CHAPTSH S£V£N FKOBU^M OT HOSTAGES ANP SUBS£CUjOiX fiCONJHIC SAKC;i(»!IS A0ABIS7 IRAM

tou stupid scarecro^i Und*r your very stlckfeat Birds are stealing bsana

(Fron a Japanese tiaika cofflposed by Tayu)

Tue Backgrottnd

1%e contlnaatlon of tAe oll'-lndueed aocla*eoQnofflic e ria ls viiEiic& reaultad In the overtbrow of tne obaii, reflec* ted It s e lf In the oecupatioii of the U*b* ^Mubassy In iearan and t'^klnj; of Aneriean dlplomnta ae hostagas* J^e real motivation for taking hostai^ea was to divert cne attention of the Iranian ot^saes fxoa the acute soclo^eeonomio and

^>olitleaI probleoLS that thx^ntened to unde mine the reglae of the mullahs* The poat revolutionary hysteria had begun to fade* the mullahs had begun losing che grip over

35B 359

tJie country. Th« leftists and Tsrioas liberal trende

had beon opposing different aspects of tne lelai&ic regime

vAlch atood for idealised version of isedieYal Islainia sup­

pression and oppressior. in the n»i.e of the revolution,

dieorimination and injustice in the naii;e of Islaatic JustieSy

etc* In contrast, «'-lujaheddin and tne le ft ia t s s^-oke more

in tem s of fimdam^^ntal chaneies that woald transform the

socio-econtKBic structure of society- tfith unemployment fiinir«s rlsini^ and inflation raisins: its ugly head many

Iranians be^an to feel the pinea of a raridly deteriorating

econonic situation*

Apart from this, the clerical regime was facing a deep

p olitical c ris is : Kurdistan had been occupied by the

**l8lamic Army^ of Ayatullan Khomeini, at^d the armed resis­

tance of Kurdish i&asaes was gaining no^en&Uu. Benefitted

by the support of other Iranian n a t i^ a llt ie s , the Kurdisi:!

fighters were in the process of winnini: the battle on

military and political fronts-

It is titerefore, r.ot surprising uiader the circutastancea,

that many turned away from tne mullahs towaids proxressives*

Khomeini and his Islamic loftpablican rarty (IKF) noticed the

trend, and in an effort to maintain tneir base, made

various attempts to ra lly toe f>eople beuind them* I long march was organised in support of the i^alestiflffilans and

then, another lonjE^-march to express solidarity witn Iiuam

fOiomeini- These tactics reaped a rich dividehci in rallying 360 the discontented ar^imd the Isla alc regime* Inle is just yhat the nollnhs wanted— a cover for tcielr mie&akes*

Islamic r e ^ e from the y^ry beginning was quite skill* ful in justifying its oppressive and sappresalve policies and distracting; tne attention of tne masses froa the messy int^ntal affairs by posing the threat of foreii^ eneales--

ImAP-inary and real* While unemployuient rose sharply and living standards declined and a large nt&nber of people stiffered the intolerance of the Islamic lnqulaltlon»tae rulers were Involved In exaggerating the i:iu;.edlate tixreat of the deposed Shah and U*S« laperlalista*

In these circumstances^ tae inah's journey to the

0«S«A* gave an excuse to tne mullahs for exseutlng certain plans* On October 22nd» I979> the Shah arz*lv0d in New Tork from ;iexlco city fo r ffledlcal treatment* i4r* Uoddlng Carterp f>tate repartment spokesman said on the same day tnat the

Iranian authorities, especially Hr* Basargan and »^r« lezd l, had been kept inforaed of the decision« i^e authorities were aaid to have stated taat the Iranian people would not

9 agree to the Shah's prsa<»nce In tae (l*S* on grounds of medi­ cal treatment but that the U»s* embassy would be prot.ected*

Ibe official protest of Basaxgan's government was then reived in talks betwe-*n the two Iranian ministers and

Dr* Zbej^lew Br^zeiinskl, President Carter's National Secu­ rity Advlsori at a meeting in Algiers on November 1« 1979*

41ong with these open effo rts by the lib e ra l faction 361 of the Islaaiie state, e surewd more was under way secretif bythe fimdaaentalist faction of the regiae* before the occupation of U.S« ejnbassy in rearani a group of

70*^0 fanatical atudent-meii^bers of ttie unlvex*sltlea* lalamlc associations met Ayatollah Khoaeini* A week before the occupation, the plan vias carefully deaij^ed by Khoioeini's henohnen Including Hojatollalaio i^oosavl

Khoeiniha (a leader of a top mejaber of iievolutlocary

Ouarde and a leader of fanatical students*^ In discus* alons before laplefflentlng their plans, they had coaie to the conclusion that the wave of dissatisfac&ion was ever

Increasing;* and the Basargan's Cabinet, was incapable of solvlnj^ the crisis* £hey fe lt tnat i f they didn't act,

"eith er [•.ujaheddln or t.he le ft is t groups would become 2 prominent and m i^ t take over*"

Following this, the Islamic student a illta n ts on

November 4th 1979 occupied U«S*eabassy in rehrsn and took

63 Americans as hostages*^ Ihey deiuanded extradition of the Shah by U*S* govexTuuent as a price fo r tWr^eaae of the hostess* they threatened tiiSt any attempt by the U*i« to release the hostage would lead to their executions*

Khomeini and the clerics stauncnly supported the students, blessed their action and encouraged them* il^e

New Tork Times r^uoted Khomeini as naving said; **In the name of Ood, the merciful, deatn to your plots, U»3*A», tne blood of our martyrs la dripplnsc fz'oa your claws* Xhe 362

United Jtatea Is the o^ain enemy o f mankind and of tne

Iranian people* Under tae i>retext tnat tne :>hari Is 111

they shelter

The ocGUpatlon of American eiubessy was by no means

a spontaneous moTement by 9 group of fanatieal pro-

Khomeini students* The fun dement nil at headed by

Ayatollah Beheshti was the brain behind tne move even before its iapleaientacion*^ Ibis action was necessary

for IRP to consolidate its power and oust the liberal faction of the Islaialc state- The iuu&edlate outcome of

taking the hostages was the f^ ll of the liberal ^Temment

of *4ehdi Baaargan on Koveoiber 5, 1979* Ihe act of nego­

tiation with i

Undoubtedly, the Iranian i&asses wholeheartedly hated

U*S« ioti^erialisiB and the jhah as it s iuarionette* During

the Shah's reF^lme, the luaases could discern that the

Iranian politics was f^ided and directed from the U*3*

einbftssy. t^e hatred fo r the 3hah was evident from the bloody revolutionary uprising that overthrew his regime*

By oocttpying the U«S • exbassy, and «^emanding the extradi­

tion of the ihah, tne ruling clerics oisnlpttlated the

emotion of the people and led tnea into a delusion that

they were really fi>^ting iaperialiam* Xuey succeeded in

their designs; a cross section of the Iranian masses took

part in huge demonstrations all over the cjuntryt support- 363

Ing the stuionts’ action end condsouilng tno lap e rla llsts*

Th« masses the tnklng of Postages as a sort of

redress for the hualliated natlon^il pride at the hands of tI«S* Impeilallsni thoui^ Khomeini and XKF had different

Ideas*

Intoxicated by the support of the masae3» ttie mullaas— who viez^ unable and unwilling to effect the fundamental

soelo-eeonoalc changes-*contlnued to exploit the situation

to their adTsntage. A ll sane voices got drovmed in the

sea of hyaterla generated by^ the aullahs*

In the chaotic and h l^ ly rolatlle situation that pre-

Talled then, every politician was trying to manipulate

the conditions to prxxn^te his own political objectives.

Mr* Banl 3adr and his faction^ fo r InsGsnce, supported

^ e aoTtttent of the hostage seizure • He was at tnat time

Minister of Finance and tscon^uilc Affairs with responsibi*

lity for supervision of Foreign i*inistry- He categorically

saidi'^thls occupation is certainly positive because i t

shows that the youth of Iran reisalns loyal to toe ideal

of national independence and—having realised that» the

Iffl«n (Ayatollah Khomeini) also fe lt that the government was in itiatin g an appeasement policy vis'-a^vls the U*3*”^

Hie Qullahs in it ia lly intended to take benefit of

the conditions created by the occu^tlon of tne eiubassy, but wnen they s-^w the i^aasionate and unconditional support 7 of the sassesy they decided to continue the occupation* 364

The Nature of sanction of iitsurn PgKtri

Two days sfte r tn« occupation^ toe U«3« 3tat<» d«>>art* iMnt announc«(^ tbat the U»S. ;^Tenu:.«nt would not accade to the student's demand» Following tnlsi the world wlt« nessed repeated confrontation between United states and

Iran, also the attempt by the U.S* and the international orj^anlsations for unconditional release of the hostages and the refusal by the Iranian goveminent* On Koreiaber ^th, 1979f the U#S» ROYermnent ordered a halt to the shlpoent of i 300 fflillion worth of military spare parts (already paid fo r) to Iran» Pour days la te r, on November 12th (eight days after tne embassy seisure)

Kr« Carter halted U«S* o il imports from Iran* The o il companies prior to the hostage aeiaure, received about one million barrels of Iran's production of 4 million barrels a day* About 700,000 barrels of Ute Iranian oil bought by the U*3« firms had been going to Che U*S< consti­ tuting, about of tae 0«S* crude o il consumption, with the rest ^ing to Japan and a few otner nationa*

Mr» Carter responding to che nolding of the hostages, told oil companies to stop buyini; Iranian oil for ship* ment to the U«S* But he eould not overlook the comu^rcial % considerations and the deiuand of o il by comi*iercial partners of the U«S*«-Japan and Vest :^:uropean countries* fherefore, his order did not apply to o il sold by U*S* companies to other nations* 365

For 9 ll r>raotlcal purpOM8» Q«3* o il aoibargo against

Iran vias a partial on«« It was actually iapossibla for

U«S» to lapoae a com^late o il ai&bargo against Irani as

and Britain did in 1953 • It >fas baoauaaf f i r s t of a ll I tha a^ra^te international demand fo r o il axoaedad it s world supply* Saoondly, the popular consciouanaaa in

Third Vorld eountrias««>lncludln? OPiiC ooimtrias**fflada i t d iffic u lt fo r i^vemmdnt of these nations to assune fo r themsalvas the position of blind agents of imiwrialism as they itfers bafora* Thirdly, tha undia^uted world su^nsaacy of the international cartel was ahattered» tna contradic­ tion in the imperialist eaap intensified, and the countrlea in soci^liat bloc were mars or less, ea^erging as an alter* nacive in international ijetroleom trade*

In e(^trast to the happenings of 19931 Iran could confidently announce ; "In view of the recent e w n ts ,’’ sales of Iranian oil to U*S* c;^^anle8«-no atatter where

It was to be shipped were being halted iiuciediataly* A apokeauan of NIOC added, "agreements rsached hitherto are cancelled with Inmedlate effect*'* Iran went much further to announce on January 12, 19^0 that i t would stop aelling to co^jtntries which join the U*3« in iaposing economic sanctions against Iran* These develoiSMnts which resulted In replacement of

Iranian o il by buying on the spot market, raised the o il prices fa r beyond d per barrel* The actual prevailing 366

prlc« then was around i yo per barrel)*

The U»S*| by this tine began exerting all kinds of aiilltanri eoonomle and political pressure to force the

Iranian crovernment to release tne hostages* On November

13th 1979* tJ.S« and British warships were raanoeuverlng In

the Arabian Sea,s3uthFbf Zr^n* Jn Noveaber lUth, President

Carter Issued an executive order freezing "all property

and Int^irests of the govems^nt of Iran**** and tae Central

Bank of Iran ( aria Inc f ro*. investments In U .S .) wnloh baeane subject to Jurisdiction of United States*" £he

assets blocked included Iranian official deposits in U«3* banks with forel|p:i brano^ies and aubsidlarles* U«i* o f f i -

cisls eatiaated the assets thus blocked as Q worth six thousand million d o lla rs *'

Followinc thlSf the American big banks started using

Iranian deposits to pay-off tae loans to Iran—a practice

called off-setting*

Mr« a lte r B* Wriston, chairman of the second largest bank In U*3*A*,told a news conference that the Iranian government deposits "Bore than covered a ll the debts that wei« due to us* by a substantial marg^ln*" He said that

the remaining: frosen assets would be held by the bank '’as conservator’" until the order was revoked*^® Later,

American ffllnor banka ansed tneuiselves with court orders

and attacked any "free" Iranian deposits, wnich the big banks had not already put aside fo r tnemaelves*^^ 367

It is ouite from all tiils that tao unscrupu­ lous method of U«3« Imperlallam in ehAllsnging tue black­ mail of the clerics was another kind of blackmail* Xhe direct retaliatory effo rts o f U*3»A* were announced wit£«out any respect for international values and principles* Xhis reveals Uie nature bourgeois lavjs in the age of iaperlalisiay which remains valid as Ions; as it serves the vested interests*

As a reaction, the American decision almost immediately evoked response from the Iranian authorities* i^r- Bani

Sadr said on November 16th 1979 taat Iran would no longer accept the U«S» d o llar as means of paymtint fo r o il exports*

He further announced on November 23rd tuat Iran would not pay its foreign debts (estimated at 15 billion dollars) as these were incurred due to tne activities of "looters 12 and th eir foreign collaborators** who had bort^wed tnis money*

These responses did not have any impact on the U*i* and the c ris is continued because Iran was not strong enough to put her announcement into action* Ihe United States government tried to exert greater pressure, by calling more than 67,000 Irsnian studente, studying in different American universitiesi fo r interview by immigration offici*)ls*

On November 25th» 1979* I^r* Kurt Waldheim» the Uien

U«K* Secretary (General referred to the c risis as ”tue greatest threat to Uie world peac«: fsince the 1962 Cuban missiles affair*"^^

On December 4, 1979, tne Security Council unanimously 36d adopted ft rdsolution calling urgently on tae govomment of Iran to release the hostages* Spokesman for the mill* tants holding the hostages announced the rejection of the Council's call next day and said that they would act only on the Instructions fro& Ayatollah Khomeini*

On ’^cember 15t 1979» the International Jourt of Justice unanimously issued an order asking Iran to surrender the embassy the U.S. authorities and to release the hostages* l^ls order was also dismissed by Ayatollah Khomeini on

December 16, 1979* In spite of the m ilitary pressure exerted, the U*S* iroTornment was unwilling to wage a war accfllnst Iran at that stage* Xhe U.j. had only little to gain from it , besides soiue enhaneefj.ent of it s prestige* Siie had much to lo ^ because the destruction of oil wells (an inevitable consecuence of a war) could cause great damage to tiie economics of Japan and Western buro^ to which the

U«S* econouiy is synerG:etlc^lly linked*

Instead of waging a wari United States tried to obtain n«N* sanctions j^galnst Iran* Freaident Carter announced on necember 19, 1979, that 0*3.A* preferred a peaceful solution in preference to ""other means"* He then called fo r n meeting of the U*N* iecurity Council to decide on economic sanctions, under Chapter VII of the U«N* >^harter which prescribes violent collective security actions against nny country v^ich threatens international peace and security*

On Hecember 2d, 1979 U*N* iecurlty Council met in 369 olos« session to consider the U*S» cell for economic sanc­ tions against Iran*

Before any decision was taken by tiie Jouncllt

Dr* aldheim visited Tehran from January 1 to 4, 19^0 in an attempt to break ttie impasse but returned without any success*

In Iran, lir* Banl Sadr said on January 11, 19^0, that chnnces of !»ueceas of economic sanctions ^ere "next to zero** due to the reluctance of other nations to impose the sanctions*

Around this time, a U*S* draft resolution was submitted to the Security Oouncil, to consider drastic measures against

Iran* On January 13» 19^0 the resolution was put to vote but it was vetoed by the U*i*S*K*

Or January 21, 19^<^, trssident Carter stated in a television Int^^rview that "sanctions against Iran will be perused by ourselves unilaterally and Joined by as many of our a llie s as w ill as^ree.^^** However, at that time, tne sanctions were not applied against Iran, because of the

Soviet lntez*vention in Afpiianlstan and tne election of i^lr* Banl l^adr, as i resident*

Around the late January 19^0, ^resident Carter made a skilful use of tne hostage problem to divert the attention of the American masses and tax payers from the worsening econ ^lc problems: hlith rate of in flation , unemployment, a f a l l In standard of livin?, etc* On January 23t 19dr, he 370 d«llver«d hla Annual State of Union address to tb« Gongr^aai devoting It, princlpflilly» to ttie probleu of nostages In

Xehran. He said ''In response to Ui« abhorrent act In

Iran, our nation has bean aroused and unified as never before In peace time* Our position is clear, we will never yield to the blnckmnil.• • i f the Amerlean hostai^s are haxmedy a severe price will have to be paid»"^^

On February Z3$ 19^0, a U«K» Coauaission of Inquiry arrived in Tehran, to be^ln investigation into the grie*

Vances of Iranian people against the fonaer ihsh, witn a view to resolving the 0*S«-Iranlan crisis* On February

26, the Coomlssion met At* All iveza Nobari (the Governor of Central Bank of Iran)« He told the Oomaiisslon that he had documents "showing that the total amount of money plundered by the ifflperlal family was 500 billion rials" (eoulvalent to i 714^ fflllllon) and that he had submitted to tne Commia- sion a file on "plundered national property'

Having unsucceaafully begun its encuiry in Iran, the

Oommlsslon cut short its v is it on xnaron 11, 19^0, and re­ fused to publish the report of its findings. £he breakdown of Comialssion^s work w*^s to some observers doe to disagree-* ments between rival factions (liberal and fundamentalists) in the Iranian Islamic st^te*

The trade between U«3. and Iran had been severely disrupter^ and there was, Iri reality , no diplomatic relations betwe^an the two countries* Xne U*S* was continuing its 371 econoffllc ssnctions aitalnst Irnn but it was not «ff»ctiTe*

Around *'iarch 31, 1980, many U*S. Bdailnlstrstlon o fllc la la

reaoh-?d the conclusion taat n^tbing less tnan a total

sanction, with the participation of U«3- a llie s could force

the Iranian clerica to release the hostAgos*

By the en

of the Iranian Islaffiic res'ime was insisting on the transfer

of hostages froai tae seise of militant students to the

Oovemoent* Howeveri on April 7, lOioseini refused to give his approval for this transfer* In tiils connection,

Dr* Habibi, spokesman for the itsvolutionary Council said on

the same day, "we did not make a decision because the Imaiu's

decision is final, explicit, and clear; it is not appro-

priate fo r the h o ste ss to transferred (to the govemiMnt

of Iran).^^

On the same day, ^'resident Carter announced further

punitive measur-es against Iran which involved; (1) breaking

of diplomatic illations, Uie expulsion of all diploaats and

tne closure of diploaatic and consular offices; (ii) prohi­ bition of all exports to Iran, except food and ttediclne;

(iii) drawing up of an inventory of the assets of the

Iranian government frozen since the previous Noveaiber« with

a view to their possible confiscation, and^ (iv) cancellation

of all visas issued to Iranians for future entry into the

United States* 372

On April 131 the United States started aarae* sinje; Iranian nations IlYln^ In that country- It was stated that all Iranians would be forced to leave uie country when their travel doeoments expired*

On April 17, the Imperialism tightened its clutches on Iren «id announced soae new pumltive measures*

President Carter said henceforth. (1) all financial dealings between subjects and Iran would be banned^ (11) import of Iranian goods would be prohibited» (ill) all Aaericans, with the exception of Joumallstdf would be banned from travelling to Iran; and, (iv) all U.3* military equl^enta previously purchased by Iran, and subsecuently impounded, would be i&ade available to the U«3. anued forces for sale to other countries* rresldent Carter also suggested passing legislation enabling the seisure of frozen Iranian assets

(counting to over i tOOO ffiilllon) in the United States, to pay for private and Ooverm&ent claims against Iran*

On April 17, 19^0, i-.r* Carter iaplemented the above proposals and even went further revealing the barbarous and warHaongerlnc natun? of U*3« Iffiperialisn* He warned, if "this additional set of sanctions that I nave described today and concerted action of our a llie s Is not successful, then the only next step av«llable that I can see would be some sort of ailitary action, whicn Is the prerogative and id the right of tne United States under the circumstances*^

Mr* Carter em^^asised tne undisputed right of U*i»* 373 lAip«rl»ll9ai to donlnate the world by f l r « and blood* He sui^posted that military force mle^t be aimed at Interrupting trade apparently throap;ti ttiO blocking or mining of Iranian ports, aa distinct from an Invasion and ^ny other eort of combat operation*

Later, on April 2^, I960, ..r* Cotbzaden responded to rresldent Cnrter In siicilar vein. As an official repre* sentatlve of the Iranian clerical reglmei he exposed taa retx^j^resslve and wf*r*mongerln^ nature of tne IsIaiBlc Re­ public* He warned that I f tne United States attempted to block;»de Iranian harbours, Iran mlj^t rst^^llate by blocking IQ the rest of the Oulf, ^even i f the whole area goes to f ir e * ”

The U«S« Imperialism fin a lly succeeded in sioblllzlng a ll Its partners to staPie a fu ll fledgsd economic embargo airalnst Iran* On April 22, 19^f^ uiembers of the European

Oonmunlty announced that they would impose sanctions In two stages* Uow*Ter, this did not prevent U*S* liaperlallsiu

(whose domination was threatened by tne frobleo* of hostages) from making a desperate attempt to release tne nostages by launching a military operation* 'Oils operation had no 20 chance of success* the fact that It was launched, reveals the war^mon^^rlnF nature of 0*3* Imperialism*

The American fiasco helped Iranian clerical regime to consolidate Its seize by accentuating;, tne illu sion s of the Iranian masses* Khotneinl cor:sidered U*S* fallurv^ as the **wlll of God'' to save Islan: and the Islamic state* 374

Following the fiasco, the fundamentalist regime of

Ir^n tried to make p o litic s! capital out of the Aaerican

dead bodies killed in the military o^ration. The dead

bodies were made a symbol of tne defeat of ■'satan"*

The remains of the servieeiuen were transferred from

the sice o f the action in the desert, to tne U»$» eoibassy

in Tehran under the supervision of the notorious 'hanging

Jud^e', Ayatollan Knalkhall* Jn A^rll 27, 19^0 ne neld a

press conference at the e^abaesy and displayed tae remains

of tne Araericnns*

M l this provided a ?ood excuse fo r t^^e u llit a r ia t

and w8r*mon^rlng forces of tne 0*S. r'allng class to escalate

their propaganda about 0«3. national Inter^^stsi and ask fo r more military expendltuz^« Tne conseriratlves—especially

the Kepubllcans—^ t opportunity to Intensify their criticism

of Carter for not takinf serious against Iran* »r. Carter

and his administration responded by evoking a war*mongerlng hysteria among the American masses -jfitnout botnerlng to dl3tin?uisn the Iranian people from tnelr rulers* 12ie

Americans were provoked afrainsf^dirty Xranlana** wao wore

characterised as terrorists and savage barbarians- I'ne U*3*

ruling oligarchy, now had sufficient excuse to organise a Hat'ld Deployment Fozce* fhis enabled tnem to Instltaclonalize

their "rigjit" of intervening in any A ird World country whenever interest of 0«S* imperialism was tareatened*

The U«S» p>irsuad its tactics aealnat Iran with greater 375

Intensity to Isolsta Iran from tbe rest of tne world* ^ M«7 2k, 19^0, tiie Intarnatlonsl Court of Justice in the Howe I met to deliver I t s Jud '^ment on the U.3 « ootk- plaints against Iran* rhe courts In Its jod^-ient, condemned

Iran and demanded the im^r.edlate release of hostages*

On the economic front* the United States intensified

it s economic warfare by jt^rsuading it s partners to ia|x>se

coaplete sanctions against Iran* An analysis of tae deralo^ ment of the econ>oijc sanc&ions imposed by U*S* a llie s is

of considerable im^^rtance for understanding t^e way world

imperialist network functions to-day. It is therefore neces­

sary to trace the bei^lnnini: of tne develOriueiit of these

sanctions*

Turing the f i r s t months a fte r the hostages were taken,

United states complained o f the apathy of it s a llie s * Mr* Carter spoke of the poor coozdination between U«3 * tf^d it s partriers x^gaiding a i^lan of econoialc ^ asu res

against Iran*

The U*$* authorities thougbt Iran s t i l l could be hurt*

Austrplla could refuse it ^eat, Thailand rice, Japan could

stop buying its o il; Britain could follow ^UBerican «xaiB*^le

and freese Iranian assets* B u ^^ls did not actually happen*^^

In December 19^^i some of the U*S* a llie s responded

to its C!*ll and imposed certain econ>mlc sanctions against

Iran* In Britain all assets of tne Goveituient of Iran and

the Bank i>UHcasl Iran, were frozen by High Court order on 376

December 4* Hit /ect OoT»rment announced on Deoember

7 Its deolalon to stop underwriting n«w credits to Irsny refuse pen&lsslon for sny exjx)rt of weapons o r s^are parts until tne hostages were released* Kr* i^'^oahd Dayan, the former Israeli minister went even further In advocating military intervention in Ir^n.

Japan, while urging tne release of ttie hostages and anxious to avoid any ecibarrassment to tne U*3*y s k ilfu lly skirted the issue. 3he felt it necessary to declare tne issue of Japanese loans to, and other ecorioalc ties wltn

Iran a ’'private aff^»ir”* It may be pertinent to note taat du3rlns[ Moveaber-tJecember 1979, Japan had bought 3»*^fOOO kilo lit r e s of o il (l* e . over 13,000,000 barrels) iuade available by the U«3* embar^, and representing about kO^ of noraal Iranian exports to U«S*A*

New Zealand too was unwilling to support a trading emb-^rif^ against Iran* She could not afford to overlook a proposal to export lamb worth 45,000,000 to Iran* Later, on January 15, Mr* >laldoon, Prlaie i'-ilnlster o f fjew

Zealand, conflnsed that his country would not join the U*S* boycott*

l^e U«S*, havins succeeded in obtaining agreemQut asialnst Iran from major Western countries, announced on

January 9, 19^0 a four point plan* The plan envisaged :

(il barrlnj; Increases In Iranian de^slta in currencies other thsn the U*3* d o llars; (11) preventing Iranfrout o>«nlng 377

new deposit ^tccounts; (111) granting no new loans to Iran

and; (Iv ) encourai^nfi; foreign banks to deolarv Iranian

loans in default* wberevor >>osaible ax^d to accelerate

demands fo r payment* It Is oulte erldent tnat these economic

and financial restriction? f e l l short j f the proposed eco*

noffllc embargo against Iran-

Ihis clearly shows that imi^rialism todajr Is not an

all'*encompassing, or an integral systeui* me U *i., altnougn

the leader and organizer of tne system, does not hold sway,

over even its allies*

The Iranian authorities claiii^d on January IZ f 19^C

that Austria would not Join the embers* £hey also dec­

lared that several :^ast iiiuropean and Latin Aserloan govem-

ments had offered to offset tne effects of a boycott of

Iran^bound ships by some U»S« dock workers*

Willinieness to import from these countries, clearly

reveals the designs of Iranian regime to attain its political

objectives at the expense of the excneouer* It hardly needs

to be stated txiat Importa from Latin American acid i^iast

European countries would be co stlier then .est*

Not'iflthstandlng repeated appeals of the U«S*y txie ineat

European countries continued exporting comraodities to Iran*

Britain's exports were twice tnat of tae previous year

duarlng the fir s t five aonUts of 19^0. ^.xpressing solidarity wiUi the U*3. on one aand, oiembers, nowever, exported

a c3nslderAble amount of consumer and cat.'ital goods to Iran tiirou^ British trnnsport c^m^^anie3• 2 2

Hie foreign sln laters of tiie i.uropdan community met

InforDslly In April, 19^0 In Lisbon* iliey declined to

Impose econDfflic sanetlons agAlnat Iran or, to reduce th eir embj»997 et^ff In rehran* Instead they Issued a renewed condemnation of the Iranian government fo r allowing detention of the hostage* Also in Lisbon, on A^^rll 10, 19^0 ministerial repre* sentfltlYe of the 21*ueffiber Council of ;^uro^ (comprising the 9 community countries and 12 otaer iilest iiiuro^ean states), sim ilarly denounced the continued detention of ^ the hostai^es* It called on the Iranian authorities to take necessary me«)suree fo r th eir iffliuedlate relea^^e-

On A^rll 13, xresident Carter Issued a further a^'peal t for support* Xalklng to trie Journalists ae said, Aaeilca needed fu ll and active «>upport of her a llie s .*• **to show that we a ll do sti^nd togeti:ier In tbls condeiimation of 23 terrorism, a threat to all our countries

i::arller, before the announcemeia of tae c;ouncll*s

Lisbon decision, on A^ril 10, President Carter had criti­ cised those who **8sk fo r protection but are wary of alliance*" ne added, **Tney ask for understanding yet often 24 decline to understand us in return*^

The ever-increasing pressure of the U«3* governmt^nt finally forced the jiuro^ans to tske some actions* At a special European co-operation ii^eetlng In Luxembourg on 379

April 22» Community Foreign K in lsttrs adOi^ted a two*

8tsi;9cl plan^ Initiated by Lord Carrln^^ton, Uaa U«K*

F o re i^ minister i»nd Coausonwealta Sttcretary**to &aice

action ai^Ainst Iran* maeting stipulatedj firatly no new export or service contracts snail be concluded with Iran* ‘Secondly, there would be a fom al ban on tbe

sales to Tran of axtns or defence-related ecul>i&ent* It was agreed that In the eyant of no "d e c is lT e pro^rese'^ in

the hostai^ c risis was ris ib le by i^ay 17« tnese measures would be followed by full scale trade and econou.lc

sanctions*

7h% Community plan was described by some i:/uropean o ffic ia ls as a compromise between Britain and France*

Brit^lni together with vrest Germany, nad been tne strongest

advocate of taking substantive measures against Iran;

France had Initially indicated Its flru opposition to O.ii*

preeeure on Vestem a llie s to take "punitive* action*

Besides, France and Ita ly also expressed concem at the possible adverae effects of sanctions* Italy nad to take into account her 1»750 workers wiio were In Iran then*

West Gennaxiy, however» fu lly suppoirted imposition of sanc­

tions and even threatened to take unilateral action, I f a

Joint community initiative did not materialize* On April 239 19^0, the Japanese f^vemaent expressed Its wlllinjKness to endorse the Ooaununlty action, and on

April 24, it was reported tnat Japan was urging tne nation's 3^0

I s r ^ s t trading coapanios not to conclude any new export

contracts with Iran* Xhare was no doubt tliat Ja^anWouId

be seriously affected by Isiposinff sanctions against

X]*an • In partlculart the Japanese Mitsui Corporation*

It had invested fifty per cent capital for tne d 3,300 m illion petrochemical plant In Bandar Khomeini region*

Japan was also dependent on Iran, fo r a large ^art of it s

o il recuirsBients* It must be noted, howsveri tnat on Ayril

12, *'«r* Ohira**-the then Japanese i^rlma M nlster**declared while o il was v ita l to Ja^Rn* "friendship with Auierica** was more important* It was even mentioned that Ja^^an was pre*

pared to reouest .'iexlco, fo r 200,000 barrels per day, i f

Iran did cut o ff supplies*

Seveial otiier Western countries toed tae U*S« line*

rhe Canadian government announced a ssries of measures on

April 24, 19^0* The measures were as follow s, ( i ) the

Canadian companies v/ould be ux’i^d not to enter into new

contracts wltri Iran; (11) export permits for military equip* ment fo r Iran and export credits would continue to be arefused;

( i l l ) a ll Canadian o il companies would be asked not to

import Iranian o il (although they were then, receiving none)*

On April 21, 19^0, the Australian Foreign minister

^ir* Andrew i^eacock, announced trade restrictions against

Iran* these restrictions discouraged exports and even

provided for several disincentives vis-a-vis exports to

Iran* However, the restrictions did not au>^junt to a fu ll 3«1

(Th« aid^sures did not, hawdT^r, effect exports

of foodstuffa'-cMBprlsing the bulk of Australian ex^^^rts

to Iran ).

The Norwegian government on A^rll 24, decided on a

total trfide boycott Against Ir«n, effective on >i&y 17,

I f the hoateeie problem 4ias not r«solved by then*

I f was reported that r'ortu;;*!, on April 17, had agreed

to ban all exports and Im.^rta and all financisl dealings

with Iran-

'^der the clrctmstances, Ir»n, on April 231 aimounced the conclusion of an o il supply eor^tract with Koaania*

i.eadinesa to enter into otnei trade agreea^nts with i^.aat 27 European countries was expxvssed*

The finited States, anxious not to lose it s prestige

and domination over the world Im perialist system, continued

to exhort her allies to enforce now financial and comwer*

d al restrictions against Iran* On iusy 1^» 19^0, the

European Community Foreiioi Ministers meeting in Naples

decided to jo in tly impose sanctions against Iran, because

they fe lt that no "decisive progress’* towards the release

of the hostaffss was evident since their April 22, Luxembourg meeting*

The new restrictions, however, did not affect the

bulk of trade between iurope and Iran* The readiness of

European countries to Impose si^nctlons against Iran diminished

after the rescue attempt of A^jril 24, 1980# They were very 3^2

Mtnry of the sanctions adversfdly affdctlng t^e Vest mor«

than Irani and Iran forie^ng closer tie s with the i^aatera

bloc* KoreoT^ry the Co&ii.unlty countries feared alienating

the moderate factions In Iranian state apparatus by endors*

Xng full sanctions*

These considerations prompted Britain and France to

exempt a wide variety of services like engineering, con* 2d sultancyi Insurance, transport and tourlsct froa the sanctions*

I t should be noted that around this tlmei several

turapean countries ( particularly France) were conducting

behlnd^the-scene diplouacy to secure release of hostages

throu^ Iranian interaediaries*

At this tlrae Iran started withdrawing money from

countries she considered •’most vulnerable" to the U.S*

Influence* For instance» a lari^ sum was reportedly with­

drawn from • est Germany and deposited in Libyan and

Alicerian banks*

Japan, a fte r consultation with the ii>urOi^an Community

anoiKiced the ImpleiBentatlon of sanctions by her against

Irant in line with the European Community* i'he sanctions were to be effective from June 2, IV^O.

■The Japanese action meant freezing of large export

orders received after Noveaiber 4, 1979. Businessmen In

Tokyo f e l t the sanction move would have fa ile d , without

the support of Japan, as one of Irari^s largest trading

partners* However, tne contract for i^trocnemlcal complex 3^3

at Bandar Khomeini was not affected*

'Die Australian Oovemfflent on 20, 19^0 announced

a ban on ffll trade» except food and medicine, to take

effect immediately*

Turkey declined to Impost a trade eiabar^ against

Iran because of it s *very elos^; ties wltii tne people of

Iran"* Accordini^ to tne I'urkisQ daily riurriyet (o f ^4ay

26 ]| Turkish exports to Iran had increased considerably

a fte r the ?*S* sanctions*

The Norwejrian Cabinet approved on June 20, I9de details of restrictions on the export of goods to Iran*

It is pertinent to note that despite trade r^strlc* tions imposed In Kay 198^i exports by Industrial countries to Iran Increased In 19^0. Inflation pushed up the face value of on irolnje; contracts (the benefits accruing to the exporters) that were not affected by the eiabargo* Bota

Britain and Japan exported about 1*5 b illio n in goods in

19^0 on this basis*^^

^ e conspicuoos fact that emerges from the foregoing account is the vacillating position of U*3* allies and

Vestem policies In supporting tne U*S* in her struggle against Iran* This can be undexstood by a careful analysis of the relationships prevailing In world Iffiperialist system.

Marxist analysts draw attention to three aaln forces operating In imperialist network which detemlne relations betwsan U*3* and its imperialist allies* Ihere are: 3d*

1* Cdntrlfugiil forces atimulated by competition

fo r p ro fit; seeking special advantages when

weak spota in the United States' o ^ratio n s

emerge*

2* Centripetal forces binding tne main laperlalist

countries with the lilted States for the prs-

servfttion of world ia p e ria list systeiu.

3« ''Vertical cohesion” of ifflperialist oentresi

trying to get as such as possible fr-om the less

developed nations*

A careful analysis of Vestem econjaic sancLions a«:ainst Iran clearly shows thts operation of these three forces in the differing relationships of tae U«S« with its allies*

The Jonaeouenees of cconoi;>lc sanctions

Let us now assess the impact of U«S* and Vestem economic sanctions on Iran ’ s economy* Throughout the hos* taj^ crisis Ayatollan Khomeini repeatedly said with a tone of contemptt *'^ e rlc a has no guts to do anyti^ing to us**

Besides his philistine view on the effect of Ipfestem econoalc sanctions serious disagreement arose» in course of tlmei amon^ various Iranian political leaders* Iran’s Coounerce i^lnister stressed towards the end of April, 19^0 that 'any imposition of sanctions against Iran would be drmgerous fo r both sides* He added, Iran would not suffer, but actually benefit fi-oa tJ*S* sanctions* Ihe American t&easures 3«5

"will clv« US a greater self-relienc#, and w« will not exijerienoe any problem.

Ih« T o m er Oil Minister and momber of iuajll8« All

Akbar fiOlnfar^ repeated tne same thing on Se^teuiber 1, 19^0*

He said that the blockade had failed and tne U*S. **has not been able to do anything with Iran, and ^ould be unable to do anything with it In the future as well

However Frealdent Banl Sadr narrated th^ other side of the story* He fe lt that the U«S» econofidc blockade was moat serious problem facing Iran* the very beElnnlng** he said, I was against taking nosta^ds* Because of this fact that the Afi^erlcan h o sta^ s have 2iade Iran a hostage of the United States*"^^

A few days later, Ayatullaa Beheshtl cnallenged ^lr*6anl

Sadr: "The occupation of es^^lonage centre (U«3* embaesy) was so valuable that it makes a ll losses tolerable* We have even obtained economic benefits In the ligh t of this action.

These contradictory stateif^ents obfuscate Ute natter and calls for a careful analysis. As mentioned earlier, the sanction did not deprive Iran of iiaporta of ..estem goods and spare parts* Iran continued Importing western com^^odltles from titie following souxces:

1* Tiny states of i^erslan Gulf sucu as lubal,

Kuwait, Bahrain, etc*

2* Neighbouring countries like xurkey arid Pakistan* 3^6

3» Countries like Spafn> Austria, Greece, Sweden,

Singapore, Hongkong, and South Korea*

Amonsr these countries the smsll state of Gubal played a very im ^rtant role« During the period of embargo» the

International alddlemen crowded In Dubal-*the G u lf's great trade centre* The destination of most Vestern l&ported

?oods and materials to Tubal was Iran* exporters reaped millions— unearned profits—by reexporting Veatem ^coods to Iran* A spectacular booffi-oafter the Amerlosn embargo—

In sales to Iran from Dubai was eonsplcaous* Besides, luany merchant s h l{» were involved In smuggling electrical eculp* ments, food, tyres and textiles to Iran* It Is rather surprising that despite strained political relations between the two countries, the trade boom continued* Xhe p o litica l relations touched its lowest ebb after the outbreak of the Iran*-Iraq war* Trade, however, has it s own logic*

"The mysterious autarchic 'j^rld of the dhous (commercial carro boats in Dubai)** were lm;nune to polltlcs*^^ I t should be mentioned that Ira n 's imports from Dubai cost at least

10 per cent more*

The c le ric s ' repeated claims during the period of sanctions about "eelf^relianee" and detachment from world

Im perialist markets proved to be hollow* Because the whole structure of the Iranian economy, wiiether mullahs admitted or not was linked to the world capitalist order wnlch is dominated by the centre* Unly a structural transformation 3«7 oould chang'd everrthlng*

The low level of productive forces and tne undei'- developed economic Infr^striacture of Iran necessitated dependence on West fo r i^ods nnd sp^re parts*

The economic sMictiona forced Iran to li&>«rt Hfestem

commi^dltles at intexnatlonal blackiaarket prices* The

sanctions In most cases did not include ttie exports of goods

Incorporated In old contracts* Under chaotic condi&lonSf many Western companies concluded pre-dated trade agreements with Iran— side-tracking the eiubar^* Ihey even sold goods at hij^er prices* Quite a few companies inade superprofits by actinp as Intensediarles. They purcnased coaimodlties from West (Includlne U«3*) on their private account

(smiiranteed by the OoveiriBient of Iran) and sold these to the Iranian Government*

The branches of multinational corporations in fringe

European states like Spain, Turkey, etc* and talrd world countries stretched tnemselves considerably to export these products to Iran* Hisy exploited the turbulent situation and chj^rged h li^ e r prices— especially fo r commodities coming from concerns with monopolistic privileges* The

Iranian manufacturing companies had no alter-native in the circuffistp^ncesf but to submit tnemselves to tne dictates of the multinationals* Iranian i^epsl uola ( Zam

Corporation), for instance, tried to buy raw materials from other sources^^Sweden— to no avail* Finally, it had to 3dd purchase the same from a bianch of U«:$. ^epsl Cola; the price bsinc; determined by this multinational giant*

It la evident tiiet tae sanctions did not affect tne

U«$« nnd tfestem companies. It worked to Ira n 's disadvan-* ta^e embellishing the ^urse of tne liatjerlallst u o n o ^ llsts in the bari^ain*

On the economic fronti Iran suffered conaiderable set-back by way of hli^er prices, commissions and foes it had to shell out—the amount of this loss accordini; to the then t resldent—i^ir* Bani Sadr—was 2 b illio n in the first six months of the imposition of sanctions.

The economic sanction aggravated Iranis worsening economic situation by causing liquidity difficulties, and creating shortages of raw materials and spare parts,

(lovemment's intervention in the various sfiieres of economy deserves mention here* This was prompted to a great extent by the d iffic u ltie s caused by eeonoa^ic sanctions* the clerics thought of intervention as a measure to offset the adverse effects of embargo on the economy, however, j?ovemment intervention instead of curing, actually exacer­ bated ti'ie disease*

The clerical state tried to gain control over tne situation through religious institutions such as Bonyad-e-

Kostaiafin ( Hie Foundation o f Deprived i'eople) and Bonyad- e-Shahid (diartyr's Foundation)* these Foundations sent delegations to different countries to purchase various 3«9 comiiioditioa* Iheae delegations usually w^re a«ad<«d by a o lo r ^ ffiember of ZiiF, made costly Journeys and In laost cases| swindled a considerable sum as commission on purchases*

In exceptional cases, ^en tne responsible authority was honesty he failed to clinch an econsnic deal for lack of experience in business and trade* The Islamic regime did not belieye in authorising experts in the field of i&anage- aent and business to negotiate conuuercial transactions*

Instead they appointed novices who ^andered to Khocieinl's

Islamic do^gaas* Iran had to pay heavily for this arbitrari* nesSf and non-professional approach*

4 few examples w ill not be out of placet

(1 ) during tne period of sanctions, Mr* Heidarit a rssponsible senior member of the i^volutionary Guards> concluded a ^ 57 otillion ams agreei^nt with anon-existent

French Coapanyl ' hen Questioned about the fflatter« Ayatollah

Beheshti said, "doesn’t fuatter* It is a drop in a big ocean*** ^iany Iranian observers suspected financial sabotage by IRP members*

(2) Ihe sanctions caused shortages of video cassettes and film s fo r Iranian 7*V« (No* 2 channel). A senior govexn- ment official ^r* Islaml vient to Tubal for the relevant purchases* He ran up a fa t b i l l on his personal ex^nwea in ^ubal. He ended up paying f i f t y per cent more fo r the purchsses to a supposed Palestinian* Fraternal rslations between Iran 's government and ralestinlan organisation 390

wfis .-.r* Islam!*9 criterion In selection of nis supplier^

(3 ) scarcity of meat was an outgrowth of the

sanctions* The responsible authorities concluded an un-

econouiical agreement id.th a Dutch company fo r supply of meat*

l!h9 coffipany« howeveri asked it s Indian a ffilia t e to d eliver

buffalo meat—obviously cheapter-'to Iran.

One c^n easily multiply these examples* I t is not

d iffic u lt to judp^e from these instances that the problem

of hostages and the subseouent economic sanctions it in -

vitadt provided a j^olden opportunity for tae clerics and

IHP authorities to appropriate unearned px-ofitS| out of

corruption and e;fxbezzlement* A macro-level analysis would

reveal that this contributed to the widening of tne economic

jisap between the Iranian u^asses and tne ruling e lite s, bringing in Its wake social and p o litic a l problems*

'Die sanctions brought Iran close to tne socialist bloc

and more developed l^iird Vorld countries*^ India acouired

considerable glf^iificanee for Iran in its efforts to beat western trade sanctions* Turing the f i r s t two weeks of

June« 19^f^i Indian ccwpanies received / 5^ m illion worth

of Iranian orders for Jeeps, railway tracks, bicycles

and transmission towers*^^ the exports from India increased

further during the period of sanctions*

This change of trading ^ rtn e rs — although perhaps

useful in the long run->-was at seme economic cost to Iran* fts noted e a rlie r, the change was not so significant 1 as 391

Iran continued bulk of her trade with tAe Vest*

The embnrgo also had an ia^act on Ira n 's m ilitary

potential» Iran's major problem during the ^rlod of

embarffo was acute shortage of spare parts (ratner tnan

ammunition, ^^hlch was more or less, a v aila b le), fo r Irifttance,

spare tyres fo r f i l t e r planes— ti^hantoui*

Iran's niost pressing anxiety was oulck delivery of military ecul^ent It had already bou^c* Britain and

France, the main fiuropean suppliers, were wary of supplying

anas* Biey fe^^red offendlnr Iraq— thelr major comuterclal

and m ilitary customer* Iran, thus had no alternative but

to resort to the incematlonal blackruarket fo r aniiaments,

and pay double—even triple price for military equipment*

Lack of experience In buying anaaments and dearth of pro*

fesslonals resulted in the authorities being cheated by

amament monopolists*

An interesting side-light to Iran's fishing for aiHis

relates to its deal with Israel during the sanctions* In

Auj^st 19dl| Ira n 's former ^resident, >«r* Bani Sadr confirmed

in an interview In Paris that ^against h is wishes'*, Iran**

aupposedly b itte rly enemy of /sionisBu and Isra e l—had made

serious secret arias deals with Israel*

The details of two of these deals ar« known today*

A ahlpoient of 25^ tyres fo r Phantoiii a irc ra ft in Jctober

19^^t the second month o f the Oulf war, and 360 tons of

tank spares and «amunltlon arrived In July 1931* Ihe U*S« 392

protested to Israel wneut belatedly, It was informed of the first transaction* liters was a temporary cessation %g in supplies while Iran still held the JU&erican hostages*^

It will be worthwhile considering the condition of

Iranian exports darinp; the period of embargo* I t is a well known fact that Iran’ s economy is dependent on o ili sa its sole source of foreign exchange* 'Hie effe c t of sanctions on Ira n 's incoine from o il w^re indeed debilitating*

On July 27, 19€tO, Irsniar* government annouxiced that it s o il export rsvenue dropped by almost h a lf (in tae

Psrsian month ended July 22), to i million, from ^ 1*61 billion. In the previous months* According to an J il

Ministry spokesman, the figures available for tne latest month fo r export of o il was about ^00,000 barrels per day*

In n exported an averatse of d 2*63 million barrels dally in tile ;;rBeeedinfi’ Persian year*

Japanese and i^uropean companies that had lifte d total of dOO,OOn barrels per day since the beginning of l$dO, refused on April to accept a i 2*90 per barrel price rise by Iran* Or the pretext of price rise, these countries, under the influence of oil embargo, refused to lift crude o il from April 19dO. (They compenssted their loss by import** in? o il from other OP^C countries, especially Saudi Arabia*

The sharp reduction in oil Income had wide ramifica­ tions for Iren’s socio-economic condition* Jbservers wwdered how could a country continue Iftportlng without any 393

foreign exchange osmlni^s frt>ia exports o r any oUier source*

The only to ^ay fo r Imports— was to draw

upon ihah's deposits and otiner reseirved sources, tlais

Aowever, not possible because of freeze on Ir^^nian

assets in 13*S« and Vestem banks*

Vithin a short i^riod the i^rlce of loif.orted cooiiaoditles

skyrocketed and fanned the flaae of inflation^ witn the

conseouent ^squeese' on the poor and tne lowest strata of

society* feople experienced a s^eep f a l l in tne standard of liTinir* lurchasea and consu&ption sluj&p«d*

The deteriorating ec

XJcie Hevolutionary Oouncil, Hassan habbibi said tnat an econ^ic "Holy war*’ would mean **rationing consumer goods, putting a lid on ^ e salaries and overtiutet ax^d clamping down on hoarders and others causing doutestic snortages in 41 a nuii^ber o f induatries**'

The Government at the same time took, the opportunity to divert the attention of the masses from the turbulent domestic situation and its mistakes arid failure* iSite res^e made America scapegoat for all its failures and mistakes*

Towarf^s ieconciliation

Let us now trace the develo^nt resulting in tue release of hostai^s* The death of Shah in late July 19^0 J9k

^ave twist to tti« problaio of hostai^s* It didn't howeT«r» bretik th« impass« over the hostng« Issuo* Int«r«atlngXy enou^t a political problem (tke extradition of Si^iab) boc^a a lagal and financial one (the reatitutian of tae

Shah'a propei'ty to Iran)* Uojatollsla^u iCaoelniha expli* 42 citly demanded ’'retura of tne Shah's plundered pro^rty**

Xran-Xraa var was another factor liaplnging on tne hoata^ issue. This viar^'-^leh bd^an on September 19^0, and exploded into a full-fledged war on Septeaber 22| was amonfir other things, one of the by<«produets of Western econoffiic sanctions against Iran* To run the war i&acalnery«

Iran was badly hardpressed for flnance-*not easy to come by* The sanctions had seriously undemlned Iranian econoi^ic potential* Tne only remedy was aeoess to tae deposits frozen in ' estem banks*

The war necessitated raising amy'a potential by eoulpping it with military hardware and spare ^arts blocka­ ded by (7»S* and other Western countries* Under ta e ^ c ir­ cumstances the Iranian c le ric a l rei^rae was forced to relent*

It indicated wllllnjsness to settle tne dispute* i'he speaker of Irsnian parliament! Hojatolislaai Uasnejal kafsanjanif asked America to return Iran's / 400 million blockaded spare parts* i^r* h ajaii— ttie taen i rime Minister— also said, ”we w ill drag our spare parts out of tne crooked 4? cTotches of the ^raat Satan*" 395

Another f;«ctor \^lch influeneed the Issue of hostages was the inmlnent U«3. Presidential elections* itie possi* blllty of keagan taking office was an ominous ^rtent for

the Iranian political leaders*

Policy makers in ttie U«S» correctly aasutftedi ««glven

the cireufflstances«*that tne hosted crisis, an anathema to

America» was even, a aore acute problea for Iran* tiencef the U.S. ^owed little anxiety* In contrast Iran was feverish. Several concessions ware sujtc^sted In e bid for

reconciliation*

Flnallyt on September 12, 19^0^ Ayatollah Khomeini proposed four conditions fo r the x«leaas of the hostages*

(i) jreatitution of the ex*5hah*s wealth to Iran, (ii) U*S* guarantee not to interfere in Iran's political and uili* tary affairs; (iii) release of Iranian assets froxen in the

United States; and^tlT) dropping of U.S. claims against

Iran* Khotaeini left th<« whole issue to tae i-ajlie (Iranian parliament)* On Novsaaber 2« 19^0 t^ajlis adoi^ted a resolu­ tion confimin^ Khoaeini's four points*

Parliafflentary debates witnessed sharp conflict between the two factions of the Iranian state- Xhe clerry**doalnated

IRP hed st^uncnly supported the taking o f hoat^ages; and ultimately was trying to negotiate their xvlease* The other faction was the liberal supporters of ^resident Bani iadr who had Ionic called fo r an end to the crisla* Ihey denotsnced

deal with Vashinitton ae a *^hwiillatlng national 396

8«11

On Kovdmber 19i Uojatollsl^m i\«fa;nnjani saI cI in

Algiarai tniit the U»S«A« had f»ec9^ted "tne principles of

the^our eondltiona set by Ir«n for the liberfitlon of tiie 49 hoatiii^es.*’ ^

tJntll then there were 3t3^ prirf»te claias against

the Iranian frozen assets out of which 3^ claine, vorth

i 6 billlo A t had made that way to tne U«3. courts• The

claims could be clasaifiad into three oategorlas;

1* Default claims on b^nk lo^ng

Hie biggest claimants were Za99% Manhattan Bank^

Citibnnki >;8nufacturers :ianover Trust and Bank of Aserica

with ^ $00 million amon^ them* Total loan default claiss

exceeded i Z b illio n *

olatms fo r broken contracts with Iranian ^omiiniaei^t

The lars^est elaia nade publicly w^s that of General

^otorsi wnicn lost on a car deal* Bechtel oor^ration made claims fo r unpaid consi;ruction work worui sore t^sn i 3 b m io n . 3* Nationalization claims

Tt.ese cl Aims amounted to leas than i 1 billion in

total value* The largest sinr?le claim |,ubllcly made was / 4A that of the American Insurance Group fo r » 35 million*

It was revealed on December 21, 19^0 tnat Iran had

asked the Q«S* to deposit i Zk billion, a large slice of

the Shah's fortune, in Algeria as a surity in lieu of the 397

47 return of Iranian asstts frozen earlier* Buizad

Hab4Vl,«**^e tiien hxeeutlvft A ffnlrs ^’ilnlat«r**«laboratt3d on tae amount to ba dapoalted by tne 0»3« in Algailan

Central Bank: i 10 b illio n in aas£i| i 9 billiof^ of Xranis^n

Assets frozen by the 0»3», i k billion of furtner un­ specified Iranian assetsi and 1»63 million ounces of Iranian lirold-*worth about / 1 b illio n * I t should be noted tnat after release of the captives, Ir?n would have access to

14 billion of its asaets*^^

The Iranian denand was rejected by the U«S« Govern­ ment* ^lr« iMuakie called it unreasonable* He added tfiat the U*s« M^'ould continue to negotiate with Iran throu^

Alffarla*

Hajatolislam Rafs8nj<«ni declared on December 22, 19^0 that Iran would not chanse its tersi for releasing the hostages. He said, "If America is not ready to give us our 49 rii^ta, our last resort is trial*'' '

The thxvi^t was eapty as Iste r events were to ^rove*

Few days lateri i'*r« Hafsanjani revealed his real intention fo r com^r

But we should proceed rationally and give op^rtunity to

0*3* to find out a legal solution.

In the f i r s t days of January 19^1» the t7*S«A* respon­ ded to Iran 's demands, and p artially accepted tne resolution of the Kajlls* After the initial protest by Iran, uie U«S* 39« respon^dd As expeetedi tht? Iranian autxiorltiea preferred reconciliation to Intransigence* »ir« tiafsanjanl announced on (January 11, 19^1; '^Ve nave ramoved a ll tne bnrrlers fo r aolvlnfir tne problem of hostagaa*”^^

Ultimately, tne clerics acaled do\vn tnelr demands to / 6 b illio n frOBJ the i 2^* b illio n demsnded earlier#^^

Agreement fo r tne releaae of noatagea was thus concluded between and Iran*

The following is a auotmary of the teniis agreed to by

Iran and the U.S*A*:^^^

**Tlie U«3* pled^d to restore Iran’s financial poaition as fwr aa poaslble to what i t waa before Horember 14, 197V, when President Cfirter ordered seisure of Iranian assets*

*^The 0«S* agreed to drop a ll private wid o ffic ia l suits aeainst Iran and not to intervene in Iran's Internal affairs*

"Iran and U«S* aet up escrow (third party] and security accounts in the name of the Algei'isn Central Bank with Bank of England* Jnee Algeria certified tnat the hostages nad le ft

Iran, it s central bank waa to transfer a ll assets in escrow to Ii:^ «

"The transferred to tne Algerian account a ll of

Iran's ^Id bullion and other assets held by the U»S*

Federal Keserve* tJmS* banks were to send Iranian funds and aec’irities plus interest held In U«S* banks and Uteir over* aeas branches to tnese accounts*

''According to the agreement, tne Aserloan banks trans­ ferred to an escrow account with tne Bank of isngland ^ k billion in Iranian funds that they nad in tueir Js>uropean 399 branches* Th9 e^erovr 9CC0u»t was to be controlled by

the iroTernment o f A li^ris* The federal heserve Bank of

New ToHe is ready to put another i 1*3 billion in eaah

And 1«6 b illio n ofinces of gold (worth about i 2 billion)

In that same account*

*Mithin 3^ days Algeria would establish a security

account of / 1 b illio n to repay claiins against Iran*

**The 0*3* w ill revoke all trade sanctions against

Iran and w ill withdraw a ll clAlma and bar prosecution of

current and futtre claims, whether prirate or govem^et^tal*

”0n the release of the hostages, the U.S* w ill freeze and prohibit transfer of assets controlled by the estate of the latd Shah or any close relative until litigation by Iran to recover those assets is coapleted*”^^

The above agreeioent was signed on January 19t 19^1 and next-day» the $2 American hostages were released after

444 days in captivity*

k closer look at the clauses reveals the ambiguous nature of the agreement. I t would be better, therefore, to study what was actually heppsning in practice.

A sum of d 7,977 million worth of Iranian assets

(from various Aaerican sources) frozen by the U«S« govern­ ment was deposited, Just before the release of hostages, in the Bank of England, the escrow account neld In Central

Bank of Algeria* Initially i 5*$ billion was delivered to this account by the vfirious AsMric^n financial institutions; 400

Th« Bank of Amftrlca, Obaso Maniiattaiw Citicorpi i^^anufac*

tures HanoTar, Korgan Guaranty Xruati Firat Jiational

City Bank of whleaj^ and athar aiLQllar banks* Into the escrow account also v«ent i 1*4 billion of Iranian d^rpoaits wltfe the Fedaral Kasanre, ti 94r ailllon In Iranian gold; d 13.7 Billion In ottiar Iranian assets* From the aserov^ aecount, tba Aoariean banka got back

3*^ blllion**cosplete rapaytnent of all loans syndicatod

to the Shah’s regime. Foreign banks taat ^ ra part of

the loan syn

^ 1*4 b illio n regained in the asoroM account to cov«r non*>

syndicated loana* I t is pertinent to note that the

Central Bank >f Iran secured only i 2«^$ billion*

Another Important fact relates to on estiaated / 2*2 billion, or more, of Iranian deposits excluded froia tne ^ 7^977 m illion escrow accoutit* ihese posits zvi&ained frosen even after the release of nostages—being subject

to hundreds of law salts and attachmenta* Ilhese deposits were thus as good as written o ff hardly ex^^oted to be 54 returned to Iran*

Table 7,1 throws liflbt on the financial deal Involved

In the release of hostai^s* A careful analysis of the hostage deal clearly shows ttp Iran as tJie main lo s e r * ^ The International Banks*—

toerieant Japanese ^nd £ux'opean*‘'»that nad loaned money to the Shah emerged as tne hlgliiest gainers from the financial

transactions involved In the hostage deal* they managed to

set back their outstanding loans avoiding a possible risk kOl

G o § •o ,§ :r On c O it o ac XJ DO o tv 4» § 4> s a •H I I (B 49 le 9 o

« c c

S • f i o u o 0) A 5 C £

O'

It a kOZ

o f default* B«sld«a, bunks bnck taeir loans 100

cont on tbe d o lla r—a wonderful riaal eonsldarlng taat CA thar navar dreamt of*

lha Amarlcan businesa magnates raa^d a rlcb hanraat

of profit in racorary of th eir elalffls fo r breaoa of

agreement, nationalisation and confiacation of Uielr

properties by the Iranian fi^oyertUBent* Ihia becomea evi*

dent from Table 7.2» >ome even recovered money fo r eoods

that were not d eliven d and >iould not be delivered In

future*

At thia tiae the aanctiona by t^ie tfeateni European

countries were removed*

On January 22, 19^1, the new tl«3* adminia&ration

nocuaed the Iranian n ilitan ta of "aerloua mal^treatment of

a number of American hostages during tueir captivity*"

Many observers were skeptical of the acouaatlon and sue-

pected the intentions of the new adminiatration* Jn tne

aame day» Kr* Nabavif the chief Iranian negotiator in the hostage erlaist issued a rejoinder; "If U*3«A« doea so (break the agreement) i then i t uieana tnat the U*i« govern* mentt despite a ll coaiioitments» does not respect it s internal and international lawa aa well***

How the financial deal was iapl«»aented and what

actual financial transactions transpired between haagv^iA's

and Kho&eini'a itovemmdnt was not disclosed by either*

Jbservera are of the opinion that heage.n*8 aciministration 403

Table 7«2» 'Hie Clalas of iialn Aaerlcan Compftnles Agalnat Iran (in i m illions)

Nafie Aaount claias

1. William Bikoff Nationalization of their and Ceorge stake in the ^arshouran ^isenpresser copper mine

2. Sedco 175 Uofifiscation of 16 dril* ling rings and assorted construction equipnents*

3« General Telephone 151 Breach of contract and electronics unpf^id for raeeivablesi inventories and assets an the cofi^eny's books and damages*

4. Santa Fe Inter­ i6d Confiscation of oil national drilling eouipaent and breach of contract*

5. General motors Nationalisation of Iran, and unpaid (trie obsolescent passenger car kits still sitting in the yard of Canada

6. Aserican Telephone 69 Breaon of contract* and Telegraph

Total claims frosi Iran d 2» 4 b illio n

Source: fhs snme aa source of Table 7.1.

appropriates) the reniQlning 1»2 billion (of Irenlan

deposits in doueetie branches of American b8Rks)‘**not 57 subjected to any cl^iai* kOk

An Asg»9>fflent ; /iho'Lqst tne Gaaw?

L«t us now oonsldar the nialti*diia9nslon8l effeots of hoatai^ erlaes* What did tae fflullahs gain from taking

Amarloan diplomats hostages? ftiay first tried to get Uis ihah extradited; they didn't sucoessed* tney pressurized the 0*5« to admit her psst Klsdemeanour In Iran^ the

^erlean i^OYemment remained unimpressed* Xh«»7 sought ' restitution of the Shnh's wealth; this didn’t happen*

The sullnhs boasted of putting an end to the freeze on Iranian assets and took the exMdlt, so to say, for cessation of economio sanctions by tfestem powers* £he stupidity of the fflullahs la fo r e ll to see* But had the hostai!8s not been taken, the auesT^lon of freezing tne assets and economic sanctions would not nave arisen and

Iran would never have faced the predicament It did* Tne mullahs' "In^nulty could recover only / billion of

Iran's 12-14 billion frosen assets*

It should also be noted that revoking of freeze on

Iranian assets, did not imiaedlately cover d $00 million worth of m ilitary equi^Aient already paid for* i!his w»a critleally needed at the time of mullahs' war wita Iraq*

The rullnf elite benefited from the hostage orlsls by securing fo r themselves a sound fortune and that at the expense of Iranian people*

However, the main benefit the clerics reaped were political* The hostage deal concluded could have been 405

to aucti earlier* 0ie deliberately pro* loni^d tae noatsge c ris is to consolidate ta e ir iX>3ltion»

The economic problens of the country had creaced an explosive situation, threatening the very exiatenoe'of the reirlme. The mullaha naaded the 'l i d ' of hoets^je e risla to le t o ff the ateam* The lib e ra l riv a ls of the govern­ ment (epedaily At * Banl Sadr) Mere v lc tia l2t»d in uie process*

Hr« Behzad Kabavl la te r stated, "we should avoid looking at tne Issue throu|^ a trader's eyas, jur p o litica l gsln» m r» f i r r»"^^ (e a ^ a e ls sddad)

^ e policies of the mulliuis provided a pretext for

U.S. imperiallem to provoke anti-Iranian feelings in inter­ national Ar«ia« The Iranian masses, wronj^y represented by th eir ^ovemoient, lo st auca of syapatay they needed during those c ritic a l moments* The sanctions by vieakeniag the Iranian econo&ic poten­ tial! brou^t Iran closer in tne vortex of world laperia- liaesi. Ihe sanctions increased th^ Vd8t;em annual export of wneat to Iran from 1*4 B illion tons during the ohah to more than 2 million tons on Fsbruary 2» 19fil« (Some 59 fii^res speak of 3 Billion tons)* The release of the hostages had tragic conseousnces fo r the Iranian fflasaes* In absence of a scapegoat (lik e a hostafi^ crisis) the latent tensions in the Iranian society caae to the fore invlcinc^ suppression* £he aullahs 406 employed the most lnhu&i>n te rro ristic methods to sllenes maas protest-'-and even minor dlsosnt*

In the IddoloFlcsl sphere, the mallAhs geve 9 retro­ gressive turn to the people *s aovement* they created e chaotic situation and indoctrinated the siasses wltn false consciousness about the nature of Impexlalism and the way it should be fouj^t*

Let us consider the f^alns and losses of tae U«s«

The concessions finally made were very saall* ohe pledjfced not to Interfex^ in Iren's internal affairs in future* This sort of pledi;es in practice are of little conseouence* The A&terlcAn f^overnment» pretending to give

Iran a concession, undertook to prevent it s citl«exis from suing Iran fo r sei;sure and det<3ntion of hostagas*

Howevery her pretension gave way wiien i t was publicly known that there was no such provision ir4 tae U*S« consti** tution- Ihe U«S* pledge to freese assets belonging to the

Shah, to enable the Iranian govenuaent to lay it s claim in the U«3« courts did not materialise* (Tne Cf*S» courts and the Congress ruled the Atoexican ^siovemaient^s pled;^ unconstitutional* 'The U*S* government thus secured fo r itself a pretext for its inability to keep the promise*)

The O.S« was publicly humiliated, wnen after mucn twisting of muscles, she signed the agreeiaent wlta Iran fo r release of hostages on January 19» 19^1* Xhe agz^eiuent swelled ^e ei^ of the Iranian ruling clerics* nowever, 407 the Question roiaalns; vfhat was tiie material (o r evon sp iritu a l) benefit of such agreement fo r Iranian massae?

'Hie Imperialist! lost notning« Jn the eontrar/ It stood to eain* American's hUBiillatlon taugnt U«S« i a ^ - rlaHsoi to act In a more steady, less Hysterical way next time i t was plnprlctced*

Tbe freeae imposed by the U*S« AdiBlni9tr»tlon created mistrust among o il producing countries under ner s ^ e re of influence* The OPEC inveatore wondered if their wealth

WAS in effect neld "hostafi^ by Vest"* ^*r- Javad 4-^asnim, the President of the Arab .'monetary Fund**cualified cne move as a **severe blow to international confidence and sta b ility "* A dependable a lly of tne U*s*, Saudi Arabia, too expressed apprehensions: **0?EC countries needed guaran­ tees that their money would not be touched under any circumstances."^^ Ihe U*S*A« overcame tnese objections by diplomacy; and exerting political pressure, ^ae also raised the lending rate to a record level of 20*21 per cent in 19^0 preventing a flli^t of Arab capital to tne banks of other vestem countries*

Freesing of Iranian assets, was a proof of tae con* trol exercised by the Imperialist powers, 0V4»r tne petro- f^ollar assets of the OPSC countries* It also clearly ravealed the power of the former, in denying the latter, access to its own finances*

As far as the international expansionist policy of kCA

Imperialism is ooncemttd, toe hostay^e taking operation p'Ave U.3« iapsrlallsa pretext to Justify all its actions and create a crave threat to peace and security in the world •

U»S»A* slde*tracKed a ll bourgeois democratic noius in the new doctrine of direct allitary intenrention In the to m of Rapid l«Telopa>ent Force (o f 300,000 personnel)* the U*S« ruling coterie used the hostage Issue in urging

U*3* m ilitary presence In Indian Jeean and adjacent areas--*

Saudi Arabiai Oman, U*A«S*| 3oaalla, etc*-*to ^protect

AfflerlcAn oil Interests In the Persian Gulf*" Turing the hostage crlslsf U«S* military budi^t escalated, raising its ag^resslTe potential* AmerlCi°Ji men were called fo r com­ pulsory m ilitary serrlce* Hostage c risis made i t easier for U«5» imperialism to strengthen KAtJ military potential and supply arms to Egypt and Pakistan*

The former Iranian representative to the United

Nationsf Kr* Kvisure Faziiang gave true and insli^tful analysis of the U*S* and its Intentions* It is worth ouotlng him at lenf^tht

"The influential centres in American society— 7.ionlsts, milltaristst CIA, Bapublicans— and the extreme rightist groups exploited the hostage problem fo r tn elr own purposes*

*^The main achievement of the U*3* imperialism from the problem of hostages could be classified aa follows* escalation of American military budget, heightening m ill- 409 tffrlsffl chfliuTlnism (in U*S* soclety)* shaping pablle opinion for accepting aggressive ailitary operationa* and wepkdnin^ anti^imparlalist groups and personalities*

Taking h o ste ss gaTe a deceitful excuse to im perialist propaganda madilnery to mobilise Aoeriean and tiiuropean public opinion against us* More tban tnlS| the popular resentioent of Aaeriean people against taking hostages created such an atmosphere that the warmongering elements in Ajieri* can ruling machinery strengthened themselves* Ihis gave an opportimity to Konald Keagan»a symbol of the most vicious fflid detestable objectives of imperialism—a fair and unantlclpate'1 c^ifsnce of succesa*

’Turing tne la st 9 months we have paid, on an averagei i 600,000 per month as legal fees to the lawyers to post­ pone court prooeedings against Iran*

previously used to purchase f^oda directly fx w the producing countries, now we should buy through inter* mediarles* As a result we have to ^ay, on an average,

20 per cent more*”

Al^ough Imperialisai stood to gain tne nostage crlsisf tne latter proved tnat imperlallsci today is not all'-encoffipasslni; enough to a rb itra rily influence the course of international affairs* The hostage crisis also demon* strsted the ultra-reactionary, antl-popular and anti'-human nature of the Iranian clerical re dme* l^like Cuba (which has been trying fo r more than twenty years to remove U«S« k io

sAnetions), the Iranian "I(ltotollah8**'»*lf one could call

them thst*«rs sorted to tlie most sdYanturous and stat>ld

gaable.®^ The ruling o larlcs aftowad bayond doubt thair

raadinaaa to aacrlfica the Interaats of taa ^asaas for

consolidation of thair own power*

It ia absurd on the part of some opportunist le ft is t

or^anlaations (if^o reveal in i^^arxist dogpias«*as distinct

from Karxiat trutba*-and Fdilistinlaai) to hail hostage

seizuret a strujcrlo against ia^rialism* In point of factt

it waa really, a part and parcel of anti-ia^rialist daaa^oin^ of the Khomeini*s ^eo cratic regime* 411

(1) Mttch Ister, Hojatollslasi KhoelnlAa admitted Uiat he

knew about the move five or six days before nand

and the order iiad been directly givei. by Ayatollah

Khoaeini* For fflore d etails see i'ae i:,conoaiat.

February 2, I960, pp. 4S-49*

(2) Ihls and icany other fncts were diaelosed leter by one

of the students vjho n«as involved in u^e occupation

of the embassy* His exposure was published in a

aeries of articles in Mujahid i^apc:r entitled Naiae-ve

iuoftan adrejrek ^s DaneaaJopyan-"# i^eirgw K g a ^ iJ t M i MaJera*y» epsht-e rrsdeft-ya GroweMO Qiri*^ ( fae documentary le tte r of one of ti:ie students following

Khoi&eini's line; the events behind the curtain of

taking of hostages**, i.u.1anid (tti® or?an of Peoples

Mujahedin Jrganlsation of Iran), second year^ number

If^ , Tuesday, Dayman 22, 1359 (January 12, 19^1),

PP» 3* To understund the background of taking the

hostages, i t would be useful to read Bani Sadr's

admission after being sacked and wnen in exile in

Paris* He stated much la te r that Khomeini had told

hia. at the time tnat he wanted to keep t£ie hostages

till the presidential atid parliamentary elections

in Iran were over* ( Kanarastitra aerald. r^oona,

Tuesday, Au**ust IS, 19^1)*

(3) Later, 10 hostaMs were released and tne number became 412

53 and much la te r (In early June 19^0) anotner bos-

ta ^ was released for uenlth reasons*

(4) Ke»alng*a Oonfjayorarv Arcnlvas. *-arch 21, 19^0,

p. 3fil50.

(5) The matter la explained in detail in images 3, 6^ 22

of the source given In No* 2 above*

(6) At 9 l^Btter date when trte ^roblea of hoata^ces lost

Its Inltlfll attraction for the people,

■ade a volte fpce* Hla tactics tiien changed Into

criticisin g the. movement and using i t as an Instru­

ment in his struggle for »>ower against the strong

fundaoientallst faction of the Islautic state* At

this atai^ he kept on saying that the occupation had

"shown up the nultlpliclty of centres of decision

and rovemoient's pow

of the capital's arteries**; it had ^furcher reduced

government’ s p re s tl^ both In Iran and abroad**;

and taat a country could not be ruled by **>«manerit

popular spontaneity”* For more details aee

Keesing*s Conte«>>orarv Archives, i^arca 21, 19S0|

p. 3C150.

(7) In the following months the ffiullahs came to know tnat

taking hostasres was a panacea fo r cure of uany of

their shortcomings* ^ e of the student militants

who kept the seize of the ei&bfisay admitted that his

leader had aald in the :ueetlng of a ll Uie militant 413

students of U.S« eiubfissy. 'Bravol By your action

you have preTented any kind of atriko; you uare also

b€lpad Xsla&le constitution to be api^rovad by many

votea (sea the source given In footnote So* 2)*

(d) Kauf York Tiaaa and Intamationel Harald rributi^.

Zurich as citad in ^alan ^econi^r. Saw Ealhi» January

1-7, 19^0, pp. 15245-9.

(9l Kaaaipga ConteacJorarY Arcalvjs> jli/ril 25, 19^0, pj^*30206'7»

(10) Aa Quotad by the Tlmea of India. Boitb^y, Nov* 17, 1979*

( 11 ) i’ne -.conomtst* London, December 1, 1979* p»94* (12) Kaesing’ a Oontam^^rary Archlvaa. April 25, 19^0,

p. 3o;o^* (13) Ib id *, p. 3<'210. (14) Ibid*, p. 302212.

(15) Kae sing * a C

(1^) Ibi^*> p. 30529. (19) Ibid *

(20) Datalla of the U*S* rescue operation and Its failure

ia rlvan In Turi Oudkov, ”U*3.— Iran; Croasine the

Threshold”, LS2LJIB£2> No*23, Aoacow, Jutie 19^0, pp* 20^22• Also see Kaasing^a :ionte»^rarY Arcnivea.

Jctober 24, 19^Jo, pp. 3*^531*34*

(21) For more detaila see ^cono^.lst* Vol. 275, No*712S,

London, April 12, 19^0, pp. 7-d. klk

(22) No. 44, rehrsn, 2f^th *'iordad 135V (August 19^0), p.

(23) K— lng*a Contemi^or^ry Arefatvs* October 24, 19^0,

p. 3H530. (24) Ib id .

(25)

(26) Ib ld »

(27) Ib ld >, pp. 3f^530^31.

(2^) r.^e ^conomtat * London« June 7^ 19^0, pp. 42*43*

(29) From International aerald Tribune. aonRkong; ^

Karachi; Ctie iUndu. Kedrns; and the Jliiies j f Indlw.

Kew Dalhi; aa cited in Aslyn uecjrdar. Vol. XIVIX»

Mo. 6, February 19-25, 19^1, p. 1500. ( 30) 3ae Harry Kagdoff, I'be Age of Im ^arlaliaa. ^uonUily

Kavlew ^reaSf Kavf York, 1969. ( 3 1 ) "alan Itecordai. Vol. IXVI, Ho. 29, Waw I>alni, r^ay 13-19, 1980, pp. 15455-6.

( 32) As cuotad In Pavel Masentsav, "U .S .— Iran: Ihraats and

Blackmail” , r:aw /Imes. No. 3^, ^toscow, Saptambor 19^0, p. 10,

( 33) From Mr. Ban! Sadr'a speech In uia Joint seaaion of 3|i!IBi.0-£.,Oo»t>r»tt~« .»n«T.ll /■t.lll (iite tlon for Develor

Shahrivar 11, 1359 (iai-trfmbor 1, 19^0), aa quoted

^aerooal ('fne V ictoiy), Ko. 3, ionran, A»ar 1359

(Kova .bar 1915^), p. 41. 415

(34) From Ayatollah Behesbti's int«rvl«w given to tue

o ffic ia l newspaper Jouiaojrl Islaml (laXaml ha public) i

Organ of IRF, faJiran, Snaxirivar 27, 1359, (Se*-t«

1«, 19«0).

(35) ine i;.conomigt* Vol* 277, No* 7163, London, Iiaceiabar

13, 1930, p. 35.

(36) Iho examples have been provided to tne autaor by a

well-infomed personality in Iran's business clicle*

for obvious reasons iie Irtsisted tnat he should reatain

anonymous- X would like to express ay taatiks fo r the

valuable infonoation provided by nln«

(37) For mor« details 3»e Xue jjconomlst. London, A|.ill 26,

19^0, p. 54.

(3^) Tite . conoatst. Vol. 279, ho. 713^, London, June 21,

19^^^, p. ®6.

(39) The wConomist* Vol. 2S''', No* 7200, London, August

29, 19^1f p. 42* ( 40) ^slan Fecjrder^ Vol. XXVI, Ko. 36, Mew Delhi, Sept* 2-#», 19S0, p. 15634.

(41) Ae Quoted in ^3is^i Kecorder. Vol* X2VI, Mo. 23, Mew

Delhi, June 3-9, 19fi0, p* 15435*

(42) As ouoted in Kavhan. Xenran, i>.ordad 6, 1359 (July 27, 1930).

(43) This problem w ill be dealt in the last Chai^ter of

this study entitled *^Oil Conflict"*

(44) As ouoted in ;.eha'i. Ko. 53* Tehran, Abanl9, 1359 416

(Noreober 9, IV^O), p. 3»

(45) S«« f-qeroozi, No« 3, r«uran, Aaar 1359 IDeceiuber

19^0), p* 3^; and ritue. hew lork, Febmary V, 19^1,

P*23* (46) Aslan ;ecorder. liew tielhl, February 9-21, 1931, p.l)900«

(47) ifie ■■conomiat. Vol. 277, London, Hot. 29, 19^0,

PP* 33-34.

(4^) Xhe i:;Conoml3t> Vol. 200, Mo. 7204, London, Sa^teaiber

26, 1981, p. 10.

(49) ft-slaii recorder. Vol. XXVIII, Mo* 4, h%n U ln l, January 22- 28, 19?^1, p. 15^51. (50) As ouoted In Iblri.

(51) A# ruoted in Kavhan, rayman 9, 1359 (Decoiaber 30# 1980).

(52) Aa ouote

axid eitad in KPn-e-Kargar (..orker'a FaUi), Second year,

Mo. 6| Ter^ran, Baniuan 6, 1359 (January 27, 1981), ^.7.

(52a) A very brief and clear version of tne agreejSiSnt has

been i^iven by P. .^esentsev in his a rtic le "i^ersian

Oulf; rhe Hostaroa Keleased—«tnat ^owi* in i.ew i'laies,

..oacowi Ko« 5i January 1981, p* 8.

(53) Asian iecorder. Vol. IXVII , lo. 8, New Delhi,

February 19-25, 1981, p. 15898-

(54) From this, it was expected that i f ieagazi's adminis­

tration and tae U.S. Supreme Court allowed, another

d 1*2 b illio n or nors from doffiestic brancnes of

^jaericpn Banks would be raaltted to Iran, making the 417

to t»l ^ iv.05 b illio n . ($5) 0«roian offlclcils vmo h e l^ negotliat^ tae asttleaisnt

r«fard«d It as a basically good deal* "Lat ua face

it**, said a to^ «x ^ rt in Bonn ForelgCi Ministry*

*tha 52 got out* Ihat in itself was a salvage Dera­

tion fo r the United States* After a ll wnat did the

Iranians gat out of it? taey are not even back to

souar^ one**- (see ^ewsj^gek, February 9i 19^1, p* 39)*

(56) T e i.conomlat* Vol* 27S, No* 7l69i London, January

24, 1931, Pfc^. 19-21.

(57) Ayatollah Khomeini is reported to nave said, "they

have said in words, but it is a real fact that the

forei^ers don't pay our m^ey*” (froiu Knoffieini*s

speeches auoted in Kauser. s o c ia l issue. Union of

Iranian Students Islaalc Associations, India, No* 7,

Khord^d 15, 1360 (June 5, 19^1).

(5^) As Quoted in fii&e. Vol* 117, No* 6, New Toric,

February 9, 19^1, p. 23»

(59) J*I*P*F*0* (minority), Kar. iliird Tear, No* 101,

ednasday, ^sfand 2, 1359 (February 10, 19^1)» p*ld*

(60) As Quoted In Kubln ^dreasyan, ^.ho Benefits by the

Petrodollars'*, .-ew Ximes. ^o* 15i **oscomj, Apxil 1931,

pp* 24*26*

(61) Ibid*

(62) From a report ^ven by t*xr* .insure Faxiiang, the Xr?>nian

representative to United Nations, in angfaelab-e- klS

^alaml (Islam ic Kevolutlon), Siisbrlvar 9| 135V (August 30, (63) In hla v is it with ciie auuioritlss of o il IndustrXt

Ayatollati Khoraelni said; "I believe tnat if Uie

economic sanctions continue fo r another 10*15 srears

we would find our own {jersonitllty* • • • ^'^any people are afraid of thl9 economic sanc:.ion » but^consider tn« 9 as a id ft to our country ••• we have suffered from

the game of su^rpowers* I must say that tise maxlsiua

damage they have done Is what I c a ll the damage of

personality* rhey tried to take i^isonallty froa

us*" (from Khf^einl speeches ouoted In Kauser.

special Issues, No« 5i 15tii Jrdibehesht 1360 (^^ay 5|

19^1) > published by U .I. •I^A* - India, p* 15•