A STUDY OF SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY AND URBAN WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS IN SHILLONG
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
BANKERLANG KHARMYLLIEM
ROLL NUMBER – 136141012
DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY GUWAHATI
GUWAHATI, ASSAM, INDIA
JULY 2018
TH-2195_136141012
Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Guwahati 781039 Assam, India
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that the thesis entitled “A Study of Social Sustainability and Urban Water Supply Systems in Shillong” is the result of research work carried out by me at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences of Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati, under the supervision of Dr. Ngamjahao Kipgen. The present thesis or any part thereof has not been submitted in whole or in part to any other university/institution for the award of any degree or diploma.
IIT Guwahati Bankerlang Kharmylliem July 2018
TH-2195_136141012
Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Guwahati 781039 Assam, India
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that the thesis entitled “A Study of Social Sustainability and Urban Water Supply Systems in Shillong” submitted by Bankerlang Kharmylliem, Roll Number – 136141012, for the award of degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences of Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati, embody bonafide record of research work carried out under my supervision. It is the result of his investigation and has not been submitted either in whole or in part to any other university/institution for a research degree.
IIT Guwahati Dr. Ngamjahao Kipgen July 2018 Supervisor
TH-2195_136141012 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor Dr. N. Kipgen for his support, patience and kindness. His modus operandi instilled confidence and hope, influencing me for accomplishment.
I would also like to sincerely thank my doctoral committee members – Dr. S. Mallick, Dr. R. Bedamatta and Dr. S. Ray for their guidance and encouragement.
I am grateful to my friends and colleagues for their assistance in many ways, in word and deed.
I am appreciative of the willingness of all the interviewees to share with me their time and knowledge necessary for the study. I cannot name all of them here.
To the faculty and staff of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, many thanks, I am really grateful.
To my family, who inspire and strengthen and love me all the way.
My God, I have tasted and seen Your goodness all these years. I give You thanks for grace upon grace.
IIT Guwahati Bankerlang Kharmylliem July 2018
TH-2195_136141012 Abstract
This study is concerned with social aspects of sustainable development. It attempts to
understand social sustainability by examining the water supply systems in Shillong,
the capital city of Meghalaya. The focus is on ‘water equity’ in terms of domestic
water access and supply, and ‘water governance’ practiced by the traditional
institutions.
The city of Shillong is a comparatively small city in the Northeastern part of India.
Like most cities in India and in other developing countries, one of the foremost
challenges is to ensure a safe, reliable, affordable, and easily accessible water supply
to its urban residents.
The current system of water supply in Shillong has failed in various fronts. There is
inequity in access to water and the current water supply situation is insufficient even
to those having piped water supply. Most of the poor are excluded from the water
network and those with piped connections still get insufficient and irregular water.
Households who do not receive water encounter costs in getting water from other
sources. The dependence on the many sources of water (both ‘improved’ and
‘unimproved’) reveal the quality of water services and water governance.
In some localities the water supply is twenty four hours daily whereas in some it is
less than thirty minutes in a day. There are many differences in water supply and
access between the municipal and the non-municipal areas. Also, there are notable
differences among localities of the same area, i.e., either the municipality localities or
the non-municipality localities. For example, water supply in these two areas is not
homogeneous. Households within the municipal area get more water which is more
regular and of better quality than those outside the municipal area. In the municipal
TH-2195_136141012 area most have piped water on premises. Outside the municipal area there is piped
water supply provided by the PHED mainly through local sources of water. Public
standpipes are also an important means to get water. Other sources that people depend
on are wells, tube wells, tanker trucks and springs. The study gives a broad view of
the current water (in)equity condition and position of Shillong.
This study also explores the traditional institutions of the dorbar shnongs operating in
the urban setting in the context of domestic water distribution. The nature of water
governance carried out by these institutions is examined to understand their role and
contribution to water governance in the city. Comparisons are drawn to highlight the
practices that are directly and indirectly contributing to water supply and how as a
part of the hydrosocial cycle, these institutions affect the outcome. The study closely
examined three localities in the municipality area and four localities in the non-
municipality area. Of the many significant findings, one shows that closely knit
communities, through the traditional institutions, can successfully distribute water and
look after and protect water sources. The dorbar shnongs play a vital role in the
augmenting water supply in some localities in the city. Water creates
interdependencies among the actors. But this is weakened by modern mechanisms of
government and urbanization itself.
TH-2195_136141012 Contents Page no.
Declaration Certificate Acknowledgement Abstract List of Figures iv List of Tables v List of Maps vii List of Plates viii Abbreviations ix Glossary of Terms (Khasi to English) xi
I. Chapter 1 – Introduction 1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. Background of the Study 3 1.3. Review of Literature 1.3.1. Cities, Water and Sustainability 9 1.3.2. Foregrounding Social Sustainability 13 1.3.2.1. Social Sustainability and Cities 22 1.3.3. Equity 28 1.3.3.1. Water Equity 30 1.3.4. Water Governance 32 1.3.4.1. Good Water Governance 35 1.4. Research Gap 38 1.5. Rationale for the Topic 39 1.6. Objectives of the Study 41 1.7. Research Questions 42 1.8. Research Methodology 42 1.9. Organisation of the Thesis 50
II. Chapter 2 – Profile of the Study Area: Shillong and Water Supply Systems
2.1. Meghalaya 52 2.2. Introducing the ‘Field’: Shillong 55 2.2.1. Geography and Climate 59 2.2.2. Land and Forest 60 2.2.3. Population 64 2.2.4. Shillong Municipal Area 65 i
TH-2195_136141012 2.2.5. Shillong Urban Agglomeration (SUA) 66 2.2.6. Community 67 2.2.7. Socio-Cultural Belief and Water 68 2.3. The State of Water Supply in Shillong 70 2.3.1. Demand and Supply of Water 72 2.3.2. Major Issues at Present 74 2.3.3. Water Supply and the Traditional Institutions 77
III. Chapter 3 – Traditional Institutions (Dorbar Shnongs) in Shillong 3.1. Introduction 79 3.2. Dorbar Shnong: Meaning and Concept 84 3.3. Functions and Responsibilities of the Dorbar Shnongs 89 3.4. The Dorbar Shnong and Women 95 3.5. Democracy and the Dorbar Shnongs 97 3.6. The KHADC and the Dorbar Shnongs 99 3.7. Dorbar Shnongs as Institutions of Local Self Government: The Way Forward 102 3.8. Discussion 105
IV. Chapter 4 – Examining ‘Equity’ in Water Supply Systems in Shillong 4.1. Measuring Water Equity? 107 4.2. Sources of Water 109 4.3. Quantity 112 4.3.1. Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quantity 115 4.4. Water Quality 117 4.4.1. Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quality 120 4.5. Accessibility 121 4.5.1. Collection Time 121 4.5.2. Water Connection 123 4.5.3. Buying and Cost of Water 124 4.6. Reliability 126 4.7. Other Measures of Equity 129 4.7.1. Gender Equity 129 4.7.2. Social Equity 130 4.7.3. Seasonal and Geographical Variations 131 4.8. Water Equity and the Poor 132 4.8.1. Municipal Area 133 4.8.2. Non-Municipal Area 134 4.8.3. Discussion 137 4.9. Conclusion 142
V. Chapter 5 – Water Governance and the Dorbar Shnongs 5.1. Municipality Localities 148 5.1.1. Water Related Problem in the Municipal Area 153 5.1.2. Roles of Dorbar Shnongs in Municipality Localities 154 5.2. Non-Municipality Localities 155
ii
TH-2195_136141012 5.2.1. Mawlai Mawdatbaki 155 5.2.2. Nongkhryiem 158 5.2.3. Nongrah 160 5.2.4. Lawsohtun 161 5.2.5. Mawpat 164 5.3. Water Related Problems in the Non-Municipal Area 166 5.4. Roles and Functions of Dorbar Shnongs in Non-Municipal Localities 167 5.5. Discussion 169 5.5.1. Nongkhryiem and Lawsohtun: Exemplary Water Governance 169 5.5.2. Impediments to Good Water Governance Confronting the Dorbar Shnongs 172 5.5.3. Challenges and Opportunities 175 5.5.3.1. Clans of Nongkhryiem and Nongrah 175 5.5.3.2. Groundwater 177 5.5.4. The Dorbar Shnongs and its Criticisms 182 5.5.5. Water Future and the Village Councils 185 5.5.6. Are Water Supply Systems in Shillong Socially Sustainable? 187
VI. Chapter 6 – Summary and Conclusion 6.1. Water Equity in Shillong 190 6.2. Water Governance and the Dorbar Shnongs 192 6.3. Reaching for Social Sustainability 194 6.4. Likely Significance of the Study 204 6.5. Limitations of the Study 205 6.6. Future Scope of Research 206
References 208
Annexure 255
iii
TH-2195_136141012 List of Figures
Figure No. Description Page No.
1.1 Components of Social Sustainability Framework 19 1.2 Dimensions of Good Water Governance 37
iv
TH-2195_136141012 List of Tables
Table No. Description Page No.
Chapter 1
1.1 Drinking Water Sources in Urban India 1.2 Themes, Elements and Criteria of Social Sustainability 20 1.3 Key Themes for the Operationalisation of Social Sustainability 21 1.4 Criteria for Social Sustainability 22 1.5 Key Social Sustainability Dimensions and their Characteristics 24 1.6 Profile of the Questionnaire Survey Respondents 47 1.7 List of Interviewee 47 1.8 Localities of Shillong City where the Survey was Conducted 49
Chapter 2 2.1 Land Resources of Shillong 61 2.2 Population Growth of Shillong (1901-2011) 64 2.3 Population with Literacy Rates 65 2.4 Religion-wise Population of Shillong 65 2.5 Population and Literacy in SUA 66 2.6 SUA Localities with Population 67 2.7 Water Sources of East Khasi Hills 70 2.8 Water Demand Projection for Shillong 72 2.9 Details of Performance Indicators for Water of Shillong City 73
Chapter 3
3.1 Assessment of the Dorbar Shnongs with other Institutions in Meghalaya 88
Chapter 4
v
TH-2195_136141012
4.1 IRC Water Service Delivery Ladder Framework 108 4.2 Main Sources of Water Supply in the Municipality Localities 109 4.3 Main Sources of Water Supply in the Non-Municipality Localities 111 4.4 Duration of Water Supply for Piped Water on Premises in Some Selected Localities 113 4.5 Duration of Water Supply for Public Standpipes in Some Selected Localities 114 4.6 Levels of Satisfaction of the Respondents with Water Quantity 116 4.7 Localities and Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quantity 117 4.8 ‘Improved’ and ‘unimproved’ sources of water 118 4.9 Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quality 120 4.10 Localities and Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quality 121 4.11 Water collection time in the non-municipal area for public standpipes 122 4.12 Water fees in the non-municipal area for piped water on premises 125
4.13 Reliability of water supply for piped water on premises and public Standpipes 128
vi
TH-2195_136141012 List of Maps
Map No. Description Page No.
2.1 Map showing the Location of Meghalaya and its Capital Shillong 56 2.2 East Khasi Hills District 56 2.3 Shillong City 57
vii
TH-2195_136141012 List of Plates
Plate No. Description Page No.
2.1 Leaked piped in Mawprem 75 4.1 A Public Standpipe in Lawsohtun Locality 110 4.2 A community Spring in Mawlai Mawdatbaki 111 4.3 Water Containers Used to Deliver Water by Water Vendors 126 4.4 Water pipes running along drains are a common sight in Shillong 128 4.5 Women Washing Clothes in the Locality of Nongrah 130 4.6 ‘Stealing’ of water – plastic pipe connected to an iron water pipe in Nongmynsong locality 140 5.1 Water Source of Cleve Colony 151 5.2 A Polluted River in Shillong 156
viii
TH-2195_136141012 List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Full Form
ADC Autonomous District Council
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BSUP Basic Service of Urban Poor
GSWSP Greater Shillong Water Supply Project
GSWSS Greater Shillong Water Supply Scheme
IRC International Water and Sanitation Center
JMP Joint Monitoring Programme
JNNURM Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
KHADC Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council
LPCD/lpcd Litres per capita daily
MBDA Meghalaya Basin Development Authority
MDC Member of District Council
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly
MLD/mld Million litre per day
MoUD Ministry of Urban Development
MUDA Meghalaya Urban Development Authority
NOC No objection certificate
ix
TH-2195_136141012 PDS Public Distribution System
PHED Public Health and Engineering Department
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SMB Shillong Municipal Board
SUA Shillong Urban Agglomeration
ST Schedule Tribe
UFW Unaccounted for water
UKJHADC United Khasi-Jaintia Hill Autonomous District Council
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDSD United Nations Division for Sustainable Development
UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WHO World Health Organization
x
TH-2195_136141012 Glossary Terms (Khasi to English)
Adong : rules
Bakhraw : council of elders
Basan : elder
Dong : sub-locality, division
Dorbar : council
Dorbar pyllun : small council of a number of villages or localities
Dorbar shnong : Khasi local traditional informal institution
Hima : state
Hima pyllun : full state
Hynniewtrep-hynniewskum : seven huts seven nests
Kamai ia ka hok : integrity, a disciplined sense of righteousness that has to be maintained
Khlaw : forest
Khrud : to scrape, erode
Khyndai : nine
Ki tymmen ki san : elders
Ksiar : gold
Kur : clan
Kynthei : women
Laiphew : thirty
Lyer : air, wind
Lyngdoh : priest
xi
TH-2195_136141012 Mariang : nature
Mei Ramew : mother earth
Niam Khasi : Khasi traditional religion
Pynkhuid shnong : cleaning of the village or locality
Pyrkhat : think, thought
Rah : carry
Raid : commune or province
Rangbah Shnong : headman
Ri Raid : community land
Ri Kynti : private land
Samla : youth
Seng : organization
Shnong : village or locality
Sirdar
Sngi : the sun
Syiem : ruler (king or queen) or chief
Synjuk : federation
Tip briew tip blei : to know one’s neighbours/fellow human being and to know God
Tymmen shnong : elders of a village or locality
Um : water
Umdih-umtong : drinking water
Umjer : dewdrops
xii
TH-2195_136141012 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The battle for a more sustainable future will be won or lost in cities.
- Manifesto for Cities, 2012
1.1 Introduction
The earth appears from space as a blue planet which is a vivid sign of water‘s
ubiquity. Most of the water is found in the oceans. Fresh liquid and atmospheric water,
which sustains terrestrial life, constitutes less than one per cent of our water stock. It is a
small and fragile part of our water cycle within a much larger system (Grey et al., 2013).
One of the wonders of the earth is the pristine waters that give life to ecosystems and
human societies (Dargantes et al., 2012). Flowing water, emerging from the depths of
the earth, symbolizes its virginity, its purity and its freshness (Euzen and
Morehouse, 2011).
Water is essential for sustaining life, development and the environment (Mehta,
2000). Availability of water is a key determinant of social prosperity (Rasul and
Chowdhury, 2010); however, vast populations still lack access to water and continue to
be victims of poor water provisioning. Water is increasingly seen as a scarce natural
resource (Mehta, 2000) which cannot be replaced (Mega, 2010). But there is a
substantial quantity of fresh water available in the world, which goes much beyond
current or projected use levels (Gandhi and Namboodiri, 2009).
Water scarcity is often presented in absolute and monolithic terms which are not
right. It is linked with ecological, socio-political, temporal and anthropogenic
dimensions. There is tremendous inequality to access and control over water resources
1 TH-2195_136141012 and is related to the distributional and relational aspects of scarcity (Mehta, 2000).
Decisions taken today in cities across the world will shape not only their own destinies
but also the social and environmental future of humankind (World Urban Campaign and
UN-Habitat, 2012).
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been succeeded by the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Goal 6 of the SDGs envisages of ensuring
access to water and sanitation to all. Two of its main targets are to achieve universal and
equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all and to substantially reduce
the number of people suffering from water scarcity by 2030 (UN, 2015).
Water is the most familiar and the most important substance in our lives
(Fishman, 2011). Water is not just a natural resource but a social good (Tvedt, 2015).
According to Linton (2010), water and people are involved in the business of making
each other. Water and society are deeply interwoven. Water runs in society and becomes
socialized (Tvedt, 2015). Water ―has a multiplicity of cultural, social, symbolic,
discursive, imaginative and ideational meanings, values and practices coupled with it,
which exist in complex ways alongside, and intermingle with, its basic material qualities
as something that is essential for life‖ (Fontein, 2008, p. 743). Societies‘ and people‘s
ideas of water have been developed and formed in relation to a broad range of issues
(Tvedt, 2015). For instance, water is given meaning through cultural beliefs, historical
memory, and social practice, and exists as much in discourse and symbolism as it does as
a physical, material thing (Perreault, 2014).
Water is inextricably bound up in all life (Whiteley, Ingram and Perry, 2008). As
a resource, it circulates through the hydrosocial cycle (Bakker, 2002). Water lubricates
social functions and life itself (Perreault, 2014). The influences which city exert on social
life is great (Wirth, 1938). Since the very origins of the city there have been concerns
2 TH-2195_136141012 over how to maintain its social life. It is therefore unsurprising that there remain
concerns over the sustainability of urban societies (Davidson, 2010).
The 21stcentury will not be just an urban century but also an Asian century with
much of the urbanisation taking place in Asian cities, especially in India and China
(Saxena and Vijayakumar, 2014). The growth of cities marks the beginning of what can
be called modern in our civilization. One of the challenges associated with the magnitude
of urban change will be to supply water to urban areas (Srinivasan, Seto, Emerson and
Gorelick, 2013), as many urban centers will be unable to expand supply to meet the
demand because of poor governance or inadequate co-ordination among relevant
agencies (Vo, 2007).
Consequently water is one of the biggest crises that are faced in Urban India
where there is more demand than supply. As city grows and towns‘ sprouts adequate
policy measures regarding water are not given its due priority, this has resulted to
emerging water problem. With the process of urbanisation the traditional system of
managing water resources are often dismantled, the problem of mismanagement and
wastage of water during collection, distribution and delivery of water is rampant.
1.2 Background to the Study
Most cities in India are facing a form of water crisis, be it related to water
resource scarcity or water access (Zérah, Janakarajan and Llorente, 2011). The biggest
concern is that most cities do not provide the requisite amount of water: cities on an
average receive only 69 litres per capita day (lpcd), as opposed to the norm of 135 lpcd
(Wankhade, Balakrishnan, and Vishnu, 2014). The failure to provide safe drinking water
and adequate sanitation services to all people is perhaps the greatest development failure
of the twentieth century (IWMI, 2007).
3 TH-2195_136141012 In rapidly urbanizing areas, the limited availability of clean water supplies leads
to widespread concerns over water quality and access (Bakker, 2003a). In India, growing
population and rapid urbanization is putting a strain on water supply systems in urban
areas (Gottipati and Nanduri, 2014). Like most countries of the world, domestic water
supply in India is heavily subsidized which causes water to be overused (Biswas and
Tortajada, 2010a). As a large section of the population will not have the financial
capacity to pay for water, the government will have to subsidize the water harvesting,
processing, and distribution costs, possibly at the expense of other equally important
public needs (Ray, 2008). Thus low efficiency and low cost provision reinforce each
other (Jha, 2010).
Almost 74 per cent of urban population in India has access to formal piped water
supply system (World Bank, 2006). However, the term coverage only indicates the reach
of the public water supply system but does not indicate the quantity, quality and duration
of supply to the covered population. It is estimated that people in Indian cities that are
connected to a piped system, on an average, receive less than three hours of water service
per day (Bassi and Kumar, 2012).
India‘s utilisable freshwater resources are unevenly spread both seasonally and
topographically (Grönwall, 2008). In 2003, India currently withdraws a little more than
26 per cent of available freshwater resources (Ray, 2008). India‘s cities depend most
commonly on a mix of ground and surface water. Increasingly, urban areas draw water
from great distances. Cities are excessively dependent on groundwater (Wankhade,
Balakrishnan and Vishnu, 2014). 97 per cent of urban India has access to improved
sources of water in the year 2015 (UNESCAP, 2015). Up to 48 per cent of the urban
population in India uses groundwater (Koshy, 2016).
4 TH-2195_136141012 According to Census 2011, about 62 per cent of urban households in India have
access to treated tap water (mostly piped water), 9 per cent to untreated tap water, 66 per
cent to wells, 12 per cent to hand-pumps and 9 per cent to tube-wells. Even though
Indian cities currently do not have universal access to potable water, the more pertinent
issues are insufficient and unreliable supplies (MoUD, 2010).
Most cities in India are facing a form of water crisis, be it related to water
resource scarcity or water access. Problems and concerns pertain to quantity and quality,
equity across different sections of the population, ineffective and obsolete wastewater
management practices and lack of long-term vision, planning and motivation (Zérah,
Janakarajan and Llorente, 2011).
Institutional factors are a major reason for water supply conditions in India. In a
weak institutional setting, for example in the absence of secure land tenure, it may
be difficult to obtain the necessary permits to build infrastructure. Also, expanding the
water distribution network poses distinct technical difficulties. In most cities, a
networked water supply system exists but covers only a proportion of the city
(Bakker, 2003a). Scarcity in the Indian urban cities and towns is a mostly man-made
phenomenon that is conducive to the flaring-up of localized conflicts (Zérah, Janakarajan
and Llorente, 2011). Skewed availability of water between different regions and different
people in the same region and also the intermittent and unreliable water supply system
has the potential of causing social unrest (National Water Policy, 2012). Adding to this,
though regulatory power lies with individual state governments, very few, if any, have
passed laws and implemented them.
Consequently, sustainability is neglected and equity questions are flouted (Ray,
2008). The reinforced top-heavy urban hierarchy also aggravates inequities in service
delivery. In terms of water service, this leads to problems such as reliance on untreated
5 TH-2195_136141012 groundwater, the critical role of which in the process of urban development is given very
little attention (Janakarajan, 2004) and the withering of the current model of governance
(Zérah, Janakarajan and Llorente, 2011).
The per-capita availability of water in India as a whole has been assessed as
1,720 cubic metres (m3) per year in 2007. By international norms, a country with water
availability less than 1,700 m3 is categorised as ‗water-stressed‘, whereas less than 1,000
m3 makes it ‗water-scarce‘ (Grönwall, 2008). According to the WHO (2010), good
achievements can be attributed to urban water supply in India but population growth is
adding to the challenge. Drinking water for this growing population poses considerable
demands (81,000 MLD) on India‘s dwindling water resources (MoUD, 2010). The National
Water Policy (2012) tells us that natural water bodies in India are being encroached
upon, and diverted for other purposes. Groundwater recharge zones are often blocked.
Groundwater, though part of hydrological cycle and a community resource, is still
perceived as an individual property and is exploited inequitably and without any
consideration to its sustainability leading to its over-exploitation in several areas. India
has a market where private water vendors sell freshwater (groundwater) which
supplements the public-service providers in cities (Grönwall, 2008).
Table 1.1: Drinking Water Sources in Urban India
India Drinking water coverage estimate Urban (%) 1990 2015 Pipes onto premises 47 54 Other improved source 42 43 Other unimproved source 10 3 Surface Water 1 0
Source: WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2015
6 TH-2195_136141012 At national level, main drinking water source is tap water (44 per cent of total
households), followed by hand-pump/tubewell/borewell water (42 per cent of total
households). In Northeast region of India, only 21 per cent of households have access to
piped water. Main drinking water source in the region is hand pump/tube well (45 per
cent of total households). The region is seriously lagging behind in terms of water supply
infrastructure development as well as proper operations and maintenance of existing
infrastructure. In the region, 47 per cent of total households have a water source within
premises, 31 per cent have it near premises and 22 per cent have it away from premises,
while national numbers are 47 per cent households have a water source within premises,
36 per cent have it near premises, and 18 per cent have it away from premises. One more
important difference is in terms of using other water sources than the main sources of tap
water, well water and tube well/borehole water which includes water from lake/pond,
springs, river/canals, etc. Only 4 per cent of households on the country use these other
sources, but in Northeast the number goes up to 15 per cent. Meghalaya has the second
highest number of urban households (about 68 per cent) using treated tap water in North
East India after Sikkim (70 per cent). The dependence of households on
tubewells/borewells is low when compared to other states like Assam, Nagaland and
Tripura. Other sources of water in urban Meghlaya include untreated tap water (about 10
per cent), covered and uncovered wells, borewells and other sources (India Water Portal,
2015).
The Northeast region is endowed with an enormous water resources
potential that accounts for about 34 per cent of the country‘s total water wealth and about
37 per cent of its total hydropower potential although the region represents only 7.9 per
cent of the total Indian landmass. The per capita and per hectare availability of water in
7 TH-2195_136141012 this region is the highest in the country. However, less than 5 per cent of the existing
potential of the region has so far been tapped for societal use (Goswami, 2005).
Despite high rainfall, many areas in Meghalaya face water shortage. Shillong, the
capital city of Meghalaya in recent years have experience water scarcity with the
onslaught of rapid urbanization. The city is highly congested area where much of the
land is under settlements and roads. Deforestation in this zone is having detrimental
effect on the water supply of the Shillong Urban Agglomeration (SUA). Water demand
is rising whereas supply is declining possibly due to climate change, land use changes,
groundwater exploitation, pollution of both surface and ground water, and degradation of
catchment areas mainly through deforestation (Shabong, 2015). The growing population
in Shillong puts pressure on the natural resources. With the rapid growth of urbanization,
Shillong now faces shortage of water.
Sources of water supply in Meghalaya state are generally rivers, lakes, springs,
natural falls and streams.1 The water from these sources are fed directly in the piped
distribution system and stored in tanks where it is distributed to the consumers through
piped water supply (Gupta, 2003). Like other urban centers of India Shillong faces
similar problems in regards to water distribution. Most hilly urban areas like Shillong
face acute problem of water supply during the dry season. This is because the water
supply in most hill towns is by and large governed by seasonal rainfall. The annual
availability of surface water in Meghalaya is roughly estimated at 63.204 billion cubic
metres and the estimated replenishable ground water resources are 1.15 billion cubic
metres.2
1 The discharge of water from these sources has reduced considerably in recent years as a result of massive deforestation and stone and sand quarrying in the water catchment areas. 2 Meghalaya State Water Policy 2013 (draft). 8 TH-2195_136141012 This study is concerned with social aspects of sustainable development. It
attempts to understand social sustainability and its two elements ‗equity‘ and
‗governance‘ by examining the water supply in urban areas. The focus is water equity in
terms of domestic water distribution and accessibility and water governance in the city of
Shillong. I will detail the current state (demand and supply) of water in Shillong in
chapter 2. This study also explores the traditional institutions of the dorbar shnongs
operating in the urban setting in the context of domestic water distribution in Shillong,
Meghalaya. The nature of water governance carried out by these institutions is examined
to understand their role and contribution to water (in)equity in the city.
In the following sections, relevant scholarly works and empirical studies have
been drawn from existing literatures. The theoretical framework is included as part of the
literature survey.
1.3 Review of Literature
1.3.1 Cities, Water and Sustainability
The city is man’s most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in more after his heart’s desire…..in making the city man has remade himself (Park, 1967, p. 3)
Cities are complex and dynamic entities (Button, 2002); an emphasis on the
sustainability of these entities started in the 1990s (Wheeler, 2000). No sustainable
development strategy can ignore cities, as they are pivotal to all our current questions on
political, economic, social, environmental, health-related and cultural fronts (Jacquet,
Tubiana and Pachauri, 2010). When the term sustainability is applied to cities, it
comprises of the goal to make cities healthy, enjoyable, resilient places to work and to
ensure that the draw of their populations‘ consumption and enterprises‘ production on
9 TH-2195_136141012 local regional and global resources and sinks is not disproportionate (Satterthwaite,
2010). Goal 11 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is to make cities inclusive,
safe, resilient and sustainable (UN, 2015).
As cities are growing and many new cities are coming up, the 21st century will
see water availability as the greatest natural resource challenge (Oyegun, 1985). With
much of the urbanization processes taking place in Asian cities, 21st century will be an
urban century especially in India and China (Saxena and Vijayakumar, 2014). According
to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division of the UN
(2014), now more people in the world live in urban areas than in rural areas - with 54 per
cent of the world‘s population residing in urban areas in 2014 and expected to increase to
66 per cent by 2050 (Amir, 2015). According to the Urban Institute of the University of
Sheffield (2018), three per cent of the earth‘s surface has been urbanized and around four
billion people are living in urban areas. We have entered the Anthropocene which
indicates human dominance of earth systems (Brown and Schmidt, 2014). Urban
dwellers use more of the earth‘s resources than their rural counterparts (Landry, 2006).
Urban areas are central to all aspects of sustainable development (Rydin, 2010)
with water being at the core of sustainable development (UNDESA and UN WATER,
2015). Water is a critical issue of this century. Therefore, a fresh and reliable water
supply is vital to sustaining life and supporting healthy communities, economies and
environments (Benton-Short and Short, 2008). One of the challenges associated with the
magnitude of urban change will be to supply water to urban areas (Srinivasan, Seto,
Emerson and Gorelick, 2013), as many urban centers will be unable to expand supply to
meet the demand because of poor governance (Vo, 2007). Beyond a certain level of
urban growth, a lack of water resources could slow down development (Bao and Fang,
2007).
10 TH-2195_136141012 Water insecurity is a paramount threat to the future sustainability of global
populations (Biggs, Duncan, Atkinson and Dash, 2013). The irresistible growth of urban
areas has caused the number of people without an improved drinking water source to
reach almost one billion (UNICEF, 2009). Water quality, too, is deteriorating in many
areas because of pollution, and far too many people still lack access to safe and
dependable sources of clean water (Mak and Damania, 2017).
Urbanization poses a major challenge in terms of provision of water supply
services (Biswas, 2006). The supply of water to a city is for many uses and the demand is
rising from all quarters (Oyegun, 1985). Water demand already exceeds supply in many
parts of the world (Vairavamoorthy, Gorantiwar and Pathirana, 2008). The growth of
cities throughout the world presents new challenges for securing water to meet societal
needs (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2013). Growing pressure on the world‘s water resources
is having major impacts on our social and economic well-being. Even as the planet‘s
endowment of water is expected to remain constant, human appropriation of water,
already at 50 per cent by some measures, is expected to increase further (Cooley, et al.,
2014).
It is a commonly held belief today that cities in their present form and
functioning are unsustainable in terms of use and abuse natural resources (Cook and
Swyngedouw, 2014). The very sustainability of cities and the practices of everyday life
that constitute ‗the urban‘ are predicated upon and conditioned by the supply, circulation,
and elimination of water (Swyngedouw, 2004). Sustainability requires that the value of
the fresh water capital stock should not decline over time. Rather, current fresh water use
should not be at the cost of future generations, be it directly or indirectly (Pearce, 1993).
Thus, cities of the 21st century must realize the many ways of sharing in urban life
(Kazancugil, 2000).
11 TH-2195_136141012 Provision of clean water will be one of the major challenges of the present
century, the magnitude and the complexity of which no earlier generation has had to face
(Biswas, 2006). Water is therefore a parameter for inclusiveness in cities (Lupala, 2014).
The challenge of securing sustainable and equitable access to water is enormous (Lu,
Ocampo-Raeder and Crow, 2014). Given its fluid nature, and the multiple actors
implicated in its extraction, use and distribution, reaching water equity creates a daunting
set of challenges to collective action (Bakker, 2010).
Freshwater is fundamental to the well-being of the human population (UN, 2014)
and is still wanting in terms of supply, coverage, quality and quantity (Lupala, 2014).
Not all urban areas are proximal to freshwater resources, but heavy investment in large-
scale hydraulic infrastructure has allowed many urban areas to develop water systems
thus overcoming water insecurity issues associated with urban growth and/or geography
(Padowski, Carrera and Jawitz, 2016). The availability of water may be plentiful but
human activities can significantly degrade supplies and effectively limit access to safe
water (Johnston, 2012). For instance, accesses to water in developing countries typically
refer to a combination of sources including pipe connections on the premises, shallow
wells and boreholes. It also refers to service levels in terms of hours of water supply
from the piped connections (Lupala, 2014).
In all developing countries, unplanned and poorly managed urbanization
processes have been a major source of social stress (Biswas, 2006). Land, air and water
are the primary resources of the city. Urbanization increases the demand for land
resources which results in water pollution (Mega, 2010). Municipalities across the globe
are expected to increase annual water use by 43 per cent by the year 2025 (Gandhi and
Namboodiri, 2009). With the beginning of this century, attention shifted to management
as a major cause of the urban problems (Salman, 2014). There is also a growing
12 TH-2195_136141012 recognition that current water management practices are unsustainable (Brooks, Brandes
and Gurman, 2009).
Urban water is necessarily transformed water, not only in terms of its physico-
chemical characteristics, but also in terms of its social characteristics and its symbolic
and cultural meanings (Swyngedouw, 2004). Philosopher Ivan Illich (1945) argues that
since the industrialisation of H2O and the convenience of water on tap, people have taken
it for granted that has led to a deep cultural disconnect, and profound abuse (Withers,
2013).
There is a water crisis today but the crisis is not about having too little water to
satisfy needs. However it is a crisis of mismanagement which has resulted in the misery
of billions of people and the environment alike (Gandhi and Namboodiri, 2009). Human
use and pollution of freshwater resources have reached a level where the sustainability of
water resources is threatened. Water issues are intrinsically linked to other sustainable
development issues such as poverty, hunger, health, education, gender inequality,
ecosystems integrity, climate change and disasters (UNESCO, 2014).
1.3.2 Foregrounding Social Sustainability
The concept of sustainable development emerged with the publication of Our
Common Future in 1987 as an attempt to bridge the gap between environmental concerns
about the increasingly evident ecological consequences of human activities and socio-
political concerns about human development issues (Robinson, 2004). Since then,
protecting natural resources, and ensuring social justice are not conflicting anymore but
have become interwoven and complementary goals (Victor, 2006). Hence sustainability
has become a socio-ecological problem (Prugh and Renner, 2014).
13 TH-2195_136141012 The division of sustainable development into three pillars – the environment,
economy, and society, indicates that a practice cannot be fully sustainable until all these
three dimensions are satisfied (Casula and Soneryd, 2012). The concept of sustainable
development is about achieving an appropriate balance between the three pillars.
Basically, it is about reorienting the development trajectory so that genuine societal
progress can be sustained (Meadowcroft, 2007). In fact, sustainable development refers
to quality of life in the broadest possible sense (Casula and Soneryd, 2012). The values
embedded in sustainability discourses are broadly anthropocentric (Marder, 2014) and
our entry into the age of Anthropocene compel us to revisit the governance norms
(Brown and Schmidt, 2014) in order to enable us to solve urbanization challenges as well
as to grab the opportunities present in our cities (Biswas, 2006).
The different dimensions of sustainability have not been equally prioritized
academically or by policy makers. This is not only because ―sustainable development
was born out of the synergy between the emerging environmental movement of the
1960s and the ‗basic needs‘ advocates of the 1970s, but also because assessing the
intangible nature of the social aspects of development presents measurement quandaries‖
(Colantonio, 2009). As a result, there is a limited literature focusing on social
sustainability (Ibid). The social dimension has commonly been recognized as the
weakest ‗pillar‘ of sustainable development, notably when it comes to its analytical and
theoretical underpinnings (Lehtonen, 2004). Yet sustainability is a topic of research that
is basically social (Partridge, 2005) because it is ultimately an issue of human behaviour
(Robinson, 2004).
According to the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987), the definition of sustainable
development which is given as – ‗‗development which meets the needs of the present
without comprising the ability for future generations to meet their own needs‘‘ has a
14 TH-2195_136141012 clear social imperative (Axelsson, et al., 2013). But it was not until the end of the century
that the international community began to understand that the goal of sustainable
development must be to increase human abilities (Sierra, Pellicer and Yepes, 2016).
Social sustainability has been a core element of the sustainability discourse, ever since
the Brundtland Commission3 stressed that we cannot solve the key environmental
problems if global social equity issues are neglected. The social dimension is often the
most challenging to incorporate into actual projects and policies (Dillard, Dujon and
King, 2008). Recently, scholarly work has paid increasing attention to the social
dimension of sustainable development (Boström, Vifell, Klintman, Soneryd, Hallström
and Thedvall, 2015).
Social sustainability is a wide-ranging multi-dimensional concept, with the
underlying question – ‗what are the social goals of sustainable development?‘ which is
open to a multitude of answers (Hopwood et al., 2005; Littig and Grießler, 2005). It is a
concept that has been under-theorized or often oversimplifies in existing literature, and
there have been very few attempts to define social sustainability as an independent
dimension of sustainable development (Colantonio and Dixon, 2011). Little attention
has been paid explicitly to the concept of social sustainability in the water literature
(Hellberg, 2017). The ―social‖ was integrated late into debates on sustainability
(Eizenberg and Jabareen, 2017). For these reasons the relationships between the different
dimensions of sustainability are still unclear (Colantonio and Dixon, 2011). Social
sustainability is an open and contested concept. Over the years, there have been efforts to
3 The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) also known as the Brundtland Commission was formed by the United Nations in 1983. Gro Harlem Brundtland was appointed its chairperson. The aim of setting up the commission was to unite countries to pursue sustainable development together by the year 2000 and beyond. In October 1987, the Brundtland Commission released the document Our Common Future also known as the Brundtland Report.
15 TH-2195_136141012 develop theoretical frameworks to define and study social sustainability and to
empirically investigate it (Boström, 2012).
The concept of social sustainability can be interpreted differently depending on
one‘s political and ideological convictions (Aucamp, Woodborne, Perold, Bron and
Aucamp, 2011). One way to bring some conceptual order is to distinguish between a
substantive dimension of social sustainability and a procedural dimension. Such a
distinction is in line with various recent publications that discuss the concept of social
sustainability (Boström, Vifell, Klintman, Soneryd, Hallström and Thedvall, 2015).
Another way is to look at social sustainability as having three inter-related
components. First, a normative component indicating a broad vision of a desired end
state that is both holistic and long term; second, it has a strategic component, indicating
the desire to align a wide range of specific actions towards achieving the desired end
state; and third, there is a descriptive component which talks about ‗what is‘ in terms of
how it can be measured against strategy and vision (Colantonio, 2008, 2009; Manzi,
Lucas, Lloyd-Jones and Allen, 2010). It is these ‗what is‘ components that are important
in this study and will be further surveyed.
The following section highlights some of the selected interpretations / definitions
of social sustainability drawn from extended literature.
1. According to Magis and Shinn (2009) social sustainability concerns the ability of
human beings of every generation to not merely survive, but to thrive. Social
sustainability plays a paramount role in the continuous journey toward sustainability, as
ultimately it is human beings, individually and in collectives, which will determine
economic and environmental well-being.
16 TH-2195_136141012 2. Social sustainability is mainly concerned with the relationships between individual
actions and the created environment, or the interconnections between individual life-
chances and institutional structures (Jarvis, Pratt and Cheng-Chong Wu, 2001).
3. It is development that improves the quality of life for all segments of the population
(Polèse and Stren, 2000).
4. Social sustainability is about how individuals, communities and societies live with
each other and set out to achieve the objectives of development models which they have
chosen for themselves, also taking into account the physical boundaries of their places
and planet earth as a whole (Colantonio and Dixon, 2009).
5. Social sustainability occurs when formal and informal processes, systems, structures
and relationships actively support the capacity of future generations to create healthy and
liveable communities. Socially sustainable communities are equitable, diverse, connected
and democratic and provide a good quality of life (McKenzie, 2004).
The following are definitions on social sustainability that emphasizes on the
urban perspective:
1. Urban social sustainability is about the long-term survival of a viable urban social
unit. It is the continuing ability of a city to function as a long-term viable setting for
human interaction, communication and cultural development (Yiftachel and Hedgcock,
1993).
17 TH-2195_136141012 2. Social sustainability of a city is defined as development that is compatible with
harmonious evolution of civil society, fostering an environment conducive to the
compatible cohabitation of culturally and socially diverse groups and encouraging social
integration, with improvements in the quality of life for all segments of the population
(Polèse and Stren, 2000).
The concept of social sustainability is still developing (Axelsson, et al., 2013).
While there is no consensus on the definition of social sustainability, it is commonly
understood as related to a set of indicators or themes (Hellberg, 2017). Social
sustainability also refers to a variety of aspects such as quality of life, inter- and intra-
generational justice, and local populations‘ access to natural resources, access to green
urban spaces, cultural diversity, gender issues, workers‘ rights, participation and
development of social capital. It often refers to both the improvement of conditions for
people and the quality of institutions or the governance of the process (Boström, Vifell,
Klintman, Soneryd, Hallström and Thedvall, 2015). Much of today‘s literature expands
on the belief that social sustainability not only promotes equality of amenities among
community residents but also the development of stronger and more robust communities
(Toole and Carpenter, 2013).
It is important that social sustainability be grounded in equality, democracy and
social justice. Emphasis must be given for the preservation of social values, cultural
traditions and ways of life (Woodcraft, 2012). Social sustainability is not only
instrumental but also a goal towards which society should strive (Ahman, 2013). Over
the last thirty years the concept of social sustainability has evolved giving a greater
concern to social participation and the increase in the capacity of people to construct
their future (Foladori, 2005).
18 TH-2195_136141012 Cuthill (2010) tell us that social sustainability framework contains an
interdependent and self-reinforcing relationship between four key components (Fig. 1.1):
(1) social capital, (2) social infrastructure, (3) social justice and equity and (4) engaged
governance. There is an interdependent and self-reinforcing relationship between these
four different aspects of social sustainability (Boström, Vifell, Klintman, Soneryd,
Hallström and Thedvall, 2015).
Figure 1.1: Components of Social Sustainability Framework
Source: Cuthill (2010)
Besides the ones discussed, the following tables are compiled to categorize
further the themes, principles, elements, criteria and indicators related to social
sustainability drawn from various literatures:
19 TH-2195_136141012 Table 1.2: Themes, Elements and Criteria of Social Sustainability
Themes, Elements and Criteria Reference
Social justice and equity, social Cuthill (2010) infrastructure, engaged governance, and social capital
Human well-being, equity, democratic Magis and Shinn (2009) government, and democratic civil society
Sense of community, local well being and Rydin (2010) security, and the elimination of poverty, a more equal society (equity)
Social exclusion, social capital, Manzi et al., (2010) governance
Equity and human rights, quality of life, Baines and Morgan biodiversity and ecological integrity, (2004) ‗sense of place‘ and heritage, precaution, hope, vision, symbolic and iterative change
Social capital and human capital and Mauerhofer (2013) social carrying capacity
Equity, awareness for sustainability, Murphy (2012) participation, and social cohesion
Diversity, interconnectedness, equity, McBride (2009) quality of life, democracy and governance
Source: Compiled by the author
20 TH-2195_136141012 Table 1.3: Key Themes for the Operationalisation of Social Sustainability
Features Reference Livelihood Chambers and Equity Conway (1992) Capability of withstanding external pressures Safety nets
Inclusion DFID (1999) Equity Poverty Livelihood Equity Sachs (1999) Democracy Human Rights Social Homogeneity Equitable income distribution Employment Equitable access to resources and social services Paid and voluntary work Hans Böckler Basic needs Foundation (2001) Social security Equal opportunities to participate in a democratic society Enabling of social innovation Social justice Thin et al. (2002) Solidarity Participation Security Education Omann and Skills Spangenberg, Experience (2002) Consumption Income Employment Participation Interactions in the community/social networks Bramley et al., Community participation (2006) Pride and sense of place Community stability Security (crime)
Source: Colantonio and Dixon (2011)
21 TH-2195_136141012 Table 1.4: Criteria for Social Sustainability
Criteria considered Author(s)
Equity; democracy; human rights; social homogeneity; (Sachs, 1999) equitable income distribution; employment; equitable access to resources and social services
Equity; health; education; housing; security; population (UNDSD, 2001) Income; communication and participation; education; social (Spangenberg, contacts; social security; distribution of income and assets 2004)
Citizen participation; social interaction; feeling of belonging; (Choguill, interpersonal relations among the neighborhood residents; 2008) collective action; mutual support; access to facilities and amenities; safety
Social equity; access to facilities and social access to facilities (Bramley, and amenities; affordable housing; social interaction; Dempsey, safety/security; satisfaction with home; stability (turnover); Power, participation in collective group civic activities Brown, & Watkins, 2009) Equity; inclusion; adaptability; security (Colantonio, 2009) Access to facilities and amenities; amount of living space; (Dave, 2011) health of the inhabitants; community spirit and social interaction; safety; satisfaction with the neighborhood
Social interactions; participation; community stability; pride (Dempsey et and sense of place; social equity; safety and security al., 2011)
Accessibility; social capital and networks; health and well- (Weingaertner being; social cohesion and inclusion; safety and security; fair & Moberg, distribution (income, employment); local democracy, 2011) participation and empowerment; cultural heritage; education and training; equal opportunities; housing and community stability; connectivity and movement; social justice; sense of place; mixed use and tenure; attractive public realm
Source: Sharifi and Murayama (2013)
22 TH-2195_136141012 Chatzinikolaou, Manosand and Bournaris (2012) used the following indicators of
social sustainability for rural Europe:
(a) Members of a sports club, recreation or other social organization
(b) Using the internet for buy production means
(c) Using internet for sell products
(d) Lifelong learning
There are no ultimate indicators for social sustainability but the need for
indicators is wanting and strong (McBride, 2009). The indicators and themes are all
interrelated (McKenzie, 2004) and to some extent, they overlap (Baines and Morgan,
2004). Despite an apparent lack of consensus on the scope and meaning of social
sustainability, there seem to be some broadly accepted common ingredients (Baines and
Morgan, 2004). In the opinion of Woodcraft (2012), there seems be a consensus in the
social sustainability literature that incorporates a set of underlying themes that could be
described as social capital, human capital and well-being. Adding to that, two main
perspectives usually emerge in all researches conducted on social sustainability: on the
one hand, ethical values and norms and, on the other hand, issues related to community
engagement. Social sustainability can be considered as a combination of both these
aspects (Pareja-Eastaway, Elsinga, O‘Mahony, Eng, Wachter and Lovell, 2012).
Moreover, new ‗soft‘ themes such as happiness, well-being and social capital, are
becoming central to the social sustainability dabate, together with more traditional ‗hard‘
concepts, which include basic needs, equity and employment (Colantonio and Dixon,
2011).
According to Landorf (2011), ‗basic needs‘ and ‗equity‘ are the most common
and fundamental themes of social sustainability. Both concepts are necessary for the
23 TH-2195_136141012 physical and psychological survival of individuals. Also themes associated with the
wider social organisation of communities, such as ‗social capital‘, ‗social cohesion‘ and
‗social identity‘ are common. All of these factors are presumed to make communities
socially sustainable and enhance their capacity to meet basic needs equitably. Several
theoretical positions and their associated key social sustainability themes are shown in
Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Key Social Sustainability Dimensions and their Characteristics
Dimension Characteristics
Social equity Access to services, facilities and opportunities, level of institutional stability and flexibility
Social coherence Strength of networks, participation, identification and tolerance, level of empowerment and accountability
Needs satisfaction Objective satisfaction of basic needs, subjective satisfaction of basic needs
Source: Landorf (2011)
From the above tables, we can see the extent of the concept by looking at the
many indicators, themes and features. Social sustainability must be regarded as an
ongoing process which is underpinned by a specific set of social conditions and values,
rather than as a fixed outcome to be achieved within a definite time horizon (Aucamp,
Woodborne, Perold, Bronand and Aucamp, 2011). The more one includes within the
frame of social sustainability, the more difficult it becomes to understand it, much less to
achieve it (Boström, 2012). The principles and themes required for generating social
sustainability (Devidson, 2009) have been explored thus far. We shall take the
24 TH-2195_136141012 examination of the concept of social sustainability further by looking at more
interpretations and elucidation.
The social dimension of sustainable development is bipolar both at individual and
collective levels. First it is reflexive – based on our subjective perceptions and
interpretations of social conditions; second, it is immaterial where the social phenomena
themselves are essentially immaterial and therefore difficult to grasp and analyse
(Lehtonen, 2004).
According to Vallance, Perkins, and Dixon (2011), social sustainability is a
concept to describe a collective understanding of the need to build a community in order
for individuals to thrive with equal access to opportunities for individual development.
This includes the notion that it is a human right for all individuals to have access to basic
needs and to promote the idea of thriving within a community instead of just surviving.
They gave a threefold structure of social sustainabilities, which comprises of (a)
‗development sustainability‘ which addresses basic needs, the creation of social capital,
equity and so on; (b) ‗bridge sustainability‘ which concerns changes in behaviour so as
to achieve bio-physical environmental goals; and (c) ‗maintenance sustainability‘ refers
to the preservation of socio-cultural characteristics in the face of change, and the ways in
which people actively embrace or resist those changes (Wolbring and Rybchinski, 2013;
Eizenberg and Jabareen, 2017).
Social sustainability is a notoriously complex concept (Yung and Chan, 2012). In
short, social sustainability refers to both the improvement of conditions for living people
and future generations and the quality of governance of the development process
(Boström, 2012). The concept of social sustainability has been changing to accommodate
many different foci of concerns and today, the concept has become more relevant
(Jacobsen and Delaney, 2014).
25 TH-2195_136141012 1.3.2.1 Social Sustainability and Cities
Social sustainability is people-centered and pro-people. In this era of urban
century, much of the social sustainable development will occur in cities and towns. The
role of cities in sustainable development has become more prominent due to the growing
urban population all over the world (Dempsey et al., 2011). Basic social sustainability
concerns the social balance within an urban community (Hilgers, 2013). Within the
context of urban areas, emphasizing social equity may assist cities in evolving to become
better places by facilitating a fairer distribution of resources (Yung and Chan, 2012). In
recent years, a number of cities have adopted the concept of social sustainability in their
policies (Davidson, 2010).
Since the very origins of the city there have been concerns over how to maintain
its social life. The recent concerns over the sustainability of urban societies and
engagement with social sustainability might therefore been seen in a long historical
tradition that was concerned with the fragile nature of urban societies (Davidson, 2010).
The concept of urban social sustainability conceives the city as a backdrop for lasting
and meaningful social relations that meet the social needs of present and future
generations (Yiftachel and Hedgcock, 1993). Social sustainability of cities cannot be
limited to a technical, problem-solving approach, or institutional management. Rather the
local context and its history are fundamental factors to consider in fostering a dynamic
sustainability. When we look at the social aspect of sustainability, it is essential to
consider the contentious nature of the urban change, the networks and alliance necessary
to implement a new voluntary orientation (Hilgers, 2013). Social sustainability requires
minimum social conflict. In practice this means that development should increase
people‘s control over their lives in such a way that all social groups have the opportunity
to take part in meaningful decision-making (Reid, 1996).
26 TH-2195_136141012 Social sustainability is related to the ability of cities to provide a feasible
framework where interaction between people is preserved throughout the existence of
communication channels where exchange of ideas, cultures, norms, and traditions takes
place (Pareja-Eastaway, Elsinga, O‘Mahony, Eng, Wachter and Lovell, 2012). A socially
sustainable city is marked by vitality, solidarity and a common sense of place among its
residents (Yiftachel and Hedgcock, 1993). Polèse and Stren (2000, p. vii) assert that ―the
cities of the twenty-first century must place the citizen at the center of public policy,
reinvent the concept of the city, and realize the many ways of sharing in urban life‖.
Social equity is a dimension that is essential to produce social sustainability
(Bramley and Power, 2009) in urban areas. An equitable society is one with no
exclusionary or discriminatory practices hindering individuals from participating
economically, socially, or politically. Within an urban context, social equity is related to
access to services, facilities and opportunities (Santa-Cruz, 2016). Urban developments in
order to be socially sustainable should create a harmonious living environment and
improves quality of life in general (Chan and Lee, 2008).
Central epistemological axes in urban studies resonate particularly well with key
tenets of sustainability including inter-/intra-generational equity and good governance as
well as the welfare for place, communities and culture (Wolfram and Frantzeskaki,
2016).
Based on the literature review of the concept of social sustainability, there are a
number of social components that are keys to analyzing and understanding social
sustainability. The elements of ‗equity‘ and ‗governance‘ would be used in this study to
generate insight into social sustainability of urban water supply systems in the city of
Shillong, India. These two indicators of social sustainability will be discussed in this
section below.
27 TH-2195_136141012 1.3.3 Equity
The term equity is a key social concept in sustainable development discourse
(Murphy, 2012). According to Sachs (1999), one of the basic values that social
sustainability must rest on is equity. Colantonio (2008) also opines that equity is a
fundamental component mentioned in much of the literature on social sustainability.
Being the most commonly mentioned requirement for social sustainability, it must be the
overarching guiding principle for any approach to social sustainability.
Numerous authors argue that social sustainability must have a redistributive
element and that a sustainable community must be an equitable one (Partridge, 2005). It
is generally agreed that equity implies a need for fairness in the distribution of welfare
goods and life chances, and the entitlement of everyone to an acceptable quality and
standard of living (Beder, 1996; Murphy, 2012). Equity focuses on the social disparities
that threaten to rip society apart (Ahman, 2013).
As one element of justice (Patrick, 2014), equity is principally concerned with
relationships between people, and with their relative circumstances (McDermott,
Mahanty and Schreckenberg, 2013). Social equity issues are powerful political and
policy concerns, and centre upon a distributive notion of social justice (Bramley, et al,
2006).
Equity is based on the idea of moral equality, the principle that people should be
treated as equals. This is the idea that, despite many differences, all people share a
common humanity or human dignity and, as a result of this, we must consider how each
of them should be treated (Jones, 2009). Equity is not simply a normative concern. It is a
material factor which directly impinges on the process of social and material sustenance.
In fact, equity enhances a city‘s transformative capacity while also promoting identity
and agency among the population (UN-Habitat, 2013).
28 TH-2195_136141012 Besides being relative, equity is also a matter of subjective perspective. It can be
determined by history and social conditioning, and permits no universally acceptable
definitions. The concept of equity is value laden. The extrinsic bases of these values
could be common human values of fair-play and justice or be much more specific and
established notions (Phansalkar, 2007). Equity is informed by deeper ethical principles
(Perreault, 2014).
To Eizenberg and Jabareen (2017), the concept of equity is a central component
of the social sustainability framework which comprises of three dimensions:
(a) Redistributive: This concept suggests that social distributive justice entails
ensuring that people have various rights like the right to clean air, water, and
related resources.
(b) Recognition of the voices of vulnerable groups, the disadvantaged in policies
that determine their lives.
(c) Participation: Recognizing the membership of people in the moral and political
community and promoting their capabilities.
Franks (2015) gives similar dimensions of equity: distribution, procedure and
recognition where ‗distribution‘ is about the costs and benefits that affect human
wellbeing; while ‗procedure‘ is about the inclusiveness of decision-making processes;
‗recognition‘ is about recognizing stakeholders' rights, interests, concerns and grievances
necessary for procedural equity.
The concept of equity is a complex and protean idea. It is not some objective
state of being, but rather an ideal, vision, or aspiration (Whiteley, Ingram and Perry,
2008). Equity defines the principles that should underpin the distributive allocation of
29 TH-2195_136141012 resources (Syme and Nancarrow, 2008). It is a needed condition for a just society
(Whiteley, Ingram and Perry, 2008). Equity is ―a belief that there are some things which
people should have, that there are basic needs that should be fulfilled…..and that policy
should be directed with impartiality, fairness and justice towards these ends‖ (Falk,
Hampton, Hodgkinson, Parker, and Rorris, 1993, p. 2).
Equity in resource management means the allocation of more resources to
disadvantaged groups so as to make the system as a whole more fair. Therefore,
interventions, which seek equity, should devise ways to give marginalized groups more
benefits (Timsina and Luintel, 2003). The way in which water resources are allocated
and developed will play a major role in determining whether human poverty is alleviated
or exacerbated in the near future. Ensuring equitable distribution is essential. Equity in
allocation means that all users should have a fair access to water they need for their
activities (Kansiime, 2002). As already stated, social sustainability is dependent on social
equity. Within an urban context, social equity is related to access to services, facilities and
opportunities, and adequate infrastructure (Santa-Cruz et al., 2016). As we know, one
important principle of equity is the equal concern for people‘s needs. Water, which is a
matter of necessity, should be distributed proportional to people‘s level of need and
nothing else (Jones, 2009).
1.3.3.1 Water Equity
Water is the quintessential equity issue because it is absolutely necessary to
sustain life, livelihoods and environmental quality (Wilder and Ingram, 2016). Equity in
water is impacted by competing uses, whether at the individual and household level or
even between communities (Lu, Ocampo-Raeder and Crow, 2014). Water equity is
aspirational, contextual and relational (Wilder and Ingram, 2018).
30 TH-2195_136141012 According to the UN-Habitat (2013), addressing inequities requires political will,
strong institutions and well-targeted policies. Promotion of equity also involves
enhancing socioeconomic equality and providing for civic participation by all in the
social, political and cultural spheres. Equity is about social and political relations among
urban populations as well as among government institutions and individuals and social
groups. It is the relational dimension which underlies the degree to which a city operates
and sustains as a collective entity (UN-Habitat, 2013).
The concept of equity is both very simple and complex: it is, simple because
everybody is aware of it and complex because there is no single best measure of equity.
Equity of water distribution refers to the delivery of a fair share of water to users
throughout a system (Ameyaw, Memon and Bicik, 2013). According to Goff and Crow
(2014), water access is equitable if residents are able to live healthy lives that they value.
Matthew Goff (2013) provides some basic inputs for an improved equity formula
for water, which are: quantity, quality, cost, ease of access, collection time and distance,
physical strain of access, ease of facility, reliability of supply/ uncertainty of availability
and water connection proximity to water. The issues that constitute equity in access to
and provision of water are wider than the quantity and quality of water. They can include
labour time spent collecting water, health outcomes from inadequate water and
sanitation, work and other opportunities foregone because of water collection, certainty
of supply, the valuation of domestic work, costs of dealing with conflict resolution
between multiple stakeholders, and income-earning and business opportunities made
possible by water supply (Lu and Ocampo-Raeder, 2014). Furthermore, Ingram, Scaff
and Silko (1986) give us principles that are necessary conditions for water equity -
reciprocity, value-pluralism, participation, promises, and responsibility.
31 TH-2195_136141012 The framework presented by McDermott et al., (2013) has three dimensions of
equity. These are (a) distributive equity concerned with the distribution of the
resource and its benefits; (b) procedural equity that investigates decision-making
processes and procedures; and (c) contextual equity that addresses the pre-existing
conditions and power relations that enhance or curtail people‘s access to decision-
making, resources and its benefits.
The equity concept implies that water allocation among the competing users
should be based on the overriding criterion of social justice. It also implies protection
of water rights and access to safe drinking water, as it is a basic human need (Rasul and
Chowdhury, 2010). In terms of measuring social equity, accessibility is commonly cited
as a fundamental measure (Dempsey, Bramley, Power and Brown, 2011). Equity in
allocation means that all users should have a fair access to water they need for their
activities (Kansiime, 2002).
The concept of equity, in the context of water governance, can refer primarily to
distributional issues like fairness in access to drinking water (Perreault, 2014). Achieving
equitable access implies a form of governance that includes considering different
political constellations of organizing the hydrosocial cycle (Swyngedouw, 2014).
1.3.4 Water Governance
Water is a key element in terms of distributive equity among communities and
therefore a parameter for inclusiveness in cities (Lupala, 2014). Both in academia and
policy circles, the attention has shifted from water management towards water
governance. With the shift, the principle of equitable utilization has emerged in the
literature as an important principle for allocation (Doorn, 2012). Water governance is
critical to water security and to the long-term sustainability of freshwater. The shift from
32 TH-2195_136141012 ‗government‘ to ‗governance‘ is a prescribed method that promises better solutions to
natural resource management (Bakker, 2013).
Governance is seen as processes of interaction. It is based on accommodation
rather than domination. Governance is also many times considered as facilitating action
since it involves activities for resolving common problems. Governance also puts
emphasis on networks, flexibility and informal institutions (Tropp, 2006). Governance
systems reflect a community‘s or a society‘s collective view about what it is, what it
believes in, and what it wishes to become (Cullinan, 2014). Governance systems
determine who gets what water, when and how and decide who has the right to water and
related services and their benefits. Governance is one of the biggest challenges within the
water sector (UNDP and IFAD, 2006). Governance is a foundation of social
sustainability (Ajmal, Khan, Hussain and Helo, 2017).
The following are four definitions/interpretation of ―water governance‖.
1. It is the political, economic and social processes and institutions by which
governments, civil society, and the private sector make decisions about how best
to use, develop and manage water resources (UNDP, 2004).
2. Water governance is defined as the range of political, organizational and
administrative processes through which communities articulate their interests,
their input is absorbed, decisions are made and implemented, and decision
makers are held accountable in the development and management of water
resources and delivery of water services (Bakker, 2003b)
3. Water governance refers to the range of political, social, economic and
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources,
and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society (Rogers and Hall,
2003).
33 TH-2195_136141012 4. Franks and Cleaver (2007) defines water governance as the system of actors,
resources, mechanisms and processes which mediate society‘s access to water.
Batchelor (2007) talks about ‗distributed governance‘, which embraces the
governance of both formal and informal institutions in the management of water. The
actual realization of the right to water depends on context-specific governance processes,
mechanisms and actors (Morinville and Rodina, 2013).The discursive shift from water
management to water governance reflects a shift of attention from the isolation, or
abstraction of water itself, to the complex relationship between water and people (Linton,
2011).
Governance generally refers to questions about forms of power and authority,
patterns of relationship and rights and obligations among the people facing common
problems (Newman, as cited in Tropp, 2007). In a sense, governance is about the
processes of making choices, decisions and trade-offs (Tropp, 2007).
Governance to ensure social justice dates back to the period when cities have
flourished. What is new is the awareness that reducing inequities is fundamental to
solving sustainability issues and that they are entirely synergistic (Newman and
Jennings, 2008). According to the UNDP Water Governance Facility, water governance
determines the equity and efficiency in water resource and services allocation and
distribution, and balances water use between socio-economic activities and ecosystems
(UNDP and SIWI, 2015).
The challenges of water governance are most acute in developing countries
because of the problem of ―bad hydrology‖ (Briscoe, 2009; Araral and Wang, 2013).
Also, water management and governance suffers due to reasons that range from the usual
constraints like short-term planning, shortage and inappropriate use of financial
34 TH-2195_136141012 resources, to lack of institutional and human capacities (Tortajada, 2010). Moreover,
issues of urbanization, climate change, lack of awareness, lack of ambition and
government effectiveness, and limited financial resources for infrastructure construction
and maintenance pose immense governance challenges particularly for cities in
developing countries (Van Leeuwen, Koop and Sjerps, 2016). According to Biswas and
Tortajada, 2010b), physical scarcity of water, lack of availability of investment funds,
inability of the poor to pay for water, lack of expertise, and among many other reasons
are only excuses to hide the real and fundamental reason which is poor leadership and
governance.
As already indicated, governance is not confined to the actions of the governing
authority but is dispersed through society as a culture of governing, enacted through a
number of agencies to the level of the individual (Eddy, 2006). The issue of governance,
multilevel or not, implies that people, not water, should be central to water governance.
From a governance perspective water management is about the hearts and the minds of
the people and their vital interests (Toonen, 2011). Fundamentally, water governance
deals with how a society governs the access to and control over water resources and their
benefits (Slinger et al., 2011). Human and social capitals are as important as money, and
form the key to good water governance (Toonen, 2011). Management of fresh water
resources is of critical importance to healthy social, economic and political well-being of
a society (Van Leeuwen, Koop and Sjerps, 2016). In the absence of good systems for
resource distribution, the future holds dark clouds (Seyle and King, 2014).
1.3.4.1 Good Water Governance
One of the key propositions of the Rio Declarartion (1992) is the process of
‗good governance‘, which is a precondition for achieving sustainability at the local level.
35 TH-2195_136141012 The logic behind this proposition is two-fold. First, achieving sustainable devlopment
cannot be secured by governments alone. It will be necessary to mobilize the enrgies and
initiative of local communities for changing attitudes, values and behaviour are to be
secured. Second, the governance process is regarded as a key mechanism to participatory
decision-making, thereby increasing political engagement and levels of acceptance of
decisions and policies for sustainable development (Evans, Joas, Sundback and
Theobald, 2006). Social sustainability often refers to both the improvement of conditions
and the quality of governance of the development process (Boström, 2012).
There is no universally acclaimed definition of good governance. However, one
can argue that good governance requires transparency and accountability, fosters
participation and representativeness, promotes fairness and equity, accomplishes
effective and efficient allocation of resources, peacefully resolves conflict, meets
obligations to future generations, is ethical and future-oriented (Tonn, 2012; GWP,
2002). Governance is essentially a process and what makes it ‗good governance‘ is the
capacity of achieving results in a fair and inclusive manner that leads to sustainable
water management practices, that contributes for ensuring water security in the long
term, and that is in conformity with the goals established and accepted by any given
society and by the international community (Akhmouch and Correia, 2016). Governance
is good if it can help to solve key water challenges, using a combination of bottom-up
and top-down processes while fostering constructive state-society relations (Akhmouch,
2016). Further, good governance requires proper allocation and management of
resources to collective problems, that is, all citizens receive in a timely and efficient
manner requisite public goods of appropriate and acceptable quality (Biswas and
Tortajada, 2010a). In analysing good water governance, Tropp (2005) gives four
dimensions, as shown in Figure 1.2.
36 TH-2195_136141012
Figure 1.2: Dimensions of Good Water Governance
Source: Tropp (2005)
Good governance is an important pillar of water management, which enhances
various aspects, such as promoting decentralization, building capacity, and strengthening
and monitoring evaluation, research and learning at all levels (Khadka, 2010). Water
governance has more to do with people than with water. Therefore, the emphasis should
be on connecting people (van der Valk and Keenan, 2011). Governance mechanisms
allow flexibility and innovation and, by allowing a wide range of groups and
organizations to work together and determine their own objectives and activities, they are
a key component of ensuring social sustainability (Manzi, Lucas, Lloyd-Jones and Allen,
2010).
37 TH-2195_136141012 Around the world, the allocation of water is still treated as a technical problem
when in fact it is primarily a social problem (Susskind, 2013). Unless the urban water
governance practices are improved significantly universal access to clean drinking water
will remain an unachievable dream, even if hundreds of billions of dollars are made
available (Biswas and Tortajada, 2010b).
Governance for sustainability (Shiroyama, Yarime, Matsuo, Schroeder, Scholz
and Ulrich, 2012) requires participation, promoting new alliances and new ways of
mobilizing resources (Allen and Cochrane, 2007). Governance is a core issue within
debates about sustainability, partly because existing arrangements are responsible for the
problem and partly because creating new ways to do things together is a part of the
solution (Manzi, Lucas, Lloyd-Jones and Allen, 2010). Without good governance,
society‘s water problems may be ignored, or the purported solutions may be
corrupt, too short-sighted, or simply too little, too late (Tonn, 2012).
1.4 Research Gap
The survey of literature suggests that no comprehensive work has been
undertaken as such on the issue of water supply using the social sustainability approach.
The concept of social sustainability and its two elements of ‗water equity‘ and ‗water
governance‘ have been summarised and discussed applicably. As has been mentioned
earlier, social sustainability is still at a budding stage though the original concept
presented by the Brundtland Commission focused on the idea of sustainable development
which has social issues at its core. Somehow, this focus has been lost. Also, most of the
research pertaining specifically to it has been carried out in the West covering themes of
urban development like city planning, urban housing, urban agglomeration, etc.
38 TH-2195_136141012 However, there are gaps in literature and discussion which we have tried to address in
this study.
From the existing literature review, the researcher has learnt that social
sustainability has not been explored from the ‗water equity‘ and ‗water governance‘
perspectives. Past studies have overlooked the relationship between these two variables.
Also, water supply systems in the present field site have never been examined from the
social sustainability point of view. So far, no research conducted on water in Shillong
city has employed the social sustainability perspective. This study follows practical
approach and aims to fill the research gap in existing literature of social sustainability in
the city. The outcome of the study will enhance to apply consideration of social
sustainability to projects, policy development and programme implementation.
1.5 Rationale for the Topic
Shillong, the capital of Meghalaya is the second largest urban center among the
Northeastern states. In terms of its economic, administrative and commercial importance
it is perhaps second to Guwahati. The city supports about 60 per cent and about 96 per
cent of the total urban population of the Meghalaya State and the District of East Khasi
Hills respectively (Census 2001). Shillong is located on the northern slopes of the
Shillong ridges which mark the highest part of the Meghalaya Plateau. It is from here
that many streams originate to flow either towards the north to the Brahmaputra river
system or towards the south in the Bangladesh plains in the Surma valley. These streams
are rain fed and dry up especially during the dry season and create water scarcity.
The growth of Shillong as an urban center can be traced down to the period of
1863-64 when the British shifted the administrative headquarters of Khasi and Jaintia
Hills from Cheerapunjee (due to its inclement weather) to Shillong associated with a
39 TH-2195_136141012 salubrious climate and ample water resources for meeting the water demand (Pakem,
1984). From a mere population of 9621 as per 1901 census, Shillong has grown with a
total census recorded population of about 3,54,759 persons (Census, 2011).
This rapid urban population growth both natural and migration induced is having
its toll on the existing resources, which was initially designed to sustain a much smaller
size of population. With urbanisation the demand for water increases with population
growth and better standard of living. But the total quantum of water supply remains the
same or in some cases reduces due to loss of vegetation cover and constructional
activities. Hence urbanisation and growth of population has a pressure on the land
resources which has its direct impact on the hydrology of the area. Like many other cities
in the developing world, city authorities seem unprepared for the urban onslaught. With
an annual rainfall of 2167mm (85.3 inches) and having a hilly topography, Shillong has
ample water resources ranging from springs to rivers. However, there is extensive
inequitable distribution of water in the city. Similar to many Indian cities, there is gross
mismanagement of water in the city (Ahluwalia, 2014).
Water supply is basic to human security (Galaitsi, Russell, Bishara, Durant,
Bogle and Huber-Lee, 2016) and inequitable water supply is a major challenge to cities
of developing countries (Mohan Kumar, Manohar, Pallavi and Anjana, 2013). Many
water related problems can be attributed to governance failure at multiple levels of
governance and our knowledge on water governance systems and conditions for success
of water governance reform is still quite limited (Pahl-Wostl, 2017). Shillong, like other
cities in the developing countries abound in domestic water supply problems. This study
will help in better understanding the main reason for water inequity which is
mismanagement caused by deficient and disappointing water governance.
40 TH-2195_136141012 Shillong city is chosen as a site of study because of recurrent urban water
problems and to improve the understanding of a specific problem and with the ―intent of
contributing to the solution‖ (Hedrick, Bickman and Rog, 1993). My thesis proposes to
look at several of these issues in the process developing an alternative discursive
framework to understand Shillong‘s water problems and the issue of water more broadly.
Also this study seeks to add to the small cities literature in trying to understand the
uniqueness of the study area with reference to water and thus reiterating the importance
and prevalence of small cities (Bell and Jayne, 2009) in contributing to global urban
sustainability. The results and finding of this dissertation can be juxtaposed with other
small cities, hill stations, urban areas of the north east, India and the world for further
research.
1.6 Objectives of the Study
The present study follows the social sustainability perspective, and attempts to
identify the major constraints in urban amenities associated with equitable supply of
water and water governance in Shillong through the following objectives:
1. To examine the nature of distribution of water in Shillong. A systematic and
structural inquiry into the potential demand and requirement for water services
will be undertaken.
2. To study the involvement of local institutions in water supply and other related
water activities in the localities of Shillong. For this, the traditional institutions,
chiefly the dorbar shnongs, would be examined.
3. To understand the water governance system, role and impact of these traditional
institutions on water supply in Shillong. This will provide detailed information
41 TH-2195_136141012 concerning the degree of involvement of local institutions in water supply and
other related water activities in the localities of Shillong.
1.7 Research Questions
On the basis of the theoretical premises on social sustainability with an extended
review of relevant literature on elements such as equity, governance and water supply
systems, the research questions of the present study are:
1. What is the present state of domestic water supply systems in Shillong in terms of
equity?
2. What is the position and role of the dorbar shnongs in water governance?
3. What are the differences and similarities in the roles of the dorbar shnongs and
what impact do these have on water distribution?
For attaining the above objectives and research questions the present research
work is based on analyses and interpretation of both secondary and primary data. The
whole study is based on empirical facts and figures which have been obtained by
employing the following tools and techniques of data collection.
1.8 Research Methodology
For the study, qualitative method is combined with data tabulation of numerical
data in order to provide a general picture (Punch, 2005). The numerical data is connected
with the qualitative and embedded in it. The study takes a qualitative approach where
this method is described as ―procedures for the analysis of raw data that consists of
words or pictures . . . in qualitative research, data-collection and analysis methods are not
42 TH-2195_136141012 standardized but unique, often with a variety of methods being used in an iterative
fashion that fits the peculiarities of the research problem‖ (Aunger and Dow, 1997).
Concurrent sampling was used in which non-probability method for numerical
data and qualitative purposeful samplings are combined as independent sampling
procedures (Creswell, 2009). Questionnaire and interview were the main research tools
used in the study. In-depth semi-structured interviews were carried out with headmen of
selected localities, PHED engineers, academicians and other experts and members of
households. Narrative research method was also incorporated. Narrative research was
found to be useful to the study because of a breach between the ideal and real selves of
water consumers in terms of water as need (Bloor and Wood, 2006). Through the
household survey in the form of questionnaires, both qualitative and quantitative data
were collected from the sample.
The tools of key person interview and questionnaires were used to answer the
research questions and to gain a clear understanding of the water management in the city.
Household Survey
Numerical data was mostly obtained from the questionnaire survey distributed to
the water consumers. The questionnaire was designed in such a way so as to gather data
pertaining to water supply and the respondents‘ subjective opinions on water quality,
governance, etc. The questionnaires were designed keeping in mind the objectives of the
study. The questionnaire is a structured-non-disguised type. The Likert scale is also used
in the questionnaire. In selecting the sample localities, care was taken to see that there
was sufficient geographical coverage. One of the main thrusts of the study is to compare
data between and within the municipality and the non-municipality localities. So the
study was approached in a manner to achieve the required. It covered localities in both
43 TH-2195_136141012 the areas. The sample universe consists of all the adult population of the city of Shillong.
Profile of the questionnaire survey respondents is given in Table 1.6.
Through the household survey both quantitative (numerical) and qualitative data
was collected. The questionnaire survey was carried out in two hundred households
across the city. The sampling method was snowball combined with homogeneous
convenience sampling method. The questionnaire is self-administered. The open ended
question allowed the respondents to express their attitudes and opinions which added
depth to the survey findings. This was done to get an overview of the nature of water
supply in the different parts of Shillong and especially to study the differences in
household water supply between localities that fall within the municipal jurisdiction and
those that do not. In this survey, the respondents represented twenty localities within the
municipal area and twenty eight localities outside of the municipal area (Table 1.8). The
number of respondents ranges from 1-5 from each locality. A large number of localities
were chosen in order to get a vast perspective of the water supply scenario in the city.
This is because the water supply with regards to quantity and duration differ from
locality to locality. The reasons for this are many, for example the presence of a spring in
one locality and absence of such in another adjacent locality will show water disparities
especially in localities outside the municipal area.
Interview
Both purposive and snowball probability sampling was used for the interviews.
From these key person interviews, a wealth of information was acquired. From the office
bearers of the dorbar shnongs information was provided regarding the working of the
dorbar shnongs, in the past and present situation of the water supply in their respective
localities, the plight of the poor people, and water sources that are available, their take on
44 TH-2195_136141012 the future and other related topics. This kind of information could not have been acquired
though the questionnaires alone. These rangbah shnongs are mostly elderly people with
a lot of experience in local administration. They are responsible for their residents and
hence they have a lot of insight and knowledge of individuals and collectively also. The
engineers provided valid information that is necessary to understand the water situation
from the supply side. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews were conducted with
dorbar shnongs, academicians and other experts acquired a wealth of information,
suggestions and subjective opinions that helped weaved the study together (see profile of
interviewees in Table 1.7). Most of the interviews were audio recorded. Transcribing the
interviews provided for a thorough examination of what people said (Bryman, 2012).
Photography
Photography was also used as it has the potential to be a visual language with
which we can chronicle and represent reality (Moran and Tegano, 2005). Taking
photographs can also allow the researcher to reflect on what they encounter in their
fieldwork and on their own relation to the field (Rose, 2014). Photograph taken by me
during fieldwork are inserted in relevant sections of the chapters.
Narratives
Narrative approach was conducted with seven interviewees in the municipality
localities and ten interviewees in the non-municipality localities. This generated
information regarding the poor and their water experiences. Narrative research is useful
to apply when there has been a breach between their ideal and real selves or between the
self and society (Williams, 1984). The most transparent value of narrative research is its
ability to ‗give a voice‘ to the individuals or groups being studied (Haines, 2011).
45 TH-2195_136141012
Non-Participant Observation was also used as a tool to a certain extent. It helped in
understanding and generating questions related to the study.
Literature review and interviews were used in drawing interpretations from the
questionnaire data. This analysis was then represented using tables for a clearer
understanding. From the interviews data was thematically analysed to understand the
water governance systems that exists in Shillong. Much of the analytic reasoning made
in this study to draw wider conclusions can be termed inductive (Thomas, 2006).
Secondary data was collected from the following sources:
(1) Meghalaya Urban Development Authority (MUDA)
(2) Department of Urban Affairs, Government of Meghalaya
(3) Central Groundwater Authority, Shillong
(4) Dorbar Shnongs
(5) Meghalaya Basin Development Authority (MBDA)
(6) North Eastern Hill University (NEHU) and Synod College Libraries
(7) Local newspapers- Mawphor and The Shillong Times
46 TH-2195_136141012 Table 1.6: Profile of the Questionnaire Survey Respondents
Social Demographics of Respondents Percentage Gender Female 62 Male 38 Age 18-25 32 25-45 45 45-60 23 Occupation Government Service 74 Self Employed 10 Retired/Housewife 16 Household 2-3 7 Size 4-6 69 7-10 24 Type of Independent House 57 House Apartment/rented house 41 Govt. quarter 2
Table 1.7: List of Interviewees
I. Headman/Secretary of the dorbar shnongs of municipality and non-municipality localities:
A. Municipality Localities
Sl. No. Municipality Localities
1 Cleve Colony
2 Laban
3 Umsohsun
4 Wahingdoh
47 TH-2195_136141012 B. Non-Municipality Localities
Sl. No. Non-Municipality localities
1 Lawsohtun
2 Mawlai Mawdatbaki
3 Mawlai Nonglum
4 Mawlai Phudmawri
5 Mawpat
6 Nongkhryiem
7 Nongrah
II. Academics
Seven persons from academics, teaching in university and colleges in Shillong were
interviewed for the study; including the former Chairman of Khasi Hills Autonomous
District Council (KHADC), and a Member of Union Public Service Commission
(UPSC).
III. Others
This category comprises of bureaucrats, journalist (media) and activist. In total 10 people
were interviewed – which includes officials of Central Ground Water Board (CGWB);
Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC); Meghalaya Basin Development
Authority (MBDA).
48 TH-2195_136141012 Table 1.8: Localities of Shillong City where the Survey was Conducted
Localities In Municipal Area Localities in Non-Municipal Area
1. Cleve Colony 1. Demthring 2. Forest Colony 2. Golf Links 3. Jaiaw Lansonalane 3. Ishyrwat 4. Jaiaw Lumsyntiew 4. Langkyrding Mihngi 5. Jaiaw Pdeng 5. Lawsohtun 6. Laban 6. Lumdiengsoh 7. Lama Villa 7. Lummawbah 8. Lachumiere 8. Lumshyiap 9. Laitumkhrah 9. Madanrting 10. Lawmali 10. Mawiong 11. Lumdiengjri 11. Mawlai Mawdatbaki 12. Malki Pdengshnong 12. Mawlai Mawroh 13. Mawbah 13. Mawlai Nongmali 14. Mawprem Bishop Falls 14. Mawlai Nonglum 15. Mawprem Lumkshaid 15. Mawlai Nongpathaw 16. Mission Compound 16. Mawlai Nongpdeng 17. Paltan Bazaar 17. Mawlai Syllaikariah 18. Riatsamthiah 18. Mawlai Umshing 19. Umsohsun 19. Mawlai Umthlong 20. Wahingdoh 20. Mawpun 21. Nongmynsong 22. Nongthymmai Golden Estate 23. Nongthymmai Lumiablot 24. Nongthymmai Springside 25. Pynthorbah 26. Rynjah 27. Umpling 28. Upper Shillong
49 TH-2195_136141012 1.9 Organisation of the Thesis
The dissertation is divided into six chapters as follows. Chapters I through III are
based on literature review and secondary data collected during data collection period for
the study. Chapters IV to VI discusses and analyzes the primary data using related
literature.
Chapter I: This chapter gives an elaborate review of literature and theoretical
perspectives on social sustainability, equity and water governance. This sets the context
for the research and also provides the rationale to examine social sustainability in an
urban context using the criteria of ‗equity‘ and ‗governance‘. It is followed by a
discussion on the research methods used in this study. Research gaps, rationale of the
study and objectives and research questions are given in this chapter.
Chapter II: This chapter gives a vivid account of the study area. Based on existing
secondary literature, this chapter provides a general understanding of the physical setting
– geography and climate, land and forest, population, community of Meghalaya in
general and Shillong in particular. It also provides the condition of water supply systems
and associated problems in Shillong.
Chapter III: This chapter provides an extensive review of literature on the traditional
institutions of the dorbar shnongs. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the history,
role, function and the evolution of these institutions. This chapter provides a better
understanding and reflects the importance of local traditional institutions as they play an
important role in water governance.
50 TH-2195_136141012 Chapter IV: This chapter examines ‗equity‘ in water supply systems both in municipal
and non-municpal localities in Shillong. The chapter discusses the findings and analysis
of the data garnered from the field.
Chapter V: This chapter deals with water governance exercised by the local traditional
institutions chiefly the dorbar shnongs. It examines the role of the dorbar shnongs in
selected localities of Shillong city.
Chapter VI: This chapter summarizes and collates findings of the study thematically. It
also provides the limitations of the study and suggestions for practice and policy and the
implications of the work for future research. Personal opinion of the researcher is
condensed in further discussion combining with related literature suitable for concluding
remarks.
The next Chapter 2 provides a vivid account of the study area – the
physical/geographical settings, demography, community, and water supply systems of
Shillong.
51 TH-2195_136141012 CHAPTER 2
PROFILE OF THE STUDY AREA: SHILLONG AND WATER
SUPPLY SYSTEMS
This chapter attempts to understand the nature of the growth of Shillong city and
associated problems of water supply through survey of relevant literature. Shillong, like
other cities in the developing countries is facing acute drinking water shortages. Shillong
city is chosen as a site of study because of the recurrent urban water problems. To set the
context for this study, this chapter provides a general understanding of the topography of
the Meghalaya state in general and Shillong in particular. The profile of the field site
includes population, community, the state of water supply and its associated problems.
2.1 Meghalaya
The state of Meghalaya is located in the hills of eastern sub-Himalayas in the
Northeast of India. It is one of the smallest states of the country with a total area of
22,429 km2. Meghalaya lies between 85.49‘and 92.52‘ east longitude and between
20.1‘and 26.5‘north latitude. It extends for about 300 km in length and about 100 km in
breadth (Sun, 2016). The state has eleven districts – East Garo Hills, East Jaintia Hills,
East Khasi Hills, North Garo Hills, Ri Bhoi, South Garo Hills, South West Garo Hills,
South West Khasi Hills, West Garo Hills, West Jaintia Hills and West Khasi Hills.
Meghalaya is the homeland mainly of the Khasis, the Jaintias and the Garos. The Garos
inhabit western Meghalaya, the Khasis in central Meghalaya, and the Jaintias in eastern
Meghalaya (Government of Meghalaya, 2015).
52 TH-2195_136141012 Meghalaya is a Sanskrit term meaning ‗abode of clouds‘. Primarily, this name
was given because half of the year—from April-May to September, rain bearing clouds
envelope the land (Sun, 2016). The wettest places in the world are also located here
(Planning Department, 2010).4 The state receives an annual rainfall of 12000 mm (470
in) in some areas (Government of Meghalaya, 2015). The western part of the plateau,
comprising the Garo Hills region with lower elevations, experiences high temperatures
for most of the year.
Meghalaya has a large forest cover, rich biodiversity and numerous water bodies.
The state is also well endowed with rich natural resources. The coal reserve in the state is
estimated to be about 640 million tonnes. Limestone is another major mineral item found
in close proximity to coal. The total estimated reserve of limestone in the state is in the
region of 5000 million tonnes. The increased out-turn of products like industrial wood,
fuel wood, bamboo, broomstick and tezpatta5 has the potential to transform the rural
economy. In the Human Development Index (HDI) of India for the year 2011,
Meghalaya is ranked a low 26th.6
Meghalaya is primarily a rural-agrarian economy with 79.9 per cent of the
population residing in rural areas and around 65.8 per cent of the working population
engaging in agricultural and allied activities. Jhumming (shifting cultivation) is
predominantly still practice in many districts. Although efforts have been made by the
Government to wean away jhumias from this practice, it continues in certain areas.
Though the production of principal crops like rice, maize and wheat reveals increasing
4 For instance at Sohra (Cherrapunjee), the average annual rainfall is as high as 11,777 millimetres (463.7 in); whereas Mawsynram (the wettest place on earth) has 11,872 millimetres (467.4 in) of rain per annum (Government of Meghalaya, 2015). 5 The oil from tezpatta (cinnamomum tarnata) available in Meghalaya in large quantities contains 70-80 per cent engenol suitable for preparation of perfumery chemicals. 6 ―Meghalaya ranks all India 26th and 7th in NE in HDI‖. Meghalaya Times, December 23, 2011. Accessed March 8, 2017. 53 TH-2195_136141012 trends during the last few years, yet the production of rice which is a staple food of the
state is not sufficient to meet the requirement of the state.
Shillong, the capital city of Meghalaya is traditionally known as the ‗Scotland of
the East‘ but also characterised as the ‗land of abundant wonders‘ because of its
enchanting natural beauty.7 It has attracted people from different parts of the country and
abroad. Accordingly, tourism has now emerged as an industry and both the Government
and the local people of various tourist destinations have become conscious of its
economic benefits.
In Meghalaya 86 per cent of the population belongs to scheduled tribes, the major
tribes being the Khasis, Jaintias and the Garos with their numerous divisions into clans
(Nongkynrih, 2014). All the three major communities of the state reckon their descent
through the female line. Although ‗a unilineal principle of matrilineal descent‘ is
followed by all of them, there are local differences in their functional arrangements. The
customary systems of inheritance and landownership found among these communities
are intimately associated with the institution of matriliny (Karna, 2009).
The population of Meghalaya according to the 1971 Census was only 1,011,699.
Then it rose to 1,335,819 in the 1981 and to 1,774,778 in 1991. According to the census
of 2001, the population of Meghalaya is 23,06,069, which were 17,74,778 in 1991. As
against the decadal growth rate of 21.34 per cent during 1991 – 2001 at the national
level, the population of the State has grown by 29.94 per cent during this period. While
the density of population is 103 persons per sq. km, the sex ratio stands at 975 females
per 1000 males, which is significantly higher than the national average of 933. The rate
of literacy has appreciably grown from 49.10 per cent in 1991 to 63.31 per cent in 2001
7 Shillong still retains influences of the British in its architecture, lifestyle and language. Shillong is the place where the British moved to after they found Cherapunji too wet. The rolling hills around the town reminded the European settlers of Scotland. Shillong is known as the Scotland of the East for its rolling hills and pine trees that are evergreen (Sun, 2016). 54 TH-2195_136141012 which is of course still below the national average of 65.38 per cent. There is however
some difference in the levels of literary among males and females. While the rate of
literacy among males is 66.14 per cent, it is only 60.41 per cent among females. In the
2011 Census the population went up to 2,964,007 (males 1,492,668 and females
1,471,339) with a density of 132 per km2 (Planning Department, 2010). The literacy rate
of Meghalaya is 75.48 per cent (Census of India, 2011).
2.2 Introducing the ‘Field’: Shillong
Shillong is a hill station in the Northeastern part of India and the capital of
Meghalaya (see Map 2.1). Shillong is the only major urban centre of the entire state. Out
of the state‘s total urban population of 452,612 persons, as per 2001 Census, the Shillong
Urban Agglomeration (SUA) had a population of 267,662 which represented nearly 59
per cent of the state‘s urban population. It ranks fourth in terms of population among the
cities of the Northeast region of India. Out of a total urban population of East Khasi Hills
district, nearly 97 per cent are residing in SUA (Government of Meghalaya, 2015).
There are two bodies of local governance in Shillong – traditional (informal) and
modern (formal) (Rani, 2016). The present governance system in the Khasi Hills is ―a
curious mixture of the traditional and the modern‖ (Syiemlieh, 2006). The urban
government in Meghalaya particularly in Shillong takes the form of a municipality, a
cantonment board and the dorbar shnongs. A large part of the city falls within the
jurisdiction of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) (Rani, 2016).
55 TH-2195_136141012 Map 2.1: Map showing the Location of Meghalaya and its Capital Shillong
Source: https://www.mapsofindia.com (2017)
Map 2.2: East Khasi Hills District
Source: http://meghalaya.gov.in/
56 TH-2195_136141012 Map 2.3: Shillong City
Source: www.indianmaps.com
Shillong in the Continuum of Urbanisation
Shillong was a small village till it was made the capital of the Khasi and Jaintia
Hills District in 1866. Since then Shillong grew and its history of urbanization began.
Shillong was made Assam‘s capital in 1874, remained so till January 1972, following the
formation of Meghalaya. Unlike most parts of the country, urbanization in Meghalaya is
not associated with industrialization as such but with the growth the expansion of
bureaucracy (Rani, 2016). Shillong has a chequered history which goes back to the time
of the old Shillong Kingdom, the headquarters of which were at Nongkseh on the South-
western vicinity of the town. The old Shillong kingdom was very vast in size, stretches
as far as Beltola and Desh Duimria on the plains of Assam in the north and the East
Bengal border in the South (Dkhar, 1981).
57 TH-2195_136141012 The city started off with a few scattered huts in the adjoining villages of Laban,
Laitumkhrah, Nongkseh and Lawsohtun.8 The area of Shillong, as it came to being in the
second half of the nineteenth century was the habitat of the Khasis who had been living
in these hills from time immemorial. The life of the Khasi inhabitants in those early days
of settlement was simple. They were mostly a pastoral group and lived in small thatched
houses. Shillong‘s growth began when the new political and administrative set-up
demanded the settlement of the British and other European officials in the area. Soon the
centre of political gravity was shifted from the plains to the Khasi hills district of Assam
(Dkhar, 1981). The growth of the city can also be traced to the establishment of the
cantonment by the British in 1867. In 1878, two sub urban villages of Mawkhar and
Laban were formed into a station with the consent of the Syiem of the Mylliem.
Subsequently, Lachumiere and Haneng Umkhrah were included in the station. The
station was converted into a municipality in 1910 (ADB, 2009).
The climate of this place suited the foreigners better than any place in the plains
of the North Eastern Frontier region. Shillong thus became a much coveted place (Dkhar,
1981). Shillong was originally designed by its founder Col. Henry Hopkins,
Commissioner of Assam and agent to the Governor-General of India to be ‗a little
England‘ for the British in Eastern India (Kyndiah, 1990).
There was no settled habitation by the name Shillong until the British selected the
area for their headquarters (Dkhar, 1981). Shillong derives its name from a peak of the
same name, the highest in Meghalaya (6445 ft). There are a few legends surrounding the
name of Shillong. One of the legends says that it originated from the name of a
handsome youth, U Shulong, a supernatural being born in mysterious circumstances, of a
virgin human mother (Kyndiah, 1990).
8 Theses are now localities of the present day city of Shillong. 58 TH-2195_136141012 2.2.1 Geography and Climate
Shillong is the capital of the Meghalaya state and is a popular hill station as it is
surrounded by scenic hills and is well-known for its natural beauty (Nongkynrih, 2012).
Hence Shillong is an important tourist destination. The city is situated along the northern
slopes and foothills of the Shillong Peak 25°34'8.11"N latitude and 91°52'59.27"E
longitude at an average altitude of 1496 metres above mean sea level.9 The city is a part
of Shillong plateau which is dissected in nature with well-developed valleys along which
the streams flow. The Umshyrpi and Umkhrah rivers, along with their tributaries, flow
through Shillong (Tariang, 2011; Government of Meghalaya, 2015).
Shillong experiences a humid sub tropical climate, and is characterized by
moderate warm wet summers and cool dry winters. Weather conditions remains pleasant
in Shillong throughout the year, with maximum summer temperature of 23° C (73° F) to
an average minimum of 4° C (39 °F) during winter. Its climate is pleasant (Sun, 2016).
The average annual rainfall is about 2200 millimeters (mm), mostly from the southwest
monsoon (Government of Meghalaya, 2015).
Shillong, which was planned by the British as a hill resort, has undergone
substantial change (Government of Meghalaya, 2015). Shillong has developed
principally as an administrative and commercial centre employing a large number of
workers in these sectors (Dkhar, 1981; Lyngdoh, 2015c). The importance of trade and
commerce grew simultaneously with the process of urbanization (Gupta, 2003). Shillong
due to its location advantage and communication linkages attracted entrepreneurs
and commercial activity and is growing as regional commercial centre. Tourism is
one of the major contributors to the city‘s economy (Department of Urban Affairs,
2009).
9 See http://latitudelongitude.org/in/shillong/ (Accessed on 23 May, 2018). 59 TH-2195_136141012 The seasonal winds, i.e. southwest and northeast monsoon circulation as well as
the altitude of the area control the climate of Shillong. The Shillong range has an
absolute altitude of about 1800-1900 m above mean sea level and extending in an east
west direction across the path of the south west monsoon winds play a significant role in
governing the weather condition of the area. Geographically the climate of Shillong can
be classified under the humid subtropical climate, characterised by high rainfall mostly
during summer. It is characterized by cold dry winters and heavy rains from June-
August. Due to Shillong‘s location on the northern leeward side of the Shillong range it
is in the rain shadow zone, thus there is relatively less rainfall than other areas like
Cheerapunji and Mawsynram (Hussain, 1984).
2.2.2 Land and Forest
Meghalaya is endowed with rich and luxuriant vegetation cover and is regarded
as one of the biodiversity hotspot of the country that supports dense natural forest cover.
The natural vegetation of Meghalaya can be divided into three groups:
1. Mixed evergreen forests in the southern parts.
2. The rolling grasslands and the pine forests of the central upland zone.
3. Grasslands with scattered pine trees, which have been observed in the higher altitudes.
The hilltops are smooth with shallow sub-soil supporting the growth of several species of
grass (Rao, 1968).
In 1933, the vegetation in Shillong cover was around 80 per cent. By the year
1996, the vegetation cover came down to 28 per cent. In 2003 it was reduced to 22 per
cent. Today forest cover includes the government protected forests on the northern slopes
of Shillong Peak- Kynton Sngi Range also known as Laitkor Protected Forests, Riat
Laban Protected Forests, the Upper Shillong Protected Forests and the Riat Khwan
60 TH-2195_136141012 Protected Forests. The vegetation of Shillong can be classified as sub-tropical pine
forests and the evergreen forests (Nongkhlaw, 2003).
Land management and control in Meghalaya has historically been different from
the rest of the country. The land use system and patterns of landownership is closely
linked with social structure and agrarian practices (see table 1 for details). Simply put,
land in Meghalaya primarily belongs to the people and is owned by individuals, clans
and communities. Land distribution and management is done according to customary
practices. Traditional land tenure system in the Khasi Hills classifies land into two main
types – Ri Raid and Ri Kynti. Ri Raid or public land belongs to the community and the Ri
kynti is private lands (Nongkynrih, 2012).
Table 2.1: Land Resources of Shillong
Sl. Percentage to total Land use Area(km2) No. area (%) 1 Land use 54.94 31.58 2 Developed area 15.73 9.04 3 Underdeveloped area 50.77 29.18 4 Urban agriculture 8.03 4.62 Forests and Water 44.51 25.58 5 bodies Total Area 174 100.00
Source: Directorate of Urban Affairs, Government of Meghalaya (1991)
The management and control of ri-raid which is land belonging to the
community is within the jurisdiction of the concerned community. Such lands are
normally located at three levels, namely, village (ri-raid shnong), a group of villages (ri-
raid Raid) and a group of villages and Raid (ri-raid Hima). A plot of ri-raid is allotted to
individuals for constructing a dwelling or for cultivation and for other uses. Ri-Kynti,
which is private land, includes two broader categories: ancestral and self-acquired. While
ancestral lands are customarily under the control of the clan and cannot be sold, the self-
61 TH-2195_136141012 acquired lands are under the complete ownership of persons who have acquired them
through their own earnings (Karna, 2009).
The current regulations do little more than lay down the primary land control in
the hands of the tribal groups. Land tenure system, management and regulations are
extremely complex and varied, and the land laws remain uncodified. Land cannot be sold
from ―tribals‖ to ―non-tribals.‖ Land management and control is single-handedly
assigned to the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). In reality, in the Khasi Hills, for
example, three layers of hierarchical institutions coexist: the Syiem (the chief), the Raid
(intermediary level) and the Dorbar (local level). All these are under the jurisdiction of
the Khasi ADC (Soereide, 2018).
Agriculture
Agriculture is the main stay of the people on which about 75 per cent of the total
population still depends for their livelihood. Rice is their staple food (Mukherjee, 2002).
The widely prevalent agricultural practice has been shifting cultivation known as jhum in
the region but a marked transition from shifting to settled cultivation is observed
throughout the state. According to one estimate the minimum area under shifting
cultivation at one time or the other has been 2650 sq.km in the state involving around
52,200 families (Ministry of Agriculture, 1983). Mixed cropping is widespread in
jhumming involving both food and cash crops. The major food crops grown in the state
are rice, maize and potato. Besides vegetables, all kinds of horticultural crops such as
citrus fruits, banana, pineapple, peach, plum etc. are grown in abundance.
62 TH-2195_136141012 Deforestation
The rapid growth of Shillong Urban Agglomeration (SUA) is leading to
indiscriminate felling of trees as more forested land is coming under constructional
activities. Due to the lack of proper plan and programme coupled with lack of scientific
management of the forests, the natural vegetation of Shillong is under threat, which may
have a serious repercussion not only on the water supply but also on the ecological
balance of the city. The southern part of Shillong is the water shed zone of the
Meghalaya plateau.
Shillong is a highly congested area where much of the land is under settlements
and roads. It is here that the numerous small streams have disappeared under the stress of
urbanization.10 Due to population growth this area is now occupied by settlements
resuting to massive deforestation. Deforestation in this zone is having detrimental effect
on the water supply of the Shillong Urban Agglomeration. All the seven Municipal
sources of water consisting of natural springs are located here. This area has some
reserved forests controlled by the State Government this has restricted deforestation to
some extent. This area acts as the source region for Shillong‘s water supply. The river
Umiew has its origin here and flows towards the south to Bangladesh plains. This river is
tapped at Mawphalang about 30 km from Shillong proper and supplied to the greater
Shillong water supply scheme operating under the Public Health Department,
Government of Meghalaya. The total capacity at present of this reservoir at Mawphlang
is about 7.5 million gallons of water per day whose total capacity will increase to about
11.3 million gallons (PHED, 2001) per day, i.e., after the completion of the project
which was due by 2003 but still incomplete. Hence deforestation due to urban sprawl
10 For example, Zone II of Shillong – consisting of Lachumiere and Raj Bhavan area situated in the Laitumkhrah-Mawkhar physiographic limit. Due to constructional activities numerous small streams are no longer visible as their beds have been filled up by concrete structures, residential and office buildings. 63 TH-2195_136141012 may decrease the amount of discharge in the streams—which are the sources of
supplying water to the Shillong localities.
2.2.3 Population
According to the 1872 Bengal census, Shillong had a population of 1363 (Hunter,
1975). As per the 2011 Census, Shillong (both municipal and non-municipal areas) has
inhabitants of over 490,000. The population is projected to grow at a rate of 28.9 per
cent. The population of Shillong is projected to be 5.5 lakhs and 7 lakhs by the years
2021 and 2031 respectively (Directorate of Urban Affairs, 1991).
Table 2.2: Population Growth of Shillong (1901-2011)
Year Population 1901 9,621 1911 13,639 1921 17,203 1931 26,536 1941 38,192 1951 58,512 1961 1,17,483 1971 1,47,170 1981 1.74,703 1991 2,22,273 2001 4,52,612 2011 4,90,000
Source: Nongkhlaw (2003); Census 2011.
The British established Shillong as a hill-station to sustain a few thousand of
population only. Over a century, this tiny settlement has grown to a flourishing city and
has undergone radical changes from an administrative and resort town to a multi-
functional large urban settlement now (Ambikapathy, 2009).
64 TH-2195_136141012 2.2.4 Shillong Municipal Area
Shillong Municipal Board has total administration over 31,025 houses to which it
supplies basic amenities like water and sewerage. It is also authorize to impose taxes on
properties coming under its jurisdiction. As per the Population Census 2011 data, the
following are some relevant facts about population, literacy and religion-wise population
of Shillong municipal area (see table 2.3 and 2.4). The total area within the municipal limit is
10.36 km2 which has remained unchanged. The density of population in Shillong is the highest
in the municipal area.
Table 2.3: Population with Literacy Rates
Shillong Municipal Area Total Male Female City Population 1,43,229 70,135 73,094 Literates 1,19,642 59,479 60,163 Average Literacy (%) 92.81% 94.80% 90.92%
Source: Census 2011
Table 2.4: Religion-wise Population of Shillong
Religion Population (%)
Christian 46.49
Hindu 41.95 Muslim 4.89 Sikh 1.14 Buddhist 0.74 Jain 0.13
Other Religion 4.5
No Religion Specified 0.16 Source: Census 2011
The sex ratio in the municipality area is 1042. Slum dwellers account for 10.09
per cent of total population of Shillong city. The Schedule Tribe (ST) accounts for 51.2
per cent of total population in Shillong.
65 TH-2195_136141012 2.2.5 Shillong Urban Agglomeration (SUA)
As per data released by Government of India for Census 2011, Shillong is an
Urban Agglomeration coming under category of Class I Urban Agglomerations/Towns.11
At present, Shillong is the only Class I city of the state Shillong Metropolitan Areas in
SUA are Lawsohtun, Madanrting, Mawlai, Mawpat, Nongkseh, Nongmynsong,
Nongthymmai, Pynthorumkhrah, Umlyngka, and Umpling.
Table 2.5: Population and Literacy in SUA
Shillong UA Total Male Female Population 3,54,759 1,76,725 1,78,034 Literates 2,85,901 1,44,673 1,41,228 Average Literacy (%) 91.37% 93.30% 89.48%
Source: Census, 2011
The literacy rate of Shillong Agglomeration is 91.37 per cent which is higher
than national urban average of 85 per cent. Literacy rate in East Khasi Hills was 76.07
per cent in 2001, and 84.70 per cent at present (Planning Department, 2010). The sex
ratio in SUA is 1007 females against a national urban average of 926 females per 1000
males. The Schedule Tribe population in SUA account for 72 per cent.
The social fabric of Shillong has undergone great changes owing to large scale
migration from rural areas and from outside the state. Apart from the tribes of the
Northeast, today we can see many people from all over India residing in the city. The
most prominent feature of growing population in Shillong today due to migration of rural
poor is the emergence of slums. Slums are found in localities like Polo, Jail Road, Madan
Laban, Lumparing, Wahingdoh, Wahthapbru, Lama Villa, Pynthorumkhrah, Jhalupara,
11 The Census of India has classified towns into six categories on the basis of their population. Class I towns and cities are those with a population greater than 1,00,000. 66 TH-2195_136141012 Mawprem and Malki. Most of these localities fall in the municipal area. Also the pace
and magnitude of intra state migration has been increasing over the years (Directorate of
Urban Affairs, 1991; Nongkhlaw, 2003). As an education hub, Shillong attracts much
student population (Lyngdoh, 2015c). As a state capital and commercial centre, labour
force is also large. So floating population in Shillong is quite large.
Table 2.6: SUA Localities with Population
Localities Population Lawsohtun 8,214 Madanriting 29,194 Mawlai 55,012 Mawpat 6,184 Nongkseh 4,846 Nongmynsong 15,017 Nongthymmai 38,004 Pynthorumkhrah 27,219 Shillong Catonment 11,930 Umlyngka 7,381 Umpling 8,529
Source: Census, 2011
2.2.6 Community
In Shillong the Khasis constitute the majority of the population. There are also
other tribal population like the Nagas, Mizos, Kukis and others. The city also supports a
sizeable proportion of people of non-tribal origin, most of them being Bengali and
migrant Nepalis, Punjabi and Bihari population (Gupta, 2003). The Khasis are an
indigenous ethnic group whose society and religion is clan and community oriented
(Lyngdoh, 2015c).
67 TH-2195_136141012 The Khasis differ from other tribes of North East India in their language, religion
and traditional practices. The Khasis practice matrilineal descent. Children belong to the
mother‘s clan (kur). The Khasis follow the matrilineal ultimogeniture system of
inheritance of property where the youngest daughter or Ka Khadduh inherits the
ancestral property. The Khasis also practice matrilocal form of residence (Nongkynrih,
2012). But much of the traditional character has undergone changes due to urbanization
(Begum, 1983). The main language spoken is Khasi-Khmer, a branch of the
Austroasiatic language family (Lyngdoh, 2015c).
In the course of the colonization of the Indian subcontinent, the westernization of
the Khasis began with the arrival of the British and the widespread activities of Christian
missionaries. Christianity, westernization, and urbanization have had a huge impact on
the social organization of the Khasis (Lyngdoh, 2015c). The majority of the Khasis of
Shillong have embraced Christianity. Next to Christian population are the believers of
Khasi traditional religion (Niam Khasi). There are also a few Khasi Muslims in Shillong
(Mukherjee, 2002). There are ethnically exclusive localities in Shillong where only
Khasis reside. The Khasi, like other tribes, have their own traditional institutions.
2.2.7 Socio-Cultural Belief and Water
The Khasis‘ respect for nature is an integral part of their worldview (Deingdoh
and Wahlang, 2016). H.O Mawrie in his book Ka Pyrkhat U Khasi stated that a Khasi
lives with nature and is schooled by nature. Primrose Gatphoh in his work Ki Umjer
Ksiar considers that Khasis received knowledge and love for one‘s land from nature.
Knowledge is acquired by interacting with nature. Khasis have an eco-theandric view of
reality which makes them realize that they should co-exist with every element of nature
(Mawrie, 2016). It is in the Khasi custom to believe that the earth is referred to as
68 TH-2195_136141012 Meiramew (which means ―mother earth‖); Meiramew being a combination of land,
forest, rivers and streams (Shangpliang, 2010).
Rivers are always hybrids of nature and culture (Fos, et al., 2017). It is the belief
of Khasis that every river, stream or lake has got some sort of fairy or deity guarding its
integrity. Water according to the Khasi creation myth is one of the five children of U
Basa and Ka Ramew (the cosmic couple). It is through the three children Ka Sngi (Sun),
Ka Lyer (Air) and Ka Um (Water) that vegetation appeared on the earth. The Khasis
value water as God‘s precious gift to humans. The many rivers found in Khasi-Jaintia
Hills have been personified in Khasi folktales. The fact that Lum Shillong (Shillong
range) has been perceived as the abode of the chief deity ―U Lei Shillong‖ and that three
important rivers originate from here indicates the reverence the Khasis give to rivers
(Mawrie, 2016).
According to H.O Mawrie, ―U Khasi u im bad ka mariang bad ka mariang ka im
bad u‖, which literally means, ―A Khasi lives with nature and nature lives with him‖
(Shangpliang, 2010). Khasis speak of ki khyndai umdih-umtong (nine sources of drinking
water). It is believed that in ancient times there was a kind of lake on the top of Sohpet-
bneng (Sohpet-bneng peak). The Khasis, who believed that they came down to earth
through this peak, were convinced that God himself provided this lake for them. This
legendary lake had fresh water in it and it flows out through its nine outlets. The
hynñiewtrep-hynñiewskum used to collect water from these nine outlets (Mawrie, 2016).
Respect for rivers and water sources are still prevalent in most rural areas of Khasi-
Jaiñtia Hills (Mawrie, 2016). The affective link to rivers and the appreciation of their
value for the spiritual and physical wellbeing is important (Wantzen, et al., 2016). Khasis
perceive of mountains and rivers as sacred entities and it has led to an attitude of respect
and reverence for these elements of nature (Mawrie, 2016).
69 TH-2195_136141012 A number of streams and rivers flow through the city of Shillong (Jyrwa, 2008).
Two main rivers flow through the city namely Wah Umkhrah and Wah Umshyrpi.
Umkhrah River, a relatively small river, runs through the heart of the city of Shillong.
Small rivers carry purely local and regional meaning. The little rivers possess ‗small
responsibilities‘ (Van Dyke, 1903). The Umkhrah derives its name from two words
‗Khrud‘ and ‗Rah‘. ‗khrud‘ means ‗to scrape or erode‘ and ‗rah‘ means ‗to carry or to
transport‘. Literally, Umkhrah means ‗the water that erodes and transport‘. Song and
poetry have been composed praising this treasured river. Khasi poet, Victor G Bareh
(1957), besides glorifying, also emphasized on the phenomenal role of the river in his
poem Ka Wahumkhrah:
‗La um jakhlia ia tngit pyrthei, Ha pha ki wan b’an theh kyntei, Pha rong ia ki
sha trai duriaw.‘ (Free translation: Though turbid waters of the world empty into
you, You carry all this to the bottom of the seas).
2.3 The State of Water Supply in Shillong
Shillong is expanding in area and the physical growth of the city is in the
northeastern direction, where the new Shillong Township is proposed (ADB, 2009). The
new township is located nearly 13 km northeast of the present city. Within the township,
there are ten villages viz., Mawdiang-diang, Umroh, Mawlong, Diengiong, Umsawli,
Mawkasiang, Madansaisiej, Mawpdang, Siejiong and Tynring (Department of Urban
Affairs, 2009). With the rapid growth of urbanization, Shillong now faces shortage of
domestic water supply (Dkhar, 1981). Table 2.7 shows the distribution of households by
availability of drinking water facility in the district.
70 TH-2195_136141012 Table 2.7: Water Sources of East Khasi Hills
Distribution of households by availability of drinking water facility in East Khasi Hills Total No. of (%) Households Tap water Well Handpump Tubewell Spring (Excluding Total From From Total Covered Uncov institutional related un- well -ered households) source related well source 538299 39.5 27.8 11.5 25.4 6.9 18.5 2.8 2.6 19.0
Source: Census of India, 2011
Most hilly urban areas like Shillong face acute problem of water supply during
the dry season. This is because the water supply in most hill towns is by and large
governed by seasonal rainfall. Sources of water supply in hills are generally rivers, lakes,
springs, natural falls and streams. The water from these sources are fed directly in the
piped distribution system and stored in tanks where it is distributed to the consumers
through piped water supply (Gupta, 2003).
The Shillong Municipal Board (SMB) and the Public Health and Engineering
Department (PHED) provide the bulk of the water supply services in the city. The main
water sources are rivers, streams and springs. The SMB controls several springs and
stream. In areas beyond the ambit of the municipality, the PHED networks with some
traditional institutions to develop small water schemes supplying the water through stand
posts and through piped-in-premises. According to the Master Plan of Shillong 1991-
2011, the available quantity of water is just sufficient to meet the demand of about fifty
per cent of total population of Shillong. The rest of the population depends upon private
wells, vendor tankers, small springs, etc. Water supply available to the city is 28.68 mld
(million liters per day) as against the demand of 51.70 mld for the year 2006. During the
dry season water supply is irregular as it is evident in most parts of the city. The amount
of water that the localities receive differs in both quality and quantity (PHED, 2008).
71 TH-2195_136141012 The main water supply project covering the city is the Greater Shillong Water
Supply Project (GSWSP) designed to cover the areas under Shillong Urban
Agglomeration (SUA) including the Shillong Municipal Board (SMB) and Shillong
Cantonment Board (SCB). Phase I of the project whose implementation commenced in
the year 1978-79 was completed and commissioned in the year 1986. The source of
water supply is the river Umiew at Mawphlang about 30km away from Shillong. Phase II
of the project comprises the construction of mass gravity concrete dam of about 130m
wide and 50m high across the river Umiew at Mawphlang (PHED, 2008). Phase III is
currently being implemented.
2.3.1 Demand and Supply of Water
In Shillong, population projection was made considering the trend of population
increase in the past decades. The aim is to increase the per capita water supply level from
2021 onwards so as to attain 150 litres per capita per day (lpcd) by 2031 and 175 lpcd by
2041, in an effort to improved living conditions. Table 2.8 shows the future water
demand projected by the PHED.
Table 2.8: Water Demand Projection for Shillong
Sr. Year Per capita Total demand No. demand (MLD) 1 2011 135 57.65
2 2021 135 74.31
3 2031 150 106.4
4 2041 175 160
Source: Directorate of Urban Affairs, Government of Meghalaya, 1991
72 TH-2195_136141012 Table 2.9: Details of Performance Indicators for Water of Shillong City
Sl. Description Details No. 1 (a) Surface water source capacity 9.145Million cubic meter (mcm) (i) Umiew River reservoir
(ii) Other PHED source 3.64 MLD (iii) SMB source 3.27 MLD (b) Quantity drawn from surface source 40.96 MLD 2 (a) Ground water source capacity Not assessed (b) Ground water quantity drawn 2.05 MLD 3 Total quantity of water supplied 28.86 MLD (including unaccounted for water due to leakages and evaporation and losses in distribution system) 4 Actual per capita water supplied 65 LPCD (calculation based on population) 5 Treatment plant capacity 40.96 MLD 6 Storage capacity 23.4 Million Litres 7 Distribution network 182.5 Km 8 Distribution coverage 90% 9 Water supply frequency 3-4 hours in morning and similar period in evening (however in some areas supply ranges from 30 minutes to 90 minutes) 10 Water supply facility for public stand post 50% (3-4 hours each in two shifts) 50% (2-3 hours each in two shifts) 11 Average cost incurred for operations and Rs.8.00 Crore (approx.) maintenance per year 12 Water tax Not assessed 13 Average leakages (UFW) 50%
Source: Department of Urban Affairs, Government of Meghalaya, 2007.
The available quantity of water is just sufficient to meet the demand of about
50% of population of Shillong. The rest of the population depends upon private wells,
vendor tankers, springs, etc. The total quantity of water available for supply to the city is
28.68 mld as against demand of 51.70 mld for the year 2006. This reveals that about 70
lpcd is available for supply to the consumers. Considering about 30% losses in
distribution from long length of service lines, the actual supply reaches at the consumer‘s
end is 20.08 mld, which is about 50 lpcd (based on total population). The actual position
73 TH-2195_136141012 of supply is however somewhere near about 65-70 lpcd as the newly included areas in
the Urban Agglomeration have their own limited supply and not considered in the total
availability (Department of Urban Affairs, 2007).
The Table 2.9 in the section above provides a detail picture of the performance
indicators of water supply in the city of Shillong (Department of Urban Affairs, 2007).
2.3.2 Major Issues at Present
In November 2017 High Court of Meghalaya has asked Shillong Municipal
Board and the Public Health Engineering Department to attend to the deficiencies in
water supply in the city. This was its response to a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) which
was filed.12 The lack of adequate water has affected too many of the city residents. Water
supply poses a serious problem as major areas of SUA are yet to be covered with
organized water supply system. The areas which are covered by Greater Shillong Water
Supply Project (GSWSP) have access to organized water supply system and other areas
outside coverage of the project depends on other small water supply schemes like deep
borewells and other local sources for water supply.
High leakage losses occurred in the consumers‘ lengthy service lines as well as in
the supply tank (see Plate 2.1). The losses in the transmission main and distribution
system account to about 55%. Leakage in water distribution systems is an important
issue. The need to manage leakage in pipe networks of most of the Shillong municipality
became more urgent in recent years due to water shortages caused by recent draughts,
increasing the demand along with environmental, social and political pressures.
In general, the available water in rivers, streams and dams including ground
water in Meghalaya state as a whole is unsafe for direct consumption. Therefore, it is
12 See ‗HC Asks Government to Solve Water Deficiency‘, The Shillong Times, November 30, 2017. Accessed 20 March 2017.
74 TH-2195_136141012 required to be lifted and transported against considerable head and distance to a place of
treatment to make it safe for drinking and thereafter required to be transported again over
long distance to consumers in urban areas. For this tremendous amount of electrical
energy is required for lifting and transportation of water. In Meghalaya especially, the
electricity tariff applicable to water works is the highest in the country. The high cost of
electricity charges on public water works has had a direct bearing on cost of production
of water (PHED, 2008). The overall objective of a distribution system is to deliver
wholesome water to the consumer at adequate residual pressure in sufficient quantity and
achieve continuity and maximum coverage at affordable cost.
Plate 2.1: Leaked Pipes in Mawprem ‘A means of accessing of water for the poor’!
Source: This photograph was taken by the author during fieldwork, 2016
Loss in treatment plant is reported to be 2.5 per cent and during transmission
from treatment plant to main reservoir is 18 per cent totaling 20.5 per cent losses even
75 TH-2195_136141012 before distribution to the consumers. The percentage of UFW, as reported by PHED, for
water production and transmission to the zonal reservoirs is exorbitantly high, which
calls for serious efforts to detect the source of leakages for this huge quantity of UFW
water. Besides, there are losses in distribution. The total UFW is observed to be more
than 50 per cent, which is exceptionally high by any standard (Department of Urban
Affairs, 2007).
The major issues of the current water supply systems in Shillong are inadequate
availability of water supply, antiquated water infrastructure, inadequate financial
resources and inefficiency in mobilizing capital by SMB and PHED, absence of
integrated approach in service delivery and inability to impose user charges (Department
of Urban Affairs, 2007). With the rapid growth of urbanization, Shillong now faces
shortage of water, inadequacy of sanitation and other civic services (Dkhar, 1981). The
rising populace puts pressure on the natural resources.
The discharge of the main water source i.e. Umiew River has reduced
considerably in the past years due to massive deforestation and stone and sand quarrying
in the catchment areas. Also the water quality is deteriorating. This could be detrimental
in the long run and the yield of the Umiew is bound to reduce substantially. Similar is the
position of municipal sources and other sources tapped by PHED in areas outside
municipality, many of which are originating from Shillong Peak. The forest covered hills
are being encroached upon for space. There is no land policy to protect these areas. More
than 90% of the land is owned by private individuals. That means that the government
has very little leverage to mandate or regulate the use of resources directly (Ibid.).
The quantity of water has decreased in many of the rivers, the main reasons being
deforestation. With the current trend of reduction of discharge of the water sources, the
small spring sources are likely to be dried up thus reducing the yield considerably in the
76 TH-2195_136141012 coming decades. Hence there will be more dependence on Umiew River storage. The
present storage capacity of 9.145 million cubic metres (mcm) is required to be increased
in the coming years.
The objective of the draft Meghalaya Water Policy 2013 is to ensure that ―water is
used efficiently, shared equitably, managed sustainably, governed transparently and
contributes to improving the health and livelihoods of all citizens‖. The objectives of the
Draft Meghalaya Water Act (2012) include,
a) To introduce professional cost recovery operation and preventive maintenance,
accountability.
b) To ensure long-term functionality and safety of water infrastructure.
c) To ensure continued and reliable service delivery.
d) To reduce water losses, effluent leakages, and increase water availability for
users.
e) To enhance water user participation.
f) To enhance private sector involvement in water service delivery.
2.3.3 Water Supply and the Traditional Institutions
Access to water and the claiming of water rights is often mediated through
institutions. Claims to water resources are made and enforced through both formal
(PHED, SMB) and informal (customary practices, social relationships, norms of use and
access) (Cleaver, Franks, Boesten, and Kiire, 2005). The traditional institutions have an
important part in the implementation and operation of the many water schemes in order
that the schemes are implemented successfully and to minimize obstacle and for the
schemes to provide the intended benefit. The Draft Meghalaya State Water Policy (2013)
states that local bodies like the dorbar shnongs should particularly be involved in the
77 TH-2195_136141012 operation, maintenance and management of water infrastructures/facilities at appropriate
levels, with a view to eventually transfer the management of such facilities to the user
groups or local bodies. The draft version of the Meghalaya Water Act (2011) specifies
the rights of communities to exercise their access right to water resources, benefit from
the management of water resources, play a role in water resource management planning
and implementation, be compensated for damaged suffered in relation to water
management, obtain information about and to declare objections against water
management plans, and file complaints and claims. They also have the duty of ensuring
that their water resources are conserved and protecting water infrastructure.
Six dorbar shnongs are providing water service on their own and some partner
either with the SMB or PHED. Some of the dorbar shnongs that provide water wholly on
their own are Wahdienglieng, Lumbatngen, Demthring and Lumdiengsoh. Here the
source of water is springs. In Wahdienglieng, the supply is for 24 hours and in
Lumdiengsoh the supply is for 6 hours. In the rest of dorbar shnongs, the supply duration
varies from 30 minutes to 90 minutes in a day. And there are the dorbar shnongs mainly
of the municipality localities which have lesser roles to play in water management but
nevertheless important and supporting the supply system. It is these traditional
institutions of the Khasis that is one of the main focuses of this study. We will present
further detail the role of traditional institution in regards to water supply in Shillong in
chapter 5.
In the next chapter, we shall delve into the nature and roles of the institutions and
the circumstances surrounding their present state. These local traditional institutions are
called the dorbar shnongs in Khasi.
78 TH-2195_136141012 CHAPTER 3
TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS (DORBAR SHNONGS) IN SHILLONG
3.1 Introduction
The Constitution of India, under the provisions of its Sixth Schedule provides a
legal framework for the protection of the tribal people of the Northeastern states.13 They
were guided broadly by the following considerations: (a) the exigency of preserving the
culture and tradition of the tribal people; (b) the need to provide autonomy in socio-
economic and political affairs; and (c) the necessity to prevent their exploitation by the
more advanced people of the plains. This provided for the establishment of the
Autonomous District Councils (ADCs)14 in some hill districts of the erstwhile composite
state of Assam. In pursuance of this policy, ADCs were constituted in Meghalaya for the
United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District in addition to some other
districts of the region in 1952. The Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council was
subsequently bifurcated on 1st December 1964 when a new council called the Jowai
District Council, which was later, renamed as the Jaintia Hills Autonomous District
Council was created for administrative expediency. Thus three ADCs have been
functioning in the state of Meghalaya for more than five decades.15
The District Councils have wide-ranging powers to make laws in respect of
subjects like land regulation, management of forest, matters relating to village or town
13 The Constitution of India makes special provisions for the administration of the tribal dominated areas in four states viz. Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. As per article 244 and 6th Schedule, these areas are called ―Tribal Areas―, which are technically different from the Scheduled Areas under Fifth Schedule. 14 The Autonomous District Councils are essentially states in miniature with all three wings of governance, namely, legislature, executive and judiciary. 15 For details of Autonomous District Councils, see Stuligross (1999). 79 TH-2195_136141012 administration, appointment of Chiefs and Headmen, inheritance of property, marriage
and divorce, management of primary education, dispensaries, markets, road and
waterways, regulation of trading by non-tribals and money lending and so on. Besides,
they have the powers to assess and collect land revenue, impose taxes on professions,
trades and employment, vehicles, animals etc. In addition to these sources of income the
Councils receive financial assistance from the Government of India under the Award of
the Finance Commission through the Government of Meghalaya. The Sixth Schedule
further provides an independent three-tier judiciary with powers to undertake cases of
both civil and criminal nature. The three tier courts have been established at the village,
cluster of villages and district levels for faster redress of disputes based on customary
laws and practices as well as codified laws.16 The Sixth Schedule has provided a
comprehensive mechanism for self-governance in the tribal dominated state helping the
people to safeguard their customs and practices and preserving their distinct culture and
identity.
Another significant turn of event has been the placement of the traditional
institutions of chiefs such as Syiem under the purview of the ADCs. The powers
pertaining to the appointment and succession to these offices have been vested with the
council virtually driving the former under the control of the latter. According to the
Paragraph 3(g) of the Sixth Schedule, the District Council has been given the power to
make laws on the appointment and succession of Chiefs. By virtue of this power the
United-Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council passed the United Khasi-
Jaintia Hill Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headman)
Act, 1959. The Act has laid down the procedure for the election or nomination of Chiefs
16 The Sixth Schedule has provided a comprehensive mechanism for self-governance in the tribal dominated state helping the people to safeguard their customs and practices and preserving their distinct culture and identity.
80 TH-2195_136141012 and their suspension and removal from the office. In this manner the District Council has
thoroughly reduced the position of the Syiem and other traditional Chiefs to that of the
position of the employee of the Council. Under the condition, the District Councils and
the traditional institutions continue to be at odds over power sharing and existence under
the Sixth Schedule (Syiemlieh, 1989).
Of late, the umbrella organisation of the traditional Khasi states, the Federation
of Khasi States have been making various representations to both the State and Union
governments to highlight their marginalisation over the decades. The Khasi states are
demanding that special provisions should be made in the Constitution of India to
recognise, restore and empower these traditional political institutions as guardians of
local customs, usages and practices. The traditional tribal values and political practices
have not vanished with the democratization, as the chiefs continue to influence the
social, economic and political values of the people. In fact, customary laws and
traditional political structures of governance actively interact and somewhat interfere
with the contemporary structure of governance, which has been shaped by liberal
democratic norms and follow the principles of equality and individual liberty along with
the rule of law.
This chapter begins by discussing the composition and functioning (powers,
functions, responsibilities) of the traditional village council (dorbar shnong). The
principle of legitimacy and authority is strongly intertwined with the institution of the
dorbar shnong. Hence, the power relations rooted in the dorbar shnong system will be
examined here. Authority and law are interrelated since the dorbar shnong or the
village/local council is also responsible for interpreting the customary law and settling all
disputes within the village and in Khasi society. Customary laws have governed all
criminal and civil cases and resolution of disputes within the village. The traditional
81 TH-2195_136141012 governance of Khasi has survived and the fact that customary law continues to be
relevant in the presence of modern legal system shows the efficacy in checking crime in
the contemporary period in the Khasi villages. Also important are the constitutional
provisions that follow a policy of non-interference and allow the Khasi and other tribes
of Northeast India to use their customary laws in order to arbitrate internal disputes.
This chapter then discusses the traditional governance system of the Khasis and
examines its relevance in post-colonial India. Some of these important legislations have
proposed changes in the traditional governance and land system. The interface between
traditional institution and the democratic form of governance is a big challenge to the
dorbar shnong as the former is based on customary laws and the latter is based on formal
laws of the Indian Constitution. Despite all these legislations, the dorbar shnong
continues to play an important role in village or local administration even today.
Before discussing the traditional governance system it is pertinent to conceptually
understand power, authority, and legitimacy. Max Weber (Girth and Mills 1964; Weber
1964; Bell 1975; Morrison 1995) has discussed them at length and my analysis is guided
by his conceptualization. Weberian theory differentiates between power and authority
and delineates three ideal types of legitimate domination or authority. Power can refer to
domination by brute force or normative acceptance of it based on persuasion and social
sanction. Power is always power over others and it may or may not be accepted to be
legitimate by others. When it is sanctioned and acquires social acceptance or legitimacy
then it becomes authority. A society is said to be legitimate as long as its institutional
orders remain justified to its members. Legitimacy produces the belief that the existing
political system is right and most appropriate. It provides the moral propriety to power
by transforming it into authority. It is the concern for legitimacy and the perception that
authority is legitimate among those who are subject to it (Morrison, 1995).
82 TH-2195_136141012 The three forms of authority conceptualized by Weber are traditional authority,
charismatic authority, and rational-legal authority (cf. Girth and Mills, 1964). The first
type of political legitimacy, that is, traditional authority, is based on indigenous customs
and immemorial traditions. According to Weber (1964), a system of domination can be
called ‗traditional‘ if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in on the basis of the
sanctity of order and the attendant powers of control as they have been handed down
from the past. The ability and right to rule are passed down often through heredity. This
form of authority determines the rule of tribal chiefs, princes and kings. In this kind of
regime the essential factor that ensures compliance with the orders and laws of
government is personal loyalty to the chief or king or ruling family (Birch, 1993). Here,
command and obedience are legitimized on the basis of the sanctity of immemorial
traditions which govern the authority relationship. This form of authority is legitimated
by the sanctity of tradition and custom, which allegedly or presumably has always
existed. This form is most relevant to understanding the political system of the Khasis,
both in the past and in the present. The legitimacy of traditional authority thus rests upon
the legitimacy of traditional norms. Modernization and western education have not
brought about a radical transformation, as far as the traditional values are concerned. In
fact, the neo-educated class has strongly advocated the need to preserve the culture or
heritage of chieftainship system.
The traditional institutions of governance today they may appear archaic but in
practice continue to function with the support of communities to the advantage of the
latter and social control. A proper understanding of their structure and function also
assumes significance for an attempt is being made by the authority of these institutions
for their constitutional recognition in order to harmonise them into the modern system of
83 TH-2195_136141012 governance. The traditional political institutions are essentially based on the age-old
tradition and usages.
3.2 Dorbar Shnong: Meaning and Concept
The dorbar shnong is one of the traditional political institutions of the Khasi
people (Lyngdoh, n.d). The dorbar shnong is a traditional assembly of all resident adult
males under an informal headman elected by them from among their number (Syiemlieh,
1989).
The traditional political structure in Meghalaya is a three-tier system. There are
the shnongs (villages/localities) at the bottom, the raids (provinces/commune) at the
middle (regional or provincial level) and the syiems (rulers/chiefs) at the top. Each level
has a dorbar (assembly/council/meeting) comprising of people who are traditionally
chosen according to their level of maturity or the sacerdotal functions they are supposed
to perform (Baruah, Dev and Sharma, 2005). A rangbah shnong headed the dorbar
shnong, lyngdohs or basans headed the dorbar raid, and the syiem was the head of the
dorbar hima (Sharma, 2004).
Conventionally, a Syiem is appointed from a pre-ordained royal clan called the
Syiem clan and heirship to the office of the Syiem is in all cases traced through the female
offspring. It has been evinced that the office of the Syiem ―arose out of an impulse for
amalgamating identical pursuits, interests and necessities of the clan residents and
villages. It was instituted on the spirit of reciprocity along with a consolidation of their
intimate relations, which had grown among the different sections of people who made up
their units‖ (Gassah, 2002). The office of the Syiem is widely known and it actually
represents the core feature of the Khasi traditional political institutions.
In his classical monograph on The Khasis Major P.R.T. Gurdon (1975) stated,
84 TH-2195_136141012 In most states the Siem is the religious as well as the secular head, e.g. in the
Cherra State, where the Siem is also lyngdoh. In Khyrim State the Siem has
sacerdotal duties to perform at different religious ceremonies, especially at
the time of the annual Nongkrem dance ... the Siem in matters judicial acts as
a judge, the whole body of the durbar being the jury. In the olden days the
Siem marched to war at the head of his army.
The Syiem as a head of the state has traditionally performed numerous functions
for the welfare of the people living within the territorial limit of the state. A Syiem is
always assisted by the Durbar, the composition of which of course varies from the state
to state.
The traditional Khasi political organization of the dorbar can be divided into the
following (War, 1998):
. Ka Dorbar ka Hima Pyllun (full state Dorbar)
. Ka Dorbar Raid or Dorbar ki Laiphew Shnong (Dorbar of the Thirty
Villages17)
. Ka Dorbar Pyllun is a small council of a group of villages or localities
. Ka Dorbar Shnong (village or local dorbar)
. Dorbar Kur (Clan Council)
In Khasi tradition, the clan, ka kur, is considered to be the oldest institution
through which other structures of socio-political organizations emerged. All the adult
male members of the clan arrived at decisions through consensus. This system of
17 ‗Thirty Villages‘ is simply a name given to denote a group of villages larger in number than Ka Dorbar Pyllun; it can be more or less than thirty villages/localities in number. 85 TH-2195_136141012 administration concerning related kin groups was later extended to the village (shnong),
the commune, (raid), and finally the state (hima) (Lyngdoh, n.d.).
The Khasi traditional concept of dorbar (council) is social, political, sacred and
divine. So the authority of the dorbar depends on both its political authority as an
institution and on its sacred and divine authority (Lyngdoh, 2016b). The dorbar shnong
is the primary unit of administration based at the locality (in the urban areas) or village
level (in the rural areas) (Baruah, Dev and Sharma, 2005) and it is ethnocentric and semi-
democratic in nature (Lyngdoh, 2016a).
The concept of dorbar emerged as an outcome of a social need felt by the
community (AusAID, 2005). The concept of dorbar is an important part of a Khasi‘s
communal life. The dorbar is closely associated with a Khasi—from his hearth to his
clan, to his village, commune and even to his state (Lyngdoh, 1952). Every decision
taken at the dorbar is considered sacred as the dorbar is considered to be God‘s council.
The Khasis have accorded reverence for the institution of the dorbar (Bacchiarello,
1974).
The traditional dorbar shnong was entirely autonomous, since there were no
funding or personnel assistance from outside. Today dorbar shnongs are still
autonomous bodies, with independent decision-making processes and implementations
(War, 1998). The traditional institutions are based on customary beliefs, practices and
traditions (Planning Department, Government of Meghalaya, 2009).
The Khasi society is universally recognised as having a distinct identity
historically and culturally, and its traditional political institutions are also recognised by
the Constitution of India through the Sixth Schedule (Lyngdoh, 2016a). The traditional
institution of dorbar shnong is linked with the modern political institution of the District
Council created by the Indian Constitution (Nongkynrih, 2002).
86 TH-2195_136141012 Khasi villages have enjoyed autonomy in the organization and management of
their own affairs and have exercised collective control over their resources (natural and
human) through the dorbar shnong. Dorbar shnongs have their jurisdiction over their
residents and the natural resources within their territories (Nongkynrih, 2002).
In Meghalaya the dorbar shnong is seen as a body outside of the Constitutional
framework. The dorbar shnongs do not enjoy any legal or constitutional status. Though
no constitutional recognition has been accorded to them the people identify themselves
with such institutions as they are rooted in society (Nongkynrih, 2015). But Lyngdoh
(2015b) opines that the dorbar shnong today is not totally unconstitutional. It has an
indirect constitutional recognition.
The dorbar shnong is a male-centred institution. The Khasis do not conceive the
act of attending a dorbar as a matter of right but as an imposed responsibility or a
compulsion (Lyngdoh, 2016a). The decision-making procedure in the general dorbar is
usually through negotiations, discussions and deliberation (Baruah, Dev and Sharma,
2005). It is a political institution of the Khasis, by the Khasis, and for the Khasis only
(Lyngdoh, 2016a).
The dorbar shnongs and their authority fall in line with Weber‘s (1978) idea of
‗traditional legitimacy‘ where authority is established on and rests on traditional grounds.
The dorbar shnong has the support of the Khasi inhabitants of the village or locality
(Lyngdoh, 2015a). The dorbar shnong seem to be most important in the politics affecting
the day to day administration and the lives of the people (Baruah, 2004).
Today most dorbar shnongs have ‗constitutions‘ that contain rules that are meant
to ensure the moral and social stability of the community, which members of the locality
must follow, and are usually referred to as the ―Ki Adong Shnong‖ or ―Rules of the
village/locality‖ (Baruah, 2005). Residents should abide by these rules. The rules also
87 TH-2195_136141012 have quasi-structured procedures or norms about the scheme of functioning of the
traditional institutions (Baruah, Dev and Sharma, 2005). E.g. the Dorbar Shnong of
Laitumkhrah (a locality in the city of Shillong) has a constitution called ―Rules and
Regulations Concerning the Administration of Laitumkhrah‖ which was adopted in
March 1990. These rules categorically mention that they aim at maintaining peace and
harmony in the locality and are meant to bring about understanding and co-operation
among the residents and are binding on all members of the locality (Baruah, 2004).
As stated earlier, the present governance system in the Khasi Hills is a
combination of the traditional and the modern elements. Below is a table showing some
comparative attributes of the dorbar shnongs with other institutions of governance in
Meghalaya:
Table 3.1: Assessment of the Dorbar Shnongs with other Institutions in Meghalaya
Attributes Traditional Autonomous District Legislative Institutions Councils Assembly Appointment/Choice of Inherited, Elected Elected Members selected Date of First --- 27 June 1952 21 January 1972 Constitution (UKJHADC)
Selectors/Electors Permanent Tribal residents and non- Residents, all residents, tribal permanent adults males residents, adults (over 18 years) Member Attributes Males, clan As above, and adults (25 Residents, adults affiliation, years) (25 years) permanent residents Periodicity Varies 5 years 5 years Juridical Powers to Yes Yes Yes Frame Laws and Rules Codified Rules No (except few) Yes Yes Electoral Apparatus Rare District Council Affairs Election Department Commission
Source: Rao et al., (2013)
88 TH-2195_136141012 Lyngdoh (2016a) opines that the dorbar shnong is semi-traditional; it is
traditional in spirit, but modern in structure and composition. The executive committee
of the dorbar shnong is a modern governing body bearing a modern name. The
traditional concept of ki tymmen shnong (village elders) got transformed into that of the
executive committee. The functionaries of the executive committee of the dorbar shnong
like the secretary, treasurer and executive members are all modern inventions to suit new
circumstances and requirements in the modern society.
The dorbar shnong is a politically neutral village / local council and its office
bearers have no collective affiliation to any political party. Thus political parties and
party politics have not been able to influence the functioning of the dorbar shnong to a
large extent (Lyngdoh, n.d). In the dorbar shnong there is no question of party politics in
the case of elections. The dorbar shnong elects the rangbah shnong (headman of the
village or locality). In many cases if the locality is big, some rangbah dongs18 (area
elders or leaders) help the rangbah shnong. There are also committee members and other
responsible people with duties and responsibilities (War, 1998). The decision-making
process in the dorbar shnong is that for all practical purposes it is the rangbah shnong
who performs the quotidian functions of governance. He asserts immense influence that
motivates the decisions of the dorbar (Baruah, 2005).
3.3 Functions and Responsibilities of the Dorbar Shnongs
Dorbar shnongs functions largely on the basis of an unwritten code of conduct
though a number of dorbar shnongs today also have a set of guidelines (Lyngdoh, n.d).
The rangbah shnong functions on the principle of collective decision-making. He is
assisted by a small executive council, comprising of a council of elders (Bakhraw or ki
18 In modern terminology, they are called Assistant Rangbah Shnongs. 89 TH-2195_136141012 Tymmen ki San). The dorbar shnong meets at least once in a year to discuss matters
concerning the village or it may also meet more often depending on necessity (Lyngdoh,
n.d). The powers and functions of the rangbah shnongs (headmen) combine executive
and judicial powers (Baruah, 2004).
Since most of the dorbars are generally without any written constitution, they
function in different ways. Dorbar shnongs within the municipal area have a different
role to that of dorbar shnongs located elsewhere. Within the municipal area the Shillong
Municipal Board (SMB) has the responsibility of providing the basic services and the
rangbah shnongs primarily play the role of a representative organisation of the
community to liaise with the SMB or the other agencies responsible for the service
delivery. The dorbar shnongs outside the municipal limits have large variations in their
responsibilities (AusAID, 2005).
The state administrative machinery depends on these institutions for a great deal
of support - from the traditional heads of the himas to the rangbah shnongs. Interaction
and dependence of the KHADC and the SMB has increased with these traditional
institutions (Syiemlieh, 2006). The SMB has, in many ways, failed to effectively execute
all its mandated responsibilities. Some of these especially the civic responsibilities are
being executed by the dorbar shnongs. This tacit relationship is acceptable to all
concerned parties (the people, the SMB and the state government) so long as the services
are rendered. Although the Meghalaya Municipal Act, 1973 does not legally recognize
dorbar shnongs, many of the civic responsibilities are executed by them (Lyngdoh, n.d.).
Also, the civil administration of the government appears to have accepted that the
dorbar shnong is the legitimate law-enforcing authority (Lyngdoh, 2016a). But, as
mentioned earlier, these traditional authorities have no constitutional power whatsoever
and function on the basis of customary laws and practices, and traditions based on the
90 TH-2195_136141012 goodwill of the people. Therefore, any judgment passed by them on issues – related to
land or otherwise – is technically not binding in a court of law (Nongkynrih, 2014).
The dorbar shnongs are fast becoming formalized by acting as an arm of the state
government. They are fast losing their traditional, non-formal character and are acquiring
an authority of unprecedented formal nature through de facto jurisdiction. They play an
important role in bringing an ethnocentric perception to administration at the local level
(Baruah, 2004).
The major functions of dorbar shnongs both in rural and urban areas are
indicated as follow:
1. The primary functions of the dorbar shnong are to maintain peace and
tranquility (Lyngdoh, n.d). The dorbar shnong is quite efficient and
effective in the maintenance of peace, and law and order in the village or
locality (Lyngdoh, 2015b).
2. The dorbar shnong performs specific judicial functions and arbitrates
minor local crimes and functions as a prosecuting body (Baruah, 2005).
They also functions as local courts to try petty cases as land squabbles,
fights, divorces, boundary disputes, petty thefts etc. (War, 1998). Minor
cases of civil disputes and crimes were effectively solved at the level of
the dorbar shnong itself, and very few cases decided by the executive
committee of the dorbar shnong are disputed by the litigants and appealed
to higher authorities (Lyngdoh, 2016a).
3. The rangbah shnong also exercises executive and law-enforcing functions
within the locality/village. Crimes are reported to the rangbah shnong
first who then decides based on the nature of the crimes whether to report
91 TH-2195_136141012 them to the police or take action. The other executive functions of the
rangbah shnong include granting of permission for construction, purchase
of property or organizing fetes in the village (Baruah, Dev and Sharma
2005).
Developmental works such as the construction and maintenance of roads,
bridges, water sources, sanitation etc. and providing and maintaining civic amenities to
its residents are a primary function of the dorbar shnong. These include construction and
maintenance of small roads, footpaths, street lighting, drainage and sewage system and
waste disposal (War, 1998; Lyngdoh, n.d). The role of the dorbar shnong as the
administrative functionary of the government‘s at the village level with regards to health
service, education, census enumeration, election processes, crime detection, and
developmental services (Lyngdoh, 2015b). They are also engaged in many welfare works
like the practice of periodic pynkhuid shnong (cleaning the village/locality) (War, 1998).
Further, some of the power and functions of the dorbar shnongs are discussed as
under:
1. Each dorbar shnong can levy contributions and duties from households
and markets within its jurisdictions, to meet their expenses (War, 1998).
Different rates of fees are collected for allowing residents to buy property
and to forward applications for trading licenses by the non-tribal traders
(Baruah, 2004). Other kinds of fees are also collected, e.g. vehicle parking
fees.
2. Many villages or localities own some community land e.g. khlaw shnong
(village or community forests). Usually those forests have water sources,
92 TH-2195_136141012 streams etc. Localities can also have ki khyndew shnong (village or
locality land) which are used for various activities (War, 1998).
3. Many dorbar shnongs promotes youth development activities through the
seng samla, the youth organization of the locality (Lyngdoh, n.d) besides
other activities.
4. It serves as a sort of watchdog to check the illegal immigration
(Kharbudon, 2015).
5. The extent of social cohesion in the village is centered on the proper
functioning of the dorbar shnong (Lyngdoh, 2015b).
Nowadays, especially in the urban setting some of the functions of the dorbar
shnong have been modified to suit the needs and contexts. In several areas the dorbar
shnong work together with government agencies/functionaries and NGO‘s e.g., for
obtaining and maintaining drinking water supply (War, 1998). The dorbar shnong is
usually approached to implement other government programmes like adult literacy and
non-formal education and public distribution system (PDS).19 The dorbar shnong acts as
a developmental and administrative agency of the state government. The dorbar shnong
voluntarily plays the government‘s administrative functions at the locality level in
matters concerning maintenance of law and order; and civic welfare administration with
regard to all the items of collective interest. The rangbah shnongs and members of the
dorbar shnong committees do not receive any payment or honorarium for fulfilling these
responsibilities (Lyngdoh, 2016a).
With the growth of localities and increasing number of households especially in
the case of urban areas, many of the dorbar shnongs have been divided into smaller sub-
19 Public distribution system is a government-sponsored chain of shops entrusted with the work of distributing basic food and non-food commodities to the needy sections of the society at very cheap prices. 93 TH-2195_136141012 localities called dongs. Each dong is headed by rangbah dong (assistant headman). The
dorbar shnong within the SMB area has an apex body called the Synjuk ki Rangbah
Shnong or the federation of dorbar shnong. The role of this federation is primarily to
pursue the agenda or the city level issues common to all the dorbars with the government
(AusAID, 2005).
In general, the dorbar shnong is efficient in meeting the day to day requirements
of Khasi society at the grassroots level. It has also played a significant role as a
legitimate organ of the government in the implementing of various development
programs and in maintaining law and order (Lyngdoh, 2016a).The dorbar shnong works
hand in glove with the government to bring overall development through various
schemes as well as maintaining law and order by working together with the police
when the need arises (Laloo, 2014).
In the midst of all this, the traditional institutions of the dorbar shnongs are
sometimes blamed as being barriers to development and improved service delivery. On
the other hand formal institutions have also been charged with hampering development.
They have been charges with inability to respond to local needs (Meghalaya Institute of
Governance, n. d.). Critics of the dorbar shnongs claim that these institutions are an
exclusivist and extend an ineffective form of rule that ought to end. They stress that the
headman usually lack skills and resources required for increasingly bureaucratic and
complex urban administration and various other infrastructural arrangements that need to
be in place. Another problem is a lack of transparency, which critics claim enables
corruption (Karlsson, 2017). There are strong reservations to the continuation of
traditional institutions when there are newer forms of governance that guarantee equality
before the law, women rights and stand for accountability (Syiemlieh, 2006). These
94 TH-2195_136141012 institutions are also presently being criticized as ones that have no or little utility
(Kharbani, 2016).
Linkage between the government and the people is provided and can be improved
by these grassroots institutions. But instead of acting as a vital bridge between
community and the administration the dorbars are spearheading confrontation with the
state government. This has produced governance of confrontation instead of governance
through cooperation. Confusion has been the outcome and the victim of such inequity, as
always, is the common man (Blah, 2016). Dorbar shnongs today have lost focus of their
mandate to provide basic fundamental services to the community they serve. Blah asked
an important question- ―are the dorbars providing governance which is in tune with the
needs of our times?‖ (Blah, 2016).
In the following section, two main criticisms largely cited in existing literature
against the dorbar shnongs will be briefly discussed. These drawbacks are also the
prominent subjects of contemporary debate outside academia.
3.4 The Dorbar Shnong and Women
A Khasi system of beliefs states that ka said ka thew, ka saiñ ka tiah, kiba khia
kiba shon ka jong u rangbah, that is, deliberations and decisions, planning,
administration and policies and the burdens of management belong to the man. Another
tenet states, ka wait, u sum, ka sang, ka barshi, ka kñia ka khriam baroh ka jong u
rangbah. Ka kynthei tang ka lum ka kynshew, ka taiar ka dah ka dang, that is, the
weapons of war and the sacerdotal performance belong to the man. The woman is thus
regarded to be the keeper of the home and the one who prepares and collects the things
connected with the rituals (Lyngdoh, n.d).
95 TH-2195_136141012 Traditionally the Khasis believes that ―war and politics is for men‖ and this can
be clearly seen especially in the traditional system where men dominate in the political
administration (Laloo, 2014). Furthermore, according to Lyngdoh (2016a), it was not
that Khasi women were disallowed from attending public dorbars but it was unnecessary
for them to do so as it was solely for their own interests that their uncles were attending
the public dorbars. Also the Khasi trational dorbar was charged by the presence of
spirits to which a man would not like his sisters or nieces to be exposed to. Khatso
(2004) reiterates that tradition is the excuse cited for debarment of women from these
local institutions.
Before independence, the British followed a policy of allowing the hill tribes of
the area of the then province of Assam to govern themselves according to their customs
and traditions. The tribal areas were kept isolated from the rest of the country and outside
the purview of laws enacted by the provincial legislature (Umdor, n.d.). But after
independence many changes took place. The British did not recognise the sanctity of the
dorbar (council). The coming of Christianity and western idea of separating religious
from the secular hampered the religious importance of the institutions (Kharbani, 2016).
Christianity brought with it a male-oriented value system, and the new education
and British rule further strengthened that system. The tradition of keeping women out of
public bodies seems to be a new tradition that was perhaps invented as recently as the
late nineteenth or early twentieth century (Sharma, 2004). According to a report of
Captain R. B. Pemberton in 1835, women took important decisions in the public sphere
of Khasi administration. But later they were politically marginalized (see Sharma, 2004).
A visible change has occurred in urban-centred localities. Women in many
localities in Shillong attend dorbar and are also included in the executive committees of
the dorbar shnong. Laitumkhrah, Nongrim Hills and Lachumiere dorbars include
96 TH-2195_136141012 women in their executive committees. There are also some women organizations such as
ka seng kynthei (women‘s organizations) in various localities which send representatives
to the executive committee of the dorbar or local council (Khatso, 2004). In the past the
dorbar shnong practices male suffrage but now women also take part (War, 1998).
Besides the issue of gender discrimination, there are other pressing issues
presently concerning the dorbar shnongs. One major concern is undemocratic practices.
3.5 Democracy and the Dorbar Shnongs
According to historian Helen Giri (1998) democracy, to the Khasis, is the ideal;
shaped, molded and brought into structure by the ancestors and that they had been able to
preserve and maintain their democratic way of life. British colonial official Captain D.
Herbert (1903) also writes, ―The Khasis are a singularly progressive and intelligent race
with democratic tendencies.‖
Moreover, War (1998) is of the opinion that the dorbar shnongs arising out of
needs at the grassroot level had from times immemorial placed power with the people.
The traditional administrative thinking has been guided by a social value system founded
on principles of social justice (kamai ia ka hok, tip briew- tip Blei). Today, there is a
degeneration of these principles. In its place, exploitative qualities for power, money and
corruption has now taken root in the socio-political system (Blah, 2013).
At present, urban localities represent a pluralist population. However,
communities other than the Khasi are debarred from attending meetings of the dorbar
shnong, having no say in the affairs of the shnong, where decisions arrived at ‗in their
interest‘ are dictated upon them (Lyngdoh, n.d). It is generally accepted and believed that
a non-Khasi can never understand the concept of a Khasi dorbar.20
20 As told to me by a former rangbah shnong of the Umsohsun locality (Interviewed on 12th June 2016). 97 TH-2195_136141012 In the name of safeguarding tradition, some rangbah shnongs misused their
powers and position and some have even acted like dictators. There have been many
cases where people were banished, stigmatized and ostracized by the dorbar. Some were
denied ration cards and other benefits because they protested against some acts of the
dorbar shnongs. Cases have also been reported where children were not allowed to
attend school because their parent did not comply with the dorbar‘s directive (Mohrmen,
2015). Sometimes ―rangbah shnongs behave as if they are running an independent state
of their own‖ (Ibid).
Khasi democracy was not completely representative either. The original clans
who played a crucial role in the emergence of the shnong enjoyed exclusive privileges.
These clans were represented in the dorbar shnong and from among them were chosen
the rangbah shnongs whose office in due course became hereditary and lifetime. These
clans came to represent little oligarchies thus wielding unsurpassed power (Lyngdoh,
n.d). In the city of Shillong this is still witnessed in localities like Mawpat and Nongrah
where only members of particular clans can become a rangbah shnong (Laloo, 2014).
Other flaws are also in existent. For instance, the income and expenditure of the
dorbar shnongs and the rangbah shnong are not subject to financial audit thereby leaving
this vast area of financial accountability open to manipulation and misappropriation. In
some villages or localities dorbars are not held at regular intervals in many shnongs
thereby denying the Khasi residents the opportunity to put forward their grievances and
suggestions (Lyngdoh, n.d).
But there are positive changes taking place. One good example is that, in many
localities, the rangbah shnong is no longer a clan based, hereditary and permanent
representative of the locality but is today a term based elected representative. Another
positive change is that residents (including Khasi women) who attend dorbars speak
98 TH-2195_136141012 freely at such meetings and also raise important matters concerning their village or
locality (Lyngdoh, n.d).
Modern constitutional devices and values have invaded and caused influential
changes. The presence of a written constitution, presentation of reports, election of
functionaries and the constitution of the executive are indication Modern democratic
governance has influenced and impacted these traditional political institutions and the
socio-political dynamics and state of affairs. Traditional un-codified sets of rules are no
longer adequate (Baruah, Dev and Sharma, 2005), and there is a paradigm shift towards
modern participatory democracy (Lyngdoh, 2016a).
3.6 The KHADC and the Dorbar Shnongs
The rationale behind the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) was to set up a
system of local administration to give greater autonomy to tribal societies, to preserve
and safeguard tribal groups‘ traditional practices and to act as a
‗mesoinstitutional‘ linkage between the state government and informal grassroots
tribal institutions (Meghalaya Institute of Governance, n. d.). The Constitution makers
saw the necessity to maintain the distinct and unique customs, socio-economic and
political culture of the tribal people of the region to allow the tribal people to develop
and administer themselves according to their own genius (Karna, Gassah and Thomas,
1998). Independent India followed the colonial traditions of valuing tribal autonomy by
protecting the state under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution (Upadhyaya and
Upadhyaya, 2016).
The idea behind the Sixth Schedule was to provide the tribal people with a simple
and inexpensive administration of their own (Karna, Gassah and Thomas, 1998). The
preservation of smaller culturally defined states like Meghalaya has made it possible for
99 TH-2195_136141012 the elected representatives of indigenous peoples to access control over policy making
and administration. However, this has also posed a challenge for the traditional
institutions to bring the necessary adjustments in order to engage positively with state-
based institutions and fulfill the obligations of democratic governance (Upadhyaya and
Upadhyaya, 2016). The Sixth Schedule grants self-governing autonomy to tribal
communities in Meghalaya. It formally acknowledges the full jurisdiction of tribal
communities over land and natural resources (see Oberlack, Walter, Schmerbeck, and
Tiwari, 2015). It is the function of the District Councils to conserve the dynamics of
tradition (Lyngdoh, 2014).
The main problem today in the governance system is the existence of two parallel
systems of administration – one mandated by the provisions of the Constitution of India
and the other by the sanctity of tradition. Where the constitutional system of
administration fails to execute its civic responsibilities, the traditional political institution
fills the lacuna (Lyngdoh, n.d). Lyngdoh (2013) identified two deficiencies relating to
the Sixth Schedule: i) establishment of village councils is not mandatory in the Sixth
Schedule areas, where they exist (like the dorbar shnong), do not have constitutional
protection for election on the basis of universal adult suffrage and tenure ii) there is no
constitutional provision for reservation for women in the district council and the
traditional institutions.
There is a growing concern among civil societies that the Khasi Hills
Autonomous District Coucil (KHADC) is not effective but that it it obstructs
development instead. Many are of the opinion that ADCs should be abolished21. Rani
(2014) also agrees that ADCs seem to interfere rather than manage and maintain the
traditional institutions. The KHADC has not frame rules for the effective functioning of
21 Interview with Patricia Mukhim, Editor of The Shillong Times (An English daily newspaper based in Shillong) (Interviewed on 16 April, 2016). 100 TH-2195_136141012 the dorbar shnongs except for the appointment and succession and judicial functions of
the rangbah shnong (Lyngdoh, n.d). The KHADC has miserably failed to empower such
traditional institutions in the entire process of governance (Borkotoky, 2014).
The Sixth Schedule has relegated the traditional heads to a subordinate position,
turning them into agents of the district councils. The fundamental cause of conflict is that
the Councils which are modern institutions based on western democracy are being
implanted to preserve the traditional institutions in Meghalaya. Furthermore there seems
to be more politicking among Members of District Councils (MDCs) in the district
councils and little focus on issues mandate to the council (Buam, 2015). There is an
overlap of authority and a conflict of interest between the state government and the
district councils (Karlsson, 2005). There is a governance deficit at the level of the
institutions as none of the institutions, namely, the state government, the District
Councils and the traditional institutions (here, the dorbar shnongs) are able to perform to
their fullest potential in contributing to the governance (Borkotoky, 2014).
On the one hand, the state government stands for modern democratic system, and
the KHADC stands for indigenous traditional system, on the other. However, both serve
the needs and interests of the same people and same territorial area. This simultaneous
existence of these different systems of governance concerning the same people and the
same territory has brought about institutional dissonance in Meghalaya (Lyngdoh,
2015b).
Joshi (2004) also opines that there are real and potential tensions between the
state and the traditional grassroot institutions. The grassroots indigenous institutions in
Meghalaya have felt threatened by state interference and modernization. The principles
of individual liberty, the rule of law and the expectation of competitive politics come
directly in conflict with traditional values of tribal life, implying group assertion, kin-
101 TH-2195_136141012 protection and collective effort. With the dawn of independence and with the setting up
of ADCs, the period of an erosion of democracy in the area begins. Such new political
institutions (ADCs) were in fact eroding the powers and functions of traditional councils
instead of improving them (Gassah, 2002). The introduction of the District Councils has
brought about to mistrust and misuse of power by the newer form of administration
(Syiemlieh, 2006). Their functions have been curtailed or taken away (Gassah, 2016).
Hence the relationship between the traditional dorbar shnongs and the KHADC has not
been very advantageous.
The emergence of the ADCs has caused a sense of confusion among the people in
general, and a feeling of uncertainty, if not of mistrust or suspicion, among the chiefs of
the motive of the District Council as to their continuance as custodians and trustees of
the customs and traditions of the people. Such new political institutions which were
created after independence were in fact eroding the powers and functions of traditional
councils instead of improving them. The traditional chiefs never welcomed the District
Council because it threatens the powers and functions of the chiefs and it appears to be
alien to the traditional institutions (Gassah, 2002). In the opinion of P. A. Sangma, the
initial concept of having an autonomous body was because the major tribal groups
namely Khasi, Jaintia, and Garo were minorities within Assam. After attaining statehood,
the District Councils have become irrelevant (Rani, 2014).
3.7 Dorbar Shnongs as Institutions of Local Self Government: The Way Forward
The governance of the dorbar shnong in a village or locality today is perceived to
be a new grassroots governance institution evolving out of the amalgamation of the
Khasi clan-based democracy and the individual-based modern popular democracy
(Lyngdoh, 2016c). The representatives of traditional institutions claim historical
102 TH-2195_136141012 legitimacy. The representatives of the constitutional bodies, while not directly
questioning the validity of the traditional institutions, talk of a situation where traditional
institutions can contribute more effectively to governance if they are ready to
accommodate change (Sharma, 2004). According to most traditional institution leaders,
dorbar shnongs represent a superior form of governance, free from the deceitfulness of
modern party politics (Karlsson, 2005). The dorbar shnong has the support of the Khasi
inhabitants of the village or locality as a spontaneous social authority that emerged from
within and not imposed from outside the society. So as far as the Khasi society is
concerned, the dorbar shnong is sociologically legitimate, though it is not fully
democratic (Lyngdoh, 2015a). The dorbar shnong is a very powerful social institution
even without any constitutional or legislative support (AusAID, 2005). The traditional
institutions by themselves have been playing a very important role in the development
process in the Khasi Hills (Borkotoky, 2014).
Essentially, the state of Meghalaya is experiencing a complex governance
structure. The responsibility of governance and service delivery falls under the ambit of
three centres of authority: (i) the State; (ii) the Autonomous District Councils; and, (iii)
grassroots indigenous traditional institutions (MBDA, n.d.). The state has been unable to
come up with any legal paradigm which will introduce the element and concept of good
governance at the grassroots level (KHADC, n.d.). For meaningful coexistence it is
important to streamline the practices of the dorbar shnongs and to eliminate the
discrepancies. Overlapping jurisdictions between the three-layered governance in
Meghalaya has to be eliminated (Upadhyaya and Upadhyaya, 2016). Restructuring and
streamlining the traditional institutions is necessary to bring them at par with other
democratic grassroots institutions in India (KHADC, n.d.).
103 TH-2195_136141012 For instance, one of the often-cited difficulties in resolving the anomalies and
contradictions between the traditional institutions and non-traditional institutions is the
lack of understanding about their respective roles as well as their responsibilities towards
each other (Upadhyaya and Upadhyaya, 2016). A trustful relationship and a sensitive
approach are missing. E.g. the traditional institutions were not consulted by the state on
the Forest Right Act (2012), which delegitimized the rights of indigenous people to their
traditional habitat. Many experts observed that it was, as always, a top-down imposition
(Upadhyaya and Upadhyaya, 2016). In recent years some control over the traditional
institutions has been attempted by the state government (War, 1998).
As a society, committed to the traditional principles of ka tipbriew-tipblei
(conscientiousness) and, ban kamai ia ka hok (to earn righteousness and justice), it is
currently advisable that there should be a review of the present customary practices of
the traditional governance institutions in the Khasi Hills. Only traditional customs that
legitimately serve the need of the society at large should be kept (Lyngdoh, 2014). Two
important tasks are to be performed simultaneously - to protect the cultural identities of
the tribal groups as provided in the Sixth Schedule and to build up equitable, transparent
and responsible democratic governance at the grassroots according to the present
requirements of the modern democratic society (Lyngdoh, 2016a).
Voices for a renewal of the traditional institutions in Meghalaya, and increased
authority vis-à-vis other tiers of government, have been turning into a political
movement in the state (Andervad, 2014). Today the office of the syiem and the hima are
but skeletal relics. The local dorbar is perhaps the only traditional institution with any
resemblance of traditional governance left, but even here drastic steps are needed to
make it pertinent to community needs for the 21st century (Blah, 2013).
104 TH-2195_136141012 Democratic transformations can accommodate gender justice in the dorbar
shnong and make it more adjustable to the requirements of non-Khasi communities
permanently residing in the villages and urban localities. Democratic decentralization of
local self-government in the Khasi society would be practical and efficient if it is carried
out through the institution of the dorbar shnong with necessary improvements in its
constitution and procedures. More positive democratic elements should be introduced in
the constitution and functioning of the dorbar shnong to suit the present needs of Khasi
society as well as for democratic justice (Lyngdoh, 2016a). These traditional institutions
are still relevant and play an important role in local governance and administration in
Meghalaya (Rani, 2014).
3.8 Discussion
It is evident from the discussion that the notion of dorbar shnongs still exists in
the minds of the participants and sometimes is ―shared as implicit knowledge rather than
in an explicit and written form‖ (Ostrom, 2010). At present there is a resurgence of the
rights and powers and privileges of the traditional institutions (Syiemlieh, 2006). The
main threat to these grassroots traditional institutions is not from advancing modernity or
from new and emerging trends in developmental administration. The main threat is from
the belief that tradition is carved in stone (Blah, 2013).
Nevertheless, the dorbar shnongs may be functioning and strong but they are
not on an equal footing in terms of their control, influence, contribution to people‘s
welfare, and recognition as modern political institutions (Rao, Bhasin, Barua, Anand,
Pandey and Srinivasan, 2013). The revival of traditional institutions is complex and
socially significant (Karlsson, 2005). Institutions that don‘t know what it is to be
accountable in little things cannot be responsible with more powers over larger issues
105 TH-2195_136141012 (Mukhim, 2014). Instead of preserving static and dead customs (Lyngdoh, 2014), the
KHADC can reform the dorbar shnong in a manner befitting today‘s state of affairs. As
aptly remarked ―progressive society Khasis should not cite tradition as a pretext for
avoiding change when it is necessary‖ (Mukhim, 2008). It is increasingly felt that
necessary changes in the grassroots administration are needed (Lyngdoh, 2015b).
Interviews conducted for this study indicates that these institutions, despite the
historical moorings, transition and shortcomings, are of immense importance to the
Khasis way of life. Taking away these institutions would essentially mean to do away
with the identity, value and unity of the Khasi people. The attributes of these institutions
define the character of their indigeneity of the Khasi Hills. The intricacies revolving
around this debate is to make sweeping changes to these institutions and also the whole
traditional administrative system. An extensive discussion of the roles and functions of
the traditional institutions in the context of water governance will be provided later in
Chapter 5.
In this chapter, attempts have been made to understand the dorbar shnongs
institutions—chiefly their structure, roles, challenges and future possibilities. This is
occupies an important crux for this study because these local traditional institutions are
the central object of investigation here.
The next chapter will examine the water supply access and distribution patterns
in Shillong. From here, we will get a better understanding of the present situation of
domestic water in terms of equity. Because the dorbar shnongs are one of the institutions
that are responsible for water governance, the current circumstances of household water
supply partly reflect on the nature and conduct of these institutions.
106 TH-2195_136141012 CHAPTER 4
EXAMINING ‘EQUITY’ IN WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS IN
SHILLONG
4.1 Measuring Water Equity?
As discussed in Chapter 1, the literature survey has shown that there are many
principles and frameworks for measuring water equity. Like social sustainability, water
equity can be measured or evaluated using a number of principles and indicators. For
example, Phansalkar (2007) offers ways of measuring equity by taking into account the
social and gender aspects. According to the WHO and UNICEF (2015), equity occurs
when the water is obtained from ‗improved‘ sources (see Table 4.1). Recent research
has utilized the basic principles of human rights to develop an equity index (Kayser,
Moriarty, Fonseca and Bartram, 2013). The UN (2012) provides dimensions of equitable
access dimensions like access by vulnerable or marginalized groups and affordability for
users. General Comment No. 15 of The Right to Water adopted by the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) provides three factors for water adequacy
that applies in all circumstances – availability, quality and accessibility (physical
accessibility, economic accessibility and non-discrimination). In 2008 and 2009, the
International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC), The Hague developed a water service
ladder based on categorizations of four indicators: quantity, quality, accessibility and
reliability (see Table 4.1).
107 TH-2195_136141012 Table 4.1: IRC Water Service Delivery Ladder Framework
Accessibil Quantity ity (litres / Service Level Quality (minutes / Reliability Status capita / round day) trip Meets or exceeds Very Greater national Less than reliable: High than 60 norms, based 10 works all of on regular the time testing Intermediate 40-59 Acceptable user Improved perception Reliable / and secure: meets/exceed 10-30 Basic 20-39 works most s national of the time norms, based on occasional testing Problematic : suffers Negative user breakdowns perception Sub-standard 5-19 30-60 and slow and / or no response testing time to Unimproved repairs Unreliable / Fails to meet Insecure: No service Less than Greater national completely improve-ment 5 than 60 norms broken down
Source: Kayser, Moriarty, Fonseca and Bartram (2013)
This chapter examines equity in water supply systems in Shillong. At the outset it
must be noted that this study focuses on domestic water aspects both in the municipal
and non-municipal areas. Also, this chapter looks at the present nature of water supply,
the quantum and quality, the distribution pattern and the intra-generational equity in
Shillong. Relying on the aforementioned inputs or indicators such as – quantity, quality,
accessibility and reliability, this chapter will examine equity in water supply. However,
108 TH-2195_136141012 with regards to quantity, since it was difficult to measure water quantity or volume (in
metric unit of litre) for this study, the duration of water supply is taken as a measure of
quantity instead. With regards to the quality of water, user perception is mainly taken as
a measure of the water quality. Quality is examined superficially through subjective
feedback of water consumers. For other inputs, scattered references will be made which
depends on the available primary data collected.
4.2 Sources of Water
The main sources of water supply in the municipal area are shown in Table 4.2.
In the municipality localities more than 80 per cent of the households are dependent with
piped water on premises. The rest relies on public standpipes (see Plate 4.1). Only a
negligible percentage of households (1.5%) are reliant on both sources i.e., piped water
on premises and public standpipes simultaneously to meet their domestic water
requirements. Purchasing is another way of obtaining water in this area but this means is
used only during seasons of water shortage. Here, for the households with piped water on
premises, water is mostly supplied by the SMB, whereas the PHED supplements the
water supply.
Table 4.2: Main Sources of Water Supply in the Municipality Localities
Water Sources Households (%)
Piped water on premises 81
Public standpipes 17.5
Both 1.5
Source: Field Study 2016
109 TH-2195_136141012 Plate 4.1: A Public Standpipe in Lawsohtun Locality
Source: Photograph taken by the author during fieldwork, 2016
The main sources of water supplies in the non-municipality localities households
are piped water on premises, public standpipes, rivulets/streams and springs, wells and
buying (see Table 4.3). This wide range of water sources has a direct bearing on quantity
and accessibility. A large proportion of 14.4 per cent of the households relies on
purchasing water for their daily domestic purposes. Compared to 81 per cent of
households which are connected to a water network in the municipal area, only 34 per
cent have piped water on premises in the larger and expanding non-municipal area. A
significant percentage of 17.7 per cent rely on more than one source of water.
110 TH-2195_136141012 Table 4.3: Main Sources of Water Supply in the Non-Municipality Localities
Water Sources Households (%)
Piped water on premises 34 Public standpipes 24.7 Buying 14.4 Rivulets/streams and springs 6.2 Wells 3 Piped water on premises and public standpipes 5.15 Public standpipes and buying 4.4 Piped water on premises and wells 3 More than two sources 5.15
Source: Field Study 2016
Plate 4.2: A Community Spring in Mawlai Mawdatbaki
Source: Photograph taken by the author during fieldwork, 2016
111 TH-2195_136141012 The study reveals that households in non-municipality localities depend on other
water sources besides piped water on premises and public standpipes. Springs and
streams are common water sources in many parts of the city (see Plate 4.2). But during
winter, most are without water or water flow is very low and hence insufficient to meet
required water needs. A significant proportion of 5.15 per cent of households depend on
more than one sources to meet their daily water requirements.
4.3 Quantity
To comprehend the quantity input, only piped water on premises and public
standpipes is taken into consideration for this study. During the study, it was not
conducive to measure diurnal quantity of water from sources like springs and water
vendors. Therefore a comparison is made among selected localities with respect to the
duration of water supply i.e. the number of hours per day for piped water on premises
and public standpipes (as shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5). It depicts clear differences within
and across the municipal and the non-municipal areas. These tables show data of selected
localities only from the field survey conducted.
Based on the findings of the study the average daily water supply in the
municipal area is 6.67 hours, in the non-municipal area it is only 3.4 hours for piped
water on premises. The maximum duration of water supply in the municipal and non-
municipal areas is between twenty-four hours and six hours respectively. For instance, in
municipality locality like Jaiaw Lumsyntiew, water supply is for a trifling two hours only
in a day. In the non-municipal area, the lowest duration of water supply is recorded from
Rynjah locality—which is thirty-five minutes per day only. The vast range of
differences of water being supplied to the households is evident from the data is shown
in Table 4.4 below.
112 TH-2195_136141012 Table 4.4: Duration of Water Supply for Piped Water on Premises in Some Selected Localities
Municipal/ Non Locality Water Supply Municipal Area (hr/day) Jaiaw Lumsyntiew 2 Umsohsun 4 Mission Compound 4 Kharmalki 4 Lama Villa 4 Municipal Area Mawbah 4 Mawprem Bishop Falls 4 Jaiaw Shyiap 6 Madan Laban 24 Lawmali Pyllun 24 Cleve Colony 24 Rynjah 35 min Langkyrding Mihngi 45 min Golf Links 45 min Mawlai Mawdatbaki 1 Madanrting 1 Pynthorbah 1 Mawlai Nonglum 1 Non-Municipal Area Mawlai Mawroh 2 Lumshyiap 2 Mawiong 3 Upper Shillong Third Mile 3 Lummawbah Parmaw 5 Nongthymmai Golden 5 Estate Lawsohtun 6
Source: Field Study 2016
113 TH-2195_136141012 Comparatively, the extent of differences in the duration of water supply is lesser
between the public standpipes and piped water on premises for two localities, namely
Riatsamthiah and Umsohsun. The maximum duration of water supply is seen to be six
hours in both the localities (Riatsamthiah and Umsohsun). From the study, it is
interesting to note that none of the localities in the non-municipal area obtain water
supply of not more than three hours per day. The lowest duration noted is of two hours
per day recorded in five of the six localities given in Table 4.5 below. The maximum
duration in the non-municipal area is recorded in the locality of Lummawbah which is
three hours per day.
Table 4.5: Duration of Water Supply for Public Standpipes in Some Selected Localities Municiapl/Non- Locality Water Supply municiapl Area (hrs/day) Riatsamthiah 6
Umsohsun 6
Municipal Jaiaw Shyiap 5
Mawprem Dymmiew 4
Lumdienjri 4
Lummawbah 3
Nongthymmai Nongshiliang 2
Mawroh 2
Non-municipal Mawlai Mawdatbaki 2
Mawpat 2
Nongmynsong 2
Source: Field Study 2016
114 TH-2195_136141012 In the municipal area 93 per cent of the households with piped water on premises
obtain water everyday. For the rest it varies from 4-5 days in a week. Whereas in non-
municipal areas, 64 per cent get water everyday, 10 per cent for 5-6 days and another 26
per cent less than 3 days in a week. The study found out that in the non-municipality
localities, where the dorbars shnongs involved in water schemes, water is supplied
through piped on premises and public standpipes on a daily basis. On the other hand a
‗pure‘ PHED water connection does not guarantee daily supply. For public standpipes,
water supply is daily in both the municipality and non-municipality localities.
Respondents were also asked if the water supplies i.e. quantity is enough to meet
daily household water needs, in which 100 per cent in the municipality localities
responded ―yes‖. Whereas, in the non-municipality localities, 42 per cent said that the
water supply received by their households is ―enough‖ and 58 per cent responded ―no‖,
i.e. it is not enough to meet daily household water needs.
4.3.1 Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quantity
The levels of satisfaction of both piped water on premises and public standpipes
are given in Table 4.6. The data analysis indicates the level of feeling of satisfaction of
the people. The study has taken ―quantity‖ as an indicator and its objective to meet basic
household needs.
The data in Table 4.6 shows that the level of satisfaction is higher in the
municipal area because they receive more quantity of water. From the table above we
can see that around 62 per cent of the respondents are satisfied with the quantity of water
they receive either from piped water on premises or public standpipes or both. A
relatively large percentage responded likewise for the non-municipality area.
115 TH-2195_136141012 Table 4.6: Levels of Satisfaction of the Respondents with Water Quantity
Levels of Satisfaction with Municipality Non- municipality Water Quantity among Localities (%) Localities (%) Respondents Very satisfied 6.7 1.6
Satisfied 62.7 50
Not satisfied 30.6 45.7
Not at all satisfied 0 2.7
Source: Field Study 2016
Within the municipal area, the ones who respond as ―very satisfied‖ are not the
ones who get more than 7 hours of water a day but are the ones who get below 3 hours of
water in a day. This is because 3 hours of water in a day is more than enough since water
is stored in water tanks and can be used any time as per requirement. For those receiving
more than 7 hours a day, the water supply might not be regular (i.e. getting water supply
on a daily basis), they have to share the water from public standpipes with other
households and/or variations in the flow or discharge of the amount of water. In the non-
municipal areas people receive a lesser amount of water and the supply too is irregular in
majority of the localities. Hence, the levels of satisfaction are low. The study has also
recorded that only in the non-municipality localities the respondents have retorts ―not at
all satisfied‖.
A number of selected localities corresponding with the responses of their
respective residents (respondents) are shown in Table 4.7. No overlapping of responses
occurred for these localities.
116 TH-2195_136141012 Table 4.7: Localities and Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quantity
Levels of Satisfaction with Municipality Localities Non-municipality Water Quantity among Localities Respondents Very satisfied Umsohsun, Jaiaw Demthring, Mawlai Lansonalane Nonglum Satisfied Wahingdoh, Mission Mawlai Nongpathaw, Compound Mawpun Golf Links, Pynthorbah Not satisfied Cleve Colony, Lummawbah, Kenchs Trace, Laitumkhrah Ishyrwat Not at all satisfied Laban Rynjah Lumshngain, Nongthymmai
Source: Field Study 2016
4.4 Water Quality
Generally, water requirement for personal or domestic consumption must be
clean, safe and should be of an acceptable colour, odour and taste. However, throughout
the study, the respondents utterly stated that the water obtained from the different
sources is not safe for direct consumption (drinking). Therefore, it requires further
treatment like boiling or filtering.
Water sources as ‗improved‘ and ‗unimproved‘ is categorised by the Joint
Monitoring Programme of the UNICEF and WHO in 2004 (see Table 4.8). This division
can be juxtaposed with Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 to obtain the required information of
examining water equity in terms of quality. In the municipal area, most of the water
comes from ‗improved‘ drinking water sources whereas in the non-municipal area, most
households attain water from ‗unimproved‘ drinking water sources. Bottled water was
117 TH-2195_136141012 not included in the survey, as it recorded zero responses during pre-testing of the
questionnaire.
Table 4.8: ‘Improved’ and ‘unimproved’ sources of water
Sources of Water ‘Improved’ water sources ‘Unimproved’ water sources Household connection Unprotected dug well Public standpipe/tap Unprotected spring Own borehole/tubewell River, pond, etc. (surface water) Protected duh well Vendor-provided water Protected spring Bottled water Rainwater connection Tanker-truck water
Source: WHO and UNICEF (2004)
Again, in 2017 the Joint Monitoring Programme of the UNICEF and WHO
provided a new updated and expanded classification where a domestic drinking water
‗ladder‘ for household water services is given. The highest rung of this ladder22 is ‗safely
managed‘ drinking water where water is from an ―improved water source‖ which is
located on premises, available when needed and free from faecal and priority chemical
contamination. If this benchmark is used against the present data for this study, the
percentages of households using ―improved water source‖ will decrease further even in
the municipal area. In this case all public standpipes and spring will no longer be
regarded as ‗improved‘. The ‗available when needed‘ criterion / criteria is / are not clear.
In majority of the localities in Shillong, water is not supplied around the clock. But if
water is obtained whenever needed from a storage facility, then it subsequently falls
within the safely managed water service.
22 Below the ladder of ‗safely managed‘ criterion are ‗basic‘, ‗limited‘, ‗unimproved‘ and ‗no service‘.
118 TH-2195_136141012 As evident from the study, improved sources include piped water, public
standpipes and private borewells. There are many borewells that serve as local sources
for localities like Jaiaw Laitdom, Pynthorumkhrah and Lumshyiap. Others include
protected spring and protected dug wells. Some of the springs in the city are tapped by
the PHED, as a consequence of which they are protected. In Lawjynriew and Madanrting
localities there are springs that are the local sources of water under PHED. Also there are
dug wells in many places and it is assumed that they are protected since they are
individually / privately owned.
Unimproved sources of drinking water include tanker trucks, unprotected dug
wells, unprotected springs and surface water. In the city water shortages has constrained
many households to resort to buying of water. On a closer examination, the quality of
such water is questionable.
Further, a comparative analysis of the satisfaction levels of the respondents with
water quality between the municipal and non-municipal areas of Shillong for piped water
on premises and public standpipes is shown in Table 4.9. Like in the case for ―quantity‖
criterion, quality of water is also better in the municipal area. Overall 39 per cent of the
respondents were ‗satisfied‘ with the quality of the water in the municipality localities
and only 5 per cent were ‗very satisfied‘. In the non-municipal area, altogether 63 per
cent were ‗not satisfied‘ and quite a large share of 10.5 per cent was ‗not at all satisfied‘.
In the non-municipal area, water quality differs widely from one locality to
another. Water quality differs because of the different water sources and the distribution
infrastructure. Water sources include borewells, rivers, springs and the Mawphlang Dam.
The quality of underground water differs from one locality to another. Water obtained
from rivers is usually not of good quality due to unavoidable pollution. By the time the
water from Mawphlang Dam reaches the people, after traversing great distances, its
119 TH-2195_136141012 quality as well as quantity has decreased. Spring water is usually the most acceptable
water in terms of quality. Spring water originating from the hills around Shillong Peak
contributes the highest amount of water distributed in the municipal area.
4.4.1 Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quality
In the municipal area, a large share of 51 per cent responded as ―not satisfied‖
with the water quality. This was further explored through interviews. Since water sources
varies for both the SMB and the PHED supply water in the municipality localities. In
municipality localities, water quality is generally similar but there are exceptions.
Interviews with people in municipality locality of Laban have revealed that people prefer
SMB supplied water to PHED water. According to the interviewees, water supplied by
the PHED is muddy red in colour, whereas SMB water is clear. During the rainy season,
even SMB water is muddy in most localities making it difficult for consumption. Hence,
it is observed that the levels of dissatisfaction with water quality are enormous in the
municipal areas. The levels of satisfaction with water quality both in the municipal and
non-municipal localities are shown in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quality
Levels of Satisfaction with Municipal Localities Non-municipal Water Quality among (%) Localities (%) Respondents Very satisfied 5 5.3
Satisfied 39 21.2
Not satisfied 51 63
Not at all satisfied 5 10.5
Source: Field Study 2016
120 TH-2195_136141012 Remarkably, the 5.3 per cent of the non-municipal area who responded as ―very
satisfied‖ are households in whose localities water is being managed wholly or jointly by
the respective dorbar shnongs.
A number of selected localities corresponding with the responses of their
respective residents (respondents) levels of satisfaction with water quality are shown in
Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Localities and Levels of Satisfaction with Water Quality
Levels of Satisfaction with Municipality Localities Non- municipality Water Quality among Localities Respondents Very satisfied Umsohsun, Jaiaw Pdeng Lawsohtun, Lumdiengsoh Satisfied Wahingdoh, Mission Mawlai Nongkwar, Compound Mawlai Umthlong Not satisfied Laitumkhrah, Umpling Dongsharum, Lachumiere Mawlai Syllaikariah and Nongmynsong Not at all satisfied Laban Umpling Dongsharum
Source: Field Study 2016
4.5 Accessibility
Accessibility to water is measured in many ways. Yet, in this study, we use
chiefly three indicators that are – collection time, obtaining new water connections and
cost to measured water accessibility.
4.5.1 Collection Time
In the municipal area water is easily accessible. There have been improvements
in recent years. As people mostly depend on piped water on premises and public
standpipes, accessibility is easy. For instance, all public standpipes are within a walking
distance of less than two minutes. And the average walking distance is less than one
121 TH-2195_136141012 minute. Number of public standpipes is more in the municipality localities and the
housing is more compact here, which lessens the distance from house to source.
The time taken to collect water is more in the non-municipality localities
compared with the municipality localities. Collection time vary widely when it comes to
other sources of water like streams and springs in the non-municipal area. From the
interviews with residents in Mawpat and Nongmynsong (two residents from each locality
were interviewed), the time taken for round trips can be more than thirty minutes.23
People also had to travel longer distances for washing their clothes. Typically a resident
in Mawpat sometimes even uses a vehicle because the stream is too far from her house.24
Table 4.11 below shows the time it takes to collect water from public standpipes, springs
and streams for respondents in the non-municipality areas. Here we see 45 per cent of the
respondents take about five minutes to collect water. Basically this pertains to public
standpipes. The 15-30 minutes of roundtrips taken to collect water includes springs as
well. Most of the people are reluctant to collect water if collections time is more than 15
minutes. In such a situation, they resort to purchasing water.
Table 4.11: Water collection time in the non-municipal area for public standpipes
Collection Time Respondents (%)
About 5 minutes 45
About 15 minutes 39
About 30 minutes 15
More than 30 minutes 1
Source: Field Study 2016
23 Interviews were held with two residents each from these two localities. 24 Interview held on 7th June 2016. 122 TH-2195_136141012 In localities like Madanrting and Nongmynsong, the hilly topography contributes
to longer collection time taken to collect water from springs. The physical strain is also
high. Moreover, it is difficult for women and children to obtain water from such
locations.
4.5.2 Water Connection
The process of obtaining water connection is also simple in the municipality
localities. A household can either choose between the SMB and the PHED for
connections. Whereas, obtaining a house water connection is a harrowing experience in
non-municipality localities like Mawroh and Mawpat. The duration of waiting for water
connection is long, it can take years! One resident of Mawpat told the researcher that he
had applied for a water connection to the PHED five years ago.25 It has yet to
materialize. Simultaneously, there are extreme cases where house water connections are
not even available in localities like Nongrah and parts of Mawlai Mawroh. Thus,
households do not have the option to apply for piped water on premises. For instance, in
Nongrah locality no household has water connections. The only available connections
are provided by means of a small private water network for selected few households on
the payment of exorbitant price ranging from rupees one thousand two hundred per
month (Rs. 1200/month).
In the non municipal area, water access is comparatively difficult for piped water
on premises and public standpipes. Here only the PHED water connection is available. In
some localities, dorbar shnong connections (PHED with dorbar shnong assisted water
schemes) are there. Water connection is easier with a dorbar shnong water scheme for
reasons like size of area governed, community bond and small population.
25 Interview held on 3rd June 2016. 123 TH-2195_136141012 4.5.3 Buying and Cost of Water
In the municipal areas water tax is included in the municipal property tax that
residents pay annually. The amount per annum is around five thousand rupees. Notably,
16 per cent of the respondents in the municipal area are not aware as to whether they pay
such tax for water or not. One of the main reasons is that the revenue on water is
marginal. And people‘s general idea and their attitude about water are apathetic. The
question of water affordability does not arise in the municipal are because everyone has
to pay taxes (inclusive of water taxes).
In the non municipal areas, the water cost that residents pay to the PHED vary
from one locality to another depending on the water source, cost of extracting the water,
kind of water infrastructure, etc. The costs in water in some selected localities of the non-
municipality areas are given in Table 4.12. The data collected from these localities
reveals that the highest cost they pay for piped water on premises is rupees 270 per
month (in the locality of Madanrting). Here, mention may be made that when we talk
about cost, it is only households who possess their own respective houses that get water
connections and hence pay the water fees. While those who do not pay water fees are the
ones that inhabit rented houses.
Localities pay different water charges per month and accordingly water quantity
varies too. For instance, there are households that get water five times a week while
some get twice a week only. So in terms of ―cost‖ in the non-municipal areas, its
contribution to an equitable water supply is quite unimpressive. Connection fees are also
high in the non-municipal area owing to greater distances from the main pipes.
124 TH-2195_136141012 Table 4.12: Water fees in the Non-Municipal Area for Piped Water on Premises
Locality Water Supply Cost for piped water on premises (Rupees per month) Lummawbah 70
Mawlai Nongpdeng 194
Pynthor 194
Umpling 200
Nongthymmai Golden Estate 260
Madanrting 270
Source: Field Study 2016
Buying of water is main source of water for many households in the city of
Shillong in the non-municipal area. The average cost of water is rupees three hundred per
one thousand litres (Rs. 300/1000lt). There are also individual vendors who deliver
smaller quantities of water either using pushcarts or carrying the water by oneself. The
price is an average of thirty rupees for about 20-25 litres of water (see Plate 4.3). In
localities like Nongmynsong and Nongrah, the majority of households depend on water
vendors (mobile water tankers or by a single person using water containers) to deliver
water. Poor and rich households alike heavily depend on water vendors in a number of
non-municipality localities. During winter when demand is high, people have to wait for
almost two to three days for water to be delivered. Some do not even get water delivered
to them. Non-networked water supplies upon which a large proportion of urban
households depend are entirely unregulated in the city of Shillong. Absence of regulation
by the formal and informal authorities means water pricing, quality and delivery remains
unchecked. Usually during the months from March to April every year there is acute
125 TH-2195_136141012 water shortage. Therefore, households even in some localities of the municipal area
resort to buying water.
Plate 4.3: Water Containers Used to Deliver Water by Water Vendors
Source: Photograph taken by the author in Mawlai Phudmawri, fieldwork 2016
4.6 Reliability
According to Majuru, Suhrcke and Hunter (2018), reliability is measured by the
functionality of the water supply system itself and the extent to which it meets the needs
of water users. Regarding the reliability of meeting needs, the data pertaining to quantity
in the earlier sections can be correlated with the feature of water reliability.
Comparatively, in the municipal area water supply is more reliable. Major
breakdowns of water infrastructure are rare. Minor problems like breakage of small
water pipes, are handled by the water consumers themselves by employing the services
of local plumbers. In case of public standpipes too, water supply is regular. In case of
126 TH-2195_136141012 any problem, the timely response to repair is speedy. In general, water supply services
are ‗improved‘ in nature and the reliability is high and secure in municipal areas.
In the non-municipal area, there are associated problems such as reliability of
water supply. The problem differs from locality to locality depending on a number of
factors. For instance, the residents in Mawlai Mawdatbaki expressed that their water-
related complaints are often not heard or that the response time is sluggish. Also in
Mawpat and Nongmynsong, there are public standpipes that are completely broken
down. Contrarily, water supply in Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem is highly reliable. Even
water services provided by the respective dorbar shnongs is greatly reliable. Further
detail as to how these two localities have maintained water equity will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
S. S. Syiem, editor of the Khasi daily newspaper U Peitngor held the view that it
is very surprising that the water infrastructure set up by the British in the present
municipal area of Shillong are still functioning and being used today.26 In other words,
the water supply in this area is reliable partly because of the robust water infrastructure
which is still dependable in optimizing water supply. Whereas, the post-British water
infrastructure are found to be less reliable.
For piped water on premises, breakdown occurs due to wear and tear mainly
because water pipes flows through drains (see Plate 4.4) or breakage caused by vehicles
running over the pipes or water theft which results in the tampering of the pipes. For
public standpipes, breakdown can occur due to the same reasons besides others that
disrupt water supply. But the main issue in this case is the time taken to repair the broken
down water infrastructure. There are cases where weeks are taken to repair or fix the
broken public standpipes. Nevertheless, there are also cases where repair is quick and
26 Interview held on 3rd September 2016. 127 TH-2195_136141012 prompt. The latter usually happens when a particular dorbar shnong is effective in its
work. The breakdown of main water infrastructure like big water pipes is uncommon.
When it occurs, the SMB or the PHED respond and solve such issues.
Plate 4.4: Water pipes running along drains are a common sight in Shillong.
Source: Photograph taken by the author in Paltan Bazaar, fieldwork, 2016.
Table 4.13: Reliability of water supply for piped water on premises and public standpipes
Reliability of Water Supply Municipal Non- municipal Responses of Respondents Localities (%) Localities (%) Very good 22 6
Good 57.4 34
Satisfactory 9.6 44.4
Bad 11 15.6
Source: Field Study 2016
128 TH-2195_136141012 The respondents view concerning the reliability levels both for piped water on
premises and public standpipes in both the municipal and the non-municipal areas are
given in Table 4.13. The data indicates that the municipality localities have a more
reliable water supply where 57.4 per cent responded to the reliability as ‗good‘ and 19
per cent as ‗very good‘. And another 44.4 per cent of the respondents in the non-
municipal area responded the reliability of water supply as ‗satisfactory‘.
4.7 Other Measures of Equity
Besides quantity, quality, accessibility and reliability, other measures like gender
equity, social equity, and seasonal and geographical variations shall be discussed in the
following section in measuring water equity.
4.7.1 Gender Equity
Usually, in water sources such as public standpipes and surface water like springs
and streams, the collection are done by adult male members. Both in the municipal and
non-municipal areas such households account for 64 per cent. This was also confirmed
by observation method employed by the researcher. It was observed that young adult
men are usually the ones collecting water from public standpipes. An interesting
observation was made among the Khasis that it was more of the adult males who collect
water. However, in areas like Paltan Bazaar, Nongmynsong and Sweepers Lane (among
the non-Khasi and non-tribal residents), it was observed that it was the adult women who
were generally engaged mostly in collecting water. The researcher cannot confirm the
latter observations. Generally, it was observed that the washing of clothes in springs and
streams / rivers is done solely by women (see Plate 4.5).
129 TH-2195_136141012 Plate 4.5: Women Washing Clothes in the Locality of Nongrah
Source: Photograph taken by author during fieldwork, 2016.
4.7.2 Social Equity
In in the course of the field study no forms of discrimination were experienced by
any of the localities, as belonging to a social groups or community do not determined
their access to water. The water authorities (SMB, PHED and dorbar shnongs) do not
discriminate on such criteria in providing water. During the interview, when the
respondents were asked as to whether they experience any kind of ―favouritism‖ in terms
of supply of water, 86 per cent of the respondents responded ―No‖. However, for those
whose responses were ―Yes‖, explanation was sought and through which it was learnt
that comparatively economically better-off household could get water connections
quickly compared to other applicants. Also, it was found that the rich usually bribe
plumbers to channel or divert more water to their households. So the respondents with
―Yes‖ responses can be interpreted as favouritism in the light of rich-poor divide, i.e.
economically disadvantaged and affluent households. 130 TH-2195_136141012 In terms of control, the study point out that private ownership of land dictates in
some form by influencing and controlling the use of water. This creates dependencies on
those who ‗own‘ and sell/give water. The next Chapter 5 will provide a better
understanding of the interplay between land ownership and water rights.
4.7.3 Seasonal and Geographical Variations
The study reveals that overall 98 per cent of the respondents had mentioned the
prevalence of seasonal variations of water supply. Seasonal variations usually occur
during the months of March and April after dry winter spells. During this period, the
duration of water supply is reduced and therefore water supply becomes intermittent in
many localities across the city. Notably, almost all the water authorities do not have any
water shortage mitigation measures. There is a huge dependence on mobile water
tankers/water vendors. Such seasonal discontinuity compels households to look for other
alternative sources of water.
Geographical variations occur due to the presence or absence of water sources
like springs and groundwater in the vicinities. Groundwater is not accessible in every
neigbourhood. Shillong being a hilly city, the topography of the land is not uniform,
which determines the retention and flow of groundwater. This factor can also be
interpreted as being a determinant in variations in terms of water equity across the city.
For example, Shyiap locality does not have any water sources like springs or rivers
within its geographical area or nearby. On the other hand, Mawlai Phudmawri which is
located near a forest, the residents have access to a number of springs.
In the subsequent sections we discuss how water and poverty is interrelated for
which access of water by vulnerable groups of selected slum dwellers will be examined.
131 TH-2195_136141012 4.8 Water Equity and the Poor
In order to understand how water and poverty is interrelated in terms of access of
water, the study identified the poor residents using two indicators – employment /
income and housing characteristics. Street vendors were chosen for interviews for the
former indicator and houses with poor physical conditions or poor housing (Baker and
Schuler, 2004; Marlier and Atkinson, 2010) for the later indicator. Besides these two
indicators, interviews were also conducted with slum dwellers.
The household survey indicated that many poor families in the city have to spend
a substantial amount of their income on purchasing water for domestic purposes. On the
other hand wealthier households with a networked connection receive water at a lower
cost per unit volume, spending lower proportions of income for much greater quantities
of water. Levels of water consumption are positively correlated with wealth in the non-
municipal area and a few pockets of the municipal area.
An interview was conducted with twenty-two individuals and families
categorized as ―poor‖ which include street vendors who are located around the city and
households members. Random and snowball sampling was used for street vendor
identification.
The following sections comprise of cases of the experiences shared by the poor
households both from the municipality and non-municipality localities. The cases
presented in the following section are a compilation of the interview and narratives in the
course of the fieldwork. The study was conducted to substantiate the findings regarding
water (in)equity in Shillong.
132 TH-2195_136141012 4.8.1 Municipal Area
1. In a slum in Paltan Bazaar, twelve Nepali households get their water through
unconventional means. A plumber illegally provides water by ‗stealing‘ it from a
main pipe and channeling this water to the premises. Moreover, the plumber sells
the water at the rate of two hundred rupees per month (Rs. 200/month). The water
is sufficient for these twelve households, however no conflict have been
experienced over the water supply. Water is stored in small containers and
buckets in their congested houses. Sometimes there would be no water for many
days and the nearest public tap is at a distance. If water problems occur, they
approach a particular person who then acts as mediator between them and the
plumber. They are happy with the present state of water. Paltan Bazaar is in the
municipal area. The households do not obtain water from the SMB water network
but in an unauthorized and unethical process which amounts to erroneous theft of
water. The residents were not willing to reveal the identity of their water ‗hero‘!
Eventually, for them what matters most is getting their supply of water.
2. Another locality adjacent to Paltan Bazaar is Qualpatty. Here poor households
have no water problems. They all have water connection in the premises with an
average supply of six hours a day. Another slum called Sweepers colony, on the
other hand has a deplorable water supply. Every household here collects water
from broken pipes. When it rains, rain water is harvested. Sometimes water is
purchased. Since the households in this locality do not buy water on a regular
basis, often times the water vendors would disregard their request for water as
they are not a regular customer. To add to their woes, the landlord lives far away
in another locality and is unconcerned regarding water provision.
133 TH-2195_136141012 3. In Jaiaw Laitdom the landlord provides water for Aiti. She is a house-maid. She
lives with another friend and shares the rent. Even during the periods of water
shortage, the landlord purchases the water for all the tenants. So water is always
sufficient. ―I am satisfied with the water supply. The landlord is kind‖, said Mem
of Jaiaw Laitdom.27
4.8.2 Non-Municipal Area
1. In Saw Mer Shiteng there is a public tap which dispenses water day and night.
This water is rationed to nearby households by turns. Each household connects a
plastic pipe for three hours per day. The pipe is connected from the tap to the
house. They pay thirty rupees per month to the dorbar shnong. According to
them, the dorbar shnong is discharging good service. A resident of Saw Mer
states,
―Water is sufficient for my household. It is sufficient for all of us. There is
understanding and unity among all the households who collect water
from this public standpipe. Our dorbar shnong is doing a good job in
providing us water.‖28
2. In Nongmynsong four people were interviewed each from different households
and these are the highlights:
a) Mr. A and his family members spend four to five hundred rupees per week in
purchasing water because all that his household can collect is one bucket of water
in a day from the nearest public standpipe. There is a spring relatively far away
and none of the household members have the time to collect the water. When
27 Interviewed on 21st June 2016. 28 Interviewed on 23rd June 2016. 134 TH-2195_136141012 they have no money to buy, they would wake up very early (around 5am) to go
and fetch water from the spring.29
b) There is a nearby spring just near the house of Mr. B which is just a few meters
away. During the rainy season this spring is covered in silt and it has to be
removed everyday. During winter the flow of this the spring water is low. Around
thirty households depend on this spring. The water is very clean, it is consumed
directly. The household members and their neighbours are very satisfied with the
water. Till presently, they have no need for water connections.30
c) Kongkong has no money to purchase water. More than 85 per cent of households
in Nongmynsong purchase water as it is the only source of obtaining water.
Instead Kongkong acquire water from a main water pipe that was cut by
someone. This water has to be shared with a number of households. Luckily,
according to her, nobody has detected the wrongful act.
―This is very convenient for us all. We do not have to go to the spring for
water. The spring has no water during winter.‖ (Kongkong,
Nongmynsong)31
d) In another part of Nongmynsong a particular family resides in one of the housing
units constructed under the Centrally-sponsored Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) Basic Service of Urban Poor (BSUP)
Scheme. Water is abundant here. All families residing in these units get a twenty
four hour water supply. One can see the glaring inequity in the same locality.
3. In Mawlai Mawiong, the public standpipe is too far from Mrs. C‘s house. People
have to queue for water at this standpipe. As a single mother, Mrs C and her
29 Interviewed on 16th June 2016. 30 Interviewed on 16th June 2016. 31 Interviewed on 11th August 2016. 135 TH-2195_136141012 children (who go to school) have no time to collect water. Also the way to this
public standpipe is steep. This household purchases water for two hundred and
fifty rupees for one thousand litres (Rs. 250/1000 litres) twice a month. If the
water is not delivered, they have to ask for water from neighbours. The stream is
also too far. The mother is the only earning member of the family. Even on no
school days, it‘s difficult for her children to fetch water, being young. Mrs C goes
to work early in the morning. To her, the dorbar shnong is not doing enough. She
attends meetings to voice her complaints.32
4. In Madanrting locality, Kong Rynjah finds it arduous to collect water too early in
the morning. She leaves home for work at around 7:30am. The source of water is
a stream. She travels for about half an hour early in the morning for two round
trips to collect water. This water is very clean. During the winter, the stream has
no water. She collects it from a spring instead which is located farther away.
Kong Rynjah stated ―Nobody cares for poor people. I get really tired collecting
water‖.33
5. In Laimer, Miss Kurbah collects water form a public standpipe which takes a
round trip of around ten minutes. The quantity of the flow is low and hence the
waiting time is long. Many households depend on this one standpipe. She collects
water early morning everyday. Sometimes during scarcity the family would either
buy or collect water form a pond. The way to the pond is steep, so they often
avoid it.34
6. Mr. Shullai of Mawpat collects water from a public standpipe. His sons take
baths in a nearby river. According to him the water supply has improved now.
Before this particular standpipe was installed, the family had to collect water
32 Interviewed on 10th May 2016. 33 Interviewed on 29th June 2016. 34 Interviewed on 11th May 2016. 136 TH-2195_136141012 from a spring. But compared to water from the standpipe, the spring water is
much cleaner. The quality of the water is superior. This family has recently
submitted a household water connection form to the dorbar shnong for a PHED
connection.35
7. Kong Aiti, a resident of Mawlai Mawdatbaki, expressed that her family members
were not allowed to collect water from a nearby public tap because this particular
tap falls within the jurisdiction of another locality. The only water sources
available for this woman are springs which are far away. They undertake risks
collecting water from there. In the rainy season rainwater would suffice. The
landlord does not provide this family with water. They consider themselves as
victims of discriminatory practices. ―I am scared to collect water‖, bemoans
Kong Aiti.36
4.8.3 Discussion
From the above discussion, it is evident that the experiences of the poor are better
in areas that falls within the municipalities‘ area except for slums like those located in
Sweepers Colony and Paltan Bazaar. The narratives of hardship and struggle exhibit the
close connection between water and poverty. Domestic water supplies are one of the
basic requirements for human life. Lack of access to safe and adequate water supply
contributes to ongoing poverty both through the high proportion of household
expenditure on water supplies, arising from the need to purchase water and/or time and
energy expended in collection (Howard and Bartram, 2003). Common property resources
like water are immensely valuable and exclusion can be costly for people (Pretty, 2003).
35 Interviewed on 7th June 2016. 36 Interviewed on 4th August 2016. 137 TH-2195_136141012 The study identifies emotional geographies of water brought about by water
scarcity or inequity and also various aspects of water-fetching and water-sharing
(Sultana, 2011). Analyzing the various forms of ‗suffering‘ that people invoke
highlights the emotional geographies of water, where suffering is intersubjecitve and
produced through the realities of access, use, and control of water. Scholars such as
Klouzal (2003) have argued that focusing on suffering enriches development research by
asking about both ‗‗material conditions and the experience of hardship, countering a
tendency in development research to ignore subjectivity‘‘ (Sultana, 2011).
Most of the poor households do not purify water before consumption. E.g. boiling
of the water is costly. They can hardly afford fuel (charcoal or kerosene) to boil water.
They are also faced with unfavourable water prices imposed by water vendors. Water
markets are burdensome for them. The poor are vulnerable, insecure and powerless.
They are as rational as anybody else but they lack the means to make rational choices
(Ramphele, 2006). The more poverty is understood to be multidimensional, the closer
and more complex the poverty-equity connection becomes (McDermott, Mahanty and
Schreckenberg, 2013). For most of the above cases, there is ―water poverty‖, that which
erodes wellbeing (Rogers, et al., 2012).
During interviews with rangbah shnongs, it was establish that the poor suffer the
most due to water shortage. The poor bear more of the water scarcity brunt because of
the fact that they are financially worse off than others. Most of the poor are landless in
Shillong, hence tenants who are dependent on their landlords for water. Poor households
lack storage facilities. The associated problems encounter by the poor includes waiting in
queues, conflicts with neighbors, the burdens of carting water, in-house storage, and
boiling and filtering water for drinking and cooking.
138 TH-2195_136141012 Not all poor households are in ‗deep water‘ regarding water access, quality and
quantity. The study draws attention to the fact that the water experiences of the poor
depends on location. Time is also a major factor but we did not include it here in this
study. By location it meant which locality and whether it falls within the premises of the
municipal or non-municipal area in the city. Except for slum area, the poor in the
municipal area encounter lesser water-related problems than in the non-municipal area.
Another important finding is that the water scarcity that the poor are facing is not
created politically. The study found no discimination, neither from the formal nor
informal institutions, against the poor in domestic water supply.
Two major factors emerges which could be the reason for the poor encountering
water problems are given by Bakker, Kooy, Shofiani and Martijn (2008). First is
governance failure. Secondly non-networked water supply alternatives upon which a
large proportion of urban poor households depend are often entirely unregulated.
A comparison between the poor and the elite/middle class sections of the city in
terms of accessibility to water are given below:
1. The poor, especially in slums, are not connected to formal water networks.
2. The main water sources for the poor in the non-municipal area include springs,
rivers, broken water pipes and rainwater. Many even resort to theft (see Plate 4.6). The
majority of the elite/middle class households buys water or have piped water on
premises.
3. In the municipal area no glaring inequity exists between the two groups due to
the abundance of water and extensive network coverage.
4. Many of the poor household members spend comparatively more time in
fetching water.
139 TH-2195_136141012 5. Water as a basic need is never enough to meet all personal and domestic needs
at a particular time. The elite/middle class households face lesser degrees of such
problem.
Plate 4.6: ‘Stealing’ of Water – Plastic Pipe Connected to an Iron Water Pipe in Nongmynsong Locality
Source: Photograph taken by the author during fieldwork, 2016
For the bulk of the urban poor in slums and in many localities of the non-
municipal area, the scarcity of potable water is a daily hardship. Governance failure
occurs in Shillong because the needs of poor households have not been taken into
account effectively, creating disincentives for the water supply utility to connect poor
households and/or for poor households to connect to the network (Bakker, Kooy,
Shofiani and Martijn, 2008). In the locality of Lawsohtun, the poor households face no
water problems whereas the major part of Nongmynsong reeks of water shortage. Both
these localities are outside the ambit of the SMB. This is because of good water
governance rendered by its dorbar shnong.
140 TH-2195_136141012 Based on my household survey, the study identitifes the interrelationship of water
and poverty and comes out with the following findings:
1. Water and poverty are linked by the whole inequity of a situation in which the
poor get the worst service from intermittent water supply through standpipes to vended
water in lieu of piped water, while the rich or better off get relatively inexpensive piped
water.
2. Water and poverty are linked by connected consumers having a collective
voice and the poor who are not connected having no voice. The poor do not even have
the time to voice their concerns. For example, most of the interviewees who are poor do
not attend dorbar shnong meetings. Hence they cannot directly voice their water related
sufferings.
3. Water and poverty are linked by the rich being able to afford to pay bribes to
plumbers for more water. This is reported in many parts of the city where there is
insufficient water supply.
The rich can purchase their solutions (Sharma and Harvey, 2015). This is true
especially when it comes to purchasing of water from water vendors. When water
governance practices is poor (Biswas and Tortajada, 2010a), the poorer sections of the
society undergo more and larger water-related problems. Water quantity, quality and
accessibility all underpin the capability to meet future water security requirements
(Biggs, Duncan, Atkinson, and Dash, 2013).
Urban poverty is much influenced by what governments do or do not do, also by
what they can and cannot do (IIED, 2000). Beside the performance of the government, it
is also influenced by what the dorbar shnongs do and not do. Procedural equity is
141 TH-2195_136141012 lacking from the government as well as the dorbar shnongs regarding provision of water
to the poor.
4.9 Conclusion
Domestic water with regards to equity in Shillong is characterized by many
problem and complexities. Like most developing cities, urban water distribution in
Shillong takes a ―center/periphery form‖ (Gilbert, 1998 in Wutich, 2006), in which well-
provisioned municipal localities give way to outskirts with progressively fewer services.
For example, outside the municipal area, dependence on the different sources of water
increases. Use of different water sources also varies temporally and seasonally. In non-
municipality localities, inadequacies of piped water on premises or public standpipes are
supplemented by water from springs and rivers, vendors, private individuals, rainwater,
etc. In some localities like Mawlai Kyntonmassar and Mawlai Phudmawri, water from
public standpipes is of dubious quality. Again in many localities in the Mawlai area,
those with access to networked services have problems with low quality and reliability.
Rampant mushrooming of water vendors reflects water scarcity and unequal
distribution. Water vending is taken as a symptom of a failure in piped systems (Kjellen
and McGranahan, 2006). Moreover, further outside of the municipal periphery water
networks are non-existent. Non-networked water supply alternatives upon which a large
proportion of urban households depend are often entirely unregulated in large parts of the
developing world (Bakker, Kooy, Shofiani and Martijn, 2008). Similarly, this is the case
in the city of Shillong. For instance, absence of regulation by the formal and informal
authorities means water pricing, quality and delivery is not checked.
Water availability for domestic uses in Shillong has progressively improved
during the last two decade in the municipality localities. Progress has been slow or
142 TH-2195_136141012 totally absent in the non-municipal area. Moreover distributional equity has been uneven
and erratic in the non-municipality localities. About 14 per cent depend solely on water
vendors to deliver water at a price. Matters like long waiting times for water connections,
varying distance from household to water source are some other issues that plague non-
municipal localities.
When we look at the city as a whole, we see a great deal of disparities among the
localities. Surprisingly, disparities even exist within a particular locality. For example,
residents in the municipality locality of Mawkhar claim that the time water is being
supplied to households sometimes differ from one household to another. One household
would be getting water while an adjacent household would not.
Inaccessibility or difficulty thereof affects people in many ways, for example,
since water play a key role in domestic work, and inadequate water adversely influences
the tasks of maintaining a home. A resident of Madanrting expressed that personal and
household hygiene has to be foregone due to lack of water.37 Also the time devoted to
water collection deprives people of opportunities to live lives that they value (Goff and
Crow, 2014). Without access to piped water, households and individuals are forced to
use limited supplies of water, often of poor quality, from unreliable sources and usually
at a high cost. The root cause of this exclusion is the long-standing inability to plan and
implement water systems which respond to the reality of the lives of the people (Evans,
2007). Access to water is determined by the preexisting political, economic and social
conditions under which people engage in and benefit from resource distributions
(McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenberg, 2013).
37 Interviewed on 26th June 2016. 143 TH-2195_136141012 Currently, these are some of the issues and challenges to water equity in Shillong.
In the section below two cases are given that portray the range and type of the issues
troubling the water scenario:
1. Twenty year ago the locality of Laban used to get daily water supply from the
SMB. Laban falls within the municipal area. Many flocked to Laban for settlement. Now
it gets only forty-five minutes of water in a day. There are around eight hundred
households in Laban at present. Interestingly there are no public standpipes in Laban.
According to its rangbah shnong, the distribution network is faulty and the water
quantity is too less. All that the dorbar shnong can do is to complain to the SMB which
has been futile.38
2. Drilling of borewells in Shillong has been restricted by the Office of the
District Commissioner, East Khasi Hills since 2014. Many households have had
borewells drilled before the restriction was passed. Mawlai Mawdatbaki alone has more
than thirty privately owned borewells. Having a borewell drilled is an expensive affair; it
costs around rupees 2.5 lakhs for one. The borewells in this locality has been a source
for water vendors for many years. Underground water from this locality reaches many
parts of the city. Many people are disturbed by the fact that people with property and
with access to groundwater are selling the water all over the city for profit. But in this
very locality itself, many households lack adequate water.
The study has found that some of the reasons for the present water inequity in
Shillong are as follow:
1. Faulty distribution system
2. Mismanagement of water
38 Interviewed on 16th November 2015. 144 TH-2195_136141012 3. Urban sprawl
4. Growing population
5. Practice of unsatisfactory water governance
6. Non-participation
7. Absence of water sources like springs
8. Physical proximity of the network
According to the rangbah shnong of Mawlai Mawdatbaki, the PHED makes
plans through various water schemes and by the time it is implemented, it fails due to
increase in population. It does not foresee this basic urbanization trend. Urban sprawl is
aggressive in the city.39 He has witnessed the changes in water supply in many parts of
the city. Below is a loose translation of his narrative.
―Years and years ago when there was no house water connections, people
would wake up early in the morning and collect water from the many springs.
Now springs cannot serve the whole population anymore. In the premises of
most houses, there would be water trickling down or bubbling from beneath
the ground. Now such kinds of springs have all disappeared due to
urbanization.‖40
Similar to many Indian cities, there is gross mismanagement of water (Ahluwalia,
2014) in the city of Shillong. Distributive, procedural and contextual equity (McDermott,
Mahanty and Schreckenberg, 2013) is essential in the present water supply systems of
Shillong. Equal distribution of water is missing and far-fetched taking the city as a
whole. As an aspiration, equity is not taken seriously by the SMB and the PHED.
39 Urbanization decreases distributional fairness across generations (Lamorgese and Geneletti, 2015). 40 Interviewed on 21st June 2016. 145 TH-2195_136141012 Distribution of costs and benefits is not even. Households pay more for water in the non-
municipal localities and yet they generally receive less water. Overflow of water tanks in
the municipality localities indicate mis-management not abundance. Localities like
Riatsamthiah and Wahingdoh receive a lot of water which is mostly more than required.
No efforts exist in the city for special measures to supply water to marginalized
groups like the poor. Slums in Paltan Bazaar and Sweepers Colony located in the heart of
the municipal administered area have existed without decent water supply for decades.
Water is a common pool resource (Giordano, Mapedza and Burns, 2014) and current
mechanisms for decision making has failed to successfully recognize this.
Large proportions of the residents are vulnerable to water related problems.
These vulnerabilities arise largely because of structural constraints of the governance
system existing in the city (Evans, 2007). To improve urban water provision in Shillong
and assure services that are safe, desirable and affordable to the people is crucial. An
equitable supply for each person must be sufficient and continuous for personal and
domestic uses. Equity considerations call for the recognition of the complexity and
diversity of our realities and our values surrounding water. This includes how
sociopolitical processes contribute to water scarcity and inequity (Lacey, 2008).
Equity can be achieved when water is treated as a common good that serves
multiple values, when there is broad participation, when people are mindful of needs of
non- humans and procedural fairness is practiced in making fairer water allocation and
distribution (Wilder and Ingram, 2016). Water policies and actions are moving in an
equitable direction when imbalances in political and economic power are being redressed
and where there is a sense of responsibility to future generations (Ingram, Scaff and
Silko, 1986). Reciprocity is also important because there is shared allocation of rights
and benefits and also of risks and burdens associated with population growth, climate
146 TH-2195_136141012 change, etc. (Ingram, Scaff and Silko, 1986). Water equity also means equal concern for
water needs which is crucial to people and of universal value and respect for people‘s
common humanity (Jones, 2009).
Achieving equity has many conditions and principles to be followed. As already
mentioned, much of the water inequity that is seen around the world is due to
mismanagement. In other words, water governance is unsatisfactory. In the next chapter,
we shall examine water governance executed by the traditional institutions (the dorbar
shnongs). Being a part of the water supply system of Shillong, these institutions partly
contribute to water distribution and accessibility.
To supplement our understanding of dorbar shnongs as dicussed in chapter 3, the
next chapter examines the roles and functions of the local traditional institutions with
regards to water governance system in Shillong city.
147 TH-2195_136141012 CHAPTER 5
WATER GOVERNANCE AND THE DORBAR SHNONGS
This chapter attempts to understand the way in which water governance system functions
and its impacts on domestic water supply by examining the role of dorbar shnongs. It
focuses on selected localities both in the municipality and non-municipality areas and
examines the nature of water governance in Shillong. This chapter explores the
associated institutional underpinnings of water inequity patterns, as a way to understand
water governance.41
5.1 Municipality Localities
Umsohsun, Wahingdoh and Cleve Colony localities are selected in the municipal
administered area for this study. Umsohsun is a relatively small locality with a household
number of about four hundred, while Wahingdoh is bigger with around seven hundred
households. Water supply in both these localities has improved in the last decade since
PHED connections were given. Before, it was only the SMB that supplied water in these
localities. Essentially, all houses have piped water on premises. People can either choose
between an SMB and a PHED water connection.
Here one of the main roles of the dorbar shnong in Umsohsun and Wahingdoh
localities is to give a no objection certificate to residents applying for a new water
connection. The dorbar shnong checks and certifies the identity of the residents. Only
one connection per household is permitted but if the need occurs, a household can apply
41 For further details on ‗water governance‘, see Lu, Ocampo-Raeder and Crow, 2014.
148 TH-2195_136141012 for another connection. The most common reason for the requirement of extra water
connections is to provide water to tenants.
Another important role of dorbar shnongs in these two localities is to scrutinise
the plumbers practicing in their localities as to whether they are registered with the SMB
or not. This is a very important aspect because often time‘s people have been swindled
by plumbers. Plumbers can lose their licenses or attract penalties if the dorbar shnong
reports of such unwanted activities. Thus, permission has to be sought from the dorbar
shnongs before any repairing and other related activities like digging of underlying pipes
and removing of slabs. The household connected with such work has to properly repair
the road, slab, etc.
Public standpipes related works that are minimal are usually carried out by the
dorbar shnong and the costs are borne by them. For example the replacement of broken
taps, construction of theft-proof structures for water pipes, etc. are common practices for
Umsohsun and Wahingdoh dorbar shnongs. The use of public taps in Umsoshsun and
Wahingdoh has diminished over the years. This reflects the coverage improvement of
piped water connections.
The study identifies that most of the water pipes run through drains in most parts
of these two localities. It is a common sight and objectionable phenomena rampant in the
whole city especially the congested municipal area. Many problems are caused due to
such unhygienic and unwanted process of water delivery. The Umsohsun dorbar shnong
has proposed that water pipes be shifted out of the drains. But many residents objected to
it stating the main reason being that they did not want to go without water for a few days
when such repairing / construction work is carried out. Over here, it is apparent that a
dorbar shnong cannot afford to convince the residents even though such steps would be
beneficial collectively in the long run.
149 TH-2195_136141012 The drobar shnongs of these two localities obtain MLA (member of legislative
assembly) and MDC (member of district council) schemes that are directed toward water
supply infrastructure. The SMB does not have enough funds. So the dorbar shnongs‘
responsibility is to obtain required funds to fill the deficiency. The use of public taps in
Umsohsun and Wahingdoh has diminished over the years. According to the rangbah
shnong of Wahingdoh,42 a dorbar shnong has limited authority in a municipal area.
There is little responsibility that they have to shoulder compared to the localities outside
the jurisdiction of the SMB.
Apart from the two aforesaid municipality localities, another one chosen in the
study is Cleve Colony. This locality has only about three hundred households. Here daily
water supply is twenty hours per day. However water quantity is low which make it
inadequate for a number of households. Though being located in the municipal area the
dorbar shnong regulates part of the water supply here. This means that, compared to
Wahingdoh and Umsohsun, Cleve Colony Dorbar Shnong has additional water-related
responsibility and more accountability. In some sense, it is a joint activity with the SMB.
The locality has one water source which is a rivulet/stream fed by springs in a
protected forest (see Plate 5.1). Earlier the locality received its water from another river
located near different locality. There were complaints of the pipes being frequently
disconnected and tampered with. People of the other locality declined to share water with
Cleve Colony. So the dorbar shnong sought financial assistance from the MLA and
MUDA (Meghalaya Urban Development Authority) and technical assistance from the
SMB and received their own separate water network.
42 Interviewed on 17th March 2016.
150 TH-2195_136141012 The present water source tapped is more efficient owing to proximity.
Surrounded by a forest, there is not much scope for expansion of this locality. So
improvement on the existing water supply network is promising. From an interviews
carried out with the secretary of Cleve Colony,43 he expressed a few major issues faced
by the dorbar shnong at present. Successful interventions of the dorbar shnong are also
highlighted simultaneously.
Plate 5.1: Water Source of Cleve Colony
Source: Photograph taken by the author during fieldwork, 2016
Some of the major issues/tasks encountered by the Cleve Colony‘s Dorbar
Shnong are:
1. In winter the amount of water in the stream is extremely low which translates to
decreased quantity distributed to the residents. Although it is enough for small
43 Interviewed on 24th May 2016.
151 TH-2195_136141012 families, it is not enough for bigger families and usually with tenants water has to
be purchased.
2. In many instances the huge distribution pipes that run through the forest have
been stolen. The dorbar shnong replaces those using MLA and MUDA funds.
This issue has been deliberated with officials of the forest department of the
Government of Meghalaya. However, the government has expressed difficulty in
tackling such issues.
3. Another issue is regarding the SMB licensed plumbers. It has been reported of
people paying them bribe for a better supply of water. It is difficult on the part of
the dorbar shnong to check this regularly. According to the Secretary, water is
sufficient but people want to see their storage tanks overflow to waste. Also
according to him, people are greedy and excessively use water; they have not
learnt conservation of water.
4. On one occasion, an individual tried to claim ownership to a large part of the
catchment area but the dorbar shnong stood up against this and confronted the
individual, who later surrendered. Despite being a protected forest, encroachment
and trespassing is not uncommon. Construction of houses has also taken place in
the protected areas. In 2003, Cleve Colony along with other adjoining localities
such as Lum Sohphoh, Lum Diengsoh and Risa Colony, wrote to the government
regarding the issue of government-protected forests of Shillong Peak Range. The
dorbar shnongs of these localities requested for better protection and
conservation of the catchment areas. These localities depend on Wah Dienglieng
(River Dienglieng) from water supply which is located in the catchment area in
question. The catchment - stretching from the Shillong Peak to the West and
152 TH-2195_136141012 River Umken in the east, has always been an important traditional natural source
of water supply to the population of many parts of Shillong.
Here we noticed four localities depending on a common water source (River
Dienglieng). The grievous concerns communicated by the localities have led the
government to keep close vigil on encroachment in the form of illegal housing
construction and so on. During the interview,44 it was also learnt that the Indian Air force
has started encroaching into this protected forest areas. But it remains to be seen how
Cleve Colony Dorbar Shnong has to act on this matter.
Some of the problems and responsibilities encountered by the dorbar shnong of
Cleve Colony are different compared to Wahingdoh and Umsohsun localities. According
to the Cleve Colony‘s secretary, managing a water scheme partially with the SMB is a
difficult task. Some of the routine problems and roles of municipality localities are given
in the section below. This set of information was obtained not only from the dorbar
shnong members of Wahingdoh, Umsohsun and Cleve Colony but also from other
groups of interviewees of different localities. Ideally, it can be safe to say that the
following points can be generalized for all localities in the municipal area.
5.1.1 Water Related Problems in the Municipal Area
Some of the major water related problems in the municipal area are indicated as
follow:
1. Water is sufficient for most part of the year. For two to three months of the year
(mostly March-April) water becomes insufficient. Also, many households report
of erratic water supply.
44 Interviewed held on 12th October, 2016
153 TH-2195_136141012 2. Wastage of water remains unchecked in many localities. This pertains mostly to
public standpipes. Disproportionate water supply among the localities is
recurrent.
3. Being in the municipal area, most dorbar shnongs have an indifferent attitude
towards domestic water supply. The dorbar shnongs in areas like Umsohsun with
comparatively more financial resources is unwilling to spend for water related
issues.
5.1.2 Roles of Dorbar Shnongs in Municipality Localities
The major roles of dorbar shnongs in municipality localities are listed below:
1. Relating to connections of piped water on premises, roles are similar in both
municipal and non-municipal areas. First, permission is required for water
connection in household in which a ―no objection certificate‖ has to be issued by
a dorbar shnong. Second, if a household with an existing water connection
(piped-on-premise) seeks permission for an additional household connection, the
dorbar shnong checks the validity of the requirement.
2. Another common role of the dorbar shnong is checking of plumbers. In the
municipal areas, all plumbers must have practice licenses. Dorbar shnongs plays
a watchdog on this and have been vigilant enough regarding erring plumbers.
3. Dorbar shnong with funds repair public standpipes, water tanks, etc. Those who
lack funds depend on the PHED or SMB.
4. Acquiring of MLA and MDC funds for water related expenditure – It is through
dorbar shnong that MLA and MDC schemes are directed toward water supply
infrastructure. The SMB does not have enough funds. So the dorbar shnong’s
154 TH-2195_136141012 responsibility is to obtain required funds to fill the deficiency. Some also get
funding from MUDA and other sources.
5. Complaints are registered through a dorbar shnong to the SMB and PHED. There
are dorbar shnongs who do not entertain water related complaints and instead ask
that the complaints be directly registered with the final authority.
6. Dorbar shnong try to protect the catchment areas. As mentioned, for instance
Cleve Colony and other dorbar shnongs solved the problem of a person who
falsely claimed ownership to the law syiem (forest of the ruler or chief). Thus
they assisted in checking such illegal activities. Their concern is the protection of
the water supply.
5.2 Non-Municipality Localities
In order to identify the major water related problems and role of the local
traditional institutions, localities such as Mawlai Mawdatbaki, Nongkhryiem, Nongrah,
Lawsohtun, and Mawpat have been selected in non-municipality areas for the study.
5.2.1 Mawlai Mawdatbaki
In Mawlai Mawdatbaki locality, there are around two thousand households. Only
thirty per cent (30%) of these households have PHED water connection (piped water on
premises). Those with piped water on premises get their water only twice a week for
charges of rupees two hundred for one month (Rs. 200/month). But people are not
satisfied with both quality and quantity of the PHED water. According to the rangbah
shnong, there is a lot of leakage before the water reaches Mawlai Mawdatbaki and thus
both quantity and quality are being affected.
155 TH-2195_136141012 The rest of the households (seventy per cent) depend on public standpipes,
springs, rivers, streams and borewells. Public standpipes are the lifelines for the majority
of households here. There are around thirty public standpipes in Mawlai Mawdatbaki.
Public standpipes are supplied with water from underground water and the Umsohlang
River. Like most rivers in the city, this river has become polluted due to anthropogenic
factors (see Plate 5.2). A treatment plant of Umsohlang stream has become outdated.
Treatment of water has become largely futile. Households who used to depend on this
water source cannot consume this water anymore. The undrinkable water can be used for
washing and other domestic purposes.
Plate 5.2: A Polluted River in Shillong
Source: Photograph taken by the author during fieldwork, 2016
Before the government passed the notice of restriction, many localities have
disallowed borewell drilling due to many reasons. In the case of Mawlai Mawdatbaki,
Dorbar Shnong however, has not restricted drilling, as it did not notice any effect on the
156 TH-2195_136141012 local springs, as has been the case in many parts of the city. People and the dorbar know
that they cannot depend on the PHED. According to an interview with a resident here,
―their right to water cannot be violated‖.45
This locality also has many springs. One of them is a perennial spring located in
dong (division) Umparmaw of the locality. Some parts of this locality with no water
connections depend on this spring as their only source. Many households depend on this
spring. The water is inaccessible to many due to distance and steep terrain. For such
residents, they have no alternative but to purchase water. The people who live near this
spring and who can easily access its water are facing a problem at hand. They have
noticed that water quality has been affected to leakage from a nearby drain into the tank.
This fact was corroborated with the rangbah shnong during the interview. The dorbar
shnong does not allow water from springs to be collected and sold. There are a few
springs designated only for washing of clothes.
During an interview with the rangbah shnong, he recounted of a conflict that
involved a particular family using a pipe to channel the water to their house from a
public standpipe.46 Families further away from this public standpipe would resort to
activities like using a wooden stopper and asking the dorbar shnong to shift this
standpipe to another location. The surprising note is that this particular household
channels the water when everyone has collected their share; according to the rangbah
shnong, the element of jealousy causes such unwanted social behavior in the locality.
After the relocation, the same problem erupted. Complaints regarding this issue reached
the dorbar shnong. This particular standpipe was eventually removed. This water
conflict arose not because of lack of water but is water-related. Similar issues like these
are faced by the dorbar shnong. Other interviewees also report similar conflicts between
45 Interview held on 4th August 2016. 46 Interviewed on 21st May 2016. 157 TH-2195_136141012 persons within the same locality and between two localities. Residents in other localities
like Pynthorumkhrah and Nongmynsong report that there have been many occasions
where the unavailability of water led to fights and quarrel in the area.47
Remarkably, the dorbar shnong of Mawlai Mawdatbaki frequently communicates
and holds meetings with the PHED engineers. One issue the dorbar shnong has been
raising is that the PHED should concentrate on such locations where springs are not
present and where the terrain makes it difficult for water collection. Further, house
connections should be prioritized in such areas.
5.2.2 Nongkhryiem
The community water (umshnong) sources in Nongkhryiem are chiefly from
springs and a river, which accounts to about seventy per cent (70%) of total local water
supply and another thirty per cent (30%) from the PHED. On an average the community
water supply is for forty-five minutes daily (45 min/day), which according to the
rangbah shnong is sufficient to meet the household‘s needs. The whole water
infrastructure was provided and set up by the PHED i.e. for both community and
government-provided water.
The water fees are fixed by the dorbar shnong. Rates differ according to source
of water supplies. These water fees are used for – paying electricity bills for pumping the
water, general maintenance costs, and other expenditures like salary of the plumber, etc.
There are two water supervisors in this locality which are paid by the dorbar shnong.
Many times even PHED pipes are repaired and funded by the dorbar shnong.
The PHED water fee is higher than the umshnong fee. The residents are proud to
have their own sources of water supply. The residents opine that water quality is good
47 For more information on water conflicts‘, see ‗Relinquishing droplets of joy‘, The Shillong Times, February 26, 2013 (Accessed on December 12, 2016)
158 TH-2195_136141012 and in fact better than the PHED. The water supplied by the PHED at times is red in
colour and unfit for consumption. Therefore, most residents prefer community water.
However, the existing community water in Nongkhryiem is not sufficient
anymore for house connections. Even new connections from PHED are no longer given.
Greater Shillong Water Supply Scheme (GSWSS) Phase III was supposed to cover this
locality.48 While interacting with some of the dorbar shnong’s committee members, they
anticipate water crisis in the city as a whole and the present water source cannot sustain
the growing population. They further expressed that community borewell drilling in the
future is inevitable, yet no individual household borewell is permitted in Nongkhryiem.
The dorbar shnong recognizes the necessity of protecting and preserving water sources
and catchment areas. And for this they will have to work in close collaboration with the
concern government departments.
In recent years, Laitkor, a village in the upstream areas proposed to dam the river
for water supply. Nongkhryiem and other localities protested and the proposal was
withdrawn. Here we notice a case where the dorbar shnongs played a significant role and
was able to protect and sustain the water supply of their localities. The dorbar shnong
has approached the PHED to dam the same river for water supply. Clearance has been
given by the Forest Department.
The section below has listed some significant features predominant in
Nongkhryiem locality:
1. In a few localities in the city only a member of a certain clan can be a rangbah
shnong (headman). But here in Nongkhryiem, even a person who does not belong
to the Khryiem clan can become a rangbah shnong now unlike before.
48 Interview with the rangbah shnong of Nongkhryiem on 11th April 2016. 159 TH-2195_136141012 2. A separate water committee to manage the water is present here. Female
members are also included in the committee.
3. The water committee exercises its authority for the improvement of water supply
in the locality.
4. Unemployed people of the locality are permitted to sell the spring water of the
community to adjacent locality households using small water containers only.
5. Community water is efficiently distributed.
5.2.3 Nongrah
Nongrah has around sixteen hundred households. Nongrah has numerous water-
associated problems. It is found that not a single household in this locality has water
connection from the PHED or the dorbar shnong. The PHED only provides spring water
through two pumping schemes to public standpipes. According to the rangbah shnong
there are eighty public standpipes in Nongrah. Upon observation and interviewing four
residents, many public standpipes are non-functional and the water supplied from the
functional ones is not enough to meet water needs49. The supply is for only two hours per
day which is extremely inadequate. The sole option for majority of the households is to
rely on purchasing water. Some households also procure water from community springs
located in adjoining reserved forest. According to the rangbah shnong there is plenty of
water sources in the adjoining forest but it flows freely into the Umkhrah River
untapped.
A new water supply scheme worth twenty-seven crores is on the horizon for
Nongrah.50 The only way out to avail this scheme is to have an Open Defecation Free
(ODF) certificate issued by the central government under the Swachh Bharat Mission
49 All interviews held on 13th September 2016. 50 Interview with the rangbah shnong of Nongrah on 5th September 2016. 160 TH-2195_136141012 (Clean India Mission).51 During and interaction with the rangbah shnonng during the
month of July 2016, we were informed that around ninety households still use pit latrines
in his locality. Mention may be made here that a locality / village applying for water
augmentation schemes must have an ODF certificate as per the guidelines of the Ministry
of Water and Sanitation, Government of India. One of the most significant roles of the
dorbar shnong at present is to fulfill this requirement to obtain this scheme to ensure
better water supply.
Like most localities, borewell drilling has been prohibited by the dorbar shnong
since 2008 because of an incident where the drilling of a particular borewell affected the
water discharge of a community spring. An agreement was reached with the owners that
they must not utilise the water for commercial purposes. As discussed earlier, minor
repair and small expenses pertaining to public standpipes is borne by the dorbar shnong.
The rangbah shnong said that one of the aims of the dorbar shnong is to encourage
groundwater recharge in the form of soak-pits. Some of the activities taken up by the
local dorbar shnong are renovation of the existing water supply scheme of public
standpipes and construction of structures around the community springs.
5.2.4 Lawsohtun
Lawsohtun is a locality outside the prerogative of municipal administrative
boundary. It has a population of around eleven thousand. Around eighty-five per cent of
the households (approximately) are covered by piped water on premises. The duration of
water supply is an average of six hours daily (both morning and evening). Springs are the
major sources of water in this locality. The waters were tapped by the dorbar shnong
51 Swachh Bharat Mission is a campaign launched by the Government of India on October 2014. Its main aims it to clean up India. One of its main goals is to eliminate open defecation by construction of toilets. 161 TH-2195_136141012 long before the PHED came into the picture. However, with increase in population
assistance was sought from the PHED.
Underground water is also utilized in the form of six bore-wells which supply
water to the locality through public standpipes. These are maintained by the PHED and
Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong. The PHED constructed six main tanks and another twenty
branch tanks are constructed by the dorbar shnong. Funds for such purposes and other
water related requirements are obtained by the dorbar shnong mainly from the respective
elected representatives such as the MLA and MDC.
The dorbar shnong is committed to preserving the water sources and catchment
areas. Since 2011, borewell drilling has been prohibited by the dorbar shnong as
groundwater extractions affect the spring water discharge.
Being aware about population growth and expansion of settlement areas, the
dorbar shnong of Lawsohtun has already explored other potential sources of water
supply to sustain the households. One nearby waterfall known as Kshaid Tymmen was
located by the dorbar shnong. To tap the water from this waterfall permission was
sought from the Forest Department and the Syiem of Hima Mylliem. The dorbar shnong
has also communicated the matter to the PHED so that they can initiate the water supply
scheme.
As and when such permission is granted to the dorbar shnong, the PHED is
prepared to begin with the construction of a reservoir and other water infrastructure.
Seeing the current partnership between the Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong and the PHED
being on a positive note, the work could process within a few years.
It is also noteworthy that members of all the dorbar shnongs work on a voluntary
basis. The degree and quality of service rendered differs from one dorbar shnong to
another. What is interesting in the context of Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong is that a greater
162 TH-2195_136141012 sense of accountability towards its citizens is witnessed. On account of which the PHED
wants to hand over the whole water supply project to the dorbar shnong. Some of the
future plans include replacement of old pipes both for house connections and public
standpipe connections. Another goal in the pipeline is to control wastage of water.
According to the secretary of the dorbar shnong, water is a gift from God; therefore they
have a stewardship role to take care of it. The locality is also involved in tree
plantation.52
Water is sufficient for all households in the locality. Those without piped-in-
premises collect water from nearby public standpipes. Every winter, some parts of the
locality encounter water shortage due to faulty distribution system. The main reason is
lack of water tanks. The dorbar shnong have taken initiatives to find a remedy to tackle
this problem. In comparison to other localities outside the ambit of SMB, Lawsohtun
executes exemplary water management by its dorbar shnong. The locality boasts of its
clean water which according to them tastes better than other waters in the city.
In Lawsohtun we see several features that contribute to its near-equitable water
distribution which are highlighted as follow:
1. Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong committee members are dedicated. Residents are
satisfied with its functions. Its leadership team is agile.
2. Office bearers of the dorbar shnong are prudent. They set rules and regulations
for all water consumers in the locality which have to be strictly followed.
3. Water related assistance is prompt due to the hiring of full-time plumbers by the
dorbar shnong.
52 Interviewed on 31st May 2016 163 TH-2195_136141012 4. Besides improving water supply at present, the dorbar is preparing for future
water needs.
5. It adopts and extends its authority further and better than most dorbar shnongs in
the city.
5.2.5 Mawpat
Another locality being examined in the study is Mawpat. It has more than one
thousand households and a majority of them experience large-scale water scarcity.
Similar to those localities outside the ambit of the municipality, the residents obtain
water in four different ways: piped-in-premises, community springs, public standpipes
and purchase of water. Purchasing of water is one of the major sources of obtaining
water in this locality. Community springs are mostly used for washing of clothes. There
are around eighty public standpipes but not enough to meet water needs. Households
with piped-in-premises constitute less than twenty per cent of the coverage. For the rest,
water for consumption is obtained mostly through water vendors, which is the only
available alternative. For a record, only a handful of households practice rainwater
harvesting here.
Recent efforts by the dorbar shnong to deal with recurring water problems
include the acquisition of a piece of land for installing a distribution tank. A local
resident donated another piece of land for the same purpose. Like in Lawsohtun, water
drilling has been prohibited when the dorbar shnong saw the effect it had on existing
springs in the area. The dorbar shnong also spearheads by engaging the local community
in tree plantation programs in the locality. According to the secretary of the dorbar
shnong, the reason this program was initiated was to ensure a regular flow of water in the
164 TH-2195_136141012 community springs.53 Since 1992, felling of trees has been banned in the community
forest,54 which is around one hundred acres in size.
Apparently the efforts put in by the Mawpat Dorbar Shnong are minimal when
compared with that of Lawsohtun. Unlike Lawsohtun, Mawpat does not keep its own
plumbers nor check wastage of water. Residents are not satisfied with the functioning of
dorbar shnong concerning matters related to water issues. Perhaps this could be an
essential factor, if not the most critical one as such general issues account for the water
scenario in Mawpat. Some residents even complain that their dorbar shnong even
discriminates in water distribution.
As an expanding locality, many new residents come to reside in Mawpat. In Lum
Wahktieh, a division of the Mawpat locality, there are no piped-in-premises. People here
used to go to river for washing their clothes. At the time of the field study, the water here
was unusable as it was extremely polluted. The residents narrates that the dorbar shnong
treats them like ‗outsiders‘. Providing water connection has not been a priority for the
dorbar shnong in this area. Their water associated-problems are overlooked, giving
priorities to the previous inhabitants of the locality. The ‗outsiders‘ (in this context the
‗new comers‘) have no voice in the dorbar shnong. People here feel that they are being
discriminated upon, not only in terms of water supply but other issues as well. Though
the number of households is many in Lum Wahktieh, surprisingly they do not have even
a single public standpipe.
In the context of Lum Wahktieh locality, it is evident that there is a presence of
politics of recognition and water grabbing that gives rise to inequity in this place.55 In a
53 Interviewed on 14th April 2016. 54 Such a forest is called lawshnong in local dialect. Possession of such a forest carries a sense of pride. Lawsohtun also has its own community forest. Protection of such forests by the dorbar shnongs is important water security. 55 For more details on water grabbing that results to inequity, see Lu and Crow (2014). 165 TH-2195_136141012 sense, this dorbar shnong exercises its power and makes what are essentially ―political
decisions about people‘s access‖ to water (Sikor and Lund, 2009).
Unlike the case of Lawsohtun, the study reveals four major shortcomings of
Mawpat‘s dorbar shnong, which are,
1. Unlike Lawsohtun, Mawpat does not keep its own plumbers.
2. It does not check wastage of water.
3. Residents are not satisfied with its water related functions.
4. It discriminates in terms of water distribution which gives rise to ―manufactured
scarcity‖ (Johnston, 2012).
5.3 Water Related Problems in the Non-Municipal Area
As discussed in the above sections the dorbar shnongs in the non-municipal area
has encountered more water-related problems. The roles of the dorbar shnongs regarding
the scenario of water governance have already been detailed in Chapter 4. Hence, from
the ongoing discussion it is evident that these institutions have additional water-related
roles to perform.
The section below provides list of problems encountered and roles of dorbar
shnongs in the non-municipality localities.
1. The PHED has not been able to provide water connections to most of these
localities. Hence water inequity is extensive and rampant.
2. Dorbar shnongs lack funds to provide assistance in their respective areas.
3. Households depend on a number of sources for water.
4. In matters of water distribution, the poor households are deprived and usually at
the receiving end.
5. Inter localities and intra locality water-related conflicts are commonly witnessed.
166 TH-2195_136141012 Further, the study has indicated that water supply is better in municipal localities.
As the government has shown keen interest in the expansion of the municipal area i.e.,
the inclusion of more localities under the municipality—this could mean better water
supply for more localities due to more municipal funding. But the dorbar shnongs are
firm against such steps. They are unwilling to be under the purview of the municipal
authority.
Based on the interviews, some of the main reasons for their unwillingness and
desire to remain outside the purview of the SMB and MUDA are listed as follows:
1) They are used to living ‗outside‘.
2) They see it as a kind of kind of anarchy.
3) To evade taxes like house tax, water tax, holding tax, etc.
4) No permission is required for construction of houses in the non-municipal
localities.
5) When the government ‗encroaches‘ many complexities arise.
6) Dorbar shnongs want to avoid cumbersome paperwork.
5.4 Roles and Functions of Dorbar Shnongs in Non-Municipal Localities
The major roles and functions of dorbar shnongs in non-municipal localities are
listed below:
1. Like the municipality localities, NOC is required for a house water connection in
non-municipal localities from the dorbar shnongs.
2. In many of the non-municipal localities, there are plumbers who are kept by a
particular dorbar for rendering service to that particular dorbar only. For
example, in Lawsohtun plumbers are engaged on a full time basis because of
heavy work. This is because this dorbar shnong manages the water supply
167 TH-2195_136141012 scheme along with the PHED. The dorbar shnong pays the salary from its own
funds.
3. There are dorbar shnongs which own property i.e. community land like forests.
They are committed in protecting these forests. Also, they oversee the protection
of reserved and protected forests of the government (acting on behalf of the
concerned authority). Eventually, protecting these forests aids in preserving both
surface and underground water.
4. Being outside of the municipal area, many dorbar shnong have to intervene for
better water supply. They seek support and aid from local MLAs, MDCs, PHED,
etc.
5. The dorbars collect water fees on behalf of the PHED. They also have their own
funds collected from the residents. These funds are utilized for water related
works besides others.
6. They construct water infrastructure like water tanks, structures around springs for
washing of clothes. They also maintain public standpipes and borewells.
7. The dorbar shnong in locality like Lawsohtun is proactive. Households here are
always sufficient in their water requirements. Another locality that is equally
proactive is Nongkhryiem. Though water quantity is not sufficiently provided to
meet all their needs, the active and responsible role of this dorbar has ensured
equity in water distribution. It is being supplemented by PHED water supply.
8. Construction of minor water-related infrastructures.
9. Protection and preservation of water sources such as springs and streams.
10. A dorbar shnong acts as a medium for complaint for problems beyond its
capability.
168 TH-2195_136141012 11. Dorbar shnongs also engage in resolving water-related conflicts.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Nongkhryiem and Lawsohtun: Exemplary Water Governance
There are similarities in the way in which Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem water is
administered. Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem reinforce a sense of community among its
residents. Rydin (2010) holds that such initiatives would add to social sustainability.
Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem localities envision a future water scenario that is based on
principles of equity and accountability. The implementation of any long-term goal on
water governance will require the understanding of the changes and challenges that are
likely to be faced in the coming years (Tortajada, 2010). The practice of ‗good water
governance‘ by these two localities is commendable. There exists a democratic and
coherent coordination and a regulation process that leads to equitable, efficient, and
sustainable water usage (Sehring, 2009). What is seen here is a classic case where the
local level peoples no longer rely exclusively on the state (Franks and Cleaver, 2007).
What has developed within these dorbar shnongs is ‗institutional bricolage‘, to borrow
the terms used by Sehring (2009).
Therefore deregulation may become feasible for better water governance. If these
dorbar shnongs are empowered they will distribute the water more efficiently in a
transparent and judicious manner. The dorbars shnongs thus have such capability. As the
dorbar shnongs are well equipped with governing small areas, it becomes easier and
more workable. By and large, water supply systems are at a smaller scale. However, one
major obstacle is that the dorbars shnongs do not have the wherewithal to handle large
projects which can limit their capacity.
169 TH-2195_136141012 According to Tropp (2007), one of the dimensions of good water governance is
equitable use. Hence, there is water equity in these two localities and water is efficiently
distributed. It is observed from the study that although the traditional institutions operate
in the urban setting they still imbibes characteristics of transparency, conscientiousness
and community-centricity. The reason for the persistence of these particular dorbar
shnongs is not just that they perform a certain functions but they also serve the interests
of people and culture (Sehring, 2009). Such characteristics have the potential to be
relevant in the 21st century if they are effective thus earning the confidence of the
community.
In Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem the community engagement is pretty strong and
thereby develops a sense of belonging. In the process that encourages people to gain a
better appreciation of their capacity to bring about change within their local community
by networking people and re-invigorating a more contemporary interpretation of
community values in a networked society (Hearn and Stevenson, 2011) making these
age-old traditional institutions relevant for the present times and demands. As opined by
Gottdiener, Budd and Lehtovuori (2016) since secondary and tertiary relations dominate
cities, it is pertinent for these institutions to take advantage of their social capital.
Also, these dorbar shnongs have general rules in relation to the institutional
structure and functions that can assist in the implementation of the procedurally just
decision-making processes in the localities in urban water management (Syme, 2008).
Dorbar shnongs are institutions that can be referred as the ―prescriptions that humans use
to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions‖ (Ostrom, 2005). The
prescriptions are rules and norms (Andries and Janssen, 2013) that apply to water
collection, consumption and maintenance. The Lawsohtun‘s dorbar shnong has a set of
guidelines for its residents specifically regarding water management. For change to occur
170 TH-2195_136141012 in urban water provision it is these dynamic social aspects like values and behaviour at
individual, organizational and community levels that can drive it (Syme, 2008) which
rules and norms have a part to play.
As institutions, Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong and Nongkhryiem Dorbar Shnong
have the ―delivery capability‖ (Padowski, Carrera and Jawitz, 2016) to augment water
supply. To a certain extent they also have the transformative capacity, which is defined
as the ability of a governance system to adapt to current or anticipate changes in the
social or natural environment (Pahl-Wostl, Gupta, Lebel, Schulze and Stuart-Hill, 2015).
Though institutional fragmentation engagement (Keremane, McKay and Wu, 2017) is
still a challenge for most part of the water governance system, the successful case of
PHED and Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong in generating efficient water supply to all
households of Lawsohtun shows that it is achievable and hence can be replicated. The
co-production of such successful stories in theses localities (see McMillan, Spronk and
Caswell, 2014) would be valuable.
In general dorbar shnongs can be said to be clusters of small groups of people.
One of their strengths is their strong social capital. Lawoshtun, through its dorbar
shnong utilizes its social capital more rationally than Mawpat. This has led to the
development of better governance (Portes, 2000) of water. The dorbar shnongs of
Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem, as informal institutions, work closely with the PHED and
such coexistence and interdependence is inescapable for the management of water
(Mowo et al., 2013).
The success story of water supply system in Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem has
proven the relevance of the traditional institutions (dorbar shnongs) in water
management and governance. It is convincing enough to opine that urban water
management is not merely a technical issue but also a social and political issue and this
171 TH-2195_136141012 involve a multi-level integrated approach involving all actors (Neto, 2016). Hence,
dorbar shnongs as grassroots institutions are indispensible. Since solutions to water
problems depend not only on water availability or scarcity but also on many other factors
including the processes through which water is managed, competence and capacities at
the institutional level, attitudes and perceptions and social and environmental conditions
(Casadevall, 2016), the importance of institutions like the dorbar shnongs cannot be
overemphasized.
5.5.2 Impediments to Good Water Governance Confronting the Dorbar Shnongs
The city of Shillong has around one hundred localities each with its own dorbar
shnong and each different from one another. One can imagine the complexity of their
governance of water system and the result thereof. Each dorbar shnong functions on its
own accord and each being accountable to no higher authority. Perhaps this is one of the
chief causes for the present state of water supply in the city.
Solutions to water related problems depend on several factors and governance of
water by the traditional institutions is one such possible approach. The water governance
practiced by the Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong can be considered to be good due to its
capacity of achieving results in a fair and inclusive manner. Such steps would be
complimentary to sustainable water management practices, which in a way also
contributes to ensuring water security in the future (Akhmouch and Correia, 2016). Here
we see a kind of governance that accommodates the people‘s interest unlike in Mawpat
where the dorbar shnong governs water by (mis)using its power to dominate and in
determining who gets water.
Water-related role of Nongrah Dorbar Shnong is comparatively limited and
narrow. One of the main reasons being the absence of piped water on premises. Its water
172 TH-2195_136141012 management is confined mainly with public standpipes and community springs. The
dorbar shnong has been demanding for water connection. But residents here were
unsatisfied and expressed that the dorbar shnong has been laid-back and unproductive in
their assigned responsibilities. This claim is evidently proven to be true and is clearly
supported by the many number of standpipes in the locality that have interrupted water
flow.
Despite such shortcomings, one cannot ignore that there are also many barriers
obstructing the dorbar shnongs that slow down and/or delay good water governance
practices. Such hindrances are both internal and external and the presence or absence of
these challenges is contingent and should be understood contextually i.e. the people
concern and place/locality.
First, dorbar shnongs in the urban arena faces problems of division,
disinterestedness and impassivity. In this context, Wirth (1938) argued that size, density,
and heterogeneity of the urban population paved the way for impersonal, transitory, and
secondary social relationships based on anonymity, formality and rational interest
(Abraham, 2014). The relationships of urbanites are impersonal, superficial, transitory,
and segmented and ―the reserve, the indifference, and the blasé outlook which urbanites
manifest in their relationships may thus be regarded as devices for immunizing
themselves against the personal claims and expectations of others‖ (Wirth, 1938).
For the sake of self-preservation, modern man tends to develop a defensive
reserve around his personality to shelter from the overwhelming social forces around.
Also, selfishness brings about human interactivity in our cities (Moroni, 2018).
Individuals living in today‘s mass society acquire what Simmel (2002) calls the ―blaśe
attitude‖ which involves antipathy, repulsion and utmost particularization. This attitude
173 TH-2195_136141012 precludes them from interacting with other men fully. Instead people interact with one
another in the most rational and impersonal way (Abraham, 2014).
Second, as ‗representatives‘ of the citizens, members of dorbar shnongs feel
―duty-bound‖ (Hearn and Stevenson, 2011) and the feeling may not shared equally inter
nor intra dorbar shnong. This results in the differences in water governance system of
these institutions. Another reason is that water governance depends on how determined
and ‗powerful‘ the dorbar shnong is. It is surprising that there are even headmen who are
‗forced‘ to take up their position because there is none willing. The kind of service
rendered is affected in different ways. Moreover, headmen and others office bearers of a
dorbar shnong are not paid any form of remuneration.
Third, the interaction with other institutional systems, such as local government is
low. Instead of acting as a vital bridge between community and the administration most
of the dorbars shnongs are instead prompting confrontation with state government. This
has produced governance of confrontation instead of governance through cooperation
(Blah, 2016). Communication between different dorbar shnongs is also inadequate. This
has a glaring impact in the way water flows through the city. This shortcoming produces
a situation where co-operation is reduced.
Further, in the municipal area most urban water systems are excessively
centralized and heavily dependent on public funding which bolster weak institutional
framework at all levels including the dorbar shnongs (Barraqué and Zandaryaa, 2011).
This in turn has given rise to a lackadaisical position of these institutions in the
municipal area.
There are still many impediments to the dorbar shnongs in exercising good water
governance in Shillong. These are summed up briefly in the following points:
174 TH-2195_136141012 1) As office bearers‘ membership in these institutions is voluntary in nature,
members might lose interest or commitment in the long run
2) Lack of management capacity
3) Undemocratic practices
4) Political interests (other than water)
5) Lack of resources (financial, human, material)
6) Lack of political will of the government
7) Exclusiveness
8) Community awareness and acceptance
9) Lack of functional and organizational flexibility
10) Lack of institutional linkages (including with other dorbar shnongs)
5.5.3 Challenges and Opportunities
A few important issues were identified during the course of the study. They
underscore the data and discussion thus far and expand our understanding of the cause
and effect of the present state of water equity and governance in the field site. These are
discussed in the following sections below.
5.5.3.1 Clans of Nongkhryiem and Nongrah
In some localities there is a prevalence of clan superiority and control of power
over the local institutions. There are dorbar shnongs where clans still hold a lot of
power. For instance, the Thangkhiew clan in Nongkseh, the Khryiem clan in
Nongkhryiem and the Pyngrope clan in Nongrah have overriding control over the dorbar
shnongs. A few clans have commercialized water and also claim ownership and water
rights through the customary law of inheritance.
175 TH-2195_136141012 The Pyngrope clan owns large parts of Nongrah and hence many sources of
water. Before the restriction of borewell drilling, a few households belonging to this clan
had already drilled borewells. The clan members also own a number of springs. The clan
sells water for profit to the majority of the households in Nongrah and also to other
adjoining localities. The clan even supplies water through piped-in-premises at a high
price (around one thousand rupees per month) for a number of households in Nongrah.
In Nongkhryiem locality, the Khryiem is the dominant clan and maintain certain
control over land ownership. It owns the springs and the land through which a river
flows. Unlike the Pynropes of Nongrah, the Khryiems do not sell their water for profit;
instead they distribute water to all the residents of the locality. The dorbar shnong
manages the supply of the water here. The water distribution charges are minimal. The
clan even shares its ―clan waters‖ not for Nongkhryiem residents only but to other
localities including Lumsohphoh and Lumpyngngad. A spring belonging to the clan is
collected in a tank free of cost for anyone to use. People from other localities also collect
water from here. Here water provisioning is operated on the basis of solidarity,
reciprocity or need where water is provided as a gift by the clan (Moretto, 2007). Here
people derive benefits from water without holding property rights to it (Sikor and Lund,
2009).
In both these localities (Nongrah and Nongkhryiem), the rangbah shnongs
(headmen) belong to the respective clans. There are close ties between power structures
and the control of resources (Strang, 2004). In the case of the Pyngrope clan in Nongrah,
the clan members‘ actions have become ―subordinated to the pursuit of profit‖ and
―political effectiveness‖ (Pawłowski, 2008).
In this context, we see how water equity is affected. In both localities, the PHED
water supply is available but not sufficient. Most households are not covered. In the case
176 TH-2195_136141012 of Nongkhryiem, if the ‗clan waters‘ were not shared the situation would be very
different. There would be severe shortage of water.
The clan system in Shillong has undergone a change and is not inclusive
anymore. Currently, ―the traditional matrilineal Kur (clan) system has broken down and
exists only in name; the traditional land tenure system based on community ownership of
land and natural resources has also broken down, leading to absolute private ownership
by individuals . . . all members of a Kur no longer have equal right in the so called Ri-
kur, which is now owned only by a few families of a certain kpoh (lineage)‖ (Lyngdoh,
2016b). In the urban context, it is usually comprised of only a few families in close
physical proximity. This is the case for both the clans in Nongkhryiem and Nongrah. In
the name of their clans, these few families exert power to dominate or garner support
from the community. Both families (clans) have a sense of authority over their respective
localities and the water in particular. However, as discussed the ways in which they
exercise such power differ altogether. The main implication here is that these clans have
a lot of influence on the water governance activities of their respective dorbar shnongs.
5.5.3.2 Groundwater
Bodies of fresh water are often common-pool resources, which pose challenges
for governance because restricting access (excludability) proves difficult, and
deterioration occurs with overuse. In addition, rights to water are often inequitably
distributed (Tucker, 2014). Groundwater is also a common pool resource. As a common
resource it is shared and is accessible to members of the community (Anderies and
Janssen, 2013). Common-pool implies that several users will inevitably use the same
resource, and so equity in allocation amongst them becomes a central issue (Lele, 2017).
Common pool resources have been defined as natural or manmade resource systems that
177 TH-2195_136141012 are large enough to make it costly or difficult to exclude people from them (Ostrom,
1990). It is customarily accepted across India that a well on a piece of land belongs to the
owner of that land, and others have no right to extract water from the well or restrict the
landowner‘s rights to use the water. So groundwater is mostly controlled by the private
sector (Wate, 2012).
In this study, the issue with groundwater is important in order to understand the
nature in which the dorbar shnongs function as water institutions. Groundwater is a
complicated issue all over the country and so is the case in Shillong. First, rights to
groundwater and surface water are treated very differently. Groundwater remains open
access and unregulated and landowners are entitled to abstract as much groundwater as
they can. The equity implications arising from this expansion of groundwater use apply
not only to other groundwater users but also to surface-water entitlements as well
(Srinivasan and Kulkarni 2014). Concerning the ban on borewell drilling (as it affects
surface water) has already been discussed in Chapter 4. The unidirectional flow of water
creates an inherent ‗upstream–downstream‘ asymmetry of impacts (Lele, 2017). This is a
matter where there is consensus among all the dorbar shnongs. The interconnectivity of
groundwater and surface water exacerbates inequitable allocation of water (Lele, 2017).
Maldistribution of water mostly by the government agencies in Shillong led to
commercialization of water—as water is considered to be marketable commodity. Most
of the water sold in the city is underground water coming from localities like Mawlai
Mawdatbaki and Nongrah. It has led to the mushrooming of informal and unregulated
water vendors. Private individual who owns land has the ultimate territorial authority.
Hence they sell ‗their‘ water. Land ownership was different with the Khasis as private
individuals or families were considered to be mere holders of the land. In fact it was the
dorbar shnong which has ultimate territorial authority. However, all the land laws and
178 TH-2195_136141012 ownership system has changed after the British left and with urbanization it has taken a
different turn.56
Today groundwater is elusive to most people in Shillong because of three main
reasons: 1) Borewell drilling is unaffordable to many who own land; 2) Groundwater
cannot be tapped in all parts of the city. For example, in Umsohsun, borewell drilling has
been attempted but ineffective; and 3) Restriction on borewell drilling. Only with special
permission can a private party drill a borewell in one‘s premises. But shallow dug wells
are a source of water in different parts of the city like Langkyrding Mihngi. Though
control over water resources is dictated by land ownership, access to water is mediated
by broader social relations (Sultana, 2011), therefore, the involvement of dorbar shnongs
is practicable.
According to an engineer of the Central Groundwater Board in the city, Shillong
has a lot of water potential in groundwater.57 But extracting the water has to be done
scientifically which so far has almost never been the case except when the PHED drills
the borewells in various parts of the city. Varady, Zuniga-Teran, Gerlak and Megdal
(2016) rightly argue that effective groundwater governance requires availability and
access to information and science.
It is in this context that water should be recognised as a common-pool resource
(Srinivasan and Kulkarni 2014) and the traditional institutions in Shillong have already
this understanding about water. Even before the government officially banned
groundwater extraction, many dorbar shnongs in the city have done it. But groundwater
is very complicated to track or regulate, and current local institutions are poorly
equipped for this task. The restriction itself was a welcomed move by restricting
groundwater to remain open access. But hundreds of borewells have already been drilled
56 Interview held with Fabian Lyngdoh, former Chairman of the KHADC on 11th March 2016. 57 Interviewed on 22nd March 2016. 179 TH-2195_136141012 in the non-municipal areas before the restriction was passed. It is this very nature of
water extraction that ―worsens inequity‖ (Srinivasan and Kulkarni 2014) because it is
being commercialized. Such practice no doubt alleviates water scarcity but also goes
against the wishes of the majority. In an interview with Toki Blah, a prominent public
figure and former bureaucrat, he asserted the view of many who oppose the sale of water.
According to him, there is no justification of selling water.58
The groundwater managed by Lawsohtun Dorbar Shnong and Nongkhryiem
Dorbar Shnong is commendable, since the water is shared equitably among the
households. Water fees are similar and low. In Nongkhryiem and Lawsohtun there is a
shared dependence on water as a critical natural resource and it provides an incentive for
―cooperation, collective action and community building even in contexts of conflict and
contested property rights‖ (Tucker, 2014). But in the case of Mawlai and Mawdatbaki
the groundwater here is not freely shared but sold by private borewell owners.
For groundwater governance to be effective, bottom-up local institutions must
enforce top-down rules. However, the likelihood and success of collective action around
groundwater has been found to be influence by several factors, including a shared
understanding of the problem, the nature and extent of the aquifer, the level of
dependence on the aquifer for livelihoods (Srinivasan and Kulkarni 2014). The property
regime of the ground water itself is complex as it is neither common property, because it
lacks an identifiable group of individuals having equal user rights, nor genuine open
access, because the ability to access groundwater is limited by well ownership (Ananda,
2009). The rule giving near absolute right to landowners to exploit groundwater started
during the colonial period and continues till today (Koonan, 2016). So far, in India there
is no law that explicitly defines groundwater ownership (Wate, 2012).
58 Interviewed on 18th August 2016. 180 TH-2195_136141012 There are many conflicts in the use of ground water in many cities throughout the
country (Rathore, Ratna Reddy and Ramanathan, 1994) but this study has revealed no
cases of such clashes in Shillong city. But the dominant question that arises from this
issue of groundwater is that: ‗what if this water is distributed equally to all who need for
free or for a minimal price?‘ It falls beyond the scope of this study to provide a befitting
answer this question. Instead it posits that, if the dorbar shnongs were given
responsibility to manage groundwater, the recurrent inequitable distribution of water in
Shillong can be reduced.
For instance, in Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem, there are two main sources of
water – surface water (rivers and springs) and groundwater. The dorbar shnongs of these
localities govern groundwater autonomously with technical assistance from the PHED
and they do it proficiently. It must also be noted that the water supplied by the PHED in
Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem is underground water. The PHE Department has used a
number of borewells in supplying water. The main hurdle that remains is the regulation
of private water vendors in terms of pricing and volume of extraction. Groundwater
therefore has to be protected with strict laws.
According to the Meghalaya Water Policy 2011 (draft), exploitation of ground
water resources should be so regulated as not to exceed the recharging possibilities, as
also to ensure social equity. There should be a periodical reassessment of the ground
water potential on a scientific basis, taking into consideration the quality of the water
available and economic viability of its extraction. The ground water in Meghalaya is still
not over exploited as a whole; however ground water stress is building up in urban areas
in view of the rate at which ground water extraction for domestic purposes is taking
place. Shillong has not yet been identified as a ―notify area‖ by the Central Ground
Water Board (CGWB). But the government has rightly put a restriction for the
181 TH-2195_136141012 unauthorized drilling of borewells in Shillong. And for this to succeed, involvement and
cooperation of the dorbar shnongs is needed.
According to the CGWB, the way of construction of deep borewells in Shillong
is being done in a very unplanned and erratic fashion with concentration of borewells in
commercial areas and plush colonies. Groundwater development in Shillong urban area
is exceeding 50%. The overuse of ground water resources in various parts of the State
especially in Shillong city is posing a huge threat to the availability of fresh water in this
part of the country. Many rich individuals on their own are drilling deep tubes in their
residential premises without bothering to take necessary permission.59
5.5.4 The Dorbar Shnongs and its Criticisms
Tucker (2014) maintains that struggles over access to natural resources are
associated with resource degradation and institutional failures. Taking this in point, the
water governance in Shillong involves a hybrid kind and blaming only the dorbar
shnongs for failure is inappropriate. But criticisms against these institutions points to
their general and specific shortcomings that contribute to ‗bad‘ water governance.
As discussed earlier, one drawback of the dorbar shnongs are their unwillingness
to be under or merge with the municipal authority. In some sense this might be the case
since water supply is much better in the municipal area. The general perception is that—
had the municipal area expanded in size i.e., the inclusion of more localities under its
ambit, water supply might have improved drastically.
The main argument for this inference, besides the obvious finding drawn by
comparing the two divisions (municipal and non-municipal), is that Shillong gets a lot of
funding for municipal development and most of it is either unutilized or spent hastily and
59 See ‗Fighting for the last drop‘, The Shillong Times, March 5, 2013 (Accessed 18 December 2015). 182 TH-2195_136141012 carelessly. One could say that the funding is too much for a small municipality. It could
be utilized for a much larger area. This is a major criticism against the dorbar shnongs.
On the flip side of the argument these dorbar shnongs are applauded for protecting
cultural identity against unwanted government influence thus staying free and retaining
traditional authority in the city. The existence of this duality makes the water issue all the
more complicated.
An institution is democratic to the degree it is accountable to society. Elections
are one of the most common means for establishing downward accountability of local
authorities. There is some evidence that elected local authorities can improve natural
resource management (Ribot, 2004). However elections to these institutions are far from
perfect. Earlier only men were allowed to vote (by voice). But in September 2017,
elections were held in Malki using secret ballot; all were allowed to vote including
women. Gradually, the dorbar shnongs is evolving by instilling inclusiveness and
flexibility into its structure and functioning through democratic institution. The degree of
accountability and transparency as indicators of good governance, vary from one dorbar
shnong to another. Not only in terms of these two elements do they differ, but also in a
whole range of other issues and characteristics.
City cultural resilience, by the maintenance of these traditional institutions, can
be enhanced and sustained and it will increasingly be intertwined with the rise of
―citizen-driven collaborations‖ (Duxbury, 2014). One major hurdle is the inclusion of
non-tribals into these institutions. Non-tribal population is increasing in the city. Social
sustainability is achieved in cities when diversity and respect go hand in hand (Pareja-
Eastaway, Elsinga, O‘Mahony, Eng, Wachter and Lovell, 2012). But this is not easy,
according to a former headman; non-tribals can never be genuine constituents of any
dorbar shnong because they, being non-Khasi, can never understand the concept of
183 TH-2195_136141012 dorbar shnong.60 So solutions are required because water problems and other challenges
require a shared understanding and commitment in order to address them (Perry and
Atherton, 2107) and the well being of the city itself depends on local structures which in
turn rely on ―horizontal ties‖ and ―shared interests‖ (Rusca and Schwartz, 2014).
It is not uncommon to see that there are contestations in support and renunciation
of the dorbar shnongs in local media. Patricia Mukhim, editor of The Shillong Times,
(see Mukhim, 2012), writes that the dorbar shnong seem to suffer from some deep fear
psychosis that they would rather remain stagnant than opt for change which is for the
melioration of the city of Shillong. She was indicating the refusal of these institutions to
support the holding of elections to the municipality. She blames these ―defunct
institutions‖ for the present crisis of civic management. Of course there are others on the
other side who want to see change while keeping traditions intact. Another major
criticism against the dorbar shnongs is their relevance at present in the urban arena. They
are considered rigid and staunch in their willingness to adapt. They are basically village
councils in an urban setting. Institutions associated with the management of natural
resources need to be adaptive because of the inherent complexity of natural systems
(Pagan, 2009).
The dominant criticism today against these traditional institutions is the exclusion
of women from these institutions (Nongbri, 2000).61 There is an old saying among
Khasis: ‗Ynda kynih ka ‘iar kynthei, la wai ka pyrthei‘ or ‗When the hen crows the world
is coming to an end.‘ It is taken to mean that if women take part in politics, the world is
doomed (Lalkima, 2009). But things have change over the past few years. From this
study, it has been found that there are some dorbar shnongs in the city where women can
also participate in ‗decision making‘. Seemingly, such radical changes start in the urban
60 Interview with a former rangbah shnong of Umsohsun, dated 4th March, 2016. 61 The historical context regarding the dorbar shnongs and women is detail in Chapter 3. 184 TH-2195_136141012 areas like Shillong and will slowly spread towards the rural. Also in Nongrim Hills,
Laitumkhrah and Lachumiere, women have entered the village dorbar as
elected/nominated members (Jyrwa, 2006). Still there is much that needs to be dealt
with.
5.5.5 Water Future and the Village Councils
Major challenges exist in governance in modern society since the scale of
interaction among people is much larger today. The future will likely bring with it new
water-related problems due to rapid environmental and technological change (Andries
and Janssen, 2013) to Shillong. The challenge of securing equitable access to water is
enormous. The nature of water and the multiple roles of actors involved in extraction,
use and distribution produce challenges to collective action (Bakker, 2010). Also, water
circulation is dependent upon institutions and practices because it is not only socially
produced, but also socially enacted (Bakker, 2003a). We argue that institutional
arrangements that can promote equity can be made possible with the dorbar shnongs.
Dorbar shnongs can be institutions that play a role for the improvement of water
management. Such institutions matter for providing good-quality water in adequate
quantity to urban to reduce poverty and increase social welfare (Venkatachalam, 2015).
Criticism and support for these institutions have their advantages and limitations.
However, both these will play an immense role in shaping the water future in Shillong.
For a better urban prospect in terms of domestic water, it is imperative that Shillong
formulates its own specific strategy based on its ―special conditions, requirements,
expectations and capabilities‖ (Biswas and Tortajada, 2010a). Hence in the present
context of Shillong, the traditional institutions are essential constituents in urban water
governance.
185 TH-2195_136141012 As argued by Linton (2010), ―water is what we make of it‖; what water will
become to the citizens or community will severely depend on how it is influenced and
transformed as it flows through the hydrosocial cycle. And in this cycle, the dorbar
shnongs play a significant part. As a relational substance water will be constituted by
many relationships among these and other institutions (Ioris, 2016).
In the section below, let us look at some of possibilities drawn from the study
after examining these institutions.
1) First, enforcement of rules is almost always the weakest link in any system for
managing water (Richter, 2014). But in Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem the will to
enforce rules is present with noticeable results. Moreover peer pressure and social
norms and morals present in the dorbar shnongs can be much more powerful and
effective than any formal law. Ostrom‘s primary conclusion in her work
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(1990), that key management decisions should be made as close to the scene of
events and the actors involved as possible to avert a tragedy of the commons
situation for common pool resources (Richter, 2014).
2) Second, the adherence of different dorbar shnongs to governance principles of
transparency, accountability and participation, based on core values of honesty,
equity and professionalism varies. ―Water integrity‖ in Lawsohtun and
Nongkhryiem is high whereas in Nongrah it is low.62 Such efficacious effort can
be advocated and advanced in dorbar shnong practices.
3) ―Egoism in the city‖ (Moroni, 2018) is prevalent and curbing self-interest and
putting greater emphasis on altruistic motivations in members of each dorbar
shnong is likely to produce desired water-related outcomes. Caring is one of the
62 For details on ―Water integrity‖, see Tropp, Jiménez and Le Deunff (2017). 186 TH-2195_136141012 most important yet most devalued values today which has reduced human beings
to greed and competition, and transformed everything, including water, into a
commodity. Again, the dorbar shnongs of Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem have
exhibited concern and regard to water management. Caring must move to center
stage as a value to avoid future problems like social disintegration and conflict
(Shiva, 2014).
4) Lastly, leaders of these institutions serves as bridging actors influencing the way
in which knowledge and learning is exchanged (Horning, Bauer and Cohen,
2016) with the government and other institutions. Exchange of information of
many forms takes place between PHED/SMB and the dorbar shnongs. More
importantly, in the context of this study, will be the knowledge sharing among
these institutions thus shaping the social network.
5.5.6 Are Water Supply Systems in Shillong Socially Sustainable?
The most significant question that remains to be asked is ―are the water supply
systems in Shillong socially sustainable?‖ This question can be effectively and
conclusively answered in two parts: the first part attempts to answer the question of
water equity in the localities of Shillong. The second part deals with water governance
carried out by the selected dorbar shnongs.
Social sustainability has been divided in three parts - development, bridge and
maintenance social sustainability (Vallance, Perkins, and Dixon 2011;Wolbring and
Rybchinski, 2013; Eizenberg and Jabareen, 2017). Drawing cues from this theoretical
framework, development social sustainability was examined in the form of meeting the
basic need of water and the creation of (in)equity; bridge sustainability was understood
by looking at the way the dorbar shnongs perform in (dis)satisfying water requirements;
187 TH-2195_136141012 and maintenance social sustainability was familiarized by examining the present stance,
characteristics and performance of the dorbar shnongs in the in the urban scene in
present time.
The study compared the water supply systems of both municipal and non-
municipal localities. While doing so, we also see significant differences even among
localities within the same area. Surprisingly, there are even water supply differences
within a locality.
The subjective responses of respondents show a mixture of impressions. Though
the study does not explicitly connect the relationship between water and well-being, it
can be inferred that water supply doles out varying influences on lives of the consumers.
More specifically it affects the other criteria or indicators of social sustainability like
security, livelihood, education, health, housing, pride and sense of place, hope, and so
on.
Social sustainability must accommodate growth from within and adaptation to
changes from without and must make things better for people (Aucamp, Woodborne,
Perold, Bron and Aucamp, 2011). The second part concerning water governance, again,
confirms that mechanisms of and reasons for water governance are the not the same for
the dorbar shnongs examined in the study. We do not generalize the same conclusions
for the city. The governance of these institutions closely affects the nature of water
distribution and at times dorbar shnongs do not have opportunities to influence change.
But this does not mean, for the latter case, that they have no governance roles to play.
They all do, in some way or another.
As a criterion of the social pillar of sustainability, (water) governance is not
uniform for reasons like lack of accountability and participation. Its impact on water
supply is clearly seen from the differences of water quantity distributed in each locality.
188 TH-2195_136141012 It has caused and impacted the hydrosocial relations and forms of social life the people
experience (Perreault, 2014). We have also seen that inequitable distribution of water has
given rise to ―bricolage economies of water‖ that are comprised of multiple and complex
combination of different forms of production and distribution of water (Sharma and
Harvey, 2015). In such a case none of the dorbar shnongs have taken any steps either to
check or to supervise. Perhaps they dare not tread on private territory.
Cities have the potential to move towards sustainability pathways, especially
given good urban governance (Rogers et al., 2012). Despite the challenges, it is
important to recognize that like other cities, Shillong has that potential. We again ask the
questions afresh that ―what kind of equity and what kind of water governance?‖ Simply
put, answers for each and every locality will be different in both time and space.
Assessing the primary data, it may be succinctly responded that because of the different
observations in terms of equity and water governance, social sustainability cannot be
easily determined. As separate criteria, we can say there water distribution is highly
inequitable in Shillong and the kind of governance delivered by the local traditional
institutions (dorbar shnongs) is too complicated to theorize for the city as a whole.
Nevertheless, social sustainability as a process (Dillard, Dujon and King, 2008) has been
examined and partially understood from the lens of water equity and governance. Both
procedural and substantive aspects of social sustainability (Boström, 2012) have been
investigated in the study further confirming the complex relationship between water and
people (Linton, 2011), of Shillong as ―a city‖ (Button, 2002) and of social sustainability
as ―a concept‖ (Yung and Chan, 2012).
The next chapter will summarize the study thematically and provide the
limitations of the study, likely significance and future scope of the study.
189 TH-2195_136141012 CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes and collates the findings of the study and sum up
thematically. The study concerns with social aspects of sustainable development. It
attempted to understand social sustainability by examining the water supply systems in
the city of Shillong. The focus was water equity in terms of domestic water supply
system and water governance carried out by the local traditional institutions. Viewing the
sustainability of water supply development through the lens of water governance
provides an appropriate context for analyzing the water supply systems which can further
contribute to strategies for achieving sustainability. To answer the question of as to
whether the water supply system in Shillong is socially sustainable or not or how socially
sustainable it is, we shall briefly look at the findings concerning the two criteria of social
sustainability, i.e. equity and governance. This chapter also includes the likely
significance of the study, limitations of the study and future scope of the study.
6.1 Water Equity in Shillong
In most municipality localities, it can be said that water is equitably distributed.
There are exceptions where there is intermittent supply during particular periods,
differences in the daily duration of supply, etc. Overall, water equity in the municipality
localities is better than that in the non-municipality localities. In most non-municipality
localities, water is not equitably distributed. Yet in non-municipality localities there are
stand-out exceptions like Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem. Equitable distribution exists in
these two localities but it does not imply that water is enough to meet daily requirement.
190 TH-2195_136141012 So, considering equity from a bird‘s eye view of Shillong city as a whole, it can
be argue that the central part of the city governed by the SMB received a near equitable
distribution of water. Here in this study, equity standards are determined by the amount
of acceptable quality of water easily accessible for personal and domestic purposes. As
one moves away from the municipal governed area, a great extent of water inequity is
witnessed. A comparison of the localities (both the municipal and non-municipal areas)
shows the water supply system as a whole in the city is in disarray.
Taking the city as a whole, the current system of water supply has failed in
various fronts. There is much inequity in access to water and the current water supply
situation is insufficient even to those having piped water supply. Most of the poor are
excluded from the water network and those with piped connections still get insufficient
and irregular water. Revenue does not cover operating and maintenance costs.
Households who do not receive water through piped on premises or public standpipes
encounter costs in getting water from other sources.
The survey data reveals that water supply system is uneven. In some localities the
water supply is twenty-four hours daily whereas in some it is less than thirty minutes in a
day. There are localities where water is not supplied on a daily basis. What emerged
from the study is that there is a vast difference between the areas under the SMB and
non-SMB in terms of the number of hours of water supplied. For instance, households
within the municipal area get more water, more regularly and better quality than those
outside the municipal administrative area. But there are exceptions in the two areas. In
the municipal area most households have piped water on premises. However, outside the
municipal area the percentage of households having piped water on premises is lower.
Public standpipes are also an important means to get water in the non-municipal area.
Other sources include wells, tube wells, water vendors and springs. But even in these two
191 TH-2195_136141012 areas water supply is not homogeneous. The nature of water supply and access depends
heavily on the formal and informal institutions. The informal traditional local
institutions, i.e. the dorbar shnongs have different measures of influencing water
distribution and roles for water management.
6.2 Water Governance and the Dorbar Shnongs
As underlined in Chapter 5, the kind of governance and much of the effectiveness
and efficiency of the same depends on the individual character and nature of the dorbar
shnongs themselves. Their structure, elections, makeup, location, attitude of leaders,
educational level of office bearers, participation, connection with outside organizations,
etc. determine whether the dorbar shnong’s governance is good, bad or somewhere in
between. This overall governance is translated into the nature of water governance we
locate. It has been established that (in)action of the particular dorbar shnong produces
different outcomes. In localities outside the municipal jurisdiction and with water
sources within their territories differ in the degree of how they govern their waters.
Lawsohtun with its ideal water governance is a glaring example of the possibility of
supplying water—a basic need, to its residents.
Ostrom (1990) reviewed the manifold examples of small, locally organized
governance systems around the world that have managed resources sustainably, often for
several hundreds of years. She consistently establishes that sustainability is possible and
that sustainable management of local resources is often built with bottom-up processes
that emphasize social connections and local control rather than large, centralized
institutions (see Seyle and King, 2014). In a similar way, we have seen the success cases
of Nongkhryiem and Lawsohtun localities where their dorbar shnongs efficiently
distribute water to their residents. Another strong suit of these particular dorbar shnongs
192 TH-2195_136141012 is that they have become a part of the ―nested enterprises‖ (Ostrom, 1990) comprising
the urban local body (the SMB) and the government (the PHED). Such collaborations are
indispensable for bottom-up decision-making and other governance activities like
conflict resolution.
The study has established that the dorbar shnongs play a significant role in
augmenting water supply in some localities in the city. But the future of these traditional
institutions is alarming in two ways – first, the cultural identity of the Khasi people
which is linked to these institutions are under constant threat; and second, urbanization is
influencing the disintegration of the inherent social capital of the traditional institutions.
These traditional institutions have also been criticized for their inaction and irrelevance
in the modern and urban arena.
The adherence of different dorbar shnongs to governance principles of
transparency, accountability and participation, based on core values of honesty, equity
and professionalism varies. As has been discussed, it is oberved that ―water integrity‖
(Tropp, Jiménez and Le Deunff, 2017) in Lawsohtun is high whereas in Nongrah it is
low. One key inference of the study is that the communities in an urban setting, by
means of the traditional institutions can effectively govern the common-pool resource of
water. The main argument here is that these local institutions are important and
necessary for a desired water future prospect. Localities where these institutions practice
good water governance witness equitable provision of water. Another important
observation is that the social network is strong in these institutions. This inherent traits
embedded in these institutions is a major reason for effectiveness in water service
delivery. Whereas in other institutions, social capital is dwindling or dormant. Successful
cases show that these traditional institutions can evolve themselves and adapt in urban
space while preserving their cultural distinctiveness.
193 TH-2195_136141012 Apparently, most dorbar shnongs in localities like that of Mawpat seem
disinterested and the political will from the top i.e. the government authorities seem to be
lacking. Fact of matter is that the governance of water supply will greatly depend on the
efficiency of such local traditional institutions. The local institutions in the city are
indispensable to meet the rising water demands. Notably the present local traditional
institutions in Shillong seem weak, disconnected and vulnerable to the onslaughts of
urbanization and modernization. As a result, many dorbar shnongs do not exhibit good
water governance practices.
The study also observes that currently there is no definite power accorded to the
dorbar shnongs. The distribution of power and authority is ambiguous. People have a lot
of respect for these traditional institutions (dorbar shnongs) yet their role is not clearly
defined. The prospective actions of the dorbar shnongs can includes providing assistance
in rainwater harvesting, water quality testing, renovation, water conservation and
disseminating water related information to the people, besides others.
According to the Meghalaya State Water Policy 2013 (draft) water is to be ―used
efficiently, shared equitably, managed sustainably, and governed transparently‖ and
should contribute to improving the health and livelihoods of all citizens. The dorbar
shnongs shoulder a great responsibility and play a pivotal role to achieve this gaol.
Sustainable water governance helps in achieving water sustainability and particularly
water equity (Kuzdas et al., 2014). So far, Lawsohtun and Nongkhryiem Dorbar
Shnongs have proven themselves in achieving this.
6.3 Reaching for Social Sustainability
Provision of the basic human need of water sets a foundation where all people
have the opportunity to live a safe, healthy and fulfilling life. As such, it is suggested that
194 TH-2195_136141012 fulfillment of this basic human needs must be seen not only as a fundamental tenet of
social sustainability, but as a prerequisite for sustainable development itself (Cuthill M,
2010). Sustainability can be the answer to the exhausting and devastating way societies
are predominantly using social and ecological resources, in contemporary times (in‘t
Veld, 2013).
Water connects people (Ait-Kadi, 2016) and so is the case with the people of
Shillong. Water is indispensible to community prosperity and in flourishing social fabric
(Vörösmarty, Hoekstra, Bunn, Conway and Gupta, 2015). In a sense, urban sustainability
is concerned with water being distributed in a just and equitable manner (Rusca and
Schwartz, 2014) and this can be achieved through local initiatives—directed by the local
institutions like dorbar shnongs in the context of Shillong.
What is evident throughout this study is that ―analytical clarity on the dimensions
of the social aspect of sustainability, our understanding of what that means … will
evolve, as will our measures and strategies‖ (Dillard, Dujon and King, 2008). We concur
with this statement; therefore aiming for social sustainability is a social process and not
an unchanging goal.
In the preceding chapters, we have seen the multiple criteria and principles
advocated in the social sustainability literature. And one of the relative criteria of social
sustainability is its dependence on the cultural, political, social and economic context
(Glaser and Diele, 2004) and such factors are equally prevailing in the city of Shillong
and the Meghalaya state. There is an interdependent and reinforcing interrelationship
between different features of social sustainability. Social sustainability requires social
sustainability, tautologically speaking (Boström, Vifell, Klintman, Soneryd, Hallström
and Thedvall, 2015). To put in it simple words, the kind of social sustainability that
subsists in Shillong will determine the social sustainability of the future. The study has
195 TH-2195_136141012 partly answered the central question—what kind of equity and what kind of water
governance are existent in Shillong.
The survey for this study contains a section where respondents are asked to
provide their remarks or opinions regarding water supply. They were also asked to
recommend water related approaches and changes they would like to see in the near
future. Some of the common responses evident in the survey are listed below:
1. That there should be an increase in the quantity of water supplied.
2. That wastage of water has to be checked by repairing water pipes
regularly.
3. That protection of catchment areas, particularly the forests, must be a
priority to ensure a sustainable supply of water.
4. That quality must be improved by initiating measures like cleaning of
main water tanks regularly. The SMB and PHED are known for their
infamous inactivity of not keeping water tanks cleaned at regular
intervals. Also, water pipes should be properly channelized and should
not run through drains.
5. That there should be house water connections available for all households
and an increase in the number of public standpipes.
6. That the price of water provided through water vendors should decrease
or reasonable.
7. That dorbar shnongs should take up more responsibility in resolving
water associated problems.
The current situations of water supply system in Shillong are being questioned
because of shifts and differences in water availability. The lack of water accessibility has
196 TH-2195_136141012 raised questions about the governance of water and the people concern. The growing
commodification and commercialization of water in Shillong will make water
governance more complicated. Also, the implementation of the Greater Shillong Water
Supply Scheme (Phase III) faces a threat of further delay with hurdles remaining and no
tentative deadline has been fixed for its completion.63 All these and many other varied,
related, imminent and present challenges demand changes of all sizes. For example, there
is a need to create a Meghalaya Ground Water Authority64 to check and preserve
underground water. The State‘s Springshed Management Initiative was launched in 2015
to map and protect the springs which are a major source of water for the city and state as
a whole.65 The dorbar shnongs are getting involved in the much larger water-livelihoods
programme in process.66 It is crucial that these practices are acknowledged by local
management structures so as to avoid disturbance of the socio-cultural fabric of these
communities.
In recent years, water has become a commodity in many parts of Shillong.
According to Bakker (2009), although water markets can help in sustaining urban water
systems, yet one has to be cautious of poor governance as it can lead to the emergence of
cartels and water mafias (Amir, 2015). Additionally, there is something emotive in the
nature of water, in the idea of water, which militates against it being owned and
controlled for profit (Coopey and Tvedt, 2006). Such perception is deeply interwoven in
the minds of Shillong‘s denizens and has to be sagasciously managed.
63 See ‗Hurdles Galore In Water Scheme Implementation‘, The Shillong Times, Jan. 18, 2018 (Accessed on May 12, 2018). 64 The Shillong Water Declaration, http://www.focusglobalreporter.org/the-shillong-water-conclave-water- equity-sustainability-in-the-context-of-north-east-india/ (Accessed on May 4, 2017). 65 See http://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/indias-largest-springs-mapping-exercise-begins-meghalaya (Accessed on June 17, 2017). 66 Ibid
197 TH-2195_136141012 Though the dorbar shong is a dominant local institution within the city, it
evolved along with two other – partly overlapping and competing with the administrative
structures of the KHADC and the state bureaucracy. This has only led to a state of affairs
that is highly complex and confusing. There have been a mixed responses and opinions
concerning the position of the dorbar shnong today. On the one hand, for the tribal
ideologues – the concept of dorbar shnong is a celebrated form of grassroots democracy;
and on the other hand, these institutions are an exclusivist and ineffective form of rule
that should end (Karlsson, 2017). There is also a strong opinion that the negative aspects
of the traditional institution like the reservation of executive functions within the council
to persons from selected clans only must be abandoned (see Gowloog, 2009). In a sense,
tradition should not curtail openness (Landry, 2006) but at the same time accommodate
the wind of change. Moreover, many have voiced their concern that the Khasi
communities have lost knowledge about their cultural and traditional practices and many
have abandoned them in favour of modern ways of living.
The question of ‗who‘, ‗why‘ and ‗how‘ shapes the content and targets of equity
in governance interventions. Strategies for the future must inevitably question existing
power relations that lead to multi-scalar re-arrangements in existing hydrosocial
networks (Hoogesteger and Wester, 2015). Water efficiency and reduction of water
losses must be prioritised and all water should be accounted for. Improving accessibility
and governance will ensure water security (Biggs, Duncan, Atkinson and Dash, 2013).
Institutions and institutional change determine development (Booth, 2013). Poor
governance and weak institutions are impediments to urban prosperity (UN-Habitat,
2013). The traditional institutions can build capacity to create a cadre of water managers
(Amir, 2015) where participatory procedures can influence social learning (Boström,
Vifell, Klintman, Soneryd, Hallström and Thedvall, 2015). Dorbar shnongs have the
198 TH-2195_136141012 prospective to become spaces where social innovation takes place, where people find
them to be enabling environments. New interdependencies among actors, network
society of the future (Castells, 1996; Arsenault, 2011) and ―e-participation‖ (He, Boas, Mol
and Lu, 2017) may lead to e-dorbar shnong which may possibly essentialise the future
water problems and challenges confronting the city of Shillong.
Based on the findings of the study, deregulation of water supply is
recommended.67 For instance, one can postulate that if more power is bestowed in the
hands of the dorbars shnongs, there is a possibility to distribute water more efficiently in
a transparent and responsible manner. And in order to achieve this, a uniform set of rules
and guidelines from the government bodies like the KHADC and the dorbar shnongs
themselves must be in a position to deliver good water governance that could bring about
water equity. Additionally, all the water supply providers should be subject to regulatory
frameworks with clear standards which should be implemented for water supply
systems—whether public or private (Bakker, Kooy, Shofiani and Martijn, 2008).
Guidelines enshrined with that of the dorbar shnongs bodies must regulate the roles of
actor-participants.
For a more equitable redistribution system institutionalization of community
participation mechanisms is desirable. Also, water infrastructure can be properly
maintained and water resources would be more effectively managed and water supply is
demand-oriented approach (Zérah, Janakarajan and Llorente, 2011). In the case of
Shillong, institutionalization already exists in the form of the traditional institutions
(dorbar shnongs) and that is an advantage. However, what is lacking in most parts of the
city is participation.
67 The literal meaning of deregulation connotes that it is the process of removing or reducing state regulations, typically in the economic sphere. It is the repeal of governmental regulation of the economy. 199 TH-2195_136141012 This study has examined that—how an institution affects the course of water
supply system? Besides it is equally important to understand how water shapes the
structure and the transformation of these institutions. A closer attention to understand the
full array of users within and across communities is indispensable, because needs,
values, attitudes and governance can change considerably among users—and such things
matters when one tries to understand water inequities (Lu, Ocampo-Raeder and Crow,
2014). A strong social sustainability therefore requires social capital, which is critical
and irreplaceable, and occupies an important framework in urban water governance (see
Lehtonen, 2004). By and large, culture is a vital and essential aspect of the social capital
of the people of the Shillong region which determines how water as a natural resource
can best be used to meet current and future social needs (Miller, 2017).
While keeping social sustainability as important bedrock within urban water
governance, the dorbar shnongs must engage in ―multilevel governance‖ and ―adaptive
governance‖ (Termeer, Dewulf and Lieshout, 2010); and in hydrosocial renewal by
placing people at the center of water solutions (Linton, 2014). As localities are usually
small areas and governance is workable within the means of human capital. But since
they do not have the wherewithal, dorbar shnongs will have to work for a water
governance regime that is supportive to the interdependence of all institutions. A
nurturing a complementary relationship between formal and informal institutions is
required for sustainability transformation (Pahl-Wostl, Gupta, Lebel, Schulze and Stuart-
Hill, 2015).
Water governance cannot remains a piecemeal and ad hoc set of activities but
rather it should focus on necessary change in the power relationships that determine
[positive] outcomes (Plummer and Slaymaker, 2017). Hence, water development
200 TH-2195_136141012 initiatives have to work with the local fabric and to have effective policy (see Rusca and
Schwartz, 2014).
As evident from the study, the dorbar shnongs are institutions are intrinsic to the
Khasi tribal society. Their role as custodians of the people in this globalizing era has to
be progressive. Karlsson (2005) argues that such institutions of the [Khasi] people
require strengthening and to be entrusted with specific roles and opportunities. To make
this happen there is a need to review the Sixth Schedule or at least some of its
provisions.68 Though the revival of traditional institutions is complex (Karlsson, 2005) it
is both significant and urgent that the dorbar shnongs accommodate change (Gowloog,
2009). Even the ones that operate comparably better require to evolve and reform their
structure as well as practices. At present, some dorbar shnongs may be functioning well
and strong but they are not on an equal footing in terms of their control, influence,
contribution and recognition as a whole.
It is worthwhile to recall Gandhi‘s idea of self-rule or swaraj here. Gandhi
believes in the idea of self-governance through individuals and community building
(Singh, 2016). Emulating such approach can become a strength as well as an opportunity
for the dorbar shnongs to expand on in the context of Shillong. Despite accepting the
fact that maximizing self-governance is critical to empowering people, it is also equally
imperative to strengthen these local institutions. In other words, managing the water
commons for the common good is a creative attempt of good governance practices
(Dargantes, Manahan, Moss and Suresh, 2012).
As posited by Carley and Smith (2001) mobilization of human creativity is the
real task of sustainable development; in the same vein dorbar shnongs provide the
avenue for such creativity that can lead to sustainable water solutions. Findings of the
68 For more details on Sixth Schedule in Northeast India, see Søreide (2013). 201 TH-2195_136141012 study underscored that Government alone—working on its own will never resolve the
challenges of sustainable development (Carley, 2001). Despite their limitations, dorbar
shnongs are the institutions that are closest to the people and the people concern can
conversely become interested in their own affairs and steer their future. Therefore, local
traditional institutions in the city are indispensable to such demands and challenges.
In order to encounter the future challenges, it is important to tease out the social
capital inherent in the institutions of the dorbar shnongs. Social networks will help
underpin the informal governance (Rogers, 2006) such as the dorbar shnongs. As an
institution that remains closest to the majority of the people in the city, ―social learning‖
(Casadevall, 2016; Bakker and Morinville, 2013) is accessible and feasible. Even ―moral
distances‖ (Park, 1915) can be bridged in the communities via the water governance
practised by these institutions. Dorbar shnongs are ―action arenas‖ (Anderies and
Janssen, 2013) where the water future of Shillong and the surrounding areas will be
vastly influenced.
Equitable water supply through robust and effective water governance with more
effective institutions is urgent for the Shillong city as a whole. As an essential part of the
transition to sustainability (Rogers et al., 2012), equity must be rightly framed
(McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenberg, 2013). Of the three pillars of sustainable
development, perhaps the most difficult to comprehend is social sustainability. Social
sustainability ―emphasizes the creation of a high quality of life for all by ensuring that
the benefits of development are shared equally by everyone‖ (Dudley, 2010). And to
attain this water user must be involved in planning processes and in the operation and
maintenance of small scale and standpipe supplies.
While Shillong city belongs to its every ‗cityzen‘, the question is – How these
traditional institutions will accommodate everyone is easier said than done. Since
202 TH-2195_136141012 dorbar shnongs as institutions are formed through ―the uneven patching together of old
practices and norms with new arrangements‖, it requires the reinvention of tradition, the
recognition and identification of legitimate forms of authority and the fostering of mutual
cooperation and respect (Cleaver, 2001).
This study took an approach of attempting to understand one pillar of sustainable
development. But all the pillars seem interconnected. So reaching for ―water equity‖ and
―good water governance‖ has to include and consider all components of sustainability.
According to renowned social activist in Meghalaya K. Pyrtuh (2015), governance is not
just for people but also for the good and welfare of the whole system including economy
and environment. Correspondingly, Falkenmark (1999) opines that if we protect the
integrity of the water cycle, protection of water quality and supply can be ensured.
People in the city of Shillong have generally been taking water for granted (Sahu, 2005).
If we relook the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6.1 – it emphasizes to
achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all
proportion of population by 2030 using safely managed drinking water services and to
support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water
management (UN, 2017). Realizing this particular goal is of paramount importance since
water is embedded in almost all the other SDGs (Ait-Kadi, 2016). Local governments
and [traditional] institutions may choose to take a leading role on implementing the
SDGs within their territories and mandates. These local goals and targets, and the
delivery of the goals will depend on [local] governance systems [at the grass root level]
(Lucci, 2015, emphasis added).
According to the State of the World’s Cities Report 20012-13 states that sound
institutions matter for the prosperity of cities (UN-Habitat, 2013). The PHED, the SMB
and the dorbar shnongs have equally important roles to play and which will determine
203 TH-2195_136141012 the water security of Shillong‘s future. The future has to be one where the dorbar
shnongs will have to be relevant, that is by of which these institutions can play a
significant role in avoiding a water future that is fragile.
For Shillong to become a ―good city‖69 water equity has to be prioritized and
good water governance can ensure that. Local institutions are important for sustainable
development. They are important for mobilising resources and regulating their use
(Uphoff, 1992; Seyle and King, 2014). The dorbar shnongs are part and parcel of Khasi
culture. Culture is a vital and essential aspect of the social capital of the people of the.
The dorbar shnongs have their influence over their residents and the control of water
within their territories (Nongkynrih, 2002). In a sense, the future of Shillong is define by
how well the region‘s natural resources is protected and preserved—to meet not just
current needs but without compromising with the future [social] needs.
6.4 Likely Significance of the Study
The study has discussed and explained on the issue of water governance rendered
by the traditional institutions in the city of Shillong. It has presented a near-holistic view
of the domestic water supply scenario of Shillong at present in terms of equity. The two
criteria of social sustainability chosen for the research – equity and governance in an
urban context have been closely examined and understood through empirical study.
We strongly feel that this thesis can contribute to the overall understanding of
social sustainability of Shillong in general and the role of dorbar shnongs in water
supply systems in particular. Also, it will be helpful for other researchers who will be
69 Amin (2006) states that a good city is one where there is continual maintenance and repair, is socially just and one which celebrates the aspects of urban life from which spring the hopes and rewards of association and sociality.
204 TH-2195_136141012 interested in doing advance research on this and other related topics. Moreover, the study
can help convey better understanding for solutions for a sustainable future.
We are equally optimistic that the study can lead to an ―engaged research–
practice relationship in catalysing urban transformations‖ (Perry and Atherton, 2017).
This study addresses issues that are significant globally, especially in developing
countries where there are urban water supply problems. The study can helps improve
practice, for example, to motivate the dorbar shnongs to invest on the social capital and
build better networks. Also, this study adds to the scholarly research or research
literature (i.e. the production of knowledge) relating to social sustainability, common
property resource and water governance, besides others. Additionally, as social
sustainability is a concept rarely discussed in the water management literature (Hellberg,
2017) the study has in some way added to the gap.
It can also improve water and urban policy of Shillong. The findings from this
study can contribute to policies that envision improving overall urban social
sustainability and water governance in particular.
Findings of this study can add to the small cities literature, such as the uniqueness
of the study area with reference to water and thus reiterating the importance and
prevalence of small cities and contributes to global urban sustainability. The finding of
this thesis can be juxtaposed with other small cities, hill stations, urban areas of the
Northeast, India and the world for further research.
6.5 Limitations of the Study
The present study is limited in terms of the following points:
1. The present study is restricted to few selected localities due to time limitation.
205 TH-2195_136141012 2. Some of the secondary data gathered from governmental agencies are not
updated. Moreover, not all relevant data could be acquired because of the
unwillingness and apathy of the concerned people. For example, the latest data
could not be obtained from the PHED and SMB.
3. The questionnaire survey has limitations of reach.
6.6 Future Scope of Research
This study can be extended in future research and some of the possible directions
include:
1. More localities and dorbar shnongs can be studied for a more comprehensive
understanding. Case study research can unfold more of what the present study has
been able to examine and find.
2. Future research focusing on other criteria and indicators of social sustainability is
suggested. The many criteria and indicators of social sustainability itself make it
imprecise to infer from two criteria alone.
3. Water equity and water governance can still be further examined. For example
equity can be understood more holistically by adopting the freedoms and
capabilities approach of Amartya Sen (Goff and Crow, 2014).
4. Future research can look further at the waterscape of Shillong by inquiring into
―the ways in which flows of water, power and capital converge to produce
uneven socioecological arrangements over space and time‖ (Budds and Hinojosa,
2012).
5. The study can be extended and integrated with various areas of research related to
water, water governance, sustainability, etc.
206 TH-2195_136141012 6. From a normative perspective, the study of water in the plural term ‗waters‘
(Feitelson, 2012) can unearth more than what the study has. More investments in
resources for research can enhance and improve upon the present study besides
propounding solutions.
7. Social network analysis of the dorbar shnongs and beyond may be worth
examining.
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254 TH-2195_136141012 ANNEXURE I
Questionnaire
Name: Locality/Dong: Household size: Adult male (in number): Adult female: Occupation: Household Type:
1. Is piped water connection/piped water on premises available in your house? YES NO
If YES, please answer 2, 3, 4 and 5, If NO; please answer 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10
2. How many days a week do you get water? ......
3. How many hours per day is water available? ......
4. Does your household also require water from other sources? YES NO
5. If YES, please tick Public standpipe Well Tube well Buying of water
Others (please mention)……………………………………………………
6. What is the source(s) of your household water?
Public standpipe Well Borewell Rainwater
Springs Buying of water Others (please mention)…………….. 255 TH-2195_136141012
7. How many days a week do you get water? ......
8. How many hours per day is water available? ......
9. What is the walking distance from your house to the water source? About 5 minutes About 15 minutes
About 30 minutes More (please mention) …………….
10. Who usually collects the water? Adult Men Adult Women others (please mention) ……………………………………………………………………………………
Please answer the rest of the questions. 1. What is your overall satisfaction with the water quantity? very satisfied satisfied not satisfied not at all satisfied
2. Is the water quantity enough to meet daily household water requirements (cooking, bathing, washing, gardening, business-related activities, others)? YES NO
3. How would you describe the reliability of the water supply? Very good Good Satisfactory Bad
4. Are there seasonal water shortages? YES NO
a) When do they usually occur? …………………………………………
b) How long do they usually last? ……………………………………….
5. What is your overall satisfaction with the water quality?
256 TH-2195_136141012 very satisfied satisfied not satisfied not at all satisfied
6. Do you think water is safe for direct consumption? YES NO
7. Do you filter/boil water before drinking? YES NO
8. Do you use filters? YES NO
9. If YES, what is the cost of procuring, installation of the filter? ………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………. 1. Do you pay for your water? YES NO I Don‘t Know
2. If YES, how much per month/ per year? ………………………………………….
3. Whom do you contact when there is any problem? (You can tick more than one) Rangbah Shnong SMB/PHED plumbers
Others (please mention)……………………………………………….
4. Do you think there is any kind of favouritism in supply of water to a particular group or a family? YES NO
If YES, why? ……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 1. Is the Dorbar Shnong of your locality engaged and committed to water supply? YES NO
2. Is the Dorbar Shnong responsive to the water needs of your locality? YES NO
257 TH-2195_136141012 3. Do you or other members of your family attend Dorbar Shnong meetings? YES NO …………………………………………………………………………………… Please mention water related problems/improvements you would like to see happen in the future. a) b) c) Additional remarks, if any:
258 TH-2195_136141012