1 Reply to Governor's Impeachment Response1 I. the Governor's

Reply to Governor’s Impeachment Response1 I. The Governor’s puerile and juvenile attacks on these petitioners demonstrate further unfitness for office, in addition to a disgusting and wasteful use of public funds (and possibly yet another violation of the U.S. Constitution) As opposed to addressing the merits and substance of the petition, Governor Beshear spends dozens of pages attacking these citizen petitioners and a puerile and juvenile fashion. It appears he has spent a troubling amount of taxpayer-funded time (the committee should consider investigating this abuse) scrolling through social media. This is not terribly surprising: he went on his taxpayer-funded television show to do the same thing at the time of the filing of our petition. As a consequence, his supporters have threatened us (we have been threatened with people coming to our homes to assault us). We can only surmise that this was done intentionally to attempt to silence our efforts to petition this legislature for redress of grievances. We submit that this is First Amendment rights retaliation, yet another intentional and knowing U.S. Constitutional violation, and abuse of office. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 110 F.3d 1233 (6th Cir. 1997). II. Beshear v. Acree is a results-oriented jurisprudential embarrassment, and the legislature, not the Kentucky Supreme Court, is the judge of constitutional violations in the impeachment context Much of the Governor’s defense relies upon his tortured reading of Beshear v. Acree, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 405 (Ky. 2020). We should probably begin by noting that the Governor made numerous public statements about the Kentucky Supreme Court before that decision and his belief that it would rule in his favor prior to the rendition of the opinion in Acree. Given that Kentucky Supreme Court Justices were making public social media posts about masking up (one of the issues in the Acree decision), and #TeamKentucky, the Governor’s hash tag, reflecting the appearance of impropriety and bias (as well as apparent ethical issues), the results were hardly surprising:2 1 This response is only from 3 of the Petitioners: Andrew Cooperrider, Tony Wheatley, and Jacob Clark; Randall Daniel desired to have additional time for review and response, and may be requesting that separately, but Cooperrider, Wheatley, and Clark recognize that time is of the essence, that the legislature’s time in session is short, that the Committee has a scheduled a meeting to undertake review of these serious matters on January 27, 2021, and we also appreciate the opportunity to present this Reply. To be clear: this Reply only represents the views of Cooperrider, Wheatley, and Clark, and not Randall Daniel. 2 Kentucky Judicial Canon 1.2 states: A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,* integrity,* and impartiality* of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety* and the appearance of impropriety. See, also, Canon 2.3. 1 Until 2020, and the results-oriented, #TeamKentucky approach by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Acree, Kentucky adhered to a strict separation of powers standard. Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. AG, 132 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Ky. 2003), “Kentucky holds to a higher standard ... Kentucky is more 'restrictive of powers granted' than the federal Constitution because the federal Constitution does not have a 'provision expressly forbidding the Congress to delegate its legislative powers,' as do Sections 27, 28, 29, and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution." citing Bloemer v. Turner, 281 Ky. 832, 137 S.W.2d 387, 390-91 (1939). Thus, “Kentucky law mandates that ‘the legislature must lay down policies and establish standards.’" Id. This rule is enforced by this Court, and has been described as “not toothless.” Id. The laundry list of what constitutes an emergency, and the limitless standards in KRS Chapter 39A, are not and were not sufficient standards. Arnett v. Meredith, 275 Ky. 223, 121 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky. 1938); See also Diemer v. Commonwealth, 786 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1990) ("Kentucky is a strict adherent to the separation of powers doctrine."); Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Ky. 1976) (invalidating a statute because it so "lacked legislative criteria" as to impermissibly delegate lawmaking power to the executive); AG, 132 S.W.3d 770, 782; State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education v. Howard, Ky., 834 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1992) (finding a statute unconstitutional for vagueness because of the failure to define the word "activities”); Bullitt Fiscal Court v. Bullitt County Bd. of Health, 434 S.W.3d 29 (Ky. 2014) (inappropriate delegation). Is this jurisprudential, results-oriented, embarrassment, a defense to impeachment? The answer is of course not. Section 109 of Kentucky’s Constitution is clear: "The impeachment powers of the General Assembly shall remain inviolate," and are outside the scope of any judicial review. In short, what the legislature says is impeachable, is impeachable. And, the Kentucky Constitution, in Sections 66 and 68, rest such determinations squarely with the House of Representatives, subject to the review by the Kentucky Senate in a trial under Section 67. 2 III. The Governor’s unauthorized unemployment loan was not addressed in Beshear v. Acree, but is a plain and palatable violation of the Kentucky Constitution. The terms “loan,” or “Section 49,” are found nowhere in Acree. The term “unemployment” is found once, in a footnote, and does not substantively address the issues raised with the Section 49 violation. That the Executive not be permitted to incur debts is a feature, not a impediment, as the Governor argues. The power of the purse is one of the fundamental checks and balances. And Section 49 could not be clearer: The General Assembly may contract debts to meet casual deficits or failures in the revenue; but such debts, direct or contingent, singly or in the aggregate, shall not at any time exceed five hundred thousand dollars, and the moneys arising from loans creating such debts shall be applied only to the purpose or purposes for which they were obtained, or to repay such debts: Provided, The General Assembly may contract debts to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or, if hostilities are threatened, provide for the public defense. The Governor in response argues necessity: but he had the tools available to be able to incur debts outside of appropriations: he could have called a special session under Section 80 and obtained the General Assembly’s permission. He made the choice not to. And this was in contravention of the law. Billeter & Wiley v. State Highway Com., 203 Ky. 15 (1924). IV. The Governor’s Easter targeting of church goers and other religious discrimination violated the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions, were knowing and intentional violations as documented by the Kentucky State Treasurer, were found by federal courts to violate the U.S. Constitution, and was not addressed in Beshear v. Acree. The Governor argues that Acree is some sort of defense to the allegations concerning his abuse of office in targeting church-goers. The problem with that is the Kentucky Supreme Court specifically observed in Acree that it was not undertaking the issues raised in the federal proceedings: “The religious challenges have been litigated in federal court, and no religious organization or health care provider has appeared in this case to challenge the Governor's COVID-19 response.” Id. at *9. As demonstrated in the attached report by the Kentucky State Treasurer [Exhibit 1], the Governor did not only send the State Police to churches, he did so with knowledge that his orders were unconstitutional infringements on church goers. As the Treasurer’s report indicates, the Governor’s office directed that certain churches (but not other businesses) “be monitored by Kentucky State Police, with a ‘visible presence’ ‘by at least two uniformed officers.’” Id. at Report, p. 12. “At the same time, the KSP received a ‘Church Protocol’ document that was being circulated ‘TO ALL Sheriffs,’ and many local health officials, which listed possible offenses that could be used to charge non-compliant church officials.” Id. at Report, p.12. 3 The public record communications attached to the report are stunning. They confirm deliberate and knowing violations of the United States Constitution by the Governor. The Kentucky State Police Commissioner, in a directive to KSP officers, observed that “this is clearly a first amendment issue and any action taken certainly has significant potential to result in litigation”, and that “there is a potential for the need for force, although it is a very low potential.” Id. at Report, p.13 (emphasis added). And yet, at the direction of the Governor, they charged full steam ahead into a series of unconstitutional actions. The report confirms equally damning communications between the Governor’s Chief of Staff, State Police, and Counsel for the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, documenting an intention to take further steps against church parishioners. Id. at Report, p.14-15. Simply put, the entirety of the Report, including the Exhibits to it, all of which are public records, demonstrate a direct targeting of religious services by the Governor. Id. at Report. As demonstrated in the attached case documents, the Governor’s actions and Easter Sunday targeting constituted clear First Amendment violations. [Exhibit 2, Maryville Baptist v. Beshear; Exhibit 3, Roberts v. Neace]. That, of course, wasn’t all. In November, 2020, he engaged in religious discrimination yet again, when he shut down parochial schools. This prompted lawsuits by the Kentucky Attorney General and others. [Exhibit 4, Danville; Exhibit 5, Pleasant View]. Still pending is an individual capacity damages claim against the Governor in Pleasant View Baptist Church v.

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