Denaturalize, Expel, Refuse and Never Allow Them to Enter the Netherlands Again”

“Denaturalize, expel, refuse and never allow them to enter the Netherlands again”

Dutch Jihadist Fighters in Syria and Iraq:

Geopolitical Representations on the Role of Statehood in Parliamentarian and Media Debates in the Netherlands

Master thesis

Emi Suijk (12295256)

Master program Human Geography Track: Political Geography

Supervisor: Dr. Virginie Mamadouh Second assessor: Dr. Inge van der Welle

11 June 2019

Abstract

In the era of globalization, the global political framework on modern statehood, as established in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, became increasingly challenged by forces from above and below that seem to erode state power at a national level. As a result, the statehood became redefined as a powerful entity constructed by a set of tangible and intangible political practices and linguistic performances. The fixed and permanent character of state sovereignty, territory and citizenship is extensively addressed by the academic field of geopolitics. Scholars argue that the legitimacy of the state and enforcing political authority is framed by linguistic constructions on national value systems, perceptions and ‘territorial language’ as a domestic justification for international events and actions. In the academic literature, a lot of attention is paid to the recent cross-border phenomenon of Dutch jihadists travelling to Syria and Iraq to join Islamic State in their struggle for the establishment of a jihadist caliphate, and repressive trend in the adopted measures by the Dutch government. Unfortunately, there is a lack of geographical understandings towards this topic. Through content and discourse analysis, this thesis tries to contribute to a better understanding from a geographical perspective by unravelling the hidden debate on role of the statehood in the political and public debates on this topic. It demonstrates that the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates are fruitful sources for conceptualisations on sovereignty, territory and citizenship. The distinguishable narratives foster a ‘nationalization’ of the representation of spaces in which the dominance of the state scale shapes the Dutch statehood and its political community.

Table of content

1. Introduction 9

2. The contested statehood and geopolitical representations 12 2.1 Debates on the transformative statehood 12 2.2 Geopolitical representations on statehood 14

3. Research design 17 3.1 Operationalization of concepts 17 3.2 Study on the contextualization of the phenomenon 18 3.3 Parliamentarian and media debates 19 3.4 Analysis strategies 21 3.5 Limitations and constraints 22

4. Dutch jihadist fighters and the European and international context 23 4.1 International context 23 4.2 European context 25 4.3 Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and repressive policies 26

5. Parliamentarian debates 31 5.1 Development of the parliamentarian debates 31 5.2 State as repressive enforcer of national security 37 5.3 State as guarantor of the constitutional state and inclusiveness 39 5.4 State as a bounded territorial entity 42

6. Media debates 45 6.1 De Volkskrant 45 6.2 De Telegraaf 49 6.3 Similarities and differences in the Dutch media 52

7. Conclusion and discussion 55

8. Literature list 59

9. Appendices Appendix 1 – ICCT literature list 63 Appendix 2 - Overview of Dutch political parties in de Tweede Kamer 67 Appendix 3 – List of all search results of the parliamentarian debates 69 Appendix 4 – Codebook qualitative analysis 71 Appendix 5 – Ethical procedure and questions by the AISSR 72 Appendix 6 – Data on parliamentarian debates 73 Appendix 7 – Data on media debates 88

List of Abbreviations AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen en Dutch security service Veiligheids Dienst

CTC Counter Terrorism European Counter Terrorism Coordinator Coordinator

CvdRM College voor de Rechten Netherlands Institute van de Mens Human Rights

EVN Europees Verdrag Nationaliteit European Treaty on Nationality

ICC Internationaal strafhof International Criminal Court

ICCT Internationaal Centrum voor International Centre for Counter- Counter-Terrorisme Terrorism

IND Integratie en Naturalisatie Integration and Naturalization Dienst Service

NCTV National Coordinator Terrorisme National Coordinator Terrorism en Veiligheid and Security

OM Openbaar Ministerie Public Prosecutor Service

UNSC Verenigde Naties Veiligheidsraad United Nations Security Council

List of Dutch terminology

IS-strijder Term referring to a member, in particular a fighter, of Islamic State

Jihadganger Term referring to an individual travelling to foreign countries – in this context Syria and Iraq – for jihadist purposes

Jihadstrijder Term referring to jihadist fighter

Syriëganger Term referring to a jihadist – from the Netherlands or other western countries – travelling to Syria (and Iraq) for jihadist purposes

Syriëreis Term referring to a trip to Syria to participate in the Syrian civil war, mostly because of jihadist purposes

1 Introduction

“Leaving them there does not make us safe.

The debate about whether or not to actively bring back Dutch jihadists who are currently in Kurdish camps has flared up again in the recent weeks. The reason for this is the statement made by US President Trump who told the Europeans to repatriate their jihadists. There was also an interview with the jihadist Yago R. from Arnhem who indicated that he wished to return to the Netherlands with his family. A large majority of the public and the Tweede Kamer [Dutch House of Representatives] does not think it is a good idea to actively engage in helping those people to return. It is assumed that there is enough to do about the jihadists in our own country and that we should not include people like Yago as well. Leave them there, far away from the Netherlands. That sounds clear and safe, but it is short-sighted and unfortunately does not make us any safer.” (Bakker, 9 March 2019, De Telegraaf: Binnenland, p. 24).

Since the emergence of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, hundreds, nearly a thousand, of European jihadist sympathizers left their homeland to join such violent jihadist organizations (De Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014). After the collapse of the caliphate in 2017, policy makers started to warn more urgent for the potential surge of jihadist fighters that will return to their home country (NATO, 2017) – the so-called blowback effect (Vidino, 2014). This caused a lot of political and public anxiety and triggered a broad debate about the fate of these individuals, like the abovementioned example, which was recently published in the Dutch media, shows. Although multiple studies found that only a small minority will eventually return home (De Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014), those returnees are often perceived as potential threats because they will carry out terrorist attacks in their home country and disrupt the social cohesion either within or around European Member states (NATO, 2017). The terrorist attacks on a Jewish Museum in Brussels and on the headquarters of the satiric newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris in May 2014 and January 2015 respectively carried out by returnees from Syria confirmed these fears. As a result, there was pressure increased on European leaders to act upon forceful measures to fight such threats (De Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014; Reed et al., 2015). Despite the fact that European countries have an extensive set of measures consisting of both preventive (soft) and repressive (hard) measures, Reed et al. (2015, p. 7) identified “a slow but steady move towards more repressive measures”. With the fall of the caliphate and the feared return of jihadist fighters, debates towards this phenomenon and the adopted approaches further intensified because of the growing fear for more returnees. In the academic literature as well as in policy-related research documents, there is unfortunately a considerable lack of geographical understandings towards this specific topic. The existing literature mainly focuses on historical examples (de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2014), psychological questions on the who and the why (Weggemans et al., 2014; Bakker & de Bont, 2016), or moral and legal challenges and constraints in policy concerning repressive measures (Carey, 2018; Barry & Ferracioli, 2015; Solow, 2011). In many respects, terrorism and counter- or anti-terrorism policies are related to geographical issues and geography provides very

valuable alternative perspectives on such topics (de Blij, 2012; Flint, 2003; Bahgat & Medina, 2013). More specifically, jihadist fighters and the repressive measures against them have a strong link with the subdiscipline of geopolitics, which tackles issues on policymaking, geopolitical discourses, international relations, boundaries and power structures (Mamadouh, 1999; de Blij, 2012). This exploratory research will demonstrate that the debates on the phenomenon on returning jihadist fighters and the adopted measures are fruitful sources for geopolitical representations on the perceived threat rising from the phenomenon and, more specifically, the role of the state in the adopted pre-dominantly repressive measures towards these individuals. To do so, this research focuses on the Dutch case study considering it is an interesting case because of its significant number of jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq compared to its size (Bakker & de Bont, 2015), and the multiple forceful measures and actions the Dutch government adopted towards this perceived security threat (Vidino et al., 2014). The aim is to unravel both the obvious and underlying geopolitical representations of the role of the state in the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates about Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the repressive measures. This is translated in the following main question:

“How are geopolitical representations on the role of statehood manifested in the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates on Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the adopted repressive measures?”

A geopolitical perspective on this particular topic is of interest because since the emergence of increasing globalization the importance of the nation state as political entity is being stressed by several geographers. They mention the ongoing process of the erosion of the state in which the power of the state is shifted to on the one hand local authorities and on the other hand supranational institutions and internationally operating multinationals and non-governmental organizations (Murray & Overton, 2015, pp. 171-174). Hence, statehood is being re-addressed as an abstract construction performing power through political practices and performances in order to enforce legitimacy and power (Mitchell, 1999, p. 89; Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 17). The principles on which the state traditionally based its legitimacy – sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship – became problematized for their value to define statehood and the existence of the national state. By discussing one of the most recent and much-discussed international developments and phenomenon of jihadist fighters, this thesis aims to contribute to a better academic geopolitical understanding on the role of the state in a shifting framework of national and international power relations. It moreover provides a valuable and innovative addition to the already existing literature on jihadist fighters in social and political sciences by discussing the phenomenon through a geographical lens. The societal relevance of this topic is that it contributes to a better understanding of the Dutch context and debates occurring in relation to the jihadist fighters leaving the Netherlands to fight for terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. By using a specific case study, the national context can be better unravelled and identify case-specific challenges and possible recommendations regarding the geopolitical representations of the Dutch statehood and how these are produced and distributed in this particular case. This thesis starts with a discussion of the debates in the field of political geography on the changing nature and geopolitical representations of statehood. The third chapter informs the

reader about the methodological choices on content and discourse analysis as well as the sampling for the analysis of the parliamentarian and media debates. Chapter 4 goes deeper into the Dutch case-study and the European and international context in which the developments and debates should be understood. Chapter 5 and 6 focus on the parliamentarian and media debates respectively, discussing the most important differences and similarities across the identified narratives on the role of the state. The seventh and last chapter discusses the main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis in the preceding chapters arguing that this topic has potential for possible further (geographical) research given the ongoing recent events and debates.

2 The contested statehood and geopolitical representations This chapter elaborates on the debates in political geography on the contested nature of statehood under the influence of globalization processes and the geopolitical representations through which a state is performed or practised. The aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework in which this research is positioned, and which forms the theoretical basis for the analysis of the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates.

2.1 Debates on the transformative statehood In the academic literature on statehood, there is a lot of literature on the geopolitical debate on the transformative statehood which is discussed clearly by Agnew (1194; 1999; 2005) and Behr (2008) among others. The emergence of the modern statehood and the international system of nation-states found its establishment through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Murray & Overton, 2015, p. 163). In this traditional framework, modern states were seen as static and bounded entities (Agnew, 1994; 1999; 2005) and their foundations based on three interrelated principles: sovereignty, territory and the political community. Firstly, sovereignty is claim for the highest political authority without being questioned, challenged, or fought (Behr, 2008, p. 361). In case of the state, such sovereignty claims mean the political control over collective goods (e.g. security of infrastructure) (Agnew, 1999; p. 500). Moreover, it includes the capability to act through legislation and institutions and thus also consists of the legal and institutional framework through which the state is capable to control and maintain power (Agnew, 1999, p. 500; Behr, 2008, p. 362). Although a sovereignty claim is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient in itself since the state must be able to define the scope of its sovereignty: over what and whom sovereignty is claimed. So, the second principle is the political space or territoriality of the state and comes forward from the spatial context after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in which state sovereignty is respected and is reduced to territorial units (Agnew, 2005, p. 446; Behr, 2008; p. 361). Here, state sovereignty is understood as “the absolute territorial organization of political authority” (Agnew, 2005, p. 439). Behr (2008) discusses the central functions of border as demarcation and protection of the state’s territory. The state derives its existence from these borders as they do define the political space over which the state claim sovereignty. In this traditional view, territoriality is often argued to be the most important, although insufficient claim in the strategy to exercise state power (Behr, 2008; Johnston, 2001, p. 684). Thirdly, it is also important to discuss over whom the state is claiming political authority. In this political discourse, state sovereignty is about the central power of the state and whether the state has the ability to “make commands that are voluntarily complied with those over whom the state claims authority” (Agnew, 2005, p. 439). In the notion on modern statehood, this refers the political community or the legal citizens of the territorial state. According to Agnew (1999, p. 513), citizenship is an important element of the state its territorial sovereignty as it presents the states monopoly over a territory by defining and enforcing citizenship. Moreover, Forcese (2014, p. 555) even argues that the treatment of individuals through citizenship and the additional legal rights has always been the monopoly of states and their power to in- and exclude or discriminate against individuals in their rights and liberties. Additionally, Behr (2008)

mentions the importance of integration as a key element that holds the political community together.

However, this conventional notion of the national statehood became increasingly challenged by globalization processes resulting in increasing cross-border phenomena. Agnew (1999; 2005) challenged the territorial ‘trap’ or ‘fever’ in which state sovereignty is understood and argues that we should rethink the territorial political space of the state and its sovereignty. Political power and sovereignty are no longer necessarily territorially bounded and became also understood as fluid, cross-border flows (Agnew, 2005). States now have the ability to exercise their power in various places which vary in their geographical reach and political power and should, therefore, not be reduced to territory (Agnew, 1999, p. 501). Although the ‘realists’ remain positive about the role of state sovereignty as it will remain a central regulatory role in the global political relations, the ‘modernizers’ argue that the role of the state becomes further eroded by forces from below and above (Murray & Overton, 2015, p. 171). Especially larger territorial units will reduce state power: these include supranational (political) organizations as the European Union or even international blocks like the NATO. Because of this, Behr (2008) acknowledges that the function of territory and borders should be re-addressed as rather ideological and socio-psychological functions but contrarily, he retained the concept of sovereignty which is based on territorial notions because “the study of global politics, especially for the analysis of security issues and conflict, has to focus on those arenas where transnational conflicts emerge and where state and transnational violent actors encounter each other.” (Behr, 2008, p. 363). Moreover, besides sovereignty and territory, the idea of a political community became further problematized due to migration and the possibility of dual citizenships (Agnew, 1999). Citizenship became more differentiated and globalization even raises questions over cosmopolitan citizens and transnational actors (Behr, 2008), which problematize the state’s monopoly to regulate citizenship. Consequently, the state has to fight even harder to control and impose restrictions on rights of citizenship to maintain their exclusive position as territorially bounded political entity (Agnew, 1999). These developments have resulted in new ways of how statehood should be understood. By the end of the 20th century, the concept of the state became re-addressed by Mitchell (1999, p. 89) and others as an abstract construction with a powerful set of political practices instead of a specific body or political authority or put simply: as an effect of practices. Hansen & Stepputat (2001, p. 17) further elaborate on this idea of the state as a fictional entity which involves multiple performances in policing and controlling territorial boundaries. According to Müller (2012, p. 382): “the state itself creates a heterogeneous, socio-material assemblage that secures its power and thus becomes more than the sum of its parts”. In short, the state is a performed construct (Björkdahl, 2018) which consists of multiple tangible and intangible practices at different levels of society to secure legitimacy and enforce political authority (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). The next section discusses geopolitical representations on statehood and its legitimacy based on sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship.

2.2 Geopolitical representations on statehood Debates about statehood and questioning the fixed and permanent character of state sovereignty and citizenship based on territoriality is extensively addressed by the subfield of geopolitics. Flint’s (2011, p. 31) definition of geopolitics implies the central role of states: “The practice of states controlling and competing for territory. [...] geopolitics, in theory, language, and practice, classifies swathes of territory and masses of people.” Flint (2011) continues that the competition over territory is closely linked to geopolitical representations; how we see the world, thus imagined geographies. Geopolitical representations are part of research towards critical geopolitical discursive practices on codes, visions, imaginations and representations (Dijkink, 1998; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006). Geopolitical representations should be understood as a set of non-verbal (pictures), semi-verbal (iconographic) and verbal (words and texts) practices (Dijkink, 1998, p. 297). Using these different geopolitical representations creates overall geopolitical storylines, discourses and narratives. Critical geopolitics consists of critical approaches to (foreign) policy and stresses the importance of language of such practices. From around the 1990s, critical geopolitics has made an important contribution to geography as an approach to investigate geopolitical discourses (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 124). The main aim of critical geopolitics is to challenge the ‘organized totality’ and unravel how politics of power are exercised (Ó Tuathail, 1994 in Müller, 2012). Moreover, key to these discursive struggles is the emphasis on the human construction and change and/or continuity (Dijkink, 1998; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006). Foucault’s (2007) work made an important contribution to geopolitics. The Foucauldian notion on productive power, either the relationship between power and knowledge (Foucault, 2007) remain a central issue in geopolitical representations. Power is constantly produced and thus creating knowledge of spaces that are imbued with power. Here, sovereignty is not understood as a given, but rather as a production involving multiple forces which are manifested in concrete and historical frameworks (Foucault, 2007). Critical geopolitics is involved in the geographical knowledge and representations to naturalize power and problematize spaces of power (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006). Shortly summarized, Flint (2011, p. 35) describes it as: “Contemporary geopolitics identifies the sources, practices, and representations that allow for the control of territory and the extraction of resources.” The approach of geopolitical representations can be distinguished in three different domains: formal geopolitics: the academic field; practical or applied geopolitics: the domain of foreign policy and politicians; and popular geopolitics: the domain of popular realm and mass media (Mamadouh, 1999; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006). Furthermore, Müller (2012) argues that the production and circulation of geopolitical knowledge on statehood arises from a complex combination of geopolitical human and non-human actors that work together in stabilizing and ordering to maintain power. Both political elites (practical geopolitics) as well as the media (popular geopolitics), among others, play an important role in the production of geopolitical narratives (Müller, 2012). Additionally, by acknowledging the role of individuals and organizations in geopolitical ordering, one should also be aware that these practices do occur in — while simultaneously shaping – a specific social and geographical context. This context is not merely an optional background, but rather a constitutive element in geopolitical representations by different actors (Müller, 2012, p. 386).

The national or the state level on geopolitical representations on power is a much- discussed topic. Dijkink (1998) argues that there can be a national vocabulary or discourse identified to make international events and policy more understandable and acceptable to the domestic audience. These discourses are based on national value systems and perceptions. Mamadouh & Dijkink (2006) additionally argue that states use geopolitical representations as a domestic justification for international events and/or actions or as part of a national identity strategy. Language, here, is a representational force to control and regulate people. Especially important to geography is the territorial language which relates to national feelings, unity and identity and sustains the representation of a bounded sovereign state which controls its political community effectively. Häkli (2001) identified the dominant tendency to take a state-territorial definition of society for granted – with some exceptions – and introduces a geographical perspective in structuring the production of knowledge of society and statehood. He refers to what Agnew (1993) calls the ‘nationalization’ of the representation of spaces in which the dominance of the state scale shapes the state and its society. These state-centred orders are inscribed in spaces, both materially as discursively (Novak, 2011). Put shortly: “Whereas the premodern state had porous frontiers and lacked the means to effectively regulate social life, the modern state organizes its practices, defines its sovereignty and population territorially, and imagines itself as a territorial unit.” (Häkli, 2001, p. 412). Strikingly, Novak (2011) argues that these state-centred discourses, and especially based on territoriality, are extremely flexible and are challenged by processes on other scales but the national one (urban, regional or global), but that the national level remains the most appropriate scale in geopolitical representations and language towards contemporary phenomena.

The example of returning jihadist fighters to European countries and the adopted repressive measures is just one of the many examples related to the shifting framework of national, supranational and international power relations and the contested role of the national state because of increasing globalization. Although this phenomenon is relatively small in its size, it has a great impact on national, supranational and international security issues and received great attention in practical and popular geopolitics. By discussing this recent example of a cross-border phenomenon in the Dutch context, it discovers how geopolitical representations on statehood play a role in the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates on the role of the state towards Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the repressive measures. The main question is: “How are geopolitical representations on the role of statehood manifested in the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates on Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the adopted repressive measures?”

After studying the theoretical background on debates on statehood and geopolitical representations, the following sub questions can be drawn up which will help to find the answer to the main questions. First, in accordance to the statement by Müller (2012), the context in which the debates occur are important to understand why some things are being said or written and to illustrate the Dutch case study we are dealing with. Moreover, it takes the role of supranational and international organizations into consideration as they become increasingly important in the geopolitical framework for international relations (Murray & Overton, 2015).

The first part of this research is based on the following questions: 1a. “What kind of repressive measures does the Dutch government adopt towards returning jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq?” 1b. “What is the role of the European Union and the international context in formulating Dutch policies towards returning jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq?”

Secondly, it became clear from the theoretical study that the role of the state is traditionally based on three principles: sovereignty, territory and citizenship. Hence, the conceptualization of these principles forms the fundamental basis to understand how the role of statehood is presented throughout debates in practical geopolitics (parliamentarian) and popular geopolitics (media). This results in the following research questions for the second part of this research: 2a. “How is the role of the state conceptualised through sovereignty, territory and citizenship in the Dutch parliamentarian debates?” 2b. “How is the role of the state conceptualised through sovereignty, territory and citizenship in the Dutch media debates?”

From the theoretical framework, it can be concluded that the debates and geopolitical representations on the transformative statehood based on the principles of sovereignty, territory and citizenship became increasingly challenged through globalization processes. The cross- border phenomenon of Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the repressive measures further challenge the role of the transformative statehood in the modern era. The next chapter discusses the research design of this thesis to provide an answer to the problem statement.

3 Research design The aim of this research is to illustrate the Dutch policy and the additional parliamentarian and media debates towards repressive measures against returning jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq. This research is meant to provide a geographical or geopolitical perspective by discussing how the role of state is presented through the conceptualization of sovereignty, territory and citizenship in these debates. It concerns an exploratory research from a geopolitical perspective on this particular topic concerning desk-research and qualitative methodologies. In this chapter the operationalization, methodologies, the research sample and the analysis strategies are outlined.

3.1 Operationalization of concepts Through operationalizing abstract constructs from the problem statement are converted into concrete and researchable entities. Statehood plays an important role in this research, but it is a difficult concept to measure. Because this thesis involves a qualitative research, it is chosen to focus on themes to describe the statehood which are based on the theoretical discussion in chapter 2. The modern statehood is characterized by three interrelated principles: sovereignty, territory and citizenship. These themes are in itself also abstract constructs which deserve more attention and the operationalization of these concepts are therefore structurally outlined in table 3.1. Furthermore, there are other important methodological choices to mention with regards to concepts and definitions. Firstly, in the academic literature, scholars frequently use the term ‘foreign fighter’ to refer to the phenomenon of conflicts attracting individuals that lack citizenship or any other kind of kinship with the competing parties (Hegghammer 2010; Malet 2010 and 2015). However, for this thesis it is preferred to use another terminology, because from a Dutch perspective there is little foreign about the ones returning to the Netherlands since they are officially Dutch citizens. Furthermore, the only way in which ‘foreigners’ are created is through the Western framework on state and citizenship. In this case, about 70 percent of the fighters are originally born in Muslim countries in North Africa’s Maghreb or the Middle East or the (grand)sons of immigrants originating from these Muslim countries (Schmid, 2015, pp. 3-4). So rather we should rather name them based on their common religious background and shared agenda to join jihadist-inspired terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq: jihadist fighters (see e.g. Bakker & de Bont, 2015). Secondly, the approach towards (returning) jihadist fighters is characterized by both preventive (soft) and repressive (hard) measures. The soft measures are aimed at preventing individuals to become jihadist fighters and the reintegration of returnees through the involvement of a very diverse organizational structure including schools, families and local communities (Vidino et al., 2014). This thesis focuses on the repressive side of the adopted measures, because of the central role of the government and government institutions. The repressive measures include both administrative measures – revoking citizenship and imposing entry bans – and measures within the criminal justice sector – extraterritorial prosecution resulting in long prison sentences (Vidino et al., 2014). It is, however, possible that both repressive measures as well as soft measures are used interchangeably in policies and debates, because both measures are often used as complementary strategies to address the phenomenon

(Vidino et al., 2014). During the data collection and analysis, such combinations must have taken into account, because the one does not exclude the other.

Table 3.1 Operationalization of the principles to define statehood Concept Dimension Theme/indicator Sovereignty Political authority The right and ability to rule over collective goods and public “a claim to authority” order without the interference of others (Agnew, 1999; Haynes, (Haynes, 2001, p. 144) 2001). Aspatial understanding on Legal and The legal and institutional structure of the state apparatus which statehood (Johnston, 2001) institutional is shaping the functionally of the state (Agnew, 1999; Behr, framework 2008).

Territoriality Borders and In the traditional sense, the main function of borders is the Geography: “a portion of bordering practices demarcation and protection of the state (Behr, 2008), which space enclosed by boundary makes the state a territorially bounded space. lines” (Gottman, 1973 in Johnston, In critical writings, borders became re-examined as “legal, 2001, p. 683) security, socio-psychological and ideological functions that would constitute the construction of political space” (Behr, Political geography: “A 2008, p. 364). material, spatial notion Relational Territory must also be seen in its relation to others: as a establishing essential links differentiator between the internal (domestic) and external between politics, people and (foreign) (Behr, 2008; Johnston, 2001). the natural setting” (Gottman, 1973 in Johnston, 2001, p. In the era of globalization, territory became increasingly 683) connected to other territories at different scale levels. Johnston (2001) is therefore working towards a theory of inter- territoriality in which a mosaic of states is operating in a non- fixed international system by constantly being restructured from forces from multiple directions and dimensions. Citizenship Legal status The legal status of being a state citizen amounts to a set of “The formal link between a (political) rights, duties and privileges, or “the rights to have rights” state and the class of (Forcese, 2014, pp. 555-556). In practice, this legal status is individuals that most closely acknowledged by having an official identification document. identified with that state” Political identity Citizenship is also an identity or expression of membership to a (Forcese, 2014, p. 555) (social/cultural) political community (Kymlicka, 2003). All actors of the nation are integrated by shared norms, values and political practices (Behr, 2008), which makes integration a key element for the political community.

3.2 Study on Dutch policies and the European and international context The first part (1a and 1b) discusses the Dutch case study towards returning jihadist fighters and adopted measures as being a contextual framework in which the parliamentarian and media debates are occurring. The aim of this study is to examine the phenomenon in the Dutch context and outline the Dutch policies and measures considering the European and international developments and legal frameworks. The answers be found are based on a literature study which proves to be highly valuable for shaping contextual data. The documents used are policy reports and research papers by the ICCT1. This independent organization “conducts policy-

1 International Centre for Counter Terrorism in The Hague

relevant and evidence-based research while aiming to provide practical and solutions-oriented policy recommendations. Research areas include comparative analysis of counter-terrorism policies, strategies and interventions, country and regional analyses, the foreign fighter phenomenon and forward-looking trends and threats analyses.” (ICCT website, n.d.). The issue on jihadist fighters is one of the main topics of interest of this organization and is, at the time of writing this research, counting over sixty publications on this topic since 2013, varying in topic and perspective. The literature list of the analysed policy reports can be found in Appendix 1.

3.3 Study on parliamentarian and media debates The second study (2a and 2b) addresses the questions of how the role of statehood is discussed in the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates on returning jihadist fighters and repressive measures. Because of the deconstruction of geopolitical representations and the exploration spatial concepts, this study belongs to the field of critical geopolitics. This approach views language as a powerful tool to make politics, policies and symbols that can shift the power- relations and that words define how one looks at particular phenomena and policies (Hajer, 2006). The used methodology for this study is content analysis to unravel both obvious and less obvious expressions of power, explore patterns for using concepts and make comparisons over time (Boréus & Bergstörm, 2017). It is an approach to “systematically break-down, categorize and the content of texts” (Boréus & Bergstorm, 2017, p. 24). Essentially, content analysis consists of both a quantitative and qualitative approach in which the former is concerned with counting and describing what is explicitly there (raw data) and the latter is a method for systematically describing the meaning of the texts (Boréus & Bergstorm, 2017, p. 24). They argue that these methods are not necessarily different in kind but in degree, and it is very useful to use both as complementary elements. One of the disadvantages of content analysis is that it is poorly suited for studying the underlying implied meanings of words or themes (Boréus & Bergstörm, 2017). Additionally, discourse analysis focuses on the framing and the meaning of certain words and studies the ideational aspects in texts. Political discourse analysis investigates how an object of study is constructed in linguistics. It is therefore not necessarily method- or theory driven research, but a problem-driven approach based on some general questions as how it is conceptualised, how and why it is sustained, and when or how it has changed over time (Glynos et al., 2009). This approach questions encountering entities in social life as fixed and argue that politics of power are essential to its formation. Political entities like states can be conceptualized through particular discursive structure: “In short, whilst objects clearly ‘exist’ independently of any particular discourse, their meaning and significance for situated subjects - and how they are engaged with - depends on these discursive articulations” (Glynos et al., 2009, p. 8). As discussed in the theoretical framework, states are constructed entities imbued with power (Häkli, 2001; Foucault, 2007) and through geopolitical representations on statehood throughout the debates the underlying interpretation on how statehood is linguistically constructed can be identified.

The research entities consist of two samplings of the Dutch parliamentarian (practical geopolitics) and media debates (popular geopolitics). The Dutch parliament is composed of two chambers: the Eerste Kamer (Senate) and the Tweede Kamer (House of representatives); together the Staten-Generaal. The main task of the Tweede Kamer is to control and formulate new legislation, before it is reviewed by the Eerste Kamer (TweedeKamer.nl, n.d.). The composition of representatives in the Tweede Kamer is determined by an electoral system of proportional representation of the different political parties over the 150 seats in the chamber. This means that there is no ruling absolute majority resulting in the formation of a coalition of the political parties with the – in theory – largest number of seats in the chamber. The ruling government is comprised of Ministers and State Secretaries who are member of the parties in the coalition. They are responsible for the formulation and implementation of legislation in the Netherlands. The remaining parties together form the opposition (Parlement.com, n.d. a; b; c). The political parties in the Tweede Kamer are characterized by a varied range of both ‘traditional’ liberalist and socialist parties (e.g. VVD and PvdA) and relatively new left- progressive or extreme-right populist parties. A detailed description of the political parties can be found in Appendix 2. The documents selected for the first part of this analysis are from the website of the Tweede Kamer which contains all reports and additional documents of the parliamentarian debates. The keywords used were, on the one hand, the broadly used term for ‘jihadists’ (jihadisten in Dutch) to describe individuals who pledge their allegiance to terrorist organizations as Islamic state and, on the other hand, Dutch terms for describing the phenomenon of individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq: Syriëgangers, jihadgangers, jihadstrijders, IS-strijders. This yielded a total of 37 results including plenary debates, oral questions, general political considerations and budgets. The use of the different key words eventually resulted in saturation which creates a final list of the search results (Appendix 3). Strikingly, all parliamentarian debates using these key words took place from September 2014 onwards. This already implies that the debate about jihadists was fostered by the developments in Syria and Iraq. However, because of the scope of this thesis, it is impossible to include all 37 results. For the final selection of the debates the following criteria were taken into consideration: the theme/topic of the debate and its relevance to Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and repressive measures; the involvement of a large number of political parties to ensure as comprehensive analysis as possible; and ensuring the best possible distribution over time. After a short orientating analysis based on these criteria, it became clear that the plenary debates are the most valuable documents for this research. Strikingly, there has not been any major plenary debate in 2019. Hence, to avoid creating the impression that the debates have come to an end, the oral questions of February 2019 are also included. This resulted in a final list of six documents for the analysis of the parliamentarian debates (table 3.2). This sampling strategy may cause some serious biases in the data which will be reflected upon on the discussion. During this time period under research, there has been a shift in the political relations regarding the composition of the coalition and the opposition: from November 2012 to October 2017, the PvdA and the VVD were the coalition with 79 seats of out 150; from October 2017 until recently, VVD, CDA, D66 and CU are together with 76 seats the coalition (Parlement.com; n.d. d).

Secondly, critical geopolitics is also interested in texts and discourses in popular geopolitics (mass media). Müller (2012) argued that in addition to the political elite, the media also play an important role in the production of geopolitical narratives. In order to identify if there is any overlap between the fields of practical and popular geopolitics in terms of discussed themes, developments, or references to each other, it is chosen to use the same time periods in which the parliamentarian debates took place. The same key words for selecting the parliamentarian debates were used in Nexis Uni2 to create a selection of the media debates. Since there is a wide range of available newspapers, two were selected for this particular analysis. The two selected newspapers are De Telegraaf and De Volkskrant, because both are positioned in the top-3 newspapers with the largest circulation and highest numbers of subscribers throughout the Netherlands (Stimuleringsfonds voor de Journalistiek, 2018). Therefore, it is assumed that these newspapers will reach the largest audience in the country. Moreover, these newspapers are chosen because of their position in the Dutch media landscape and different perspective in the editorial content. De Telegraaf is a general, ‘popular’ newspaper which audience is composed of people from different classes in society (Bakker & Scholten, 2011), in particular by adhering a conservatist perspective and populist writing style. De Volkskrant is originally a pillarized catholic newspaper and targeted at the higher educated part of the Dutch population. In general, De Volkskrant is one of the ‘quality newspapers’ in the Netherlands. (Bakker & Scholten, 2011). The differences between both newspapers may be interesting to their perspectives on returning jihadist fighters and the adopted measures. In total, De Volkskrant published 37 articles and De Telegraaf published 39 articles. See Appendix 7 (table 1) for the full list of the newspaper articles used for the analysis. Because there were little to no references between the parliamentarian and media debates, the debates are discussed separately in different chapters.

Table 3.2 List of selected parliamentarian debates for analysis Date Title debate (in English) Type debate 04/09/2014 Approach to Dutch jihadist fighters Plenary debate 26/02/2015 Revoking Dutch citizenship after terrorist offences Plenary debate 27/01/2016 Returning Dutch jihadist fighters and infiltration by ISIS in the refugee flow Plenary debate 23/02/2017 AIVD-report: Dutch returnees Plenary debate 12/06/2018 Syrian IS-fighter in the Netherlands Plenary debate 19/02/2019 D66 asks for the statements of President Trump on the release of IS-prisoners Oral questions

3.4 Analysis strategy The analysis of texts is a step-by-step and cumulative process (Boréus & Bergstörm, 2017). For the quantitative analysis in the content analysis, data matrices are used to fill in the ‘raw data’ on descriptive information and counting results. The analysis of the qualitative data is characterized by the following process: 1) the exploration phase for finding words and themes interesting to the subject matter through open coding, 2) specification phase in which the researcher looks for structure by ordering the codes and identifying similarities and differences between the assigned codes by axial coding of themes, and 3) the reduction phase in which the

2 Research database for newspapers

broader scope of the narrative(s) within the debates is formulated (Baarda et al., 2013). To effectively go through these different phases, the computer program Atlas ti proved to be an efficient tool for coding, structuring and analysing data. The codebook for qualitative analysis, obtained by open coding, can be found in Appendix 4. Because the language of the texts is written in Dutch, the quotes used in chapter 5 and 6 are translated into English. This may affect the accuracy of the texts, but it is necessary to present the results in the most convenient manner. The original Dutch texts can be found in Appendix 6 (table 12) and Appendix 7 (table 2). Moreover, the names and abbreviations of Dutch (governmental) organizations and institutions are translated and, if necessary, explained in the footnotes.

3.5 Constraints and limitations The main advantages of doing desk research on secondary data and discourses analysis are that a researcher does not have to depend upon informants, as well as its flexible character to employ on all kinds of documentation (Boréus & Bergstörm, 2017). However, any research has multiple practical, analytical and ethical constraints and limitations. A practical constraint of this research is the time-consuming content analysis of the chosen parliamentarian and media debates, among which some with a significant volume. To ensure the feasibility within the time- scope for this research, a selection of the research entities has to be made. Consequently, this results in analytical constraints regarding the sampling and generalization of the outcomes since relevant and interesting documentation are excluded from the analysis to guarantee feasibility. The assumptions made from the analysis only apply for this particular case study in this specific time slot. Finally, there are no major ethical issues which should be taken into consideration. See Appendix 5 for a detailed elaboration on the ethical procedures and questions. A final note is the positionality of the researcher as a geographer and human-being. As England (1994, p. 244) argues, research is not a product, but rather a process which is also influenced by the positionality and interpretation of the researchers when making geography. Although as objective as possible, throughout this research, some choices, assumptions and interpretations are made based on the researcher’s positionality (based on personal characteristics as age, origin, political preference etc.). It is not the intention to represent a (political) perspective, nor is it desired to criticise one or another’s opinion towards this particular topic. Moreover, the researcher has no personal connection to the topic of Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq when it comes to religious background and friendly or familial ties to individuals involved in the phenomenon – neither with Dutch jihadists nor political or professional relationships. As a geographer, it is in the interest of the researcher to present a valuable yet underexamined perspective – a geographical one – to an extremely recent and contested phenomenon in Western countries nowadays.

In this chapter, the research design for the content analysis on the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates were outlined. It moreover included the operationalisation for the most important concepts to define statehood which are the fundamentals for the content analysis. Prior to that, and as earlier explained in the theoretical framework, the context must be examined to understand in which the developments and debates occur. The next chapter outlines the results on the literature study on the ICCT reports to illustrate the context, followed by an extensive elaboration of the debates on the phenomenon and the Dutch statehood.

4 Dutch jihadist fighters and the European and international context

This study consists of an exploration of a Dutch case study on the approaches towards returning jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq and the context in which these developments occur. Based on a literature study of policy-analysis reports by researchers linked to the International Centre for Counter Terrorism, the following questions will be answered: “What kind of repressive measures does the Dutch government adopt towards returning jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq?” and “What is the role of the European Union and the international context in formulating Dutch policies towards returning jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq?”. Since it is important to understand the context in which the parliamentarian and media debates occur, this study aims to provide a concise, yet informative context. It is important to mention that the policies towards jihadist not solely focus on the repressive side, but they are complemented by ‘softer’ preventive measures focused on integration and rehabilitation of (returning) jihadists. However, because this thesis focuses on the repressive side of the approaches, this remains the focal point of this chapter. Detailed references to the reports can be found in Appendix 1.

4.1 International context The events in Syria and Iraq are seen as the important catalyst for the increasing number of jihadist fighters from all over the world joining terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. Initially, it was assumed that the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 was an isolated, domestic conflict as part of the Arabic spring. However, the combination of unstable political circumstances, state failure, the Syrian civil war and the repression of the Sunnis by the Shiite government in Iraq resulted in the rapid emergence of Islamic State since 2014 (Schmid, 2015a; 2015b) which officially proclaimed a caliphate in Syria and Iraq on the 29th of June in 2014. Schmid (2015) argues that the rise of Islamic State must be understood as the product of the will to establish a bigger Islamist movement across the world following the US-intervention in Iraq in 2003. Through the convenient use of the cross-border cyberspace, Islamic State has attracted an unprecedented number of foreign jihadist fighters compared to the past (Schmid, 2015). Because of the Syrian civil war, followed by the rise of Islamic State and the interference of an international coalition, the continuing violence resulted in the so-called European refugee crisis from which, according to Eurostat, the highest number of migrants in 2015 came from Syria. Mehra (2018) states that Europe has experienced the highest number of asylum seekers from Syria and Iraq; 339,000 applications from Syria and 156,000 from Iraq between January and October 2017. This refugee crisis became an important issue in the case of returning foreign fighters since it has been framed as a ‘free pass’ for terrorists to enter the EU (Reed & Pohl, 2017a), fearing this new wave of returning foreign fighters3 who have received more “training for covert operations, more are battle hardened, and more may be part of a network of individuals that IS established in Europe to assist with and engage in attacks” (Dawson, 2018, p. 4).

3 Scholars often make the distinction between the first generation European jihadist fighters – who left their home country to fight for violent Islamic organizations in prior conflict, such as Afghanistan or Bosnia – and the recent (second) generation – the ones that travel to Syria and Iraq to join Islamic State or other jihadist movements (Dawson, 2018).

By the end of 2016 and 2017, several experts reported the steady deterioration of the Islamic State losing territorial grounds (Mehra, 2016; Reed & Pohl, 2017a; 2017b), pointing out the possibility of a higher number of returnees. By the end of 2018 and begin 2019, international armed forces and the Kurdish army reported the last strongholds of Islamic State are under attack and expected a soon decay of the self-proclaimed Caliphate. However, several scholars warn that this should not be considered as the end of jihadism. The Islamic State project is just one of the many chapters in the history of jihadism and has further contributed to the existing networks and a global jihadist movement (Clarke, 2018; Coolseat & Renard, 2018), and not forgetting the existence of a virtual caliphate (Dawson, 2018).

Besides the international development, there are also two international binding agreements that appear to be important for the formulation of (supra)national policies towards returning foreign fighters: 1) UNSC4 Resolution 2178 presented and adopted on 24 September 2014 and 2) the Convention of the reduction of statelessness from 1961. The first serves as an integral tool for national and multilateral foreign security presenting a more balanced response through combining repressive and preventive approach (Global Center, HSC & ICCT, 2014, pp. 2-3). Most importantly, the resolution includes several legal and criminal law related implications, such as the requirement to criminalise the (attempt to) travel for the purpose of terrorist aims; perpetration of terrorist acts, training, financing or recruitment. States should moreover actively prevent the travel of terrorist through border control and the confiscation of travel documents (Global Center, HSC & ICCT, 2014, p. 9; Reed et al., 2015, p. 8; Mehra, 2016; Paulussen & Pitcher, 2018). However, because of the unclear and inconsistent definitions of foreign (terrorist) fighter and no concrete set of tools and measures (Global Center, HSC, ICCT, 2014, p. 14; Paulussen, 2015), there is room for fragmented interpretations and implementations resulting in incomplete and far from uniform legislative updates across Europe (Mehra, 2016). Moreover, it received a lot of criticism by human rights organizations for being too broad in their definitions and lack of attention for the human rights system (Paulussen & Pitcher, 2018) by referring to the ‘ever-expanding national security state’ – especially in Europe – pointing out ‘legislative fever’ and administrative measures as dominant guidelines (Paulussen, 2018). Secondly, the Convention on statelessness prohibits revoking citizenship if it results in statelessness (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 18). Nationality is considered as a fundamental human right, because it is the foundation for the acquisition of other human rights (Global Center, HSC and ICCT, 24 December 2014, p. 11). Revoking citizenship can thus only be achieved under the condition of dual nationality. This international agreement is a guiding principle in the formulation of Nationality Acts worldwide.

The Syrian civil war is also an interesting case regarding international humanitarian law. Although the Syrian civil war is officially a non-international armed conflict, in which the ICC5 is not (yet) involved, international humanitarian law still applies through, for example, national jurisdiction on the principles of territoriality (a crime committed on a state’s territory) or active

4 United Nations Security Council 5 International Criminal Court

nationality (citizenship status) (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 10; Paulussen, 2013). In the realm of the decay of the Islamic State and the post-conflict situation, Mehra (2017; 2018) discusses both possibilities related to the question of how and where to bring European jihadist fighters to justice. The most convenient option is to prosecute the crimes committed by jihadist fighters based on the principle of territoriality by the national courts of Syria and Iraq, if there is a well- functioning legal system in the post-conflict landscape, which may be somewhat troublesome conditions in this case (Mehra, 2017). Alternatively, jihadist fighters can also be prosecuted by European national courts based on the principle of active nationality – a criminal offence is committed by individuals with their nationality status, either extraterritorial prosecution– or passive nationality – a criminal offence against their nationals (which is rarely done in the case of jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq) (Mehra, 2018). Moreover, national courts may also rely on the universal jurisdiction in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but this is rarely done because of the difficulty to investigate and prove international crimes to be committed. Therefore, Mehra (2018) currently identified a worldwide tendency to prosecute jihadist fighters by the ordinary national terrorism laws.

4.2 European context By the end of 2013, the number of jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq from European origin was estimated to be between 1,100 and 1,700. Most of them are from Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and France (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 2). In 2014, this number was already updated to 1,900 Western Europeans out of a total of 11,000 individuals across the world (Hennessy, 2014). In January 2015, the Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence indicated that the flow of Western Europeans travelling to Syria is increasing at an alarming rate, mentioning that nearly one fifth (4,000) of the total number of foreign jihadist fighters (20,000) have a European nationality (Paulussen, 2015; Schmid, 2015b), mostly with an immigration background (Schmid, 2015a). These numbers are significantly higher compared to other historical cases (Schmid, 2015b). The impact of the phenomenon on European societies is examined by Bakker & De Roy van Zuijdewijn (2015) and they argue that, although the incidents which involve European (returning) jihadist fighters are relatively small and sporadic, the impact of jihadist terrorism and jihadist fighters on European public and politics is very large. This resulted in attempts on a European level for a decisive and all-encompassing counterterrorist approach towards returning jihadist fighters which is part of the broader European counter-terrorism strategy. This European counterterrorism strategy is based on four pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond – either the PPPR prism (Boutin et al., 2016, p. 11). In 2013, the issue of European jihadist fighters was for the first time highlighted by the EU CTC6 and resulted in a series of 22 proposals to tackle the phenomenon. The CTC, Gilles de Kerchove, is the key figure in recommending policies on counterterrorism and improving communication between EU and third countries (Boutin et al., 2016, p. 11). Besides several bodies, the two EU agencies Eurojust and Europol provide legal and intelligence assistance in investigating prosecutions to the Member States. In May 2013, he stated the following:

6 European Counter Terrorism Coordinator

“We have to make sure that the 27 Member States have, in their criminal book, a specific offence of going abroad for the jihad, for training purposes, how to fight, so we are working on it. Just share experience on how you start an investigation, when you start an investigation, and a prosecution. Balance the use of criminal sanctions and administrative sanctions. You may decide to freeze assets. You may decide to expel radical preachers. You may decide to withdraw social benefits. So, these are non-criminal sanctions, but which may have some impact. […]” (G. De Kerchove, Council of the European Union, Brussels in Bakker et al., 2013, p. 7).

Besides the institutional framework and opted strategies by the EU, Paulussen & Pitcher (2018) also point out the European legal framework. The European Directive on Combating Terrorism was formulated based on the wish to design a holistic, less fragmented way to address the jihadist fighter phenomenon in the EU. Most importantly, this proposal asked for the criminalisation of terrorist-related offences (receiving training for terrorism, travelling abroad for terrorist purposes, facilitating travelling or financing for terrorism). The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism – Additional/Riga Protocol is the only supranational legal instrument which is referred to in the EU Directive on Combating Terrorism. This additional protocol requires the Member States to ensure the implementation and application of the criminal offences while respecting the human rights (Paulussen & Pitcher, 2018, pp. 7-8). This is in response to the UNSC Resolution 2178 of September 2014. Moreover, the protocol also requires some deliberation on the principle of proportionality respecting the legal aims and their necessity to protect the democratic society while excluding any form of discrimination, racism or arbitrariness (Paulussen & Pitcher, 2018, p. 8).

Despite the efforts to work on a more coordinated response towards the European jihadist fighter issue (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 7), the primary responsibility of tackling terrorism and jihadist fighters lies at the individual Member States – the national level (Boutin et al., 2016, p. 11). The European policies are mainly limited as a guideline which results in fragmented approaches across the different Member States. Even though on paper the European countries rather focus on the preventive side of counterterrorism, practice shows that the repressive measures still dominate approaches towards jihadist fighters (Paulussen, 2015; Reed et al., 2015, p. 7). Some argue that administrative measures in the European Member States are highly considered as ineffective, counterproductive, risk exportation, merely symbolic and violating fundamental human rights (Boutin, 2016; Paulussen, 2016). Hennessy (2014) calls for better cooperation on the European level to challenge this cross-border phenomenon. Yet, the report by Wensink et al. (2017) showed that there are still major obstacles to be overcome in terms of European cooperation on counter terrorism strategies.

4.3 Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and repressive policies The phenomenon of Dutch jihadist fighters is not a new one. However, with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the rise of terrorist organization Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the amount of Dutch jihadist fighters increased more rapidly than ever. In the spring of 2013, the ICSR7 reported that 107 Dutch individuals had travelled to Syria (Paulussen, 2013). Partly

7 International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence

because of these numbers, the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security raised the threat level in the country from limited (2) to substantial (3) (on a scale of four levels) in the autumn of 2013 (Bakker et al., 2013). According to the NCTV8 in November 2015, these numbers had increased to 220 individuals that have left for jihadist purposes, of whom 40 returned, 42 were killed in battle, and around 140 remaining in Syria or Iraq. Compared to the number of legal Dutch inhabitants, these numbers are relatively high. Many scholars have examined the causes of motivation for young Dutch men and women including religious, ideological and personal motivations. Paulussen (2015) and Reed & Pohl (2017a) add the problematic political climate in the home countries as counterproductive in preventing and challenging the phenomenon, while mentioning the statements from right-wing politicians, rising populism and anti-Muslim sentiments. Paulussen (2015) refers to the anti-Islamic statements of politician Geert Wilders and also the statement by the Dutch Prime Minister Rutte (saying that Dutch jihadists in Syria and Iraq could rather die in the conflict zone than coming back to the Netherlands), that had provoked a lot of criticism (Coolseat & Renard, 2018).

Although the Dutch approach towards jihadists claims to be characterised by a combination of preventive and repressive approaches, the Dutch government appears to have an extensive toolbox of criminal judicial measures. In the spring of 2013, the then Minister of Justice and Security, Ivo Opstelten, introduced a variety of measures, of which the provision of article 134a of the Dutch Criminal Code, which criminalised “participating in armed jihad or jihadist training abroad” (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 18) including preparation and recruitment, was the most important one. This provision has led to the conviction of Mohammed G. and Omar H. on 23 October 2013, which was likely the first conviction of alleged Syriëgangers in Europe (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 19; Paulussen & Pitcher, p. 13). These two men, however, have never been to Syria and were solely convicted based on their intention to travel to Syria using ordinary criminal law provisions (Paulussen, 2015). Nevertheless, the spokesman of the OM9 referred to these cases as a legal precedent that clarified the fact that it is illegal to travel to Syria and which would help in future prosecution of alleged Syriëgangers (Bakker et al., 2013, p. 19; Paulussen, 2013). Importantly, this already took place before the UN Resolution 2178 in 2014. In December 2014, Maher H. was found guilty by a Dutch court of preparing murder crimes with terrorist intent while being in Syria (Global Center, HSC & ICCT, 2014, pp. 13- 14; Reed et al., 2015, p. 9). Perhaps the most controversial case in the Netherlands was that of Laura H., a female fighter who was convicted for planning and facilitating terrorist attacks (Mehra, 2018). Convictions like those of Maher H. and Laura H. were based on the active nationality principle meaning that “foreign courts [in this case The Netherlands since the criminal offences were committed in Syrian of Iraqi territory] can assert jurisdiction on the condition that a criminal offence is committed by their nationals.” (Mehra, 2018). Finally, trails in absentia are recently more frequently used in the Dutch jurisdiction. In February 2017, the OM has announced that they will start with criminal investigations against all 190 Dutch jihadist fighters who travelled

8 National Coordinator Terrorisme en Veiligheid (translated: National Coordinator Terrorism and Security) 9 Openbaar Ministerie (translated: Public Prosecutor Service)

to Syria and Iraq and are still there (Paulussen & Pitcher, 2018, pp. 22-23):“These people think they have said farewell to our legal system, but we have not said farewell to them.” (OM in Paulussen & Pitcher, 2018, p. 23). Besides criminal law, the Netherlands also became engaged in more administrative measures towards jihadist fighters (Boutin, 2016), which initially were meant as a tool to prevent potential jihadists from traveling to Syria by revoking passports and by imposing travel bans. The Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism from August 2014 allowed the Minister of the Interior to revoke or refuse passports from individuals suspected of intentions to commit terrorist acts abroad and who will pose a threat to the Netherlands. This resulted in approximately 65 revoked passports between December 2013 and April 2015 (Boutin, 2016, p. 16). This action program also has consequences for the Dutch immigration- law since it allows rescinding residence permits, entry bans and expulsion for ‘unwanted foreign nationals’ if suspected of terrorist offences (Bakker et al., 2013; Global Center, HSC & ICCT, 2014; Boutin, 2016). Furthermore, the Netherlands is using citizenship as a counterterrorism tool. Where initially an individual could lose his Dutch nationality “if he voluntarily joins a foreign army of a state that is involved in encounters against the Kingdom [the Netherlands] or an alliance that the Kingdom is a member of” (Reed et al., 2015, p. 7), the amendment on the Dutch Nationality Act extended the possibility “to revoke citizenship once an individual is convicted of terrorist offences (including recruitment for violent jihad), genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity” (Global Center, HSC & ICCT, 2014, p. 11). It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate on the challenges and shortcomings of these measures, but it is noteworthy to mention that there was also criticism voiced on the administrative measures towards (returning) jihadist fighters (Boutin, 2016; Paulussen, 2016). The CvdRM10 and the Council of State heavily criticised the legislative proposals for being too broad and unclear defining terrorism, jihadist fighters and indented offences – resulting in very expansive interpretations – and simultaneously imposing significant restrictions on an individual’s fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of movement (Boutin 2016; Paulussen, 2018). Moreover, Boutin (2016) points out the possible discriminatory effect of the extension of the Dutch Nationality Act which makes dual nationals ‘second-class citizens’ considering the fact that nationality can only be revoked in cases of dual nationality.

Mainly because of the early cases of Mohammed G. and Omar H. in 2013, the Netherlands is considered to be an important precursor in creating legal precedents by policy-makers and scholars. Yet, a general trend of repression can be identified throughout the European Union (Reed et al., 2015). The details between the different Member States, however, may differ from each other due to different interpretations of the UN Resolution 2178. Table 4.1 gives a short overview of the repressive measures adopted in neighbouring European countries. These countries were selected here because of their high number of jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq, assuming that they face the same problems as the Netherlands.

10 College voor de Rechten van de Mens (translated: Netherlands Institute for Human Rights)

In short, this chapter shows that the developments and policy-guidelines at an international and European level are connected to the national level of the Netherlands. The developments in Syria and Iraq, the emergence of Islamic State and the increasing numbers of European, and specifically Dutch jihadist fighters have led to public and political anxiety and the adoption of repressive policies towards these individuals. Especially the binding international legislation (UNSC Resolution 2178 and the Convention on the reduction on statelessness) has a major impact on the Dutch criminal justice and the Dutch nationality act, but there is no all- encompassing international approach by international organizations or courts. Moreover, neighbouring European countries are experiencing the same struggles and challenges, but the role of the European legal and institutional context is limited to a guiding or accompanying role in the approach towards jihadist fighters. This means that the approach towards (returning) jihadist fighters remains mainly a domestic affair at a national level and resulted in an extensive set of repressive measures – both legal and administrative – in the Dutch context. Now that the (legal) context in which the phenomenon of Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the adopted repressive policies is illustrated, the next chapters will discuss the Dutch case-study on the parliamentarian and media debates on the phenomenon in connection to the earlier discussed developments and policies.

Table 4.1 Short summary of other European countries’ jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and adopted measures Country Number of jihadist fighters Adopted measures Extra information (Boutin et al., 2016) Belgium Total: 420 – 516 March 2013: Amendment on criminal February 2015: conviction of 45 Abroad: 180 – 260 legislation criminalised participation in, Sharia4Belgium members Confirmed dead: 60 – 70 recruitment and providing training for Returned: 55 – 130 terrorist offences Cabinet rejected proposal to revoke citizenships based on the assumption that this would trigger the market on stolen or false identity cards and would lead to more abuse of such documents France Total: >900 December 2012: new counter-terrorism November 2014: Flavien M. was Abroad: 570 law that allowed them to prosecute sentenced to seven years for the Confirmed dead: 137 returning citizens after they committed conspiring to prepare a terrorist Returned: 246 terrorist crimes or obtained training in attack terrorist camps abroad. 2014: Extension of the counter-terrorism law that criminalised traveling abroad to join terrorist organizations and participate in terrorist activities. It also allows revoking identification documents for two years if someone is suspected of terrorist offences. Germany Total: 720 – 760 The German passport law already End 2014: Kreshnik B. was found Abroad: >238 allowed for the revocation of travel guilty for joining IS in Syria and Confirmed dead: 100 documents and expulsion if someone was sentenced to three years and Returned: 250 posed a significant internal and external nine months. security risk. September 2014: Prohibition of recruitment by using terrorist symbols in public or the internet. 2015: Extension of the law to ban travelling to Syria and Iraq and the criminalization of terrorist offences. United Total: 700 – 760 UK’s criminal law prohibit any kind of 2014: The Nationality Act, which Kingdom Abroad: 315 participation, training, recruitment, or allowed the revocation of British Confirmed dead: 70 financing for terrorist offences. citizenship even if this would Returned: >350 render someone stateless. Until 2019, the law had not been applied yet. 2019: the case of Shamima Begun, a young British female jihadist wants to return to the UK, but her citizenship was revoked, and her Bangladeshi citizenship remains uncertain which makes her practically stateless. (Sources: Bakker et al., 2013; Boutin et al., 2016; Global Center, HSC & ICCT, 2014; Paulussen, 2016; Reed et al., 2015; Van Ark, 2019)

5 Parliamentarian debates This chapter discusses the main results of the text and discourse analysis on the parliamentarian debates throughout the years and will provide an answer to the sub-question: “How is the role of the state conceptualised through sovereignty, territory and citizenship in the Dutch parliamentarian debates?”. This chapter begins with the general development of the debates throughout the different periods and the shared continuous ideas on statehood. Here, the involved Ministers are considered to be voices regarding the policy drafted by the cabinet, instead of representatives of their political parties. Secondly, three different narratives on the role of statehood, which could be discovered, are discussed. The quotes used are free translations from the original Dutch quotes, which can be found in the Appendix 6 (table 12).

5.1 Development of the parliamentarian debates For the analysis of the parliamentarian debates, six written reports from the Tweede Kamer over a period of four and a half years (September 2014 – February 2019) were assessed and analysed. See table 5.1 for a total overview of the parliamentarian debates used for the analysis.

Table 5.1 List of selected parliamentarian debates for analysis Date Title debate (in English) Type debate 04/09/2014 Approach to Dutch jihadist fighters Plenary debate 26/02/2015 Revoking Dutch citizenship after terrorist offences Plenary debate 27/01/2016 Returning Dutch jihadist fighters and infiltration by ISIS in the refugee flow Plenary debate 23/02/2017 AIVD-report: Dutch returnees Plenary debate 12/06/2018 Syrian IS-fighter in the Netherlands Plenary debate 19/02/2019 D66 asks for the statements of President Trump on the release of IS-prisoners Oral questions

Throughout the periods, the length of the debates clearly decreased: from 62 pages (7h and 44min) in September 2014 to 13 pages (2h and 41min) in June 2018. There has not (yet) been a major plenary debate on the subject matter in 2019; only a session of oral question (3 pages and 14 minutes). Moreover, with the exception of a few political parties, the party leaders were significantly more involved in the debate of September 2014 in comparison to the subsequent debates (Appendix 6, table 1). Throughout the different periods in which the debates took place, the debates show a changing enemy perception and imagination of the security threat. Table 5.2 shows that there is a general trend in referring to Islamic State, the Islam and the Jihad in combination with words as risk and threat for framing the enemy. Strikingly, in the first period (September 2014), Muslim (63 times) and extremism (20) have a high frequency compared to the other periods. Although the numbers in the table must be understood in its relativity to the length of the debates (which is decreasing over the years), it is still a useful way to illustrate the general enemy perception on jihadism and Islamic State.

Yet, in the first two periods (September 2014 and February 2015), the members of the parliament are mainly concerned about the threat rising from domestic jihadism and home- grown terrorism. In these debates, the members of the parliament and ministers fear for the internal enemy and their links to the global jihadist movement.

Table 5.2 Frequency of selected words on enemy perception in parliamentarian debates Word Period 201 4 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (De)radicalization 29 26 29 13 2 - Extremism 20 3 3 1 1 - Islam 46 23 10 3 3 - Islamic State 99 71 101 32 68 20 Jihad 200 41 51 48 9 2 Muslim 63 2 2 9 1 - Dangerous 16 3 33 30 12 2 Risk 13 8 23 10 15 2 Terror attack 8 13 33 25 2 - Terrorism / terror 79 107 47 63 10 1 Threat 23 3 15 11 1 -

The geographical proximity of the increasing threat of radicalised Muslims and the recognition that the events in Syria and Iraq are not an isolated problem are emphasized by the majority of the parliament members, among which Mr. Van Haersma Buma (CDA) mentioning that “the summer of 2014 showed that the threat of radicalized Muslims is great and close by. At the moment, it is the biggest domestic threat: the threat of IS and the threat of radicalized Muslims” (Mr. Van Haersma Buma (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK105-2 p. 1).

This view is shared by the Minster of Justice and Security who looks further ahead to the long-term consequences: “The recent international geopolitical developments and their impact on the Netherlands call for an extra boost to this effort. The rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a destabilizing factor at both regional and international level. These developments have an impact on the Netherlands. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that jihadists are seeking links with international terrorist organizations. On the other hand, this is because supporters of the violent jihad are also manifesting themselves openly in our country and tensions arise in our society. The jihadist threat has developed into a permanent security problem for Europe and the Netherlands. There is a threat to the security of our country and of Europe, as we put it, and also to the protection of the international legal order and our constitutional state” (Mr. Opstelten (Minister of Justice and Security), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-6, p. 1). As a response to the perception of an increasing threat rising from domestic jihadism, the Minister of Justice and Security and the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment present the Action plan on Integral Approach towards Jihadism in the debate of 2014. This involves a broad and balanced approach of both administrative and judicial measures, such as revoking passports and exit bans while respecting European and international legislation, and integration programmes focusing on preventing discrimination, segregation and anti-Semitism. Although the members of parliament generally agree that an integral approach is necessary to challenge domestic jihadists, the envisioned measures are still in an early phase, as may be presumed from the approved motions on an evaluation of previous approaches towards jihadism to learn from (no. 259) and an evaluation of the Action plan on Integral Approach towards Jihadism (no. 260) (Appendix 2, table 8).

In February 2015, the debate focuses on one particular measure in challenging jihadism: the possibility to revoke Dutch citizenship in case of terrorist offences and membership to a terrorist organization, without criminal charges or judicial intervention. This debate is logically dominated by words on (Dutch) nationality and law/legislation compared to the other periods (see table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Frequency of selected words on revoking Dutch citizenship in case of terrorist offences in the debate of February 2015 compared to other periods Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Dutch nationality 49 80 9 5 16 - Nationality 26 159 6 29 6 - Law/legislation 128 247 59 79 16 -

The members of parliament assume that the proposed legislation on revoking citizenships would prevent individuals from travelling to Syria and Iraq to join IS, or/and have terrorist activities going on in The Netherlands: “If by taking part in the fight of IS, you show that you do not embrace the values of our constitutional state and our freedoms, indeed, that you fight them with all that you are and that you are prepared to give your life for them, then in the extreme case, after an irrevocable condemnation, the moment may come when we say to such a person: now you are no longer a part of our society. This is just a small part of the approach and hopefully it will have a deterring effect. Hopefully the signal will be clear: know what you are doing! If someone is radicalized and makes that choice, this can be the ultimate consequence.” (Mr. Segers (CU), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p. 8).

From January 2016 onwards, the enemy perception of a dominantly internal enemy in September 2014 and February 2015 seems to shift to an external enemy: the returning Syriëgangers who left the Netherlands to fight for IS and may pose a significant security risk. In January 2016, there is a noticeable peak in mentioning the words refugee or refugee flow (118 times) and also ‘returning’ and’ returnees’ became more frequently used (table 5.4).

Table 5.4 Frequency of mentioning refugee (flow) and to return/returnees in the parliamentarian debates Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Refugee/refugee flow 8 1 118 - 10 - Return/returnees 14 14 72 182 25 2

In the following periods, the issue of returning jihadist fighters is being pushed more to the forefront of the debates. In February 2017, the AIVD11-report published a report on the (possible) returnees from Syria and Iraq. In June 2018, the members of the parliament discuss the issue of a Syrian IS-fighter who was seen in public. Although this did not concern a Dutch returnee, the arrival of a Syrian IS-fighter raises, once again, questions about the possible threat

11 Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheids Dienst (translated: Dutch security service)

rising from Dutch returnees. This perceived threat is acknowledged by Minister Plasterk in February 2017: “The situation has changed because of the collapse of IS, which is good news in itself. This increases the risk that people with that background [jihadism] could come back to The Netherlands and pose a threat to the safety of The Netherlands.” (Mr. Plasterk (Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-10, p. 7).

Besides the use of criminal justice and administrative measures towards returnees, there is also increasing attention for maintaining security by both the national security services and government institutions, such as AIVD, and through European cooperation on the Schengen zone and external border control: “The AIVD works intensively and at all levels with the other parties in the chain to minimise the risks posed by the jihadist threat. The same applies to the risks faced by returnees. The AIVD also shares information with its partners, where necessary and possible, so that they can act. The Counter Terrorism Group, which was set up on the Dutch initiative, works closely together at European level and shares as much information as possible. In this way, we ensure that when sharing information about terrorists, it does not really matter that we have different services within Europe.” (Mr. Plasterk (Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-10, p. 7).

Although there is no major plenary debate on returning Syriëgangers in 2019, the oral questions of the parliament member Sjoerdsma (D66) in February 2019 stimulated the debate regarding the possibility of Dutch Syriëgangers returning to the Netherlands. Because of the short length of the session, it is hard to identify dominance in the choice of words, except for the introduction of the United Nations and president Trump (both 7 times) in the debate (table 5.5)

Table 5.5 Frequency of mentioning United Nations and Trump in the debates Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Trump - - - - - 7 United Nations 1 1 - - - 7

Until that point, the members of parliament have paid relatively little attention to actively and collectively repatriate the Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq. However, because of the calls made by president Trump on European countries to repatriate their jihadist fighters, several members of parliament wonder how the Netherlands, as international actor involved in this issue, will handle the possible repatriation. Minister Kaag for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (she replaces the Minister of Foreign Affairs) indicated that there were no particular plans on the repatriation of the Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and that the Netherlands as geopolitical actor did not find international support among other European countries for the possibility of an international mechanism (UN-tribunal) on prosecution. She argues that the national level of the Iraqi state remains the most convenient level for the prosecution of jihadist fighter, but also a difficult one because of their underdeveloped legal system. But even if the constitutional state and judicial system is re- established because of the currently running UN-mission, sentencing through a death penalty,

which is a matter of Iraqi state sovereignty, remains an issue for discussion, because the Netherlands – and other western countries – are fundamentally against capital punishment (Mrs. Kaag (Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation), Tweede Kamer, 19 February 2019, TK 55-4, pp. 2-3).

Besides the general development of the debates and the changing enemy perception, there are also shared assumptions which continuously run through the debates. First is the assumption that national security is a collective good that needs to be protected by an all-encompassing political authority. Table 5.6 shows that the word (national) security is frequently used throughout the different debates.

Table 5.6 Frequency of mentioning security/secure in the parliamentarian debates Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (National) security 46 35 59 64 32 5

Secondly, the Dutch statehood is generally conceptualised as being a constitutional state or a democracy defending freedom(s), especially present in the early debate (see table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Frequency of mentioning constitutional state, democracy and freedom(s) Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Constitutional state 102 57 14 33 8 2 Democracy 25 1 1 7 - - Freedom(s) 63 19 1 5 1 -

The following quote by Mr. (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment) shows how national security and these concepts are used in combination to describe the Dutch statehood and its tasks: “That is first and foremost the acute protection of the constitutional state and the freedoms that we have. That is to challenge violence and to prevent violence elsewhere. […] That is the acute task of the government: the daily protection of the constitutional state” (Mr. Asscher, Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-6, p. 26).

Third is the central role of the governmental institutions and national security services to fulfil the task of the state to protect the constitutional state. Table 5.7 shows that the bigger, national institutions like the AIVD and the OM play a seemingly more important role compared to the local institutions like local police officers, schools and Child Protective Services. Furthermore, references to European (Europol) and international organizations (NATO/UN) are also significantly less present in the debates compared to the organizations on the national level (see table 5.8). The IND12 is introduced in the debate of January 2016 (18 times) (table 5.8), because of the growing concerns about the migration flow from Syria and the increasing amount of asylum applications. Yet, the most important task is generally assigned to the AIVD:

12 Integratie en Naturalisatie Dienst (translated: Integration and Naturalization Service)

“The term "services" is often used, but the AIVD does have a special place in the system because it can use special powers for the benefit of national security, even if there are no suspects or criminal offences in advance. The AIVD's product is information. (Mr. Plasterk (Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), Tweede Kamer, 27 January 2016, TK 47-9, p. 19).

“I am talking about the AIVD, the eyes and ears of our democracy. That service which protects us from these kinds of threats.” (Mr. Van Haersma Buma (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 2).

Table 5.8 Frequency of selected words on national, international and local organizations and institutions in the parliamentarian debates Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 AIVD 56 - 52 111 9 IND - - 18 1 5 - OM 81 - 25 45 9 - Europol 4 - 2 1 1 - NATO - 1 - - - - UN 1 1 - - - 7 Child Service Protection - - 2 1 - 1 Local policemen 3 - 2 1 - - Schools 8 - - 1 - -

Fourth, the legal framework for criminal justice is perceived as an important instrument in the approach towards Dutch jihadist fighters: the words criminal law and justice are frequently used throughout the different periods of the parliamentarian debates (table 5.9)

Table 5.9 Frequency of selected words on criminal justice in the parliamentarian debates Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Criminal law 47 39 52 38 14 - Justice / judicial system 81 16 13 11 2 16

Here, the central role of the governmental institutions in combination with the constitutional state are, again, pointed out by Mr. Van der Steur (Minister of Justice and Security in 2016): “The constitutional state only requires one thing and gives me one order. I share this mission with the Public Prosecutor's Office and the national police. When people break the law, for whatever reason, they are prosecuted, investigated and, where possible, tried. No distinction is made between the formation of ideas or anything else: everyone is equal before the law on that point and also before the national police.” (Mr. Van der Steur (Minister of Justice and Security, Tweede Kamer, 27 January 2016, TK 47-9, p, 19).

Besides the general development of the parliamentarian debate and the shared assumptions, the parliamentarian debates do also include different narratives on the role of the state and the usability of repressive policies, which can be roughly divided in three different narratives: 1) the state as a repressive enforcer of national security; 2) the state as guarantor of the constitutional state and inclusivity; and 3) the state as a bounded territorial unit. Whereas the first and the second narrative show a lot of interaction by criticising each other, the third

narrative provides a totally different perspective in itself. Hence, the following paragraph starts with the discussion of the first two narratives followed by the third one. Once again, for a detailed explanation of the different political parties involved, see Appendix 2)

5.2 The state as a repressive enforcer of national security The first cluster of pre-dominantly right-wing political parties – consisting of CDA, SGP, VVD and Monasch – adopt a repressive tone towards the approaches on jihadist fighters and frame the government as the righteous enforcer to protect The Netherlands and its citizens and maintain the national security, preferably by means of ‘hard’ measures. Especially the CDA showed a dominant voice in the debates of September 2014 until February 2017 in terms of the number of times speaking in the debate (Appendix 6, tables 2 – 5). The VVD showed a steady shift in becoming more outspoken about their repressive view on jihadist fighters: whereas they did not approve the motions submitted by CDA and SGP in 2014 (no. 255, 256 and 264 – on the prohibition of terrorist organizations and the criminalisation of the glorification of terrorism), they co-signed the motion of CDA on take returning jihadist fighters in custody (no. 355) and approved a quick examination of criminalisation of residence in a terrorist area (no. 415) (Appendix 6, table 8 – 10). In the language of the representatives of these political parties, the (returning) jihadist fighters are portrayed as ‘increased security risks’, ‘a threat to the Dutch freedoms’ and ‘those who have said goodbye to the Dutch constitutional state’. In 2014, Mr. Dijkhoff (VVD) indicated that the mainstream image of the enemy has to change by including non-state actors like cross-border jihadist fighters and IS in the adjustment of the Dutch nationality law13 (Mr. Dijkhoff (VVD), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 17). After the adoption of the law in 2015, IS and its supporters have also legally been declared as a Dutch enemy and participation could lead to the revocation of Dutch citizenship. This indicates the repressive attitudes towards Dutch jihadist fighters. Moreover, the shared attitude towards Dutch Syriëgangers is basically three-fold: 1) prevent them from travelling to Syria; 2) prevent them from returning to the Netherlands; and 3) if they return, arrest and prosecute them. The statement by premier Rutte on Dutch Syriëgangers14 is widely supported by the representatives of these political parties. For example, statements like “people would rather not return” (Mrs. Van Toorenburg (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p. 1) and “keep them out” (Mr. Dijkhoff (VVD), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 17) are not uncommon in this narrative. Mr. Monasch (Monasch), known for his support on a stricter immigration policy, expresses this sentiment in the following words: “If you read the letter of the cabinet you will see that there is one central verb in it, namely “to return”. Return, return: I underlined all those words “return”, but I just lost count. Nowhere, however, did I found the words “stay there”. Why is the policy letter not focusing on

13 The Dutch Nationality Act allowed the revocation of Dutch citizenship of an individual "if he voluntarily engages in foreign military service of a state involved in combat operations against the Kingdom" (Article 15, first paragraph, section e). By the adjustment of the Nationality Act in 2015, non-state actors – like IS and jihadist fighters – are also included in the enemy perspective. 14 Premier Mark Rutte stated that Dutch jihadist fighters ‘would rather die than come back to The Netherlands’ during an electoral debate on television (See also previous chapter: Coolseat & Renard, 2018).

“stay there” instead of “return”? Would it not be better for the security of the Netherlands if returnees from Syria and Iraq were simply banned from entering the Netherlands?” (Mr. Monasch (Monasch), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-5, p. 17).

Interestingly, while all parties agree that the Dutch constitutional state is the greatest asset to be defended, they argue that it is justified to ‘stretch’ the legal boundaries of the constitutional state to guarantee national security. For example, Mr. Van der Staaij (SGP) argues in February 2015 that one should not avoid any judicial or legal vulnerability in the constitutional state and, together with CDA, calls for quick and creative extension of the judiciary possibilities in February 2015 (Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8). Moreover, VVD-member Mr. Van der Steur expressed this more cryptically by stating that ‘news roads’ must be explored in the approach towards returning jihadists (Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p. 18). Throughout the different periods, CDA and SGP have made several controversial proposals or motions which test, or perhaps violate, the legal boundaries of the Dutch constitutional state. First include the motions (no. 255 and 264) on the criminalisation of glorification of terrorist violence and effective counteracting against the display of terrorist- related flags in public (Appendix 6, table 8). These proposals received a lot of criticism from the left-wing corner of the Tweede Kamer and were rebuked by the Minster of Justice and Security for being in conflict with the Dutch constitutional state. Secondly, in the Dutch Nationality Act on the revocation of Dutch citizenship it is only possible to revoke someone’s citizenship in case of a dual nationality in order to comply with the international regulations on the prohibition of statelessness. However, CDA and SGP would prefer to revoke citizenship in any case, even if this would lead to statelessness for the individuals involved. Here, citizenship is framed as the responsibility of the individual to earn and to adhere to the Dutch norms and standards, but it is up to the state to decide when someone is not worth the status of a Dutch citizen: “CDA supports the proposed legislation, because it clearly shows that the rights and duties of a Dutch citizen have certain limitations. Committing or preparing terrorist offences contradicts all the values the Dutch constitutional state stands for. As far as the CDA is concerned, someone who has been irrevocably convicted of committing such crimes may not call themselves Dutch […]. (Mr. Oskam (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p. 2). “Our freedom is threatened by jihadists who fight in the name of their religion […] by which they justify their terrorist acts. They despise Western freedoms, Western norms and standards. […] The VVD thinks that individuals who oppose our freedoms and our values do not deserve to be a Dutch citizen” (Mr. Van der Steur (VVD), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, pp. 17-18).

This makes the legislation on the revocation of nationality a powerful tool for the state to in- and exclude individuals from the rights, immunities and responsibilities which go together with Dutch citizenship.

Lastly, these political parties take a moderate, yet critical stance with regards to European cooperation (including organizations) and international legislation. Although they

plea to some extent for better cooperation on a European and international level, this is not very present in their statements on repressive approaches. The SGP shortly ‘blames’ the European external borders to be porous (Tweede Kamer, 27 January 2016, TK 47-9, p. 9) and the improvement of the European external borders is mainly considered as a tool to prevent returnees from Syria and Iraq and to contain of the refugee flow. Furthermore, the EVN15 is presented as an important legal framework and is interestingly only mentioned by Mr. Oskam (CDA) in the debate of February 2015 on the Dutch Nationality Act. But, at the same time, he points out the possibility to reinterpret this legal framework referring to the Nationality Act of the United Kingdom. Even fewer references are made to the possibility of international cooperation. Most striking is that the CDA in February 2019 asks about the possibility for an international mechanism for the prosecution of European jihadists in Syria and Iraq, but this is once again considered as an instrument to keep Dutch, or European jihadists in general, outside the free-travel zone (Schengen) of the European Union. In short, this narrative perceives the Dutch jihadists in Syria and Iraq as a serious threat to the national security and they should preferably not enter the Netherlands after their participation within Islamic State. If they return, they believe that it is the task of the government to take forceful and hard measures under law-and-order, even if this is at the expense of the legal boundaries of the constitutional state. The political authority of the state over national security and the possibility to revoke citizenship are framed as important flagships in sustaining the national statehood. The possibility to revoke citizenship gives the state the monopoly to in- and exclude individuals from the Dutch rights and immunities. The European and international contexts solely play a minor role and they are at the expense of the greater interest in national security.

5.3 The state as a guarantor of the constitutional state and inclusivity Compared to the narrative on repressive measures as described above the following cluster of political parties (D66, GL, SP, PvdA, CU and GrKÖ) offer a contrasting counter-voice for repressive performances. The involved political parties are left-wing or centred parties and, with the exception of the PvdA, are part of the opposition in the Tweede Kamer until 2017. Especially D66 is a dominant voice throughout the different debates in terms of times speaking, highlighting the ones in September 2014 and February 2017 (Appendix 6, table 2 – 7), and were moreover the political party which submitted the oral questions about Trump’s statement in February 2019. The representatives of these political parties criticize the previously discussed parties for being ‘reckless’ with the boundaries of the constitutional state by stretching the legal possibilities at the expense of ‘the greatest good of the Netherlands’: “We have to be cautious for the following: in our all-encompassing ambition to protect the free, democratic constitutional state, we must not break it down.” (Mr. Samson (PvdA), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 20).

Another example is the motion of CDA and SGP (no. 255 – Appendix 6, table 8) in 2014 on the criminalisation of glorification of terrorist violence did not find any support at these left-

15 Europees Verdrag Nationaliteit (translated: European Convention on Nationality)

wing oriented parties, likewise as the motion by CDA, SGP and VVD (no. 355 – Appendix 6, table 9) in February 2017 on the structural detention of returning jihadist fighters. These repressive attitude of the state towards returning foreign fighters is characterized by D66, GL and SP as ‘tough language’, ‘muscles’ and ‘draconian measures’ which will not maintain the constitutional state and help to solve the problem: “It is all about decisiveness. In the words of Minister Asscher [Minister of Social Affairs and Employment]: ‘Now it is time for the constitutional state to show muscles and take action. So, the rhetoric of repression prevails. […] These measures will not give the constitutional state muscles; it will further weaken it.” (Mr. Van Ojik (GL), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 12).

“D66 puts the safety of people first, but we do not think that tough language and measures will work in reality. In doing so, we always make a critical assessment of what is effective in the fight against terrorism and what unnecessarily restricts the freedom and security of all citizens.” (Mr. Verhoeven (D66), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p. 7).

Given this, it is not surprising that D66 and SP characterize the proposal of CDA and SGP on the criminalisation of the glorification of terrorist violence as ‘thought-police’. The motion was, moreover, rejected by the Minister of Justice and Security for being inappropriate in a constitutional state. But this is not the most important measure to receive criticism from these political parties; that is the possibility on revoking citizenship. GL and GrKÖ, among others, warn for the discriminatory character of the legislation – i.e. the distinction between citizens with dual and single nationality – and the increasing feelings of exclusion and segregation among certain groups in the population as a result of repressive attitudes. Integration and solidarity among the Dutch citizens dominate their narrative on the role of the state and is perceived to be the most important task of the government. Citizenship, here, is based on mutuality and a shared political community among the Dutch citizens and it is the primary task of the government to challenge exclusion and discrimination, ensure inclusiveness and take responsibility over its citizens. An important note made by GroenLinks is that citizenship is not merely based on a formal link or status, but is more deeply rooted as part of an individual identity: “You can revoke someone’s citizenship, but that does not change the person’s nationality. They remain someone who clearly has ties with the Netherlands, who is from here, who has family here, who is in contact with a group, who speaks the language and who could therefore be a danger to the Netherlands and the Dutch people. The stupidest thing you can do is to think that you can keep them out and that they won’t enter the Netherlands. These people are highly willing and able to enter the Netherlands.” (Mr. Grashoff (GL), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p.13).

In the debate of February 2015, Mr. Kuzu (GrKÖ) already indicated that revoking citizenship would not help in excluding returning jihadists and he believes that the most convenient way to challenge jihadism is ‘teaching’ them the values and freedoms of the constitutional state and include them in the Dutch society again. This implies that citizenship is not merely reduced to

a formal link or status, but it is also shaped by its social environment and identity, and it therefore emphasizes the importance of an inclusive society. This argument is moreover strengthened by the motion submitted by CU (no. 262 – Appendix 6, table 8) – together with the PvdA, SGP and VVD – on ‘prioritizing to contact the Muslim community to prevent anti-Semitism’. Strikingly, this is the only motion that was approved by almost the entire Tweede Kamer (149 out of 150 votes) and proves the shared belief on the importance of an inclusive society. However, it may be important to mention that the CU is in an unclear position between the previous narrative and this one. They are not fundamentally against the legislation on revoking citizenship and agree with the CDA on earning Dutch citizenship which may be revoked if someone does not adhere to the Dutch norms and standards; but they do also mention that strong-arm tactics (literally ‘toughness’ and muscles) will not help to solve the entire problem of the youth who feel eradicated from the Dutch norms and values referring to the inclusive character of the Dutch society. This is the reason why the CU is included in this particular narrative.

The statements of GroenLinks in the debates of February 2015, February 2017 and June 2018 show once again that they perceive citizens and citizenship as important tasks for the government. In February 2015, Mrs. Van Tongeren criticizes the CDA for turning a blind eye to their ‘not-in-my-backyard’ politics by revoking Dutch citizenship and exporting the dangers rising from those individuals. They mention that other states also do not desire those IS-fighters in their country: “Do unto others as you would have them to unto you” (Mrs. Buitenweg (GL), Tweede Kamer, 12 June 2018, TK 92-26, p. 11) – a striking quote to use when criticizing a Christian party. Moreover, in June 2018, Mrs. Buitenweg points out to Mr. Grapperhaus (Minister of Justice and Security) that there is friction between revoking citizenship (and consequently transferring the Dutch jihadists other countries) and a state’s desire to take responsibility over their citizens. Whereas Mr. Grapperhaus frames citizenship as an individual responsibility, Mrs. Buitenweg argues for an active and effective repatriation of Dutch jihadist fighters because they owe Syria and Iraq to do so. This makes citizenship a state responsibility which cannot just be revoked with respect to other states.

Lastly, these political parties generally maintain a pro-EU point of view in challenging returning jihadist fighters. They do this not only by acknowledging the European legal framework on nationality legislation, but also by stressing the importance of regulating cross- border migration within the free-travel zone as well as controlling the external borders. D66 calls for a greater attention to the European context, mentioning that they should not burden other European countries with ‘their’ terrorists – similar to the argument of GroenLinks. They also criticise the statements of president Trump for undermining the international alliance and cooperation regarding the events in Syria and Iraq. It is, however, not surprising that D66 expressed their pro-European stance because of their general pro-European attitude in their political agenda. Also, the SP allocates an important task to the government by stimulating a better cooperation between the European security services to regulate national security and asylum legislation. However, the political parties agree and acknowledge that there are still many steps to take in fostering an EU-wide approach on returning jihadists.

In short, these political parties express a narrative with a critical attitude towards a repressive character of the state at which the legal boundaries of the constitutional state should be respected. Even more important is the focus of the Dutch political community on the possible consequences of repressiveness for the inclusiveness of their citizens. Citizenship and an inclusive society are framed as important state tasks that should be placed above strong-arm tactics. Moreover, they maintain a cautiously positive attitude towards European and international cooperation as a possibly useful and rather necessary tool for challenging the cross-border issue regarding jihadist fighters.

5.4 The state as a bounded territorial unit The last narrative in the parliamentarian debate is also repressive in character, but cannot be included among the first discussed cluster of political parties because of its own position and used language towards the Islam, jihadism and Muslims and, moreover, the idea of the Netherlands as a bounded territorial unit which can only be protected by closing the borders and renouncing the European Schengen zone. These political parties – PVV and GrBvK – are known for their populist and anti-Islam/Muslim perspective in political affairs and are generally described as more nationalist-oriented, Euro-sceptic parties. Throughout the different periods, the PVV has become relatively more dominant in the parliamentarian debates; not only compared to GrBvK – a generally smaller political party with less speaking time – but also compared to the ‘bigger’ traditional political parties as, for example, VVD, CDA and D66. In September 2014, PVV only had the floor 15 times compared to the 68 times of D66; in February 2017 it was 21 compared to 45; and in June 2018 it went up to 10 times for PVV compared to 5 times for D66 (Appendix 6, table 2, 5 and 6). Although the PVV and GrBvK support all the motions submitted by SGP, CDA and VVD (5 out of 5; Appendix 6, table 8-10) – which implies the shared repressive role of the state among the parties – SGP, CDA or PVV do not support the submitted motions by GrBvK or PVV (0 out of 7; Appendix 6, table 8-11) – which indicates that there are significant differences between both stances. This is one of the most important reasons to differentiate these political parties from the first narrative.

A particular aspect for the narrative of these political parties is the use of fierce language for framing of Islam or the Muslims as the most important enemy to national security. The representatives of the political parties use words as (Muslim)terrorists, ticking time bombs, killing machines, violence-minded time bombs, or even scumbags or jerks, to refer to supporters of ISIS and jihadism. Mr. Wilders (PVV) even compares his enemy to that of one in a war: “the Islam, ISIS, has declared war on our country.” (Mr. Wilders (PVV), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-6, p. 29). Furthermore, the destruction of the jihad and the de-Islamizing of the Netherlands remain important topics in the arguments of both parties resulting in, for example, a motion (no. 265) of GrBvk for a national jihad-alert (Appendix 6, table 8) which did not have broad support in the Tweede Kamer. The following statement by Mr. Wilders also clearly expresses this message: “First of all, acknowledge, be honest, acknowledge that Islam is the problem. Start the de-Islamization of the Netherlands. We need less Islam. […] Stop “enriching” our culture.” [emphasis added] (Mr. Wilders (PVV), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 9).

In their narrative, they moreover blame the European Union and the Schengen to be the most important reason why (national) security is threatened, terrorist attacks are committed and that there are innocent civil casualties. Under the realm of ‘terrorists love Schengen’, references to ‘horrible open borders’ and ‘naïve border policy’ are not uncommon. Also, the European legal framework is portrayed as an inadequate set of tools, where the British example of statelessness serves as an important point for discussion. Administrative measures with a repressive character, such as revoking citizenship, are dismissed as ineffective and insufficient tools to counter the ‘terror threat’ and are merely examples of symbolic politics (Mr. de Graaf (PVV), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p. 1 and 15). Their perception of the only right way to protect the national security and the Dutch citizens is shortly summarized by Mr. Graaf: “First: we need to stop the asylum applications. Second: we need to close the borders. Third: we have to implement border control. Fourth, important [sic]: jihadists who want to leave the country must not be stopped frenetically. We have to let them go and never let them enter the Dutch territory again. That is what needs to be done”. (Mr. De Graaf (PVV), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p.1).

Not only does the PVV critique the European Union for its open border policy among the Member States, and thus endangering the safety, they also criticize the Dutch government directly for failing to protect the national security and the Dutch citizens (‘harming their basic human rights’) by not closing the borders and allowing asylum seekers into Dutch territory. They frame the task of the government of closing the national borders as the most important one and blame the Ministers for not guaranteeing the Dutch citizens total safety: “The government owes it to its citizens. Stop playing games with the safety of our citizens. We really cannot afford it”. (Mr. Bontes (GrBvK), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p. 6).

In summary, the PVV and GrBvK maintain strong territorial ideas towards statehood and suggest that national security can only be achieved if the state excludes itself from external influences by closing its borders. This goes hand in hand with fierce criticism on both the European Union and the Dutch government. The use of fierce language towards the Islam and Muslims further fuels the hostile image towards both jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq as well as the entire Muslim community.

To conclude this chapter, the general development shows a shift in the enemy perception from an internal enemy towards an external enemy which could be linked to international developments: the migration crisis since 2015 and the collapse of Islamic State since 2017. The debates contain, on the one hand, several general assumptions on the state as a sovereign ruler over national security through national governmental institutions and the judicial framework yet also shows different narratives between the political parties on the role of statehood and repressive approaches, in which citizenship and territory play a more prominent role. They also maintain different views on the role of the European Union or international cooperation. Considering the length of the debates and the involvement of the party leaders, one could argue that the intensity parliamentarian debates show a slow but steady decline. Remarkably,

there has not been a major plenary debate in 2019. Moreover, some new relatively smaller political parties like 50PLUS, FvD and PvdD make little to no contribution to the debates on Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq. The next chapter discusses the Dutch media debates (De Volkskrant and De Telegraaf) on Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and repressive measures. These articles were included in the same periods in which the parliamentarian debates took place. Because there were hardly any references between the debates and the topics discussed in the media were extremely varied in character, they are discussed in a separate chapter.

6 Media debates This chapter discusses the main results of the text and discourse analysis on the media debates throughout the different periods and will provide an answer to the sub-question: “How is the role of the state conceptualised through sovereignty, territory and citizenship in the Dutch media debates?”. As was mentioned earlier, the time periods under research for this analysis correspond with the ones of the parliamentarian debates. However, due to the lack of references made between both debates, they are presented in separate chapters. It starts with the discussion of both newspapers and their content regarding the debate towards returning jihadist fighters in two different paragraphs. Thereafter, the commonalities and differences between both newspapers and their position in the Dutch press landscape are discussed. The original Dutch quotes can be found in the Appendix 7 (table 2).

6.1 De Volkskrant Throughout the different periods, De Volkskrant published 37 articles related to returning jihadist fighters, both news and opinion/background pieces. The first thing to notice is the decrease in frequency between September 2014 and June 2018 regarding the amount and volume of the pieces was followed by a striking increase in February 2019: 10 publications in 2014; 3 publications in June 2018; and 9 publications in 2019 (Appendix 6, table 1). Also, the ratio between the distribution of news articles and opinion/background pieces changes over the different periods: in February 2017, there were 7 news articles compared to 3 opinion/background articles compared to 3 news pieces versus 6 opinion/background in February 2019 (Appendix 6, table 1).What can also be noted from the different titles of the news pieces is the great diversity of news pieces in De Volkskrant. Because of its wide variety of topics, it is hardly possible to identify one all-encompassing narrative on (returning) Dutch jihadist fighters and the role of the state. Therefore, it is more suitable to highlight the most striking articles or statements and attempt to identify a general perspective. In September 2014 and February 2015, based on word count, relatively much attention is paid in the news bulletins to the Dutch criminal judicial system and the role of government institutions and security services, compared to the following periods (table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Frequency of selected words on government institutions and the judicial system in De Volkskrant Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 AIVD 1 3 13 3 - 2 OM 23 21 - 4 1 6 Police 14 10 1 4 - 3 Court 7 11 1 2 - 2 Judge 17 20 1 2 - 2 Criminal law 1 16 1 3 2 2

The two most important cases are the one of the releases of suspected Syriëgangers from a little village called Huizen and the exoneration of the Syriëreis by a judge. These examples show the tension between the governmental institutions (OM and AIVD) and the judicial system in which the ruling of a judge may differ from the charges by the OM. This shows the effect of the constitutional state characterized by the trias politica and an independent judiciary.

Moreover, there is attention for the constitutional state and use of criminal legislation in challenging jihadism and returning IS-fighters from Syria and Iraq in the opinion/background section. As a consequence of the aforementioned cases, De Volkskrant published a column in February 2015 (subtitle: Combating terrorism – you cannot prevent everything with legislation’) in which two academics specialized in criminal law provide their perspective on the developments in criminal legislation towards (returning) jihadist fighters. They argue that the political pressure to challenge jihadism leads to the intensification of repressive measures and that under the influence of terrorism, criminal legislation has experienced a shift from the traditional (conviction after the crime was committed) to a system in which the legal boundaries are constantly challenged and re-defined:

“According to Borgers [professor in criminal law], even before the rise of Islamic terrorism, the development of the Netherlands into a ‘risk society’, or a society that is focused on avoiding risks, began at that time [1990s]. The role of the government is becoming increasingly important.” (De Volkskrant: columns and opinion, 14 February 2015, pp. 4-5).

“The unfortunate but honest message is that, in a constitutional state, the possibilities of criminal law to take preventive action against terrorism will always be limited. Perhaps more limited than we hope. It feels like fighting with one hand behind your back. But – perhaps a consolation – that same constitutional state is exactly what we are trying to uphold in the fight against terrorism.” (De Volkskrant: columns and opinion, 14 February 2015, pp. 4-5).

Besides the attention for the developments in the criminal judicial system, De Volkskrant also pays attention to the critical remarks towards the ‘jihad-debate’ and the repressive measures in September 2014, February 2015 and January 2016. This criticism focuses primarily on the inclusion/integration and exclusion issues due to the developments on the international scale and the adopted policies. In the news article on the Syriëgangers from Huizen it is mentioned that radicalized websites for Muslims criticize the actions for being ‘a manhunt for the Muslim community’ (De Volkskrant: news, 9 September 2014, page unknown). Moreover, in September 2014 and February 2015 Aissa Zanzen of the SMN16 – an organization for the well- being of Dutch Moroccans – and Marion van San – senior researcher on radicalisation for Erasmus University – both warn for simplicity and a stereotype-dominated view in the society and politics that will further strengthen feelings of exclusion and polarisation and have undesired consequences for the approach towards jihadism: “In the Netherlands, there already was a lot of polarisation. Since Syria and the rise of IS, this has become worse. I see fears in the eyes of parents who struggle with the radicalisation of their children. They feel pressured by the community, the neighbourhood, society and the government, which is dealing with the phenomenon of radicalisation in a desperate manner. These parents will take a step back and are unlikely to cooperate with the authorities.” (Aissa Zanzen, quoted by De Volkskrant: news and background, 27 September 2014, page unknown).

16 Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen in Nederland (translated: Cooperation Moroccans in the Netherlands) – An organization for the well-being of and representing the interests of Moroccans in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, as a response to the AIVD-report on ‘living under IS’ in January 2016, Amy-Jane Gielen – radicalisation expert linked to the University of Amsterdam – criticizes the national security service for being inaccurate in their message towards families and professionals on how to interpret the results of their investigation and characterizes the lack of information in integration and inclusion as a missed opportunity in the approach towards returning jihadist fighters. Additionally, PvdA-mayor Aboutaleb and PvdA-member Marcouch asks for attention at a local level and emphasizes the role of the community in securing safety: “PvdA-member Ahmed Marcouch also thinks that the government is less present in the roots of society. This week he appealed to the local policemen, teachers and parents to be alert on ‘risk cases’ and supports the SMN’s plea [to involve the local (Moroccan) community in challenging jihadism – see Aissa Zanzen].” (De Volkskrant: news and background, 27 September 2014, page unknown).

The community and citizenship are conceptualised by PvdA-mayor Aboutaleb as a duty rather than a formal or official link acknowledged through the ownership of a passport. Dutch citizenship is ‘a mandate not only to benefit from the rights and freedoms that the constitution offers you, but also to actively respect and promote them. If you are not prepared to do so, hand in your passport and leave’ (Mayor Aboutaleb, quoted by De Volkskrant: news, 18 February 2015, p. 3).

Although the frequency of the media debates decreased in February 2017 and June 2018 with only 2 and 3 pieces in each period respectively, the debate on the repressive measures towards returning jihadist fighters continues and criminal justice and the (extraterritorial) prosecution of suspected Dutch IS-fighters are discussed as frequently as before. A striking piece in this period is the column by Esther Gerritsen – columnist for De Volkskrant – on nationality. After parliament has adopted the law on revoking citizenship in case of terrorist offences, similar to other European countries, it raises questions to what extent this can be legitimized by other countries. Gerritsen addresses this issue by way of using a metaphor of a game of go fish in which countries are swapping citizens back and forth. She frames this as a power game in which the interrelationships between the different states determine the outcome: “Some countries can simply ask what they want, over and over again. When they like it, they say: Please give me of the category ‘heroes’ the child rescuers, and of the category ‘professors’ the smartest, and of the ‘dissidents’ the Nobel laureates. And there you go; they get what they want. They ask it nicely, though. Why not, they know they will get their way anyway and, in this way, they seem very civilized. […] Wouldn’t it be great to be able to say: ‘from our disillusioned citizens I give you the terrorists, they suit you better anyway, you will get their kids too and you may keep them forever’. What a perfect game rule.” (Esther Gerritsen, Volkskrant: column, 2 June 2018, p. 2).

She continues with her three-year-old daughter and teaching her the rules of the game, but the little girl did not mind the fair game rules, not as long as she would win the game. Gerritsen compares the actions from state authorities to a three-year-old girl who determines the rules for her own good. With this cynical representation of reality, she simplifies the developments going on in an unbalanced power framework and criticizes European states for not taking their

responsibility over their citizens and ignoring the well-being of other, apparently inferior countries. Finally, De Volkskrant shows a sudden increase in the amount of publications: from 2 and 3 in February 2017 and June 2018 respectively to 9 in February 2019 (Appendix 6, table 1). Strikingly, there is relatively more attention for the European context to address this phenomenon, and the possible return of jihadist fighters compared to earlier periods: the European Union as actor is mentioned 38 times, to return/returnees is mentioned 27 times. Moreover, international actors received more attention: the Kurds/Kurdistan is mentioned 44 times, Trump is mentioned 21 times, and the UN 6 times (table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Word count on international actors and returnees in February 2019 compared to earlier debates Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Return/returnees 4 3 3 6 2 27 European Union (actor) 2 3 - - - 38 Kurds/Kurdistan/SDF17 - - - 1 2 44 Trump - - - - - 21 United Nations - - 1 - - 6

There are two topics in February 2019 that dominate the debate: the return of a British female jihadist and the statements of president Trump on the repatriation of European jihadists by their home countries. This is especially true for the opinion/background sections: 6 out of 6 articles focus on the statements of Trump and the possibility of the repatriation of Dutch jihadists. The core argument of these articles is that there is no shared interest or sentiment among the European Member States to repatriate their jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq. Despite Trump’s statement in addressing the European as one all-encompassing political entity responsible for the repatriation, the Member States appear to be stuck in the western/European framework on state sovereignty and national judicial systems. They argue that a European solution in the prosecution cannot be set up because of the different judicial systems across the member states. Moreover, prosecution on Kurdish territory remains impossible since it is not an internationally acknowledged state. Finally, because of the malfunctioning of the Iraq constitutional state and the possibility of the death penalty, Iraq and Syria are not a possibility either. According to Nadim Houry – terrorism expert for Human Rights Watch – the European jihadists are currently located in a judicial no man’s land because of these developments (Nadim Houry, De Volkskrant: news and background, 23 February 2019, p. 8-9). Yet there is also criticism towards the reluctance of the Dutch government towards the repatriation-call from president Trump. Bart Schuurman – terrorism expert for the ICCT– argues that Syria and Iraq should not suffer from the European jihadists and that legally speaking, the Netherlands is still responsible for their own nationals. According to him, the debate should be reframed: instead of framing it as a second chance, one should rather evaluate how we can effectively prosecute them, so they will not pose a threat to our security in the future (Bart Schuurman, De Volkskrant: news and background, 23 February 2019, p. 8-9). Amy-Jane Gielen – radicalization expert linked to the University of Amsterdam – and Hoessein

17 Syrian Democratic Forces – military coalition, mainly Kurdish militants

– father of a Syriëganger – share the perspective of Bart Schuurman on the social discomfort of the ‘jihad-debate’ and argue that citizens are still a state responsibility, whether or not regarding other sovereign states: “Repatriate them in a controlled manner, so that you can keep them on the radar. They are still Dutch citizens, so arrest them and prosecute them according to the values of a democratic constitutional state.” (Hoessein, De Volkskrant: Opinion and debate, 20 February 2019, p. 20).

In short, besides the attention for the use of the criminal judicial system and the governmental institutions to arrest and prosecute (e.g. repressive policies), De Volkskrant also presents critical notes on the framing of the ‘jihad-debate’ and the adopted repressive policies through the eyes of (local) stakeholders and professionals. In these commentaries, more attention is paid to the interference of the local context and local governments by guaranteeing inclusivity and integration in the approach towards the phenomenon. This fosters a balanced view on the phenomenon and the role of the state to interfere.

6.2 De Telegraaf Likewise, De Telegraaf shows the same development as De Volkskrant in the changing intensification of the debate: 14 publications in September 2014, only 1 in June 2018 and 9 in February 2019 (Appendix 6, table 1). Moreover, each period has more news articles compared to opinion/background pieces, which dominantly consist of letters to the editor and polls by readers. As well as De Volkskrant, the variety of topics in De Telegraaf makes it difficult to categorize and identify a single narrative. Yet, especially in the first periods, in both news articles and opinion/background sections, De Telegraaf contributes to the framing of jihadists as internal and external enemies who pose a threat for the national security. In the case of the release of the suspected Syriëgangers from Huizen, De Telegraaf quotes a number of locals mentioning ‘fear’ and ‘disbelief’ in their responses, and even quoted a local citizen saying: ‘get rid of these people’ (De Telegraaf: news, 19 September 2014, p. 2). Moreover, in an editorial response on a list published by De Telegraaf on Dutch jihadists, jihadists are being portrayed as the ‘ruthless terrorist army of ISIS’ and ‘soldiers of hatred’: “The only right approach is the one of president Obama who declared war on ISIS. The Netherlands also has an interest in eliminating this killer gang. Jihadists who return to our country pose a direct threat to the national security.” (De Telegraaf: news, 13 September 2014, p. 3).

Furthermore, the newspaper sustains the idea or sentiment that the danger rising from jihadists is becoming closer and is framing jihadists as an internal enemy threatening national security. In a news article on possible terror attacks in the European Union, the Dutch member of the European parliament, Hans van Baalen (VVD), pronounces the internal threat by mentioning that ‘the enemy is among us’ (De Telegraaf, 21 September 2014, p. 2). Particularly striking is the choice to quote Dutch jihadists in several news items in September 2014, in which the Netherlands is approached as a direct enemy and main target of jihadists in Syria and Iraq:

“Everything is planned, and we did certainly not forget the Netherlands. If we can conquer territories that are even bigger than the Netherlands and Belgium combined in twelve hours, what about the Netherlands?” (Marouane B., quoted by De Telegraaf: news, 20 September 2014, p. 2). But, the hostile image towards jihadists is not merely focusing on the Dutch jihadists alone. In an interview with De Telegraaf in February 2015, Geert Wilders (PVV) accuses the Islam and Muslims for being the existential problem and the ‘real threat for national security’ as was previously discussed in chapter 5. This also includes his statement on the Dutch state as a bounded territorial unit and closing national borders as the most effective solution to protect the country.

Such an enemy perception towards jihadists goes hand in hand with the desire for forceful measures and a repressive attitude on the approach towards (returning) Dutch jihadists. Mainly among the letters to the editor and comments on the polls by the readers, there is this idea that the government is responsible for ensuring the national security through repressive measures. The desire for a decisive and repressive measures appears from the letters to the editors by mentioning, for example, that the government should simply ‘arrest, prosecute, revoke passports and expel jihadists’, because “the security of the Dutch citizens and the country are at risk, so an appropriate hard approach is required.” (R.E. Advokaat, De Telegraaf: letters to the editor, 6 September 2014, p. 6). This implies that the government is being perceived as the most important enforcer of order and security in which a forceful, repressive approach towards Dutch jihadists is legitimate and desired. Strikingly, this view is reinforced through criticism on the government and the lack of decisiveness: “By not being able to give a proper explanation on such an important subject as the fight against jihadist fanatics, Minister Opstelten does not do justice to his name. At the same pace as he talks, he also thinks of solutions. And we are supposed to feel safe about that? […] An aspirin is more bustling than he is.” (Ad Maat, De Telegraaf: letters to the editor, 6 September 2014, p. 6).

In addition, there is also criticism on the mindset of more left-wing oriented political parties: “Contradictory is the statement of the Mayor of Amsterdam, Mr. Van der Laan [PvdA]. He stated that we should not desire that Muslims turn away from jihadism and ISIS, because that desire is exactly why they feel excluded. Some readers [who filled in the poll and delivered their comments] refer to this example to show that Dutch policy is really going in the wrong direction.” (De Telegraaf: polls, 23 September 2014, p. 6).

Yet, although relatively rare, there are some messages countering the animosity towards Muslims and the Islam and the domestic-dominated, repressive approach by national governments. First, Nabeel Siddiqie responds to the ‘jihad-debate’ and criticizes the used terminology towards Muslims. He emphasizes that the actions of (supporters of) ISIS cannot be linked to the Islam or Muslims in general, and that Muslims are ‘just the Muslims’, not the ‘moderate’ ones (De Telegraaf: letters to the editor, 12 September 2014, p. 6). According to him, criminals and terrorist are the right terms to describe supporters of ISIS, “and please, let we call the Muslims just the Muslims.” (Nabeel Siddiqie, De Telegraaf: letters to the editor, 12

September 2014, p. 6). Moreover, in February 2017, an ex-military warns for the consequences of a repressive character of the government in the approach on returning jihadists and the lack of cross-border cooperation: “There is an increasing distance between countries. Populations and governments maintain an inward-looking view. But the intelligence services know very well that a threat for the Netherlands is also a threat for the UK or the USA, and the other way around.” (Richard Barret, quoted by De Telegraaf: news and background, 16 February 2017, p. 10).

Apart from these two examples, there was little room for nuanced perspectives towards the ‘jihad-debate’ and the role of the government in the approach towards jihadism in De Telegraaf. This implies that the newspaper sustained a more simplistic view towards jihadism and the adopted approaches to challenge security risks rising from the perceived enemy.

After a decrease in the number of published articles in June 2018 (only 1 article), De Telegraaf published 9 articles in February 2019 (Appendix 6, table 1). Although it concerns new topics – statements by president Trump and the return of a British female jihadist – the attitude towards returning (Dutch) jihadists remains quite the same compared to the previous periods. As response to the case of a young British female who wants to return, the readers provide their arguments in clear language: “No regrets, she does not have much understanding of the situation. Staying over there [Syria] is the best solution” (K. Gaemers, De Telegraaf: letters to the editor, 16 February 2019, p. 22). “But, in my opinion, jihadists and their families may never [extra emphasis] return to Europe” (Lily de Vries, De Telegraaf: letters to the editor, 19 February 2019, p. 16).

Moreover, related to the statements of president Trump, readers express their unwillingness to repatriate European jihadists from Syria and Iraq in various letters. The sentiment to leave them in Syria and Iraq and the possibility to prosecute them outside the Dutch jurisdiction dominates the debate: “Human rights activists will wail and cry. So be it. The rights of innocent European citizens are absolutely more important than the rights of radical scum, who have brutally misbehaved in the caliphate.” (De Telegraaf: news and background, 18 February 2019, p. 2).

“They have been talking about the repatriation of jihadists and their wives and children. I am wondering why the Netherlands have interfered. The crimes were committed in another country and should also be prosecuted there. […] We should be ashamed to even consider bringing those monsters here and taking the risk of fugitive victims running into their perpetrators here. Outrageous and criminal.” (A.W. de Haas, De Telegraaf: letters to the editor, 27 February 2019, p. 18).

Strikingly, the task of the government is not necessarily seen as having the responsibility over the repatriation of its citizens, but rather as the task to prevent the release of the European jihadists from Kurdish detention camps.

In short, De Telegraaf maintains a little nuanced and critical narrative towards returning Dutch jihadists as a threat for the national security and the use of repressive measures. The enemy perception of the jihadists threatening the national security of the Netherlands is the most important point of view through which the debate is shaped. Given the criticism on the ineffectiveness and lack of decisiveness of the Dutch government, it appears that the measures are not sufficient enough to sustain the idea of the state protecting her citizens from national security threats. Repression and an active role of the public authorities dominate the public debate in the newspaper.

6.3 Similarities and differences in the Dutch media Despite the wide variety of topics discussed in both newspapers, there are some noticeable similarities and differences between the two newspapers. First, both newspapers showed the same trend regarding the intensity of the debates and the discussed topics. Most strikingly is the sudden increase of published articles in February 2019 compared to February 2017 and June 2018, especially when the parliamentarian debates seem to diminish. Also, both newspapers showed few differences in the discussed topics and both report on national and international developments in the Netherlands, Europe and Syria. Some dominant shared topics are, for instance, the release of suspected Syriëgangers from Huizen in September 2014; the prosecution in absentia of Soufiane Z. in February 2015; AIVD- report ‘living under ISIS’ in January 2016; and the statements of president Trump and the British female jihadist who wants to return in February 2019. In February 2017 and June 2018, the number of publications has dropped to such an extent that it was hard to point out dominant topics. Moreover, there are also a number of important similarities in the use of words, especially in relation to the illustrated enemy perception. Table 6.1 gives a brief summary of the most noteworthy similarities and differences in the vocabulary between both newspapers. Both newspapers frequently used the words Jihadism, Islamic State, Islam and Muslim. Additionally, both newspapers alternately use the words terrorism and terror attack throughout the different periods. This given, one could argue that both De Volkskrant and De Telegraaf associated Jihadism, Islamic State and the possibility of returning jihadist fighters to the Netherlands with terrorist-related issues. Yet, De Telegraaf makes uses words such as ‘dangerous’ and ‘threat’ more often than De Volkskrant: for example, the word ‘threat’ is mentioned 13 times in De Telegraaf compared to zero in De Volkskrant in September 2014, and De Telegraaf mentioned the word ‘dangerous’ 10 times compared to 3 times in the same period (table 6.1). This implies that De Telegraaf more frequently use vocabulary which contributes to a fierce enemy perspective towards Jihadism and returnees.

Despite the striking similarities in the vocabulary which imply that both newspapers perceive the events in Syria and the possibility of returning jihadist fighters to the Netherlands as long- term security problem, they differ in how the debate is framed and also the way in which this is presented and discussed. As was briefly mentioned before, De Telegraaf uses much tougher language towards the perceived enemy compared to De Volkskrant: not only because of the more frequent use of words like ‘threat and ‘dangerous’, but also by direct references such as soldiers of hatred’.

Moreover, despite the fact that De Volkskrant does not deny the threat rising from (returning) jihadists, it maintains a more balanced perspective with room for nuanced terminology used in the jihad-debate and attention to the possible consequences of a repressive attitude for an inclusive society and increased feelings of exclusion and segregation. This difference is partly stimulated by how the debate is presented and by whom.

Table 6.1 Frequency of selected words in De Volkskrant and De Telegraaf over the different periods Word Period 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Islam/Islamic Volkskrant 5 7 8 1 - - Telegraaf 6 9 1 11 - 4 Islamic State/IS/ISIS Volkskrant 25 10 32 10 5 72 Telegraaf 37 8 17 - - 3 Jihad/jihadism/jihad-/jihadist Volkskrant 40 30 17 5 3 19 Telegraaf 47 34 13 11 3 26 Muslim Volkskrant 12 14 5 - - 2 Telegraaf 9 2 - 2 1 - Returnees/to return Volkskrant 4 3 3 6 2 27 Telegraaf 5 4 - 13 - 10 Dangerous Volkskrant 3 1 1 - - 2 Telegraaf 10 5 1 2 - 3 Risk Volkskrant 1 6 2 5 - - Telegraaf - - - 14 - 2 Secure/security Volkskrant 3 7 3 2 1 7 Telegraaf 12 1 - 3 - 2 Threat Volkskrant - - - - - 3 Telegraaf 13 3 1 5 - - Terror attack Volkskrant 7 20 7 2 - 6 Telegraaf 16 9 5 7 - 4 Terror/terrorism Volkskrant 16 37 15 3 5 13 Telegraaf 26 10 5 16 2 7

De Telegraaf illustrates the public debate based on letters to the editor and comments on the daily polls submitted by readers, probably without any professional background in relation to the topics discussed, and who sometimes bluntly express their opinion with short and rough assumptions. Here, the emergence of the new media may even play a significant role. Via various different internet channels, readers (and non-readers) of the newspaper are invited to respond to news items. Contrarily, De Volkskrant makes extensive use of reactions from or interviews with professionals and experts with different backgrounds related to the issue of jihadism, radicalisation and government-approaches. This collection of different perspectives results in a more balanced perspective or narrative towards the phenomenon of Dutch jihadist fighters. This dichotomy shows the divergence in the Dutch media which is characterized by

both popular newspapers and quality newspapers which both differently illustrate (and elaborate on) the public debate in the Netherlands.

These different enemy perceptions and the ways in which the debate is presented are determining the perceived role of statehood and of the state responsibilities in the policy towards (returning) jihadists. This matter becomes especially clear through the criticism expressed towards the Dutch government and adopted policies. Unsurprisingly, the fierce perspective towards (returning) Dutch jihadists in De Telegraaf goes hand in hand with a call for repressive and hard approaches. Here, the government is accused of acting weakly resulting in a ‘life-threatening’ danger for the Dutch citizens (De Telegraaf, 23 September 2014, p. 6). Especially in the letters to the editor, the readers demand more decisiveness and a more effective approach based on criminal justice and revoking passports. In this narrative, the sovereign role of the state over the national security is perceived to be the most important task of the government and should be protected in every possible way. The exclusion of Dutch jihadists in Syria and Iraq from the Dutch territory and political community (through the revocation of Dutch citizenship) is a widely supported measure among the readers in the letters to the editor. On the other hand, the nuanced perspective of De Volkskrant towards Dutch jihadists results in a more balanced narrative on the role of statehood and its responsibilities. Although criminal justice and government institutions still play a dominant role in the conceptualisation of state sovereignty in the news articles, De Volkskrant also paid a lot of attention to the possibility of a nuanced policy consisting of both softer and harder approaches. Here, ensuring citizenship and inclusiveness in the Dutch society are considered as equally important tasks of the government. In addition to repression, professionals and academics argue that the state should also play an important role in preventing segregation, discrimination and exclusion in order to make sure that this will contribute to a long-lasting solution towards rising radicalisation and extremism. Integration and inclusiveness are thus considered to be just as important as the ability to control national security through the legal and institutional framework.

In short, both newspapers assume that the phenomenon of Dutch jihadist fighters pose a significant threat to the Dutch national security and, consequently, pay a lot of attention to criminal justice and administrative measures. However, the differences in how the (national) enemy is framed and the way in which the public debate is illustrated resulted in different kinds of criticism expressed as well as different narratives on the role of the state. Whereas De Telegraaf is much more focused on a repressive interpretation on statehood and the exclusion – both from the Dutch territory and the political community – of Dutch jihadists, De Volkskrant maintained a more balanced position in which an inclusive society and integration are portrayed as an equally important task of the state.

7 Conclusion and discussion By discussing one of the most recent cross-border phenomena at a European and even global level, this thesis tries to unravel the hidden debate on the role of statehood in the political and public debates on this topic. Through an exploratory research using literature study and content analysis, an attempt was made to find an answer on the following main question: “How are geopolitical representations on the role of statehood manifested in the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates on Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the adopted repressive measures?”. The first part of this chapter gives a short summary of the most important findings and interpretations from this research, followed by a discussion of the limitations and recommendations for future research.

From the literature study it becomes clear that the Dutch case study is to a large extent dependent on the developments on an international level and the binding legal framework for the adopted Dutch policies. Moreover, the European Union fails to provide a single and all- encompassing policy framework and solely has a guiding role in tackling terrorism. Consequently, policy-making and the practical implementation of anti-terrorism policies towards the recent generation of European jihadists in Syria and Iraq still only exists on a national level. Moreover, with a few exceptions on the details, it may be concluded that there is a general repressive trend among the European Member States in which the phenomenon of (returning) jihadist fighters is assumed to be the most intense and troublesome; the Netherlands is no exception to this trend. These outcomes form the contextual situation in which the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates should be understood. The importance of the (geopolitical) developments at the international and European level are best reflected in the parliamentarian debate of January 2016 which, under the influence of the migration crisis, became the turning point in framing Dutch jihadist as an internal enemy – home-grown terrorism and domestic jihadism – to an external enemy – those residing in Syria and Iraq who would possibly return to the Netherlands. After a further examination of these debates, it became clear that both parliamentarian and media debates on (returning) Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and repressive policies are fruitful sources for representations on the role of statehood through the conceptualization of sovereignty, territory and citizenship and their spatial character. However, there were little or no explicit references between the two separate debates. Another important outcome to mention is the slow decline in length of the parliamentarian debates, eventually resulting in the absence of a major plenary debate in 2019. Contrarily, the media debates showed a significant increase in the number of published articles in February 2019 compared to the two previous periods. Hence, both debates were discussed in separate chapters. However, a number of general conclusions may cautiously be drawn from the obtained results. Related to state sovereignty, the security of the Dutch national statehood is illustrated as the most important task of the government and which needs to be protected through the legal (criminal justice) and institutional (e.g. AIVD) framework of the constitutional state, emphasizing the central role of the state as sovereign power to control collective goods on a national level. Although there is some diversity regarding the exact naming practices between the different political parties and newspapers, this idea on the role of statehood is stimulated by a general

enemy perception in which jihadists are dominantly framed as the most imminent contemporary security problem for the Netherlands. In addition, both the parliamentarian and media debates can be divided in at least two (or even three in the case of the parliamentarian debates) different narratives on the role of the state and each of them maintains its own idea on implementation and effectiveness of the repressive measures. The first narrative is supported by dominantly right-wing political parties and De Telegraaf and puts particular emphasis on the (extension of) repressive measures towards jihadists. They argue for the exclusion of jihadists from the Dutch territory and political community as it will be the most effective way to protect the Dutch statehood and its citizens. Generally, they view citizenship as the state’s monopoly to enforce their sovereignty by in- and excluding individuals from the legal rights and immunities of Dutch citizenship, like Agnew (1999) and Forcese (2014) identified in the traditional framework on the modern statehood. The fulfilment of the Dutch norms and standards is an individual task and failure to adapt or comply to these rights and duties may consequently result in the loss of the legal status. Contrarily, the left-wing political parties and De Volkskrant criticize the above narrative for harming the legal boundaries of the constitutional state and argue that a repressive attitude will further stimulate exclusion and segregation. They offer a balanced narrative in which hard and soft measures alternate to ensure an inclusive society and long-lasting solutions for radicalization and integration. They recognize that citizenship is not merely a legal status which is governed by the monopoly of the state, but it is also part of the identity of individuals (Kymlicka, 2003). Therefore, the integration of individuals is seen as an important of the responsibility of the modern statehood, as was emphasized by Behr (2008) in the academic literature. Although less visible in the media debates, there is a third narrative present in the parliamentarian debates which stands out because of its particular territorial narrative on the Dutch statehood. They argue that the national security of the Dutch statehood must be guaranteed by restoring the national physical borders and border control. This narrative most explicitly portrayed the Dutch statehood as a bounded territorial unit on which both state sovereignty and citizenship – through the exclusion of (returning) jihadists – are based (see Häkli, 2001).

The position of the Dutch statehood is a particular one, because of its membership to the supranational European Union. As Murray & Overton (2015) argue, supranational institutions as the European Union may erode the political power of the nation-state. Due to the Schengen agreement on open border policy and shifting power relations between the national and supranational scalar level, the traditional ideas on sovereignty, territory and citizenship became increasingly challenged. However, given these different narratives on statehood, one could argue that in the Dutch parliamentarian and media debates on Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and repressive measures incorporate a wide variety of linguistic constructions that foster a ‘national language’ or vocabulary – based on conceptualisations of sovereignty, territory and citizenship – to make sense of cross-border events (Dijkink, 1998; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006). This outcome contributes to Behr’s (2008) idea on territorial national sovereignty in global politics in cases of security issues, because it is the most important scalar level at which both the state and transnational violent actors encounter each other. This is further

substantiated by the fact that the task for combating returning European fighters remains assigned to the level of the European Member States, the lack of an all-encompassing European solution in repatriating jihadist from Syria and Iraq – for example, because of the different judicial systems – and the merely guiding role of the European Coordinator on Terrorism. In addition, even less attention is paid to the possibility of an international solution through, for example, a UN-tribunal. These developments in combination with the national language imply that, in this case, the narratives on the global political system still occur in the traditional framework on the modern statehood to make sense of the ongoing cross-border developments. More specifically, the Dutch statehood is constantly performed through linguistic construction to secure legitimacy and enforce political authority over the control of territory (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Flint, 2011).

Even though this thesis contributes to a better geopolitical understanding of the phenomenon of Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and the repressive trend in policy-making, there are also some considerable limitations to this research. The first is the sampling of the parliamentarian and media debates and the serious consequences of the generalisation. The included documents on the parliamentarian debates for the analysis were selected based on their valuable content and variety of political parties involved in the debate. The media debates were selected based on the same periods in which the parliamentarian debates took place in order to examine if there were any important similarities or differences between the two. Unfortunately, this resulted in a peculiar selection of debates and some serious bias issues. Therefore, the outcomes must certainly be critically addressed. Due to the time-scope of this thesis, such considerations have to be made in order to guarantee the feasibility of this research. In addition, because of the early phase of the phenomenon and the adopted measures, an exploratory research about the debates on this particular topic is accompanied by such choices. Nonetheless, it has offered valuable new perspective on the phenomenon of Dutch jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq and has opened new doors for (geographical) academic research. Second, it was decided to solely focus on the repressive measures. It was definitely not the intention to provide a one-sided perspective on the Dutch policies, nor it was meant to portray the Dutch statehood as a pre-dominantly repressive actor. Academics and other interested parties should be aware of the two-folded action plan of the Dutch government by combining both preventive (soft) and repressive (hard) measures in combating jihadism and returning jihadist fighters from Syria and Iraq. A similar research focusing on solely soft measures, or rather the combination of hard and soft measures, will probably result in different outcomes and different perspectives on the Dutch statehood. Third, one should be aware that the illustrated distinction between the different narratives provided in this thesis is only a simplistic perspective of the complex reality which is constantly subjected to new developments and events. In addition, the political relations in de Tweede Kamer continuously shift because of the emergence of new political parties and the changing formations of coalitions and oppositions. Also, the role of the new media – through social media and television – is becoming unmistakeably large and provides interesting platforms for the public debate. Fourth, the discussed Dutch parliamentarian and media debates can be subdivided to the academic sub-field of practical and popular geopolitics. Rather, to complete this exploratory

research, scholars should also address the field of formal geopolitics as an important producer and distributor of geopolitical representations. Even more desirable, geopolitical academics should work towards a comprehensive theory on how geopolitical representations on the role of statehood should be examined in future research, focusing on the conceptualisations of sovereignty, territory and citizenship.

To conclude this research, there are many other interesting sub-themes involved in the issue of Dutch jihadist fighters. For instance, the issue on the repatriation of the ‘jihad-children’ who were born and raised or at a young age were taken to Syria by their parents. This issue has stimulated an additional political and public debate in which perhaps equal but also different narratives on the role of statehood are hidden. Not only does it raise ethical considerations, but also geopolitical questions. Because, how does the Dutch statehood deal with the differences between men, women and children? And how is this legitimized? And what kind of perspectives on the enemy and the perceived role of the state does it foster? This is definitely an interesting case which deserves more attention in the geopolitical field. Moreover, the recent events on the prosecution of French jihadists by Iraqi courts resulting in death penalties18 raise questions about the consequences for Dutch state-citizens in Iraq and the possible future repatriation of Dutch jihadists. Earlier, representatives of the Dutch governments stated that the prosecutions of Dutch jihadist in Iraq is impossible because of the death penalty which is a matter of national sovereignty by the Iraqi state. But, at the same time, the Netherlands seemed unwilling to actively participate in the repatriation of ‘their’ jihadists. Will the Dutch jihadist still be located in a judicial no man’s land? And what is their fate? Will the Dutch government admit to the calls by President Trump? Important questions of which the answers may lie in the near future and, more important to geopolitics; what does it all mean for the future power relations in the global political framework and the position of the modern statehood?

18 See, for instance, De Volkskrant: van Es (2019, 31 May). Iraq ‘pioneers’ with lawsuits against foreign IS- fighters, sentenced to death. De Volkskrant: news. Accessed on June 8 June 2019, from: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/irak-pioniert-met-processen-tegen-buitenlandse-is-strijders- rechter-legt-doodstraf-op~b444c320/

8 Literature list

Agnew, J. (1993). Representing space: space, scale and culture in social science. In J. Agnew & J. Duncan (Eds.), The power of place: bringing together geographical and sociological imaginations (pp. 251-271). London: Routledge.

Agnew, J. (1994). The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory, Review of International Political Economy, 1(1), 53-80.

Agnew, J. (1999) Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement in World Politics, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 28(3), 499-521, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298990280030701

Agnew, J. (2005). Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95(2), 437-461, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8306.2005.00468.x

Baarda, B., Bakker, E., Fischer, T., Julsing, M., Peters, V., van der Velden, T. & de Goede, M. (2013). Basisboek voor Kwalitatief Onderzoek (Third edition). Groningen/Houten: Noordhoff Uitgevers.

Baghat, K. & Medina, R. M. (2013). An Overview of Geographical Perspectives and Approaches in Terrorism Research, Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(1), 38-72.

Bakker, E. (2019, 9 March). Daar laten zitten maakt ons niet veilig. De Telegraaf: Binnenland, p. 24.

Bakker, E. & Bont, R. de (2016). Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(5), 837-857, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1209806

Bakker, P. & Scholten, O. (2011). De communicatiekaart van Nederland: Overzicht van media en communicatie (8th edition). Amsterdam: Kluwer.

Barry, C., & L. Ferracioli (2015). Can Withdrawing Citizenship Be Justified? Political Studies, 64(4), 1055–1070.

Behr, H. (2008). Deterritorialisation and the Transformation of Statehood: The Paradox of Globalisation, Geopolitics, 13(2), 359-382, DOI: 10.1080/14650040801991654 de Blij, H. (2012). Why Geography Matters, More Than Ever. New York: Oxford University Press.

Björkdahl, A. (2018). Republika Sprkska: Imaginary, performances and spatialization, Political Geography 66, 34-43, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.07.005

Boréus, K. & Bergstörm, G. (2017). Analysing texts and discourses: eight approaches for the social sciences. London: Sage Publications.

Byman, D. (2015). The Homecomings: What Happens When Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria Return? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(8), 1-22, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1031556

Carey. B. (2018). Against the right to revoke citizenship, Citizenship Studies, 22(8), 897-911, DOI: 10.1080/13621025.2018.1538319

Dijkink, G. (1998). Geopolitical codes and popular representations, GeoJournal 46, 293-299.

England, K. V. L. (1994). Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research, The Professional Geographer, 46(1), 80-89.

Ferguson, J. & Gupta, A. (2002). Spatializing states: toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality, American Ethnologist, 29 (4), 981-1002.

Flint, C. (2003). Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Geographic Research Questions and Agendas, The Professional Geographer, 55(2), 161-169, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/0033- 0124.5502004

Flint, C. (2012). Introduction to Geopolitics. New York: Routledge: Second Edition.

Forcese, C. (2014). A Tale of Two Citizenships: Citizenship Revocation for Traitors and Terrorists, Queens Law Journal, 39(2), 551-586.

Foucault, M. (2007). Questions of Geography. Space, Knowledge and Power. In J. W. Crampton & S. Elde (Eds.) Foucault and Geography (pp. 173–184). Aldershot: Ashgate.

Glynos, J., Norval, A. J., Howarth, D. R. & Seed, E. (2009). Discourse Analysis: varieties and methods (ESRC National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper). Accessed on March 11 2019, from: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/796/1/discourse_analysis_NCRM_014.pdf

Hajer, M. (2006). Doing discourse analysis: coalitions, practices, meaning. In: M. van den Brink and T. Metze (Eds), Words matter in policy and planning (65-74). Utrecht: Netherlands Graduate School of Urban and Regional Research.

Hansen, T. B. & Stepputat, F. (2001). Introduction: States of Imagination. In T. B. Hansen & F. Stepputat (Eds.), States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State (pp. 1-40). Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Häkli, J. (2001). In the Territory of Knowledge: State-centred Discourses and the Construction of the Society, Department of Regional Studies and Environmental Policy, 25 (3), 043-422, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1191/030913201680191745

Haynes, J. (2001). Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics, Third World Quaterly, 22(2), 143-158. DOI: 10.1080/01436590120037009

Hegghammer, T. (2010). The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of the Jihad, International Security, 35(3), 53-94.

Johnston, R. (2001). Out of the ‘Moribund Backwater’: Territory and Territoriality in Political Geography, Political Geography, 20, 677-693.

Kymlicka, W. (2003). New Forms of Citizenship. In T. Courchesne and D. Savoie (Eds.), The Art of the State: Governance in a World Without Frontiers (pp. 265-310). Montreal, Canada: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Malet, D. (2010). Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions, Orbis, 54(1), 97-114.

Malet, D. (2015). Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context, Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(3), 454-473, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1032151

Mamadouh, V. (1999). Reclaiming geopolitics: Geographers strike back, Geopolitics, 4(1), 118-138, DOI: 10.1080/14650049908407640

Mamadouh, V. & Gertjan, D. (2006). Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse, Geopolitics, 11(3), 249-366, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040600767859

Mitchell, T. (1999). Society, economy, and the state effect. In G. Steinmetz (ed.), State/culture: state formation after the cultural turn (pp. 76-97), Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Müller, M. (2012). Opening the black box of the organization: Socio-material practices of geopolitical ordering, Political Geography, 31, 379-388.

Murray, W. E. & Overton, J. (2015). Geographies of Globalization (Second edition). London: Taylor & Francis.

NATO (14 July 2017). Tackling the surge of returning foreign fighters. Accessed on March 11 2019, from: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/daesh-tackling-surge- returning-foreign-fighters-prevention-denmark-rehabilitation-programmes/EN/index.htm

Novak, P. (2011). The Flexible Territoriality of Borders, Geopolitics, 16(4), 741-767, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2010.494190

Parlement.com (n.d. a). Kabinetten 1945-heden. Accessed on 6 May 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp1x03/kabinetten_1945_heden

Parlement.com (n.d. b). Coalitie. Accessed on 6 May 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrogvvp/coalitie

Parlement.com (n.d. c). Evenredige vertegenwoordiging. Accessed on 6 June 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp1x0a/evenredige_vertegenwoordiging

TweedeKamer.nl (n.d.). Zo Werkt de Kamer. Accessed on 6 May 2019, from: https://www.tweedekamer.nl/zo_werkt_de_kamer

Reed, A., Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. de & Bakker, E. (2015). Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (Un)Intended Consequences (ICCT Policy Brief – The Hague). Accessed on February 5 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/pathways-of-foreign-fighters-policy-options- and-their-unintended-consequences/, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.19165/2015.2.01

Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. de (2014). The Foreign Fighters’ Threat: What History Can (Not) Tell Us, Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(5), 59-73.

Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. de & Bakker, E. (2014). Returning Western Foreign Fighters: The Case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia (ICCT Background note – The Hague). Accessed on February 4 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/returning-western-foreign-fighters-the-case- of-afghanistan-bosnia-and-somalia/, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.19165/2014.2.02

Solow, S. (2011). Prosecuting Terrorists as Criminals and the Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, St. John’s Law Review, 85, 1483-1556.

Stimuleringsfonds voor de Journalistiek (11 April 2018). Oplage landelijke kranten: Telegraaf en AD krijgen opnieuw klappen. Accessed on 10 March 2019, from: https://www.svdj.nl/de- stand-van-de-nieuwsmedia/papier/oplage-telegraaf-ad-klappen/

Vidino, L. (2014). European Foreign Fighters in Syria: Dynamics and Responses, European View, 13, 217-224. DOI: 10.1007/s12290-014-0316-4

Vidino, L., Snetkov, A., Pigoni, L., Wegner, A. & Thränert, O. (2014). Foreign Fighters: An Overview of Responses in Eleven Countries (CSS Study). Accessed on February 4 2019, from: http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/188284, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010144347

Weggemans, D., Bakker, E. & Grol, P. (2014). Who Are They and Why Did They Go? The Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters, Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(4), 100.

1 Appendices

Appendix 1 - ICCT literature list

Bakker, E., Entenmann, E. & Paulussen, C. (2013, 16 December). Dealing with European Foreign Fighters in Syria: Governance Challenges and Legal Implications (Research paper – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 4, no. 8). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/dealing-with-european-foreign-fighters-in-syria-governance- challenges-and-legal-implications/

Bakker, E. & De Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. (2015, 10 November). Jihadist Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in Western Europe: A Low-Probability, High-Impact Threat (Research Paper – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 6, no. 9). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/jihadist-foreign-fighter-phenomenon-in-western-europe-a- low-probability-high-impact-threat/

Boutin, B. (2016, 16 December). Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search of Limits and Safeguards (Research paper – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 7, no. 12). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/administrative- measures-against-foreign-fighters-in-search-of-limits-and-safeguards/

Boutin, B., Chauzal, G., Dorsey, J., Jegerings, M., Paulussen, C., Pohl, J., Reed, A., & Zavagli, S. and van Ginkel, B. & Entenmann, E. (Eds.) (2016, 1 April). The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU – Profiles, Threats and Policies (Research paper – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 7, no. 2). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/report-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-in-the-eu-profiles-threats- policies/

Clarke, C. P. (2018, 11 December). The Future of the Global Jihadist Movement after the Collapse of the Caliphate? (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/the-future-of-the-global- jihadist-movement-after-the-collapse-of-the-caliphate/

Coolseat, R. & Renard T. (2018, 11 April). The Homecoming of Foreign Fighters in The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium: Policies and Challenges (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/the-homecoming-of-foreign-fighters-in-the-netherlands-germany- and-belgium-policies-and-challenges/

Dawson, L. L. (2018, 6 June). The Demise of the Islamic State and the Fate of its Western Foreign Fighters: Six Things to Consider (Policy brief– The International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, The Hague 9). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/the-

demise-of-the-islamic-state-and-the-fate-of-its-western-foreign-fighters-six-things-to- consider/

Global Center on Cooperative Securtity, Human Security Collective and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (2014, 24 December). Addressing the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon form a European Union Perspective: UN Security Council Resolution 2178, Legal issues, and Challenges and Opportunities for EU Foreign Security and Development Policy (Policy brief). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/addressing-the-foreign-terrorist-fighters-phenomenon-from-a- european-union-perspective/

Hennessy, O. (2014, 2 April). The Return of Europe’s Foreign Fighters (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/the-return-of-europes-foreign-fighters/

Mehra, T. (2016, 19 December). Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Trends, Dynamics and Policy Responses (Report – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-terrorist-fighters-trends-dynamics- and-policy-responses/

Mehra, T. (2017, 22 December). Bringing (Foreign) Terrorist Fighters to Justice in a Post-ISIS Landscape Part I: Prosecution by Iraqi and Syrian Courts (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/bringing-foreign-terrorist-fighters-to-justice-in-a-post-isis- landscape-part-i-prosecution-by-iraqi-and-syrian-courts/

Mehra, T. (2018, 12 January). Bringing (Foreign) Terrorist Fighters to Justice in a Post-ISIS Landscape Part I: Prosecution by Foreign National Courts (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/bringing-foreign-terrorist-fighters-to-justice-in-a-post-isis- landscape-part-ii-prosecution-by-foreign-national-courts/

Paulussen, C. (2013, 2 December). The Syrian Foreign Fighters Problem: A Test Case from The Netherlands (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/the-syrian-foreign-fighters-problem- a-test-case-from-the-netherlands/

Paulussen, C. (2015). Responding to Foreign Fighters: A Quick Overview for People with Little Time (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/responding-to-foreign-fighters-a-quick-overview- for-people-with-little-time/

Paulussen, C. (2016, 7 November). Repressing the Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in Western Europe: Towards an Effective Response Based on Human Rights (Research paper – The

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 7, no. 10). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/repressing-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-and-terrorism-in- western-europe-towards-an-effective-response-based-on-human-rights/

Paulussen, C. (2018, 17 October). Countering Terrorism Through the Stripping of Citizenship: Ineffective and Counterproductive (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/countering- terrorism-through-the-stripping-of-citizenship-ineffective-and-counterproductive/

Paulussen, C. & Pitcher, K. (2018, 30 January). Prosecuting (Potential) Foreign Fighters: Legislative and Practical Challenges (Research paper – The International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, The Hague 8, no. 13). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/prosecuting-potential-foreign-fighters-legislative-and-practical- challenges/

Reed, A., De Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., & Bakker, E. (2015, May 2015). Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and their (Un)intended Consequences (Policy brief – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 6, no.1). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/pathways-of-foreign-fighters-policy-options-and-their- unintended-consequences/

Reed, A. & Pohl, J. (2017a, 27 February). Disentangling the EU Foreign Fighter Threat: The Case for a Comprehensive Approach (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/disentangling-the-eu-foreign-fighter-threat-the-case-for-a- comprehensive-approach/

Reed, A. & Pohl, J. (2017b, 14 July). Tackling the Surge of Returning Foreign Fighters (Perspective Perspective – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/tackling-the-surge-of-returning- foreign-fighters/

Reed, A., Pohl, J. & Jegerings, M. (2017, 8 June). The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat: Making Sense of an Evolving Phenomenon (Policy brief – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 8, no. 1). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/the-four-dimensions-of-the-foreign-fighter-threat-making-sense-of- an-evolving-phenomenon/

Schmid, A. P. (2015a, 4 June). Challenging the Narrative of the Islamic State (Research paper – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 6, no.5). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/challenging-the-narrative-of-the-islamic-state/

Schmid, A. P. (2015b, 27 October). Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues (Policy Brief – The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague 6, no.

4). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-terrorist-fighter- estimates-conceptual-and-data-issues/

Ark, R. van (2019, 11 March). British Citizenship Revoked, Bangladeshi Citizenship Uncertain – What next for Shamima Begum? (Perspective – The International Centre for Counter- Terrorism, The Hague). Accessed on 4 May 2019, from: https://icct.nl/publication/british- citizenship-revoked-bangladeshi-citizenship-uncertain-what-next-for-shamima-begum/

Wensink, W., Warmenhoven, B., Haasnoot, R., Wesselink, R., Van Ginkel, B., Wittendorp, S., Paulussen, C., Douma, W., Boutin, B., Güven, O. & Rijken, T. (2017). The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism: Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness. Accessed on February 25 2019, from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses

Appendix 2 – Overview of Dutch political parties in the Tweede Kamer

Political party Description Christen-Democratisch Christian democratic party which can generally be considered as a right-wing party in the Appèl (CDA)19 Dutch parliament. They consider common norms and values as the foundation for the society and the government may actively make an appeal to these norms and values. The Bible remains the main inspiration source for this political party which results in principles such as public justice, shared responsibility, solidarity and custodianship. ChristenUnie (CU)20 Christian political party which beliefs the word of God and His ruling are the foundation of the government and the political system. The government is in the service of God and Its word. It is difficult to locate this political party on the left-right division in the political spectrum. In general, it is considered as a right-wing party because of their principles, but they proved to be more left-oriented in some topics. Democraten 66 (D66)21 D66 is a reform-minded social-liberalist party which is in general considered as a political party locating in the centre of the political left-right spectrum. Because they believe the humankind should be the main focus in political issues, this party adds a social element to the classical liberalist principles. Forum voor Democratie Forum voor Democratie is an eurosceptic, right-wing political party which aims to (FvD)22 introduce diverse forms of direct democracy, like referenda, and restore the national sovereignty of the Dutch state. GroenLinks (GL)23 GroenLinks is a progressive party which stands for ‘green development’ and equal share of income, knowledge, power and labour in The Netherlands as well as globally. This political party is positioned in the left corner of the political spectrum. Groep Bontes/Van This political party participated in the elections of 2017 under the name VoorNederland Klaveren (GrBvK)24 (VNL), but by not obtaining any seats in the parliament, the party was subsequently dissolved. The party was founded because the two members separated from the PVV and started their own political group. The political party was characterised as classic-liberal and euro sceptical. Groep Kuzu/Öztürk Nowadays, this political party continues under the name DENK. They aim at a respectful (GrKÖ)25 society for all Dutch citizens striving towards tolerance and an equitable society. In general, this is left-wing party. Both party members have separated from the PvdA to start this party. Houwers26 Formal VVD-parliament member Mr. Houwers became expelled from the VVD-party in 2015 Monasch27 This political party participated in the elections of 2017 under the name NieuweWegen, but by not obtaining any seats in the parliament, the party was subsequently dissolved. The party was originally started because Jacques Monasch separated himself from the PvdA.

19 Parlement.com (n.d.) Links en Rechts. Accessed on 3 April 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp8wsy/links_en_rechts 20 See 19 21 See 19 22 Parlement.com (n.d.). Forum voor Democractie. Accessed on 10 June 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vkbfkzyuqytw/forum_voor_democratie_fvd 23 See 19 24 Parlement.com (n.d. b). Tweede Kamerfractie Groep-Bontes/Van Klaveren (GrBvK). Accessed on 3April 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vjixijfzvhrx/tweede_kamerfractie_groep_bontes_van 25 See 19 26 Parlement.com (n.d.). Johan Houwers. Accessed on 10 Jun, 2019, from https://www.parlement.com/id/vifbi4vltgyt/j_johan_houwers 27 Parlement.com (n.d. c). Tweede Kamerfractie Lid-Monasch. Accessed on 3 April 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vk90c3cf6nqu/tweede_kamerfractie_lid_monasch

Partij voor de Arbeid The PvdA is a left-wing, social-Democratic party striving for equal opportunities, an equal (PvdA)28 distribution of power and income and sustainable development. They believe that every human being should be able to fully participate in the society and deserve chances to do so. Partij voor de Dieren The PvdD is a left-wing political party which believes that animals are the weakest living (PvdD)29 creatures and aims to put animal welfare at the political agenda. Partij voor de Vrijheid The PVV is a right-wing party which stands for a free and independent Dutch nation-state. (PVV30) Some even describe the PVV as an extreme right-wing party because of its fierce aversion towards the Islamisation of the Dutch society. The PVV characterises itself as a populist party which generally in opposition to the left-wing oriented parties and their ideas on subsides and development aid. Party leader Wilders is a former member of the VVD. Staatkundig Gereformeerde The SGP is a Christian-Reformatory political party which is situated in the right corner in Partij (SGP)31 the political spectrum. This political party acknowledges the Bible and the word of God as the main guide within life and politics. Although they belief state and church should be separated, there should always be room for political arguments based on the Christian religion. Socialistische Partij (SP)32 Socialist party desires a harmonious society based on human dignity, equality and solidarity. They think that everyone has to right to obtain a job, a decent income, education, social allowances and decent health care. In the political spectrum, the SP is seen as a left- wing party. Van Vliet33 The Van-Vliet group was founded in 2014 due to the dissatisfaction with some political statements made by Mr. Wilders of the PVV. Mr. Van Vliet decided to leave the PVV, but he kept his seat in the parliament.

Volkspartij voor Vrijheid A right-wing liberalist party containing more progressive views on ethical issues. en Democratie (VVD)34 Individualism, freedom and liberties are high on the political agenda of this party and believe that government intervention should be as limited as possible. In contrast, it is believed that national security is a collective good that should be in the control of the government. 50Plus35 This party focuses on the interests of people over 50 years old, because they think this group is insufficiently represented in the Dutch politics. They do not represent a particular ideology and desire to cooperate with every generation for innovation and improvement of the society. Their position in the political spectrum is contested, so they are mainly considered to be located in the centre of the left-right division.

28 See 19 29 Parlement.com (n.d.). Partij voor de Dieren. Accessed on 10 June 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vhnnmt7j73yg/partij_voor_de_dieren_pvdd 30 See 19 31 See 19 32 See 19 33 Parlement.com (n.d.). Tweede Kamer-fractie Van Vliet. Accessed on 10 June 2019, from: https://www.parlement.com/id/vji9bxgjr8tp/tweede_kamerfractie_lid_van_vliet 34 See 19 35 See 19

Appendix 3 – List of all search results of the parliamentarian debates

Plenary debates Date Keyword(s) Debat uitkomsten Europesen Raad – Veiligheid (02/09/2014) IS-strijder Aanpak Nederlandse Jihadstrijders (04/09/2014) Syriëgangers Politieke steun aan de bestrijding van IS in Syrië (02/10/2014) Jihadisten De aanslag in Parijs (14/01/2015) Jihadisten, Syriëgangers Wetsvoorstel: Ontnemen van het (26/02/2015) Jihadisten, Nederlanderschap na terroristische misdrijven Syriëgangers Aanslagen in Parijs (19/11/2015) Syriëgangers Jihadgangers, Jihadstrijders Wijziging van het wetboek Strafrecht (08/12/2015) Jihadisten Terugkerende Syriëgangers en (27/01/2015) Jihadisten, infiltratie door ISIS in vluchtelingenketen IS-strijders, Syriëgangers Aanslagen in Brussel (1) (29/03/2016) Jihadisten Aanslagen in Brussel (2 & 3) (07/04/2016) Syriëgangers Intrekken Nederlanderschap (18/05/2016) Jihadstrijders Wijziging paspoortrecht (02/06/2016) Jihadisten AIVD-rapport: Terugkeerders in beeld (23/02/2017) Jihadisten, Jihadgangers Bericht dat een veroordeelde jihadist is (14/06/2017) Jihadisten aangehouden op vliegbasis Volkel Syrische IS-strijder die vrij rondloopt in Nederland (12/06/2018) IS-strijders Nederlandse militaire steun aan Syrië (29/01/2019) Jihadisten Amsterdamse school die beïnvloed zou zijn (14/03/2019) Jihadisten door Jihadisten

Oral questions Vragen De Graaf - “PVV wil extra actie (23/09/2014) Jihadgangers na dreigementen IS” Vragen de Graaf - “Geen terugkeer Syriëgangers” (03/02/2015) Syriëgangers Vragen Helder - “PVV: regering zet (17/03/2015) Jihadisten antiterreurmaatregelen te weinig in Vragen Fritsma - “PVV eist uitzetting jihadisten” (10/11/2015) Jihadisten, IS-strijders Vragen Recourt - “Einde aan vrijblijvendheid (12/04/2016) Syriëgangers bij terrorismebestrijding Vragen De Graaf - “PVV: grenzen dicht om (07/06/2016) Jihadisten terroristen te weren” Vragen De Graaf - “Voorkom dat veroordeelde (22/05/2018) Syriëgangers Syriëgangers terugkeren”

Vragen De Graaf - “PVV vraagt naar de verijdeling (02/10/2018) Jihadisten van terroristische aanslag” Vragen Sjoerdsma - “D66 vraagt naar uitspraken (19/02/2019) Jihadisten, IS-strijders Trump over vrijlaten IS-gevangenen Vragen Heerema- “VDD vraagt naar mogelijke (12/03/2019) Jihadisten invloed jihadisten op Amsterdamse school”

General political considerations: Segers - “ChristenUnie: Bescherm onze vrijheden” (21/09/2016) Jihadisten Regeringsverklaring (02/11/2017) Jihadisten

Budgets Begroting Veiligheid en Justitie (1) (25/11/2014) Jihadisten Begroting Veiligheid en Justitie (2) (25/11/2014) Jihadisten Begroting Binnenlandse Zaken (1) (17/11/2015) Jihadisten Begroting Binnenlandse Zaken (2) (18/11/2015) Jihadisten Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken (15/11/2015) IS-strijders, Jihadstrijders Begroting Defensie (22/11/2017) Jihadisten Begroting Justitie en Veiligheid (29/11/2017) Jihadisten, IS-strijders Begroting Justitie en Veiligheid (30/11/2017) IS-strijder

Appendix 4– Code book qualitative analysis

Code Description Citizenship/community References to words as citizenship, community and society Criminal justice References to the Dutch criminal law/legislation and judicial system Democracy References to the word democracy Dutch territory References to the recognised legitimate territory of The Netherlands European cooperation References to (attempts at) cooperation with other member states of the EU or the EU as entity in itself European Law European legislation European Organisations References to European organisations Exclusion Non-physical exclusion (e.g. feeling of not belonging or in a related to discrimination/segregation) Exporting problems References to the passing on of problems to other countries/areas Expulsion Physical exclusion (e.g. territorial ban) (Extraterritorial) The prosecution of Syriëgangers prosecution Geographical proximity References to geographical proximity Geographical scales References to other scalar levels other than the national Government institutions Government institutions (other than security services) Identity References to the identity of individuals (as an addition to the code on community/society) Inclusion/integration Non-physical inclusion/integration of people International References to (attempts at) international cooperation cooperation International Law International legislation International References to international organisations (including non-governmental organisations) organisations Liberties References to the word liberty Legal order References to the legal order Media References to media debates Migration References to migration or related (e.g. refugees) National security Usage of the word national security Nationality References to the word nationality Norms and values References to the norms and values/standards in as envisaged in the Dutch society Parliamentarian debate References to the parliamentarian debate Physical border (policy) References to physical bordering or border policy Repression References to repression or other measures towards Syriëgangers Revoking (the possibility) to revoke citizenship and passports of Syriëgangers citizenship/passport Rights References to rights in case of citizenship Rule of References to the word constitutional state law/constitutional state Schengen References to the Schengen agreement or the border-free area in Europe Security services Dutch security services Social/legal boundaries Non-physical boundaries in society or the legal system State and non-state Making the distinction between state and non-state entities State task/responsibility Mentioning the state task/responsibility Symbol politics Usage of the word symbol politics Territory (in general) References to territory other than the Dutch territory and Schengen/EU area

Appendix 5 – Ethical procedure and questions by the AISSR

1. Is ethical permission required or wise? à no big ethical constraints a. No direct impact on informants (no informants) b. No direct danger or practical problems c. No fields of clashing interests that needs to be handled with care (at most, I will illustrate the opposing political parties and their political agenda) d. No clashing interests between me and other involved parties

2. Background questions a. Who and what? Solely document-based content and discourse analysis on parliamentarian and media debates, involving statements of representatives of the political parties, Ministers, professionals/experts, academics, and readers of the newspapers. b. Relating in research: This research and the outcomes will not directly harm of those involved. The data relating to this research is mainly based on already existing reports, articles, documents or media. This research will only contribute to a better geographical understanding of the topic by deconstructing the available data. The main purpose of this research is to place the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters and the repressive policies in a geopolitical context on territory, sovereignty and citizenship and related discourses. c. After assembling: After the assembling of data, this raw data is processed and analysed in private spheres until the final report is published. Possible names or other relevant information will not be shared with others (at most my thesis supervisor) until it is approved and published. There are no other parties involved in data collection and writing the analysis. d. Publishing: An extensive description of the used methods and data analysis is included in the final master thesis as a separate chapter. Here, one can find any relevant information on the methodological process of the research and how is dealt with ethical concerns. The master thesis will be published as part of the University of Amsterdam of Social Sciences. The master thesis is only available in the English language, but it may also be interesting to Dutch readers. The final work will demonstrate why a geopolitical perspective in such recent phenomena is interesting and necessary for a better understanding of the situation. I am aware of the fact that the final results will be open to everyone who is interested and may stimulate a more geopolitical perspective towards this topic.

Appendix 6 – Data on parliamentarian debates

Table 1. Overview of parliamentarian debates used in the analysis

No. Official title of the Date Involved parties * Ministers Number Time/duration Other debates planned that day debate according of pages to TweedeKamer.nl 1 Aanpak 4 September Van Haersma Buma (CDA) – party Social affairs 62 (divided Planned: - Approval of the intention to revoke the Nederlandse 2014 leader and in two 10:15 AM – 1:42 international convention on economic, social jihadstrijders Roemer (SP) – party leader Employment – documents) PM and cultural affairs (Hamerstuk) (TK 105-2 & TK Wilders (PVV) – party leader Asscher (PvdA) - Amendment of the EU Asylum Act 105-6) Van Ojik (GL) – party leader (1st debate) (Hamerstuk) Pechtold (D66) – party leader Justice and - Discussing agenda + letters Segers (CU) – party leader Security – 7h 44min - Report 1F-policy Dijkhoff (VVD) – party member Opstelten - Amendment of Criminal Law related to Van der Staaij (SGP) – party leader (VVD) nursing, extension of probationary periods, Samson (PvdA) – party leader and behavioural and freedom-restricting Bontes (GrBvK) – party member measures Klein (50PLUS/Klein) – party member 2 Wetsvoorstel: 26 February De Graaf (PVV) – party member Justice and 26 Planned: - Establishment Act on on the Council for Ontnemen van het 2015 Oskam (CDA) – party member Security – 1:40 PM – 17:00 the Administration of Criminal Justice and Nederlanderschap Segers (CU) – party leader Opstelten PM the Child Protective Services bij terroristische Schouw (D66) – party member (VVD) - Discussing agenda misdrijven Van Klaveren (GrBvK) – party (4th debate) - Discussing motions on EU-top regarding (TK 57-8) member Greece Van Tongeren (GL) – party 2h 58min - Report on horse husbandry member - Report on child care Gesthuizen (SP) – party member - Report on sham-constructions Recourt (PvdA) – party member Van der Steur (VDD) – party member

Van der Staaij (SGP) – party leader Kuzu (GrKÖ) – party leader

3 Terugkerende 27 January Bontes (GrBvK) – party member Justice and 29 Planned: - Report CvO Syriëgangers en 2016 De Graaf (PVV) – party member Security – Van 6:45 PM – n/a - Inaguration of Mrs. Sylvester as deputy infiltratie door Van Toorenburg (CDA) – party der Steur ombudsman ISIS in de member (VVD) (6th and last - Discussing agenda vluchtelingenketen Swinkels (D66) – party member debate) - Condition of nature in The Netherlands (TK 47-9) Gesthuizen (SP) – party member The Interior and - Consequences of the increased milk Tellegen (VVD) – party member Kingdom 3h 5min production in The Netherlands Öztürk (GrKÖ) – party member Relations – Van der Staaij (SGP) – party leader Plasterk (PvdA) Recourt (PvdA) – party member 4 AIVD-rapport 23 February De Graaf (PVV) – party member Justice and 31 (divided Planned: - Amendment health insurance Act “Terugkeerders in 2017 Van Toorenburg (CDA) – party Security – Blok in two 11:15 AM – 1:10 (Hamerstuk) beeld” member (VVD) documents) PM - Report people-trafficking (TK 57-7 & TK Tellegen (VVD) – party member - Report criminal justice issues 57-10) Bontes (GrBvK) – party member The Interior and (5th debate) - Report on responds on the motion of Van Raak (SP) – party member Kingdom Merkies on country-by-country reporting Verhoeven (D66) – party member Relations – 2h 47min - Discussing agenda Recourt (PvdA) – party member Plasterk (PvdA) - Report Environment Council Grashoff (GL) – party member - Report aviation Monasch (Monasch) – party - Report policy Belastingdienst member - Report on Gids Proportionaliteit Kuzu (GrKÖ) – party leader - Report Energy Council - Report Agriculture and Fishery Council - Report youth aid - Report PGB - Voting - Report Defence Personnel - Report legal assistance - Report dental care and first aid - Report innovation and wastage in health care

- Report patient- and client rights - Voting 5 Syrische IS- 12 June De Graaf (PVV) – party member Justice and 13 Planned: - Questions strijder die vrij 2018 Kuiken (PvdA) – party member Security – 4:15 PM – 7:00 - Farwell member Van Tongeren (GL) rondloopt in A.Rutte (VVD) – party member Grapperhaus PM - Voting Nederland Van Toorenburg (CDA) – party (CDA) - Discussing agenda (TK 92-26) member (5th debate) - Report medicinal cannabis Buitenweg (GL) – party member - Amendment health care Act Van Raak (SP) – party member 2h 41min Belhaj (D66) – party member Stoffer (SGP) – party member 6 Vragenuur: 19 Sjoerdsma (D66) – party member Foreign Trade 3 Planned: - Questions (growth Schiphol and increasing Vragen Sjoerdsma January Van Helvert (CDA) – party and 2:00 PM – 3:00 energy costs) (D66) 2019 member Development PM - Farewell member Van Oosten (VVD) Voordewind (CU) – party member Cooperation – - Voting Vragen naar Kaag (D66) (1st debate, 3rd - Discussing agenda uitspraken Trump question) - Introduction Environmental Law over vrijlaten IS- Replaces: gevangenen 14min (TK 55-4) Foreign Affairs – Blok (VVD)

Table 2. Quantitative structure plenary debate 4 September 2014

Political party Speaking time Number of times speaking Number of interruptions On Number of On (predetermined) in debate * on other members** interruptions on the Minsters** CDA 6 min 53 1 VVD 7 Opstelten SP 6 min 33 2 CDA, SGP 7 Opstelten & Asscher PVV 6 min 15 1 PvdA - - GL 6 min 31 1 CDA 7 Opstelten & Asscher D66 6 min 68 5 CDA, PVV, VVD 13 Opstelten & Asscher CU 6 min 23 2 CDA, GL 7 Opstelten & Asscher VVD 6 min 30 3 CDA, CU 1 Opstelten SGP 6 min 12 - - 3 Opstelten PvdA 6 min 8 - - 1 Opstelten GrBvk 3 min 17 4 CDA, SP, VVD, 1 Opstelten PvdA 50PLUS/Klein 6 min 4 1 CDA - -

*This number indicates how often a spokesperson of the political party has spoken during the debates. This includes every single time the spokesperson has spoken during his/her first or second term, responds on interruptions by other parliament members or Ministers, dialogues with other parliament members or Ministers, and responds on the president of the debate.

**This number indicates how often a spokesperson of the political party has interrupted another political party or a Minister. A possible forthcoming dialogue between both parties is included in the number.

Table 3. Quantitative structure plenary debate 26 February 2015

Structure: First term: speaking time for each political party + interruptions by the other members of the parliament No responds from the Minister, no motions to submit

Political party Speaking time Number of times Number of interruptions On Number of interruptions on On (predetermined) speaking in debate* on other members** the Minsters ** PVV 10 min 7 2 CDA, VVD n/a n/a CDA 25 min 23 1 D66 n/a n/a CU 10 min 12 2 PvdA n/a n/a D66 10 min 11 3 CDA, PvdA, VVD n/a n/a GrBvK 7 min 1 - - n/a n/a GL 10 min 9 4 CDA, CU, PvdA, VVD n/a n/a SP 15 min 19 5 CDA, CU, PvdA, VVD, SGP n/a n/a PvdA 10 min 25 5 CDA, SP, VVD, SGP, GrKO n/a n/a VVD 15 min 22 2 CDA, D66 n/a n/a SGP 10 min 12 2 CDA, VVD n/a n/a GrKÖ 15 min 9 2 CDA, PvdA n/a n/a

Table 4. Quantitative structure plenary debate 27 January 2016

Political party Speaking time Number of times Number of interruptions On Number of interruptions On (predetermined) speaking in debate* on other members** on the Minsters ** GrBvk 2 min 6 - - 2 Van der Steur PVV 4 min 15 1 CDA 2 Van der Steur & Plasterk CDA 4 min 22 4 D66, VVD, GrKÖ, PvdA 4 Van der Steur & Plasterk D66 4 min 15 1 VVD 3 Van der Steur & Plasterk SP 4 min 12 1 VVD 3 Van der Steur & Plasterk VVD 4 min 19 1 CDA 1 Plasterk GrKÖ 2 min 26 3 PVV, VVD, PvdA 3 Van der Steur & Plasterk SGP 4 min 5 - - 1 Van der Steur PvdA 4 min 10 1 VVD 1 Plasterk

Table 5. Quantitative structure plenary debate 23 February 2017

Political party Speaking time Number of times Number of interruptions On Number of interruptions On (predetermined) speaking in debate* on other members** on the Minsters ** PVV 4 min 21 3 VVD, D66, PvdA 1 Blok CDA 4 min 29 3 VVD, D66, GL 2 Blok VVD 4 min 19 2 D66, GL 1 Blok GrBvK 2 min 7 - - 1 Blok SP 4 min 13 - - 2 Blok & Plasterk D66 4 min 45 4 CDA, PvdA, GL 2 Blok PvdA 4 min 23 3 CDA, D66 2 Blok GL 4 min 20 3 CDA, PvdA, Monasch - - Monasch 1 min 16 3 D66, PvdA, GL - - GrKÖ 2 min - - - - -

Table 6. Quantitative structure plenary debate 12 June 2018

Structure: First term: speaking time for each political party + interruptions by the other members of the parliament Responds of the Ministers on the asked questions + interruptions by the other members of the parliament Second term: remaining speaking time + submit motions + responds of the Ministers Political party Speaking time Number of times Number of interruptions On Number of interruptions On (predetermined) speaking in debate* on other members** on the Minsters ** PVV 3 min 10 1 D66 2 Grapperhaus PvdA 3 min 1 - - - - VVD 3 min 5 - - 1 Grapperhaus CDA 3 min 4 - - 1 Grapperhaus GL 3 min 10 - - 2 Grapperhaus SP 3 min 3 - - 1 Grapperhaus D66 3 min 5 - - - -

SGP 3 min 2 - - - -

Table 7. Quantitative structure oral questions 19 February 2019

Structure:

Sjoerdsma (D66) asks questions (2) about the statements of President Trump regarding IS-prisoners in Syria. Minister Kaag (D66) responds Sjoerdsma (D66) responds on the provided answers Minister (D66), once again, responds on Sjoerdsma (D66) Possibility of other parties to interrupt: CDA + CU Minister Kaag (D66) responds

Political party Number of speaking * Number of interruptions** On D66 4 2 Minister Kaag CDA 3 1 Minister Kaag CU 3 1 Minister Kaag

Table 8. Motions and outcome plenary debate 4 September 2014

No. (29754-) Title By Voting result In favour Oppose 255 Criminalisation of glorification of CDA Declined CDA, PVV, SGP, GrBvK VVD, PvdA, SP, D66, CU, GL, PvdD, 50 terrorist violence SGP (30 by 120) PLUS/B-T, 50PLUS/Klein, Van Vliet 256 Prohibition of organizations aiming at CDA Declined CDA, PVV, CU VVD, PvdA, SP, D66 overthrowing the democracy and SGP (36 by 114) SGP, GrBvK, Van Vliet GL, PvdD, 50PLUS/B-T, 50PLUS/Klein constitutional state 257 Plan for integration and against SP Declined SP, D66, GL, PvdD, 50PLUS/Klein VVD, PvdA, CDA, PVV, CU, SGP, segregation (34 by 116) GrBvK, 50PLUS/B-T, Van Vliet 258 Adherence to a prior judicial review GL Declined SP, D66, CU VVD, PvdA, CDA for revoking Dutch citizenships D66 (39 by 111) GL, PvdD, 50PLUS/Klein PVV, SGP, GrBvK 50PLUS/B-T, Van Vliet 259 Analysis (incl. evaluation) on GL Approved PvdA, SP, D66, CU, GL, PvdD, VVD, CDA, PVV, SGP, GrBvK previous approaches (77 by 73) 50PLUS/Klein 50PLUS/B-T, Van Vliet 260 (267) Evaluation of the Action Programme D66 Approved PvdA, SP, CDA, VVD, PVV, GrBvK Integral Approach towards Jihadism GL (93 by 57) D66, CU, GL, SGP 50PLUS/B-T, Van Vliet 50PLUS/Klein PvdD, 50PLUS/Klein 261 Ambitious policy on preventive D66 Declined SP, D66, CU VVD, PvdA, CDA measures to promote integration and GL (39 by 111) GL, PvdD PVV, SGP, GrBvK prevent radicalisation CU 50PLUS/Klein 50PLUS/B-T, Van Vliet SP 50PLUS/Klein 262 Prioritizing to contact the Muslim CU Approved VVD, PvdA, SP, 50PLUS/B-T community to prevent anti-Semitism SGP (149 by 1) CDA, D66, PVV PvdA CU, GL, SGP VVD GrBvK, PvdD 50PLUS/Klein Van Vliet 263 Sending the intended approaches well CU Declined SP, CDA, D66 VVD, PvdA, PVV before the debate on the budgets SP (52 by 98) CU, GL, PvdD SGP, GrBvK 50PLUS/Klein 50PLUS/B-T, Van Vliet

264 To be more effective in counteracting SGP Declined CDA, PVV, CU VVD, PvdA the display of flags of terrorist CDA (35 by 115) SGP, GrBvK SP, D66, GL, PvdD organizations CU 50PLUS/Klein 50PLUS/B-T, Van Vliet 265 National jihad-alert GrBvk Declined PVV, GrBvK, Van Vliet VVD, PvdA, SP, (15 by 153) CDA, D66, CU, GL, SGP, PvdD, 50PLUS/B-T, 50PLUS/K

26 February 2015 – Plenary debate n/a

Table 9. Motions and outcomes plenary debate 27 January 2016 No. (29754-) Title By Voting result In favour Oppose 350 No criminal prosecution for Jitse GrBvK Declined PVV, GrBvK VVD, PvdA, SP, CDA, D66, CU, GL, Akse (14 by 136) SGP, GrKÖ PvdD, 50PLUS, Houwers, Klein, Van Vliet 351 Actions to protect Jiske Akse GrBvK Declined PVV, GrBvK, 50PLUS VVD, PvdA (15 by 135) SP, CDA, D66 CU, GL, SGP, GrKÖ, PvdD Houwers, Klein Van Vliet 352 Making administrative detention GrBvK Declined PVV, GrBvK VVD, PvdA, SP, CDA, D66 possible (14 by 136) CU, GL, SGP GrKÖ, PvdD 50PLUS, Houwers Klein, Van Vliet 353 No longer allow asylum seekers to PVV (2) Declined PVV, GrBvK VVD, PvdA enter The Netherlands (14 by 136) SP, CDA, D66

CU, GL, SGP, GrKÖ, PvdD, 50PLUS, Houwers Klein, Van Vliet 354 Removing the mayor of Katwijk PVV Declined PVV, GrBvK VVD, PvdA, SP, CDA, D66, CU, GL, (14 by 136) SGP, GrKÖ, PvdD, 50PLUS, Houwers, Klein, Van Vliet 355 Take returning jihadist fighters in CDA Declined VVD, CDA, PVV PvdA, SP, D66 custody VVD (73 by 77) SGP, GrBvK, 50PLUS, Houwers, Van CU, GL, GrKÖ PvdD, Klein SGP Vliet 356 An active communication policy to GrKÖ Approved PvdA, SP, D66, CU VVD, CDA, PVV remove unjustified fears about (78 by 148) GL, GrKÖ, PvdD, 50PLUS, Klein SGP, GrBvK, Houwers, Van Vliet refugees

Table 10. Motions and outcomes plenary debate 23 February 2017

No. (29754-) Title By Voting result In favour Oppose 415 Quick examination of criminalisation of CDA Approved VVD, PvdA, SP D66, GL, GrKÖ residence in a terrorist area (129 by 21) CDA, PVV, CU PvdD, Klein SGP, GrBvK, 50PLUS, Houwers Monasch, Van Vliet 416 Immediate execution of the approved SP Declined SP, CDA, PVV VVD, PvdA, D66 motion by Roemer/Zijlstra (48 by 102) SGP, GrBvK, 50PLUS, Houwers CU, GL, GrKÖ (Publication of the list of terrorist Monasch PvdD, Klein, Van Vliet organizations by the AIVD) 417 Vote of no confidence of the Tweede Monasch Declined PVV, 50PLUS VVD, PvdA, SP Kamer (14 by 136) Monasch CDA, D66, CU, GL, SGP, GrBvK GrKÖ, PvdD, Houwers, Klein Van Vliet

Table 11. Motions and outcomes plenary debate 12 June 2018

No. (29754-) Title By Voting result In favour Oppose 449 The detention and expulsion of a terrorist PVV Declined PVV, FvD VVD, CDA, D66 who turned up in De Balie (22 by 128) GL, SP, PvdA CU, PvdD, 50PLUS, DENK/GrKÖ, SGP

19 February 2019 – Oral Questions n/a

Table 12. List of original quotes in Dutch (chapter 5) Page no. Quote in thesis Paragraph 5.1 32 “De zomer van 2014 heeft laten zien dat de dreiging van radicale moslims groot en dichtbij is. Het is op dit moment de grootste binnenlandse dreiging: de dreiging van IS en de dreiging van de radicaliserende jongeren.” (Mr. Van Haersma Buma (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 1) 32 “De recente internationale geopolitieke ontwikkelingen en de weerslag die deze hebben op Nederland, vragen om een extra impuls voor deze inzet. De opmars van ISIS in Irak en Syrië vormt een destabiliserende factor op zowel regionaal als mondiaal, internationaal niveau. Deze ontwikkelingen werken door in Nederland. Dit gebeurt enerzijds doordat jihadisten aansluiting zoeken bij internationale terroristische organisaties. Anderzijds gebeurt dit doordat aanhangers van de gewelddadige jihad zich ook in ons land openlijk manifesteren en er spanningen in onze samenleving en maatschappij ontstaan. De jihadistische dreiging heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een duurzaam veiligheidsprobleem voor Europa en Nederland. Er is een bedreiging van de veiligheid in ons land en van Europa aan de orde, zoals wij dat formuleren, en ook van de bescherming van de internationale rechtsorde en onze rechtsstaat.” (Mr. Opstelten (Minister of Justice and Security), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-6, p.1) 33 “Als je door deel te nemen aan de strijd van IS, laat blijken dat je de waarden van onze rechtsstaat en onze vrijheden niet omarmt, sterker nog, dat je die met alles wat je in je hebt bestrijdt en dat je bereid bent om je leven daarvoor te geven, dan kan in het uiterste geval na een onherroepelijke veroordeling het moment aanbreken waarop wij tegen zo iemand zeggen: nu maak je geen deel meer uit van onze samenleving. Dat is een onderdeel en dat heeft hopelijk een afschrikwekkende werking. Hopelijk is het signaal duidelijk: weet wat je doet! Als iemand geradicaliseerd is en die keuze maakt, kan dit de uiterste consequentie zijn.” (Mr. Segers (CU), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p. 8). 34 “De situatie is veranderd door het terugvallen van IS, wat op zichzelf goed nieuws is. Daardoor neemt het risico toe dat mensen met die achtergrond terug zouden kunnen komen naar Nederland en een bedreiging kunnen vormen voor de veiligheid van Nederland.” (Mr. Plasterk (Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-10, p. 7). 34 “De AIVD werkt intensief en op alle niveaus samen met de andere ketenpartners, om de risico’s die uitgaan van de jihadistische dreiging zo klein mogelijk te maken. Dat geldt ook voor de risico’s van de terugkeerders. De AIVD deelt bovendien waar nodig en mogelijk de informatie met de partners, zodat zij kunnen handelen. In Europees verband wordt nauw samengewerkt en maximaal informatie gedeeld binnen de Counter Terrorism Group, die overigens op Nederlands initiatief is opgericht. Daarmee zorgen we ervoor dat het bij het delen van informatie over terroristen eigenlijk niet uitmaakt dat we binnen Europa verschillende diensten hebben.” (Mr. Plasterk (Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-10, p. 7). 35 “Dat is allereerst het acute beschermen van de rechtsstaat en van de vrijheden die we hebben. Dat is het tegengaan van geweld en het voorkomen van geweld elders. […] Dat is de acute taak die de overheid heeft: de dagelijkse bescherming van de rechtsstaat.” (Mr. Asscher, Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-6, p. 26). 36 “Er wordt vaak gesproken over de “diensten”, maar de AIVD heeft toch een bijzondere plek in het bestel omdat hij bijzondere bevoegdheden kan inzetten, ook als er niet of niet op voorhand sprake is van verdachte of strafbare feiten, ten behoeve van de nationale veiligheid. Het product van de AIVD is informatie.” (Mr. Plasterk (Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), Tweede Kamer, 27 January 2016, TK 47-9, p. 19). 36 “Ik kom op de AIVD, de ogen en de oren van onze democratie. Die dienst, die ons beschermt tegen dit soort onheil.” (Mr. Van Haersma Buma (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 2). 36 “De rechtsstaat zegt maar één ding en geeft mij ook maar één opdracht. Die opdracht deel ik met het Openbaar Ministerie en de nationale politie. Als mensen de wet overtreden, om welke reden dan ook, vindt er vervolging, opsporing en waar mogelijk ook berechting plaats. Er wordt geen verschil gemaakt tussen gedachtevormingen of wat dan ook: iedereen is op dat punt gelijk voor de wet en ook voor de nationale politie.” (Mr. Van der Steur (Minister of Justice and Security, Tweede Kamer, 27 January 2016, TK 47-9, p, 19). Paragraph 5.2 37 “Mensen zouden liever niet moeten terugkeren.” (Mrs. Van Toorenburg (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p. 1).

37 “Houd ze buiten!” (Mr. Dijkhoff (VVD), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 17) 37-38 “Als je de brief van het kabinet leest, merk je dat daarin één werkwoord centraal staat, namelijk het werkwoord "terugkeren". Terugkeren, terugkeren; ik heb al die woordjes "terugkeren" maar eens onderstreept en ik raakte gewoon de tel kwijt. Nergens heb ik echter de woorden "daar blijven" gevonden. Waarom is het beleid in deze brief niet gericht op "daar blijven" in plaats van op "terugkeren"? Is het voor de veiligheid van Nederland niet beter om terugkeerders uit Syrië en Irak gewoon de toegang tot Nederland te verbieden?” (Mr. Monasch (Monasch), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-5, p. 17). 38 “De CDA- fractie steunt het wetsvoorstel omdat het helder weergeeft dat de rechten en plichten van het Nederlanderschap duidelijke begrenzingen kent. Het plegen en/of voorbereiden van terroristische misdrijven druist in tegen alle waarden waarvoor de Nederlandse rechtsstaat staat. Iemand die onherroepelijk is veroordeeld voor het plegen van dergelijke misdrijven, mag zich wat betreft de CDA-fractie voortaan terecht geen Nederlander meer noemen en geen aanspraak meer maken op de bijbehorende rechten […].” (Mr. Oskam (CDA), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p. 2). 38 “Onze vrijheid wordt bedreigd door jihadisten die strijden in naam van hun geloof […] Zij wijzen de westerse vrijheden, de westerse normen en waarden af. […] De VVD vindt dat mensen die zich tegen onze vrijheden en onze waarden keren, het niet verdienen om Nederlander te zijn.” (Mr. Van der Steur (VVD), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, pp. 17-18). Paragraph 5.3 39 “Daarbij moeten we wel voor één ding waken. We mogen in onze allesverzengende ambitie om de vrije democratische rechtsstaat te beschermen, hem niet om zeep helpen.” (Mr. Samson (PvdA), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 20). 40 “Het gaat er vooral om daadkrachtig over te komen. In de woorden van minister Asscher: "Nu is het tijd dat de rechtsstaat spierballen toont en in actie komt". Dus voert de retoriek van repressie de boventoon. […] Daarmee krijgt de rechtsstaat geen spierballen, maar zwakken we de rechtsstaat af.” (Mr. Van Ojik (GL), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 12). 40 “D66 stelt de veiligheid van mensen voorop, maar we zien weinig in stoere taal en maatregelen die in werkelijkheid niet werken. Daarbij maken wij altijd een kritische afweging tussen wat effectief is in de strijd tegen terreur en wat onnodig de vrijheid en veiligheid van alle burgers inperkt.” (Mr. Verhoeven (D66), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p. 7). 40 “Het gaat er natuurlijk om dat je iemand wel zijn nationaliteit kunt afnemen, maar dat daarmee de persoon niet is veranderd. Het blijft iemand die blijkbaar banden heeft met Nederland, die hier vandaan komt, die hier familie heeft, die in contact staat met een groep, die de taal spreekt en die dus bij uitstek voor Nederland en Nederlanders een gevaar zou kunnen vormen. Het domste wat je kunt doen, is denken dat je ze wel buiten de deur kunt houden en dat ze Nederland niet binnen zullen komen. Deze mensen zijn in hoge mate bereid en in staat om Nederland binnen te komen.” (Mr. Grashoff (GL), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p.13). 41 “Wat wij niet willen dat ons geschiedt, doe dat ook een ander niet.” (Mrs. Buitenweg (GL), Tweede Kamer, 12 June 2018, TK 92-26, p. 11). Paragraph 5.4 42 “Ik zei het al: de islam, ISIS, heeft ons land de oorlog verklaard.” (Mr. Wilders (PVV), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-6, p. 29). 42 “Om te beginnen, erken, wees eerlijk, erken dat de islam het probleem is. Start de de-islamisering van Nederland. Minder islam, dat hebben we nodig. Sluit onze grenzen voor immigranten uit islamitische landen. Voer grensbewaking in. Houd even op met die cultuurverrijking.” (Mr. Wilders (PVV), Tweede Kamer, 4 September 2014, TK 105-2, p. 9). 43 “Een: we moeten de asielstroom stoppen. Twee: de grenzen moeten dicht. Drie: we moeten grenscontroles invoeren. Vier, belangrijk: jihadisten die het land willen verlaten, moeten we niet krampachtig tegenhouden. We moeten ze laten gaan en ze nooit meer een voet op Nederlandse bodem laten zetten. Dat moet er gebeuren. Maar juist hier laat de regering het totaal afweten.” (Mr. De Graaf (PVV), Tweede Kamer, 26 February 2015, TK 57-8, p.1). 43 “Dat is de regering aan haar burgers verplicht. Speel niet langer spelletjes met de veiligheid van onze burgers. Wij kunnen het ons echt niet veroorloven,” (Mr. Bontes (GrBvK), Tweede Kamer, 23 February 2017, TK 57-7, p. 6).

Appendix 7 – Data on media debates

Table 1. Overview of media debates

No. VK/TL Date Title Photo Type article Authors / interviewees / guests Length Page in words 1 VK 9 Sep 2014 Kinderen ‘jihadouders ‘Huizen - Ten Eerste Janny Groen 429 - weer terug (News) (Dutch journalist and author; wrote several books on the Islam) 2 VK 3 Sep 2014 29-jarige Hagenaar gearresteerd - Ten Eerste - 159 4 op verdenking van vechten in (News) Syrië 3 VK 12 Sep 2014 Paradijs - Opening Gidi Heesakkers 583 2 (Opinion/ (Editor and columnist for Volkskrant) background) Floor van der Meulen (documentary maker) 4 VK 18 Sep 2014 Jusitie: tekst over - Ten Eerste Janny Groen 392 11 zelfmoordaanslag bij ‘jihadgezin’ (News) (Dutch journalist and author; wrote several books on the Islam) 5 VK 20 Sep 2014 ‘Reisgids in jihadland’ stelt Bontinck posing with Ten Eerste Janny Groen 1491 - ouders zwaar teleur children (News) (Dutch journalist and author; wrote several books on the Islam), Bontick with fighters Sakir Khader (columnist for the from the Free Syrian Volkskrant) Army Several parents from children who Bontinck at Pauw & travelled to Syria to join terrorist Witteman (talkshow) organizations

Dimitri Bontinck

(Ex-soldier from Belgium who saved his son Jejoen and claims to have saved several children) 6 VK 20 Sep 2014 Onderzoek naar fraude bij anti- - Ten Eerste Merijn Rengers 609 5 jihadprojecten (News) (Investigative reporter at Volkskrant),

John Schoorl (Reporter at Volkskrant) 7 VK 27 Sep 2014 Op geradicaliseerde moslims valt Suicide terrorist Ten Eerste Janny Groen 858 - niet één etiket te plakken Mohammed Atta right (Opinion/ (Dutch journalist and author; wrote before the attacks on the background) several books on the Islam) Twin Towers in New York on 9/11 2001 Aissa Zanzen (Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen in Nederland (SNM)) Azzedine C., who is suspected of recruiting for the jihad, speaking at an IS-demonstration in the Schilderswijk, The Hague 8 VK 29 Sep 2014 Wat is het ware verhaal van Jejoen Bontinck (19) Ten Eerste Janny Groen 1167 7 Syriëganger Jejoen? (News) (Dutch journalist and author; wrote several books on the Islam), Sakir Khader (columnist for the Volkskrant)

9 VK 30 Sep 2014 Verdachten ronselen Syriëgangers - Ten Eerste Janny Groen 562 - blijven in cel uit vrees voor (News) (Dutch journalist and author; wrote herhaling several books on the Islam) 10 VK 30 Sep 2014 Terroristen of labiele jongens? Illustration of the court Ten Eerste Leen Vervaeke 893 14 in Antwerp in which (Opinion/ (Editor for the Volkskrant) members of Background) Sharia4Belgium stand trial.

11 TL 5 Sep 2014 Jihadisten weer vrij - News Chris Ververs 57 3 (domestic) (Reporter for Telegraaf) 12 TL 6 Sep 2014 En daar moeten we ons veilig bij - WatUZegt Coosje Hiskemuller 884 6 voelen Brieven (Journalist for Telegraaf)

Letters/reactions sent by readers: J.M.H. Paulissen 13 TL 8 Sep 2014 Wij bouwen allemaal aan - News Coosje Hiskemuller 601 2 Nederland (domestic) (Journalist for Telegraaf)

Letters/reactions sent by readers: H.H. Nehmelman

J. Bonacic 14 TL 10 Sep 2014 Uitroeien - News Sjuul Paradijs 242 3 (domestic) (Chief-editor Telegraaf) 15 TL 11 Sep 2014 Pak jihadisme hier aan: Voor de - WatUZegt Coosje Hiskemuller 622 6 lezers hoeft Nederland niet mee te Stelling van de (Journalist for Telegraaf) doen aan coalitie tegen ISIS dag Marina ter Woort (Journalist)

16 TL 12 Sep 2014 Noem ons gewoon moslims - WatUZegt Ina Heggink 342 6 Brief Letters/reactions sent by readers: Nabeel Siddiqie (Rotterdam) 17 TL 13 Sep 2014 Jihadisten - News Joost de Haas 258 3 (domestic) (Journalist, deputy chief editor Telegraaf, domestic reporting) 18 TL 18 Sep 2014 Vrijgelaten jihadist had tekst - Front page Bart Olmer 132 1 aanslag (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) 19 TL 19 Sep 2014 Ze horen achter slot en grendel: - News Chris Ververs 404 2 onbegrip en onrust bij bevolking (domestic) (Reporter for Telegraaf) Huizen Citizens of Huizen

20 TL 20 Sep 2014 Geld Nederlandse jihadi’s - News Bart Olmer 589 2 vastgezet (domestic) (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) 21 TL 20 Sep 2014 Meevechten - News Joost de Haas 263 3 (domestic) (Journalist, deputy chief editor Telegraaf, domestic reporting) 22 TL 21 Sep 2014 De vijand is onder ons - Sunday Special Menzo Willems 248 2 (domestic) (Journalist for Telegraaf)

Hans van Baalen (Member European parliament for the VVD) 23 TL 23 Sep 2014 Meer geld tegen terreur: vooral de - WatUZegt Coosje Hiskemuller 689 6 schuld van de slappe overheid dat (stelling van de (Journalist for Telegraaf) dit gevaar nu levensgroot is dag) Martine de Vente (Journalist) 24 TL 24 Sep 2014 Nederlandstalige dreiging uit - News Bart Olmer 577 2 Syrië: oproep tot aanslagen in ons (domestic) (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) land 25 VK 3 Feb 2015 Syriëgangers niet uit onderklasse Marion van San Opinie en debat Marion van San 308 21 (Researcher on radicalisation at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam) 26 VK 9 Feb 2015 Spanje blijkt sluiproute voor - Ten Eerste Steven Adolf 386 4 terugkerende Syriëgangers (Correspondent in Spain for the Volkskrant) 27 VK 10 Feb 2015 Rechter acht Syriëreis op zich niet - Ten Eerste Willem Feenstra 542 7 strafbaar (Reporter for the Volkskrant)

Harmen van der Wilt (Academic on international criminal law)

Henny Sackers (Senior lecturer on criminal law)

28 VK 14 Feb 2015 Vrijspraak op de koop toe Illustration bread and Vonk Peter Wierenga 2025 4-5 beer (writer, journalist and philosopher; books on populism and political satire) Theo de Roos (Academic criminal law) Matthias Borgers (Academic criminal law) Bart den Hartigh (Public prosecutor) 29 VK 18 Feb 2015 Binden, maar ook grenzen stellen Aboutaleb shakes hand Ten Eerste Bart Dirks 1091 3 of American vice- (Reporter for the Volkskrant) president Joe Biden in the White House in Hassnae Bouazza (journalist) Washington Spokesman Aboutaleb (Mayor Rotterdam, politician PvdA) 30 VK 20 Feb 2015 Is Soufiance Z. te dood voor zijn Muslim youth Ten Eerste Janny Groen 597 10-11 proces? demonstrating in front of (Dutch journalist and author; wrote the parliament, earlier several books on the Islam) this year, for the closure of the terrorist department in the Vught prison 31 VK 20 Feb 2015 Overheid, bescherm Joden Security at the orthodox- Opinie en debat Hans Vuijsje 953 20 blijvend Jewish school Cheider in (Director of JMW-Joodswelzijn) Amsterdam 32 VK 21 Feb 2015 Aanslag naast de terreur-expert Magnus Ranstorp Vonk Peter Wierenga 1691 6-7 (writer, journalist and philosopher; books on populism and political satire)

Magnus Ranstorp (Swedish scholar on Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda and other violent Islamic movements) 33 VK 27 Feb 2015 Straf voor jihad: pas intrekken - Ten Eerste Maartje Bakker 781 9 (Reporter for the Volkskrant)

34 TL 4 Feb 2015 Terreurverdachte blijft vast: - News Bart Olmer 541 10 Mohamed A. te gevaarlijk voor (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) schorsen 35 TL 5 Feb 2015 Twijfel over identiteit van - News of the day - 546 7 polderterrorist; meederde Nederlandse jihadisten genoemd als martelaar 36 TL 6 Feb 2015 Jihadi moet zich melden bij de - News Bart Olmer 411 13 politie: wetsvoorstel om uitreizen (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) van radicalen tegen te gaan 47 TL 10 Feb 2015 Ze lachen ons nu heel hard uit: - News Parliamentary editorial board 183 12 frustraties aan het binnenhof 38 TL 13 Feb 2015 Dode jihadist moet voor de - News Bart Olmer 514 15 rechtbank verschijnen: (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) vermoedelijk gesneuvelde Soufiane Z. bij verstek vervolgd 39 TL 28 Feb 2015 Mijn focus is altijd op Islam Geert Wilders (PVV) News Paul Jansen 1609 6 gericht: Geert Wilders bemoeit (Journalist Media-concern), zich nauwelijks met Wouter de Winther kandidatenlijsten en provincial (chief parliamentary editorial & political verkiezingsprogramma’s commentator Telegraaf) 40 VK 13 Jan 2016 Eenmaal in het kalifaat valt het IS-militant talks to a Ten Eerste Janny Groen 982 13 sprookje tegen group of younger (Dutch journalist and author; wrote children in the province several books on the Islam) of Raqqa, Syria Habib Elkadouri (Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders (SMN)) 41 VK 19 Jan 2016 IS-mythen zijn ontrafeld, laat het Jihadist Lofti S. at a pro- Opinie en debat Amy-Jane Gielen 977 21 echte werk beginnen IS demonstration in The (Researcher and advisor on radicalization Hague and jihadism) 42 VK 23 Jan 2016 Het brein van de terrorist - Sir Edmund Margreet Vermeulen 2505 38-41 (journalist on science)

43 VK 28 Jan 2016 Deradicaliseren, jullie. NU! Three actors of the show Opening Annette Embrechts 835 3 JIHAD (Theatre reviewer) 44 TL 12 Jan 2016 Jihadisten lachen om - News (foreign) Bart Olmer 477 16 grenscontrole: geheime diensten (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) hebben het nakijken 45 TL 13 Jan 2016 IS-heilstaat is flauwekul: - News Bart Olmer 699 2 ontluisterend beeld van AIVD na (domestic) (Terrorism expert for Telegraaf) anderhalf jaar onderzoek 46 TL 19 Jan 2016 Geachte lezer - WatUZegt Coosje Hiskemuller 163 14 (opinion/letters) (Journalist for Telegraaf)

Letters/reactions sent by readers 47 TL 28 Jan 2016 Syrië blijft trekken - News - 92 5 (domestic) 48 VK 14 Feb 2017 28 jaar cel voor in Syrië - Ten Eerste - 201 10 gepleegde moord 49 VK 16 Feb 2017 Ook process tegen - Ten Eerste Janny Groen 2148 6-7 doodverklaarde kalifaatgangers (Dutch journalist and author; wrote several books on the Islam) 50 TL 7 Feb 2017 Meer geld voor terreur gemeld - News Lise Witteman 222 10 (domestic) (Freelance journalist) 51 TL 15 Feb 2017 Jeugd vergiftigd met terreurlessen - News Olof van Joolen 477 2 (domestic) (News reporten for Telegraaf – dossier defence and terrorism 52 TL 15 Feb 2017 Jihadkids in vizier AIVD - News Olof van Joolen 212 1 (domestic) (News reporten for Telegraaf – dossier defence and terrorism

Dick Schoof (Director of National Coordinator of Terrorim and Security) 53 TL 15 Feb 2017 Schokkend - News - 216 2 (domestic)

54 TL 16 Feb 2017 Jihad blijft aanlokkelijk - News Olof van Joolen 627 10 (domestic) (News reporten for Telegraaf – dossier defence and terrorism 55 VK 2 Jun 2018 Nationaliteit - Zaterdag Esther Gerrtisen 520 2 (Columnist and writer) 56 VK 6 Jun 2018 Nederlandse in cel met baby en - Ten Eerste Janny Groen 371 12 vader (Dutch journalist and author; wrote several books on the Islam) 57 VK 27 Jun 2018 Jihadisten terug naar Nederland - Ten Eerste Janny Groen 371 12 (Dutch journalist and author; wrote several books on the Islam) 58 TL 5 Jun 2018 Jihad-inzameling - News - 225 2 (domestic) 59 VK 18 Feb 2019 IS-bruid smeekt om naar huis te - Ten Eerste - 160 8 mogen 60 VK 19 Feb 2019 Europa heeft weinig trek in Fighters of the Syrian Ten Eerste Arie Elshout 649 10-11 repartriëren Syriëgangers Democratic Forces (Correspondent Europe for Volkskrant) (SDF) control the village of Baghouz, the last IS- bulwark 61 VK 19 Feb 2019 Trump gebruikt wraak van IS- - Ten Eerste Rob Vreeken 594 11 cellen als drukmiddel (correspondent and analyst Arabic world 62 VK 19 Feb 2019 Zijn de Nederlandse terugkeerders - Ten Eerste Hassan Bahara 761 10-11 een gevaar? (Writer and journalist, former Muslim – criticises Islam) 63 VK 20 Feb 2019 Reken kinderen niet af op Mother and child in Opinie en debat Anna Deems 704 21 gedachtegoed van ouders camp Ian Issa, North (Journalist) Syria Guests at debate:

Amy-Jane Gielen (political scientist, specialized in radicalization)

Hoessein (husband, father and grandfather of Syriëgangers)

Thomas Rueb (Journalist for NRC and writer of the book Laura H. – girl from the caliphate)

Sinan Can (Journalist and writer, specialized in Islam, Islamic terrorism and Arab spring)

64 VK 20 Feb 2019 Terug uit Syrië - Opinie en debat Raoul du Pré 369 19 (Chief political editorial) 65 VK 23 Feb 2019 Een Guantánamo Bay of naar de At Baghouz, the last Ten Eerste Hassan Bahara 1366 8-9 EBI in Vught? Islamic bulwark, the (Writer and journalist, former Muslim – evacuation of civilians criticises Islam) from the East Syrian city has begun under the Nadim Houry (terrorism and Syria expert watchful eye of the from Human Rights Watch) Kurdish rebel movement SDF Göran Sluiter (academic international law and expert on Yugoslavia-tribunal)

Thomas Hegghammer (terrorism-expert)

Bart Schuurman (terrorism-expert) 66 VK 23 Feb 2019 Jusitie in bezit van loonstrook IS- - Ten Eerste Hassan Bahara 215 8 strijders (Writer and journalist, former Muslim – criticises Islam) 67 VK 27 Feb 2019 Bijna eenderde jihadistische - Ten Eerste Hassan Bahara 428 10 Syriëgangers is nog altijd IS-lid (Writer and journalist, former Muslim – criticises Islam)

68 TL 13 Feb 2019 Kameleon in het nauw - News Daniël van Dam 627 4 (domestic) (Journalist)

Silvan Schoonhoven (Reporter for terrorism and security services) 69 TL 16 Feb 2019 Brieven - WatUZegt K. Gaemers 873 22 (reader of Telegraaf) 70 TL 18 Feb 2019 Gevangen kamp - News - 215 2 (domestic) 71 TL 18 Feb 2019 Terug voor baby - News (foreign) - 519 13 72 TL 18 Feb 2019 Jihadist hier niet welkom - News Parliamentarian editorial 372 4 (domestic) responds of members of the parliament: Koopmans (VVD) Van Toorenburg (CDA) Wilders (PVV) Sjoerdsma (D66) 73 TL 19 Feb 2019 Brieven - WatUZegt Leo Meester (reader of Telegraaf and 1118 16 former Navy officer)

J.C. Rosmolen (reader of Telegraaf)

Lily de Vries (reader of Telegraaf) 74 TL 22 Feb 2019 Britse jihadbruid kan vestiging - News Silvan Schoonhoven 397 14 hier vergeten (domestic) (Reporter for terrorism and security services) 75 TL 26 Feb 2019 Kabinet in lasting parket - News Parliamentarian editorial 338 3 (domestic) 76 TL 27 Feb 2019 Jihadisten moeten in Syrië berecht - WatUZegt A.W. de Haas (reader of Telegraaf) 140 18 (Brief van de dag)

Table 2. List of original quotes in Dutch (chapter 6) Page no. Quote in thesis Paragraph 6.1 – De Volkskrant 46 “Volgens Borgers begon toen al, dus nog voor de opkomst van het islamitisch terrorisme, de ontwikkeling van Nederland tot een 'risicosamenleving', ofwel een maatschappij die gefocust is op het vermijden van risico's. Daarin verschuift de aandacht van de overheid steeds verder naar voren.” (Volkskrant, 14 February 2015, pp. 4-5). 46 “De weinig vrolijke maar eerlijke boodschap is dat in een rechtsstaat de mogelijkheden van het strafrecht om preventief op te treden tegen terrorisme altijd beperkt zullen blijven. Beperkter misschien dan we hopen. Het voelt als vechten met een hand op de rug. Maar - misschien een troost - diezelfde rechtsstaat is ook precies wat we in de strijd tegen terrorisme overeind proberen te houden.” (Volkskrant, 14 February 2015, pp. 4-5). 46 “‘In Nederland werd al flink gepolariseerd. Sinds Syrië en de opkomst van IS is dat erger geworden. Ik zie angsten in de ogen van ouders die zelf worstelen met de radicalisering van hun kinderen. Ze voelen de druk van de gemeenschap, van de buurt, de samenleving en de overheid, die krampachtig omgaat met het fenomeen radicalisering. Die ouders kruipen in de schulp en zullen niet snel meewerken met autoriteiten.'” (Aissa Zanzen, Volkskrant, 27 September 2014, page unknown). 47 “PvdA-Kamerlid Ahmed Marcouch vindt ook dat de overheid te weinig 'in de haarvaten van de samenleving' zit. Hij riep deze week wijkagenten, docenten en ouders op alert te zijn op 'risicogevallen' en steunt het pleidooi van SMN. 'Veiligheid is de verantwoordelijkheid van ons allemaal', zegt Marcouch. (Volkskrant, 27 September 2014, page unknown). 47 “'een opdracht om niet alleen te profiteren van de rechten en de vrijheden die de Grondwet u biedt, maar deze actief na te leven en uit te dragen. Als u daar niet toe bereid bent, wees dan zo eerlijk om uw paspoort in te leveren en te vertrekken.'” (Mayor Aboutaleb, Volkskrant, 18 February 2015, p. 3). 47 “We spelen in onze wereld een bijzonder kwartetspel. Sommige landen blijven maar aan de beurt en vragen wat ze willen. Wanneer het ze goeddunkt, zeggen ze: 'Doe mij van de helden alsjeblieft de kinderredders, van de professoren de slimste, en van de dissidenten graag alleen de Nobelprijswinnaars.' En hup, ze krijgen wat ze begeren. Ze vragen het netjes, dat wel. Waarom ook niet, ze weten dat ze toch wel hun zin krijgen en zo lijken ze heel beschaafd.” (Esther Gerritsen, Volkskrant, 2 June 2018, p. 2). 49 “Haal terugkeerders gecontroleerd terug, zo hou je ze juist op de radar. Het zijn nog altijd Nederlandse staatsburgers, pak ze dan ook op en berecht ze volgens onze democratische rechtsstaat.” (Hoessein, Volkskrant, 20 February 2019, p. 20). Paragraph 6.2 – De Telegraaf 49 “De enige juiste aanpak is die van president Obama, die ISIS de oorlog verklaart. Nederland heeft ook belang bij het uitschakelen van deze moordenaarsbende. Jihadisten die terugkeren naar ons land vormen een rechtstreekse bedreiging voor de nationale veiligheid.” (Telegraaf, 13 September 2014, p. 3). 50 “Alles is gepland en Nederland zijn we zeker niet vergeten. Als we hier gebieden kunnen veroveren in twaalf uurtjes die nog groter zijn dan Nederland en België bij elkaar, hoe zit dat dan met Nederland?” (Marouane B., Telegraaf, 20 September 2014, p. 2). 50 “[…] de veiligheid van de Nederlanders en het land zijn in gevaar, dus een gepaste harde aanpak is vereist.” (R.E. Advokaat, Telegraaf, 6 September 2014, p. 6). 50 “Door over een zo belangrijk onderwerp als het tegengaan van de jihadfanatici geen goede uitleg te kunnen geven, doet minister Opstelten zijn naam geen eer aan. In het tempo waarin hij praat, denkt hij ook aan oplossingen. En daar moeten wij ons veilig bij voelen. Op die plek moet een ijzervreter zitten die beslissingen neemt en de boel op stelten durft te zetten. Een aspro bruist meer dan hij.” (Ad Maat, Telegraaf, 6 September 2014, p. 6).

50 “Haaks daarop staat de uitspraak van de Amsterdamse burgemeester Van der Laan. Hij zei dat we van moslims niet moeten eisen dat ze ISIS afwijzen omdat ze juist daarmee in een hokje worden geplaatst. Sommige respondenten halen dit voorbeeld aan om aan te tonen dat het met het Nederlandse beleid echt de verkeerde kant op gaat.” (Telegraaf, 23 September 2014, p. 6). 51 “Er is een verwijdering tussen landen. Volkeren en regeringen richten de blik naar binnen. Maar bij inlichtingendiensten weet men donders goed dat een bedreiging voor Nederland ook een bedreiging is voor Engeland of de VS, en omgekeerd.” (Richard Barret, Telegraaf, 16 February 2017, p. 10) 51 “Geen spijt, dan heeft ze weinig inzicht. Daar blijven is dan de beste oplossing.” (K. Gaemers, Telegraaf, 16 February 2019, p. 22) 51 “Maar ik vind dat jihadisten en aanhang nóóit mogen terugkeren naar Europa.” (Lily de Vries, Telegraaf, 19 February 2019, p. 16). 51 “Mensenrechtenactivisten zullen moord en brand schreeuwen. Het zij zo. De rechten van onschuldige Europese burgers gaan absoluut voor die van radicaal tuig, dat zich in het kalifaat beestachtig heeft misdragen.” (Telegraaf, 18 February 2019, p. 2). 51 “Er wordt gesproken over het terughalen van jihadisten en hun vrouwen en kinderen. Wat ik me afvraag is waar Nederland zich mee bemoeit. De misdaden zijn in een ander land gepleegd en dienen daar ook afgehandeld te worden, […]. We moeten ons schamen om zelfs maar te overwegen die monsters hier te halen en het risico te lopen dat gevluchte slachtoffers hun daders hier tegen het lijf lopen. Ongehoord en misdadig.” (A.W. de Haas, Telegraaf, 27 February 2019, p. 18).