile and
erosion of the MP's strength were also reported. The electoral issues in this region
were similar to those at the national level, namely high 20 to 50 percent unemploy-
ment rate, rising cost of living and serious water shortage.'69
The battle between the SDPP and the alliance concluded favorably for the
alliance in Kahramanmaras, Sivas and Tokat and for the SDPP only in Tunceli. But
in Amasya the SDPP secured stable support against its main rival, TPP, and won all
3 seats. The vote of 9orum was fragmented ameng 4 parties. In Erzincan, the
constituency of ex-Prime Minister Akbulut, the SDPP overwhelmed the MP and won
2 out of 3 seats. In Yozgat and Kayseri where the NLP leader TUrke" and the RDP
leader Aykut Edibali became the candidates, the alliance was extraordinarily strong
and won 3 out of 5 seats in Yozgat and all 7 seats in Kayseri. The vote in Elazig was
divided between the TPP and the alliance. Cumhzadyet reported that the first
candidates on both the TPP and the alliance lists were an aga of the biggest tribe and
a son of a sheikh in Elazig. They won the seats without any difficulty. In Malatya
where many people benefited from the political power of Ozal, the MP won over-
whelmingly, although the SDPP and the alliance snatched one seat each.i70
Inflation and unemployment hit the people of the east more severely. The only
solution was immigration to urban areas or abroad. As a result of the decrease of
population, the number of seats allocated to some eastern provinces decreased. The
public indignation and resignation to the growing income disparity was well reported
by Cumhzarlyet in a conversation between a local barber and a customer in Kars :
"Since the MP's rule started, 1,OOO liras in my pocket was clevaluating day by day while someone in istanbul who exchanged 1,OOO liras for equivalent US
dollars gained day by day. In the end his rnoney increased to the value of
5,OOO liras while I fell 4,OOO liras in debt. Here the poor were getting poorer
and the rich in istanbul richer."
At the same time, theiranswer to the question which partY they would vote
"It for was is not our decisionbut our aga's." Kars was still one of the spheres of
113
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMES No.11 1996
tribal politics that derived its dynamics frorn the colorful constitution of various
ethnic groups. Kurdish tribes were able to control 80,OOO to 100,OOO votes which
were equivalent to the votes necessary for electing two deputies in Kars. The Shiite
Azeri Turks comprised 60,OOO to 70,OOO votes given to the MP in the 1987 election.
"native" "Osmanh" ･Turks consisted of A group of called or 70 ,OOO to 80 ,OOO people,
however they never tended to vote en bloc due to the Alevi-Sunni division cutting
across their community. Although 15,OOO nomad Turkmens also maintained their
tribal community, they never displayed collective voting as a whole, since they were
scattered around many pastures.i'i In the 1991 election tribal Kars elected 2 deputies
of the TPP and 3 of the SDPP.
Tribal politics appeared to prevail in Agri, Bing61 and Mus as well. Tribal
agas and religious sheikhs were nominated first on t)he lists of the candidates of all
parties,"2 Bing61 voted for the TPP and the alliance. Agri elected TPP and MP
deputies whereas Mug supperted overwhelmingly the SDPP. Erzurum has been
regarded as the fortress of the WP a]ong with Konya and gave 5 of its 7 seats to the WP.
Coming into Bitlis and Van, the proportion of the Kurdish population is high
and the tensions of local people caught between the security forces and the PKK is
intense. Inevitably, election issues could not be confined to simple economic matters.
The local population gradually became vocal in their desperate need for remedies for
the bogged-down guerrilla war and for their aspiration to express ethnic identity.
- - Yet the politics of Bitlis was still dominated by the Inan family. The Inans were the
most influential Nakgibendi sheikh family and produced many deputies of the
Assernbly, Kamran inan, who elected on the Nationalist Democracy Party's ticket in the 1983 election, joined the MP and consecutively held various ministerial posts.
In the 1991 election, his nephew, who,was a candidate of the TPP in the 1987 election,
ran on the MP's list as the second candidate next to Kamran inan and, as a matter
of course, both of them won seats. CuJnhumpet pointed out that their manner of
shifting the parties to which they belonged was typical of tribal politics.i'3 Van
enioyed relative prosperity thanks to the touristic business, and unemployment was not so serious as other eastern provinces. Business circles in Van complained about
the terrorist activities of the PKK which affected tourism. In Van, however, two
tribes were still powerful and had family members become candidates in the TPP,
114
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey MP and SDPP.i74 These three and the alliance shared Van's 5 seats. Hakkari,
probably the most tribal province in the east, chose the MP and TPP candidates. Violence by security forces against the local population has been a self-evident
fact in the southeast. Widespread human rights abuses and torture in detention have
never ceased, Road blocks, body checks, house searches and the like have been the
order of the day. Moreover security forces came te consider the local people to be
potential enemies. The forceful evacuation of local villages that were close to the
borders or suspected of collaborating with the PKK or reluctant to join the village
guards started probably in late 1989. Some villages were said to have been deserted
in fear of the spreading terrorism of the PKK. In the deserted villages, rnost of the
houses were reportedly destroyed or burned down so that the PKK could not use
them as hide-outs. Neither local officials nor local journalists knew the exact
number of the villagers who abandoned their villages, however thousands of them
congregated in local towns and rioted at Nevroz, a Kurdish celebration of spring, in
March 1990 and 1991. Most of those who came to towns and cities lived at the point
of starvation and made the unemployment problem more serious.i'5 In Siirt, Batman, Sirnak and Mardin, the reporters of Cumhudyet met not just
with road blocks and body checks by security forces also shootings between the PKK
"the and security forces at night. They stated that election turned into a Kurdish
referendum" here and the People's Labor Party in coalition with the SDPP had
already won the hearts of the local people. They expected that all the seats allocated
to these provinces would be swept away by the PLP, while suggesting that the PKK
strongly backed the PLP.i7G The SDPP-PLP coalition won a overwhelming victory
in these provinces, gaining all 14 seats. Diyarbakir and Sanliurfa, where large landlords dominated the local peasants, each showed a different picture. According to Cumhudyet, the politics of Sanliurfa
was decided by secret consultation among the major tribes. In the 1991 election,
support of these tribes was broken up among the TPP, SDPP, MP and WP and all
of them except the SDPP secured seats."7 In Diyarbakir the SDPP-PLP coalition
was extremely strong. Agas and sheikhs even gave support to them. Cumhzadyet
reported that Yusuf Azizoglu, the leader of the Azizoglu family, a founding member
of the New Turkey Party and the former Minister of Health in the second in6nU
government in 1962, also supported the SDPP-PLP. The people of Diyarbakir gave
115
NII-ElectronicNII-Eleetronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
7 of 8 seats to PLP candidates.i'8 All the seats of Adiyaman were also won by the
SDPP, while the vote of Gaziantep was shared between the SDPP and the TPP.
Hatay maintained its reputation as one of the strongholds of the SDPP by giving 5
of 8 seats to the SDPP in this election.i79
During the l960s and 1970s eastern Turkey had conducted tactical voting by
supporting minor parties and independent candidates. However, the election law
applied in the 1980s and 1991 was elaborated to prevent coalition government and
proliferation of minor parties in the Assembly. The electorate was made to waste
the vote when it supported minor parties which failed to clear the 10 percent
electoral threshold. Given that past voting practices were no longer an effective
means of expressing its peculiarity, then how did the electorate of the east vote from
1983 to 1991? In the 1983 election the east gave rnuch more support to a party loyal
to the military, the NDP. In the 1987 election, a censiderable part of the eastern vote
was wasted by supporting the WP whose share of the vote in the east was more than
twice as the national average. As We compare the 1991 election results in the eastern
provinces with those in Turkey as a whole, the result was as follows (the national
average in parentheses) : MP 23.6% (24.0%) ; TPP 22.8% (27.0%) ; SDPP 31.9% (20.8%) ; the WP-NLP-RDP alliance 23.8% (!6.9%) ; DLP 4.1% (10.8%) ; the Socialist Party (SP) O.6% (O.4%) ; Independent 1.0% (O.1%). The support of the
east for the SDPP and the alliance was II percent and 7 percent higher than the
national average respectively. Eastern Turkey thus concentrated its vote on two
parties and consequently created a sensation and uneasiness in national politics in
the 1991 election. Especially, the southeastern provinces along the border with Iraq
and Syria articulated their political demands through their support for the SDPP and
the PLP. The 22 deputies who originally belonged to the PLP were elected on the
SDPP ticket from these provinces. While their presence in the Assembly aroused
"the apprehension that they would endanger unity of the country," it was also the
"the unanimous view of the Turkish press that feudal chain of voting has been
broken and replaced by conscious and politically-motivated votes" in southeastern
"for Turkey the first time in republican history."ieO
A coalition government was formed by the TPP and the SDPP. Therefore,
despite strong opposition frorn the rightist parties, the deputies of the PLP also
participated in the coalition. This striking fact strengthened hope in a peaceful
116
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior ef Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
"legal solution in the southeast, and they were expected to function as a outlet to the
problems there."iS' Yet the hope proved to be transient when the PLP acted too
hastily and provocatively. At the oath-taking ceremony in the Assembly, two PLP
deputies, Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle, used Kurdish and protested against forcing all
the deputies to take the oath in Turkish. An uproar in the Assembly and an
"outburst of irrational Turkish nationalism throughout the country" followed.i82
Zana and Dicle were expelled from the SDPP in January 1992, and the PLP withdrew
from the coalition government in March. Soon after the incident, the prosecutor of
the Ankara State Security Court indicted the PLP for separatist activity. The PLP
was finally forced to dissolve in 1993. The Democracy Party (DEP) was founded as
a successor to the PLP and accommodated almost all members of the PLP. However
it, too, was closed down in June 1994. The deputies belonging to the DEP were
deprived of parliamentary immunity and sentenced to capital punishment.i83
Although their sentence was reduced to 3 to 15 year prison terms at the end of 1994,
"conscieusly it was a tragic consequence of the vote of the southeast that was cast
and with political motivation for the first time in republican history."
Conelusion
"there Serif Mardin shrewdly points out that is an element in Turkish political
culture to which the notion of opposition is deeply repugnant." This notion is based
on the Ottoman tradition in which the imperial political system can be described as
'Oriental corresponding to Wittfogel's Despotism' and the official state religiQp,
"the "the Islam, frowned on rnost minute deviation from orthodoxy" and reinforced
'true idea that there was only one way'." Intolerance of deviance was not confined
'ruling only to the institution' at the center but also prevalent among the masses of
"there periphery. He suggests that seems'to be a feeling among the Turks that
reality consists of discrete units each with its allotted place in a closed structure."
Opposition parties have Iong been subjected to the accusation that they attempt to
"divide the Turkish nation." Mardin states that this accusation represented ir-
"divisiveness-anxiety" "cynical rational and was often used as a pretext for the
"rational elimination of the opposition," rather than arousing arguments against
factionalism and fractiousness."i8` Some of the PLP deputies defied this
"divisiveness-anxiety" rooted in the Turkish society. Although the liberal circles in
117
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
politics and the press as well as the moderate faction of the PLP (later the DEP)
"political tried to find the grounds for having their presence accepted as a factor in
a democratic solution for the troubled region,"iS5 the harsh measures taken by the
government crushed the last hope.
We can apply William Hale's argument of particularlism and universalism to
"the the election results in the east in 1991. That is, poiitical developmental process"
"stretch can be seen in the east to over a space."i86 The provinces in the northeast
and the upper southeast where tribal politics were stM prevalent can be regarded as
`primitive' areas which remain in the particularlistic stage of the political develop-
mental process. Some central eastern provinces where the Sunni-Alevi sectarianism
was the decisive electoral factor seem to have almost eliminated tribal politics. Hale
"what says that appears to be involved in the universalistic element,... is the
individual's membership of or links with bodies not restricted in their scope to
particular kinship groups or religious communities and concerned primarily with the
regulation and articulation of their members' interests in the broader political
"universalistic" arena,"'8' The southeastern provinces attained this level of Political
consciousness in the 1991 election. Thus they reached the final ideal stage of the
`evolutionists' "the political developmental process as the envisaged, However
"in regulation and articulation" of the interest of the people in the southeast the
broader political arena" was not the perfect political and social integration into the
`center' national system which the elites in Turkish traditional had expected the east
to attain eventually.
As long as the ethnic, religious and social of the east continues to exist as
such, one manifestation of this fragmentation or another is likely to continue to be
`evolutionists' a major factor in national politics, Miscalculation by the and the
center-elite will often recur unless Turkish politics free itself of its extreme
divisiveness-anxiety, repugnance of opposition and low tolerance of deviance. The
procedure by which the PLP (then DEP) was ostracized from Turkish society was
by and large similar to that which had occurred in the past, It was a sad failure for
not only the people of the southeast but also Turkish democracy.
l18
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavier of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
Notes[Introduction]
"Center-Periphery 1.Serif Mardin, Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" in thlitical thrtcipation in Tharkel': Histon'cal Backg7ound and Present thoblems, eds., Engin D. Akarli and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: The Bogazigi University Printing OMce, 1975), 7-32.
2.Mardin, 25.
[Chapter I] 3. 7ZiTkipe istake-stde Yilligz (Statistical Ybarbook of 7-2trke}V 1oo0 (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics of Turkey), 1. Several schemes of regional breakdown have been used in Turkey. IIowever, the one used here seems te enjoy wider currency among both
schelar$ and the Turkish census administrators.
"Regional 4.Paul Magnarella, Voting in Turkey," 7-Vze Muslim PVbrld t')7 (3 and 4 1967): 231-232. These provinces are Erzincan, Erzurum, Agri, Kars, Urfa, Mardin, Hakkari, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Mus, Bing6J, Diyabakir and Tunceli. 5.A number of writers have commented upon the evident tendency of the Turkish government to minimize the numbers of minorities, especially the Kurds. Nezan
C`Kurdistan Kendal, in Turkey," in A People wrthout Cottnti:y--TVie Kunts and Ku7distan, ed, Gerard Chaliand (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993), 39. Kendal says when he asked their mother tongue during the 1965 census in which he participat-
"destitute ed, slum-dwellers who knew not a word of Turkish weuld answer heavily:
`Better " put Turkish, we don't want any trouble.' 6.The linguistic cemposition of Artvin is typical of the Black Sea Region, Rize Province adjacent to Artvin has the same ethnic ancl Iinguistic compositien as Artvin: Turkish 98.2%, Laz 1,7%.
"Patron-Client 7.Ayse Kudat, Relations: The State of the Art and Research in Eastern Turkey," in flolitical lkrtimp' ation in Tbeiileev, 81-86. Kudat enumerates the eastern provinces in which conspicuous clientelistic mobilization was seen in the 1969 general election, Those ptovinces are Gaziantep, Urfa, Marag, Van, Elaz]g, Tunceli, BingOl, Mus, Hakkari, Mardin, Adiyaman, Hatay, Diyarbakir and Malatya. 8. Genel Nitfats Skeyzmz: IVtijttsun Sosyal ve Eleonomth iViteliklen', 24. 10. 19as [Census of RoPulation: Social and 1[ltonomic Characten'stics of PoPulation], (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1969). 9,Turkish censuses had contained the question about religien until 1965, Muslims had been put into one category while Christians and Jews had been distinguished by the
denominations, such,as Catholic, Gregorian, Orthodox and Protestant. IO.Peter Alford Andrews, ed., Ethnic G,z}mps in the RqPublic of Tharkey, (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), 57, 117, 124.
"10% 11.Andrews, 56. of population as a minimum, with claims of 30-40%, i.e. from 4. 5 million to 18 million in 1980." Another estimate is made by David McDowall, Tlze
119
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
"there Kornts: A Arbtion Denied, (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1992), 57: are
over 3 million AIevis, in eastern and south-eastern TUrkey, of whom over one-third are Kurds."
12.Eastern Anatolia here means both the Northeastern and Southeastern Anatolia
Regions in the table 1.
13 .J.C. Dewdney, 7'hrrkay: An introducto,:y Geagmphy (New York: Praeger, 1971), 197- 204,McDowall,
14151617 54.
Dewdney, 133, 194-196.
Dewdney, 175, 182.
[`Armenia," M. Streck, (E.I, 1), article in Enc),clopaedia of lslam, FVrst Edition, 439- 440,.V.
"Kurds," 18 Minorsky, (E.I. 1), article in Enayclopaedia of fslam. FVrst Edition, 1134,
1136 1139.
"Kurdistan," 19.V. Minorsky, (E.I. 1>, article in Encyclopaedia of lslam, iFVrst Edition, 1130..Claude
20 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Thrrkay: A General Survay of the Material and SPin'tual Czalture and Htsto7y, c. 10Zl-1330 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1968), 38, 148, 290,
2122Cahen, 154-155, 211-215.
.Cahen, 143'144. Paul Wittek,7-7zeRiseof theOttoman Empire (London:The Royal
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1958), 29.
23.Neman Itzkowitz, Ottoman E7mpire and lslamic Thradition (Chicago: The University of
Chicago' Press, 1972), 9- 10,
242526Itzkowitz, 11,
Itzkowitz, 11-27.
"Kurds," E.I. 1, 1142. Martin van Bruinessen, Ag)ha, Shaifeh and the State: T72e Sociag
and Political Structures of Kuntistan (London: Zed Books, 1992), 137-138. 27 .Matti Moosa, Elxtremist Shiites: 7he Glaulat Sects (New York: Syracuse University
Press, 1988), 36.
"AIevi" 28.The term is sometimes used to denote a wide variety of Shiite and sufi orders.
"Bektas," "Kizilbas," "Alevi" For instance the religious distinction among and is very
ambiguous and the denotations of these three words are interchangeable (Moosa: 37).
Howeyer it is uncertain that the formation of the Alevi sect was simply a result of
Safavid or Kizilbag infiltration in eastern Anatolia. Long befere the arrival of the
Safavid, Anatolia had been a haven of various sufi erders including some extreme
form of Shiism that were brought in by the Turcoman ghazis since the battle of
"the Manzikert (Moosa: 16). The Alevi faith is dercribed mixture of Shiite Islam, Persian Mazdeism, Christia'nity and possibly central Asian ideas adopted by the Turcoman and Kurdish tribes (McDowall: 57-58)." Besides, the Alevi faith might
contain to seme extent indigenous elements adopted from the Christians in Anatolia,
especially Armenians.
120
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
2930 Itzkowitz, 30-[33. van Bruinessen, 138u145. van Bruinessen, 157-161. Sir Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, lsldmic Sociely and the Pli2?st: A Study of the imPact of PVlastem Civili2ation on Muslim Cultblre in the Near East (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 160-163. IIalil Inalcik, T7ze Ottoman
EmPirer TVie Cldssical Age 1300-1600 {New York: Praeger, 1973), 105-107.
3132Gibb and BovLTen, 164.
According to Justin McCathy, the smaller Eastern Christian sects of eastern Anatolia
were of two types: those whe were originally Monophisite and those originally
Nestorian. Both groups had split into smaller sects, such as Chaldean Uniates, Syrian
Uniates, Jacobites, along lines of aMliation with Rome. Justin McCathy, A4uslims and Minonties: 7Zze IbPulation of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the EMPire York[ New York University Press, 1983), 104-105.
33 van Bruinessen, 66-67, 105-107, l61-173. Charles Issawi, T72e Economic Histo7y of Tbt7doay 1800-19J4 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 66-67.
3435van Bruinessen, 175-176.
Ibrahim Pasha ef Egypt was granted the governorship of Damascus and Aleppo as the
result of the first Ottoman-Egyptian War of 1831-1833 in which Ibrahim advanced and
occupied up to Konya. The VLrar was begun by Mehmet Ali of Egypt who resented
Mahrnud II's rejectic)n of his request for Syria as a reward for the expedition to Greece.
"The 36 van Bruinessen, 176-177. Nezan Kendal, Kurds under the Ottoman Empire," in
A Reople Without Counti:y, 18-20.
37383940It was the second war between Mehmet Ali of Egypt and Mahmud II in 1839.
van Bruinessen,177-182. Kendal, 20-22.
van Bruinessen, 224 234.
Stanford J, Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Histo7), of the Ottoman Empire and Modem Tletrkayr vol. 2. T7ze Rise of Mbde,7z TZirkay 1808-197?5 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977), 31-32, l82-191.
4142Shaw and Shaw, 115-117.
"The Stephen Duguid, Politics of Unity: IIamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia,"
Middle Eastem Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 1973): 145. 43 van Bruinessen, 185-186, Robert Olson, The E"ieigence of Ku7dish AJlritionalism 1880 1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 7-15.
44 Loise Nalbandian, Tlie Anuenian Revolutiona7:y Adovement (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1963), 104-110.
45 In 1864, by a new Law of Vilayets, new large provincial units (vilayet) replaced the
older historic eyalets. The law remain effective to the encl of the Empire ancl beyend
(Lewis: 121) (Shaw and Shaw: 89). "A 46,Nalbandian, 120-122. Robert Melson, Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian
Massacres of 1894-1896," Compavative Studies in Society and Htstoay, vol. 24, no. 3
(July 1982), 487-488.
121 ' NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanA..oCi..t,iA.Eladi Association for MNd.l{IEaitggS6tudiesMiddle East Studies
47 Nalbandian, 122--126. Melson, 488-489,
48 Melson, 489,
49 Shaw and Shaw, 314-316. Ronald Grigor Suny, Loofeing 7bu:ard Ara7zit: Auaenia in
Modern thstory {Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 109-115.
50 McCarthy, 121.
51 Shaw and Shaw, 324-326.
52 Paul C. Helmreich, F)fom llaris Tb Sewres (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1974), 298,
53 Kendal, 34.
54 Lewis, 242-252. Shaw and Shaw, 340-35e.
55 Shaw and Shaw, 356- 357.
56 Lewis, 254.
57 Shaw and Shaw, 376.
58 Lewis, 252.
59 Zaza is one of the Kurdish dialects spoken in eastern Turkey. Another prevalent one is Kurmanji. They are said to be unintelligible to each other.
60.van Bruinessen, 278-291. McDuwall, 36-37. Kendal, 51-54. Gerard Chaliand, 7-)l)e
Kuntish Tbeqgedy (London: Zed Books, 1994), 36-37.
61 Olson, 102-106.
62 Lewis, 266.
63 Kendal, 54-58. McDowall, 37-38. Chaliand, 37-39.
64 Shaw and Shaw, 376-377.
[Chapter II] ``The 65.Cem Erogul, Establishment of Multiparty Rule: ]945-71," in 7letrkay in T)ransi- tion: Arew fempectives, ecls., irvin C, Shick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987), 102-le3.
"Postauthoritarian 66 . Ergun Ozbudun, Democracies: Turkey," in Competitive Elections in
Devegoping Countn'es, eds., Myren Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun (Durham; Duke Univer- sity Press, 1987), 337. 67.Feroz Ahmad, 7the Mtiking of Modem Tberkay (New York: Routledge, 1993), 107. `LA 68.Howard A Reed, New Force at Work in Democratic Turkey," 7)Jie Middle ELzst foumal, vol. 7, no. 1 (Winter 1953), 35. "Postauthoritarian 69.0zbudun, Democracies: Turkey," 342.
70.The seat allocatien in a constituency was decided by populatien. If its population was less than 55,OOO, it should elect one deputy. One additienal seat was allocated for each addtional 4(],OOO inhabitants. Thus the number ef seats in the Assembly had to be qdjusted upwards, to cepe with the population increase, from 487 in 1950 to 610 in "The 1957. William Hale, Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politics," Intema- tional Llbumaal of Middle Etist Studies, vol. 2 (1980), 402.
71.Ahmad, 116.
122
NII-Electronic LibraryMbrary Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eustern Turkey (Natsume)
72 Feroz Ahmad, Tlie 7"hrrkish llxPen'ment in Demociucy 1950-1975 (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1977), 133-136.
7374Ahmad, 71he Making, 113-]14.
"The .Kemal H. Karpat, Turkish Elections of 1957," PP'2stem Political Qmarterly, XIV, no. 2, (June 1961), 451.
75 This party was originated in the Nation Party banned by the DP governrnent in 1954.
Its leader, Osman Bdlifkbasi, reconstituted it as the Republican Nation Party in 1954.
Later it merged with the Peasants party and acquired this name. This party re-
presented the most conservative and religious sector of the political spectrum in this
period (Magnarella, 228).
7677Ahmad, 711ie Thr7:leish Eltl)en'ment, 233.
"Particularism William Hale, and Universalism in Turkish Politics, in Aspects of ' Modern Tberkay, ed,, William M. IIale (New York: Bowker, 1976), 51. "Kurdistan 787980Kendal, in Turkey," 66. Chaliand, 7';lze Kurdish T)fcrgecb,, 45. '217. Erogul, 126. Ahmad, TZze Tletrkish ErPeriment, 216
"Ieft The proclamation of of center" led a split of a rightist wing from the RPP. The dissidents led by Turhan Feyziogulu founded the Reliance Party in May 1967.
81 , It reestablished by Osman Bdltikbagi who left the RPNP with a group of deputies in
1962. The remaining elernents of the RPNP was taken over by ex-Colonel Arpaslan
TUrkes who became the party leader in 1965. Under TUrkes's leadership the RPNP changed not only its name (to the National Action Party, NAP, in 1969), but also its
character, The NAP's ideology combines an ardent nationalism and anti-communism
with strongly etatist policies (Ozbudun, Social Change, 56-57).
"The 8283Hale, Role of .the Electoral System," 406.
"tThe Jpseph S, Szyliowicz, Turkish Elections: 1965," Middle East lbumal 20 (1966), ' 477,
8485Ahmud, T;l2e Mdeing, 143. Erogul, 133-135.
"Aspects Erogul, 135. William M. Hale, of the Turkish General Electien ef 1969,"
thddle Eastem Studies 8 (1972), 393,
86 The remaining one candidate was Necmettin Erbakan, ex-JP member, a professor of Istanbul Technical University and the president of the Union of Chambers of Com-
merce and Industry, elected from Konya. Erbakan founded the National Order Party
which represented Islamist Right in 1970,
"Aspects," 878889909192Hale, 402. 0zbudun, Social Change, 57.
Erogul, 135-137.
Ahmad, 77ze Making, 148.
Ahmad, T;Vte Tbe,oleish Empen'ment, 246-248.
Ahmad, 7-;lte Making, 158,
"Changing Usttin ErgUder, Patterns of Electoral Behavier in Turkey," Bagaxivi
(Jitiversitesi Dergisi (:Sosyal BilimieO, vols. 8-9 (1980-1981), 46.
93 Erglider, 50.
I23
NII-Electronic LibraryMbrary Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMESMiddle No.11 1996
"The 94.Sabri Sayari, Turkish Party System in Transitien," Covernment and (:ipPqsition 13 (1978), 47-48, Ahmad, 7-;he Mahing, 158-160, Ergun Ozbudun and Frank Tachau,
"Social `Critical Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a Realignment'?," International Middle East Stzadies 6 (197'5), 472-473. 95 ErgUder, 68, . 96 When the term of aga 1 agha is used in relation to eastern Turkey, it generally means a rich landowner and a patron. Agiret bay is simply the leader of a tribe (agiret). Shethh is a Ieader of a sufi order in the eastern Turkish and Kurdish context. Lale
"Kurdish Yalcin-Heckmann, Tribal Organization and Local Political Processes," in Tha"leish Socieijt Tberkish Slate, eds,, Andrew Finkel and Ntikhet Sirman (New York: Routledge, 1990), 290.
"Politics 97 Feroz Ahmad, and Islam in Modern Turkey," Middle Eastem Studies, vol. 27, no. 1 (January 1991), 11, 98 Serif Mardin, Regigion and Social Change in Modern Ttzrkay: T7ie Case of Bedii'z- 2aman shid IV2trsi (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 159-160.
"The 99 Mardin Religion, 158-159. Sencer Ayata, Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework," in 7';he Pblitical and Socioeconomic Tvantijiornzation of Turkev eds., Atila Eralp, Muharrem TUnay and Birol Yegilada (Westport: Praeger,
1993), 55. 100 6zbudun and Tachau, 463-464.
101 Ahmad, 7';fze Mdhing, 166.
102 Ahmad, 7'72e Maleing, 169. Michael M. Gunter, TZie Kunls in 7hrrkqy: A Pblitical
Dilemma (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 33. 103 Sin6e the proportional representation system was introduced in the 196] election, the percentage of the seats dominated by the RPP and JP was the following: 1961, 73.6%;
1965, 83.1%i 1969, 88.7%j 1973, 74.2%.
104 Gunter, 33. 105.0zbudun, Combetitive Elections, 351-352.
106 Ahmad, Tite Making, 180.
107 Ahmad, 7'lte Mdking, 184.
108 The Average is calculated by dividing the tetal number of votes cast in that district
by the number of seats to be allocated in the same district. This was amended in 1987; now in those censtituencies where six deputies are elected the average is found by dividing the total number of valid votes by five and not by six. UstUn Ergttder and
'`The Richard I. Hofferbert, 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns," in Slate, Democraay and the Mililary.' Tbtrkay in the 1980s (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 83,
109 Ahmad, T7ze Maleing, 187.
"Ideology, 110 AyEe Ayata, Social Base, and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980
Political Parties," in TZie POIiticat and Sbcioeconomic TVrantYZ)maation of Thrrke),, 33.
"The 111 Feroz Ahmad, Turkish EIections of 1983," Merip Roports 122 (1984), 9. John H.
124
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
"Civil-Military McFadden, Relations in the Third Turkish Republic,'' 77ze Middle Edst foumaal, vol. 39, no, 1 (Winter 1985), 81.
112.Aype Ayata, 35,
'`Islamic ll3.Ahmad, 7-;ifze Maleing, 203-211. Mieko Natsume-Ono, Reassertion and Its
Social Background: Turkey in the 1980s," Middle EZist Studies of .laPan 13 (August 1993), 3-6.
114.Ayse Ayata, 37,
115.Ayse Ayata, 34.
116.The NSP's share ef the vote in the east in the two elections in the 1970s was 16.1%
(11.8%) in 1973 and 6,7% (8.6%) in 1977 (its share of the vote in all Turkey is put in parenthesis).
117.Ayse Ayata, 45.
118.Gunter, 71-91. McDowall, 43-48.
"Kurdish 119.McDowall, 48-50. Conference leads enly to confusion," Bn'ofng 758,
October 23, 1989.
120.Karpat, 448-451,
121.Ergun Ozbudun, Sociag Changes and hlitical ,PkerticiPation in Tlatrke3, (Princeton:
``The Princeton University Pres$, I976), 41-53. Frank Tachau, Republican People's Party, 1945-1980," in Politicat thities and Democracy in 7"2trkay, eds., Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1991), 105-I06.
122.Tachau, 106.
123.Magnarella, 229-234, 277-286.
124.Kudat, 81,
`CPolitical 125.0zbudun, Participation," 35.
"Political 126.Kudat, 81-86. Sabri Sayari, Patronage in Turkey," in thtrons and Clients in Medite7runean Societies, eds., Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duck- worth, l977), 107-110.
"Party 127.Arnold Leder, Competition in Rural Turkey: Agent of Change or Defender of
Traditional Rule?,'1 Middte Etzstem Studies 15 (1989), 95. "Political 128.0zbudun, Sociat Change, 97-151. 0zbudun, Participation in Rural Turkey,"
in ]Political lhrticipation in Tharkay, 33-60.
"Particularism," 129,IIale, 41.
"Aspects 130.Hale, of the Turkish ElectiQn of 1969," 397-398.
131.Yargm-Heckmann, 307.
132.Yargm-Heckmann, 289-312.
133,Jacob M. Landau, Pblities and lslam: 7he Aiiztional Salvation llarty in Tharkay (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Printing Service, 1976), 31-34.
134 . Szyliowicz, 478.
135.0zbudun and Tachau, 469.
[Chapter III]
125
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMES Ne.11Studies1996
136137138139140141Ahmad, TV2e Mething, 193, 198.
[`Towards an early election," Briofng, 27 March 1989,
Bn'ofng, 5 August 1991,
Ahmad, TVlre Meiking, 200-202.
McDowall, II4-120.
"Move to free Kurdish has international objectives," Bn-ofng, 4 February 1991.
"Language freedom to herald democracy drive?" Bn'qfing, ll FebTuary 1991.
McDowall, 52, Chaliand, 7)Pze Kuntish T)ragedy, 43.
142143144McDowall, 48.
"No denial on reports that Ozal contacted Tarabani," Bn'ofng, 25 February 1991.
`tTalabani affair overshadows Soviet tour on eve of US talks," Bn'ofng, 18 March 1991.L'ANAP
145 in candidates crisis as oppesition keep up the pace," Bn'ofing, 30 September "Preference 1991. voting here to stay despite the criticisms?'' Bn'eYing, 4 November 1991.McDowall,
146147148 50.
Demirel a step ahead of Ozal at the shep-window stage," Brieling, 9 September 1991.
t`GUneydogu'cla RP'ye tepki bUytiyer: Secimi boykot karari," Cumh"mpet, 1 October 1991."Campaign
149 pitches left against Ieft and right against right," Briofng, 16 September 1991."Ecevit'e
`haydi 150151 gtile gUle'," Cu,nh"mpet, 9 Octeber 1991. Statistical Ylrarbook of Tbtrkay 1990 (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics of Turkey),
191, 440.
"Chronology: 152153 Turkey," T7ze Middle EZist foumal, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1991), 332-333.
"Ciller plan sparks off intensive debate on economic policy," Brie}fing, 16 September 1991."Party
154155 promises and the demands of the electorate," Bn'ajing, 7 October 1991.
"What the main parties are proposing: the economic alternatives at a glance,''
Briqfing, 7 October 1991.
"Erbakan's 156 vision: Islamic harmony and a cleansed society," Bn'ei7ng, 14 Octeber 1991.Sencer
157158159 Ayata,.52.
``Islamic Ahmad, Reassertion," 761. The victims were Prof. Muammer Aksoy, chairman of the Turkish Justice Associa- tion; getin Emeg, journalist of the Htzni et newspaper; Turan Dursun, journalist of the thibine Dakru magazine; and Bahriye Ugok, the SDPP executive board member. ･ "1990 victims of terror," Bn'Eptng, 7 January 1991. 160 ismet G. imset, 7V2e PKK-A Rer)ort on Soparattst Violence in Tttnleay {Ankara: The
Turkish Daily News, 1993), 121-127,
``Sonug 161 tek basima RP'nin degil," Cumhurdyet, 27 October 1991.
126
NII-Electronic LibraryMbrary Service JapanJapanAssociation Association forforMiddle Middle East Studies
Voting Behavior ef Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
``Politics 162,Andrew Finkel and William Hale, and Procedure in the 1987 Turkish
General Election," in Tberkish State, TbtnE]ish Societ-y, 124-125,
163,"ANAP bifyifk kentlerde keyifli," Cumhuriyet, 23 October 1991.
"Bati'nin 164.Finkel and Hale, 125-126. g6zdesi DYP," Czamhumpet, 23 October 1991.
"SHP'nm 165.Finkel and Hale, 125. kaleleri dtistU," Cumhumpet, 24 October 1991.
"Uglti 166.Finkel and Hale, 126. ittifakta 1977 tablosu," Cumhurlyet, 25 October 1991.
`LDSP ]67.Finke] and Hale, 128. Zonguldak'ta oy kaybetti," &tmhzan'yet, 23 October 1991.
168.Ayse Ayata, 39, 44. Finkel and Hale, 126.
"ANAP 169."ANAP, gUnegte kalan dondurma gibi,'' Cumhun'yet, 3 October 1991.,
siliniyor; SHP ve ittifak atakta," Cumhurt},et, 6 October 1991.
170. Cumhun'yet, 6 October 1991.
171."ANAP tig kentte de gidici," Cumhadyet, 8 October 1991. 172.``insan haklari segimden 6nde," Cumhumpet, 12 October 1991.
`seyyar 173,"Segim igin mini karako]'," Cumhttmpet, 9 October 1991,
174. Cumhurlyet, 9 October 1991.
'`Migration 175.McDowall, 52. and village guard system call for attention," Briofng, 26
ttTurkey's March 1990. Briajing, 15 July 1991. Aliza Marcus, Kurds After the Gulf War: A Report from the Southeast," in A PeoPge nVthout a Count7s,, 238-240.
"Sonucu 176,'`Verdigimiz oylar nasil geri gelir?" Cumhumpet, 11 October 1991.. Ktirt
oylari belirleyecek," Cumhumpet, 10 October 1991.
177,"ANAP tikandi, SHP ve DYP yansiyor," Cumhumpet, 7 October l991.
178. Cu7nhun:yet, 10 October 1991.
179.`'Gtineyde sol oylar fark atiyor," Cumhunlyet, 20 September 1991.
180."Demirel inherits a growing war and a politicized society," Bn'ofng, 28 October 1991. 181 ,"inOnti trip highlight$ the SDPP dilemma," Bn'ofng, 14 May 1991.
,182."Nationalist uproar spreads after oath-taking incident," Briofng, 11 November 1991.
183."Government adopts military thinking despite spattering of appeals for common
sense," Bn'q7ing, 15 November 1993.
[Conclusion] "Opposition 184.$erif Mardin and Control in Turkey," Government and (ipPosition, vol. 1,
no. 3 (April 1966), 379-385. 185."DEP under pressure to take moderate line," Bn'ofng, 13 December 1993.
"Particularism," 186.Hale, 41.
"Particularism," 187.Hale, 40.
127
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies
AJAMES No.11Studies1996
Table3:Share of the vote and seats won by in general elections (195Q-1969yolitica]parties Parties 1950 1954* 1957 1961 1965 1969 VotingRate89.30/o88.60/o 76.60/o sl.oo/. 71.30/.64.30/.
JP 34.80/o,15852.90/o24046.50/o256
RPP 39.90/o69 34.80/o3040.60/e178 36.70/o17328.70/.13427.40/o143
RP 6.6%15
RPNP 14.oo/o54 2.20/oIl
RNP 4.8%- 7.0%4
DP 53.3%408 56.60/o49047.30/o424
FP 3.80/o4
PeaP o.6o/.5
NP 3.10/o1 6.30/.31 3.20/o6
NAP 3.0%1
UP 2.8%8
'TWP 3.0%14 2.7C/o2
NIXP 13.7%o65 3.70/o19 2.2e/.6
Independents 3.70/o9 1.5%10 O.1%L O.8%- 3.20/e1 5.60/o13
Source I Milletveleilive Cttmhun' et SenatosuLeyeten' SecimiSonuclar' (Ankara l State Institute of Statistics of Turkey, 1974) ' Injoinedofthe 1954 election, independent and the Peasant I'arty's (PeaP) deputies either DP or RPP after they were elected. Thus number of deputies the DP and RPP came to 503 and 31.
128
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociationfor Association for Middle East Studies ' Voting Behavior of Eastern Turkey (Natsume)
Table 4 Share ef the vote and seats won by political parties in general elections (1973-1991) Parties 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991* VotingRate 66.80/o 72s4% 92.3% 93.30/e 83.9e/. JP 29.80/o149 36.9e/.189 RPP 33.3%18or 41,40/o213
RRP 5.30/o13 1.9%3
DemP 11.90/o･45 1.90/.1
NAP 3.4U/o3 6.40/o16
NP o.6o/.-
NSP 11.80/o48 8.6t/o24
UP L1%1 o.4o/.-
TWP O.IU/o- 45.1%211 36.30/.292 24.oo/.115 MP 19..10/.59 27.oo/o]78 TPP 24.80/o99 2o.so/.88 SDPP 7.20/o- 16.90/o62 WP 8.50/o- lo.so/.7 DLP o.4e/.r sp 3o.so/.117 PP o.so/.` RDP 2.90/oi. NLP 23.30/o71 NDP
.7..50/o4 1.10/o- O.4%- o.lo/.- Independents 2.8%6
' In the 1991 election, WP, NLP and RDP forrned electoral alliance. The share of the votetheand seats gained by the alliancean are shown in the WP's row.
' 129
NII-Electronic Library Service JapanJapanAssociation Association for Middle East Studies AJAMES No.11 1996
[Source of the Table 4]
Miltetvekili Geapet Secimi Sonblclan (Ozet TtzblolaD 20. 10. 1991, {Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1992)
Z C. Resmi Gczaete no. 15971, 19 1hane 1977, (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1977) 7'Zixledye fslatistth Yillql?"z J971 & 1os1, (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1973 & 1981)
[AbbreviationS for political parties]
DP:RPP:PP:NP:PeaP:RNP:FP:JP:NTP:RPNPTWP:RP:NAP:UP:RRP;Demp:Democrat Party
Republican People's Party
Populist Party
Nation Party
Peasants' Party
Republican Nation Party
Freedom Party
Justice Party
New Turkey Party
: Republican Peasants' Nation Party
Turkish Werkers' Party
Reliance Party
National Action Party
Unity Party
Republican Re]iance Party
Democratic Party
NSP:MP:NDP:SDPP:National Salvation Party
Motherland Party
Nationalist Demecracy Party
Social Democrat Populist Party
TPP:DLP:WP:NLP:RDP:sp:PLP:DEP:True Path Party
Democratic Left Party
Welfare Party
Nationalist Labor Party
Reformist Democracy Party
Socialist Party
Peeple's Labor Party
Democracy Party
130
NII-Electronic Library Service
