Assaulting the Siegfried Line: An Artist’s Perspective on the Final Months of World War Two

Interviewer: Ross Munk

Interviewee: Bill Foley

Mr. Haight

February 11th, 2016

Table of Contents

Interviewer Release Form…………………………………………………………………………2

Interviewee Release From…………………………………………………………………………3

Statement of Purpose……………………………………………………………………………...4

Biography………………………………………………………………………………………….5

Historical Contextualization: Reflecting on the Siegfried Line Campaign in World War Two…..7

Interview Transcription…………………………………………………………………………..19

Interview Analysis……………………………………………………………………………….54

Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………………58

Works Consulted…………………………………………………………………………………6

Statement of Purpose

Too often, when writing about World War Two, the individual struggles of soldiers are forgotten in place of the names of generals and locations of battlefields. The campaign to break through the Siegfried line of defenses was not a glorious one, nor is it remembered and written about in many accounts of World War Two. The purpose of this American Century Oral Historian Project is to write up the firsthand account of Mr. Bill Foley, an infantry soldier in the 94th Division of

Patton’s Third Army. Mr. Foley’s experience on the front lines of the campaign make his knowledge of the events of the campaign invaluable to any historian attempting to write a comprehensive narrative of the campaign.

Biography

William A. Foley was born in 1926 in Edgewood, New Jersey, although he spent his early life growing up in the town of Teaneck, New Jersey. Upon turning 18, Mr. Foley enlisted into the United States army to fight overseas in World War Two. Mr. Foley became a rifleman in the 94th infantry division, serving as a member of General Patton’s 3rd army. He was involved in the Siegfried line campaign, and was present during the attack on the town of Sinz and the Saar river crossing. Mr. Foley was a

scout, and took part in many reconnaissance missions during the war, separated from the main

Allied forces. He was wounded multiple times, once in a finger and the other time in his chest.

During his time in the war, he discovered his passion for art, and would draw with scavenged supplies in his free time. After the war, Mr. Foley served for a year in the army of occupation in

Czechoslovakia. After returning to the United States, he enrolled in art school to further develop his skills. Later, he would move to Mexico and would take trips into the desert, surviving off of the land. Upon returning to the United States, he wrote a book about his experiences, titled

Visions from a Foxhole, which is recognized as one of the best memoirs about World War Two.

Currently, Mr. Foley is in the process of selling the movie rights of his book. His paintings have been featured in many art galleries, although they currently hang on the walls of his house in

Dallas, Texas. Today, he is married and has two children, and lives in his Dallas home, still painting.

Historical Context: Reflecting on the Allied Siege of the

Siegfried line in World War II

In the words of Capt. Belton Cooper, the Siegfried Line “was undoubtedly the most formidable man-made defense ever contrived. Its intricate series of dragon’s teeth, pillboxes, interconnected communication trenches, gun pits and foxholes in depth supported by an excellent road net and backed up by a major autobahn system that ran back to Cologne,

Dusseldorf and other manufacturing sites less than 50 kilometers to the east, provided the

Germans with not only an excellent defense system but also a base from which to launch a major offensive. “ (Ambrose 256) The defense network was considered to be impregnable; the final hope of the Wehrmacht in closing months of World War II. The offensive against the Siegfried

Line, known by the Germans as the “West Wall”, was the bloody and yet near forgotten conclusion of the war. After the Allies landed in Normandy, creating the second front, they were able to push the Germans out of France, but their attempts to cross into Germany were thwarted by the enormous line of defenses. The culmination of years of conflict, the siege on the line was inevitable; it was the final obstacle lying between the Allies on the Western front and the

Rhineland. Allied efforts to circumvent the fortifications failed, forcing U.S. soldiers into a bloody campaign to breach the West Wall. Therefore, in order to have a full understanding of the perspective of a soldier who was involved in the attack in reference to the war at large, as well as the attack’s place in the history of World War II and the underlying causes of the offensive, it is necessary to study the greater context of the period.

It is necessary to first return to the conclusion of the Great War, which shook the governments of Europe to their core. The aftermath of the war brought a great upheaval to the former powers of Europe; Russia, formerly under the control of Tsar Nicolas II fell first to a provisional government, which failed quickly and led to the October Revolution. In Western

Europe, a strong resentment for the Germans became the catalyst of future war. The Allies all blamed Germany for the war, and imposed upon the Germans ‘reparations’ for the damages caused by it. World War I historian Norman Stone wrote of the Treaty of Versailles “the French really meant to use this device to prevent the German economy from recovering, and other former Allies expected to pay off their war-debts. In 1921, the sum of 132,000,000,000 gold marks was arrived at, which meant that, annually, Germany would be handing over for generations a quarter of the money she earned from exports.” (Stone 188) After the war, the

American government invested money in Germany’s economy; this failed in 1929 when the world’s economy came crashing down. It was at this point when the weak Weimar Republic truly began to fall; “democracy broke down in 1930, in the sense that there was no longer a parliamentary majority prepared to take responsibility” (Stone 188). It was at this moment when

Hitler made his rise to power—appointed chancellor in 1933, he soon applied for full powers, which in practice would make him dictator of Germany. At this time, there was a pervasive attitude in Germany, promoted by Nationalist leaders, that they had not been defeated in the war, and that they had been “stabbed in the back” by the Jews and leftists. The Treaty of Versailles was best summed up by the Prime Minister of Great Britain at the time, Lloyd Georges; Georges was quoted as saying “if peace were made now, in twenty years’ time the Germans would say what Carthage had said about the First Punic War, namely that they had made this mistake and that mistake, and by better preparation and organization they would be able to bring about

victory next time.” (Stone 189) From the moment the terms of armistice were set, the path was set in motion for a Second World War.

With the stage having been set, Hitler consolidated his power and prepared to invade

Germany’s neighbors. Although the terms of the Treaty of Versailles banned Germany from militarization, European leaders believed that Germany would serve as a barrier between

Western Europe and the Soviet Union. For the time being, Europe stood by and watched as

Hitler built up his armies and fortifications, chief of which would later become to be known as the Siegfried line to the allies.

The chief military school of thought in the aftermath of World War I was that fighting defensively was vital. Along the Western front, static and unmoving fortifications were proven to give a large combat advantage. Therefore, in the postwar period European armies invested more heavily in permanent fortification networks. In France, construction began building a way to protect the length of their eastern border with the Germans and Swiss. However, these fortifications, known as the Maginot Line, did not extend past the Belgian border and to the

English Channel. This decision was made in part to protect the neutrality of Belgium, but also to force invaders to go through Belgium in order to invade France. During World War II, however, the Maginot line proved to be tactically ineffective as the defenses were weak by the Ardennes, because French commanders believed the terrain was far too rough for invaders to attack, and because the Germans main invasion came through Belgium. France surrendered within six weeks, an early warning that static defenses might not prove impregnable in the new era of warfare.

Hitler planned the Siegfried Line himself in 1936. The defenses would stretch four hundred miles, from Basel, at the three-way border between France, Switzerland, and Germany,

all the way to the border of the Netherlands and Germany. From Hitler’s perspective, the primary purpose for building the fortifications was for propaganda purposes as Germany did not believe that the defenses would see action in the war; once France surrendered, new fortifications were built along the English channel, known as the Atlantic Wall, to prevent Britain from being about to attack mainland Europe. The Atlantic wall failed when the Allied invasion of Normandy succeeded in gaining a foothold in France. This continued the precedent of static defense failing throughout World War II. However, the Germans were determined to hold off the Allied advance through Europe at the western wall. The defenses consisted of over 18,000 bunkers, which were made standardized to increase efficiency while building. The bunkers typically sported walls and ceilings made out of concrete thicker than 4 feet, and would often hold a garrison of between ten to twelve soldiers. These soldiers would get roughly a square meter of space in a bunker, and the bunkers lacked many amenities such as beds; soldiers were made to sleep in hammocks to conserve space. The fortifications also utilized concrete tank traps, which were commonly referred to as dragon’s teeth, referring to their pointed shape. Tanks would be stopped in their tracks by the traps, as their treads were unable to traverse the barriers. Because of the traps extending across the German border, it was difficult for Allied armor to help when breaking through the line; after Operation Market Garden failed; the Allied armies were in for a costly assault.

In months following the invasion of Normandy, Allied commanders in Europe began to face a serious logistical problem; Allied supply lines became increasingly backed up as their forces progressed deeper into Europe. After the initial landing, the only major deep-water port controlled by the allies was in Cherbourg, and during Operation Overlord, the French rail system was destroyed so that it would be difficult for the German military to respond to an invasion.

Efforts were quickly made to attempt to rebuild the railroads using prisoners of war as laborers, but for a time Allied armies were weakened as supplies had to be delivered via truck. At this point, rather than to attempt to alleviate the supply situation by securing Antwerp or aid Patton’s army to the south, General Eisenhower made the decision to assault the Rhine River directly in an attempt to bypass the Siegfried line. This offensive, which was known as Operation Market

Garden, would have far reaching consequences; Patton would later insist that if he were given the resources spent on Market Garden that he could have ended the war in 1944. Market Garden would become the largest airborne assault at the time it occurred. It was designed to cut off

Germany’s industrial heartland by attacking from the north. Initially, the operation went off successfully when almost every soldier landed within a kilometer of their target zone. Critically, however, due to a communication failure, the 508th Paratrooper infantry were unable to capture the Nijmegan Bridge, which would allow German reinforcements to arrive. Some of the radios given to British paratroopers did not function properly, and communication began to break down. German commanders began to realize the scale of the attack currently underway, and responded quickly. The battle began to turn as more German reinforcements arrived, and as the days passed it became clear that the attack would not succeed, as it became increasingly difficult to supply the soldiers. Operation Market Garden had failed.

Much of the criticism on the operation was that the men could only be supplied by one highway;

Historian Stephen Ambrose wrote of the situation, “the idea that a force of several divisions, consisting of British, American, and Polish troops, could be supplied by one highway could only have been accepted by leaders guilty of overconfidence” (Ambrose 248). Eisenhower maintained that the operation was a necessary risk, and that it came close to succeeding.

However, as a direct result of the offensive, the Allied armies were forced into a head on assault of the Siegfried line.

Patton’s advance through France into Germany was halted not by the German resistance but rather because the Third Army had run out of fuel. However, once the supply lines caught up with the army, Patton encountered Fort Driant outside the city of Metz. The fortress was built in

1902; because of this American officers were confident it would not be able to withstand a modern artillery barrage and could be taken easily. Waves of soldiers attacked the fort, only to be beaten back by entrenched Germans. When Patton finally called the assault off, it became the first defeat of the 3rd Army. This attack signified the major issues with American tactics near the end of World War II; Generals such as Patton or Eisenhower were content to defeat the German army through attrition by overwhelming them with the number of American soldiers. Because of this, many American lives were lost, perhaps unnecessarily. Eisenhower attempted to justify this strategy, saying, “this policy would result in shortening the war and therefore in the saving of thousands of Allied lives.” (Ambrose 254) Opponents of Eisenhower’s utilitarian approach to the war would blame him for the needless sacrifice of American soldiers to come over the next few months of the war; once the siege on the Siegfried Line began in earnest, it’s bloody prequel at

Fort Driant would become the norm rather than the exception. American soldiers had to quickly adapt to the new dangers of the heavily fortified defenses, including thousands of “Bouncing

Betty” S-Mines buried along the entire West Wall. The mines would spring a meter into the air and then explode; covering any soldier unfortunate enough to trip them off with hot shrapnel.

Lieutenant George Wilson referred to the mines as “the most frightening weapon of the war, the one that made us sick with fear.” (Ambrose 255) When referring to the siege of the Siegfried

Line, Ambrose wrote “The campaign that resulted was the least glamorous, yet one of the

toughest, of the war. There wasn’t much strategy involved: The idea was just to attack to the east.” (Ambrose 254)

The major targets of the Allied armies during the offensive were the city of Aachen, heavily fortified by the Germans, Hurtgen forest, and the city of Metz, to the south; while

Patton’s 3rd army lost it’s momentum and broke against the walls of Fort Driant, the battle of

Aachen would begin. The battle became one of the largest urban battles the Americans participated in during the entire war. The Germans dug in at the center of the city to hold the

Americans off as long as possible; the American army was forced to fight from building to building, paying in blood for every inch of ground gained. American howitzers were brought in, and built a path through the city by blowing up any obstacle in their way. Finally, on October

21st, a week after the battle began, the German commander, Col. Gerhard Wilck, surrendered his remained three thousand soldiers. In the end, the American army lost over five thousand soldiers in the battle. Ambrose was highly critical of the battle, going so far as to write, “The Battle of

Aachen benefited no one. The Americans never should have attacked. The Germans never should have defended. Neither side had a choice. This was war at its worst, wanton destruction for no purpose.” (Ambrose 260) The Americans continued to push forwards, taking constant losses while constantly replenishing their army with fresh recruits.

On November 22nd, the Third Army finally secured Metz. After all infantry assaults on

Fort Driant ended in disaster, the Army bypassed the fort and cut it off from all reinforcements or supplies, so that it could finally be starved into submission. The fort wouldn’t surrender until

December 8th. In total, forty seven thousand Americans lost their lives at this stage of the battle, while the main defenses of the Siegfried line remained just over ten kilometers away.

South of Aachen laid the American army’s third major objective, the Hurtgen forest.

However, the tactical importance of the forest was grossly over valued by Allied command. The

Germans controlled the dams on the Roer River, which the Allies needed to cross to reach the

Rhine. Allied leaders made a critical error by deciding that the forest was the real objective, when in fact the army should have bypassed it to the south, capturing the Roer dams instead.

Ambrose criticized the plans: “Thus did the Battle of Hurtgen get started on the basis of a plan that was grossly, even criminally stupid.” (Ambrose 266) The forest consisted of tall fir trees, which blocked out the sun; the terrain was rough and difficult to traverse on foot. The battle would be fought under some of the worst conditions of the war. Shells exploded in the canopy of the forest, raining shrapnel on the soldiers below. Airplanes were ineffective, and the Americans had trouble calling in artillery because their forward observers had little to no visibility in the woods. This was not a problem faced by the Germans; however, as they had predetermined which locations they would need to bombard. Therefore, the Germans fought with the advantages of more accurate artillery while also fighting from defensive positions. It is estimated that there were four and a half thousand American casualties for every three thousand meters the army advanced. American generals refused to call off the attack.

The situation for American GIs continued to worsen the closer they got to the heart of the

Siegfried line. In the words of Ambrose: “There was no glamour, little drama, zero maneuver, It was just straight-ahead attack” (Ambrose 311) The turnover of soldiers at this point in the war was three quarters, meaning that there were very few combat veterans remaining to attack the line. The Americans did have one advantage on their side in the fighting, however: American industry. While the Nazis were forced to conserve their shells and make them last, American soldiers had a great bounty of shells to bombard the enemy with. Over time, this advantage in

firepower would grow even greater, allowing the Allied forces to breach into Germany. One of the first attacks in Germany was into the village of Sinz, fought by the 94th infantry division.

Four companies of soldiers under the command of General Patton attempted to attack the fortified town, but were met with heavy resistance. William A. Foley wrote in his memoir about the battle “Two companies had been stopped in the woods to the left, and our two had attacked alone, taking the full impact of enemy fire and leaving 60% of our men in the snow.” (Foley 34)

The Germans were able to hold onto the town against the assault, inflicting heavy casualties. But the Allied war machine could not be deterred. They returned with armor and overran the village.

From this point they were able to push deeper into the Siegfried line, all the while under heavy artillery fire. However, when soldiers began to reach Nazi fortifications deeper into Germany, they were oftentimes met with little resistance; while artillery rained down from above, breaching the Siegfried line caused German soldiers on the frontlines, at this stage in the war often little more than boys, to realize the futility of the war; Sgt. Vernon Swanson noted of the attack “none of our company can recall any direct fire during our advance through the West

Wall, although artillery shells dropped on us.” (Ambrose 318) Soon, Allied soldiers had overrun the German heartland; the West Wall had fallen. This event signaled the true defeat of the Nazis; although it would be some time before there was an official surrender, the hope of the German people had been broken through extreme attrition.

Newspapers back in America mirrored the optimism beginning to creep in on the front lines; headlines in the Christian Science Monitor on March 3rd, 1945 read “Vaunted Siegfried

Wall Found No Match for Allied Offensive”. The article ran these words, which sum up the role of static defenses in World War II—The Siegfried Line only delayed an inevitable event. This article also expresses the optimism felt by America following the collapse of the Siegfried line; it

was seen as Germany’s last great defense against the Allies, and when it fell victory was all but certain back home. Two weeks later, the Washington Post ran an article describing the affect the destruction of the line had on the German people: “The most important reason is the terrific psychological effect it has on the Germans to see their famous defenses blown to hell”.

Although there was a practical benefit to destroying the defenses after their capture, it was also symbolic; crushing the Siegfried line crushed the spirit of the German people.

Even though the war was coming to a close, there was still intense fighting from German holdouts; many loyal Nazis refused to surrender until Hitler himself committed suicide. Vince

Sacco, interviewed by Isabelle Delcea, recalled, “The Germans fought hard to except, and they fought to the very end, which was unfortunate” (Delcea 4). The Nazi party retained control for as long as possible; Ambrose wrote, “So long as Hitler was alive, it would be. Until then, the

Germans would fight.” (Ambrose 315) This pair of quotes, one from a World War Two veteran and the other from a renowned historian, both exemplify the struggles faced by Allied soldiers up until the fall of Berlin. Desperate attempts from Nazi holdouts served only to prolong the conflict and delay the inevitable.

Although in the end the siege of the Siegfried Line was successful, and Allied troops pushed into Germany to end the war, there is contention over the effectiveness of Allied tactics in the campaign; Eisenhower practiced a strategy of attrition, in which he sent fresh recruits, many of which went straight to their deaths, to attack heavily fortified positions in order to simply outlast the Germans soldiers and bring about the end of the war. The largest example of this strategy in use was the battle of Aachen; Aachen offered little in the way of strategic advantage, and yet soldiers were forced to capture every last building that hadn’t already been

reduced to rubble by artillery. Charles B. Macdonald, the chief historian of the United States

Army in the 1960s, stated that in Aachen,

“The way in which German units were squandered without major reward was indicated by the fact that an equivalent of twenty battalions had been used in counterattack roles against the 30th Division, yet in only one or two cases had any counterattack involved more than two reinforced infantry battalions. A never-ending compulsion to stave off recurring crises had sucked the enemy’s units into the abyss of piecemeal commitment.” (MacDonald 317)

In this view, MacDonald believes that World War II was won in part by the way Allied commanders were able to draw out German soldiers and over time defeat them by the superiority of American numbers and industry, and that the act of potentially sacrificing soldiers because they were expendable and could be used to gain whatever small advantage they offered over the

Nazis was justified. Eisenhower stated, “In war everything is expendable-even generals’ lives--in pursuit of victory.” World War II historian Stephen Ambrose debated this idea; he believed that

“it was just pure waste and the commanders should have done something about it.” (Ambrose

263) From his perspective, the fact that leaders valued the quantity of soldiers over the quality showed how disconnected Allied leadership became from their soldiers in the final months of the war. Between the Americans, there was little contact between soldiers and upper command;

British officers went so far as to order American commanding officers to visit their troops on the frontlines (Ambrose 265). While MacDonald wrote his beliefs that the Allied loss of lives was necessary in 1963, while Ambrose looked back at the offensive in 1998 to view the failures of

Allied command; Ambrose would go so far as to liken American officer’s failures in the campaign to the British disaster at the Somme in World War One.

To have any sort of substantive knowledge about the long reaching effects of World War

II, it is necessary to understand the siege of the Siegfried line. The lessons learned in the final months of World War II would come to dictate American military policy throughout the rest of the 20th century. The battle is one of the most forgotten conflicts in all of World War II, and yet it dictated the terms on which the war ended; if there had been no breakthrough in early 1945, the Soviet Army would have extended it’s sphere of influence across all of Germany. In this way, this battle had long reaching affects into the lives of everybody in Europe.

Interview Transcription

Interviewee: Bill Foley

Interviewer: Ross Munk

Location: Mr. Foley’s home, Dallas, TX

Date: January 4th, 2016

6:50 Ross Munk: This is Ross Munk, and I am interviewing Bill Foley, World War II veteran, as part of the American Century Oral History Project on January 4th, 2016, at Mr. Foley’s house in Dallas. First, would you be willing to tell me a little bit about your childhood growing up?

Bill Foley: I was born in Edgewood in New Jersey, where some years later the George

Washington Bridge was built right over where I was born. My father used to say that was a monument to the birth of his son, and I believed that for quite a few years. But that was where I was born; I mainly grew up in Teaneck, New Jersey, several miles away from Edgewater. I went into the army from there.

RM: As soon as you hit the age of 18. Why did you choose to enlist as soon as you turned 18, what was your thought process?

BF: I know that some people managed to get into the service at 17, and even younger; my understanding of that time from the draft board in Teaneck was that I would have to be 18. On

my 18th birthday, I was the first one down at the draft board and I signed up for immediate induction, which of course you will find all about in the book,

RM: And then you went to Florida, for your training?

BF: I went to Florida, to Camp Landing, had the training; it was cut short. It looked like the

Battle of the Bulge was going to be moving on.

RM: What was the typical day like at Camp Landing during your training?

BF: Up at 4:30, 5 o’clock (laughs). And calisthenics, followed by breakfast; assignments for what we would be doing that day: cleaning the barracks, making our beds; everything had to be absolutely perfect. And we would fall out and do the training. There was a great deal of marching, and running, and it was quite exciting to receive your equipment, the smell of it

(laughs) and the M1 Garand rifle that was given to me. Pretty exciting occasion. And learning how to clean it, use it, and going out and shooting it after several weeks. We had to quite a bit of things before that to go to the shooting range, where we could actually do that.

(Pauses) I don’t believe that I have ever told anyone about this, and I don’t think that I wrote about this, but when I was a baby, something must have happened, some loud explosion, that affected me traumatically. And in growing up, for Fourth of July picnics, my parents would take me to fireworks and demonstrations and so on, which frightened me very badly. And as a result they decided, after several years of trying this, which never worked, they would take me away on the Fourth of July to a quiet place. One reason that I wanted to get in the service, and I chose the

most difficult, the most dangerous: the infantry. This of course is what my father served in, in

World War One. And he was wounded, and gassed, survived it, until the age of 62, when he passed away. My first experience in Camp Landing with loud noise was on the shooting range.

The way that you approach the line, which is very well organized and done with great care, of course: There would be a system of three to five sheets; each one had a distance behind the firing point that you would arrive at. I did that because I decided that I have to overcome this and I’m going to do it today. And I could feel the fear, the lack of confidence, and when I arrived at the firing point, I took my position as instructed by the instructor, each firing point has its instructor.

I never heard the rifle go off--you don’t hear it—there’s a sense of concussion—that’s all. You may lose your hearing a little bit, for a while. I felt very good about that. At least I had done that much. Later, there would be firings of automatic rifles, firing a mortar, which makes a pretty loud bang, even though it’s only a 60 mm, which every rifle company in combat has. Until eventually towards the end near Bivouac, which is the last part of the training, and the Bivouac was hurried up because they were going to ship us on a boat and get us in combat as quickly as they could.

13:03 RM: What was the Bivouac?

BF: Bivouac is apparently a French term for the troops going into the field living in tents and conducting combat like operations and patrols, attacks and so on. During one of the attack phases, we had 105 mm Howitzers some distance behind us, probably a half a mile. I never saw them, but the shells would come over, you would hear them, you would become familiar with what they sounded like, and they would hit, perhaps 100, perhaps 200 yards in front of you. And

we would be moving forward in an attack. I’ll never forget one of those shells, and it didn’t mind me at all; I felt absolutely confident with the sound of it, I could handle it very well. I had overcome the problem, because this was the ultimate test. Hand grenades and things like that we had thrown earlier and I had no problem with the sound. I do believe that because of overcoming the fear, it made me an even better soldier than I was; I was a good soldier. I was a normal, good soldier. That’s about it; no more, no less. (Laughs) And the funny thing that happened during the artillery thing was that when one shell exploded you could never predict where the shrapnel was going to be. But there was a peculiar whining sound coming closer to us, and one of our first sergeants who had been (Loud beeping noise) in the Pacific combat—All of our instructors had been in combat in the Pacific, we had the advantage of that—So this first sergeant heard the whining thing and threw himself down on the ground and I remember myself just laughing because I knew somehow that it wasn’t going to hit us, and it was probably the end part of a shell that had blown up and came in our direction; those things happen. I felt so good, I was anxious to get overseas and get into combat; I knew what to expect—many of these young guys did not, nor were they very happy about going; they hadn’t volunteered, as I had, maybe some of them had, I don’t know.

RM: I was going to ask, how did the realities of combat compare to the expectations that you had before hand?

BF: I was probably wise enough at 18 to have expectations; and that is really part of a Buddhist philosophy which I had no idea existed because I was brought up a Catholic at Catholic schools,

I had no idea about that, but some people are probably born with a little more wisdom, and one makes you think about reincarnation, I mean really, where does it come from? The things that I understood as a very young person.

(Pauses) No expectation but you see, before going into the service I had read a great deal about the war, the first world war, and the Civil War. And I had a pretty good idea of what men felt and what they go through, and what a terrific test it would be, of everything that you are. If you can survive that, despite the fact that you are scared, but you keep your head, and you survive, you’ll grow; and your character will deepen. That’s what I came out of the service with: A much stronger character, and a lot more confidence.

RM: Your first combat experience was at the town of Sinz, where your unit took 60% casualties

BF: 60%

RM: Would you say that you had been adequately prepared and trained going into combat?

BF: I can’t speak in a general way for others but I never had any doubt that I was ready.

17:51 RM: Historian Stephen Ambrose said that “The replacements paid the price for a criminally wasteful replacement system that chose to put quantity ahead of quality; its criterion was the flow of bodies.” How would your experiences compare with that statement?

BF: Absolutely true, absolutely true. We noticed that. One of the great difficulties; those of us that would question the system, and most of us do, some perhaps a bit more sophisticated than others, a bit more understanding, is that there was no loyalty to a particular company; when you establish a relationship with the men in your unit, it goes very very deep, very deep. Especially with the close relationships that I had with several men, certainly with Dan, who I was assigned to when I was first put in G Company. That frozen night we were led up to our holes, and joined him in a hole. And he was immense help immediately; he had been in combat for some time and he experienced it and told me everything he could. I followed him, especially in the attack on

Sinz, as much as possible, but sometimes you lose contact in the smoke, the noise, and the casualties happening, and are pretty much on your own. And finally going across that field of snow, and getting to Sinz, where there was a wall, next to a building and I (Laughs) I was there first, and then Dan showed up and the others. I think that’s the way it happened.

RM: What can you tell me about the Saar River crossing?

BF: Oh yes. (Pauses) I’m trying to think of things that aren’t in the book, I didn’t tell the whole story of everything.

RM: It’s fine because a lot of people who are reading this won’t have read the book.

BF: Precisely. But that particular part I did tell it quite well, my feelings, my observations of moving up through that mist and fog. Going down that hill and smelling the water and then hearing it, because of the 7-mile an hour current. There was ice moving through it as well, and I know we had to cross that and get to the other side, of course I went into the water…I was so

excited that day the water, the freezing cold of the water in February, somehow it didn’t really effect, me—it was a terrible shock, but I was only in the water for perhaps 2 or 3 seconds before

I pulled myself up on a steel ladder going up the wall. And so I didn’t feel anything except we were lying down on top of the wall waiting for the order to move forward to where there was a railroad track, and then there was a German bunker, which had already been captured by our previous battalion that had crossed the day before. We were the second battalion to cross there at that point. So when the word came to go I just jumped to my feet and my body burst into ice shards—the water had frozen to me that quickly. I was in shock, and suddenly I realized how freezing cold I am. And of course at that point then we were moved along the base of this cliff and up a path; Dan and I were scouts, and went first to follow another company. It was difficult at that point because I was soaking and moving and trying to climb. So for about three days after that, up in the hills, I had to fight the chafing in my body, under the arms and the crotch, under the cartridge belt, which is pretty heavy, its about 80 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition on it, bandoliers, the grenades, all the stuff you carry—the helmet was bouncing around on your head; it never did sit right. Often you would have to hold it with one hand while running and your rifle in the other one. So it took quite a while, and our medic, who later on we had to arrange to get out of the company because he was battle fatigued and could no longer do anything; he was totally out of it. We did get rid of him, by wounding him, by hitting him on the head, which was a great favor for him because he was a terrific guy and a great medic. A very handsome guy, a couple of inches shorter than I was; his name was Fred Buckler. And I don’t use that name in the book because so many men I’ve forgotten their names or I never got their names. I’ve been like this all my life. Like my father, we forget names. (Laughs) And when we’re introduced to

people, it’s terrible, it’s so embarrassing! So I’ve been criticized for that, because I don’t have the names. I tried to make the names close to the ones that I knew would sound something like it.

24:45 RM: When writing your book, did you come up with pseudonyms for people or did you always try to use their actual name?

BF: Mostly, the officers I didn’t for some reason, I didn’t know why.

RM: So for the officers you used pseudonyms?

BF: Yes, I picked the names up that I found.

RM: Back to the Saar River crossing. Critics of Patton maintain that he should have waited until dark to do the crossing. Having been there, what is your opinion on that?

BF: I have no opinion, because I’ve never been a general and I never will. I certainly wasn’t then. I carried a rifle, and he carried the responsibility. It’s a fearful thing to find out that you are going to be in Patton’s third army. But at the same time, statistically, I learned after the war that his methods very often caused less combat casualties than other generals along the front. Not always, but quite a bit. That’s because of the quickness of his moves I suppose. Insofar as what he did at that time, I think there’s something that I didn’t write; in fact, after I wrote the book, a man in the 376th regiment of our division, a division having three regiments, we became very close friends. He was very, very tall man, perhaps even taller than your father. After the war, he

became a very good English teacher. But at that time, when they were due to cross the river at their point, you understand that my regiment crossed at one point, in a mile, mile and a half, a couple more miles another regiment crossed and then we would try to clean out the area between us and join forces and then move as one big division. That was the idea, and it worked, of course.

But, my friend, and I’m even worse now at remembering names, I can’t even think of it. His first name was Russ. We became very close friends, a wonderful man. He was standing with his unit in a bunch of buildings about a mile from the Saar River. They had a rather flat area to run across to get to the river where the boats that survived were waiting. A lot of German artillery had wiped out the boats, they’d bring up more boats, the artillery would wipe them out, machine guns across the river in the bunkers, because this was the main Siegfried line. We had just gone through one. So they’re standing in these buildings and along comes a bunch of officers, and there’s George Patton and our division general, Maloney, and they were standing near him, looking through windows, I assume that’s what it was, through windows at whatever they could see, and it was daylight. The fog tends to come up every night, that’s what made it relatively easy for us to cross earlier, when I got soaked in the water. Even though there was some shelling.

But the Germans were not doing very well with the shelling in our area because of the cliffs in front of us across the river. Some of the shells would hit back, trying to get at us, but hit the top of the ridge. So we had a pretty good time, although a few shells got in. But Russ was listening to the conversations that you get from the generals, a fact that’s most interesting, not everyone gets to hear a bunch of generals talking about what’s going on. Patton was unhappy with the fact that there had been so many casualties. He was unhappy that the 376th had not gone across yet in whatever boats were remaining. Meanwhile desperately its officers were running all along the reach echelon looking for lost boat trains, big semi trailers stacked high with boats. He was very

unhappy with this, (laughs) he really, really was. And he’s shouting in that rather high voice that he has. Which reminds me of Donald Trump, who has a voice very much like that, and it’s been my theory for some time that he’s been a reincarnation of George Patton. Whose using his… not intelligence, I don’t think that Trump is a very intelligent man, but I think that he’s very shrewd as a businessman. I think there’s quite a difference between shrewdness and real intelligence.

And intelligence that is coupled with… compassion. (laughs) Heart, you know, this sort of thing.

And in fact this tends to put you in the class of a sociopath. That’s only my opinion, anyway.

(Laughing) So going back to the excellent General Patton, he suddenly turned towards everybody and he started to shout. “I DON’T CARE IF IT TAKES A BUSHEL BASKET FULL

OF DOGTAGS, WE’RE GOING NOW! NOW!” That’s the way it was related to me (laughs).

If it sounds like George Scott, it may, I don’t know. I never saw Patton. He was up in the line at times, and he did review the troops after the war in Czechoslovakia, and he did finally make the statement after all of his criticisms of the division. He said, “You were our golden gem.” Which is a pretty good thing to say. We got across the Saar River and started to climb, we got to the top, and ran into snipers. That was an interesting thing, eliminating snipers in the trees and stones

31:55 RM: Kind of related to what you just said—in your book, you wrote, referring to U.S.

Command, “Perhaps, as Hitler did, they saw unit designations on the maps but not the existing unit strength.” What did you mean by that?

BF: A sarcastic tone, because I’m relating that to histories I had read about the Germans, and certainly Hitler. It was written by some of his officers that Hitler’s anger—I think psychologically we understand what anger is, it’s really fear. And when you have fear, and that

takes over, you do not make good decisions. Hitler could look at a map; he could look at an area of the Russian front, for example, and say, “OK, the 11th Panzer is here, WHY AREN’T THEY

MOVING?” He would see the unit designation of maybe 12,000 men, but that was not the reality of the time, maybe they had been broken up, maybe they are half surrounded. In the last 48 hours, maybe they had lost 2,500 men. He didn’t see that, and the officers would try to explain to him what the reality was, and he would get even more angry. He expected that the German superman would somehow fill in the ranks with great acts of bravery and success. Of course that didn’t happen. The Germans were good soldiers with a very good army, and did not know, did not understand, what they were doing at the top—what Hitler did to minorities and so on.

RM: So when you were writing that quote in your book, you were being sarcastic when you said that Patton acted in the way Hitler did by asking why they weren’t advancing without fully understanding the situation?

BF: Yes, and you’re brining this up so I could have explained that a little better (laughs) that may be more interesting for the reader.

RM: It was just something I was curious about.

BF: A very good question, yes

RM: Stephen Ambrose also said that “In general, the American officers handing down the orders to attack and assign the objective had no idea what it was like at the front.” Would you say that that statement was accurate?

BF: Certainly it’s accurate. It has to be, because whether it’s war, or business, or anything else,

(loud noise) the voting public, a group of people, there’s a small percentage of truly centered, confident, perhaps brave individuals that lead the rest who don’t quite know what to do, and they follow the leader. And as far as courage at the front, it reminds me of—I think a good example, perhaps a good example, I can’t be sure, of the combat artists, who were professionals who were sent to various fronts throughout the Second World War, whether it’s the Pacific or Europe or

Asia, or could be North Africa. They did wonderful work, there’s a great, great collection of their stuff in Washington that Nadia, my wife, and I have gone to see. Because the curator of that wonderful collection was dying to get my collection of war work, and I wouldn’t give it to him because I’ve been trying to sell it to somebody who would put it in the proper museum. We have that agreement. So to this point I still have this collection in this area that could burn down at any time or blow away in a tornado. But it’s here, and I’m holding on to it, doing the best I can.

There’s so much money out there, it would be awfully nice if some wealthy foundation or individual could at least make some kind of deal with me to make me feel better about it all. And make sure it’s where the American public can see it. That’s important, because the evaluation of several different museums, including the one in New Orleans, the National World War Two

Museum, that exhibited my work, have researched it and found out that, that the fourteen million or so people who were in the armed forces during World War Two could not find any other untrained artist who did work of this quality. And they desperately tried to design a room in their

new museum when they put my work up, they couldn’t talk me out of it (laughs). I’m probably losing track here, take me back to the point please.

37:27 RM: Well, I had just asked you—Do you want me to repeat the question?

BF: Perhaps.

RM: Stephen Ambrose said, “In general, the American officers handing down the orders to attack and assign the objective had no idea what it was like at the front.” Would you say that that statement was accurate?

BF: Ah yes, I’m way off. But so many things come to mind that I’ve rarely talked about. In my company, before I joined it, when the 94th division was not on the Siegfried Line, the main line against the Germans, but when they first entered Europe, they were assigned to a large pocket of

German troops on the coast of France, the west coast, where they were protecting the submarine pens. So the submarines could keep on operating. That was the 94th’s first assignment, their first job. The company commander of my company, G Company, was hated all through training and all through the initial months of combat. Until finally one night, a rifle sounded off, and the officer received a bullet wound in his leg. It is said that one of the men, up in the forward positions, could make out pretty well who that guy was who was walking around, and decided to finally let him have it. He was taking out—he was afraid all the time, and because he was afraid, he made bad decisions.

RM: The commander?

BF: The commander, the captain. So he just disappeared back into the reach echelon hospital, we had no idea whatever happened to him. But he was replaced by Captain Griffin, who to me perhaps—I was 18, he might have been 28, I have no idea how old he was, but to me he was a father figure, and many of us felt that way; he was a good, courageous man, he was wounded several times. In Sinz he was wounded, and never left the line. I think his wounds were probably a little more severe than mine, because one wound, a head wound, blinded him for a period but he kept on commanding. (Loud noise) That’s something else that has never really been talked about; you’re getting some fresh information here. (Laughs) So that’s one example of someone who is afraid of the front line. I’m not sure he was near the front when he was shot, but it was very quiet when he was up there, except for that one rifle shot. Yes, there were certainly times when I can recall officers who were… This didn’t happen to me, but it happened to my company in a different part of the line who several officers, higher ranking perhaps, majors or a colonel, I don’t know, came up to the line. The GIs were dug in under a little ten foot ridge or something like that, and this one officer, they were talking about going up to see what’s on the other side, the Germans would be dug in 100, maybe 200 yards away, so they told the GIs, “you guys just climb up top there and tell us what you see.” And the guy who told me this turned around to the officers and said, “you can climb as well as we can! You go up and take a look!” Because every now and then I think there was a machine gun that would kind of bounce some .30 caliber rounds off the top of that little ridge. (Laughs) This sort of thing would happen. They really should have done their own looking. (Laughs)

41:55 RM: In my research, I came across the quote, “The S-mine was the most frightening weapon of the war, the one that made us sick with fear.” How do you feel about that quote?

BF: You say S-Mine?

RM: I mean the Schü mine that you talk about in your book; one of the paintings was about it.

BF: It’s called the Schü mine, yes. It was the S-mine, the Schü. That was a bad thing. That caused a very high percentage of casualties. We really hated it. There was one night that Dan, our… Squad leader. We did an amazing patrol, we got right behind the German lines to knock out that huge mortar they had, I guess it’s a 105 mm. It’s a large mortar, and we put a thermite grenade down it. That’s in the book, tells it very well. Some years--this is something else that I don’t talk about.

All the companies in the line had totally different experiences than a company 500 yards away. Everything is different, the tactical situation, what happens. There is a great diversity of action and results and things happening up and down the line. I guess our G-Company saw more action than most companies, although there were companies that suffered greatly and did their own great things each in their own way. That particular patrol, to get that German mortar, was a thing that you would normally get a medal for. At this point in my combat experience, and as many men around me felt, why do they give you medals, which are beautiful, and have these pretty, clean colored ribbons that you attach on it, for something really ugly? And somebody else would say, well that’s five points towards your discharge! That’s always a good point. I felt,

“gee, it would be awfully nice to have a medal.” And all that but that’s when I was young and

not in the service. I think everybody feels that way. And then it became an ugly thing. If it had been given to me, I would have said “fine,” And accepted it, and don’t think about it. In fact when I came home, I got off the boat, and my parents were there to greet me, amazingly, they got a special permission to come in to the dock in Hoboken, New Jersey. I’d won my combat infantry badge, and the one with the four battle stars. The good conduct medal, which is sort of a joke for all of us, nobody had good conduct. Things like that, but I didn’t wear anything else, there are other things that I had, and my father was a little disappointed when he saw that. But I didn’t want to wear them. To this day I can’t explain it very well. However, several years later, when I went back to veterans classes to finish high school that I had left to get into the army. I went to art school, in Newark, New Jersey, and I knew that my platoon sergeant was from

Newark, and he was studying law to become a lawyer, and we got together and talked about the war, and he said, “did you ever get your bronze star?”

I said, “what bronze star?”

“For that mortar patrol.”

I said, “No, Dan is dead, I didn’t get one.”

He said, “Your sergeant got a silver star.”

I said, “Well, it’s well deserved. “

He did a great job in getting us through that thing. He was absolutely perfect. Didn’t ask us to do anything he wouldn’t do. In fact he took over the scout duty from me, as they got closer.

We had good squad leaders. Good men, good soldiers. So anyway, apparently what happened according to the platoon sergeant I met in Newark was that our good Captain Griffin, and I had heard this before, was transferred after we got to Czechoslovakia. And so some things remained undone. And those were medals to a lot of different people, and a lot of things that had to be

worked out. So whatever it was, I never got that, nor did I ever look for it. It’s not very important to me at this point. And now what do they do? Recently they started giving out bronze stars to guys who were in the service. I don’t care if you were a truck driver who never even heard a gun shot in the rear echelon, because they were World War Two veterans they got a bronze star. I felt that is really not good.

48:01 RM: So did you ever receive one because of this?

BF: No. Well no I did, as a result of whatever that, that law was. You don’t mind cats, do you?

RM: No, it’s fine.

(Cat noises, small talk until 48:30)

BF: I think that pretty much sums it up about medals and officers. We had very good officers. I saw very little personally of officers who were afraid to do their thing. We had very good officers.

RM: It’s just something I’m curious about; it’s not that important, but the Germans—

BF: If you’re curious about it, it’s very important. (Laughs)

RM: So the Germans used a lot of Schü mines. Did the Americans mine up their sides, or was that not something that was done?

BF: We did, but mostly they were anti-tank mines and some anti-personnel things on the road or on the sides of a road. If the troops decide to walk around the road, they will hit the miens.

That’s exactly what the Germans did. And anyone else. This was work normally done by engineers. I didn’t have to do any of that. I don’t think I ever saw it being done. Then when we’re moving forward, the engineers have to go pick up those mines. They had a map of where they were, all the specs. The Schü mines, they were terrible. Equally, but not as many, were the… what. At my age, I’m losing… well, the move I saw last night. I can’t think of the title. But that’s ok; I’ve been that way all my life. Or the actors or their names, that goes right out of my head. Not necessarily common, but names now are more and more difficult for me, I remember everything else. You probably know, it’s the mine where you dig it in, put it in the hole, and it’s got little sensitive wire tentacles.

RM: Is it the Bouncing Betty?

BF: Thank you, that’s it. I’m in it for now; it will come to me. They put a thin wire, it’s hard to see, they put it attached to a tree or something and you would trip that, and in turn it would trip the tentacles on the mine. They were pretty ugly because they would bounce up around three feet. We used to call them ball-busters or shredders. Terrible. We had nothing like that; I never saw anything that we used like that. (Cat meows) She’s in love with me (laughs).

RM: In your book, you mentioned the fact that the German military would supply their soldiers with alcohol, and then you said “too often, those have boozed German soldiers stood erect when they should have hit the dirt.” What can you tell me about that?

BF: I know that guys would find bottles now and then, but it was a very informal thing. It wasn’t until after the war where there was a ration. We would get all sorts of strange bottles. The army would pick them up and give them out to the different companies and have a Saturday night party or something. There were guys that would find them hidden away in a house or something and use them, but I don’t think that I ever saw that, or if I did they kept them hidden. I really never tasted alcohol until after the war, and then I really got into it for a while. Pretty much like everybody else I guess. Then I quit cold. After about a year. And I’ve hated it ever since. When I go to an art opening, I might have a little glass of wine, but that’s about it. The Germans and the

British, the British have their tote of rum. That’s pretty well known. I guess it could help to warm their bellies a little bit. And we would find German canteens with a little bit of Schnapps or whatever in there. But it’s a fascinating thing, it’s like the two SS men that we picked up on hill 708. I remember stuff like that; we followed them down the hill with their hands behind their heads. They were able to walk straight I guess. They were pretty well boozed up. That can make you a lot more courageous. And after some sort of combat there would be dead bodies and after several days they really poisoned the air. It was a mixture of alcohol. So I came to the conclusion that there must have been a lot of drinking in the German army. When you would see them move, when you could see them and they were attacking you. They didn’t go as we did. We would move, hit the dirt, and try to squeeze off rounds, as that was the thing to do at the moment.

And hopefully jump up and bend over and move to another position. If you’re able to sense it,

your intuition, whatever it is that keeps you alive, and get behind something. You never got behind something until you could pretty much spot something else you could get behind. You don’t want to jump out of a relatively safe spot and just move and hope to find something because you may not find it. I would see Germans running straight at us. It’s not that simple because of course they would have groups putting down fire on us to keep us down under the hole so that other groups could move ahead. I’m seeing that also. Like on hill 708 at night with the flares; I could see the movement coming towards us. But there was a general tendency to just make the wrong kind of move, and I think that that was alcohol. I don’t know if I’ve explained that very well, I’m open to questions.

55:45 RM: Are you saying that you noticed oftentimes you noticed German soldiers might be more careless than they otherwise should be as a result of the alcohol?

BF: Well I feel certain that there wasn’t that much discipline in the German ranks. Again, you have stronger people and weaker people. You have leaders and those that might follow. You have those who might drink a little too much secretly, and others who drink just enough and can keep their head and do what they have to do. That’s true of humanity everywhere.

RM: During your experience in the war, there was one point in Lampaden when you were collecting SS rings off of dead soldiers. How common was it for soldiers to collect trophies?

BF: Well everyone did that, but if you’re referring to cutting fingers off, I know of only one other person—well there were several of course—but I personally knew of one guy who did this

a mile north of us in Lampaden--the town of Lampaden, of course. The entire ridge was called the Lampaden ridge, but there was the town of Lampaden just north of us. Then we were in

Schomerich, which was about a mile, half mile, I forget, south of that. And he talked about that.

He did that. The fingers would swell up; the first two rings I got were from men who were burned by the halftrack where they tried to start the motor and steal it from us. It was a prank, a drunken prank. Here we are, in the house, the halftrack was right at the side of the house, and it was loaded with ammunition. I was aware that there were German soldiers down there. One of them looks up, tosses a grenade, and it bounces back and goes back down, and that plus a phosphorous grenade that our platoon sergeant dropped, same guy, from the window above. That blew up the halftrack and killed both guys. They were burned pretty bad, and there was no problem getting the ring off. (Laughs) I know its gross, its 2016. But the ones that were lying on the cobbles, and the one that was the burned man that was crawling along that wall when somebody shot him. I’m looking out the door at him, waiting. It was very difficult because the fingers swelled up very quickly and simply necessitated being removed (Laughs) to get the rings off. I hated it; it was an act of insanity. Much of your actions in war are insane. I would like to explain something else too, if I may.

RM: Go ahead.

BF: I shot a German officer, after I became a temporary squad leader for a matter of a week or two. My first action up that hill was with my squad of replacements and a few older men. And that is a point, which is in my book, which I think, explains it well enough, is the action of it, that a white flag came up at the point they wanted to surrender after we had an exchange of some

grenades and rifle fire and we caught them maybe where they didn’t expect it on the side. Which we didn’t plan, it just happened that way coming up the hill and out of the trees. A white flag came up and then a pistol shot. I fired more rounds thinking they were shooting at us and then the white flag came back up again. Then men were raising their arms from the trench. I shouted at them to come out “Comen zie here” Which some of them started to do. And I thought it would be ok, because you usually don’t do it that way. I took another guy with me, and we ran across just a very short distance to the trench and the dugout with the two openings for machine guns.

And I jumped in, very quickly because I wanted to get under cover because I don’t know what else is out there in the field. And there were people out there that shot at us later. I landed on this one man who had been wounded, I don’t know by what, probably a grenade. And he screamed in pain because I landed on him, but I went down into the dugout and there was the German officer, standing there with the Luger pistol, still warm. He was staring at this man laying on the floor, a man about my age. Nice looking man, young man. He was dead. The officer had killed him for trying to surrender. He shot him for trying to surrender and then he panicked. Because of my answering rifle fire. That was one of the occasions where I saw red. I think that’s explained in the book, but again, its about five times in my life where my intense anger blots out my eyesight even though my eyes are open and there’s a red film over my eyesight for about a second, and I do something violent. I think I explained it might be an Irish thing, but I feel certain that there have been other people who have felt this experience. My rifle came up without thought and I shot him. The other prisoners were standing up outside the trench now. I thought I saw “good, its

OK”. They didn’t like him. Maybe I was rationalizing this, I don’t know. I did that, and I know it shocked the young guys in my replacement squad. You see if I had just taken him up as a prisoner of war he would have gotten away with his crime unless the other prisoners headed back

to the rear echelon would talk about it, which I would doubt. I thought he would get away with this. Now this was thinking that came to me after the act of shooting him! There’s no rational reason I could ever think of for what I did except I was horrified that he would shoot this man for trying to surrender and then he came up with the flag; that was enough for me. Later on I realized that maybe I did the right thing so that he didn’t get away with this. I punished him. I am the observer of the crime. I am the judge, jury, and executioner. And I have lived with that. And I have never felt very comfortable with it. But I think… …I don’t know what to think about that, I think I did the right thing.

1:04:05 RM: Did you ever experience anything similar to that with the American army, where a soldier might have been punished or even shot for going against his officer’s orders?

BF: I never experienced that. I’ve seen dumb things with pistols. After the war in

Czechoslovakia everybody had their souvenir pistols or maybe were buying them. I bought a little .25 caliber Czech automatic, a little tiny thing I put in my waistband. It’s against the rules of the army and the army of occupation, but I carried that for protection because a lot of weird stuff happened. When you read the article that I’m giving you, I think it’s in there. But this one fellow had a luger or a p38 pistol, it was either the p38 or the luger that the German officers carried or the noncoms sometimes. I’m not sure what kind of make he had but it was a big automatic sort of similar to our .45 that we were issued, I never had one, usually the officers had one. He was playing with it all the time, fooling around with it. I heard the gunshot, I went into that room and he was very rapidly painfully, rapidly, and confusedly dying. Within half a minute he was gone. He was just playing with it, and one of the guys said “I TOLD HIM TO STOP

DOING THAT” and that he had explained “eh, there’s nothing in it!” But there was a bullet in the chamber. And that’s all it takes with the safety off. He had put it to his chest to show that there was nothing in it and put a bullet through his body. So that sort of thing happened, there were quite a few accidents with guns. And no one has learned their lesson, and this country seems to be going really downhill quickly in stupidity with weapons. A very bad sign of many things, which are not looking good.

RM: What can you tell me about the French prisoners that you encountered on the Rhine? I felt that was a very interesting part of your book

BF: Very touching, a very touching experience. Probably before I was even in high school these men were captured in France during the initial take over of France. They came over and took so much of the European landscape. They were captured and they spent five years in prison camps in pretty bad shape. They were thin, uniforms rotted away, ropes holding up a lot of them, feet wrapped in gunny sacks, old shoes tied together, toothless. It was a real shock to find that man knocking on the door in that house on the Rhine. In a vaguely military uniform, or what was left of it. They looked so old and ancient. It was a great, great experience to be able to help them to the rear. We took every precaution to move them up from where they were hiding behind the dyke. To go 50/60 yards up the hill to where the house was, it was really a bar kind of, or a restaurant. Putting smoke shells over there, which was a great idea. Because there were Germans over there, although they were being very quiet. Because I goofed up in that window and they put two or three shells right out where I was. I made a few mistakes.

1:09:00 RM: After the war, you didn’t join any veterans associations until 50 years later. How come?

BF: I knew that I would hear in the newspaper or find out that there were divisions or units. All the services were having reunions. Well maybe not all of them, I don’t really know. I had no idea that the 94th had reunions. I wasn’t interested; I’ll tell you why, I do know why. My heartfelt association was with my brothers, all of us, because we all could look at each other and know that we had… survived something where we were brought up to the highest point where men could stand or to the lowest point where men could stand and survived. I never wanted to see them again in suits, I never wanted to see them again in ties; do you understand? That was a major thing. If we could be… be the same. And meet. I’d love it. But that was all gone, we were different, we were changed, we were civilized, we were trying to be; we had girlfriends, we were getting married, we had children. We had whole new dimensions of living trying to survive in a business world. Whether we did paintings in a businesslike way like I did, or whatever. But I didn’t want to see that. I’m not sure if I wrote this in my book, but my war art was in a portfolio that had got me into art school, and lasting friendships with my teachers, some of them had been professional artists during the war and so on. Lifelong friendships but after that I put it away in the family. I never saw it again until I got curious about it. This century, 2003 perhaps, I don’t know when—I phoned my daughter, Irene, in New York. She was very curious and looked for it.

I guess it was a couple of months later when she found it in the home of my nephew. She called me up, she had looked at everything, she called me up and she was crying her head off. Because she had found visual evidence of her fathers war. Not many soldiers could say that. It was a very emotional thing for her, because we are very close. So she sent them to me, and they arrived

here, and I put them on this table and said “this has got to be a coffee table sized book; illustration on one page, opposing page a paragraph. That’s all. So I sat down to do it.

Meanwhile a general arrived with an art agent that I had, the general lives in Dallas. He came in, and looked at the work right here, and said, “My god, you were in the 302nd?” And I said “yeah”.

He had been a lieutenant, I’m not sure now if it was a weapons company or a platoon leader. He stayed in the service and became a general. He said, “Don’t you go to the reunions?”

And I said, “No, never have, didn’t know you had them.”

“Yes, we’re going to have the next one in Albuquerque.”

Well I got all excited at that point. And that’s what I did during all this. I exhibited the work at the reunion. And it was very different than I had thought; I didn’t know anybody there, nobody knew me. We had changed; but there were four of us from G-Company, my company.

Interestingly enough, one from each platoon, there were four platoons; and I did recognize the one guy who lived in Florida, pretty sure I recognized the same fellow. But I can tell you, the sense of warmth, the sense of welcome, that I felt during the reunion convinced me of the tremendous value of these and why they occur! They occur for that warmth.

(Cat noises, laughing, and small talk)

1:16:11 BF: So at that reunion I had several people come on, some were officers, one was a captain from the 301st. He became lifelong friends; he entered to my art stuff and everybody wanted copies. I think I sold copies for 20 bucks to whoever could cover the cost. That went on, and I had wonderful relationships, but I did finish writing the book, and insist that it have one of my paintings, on the cover, showing the patch. That was the reason for that one. Of course the original was upstairs on the staircase. And I had to have the war art. And since there were two

publishers dying to get a hold of my book, which was nice, I gave it to the very best one, which was an old publishing company of military art. As a result, well one of the results of them selling their company a few months later was because of my book. Since then, as a result the library of congress and others an so on, the decision has been made, that it’s one of the five best memoirs that have come out of World War Two. And while I was writing it, I knew it was good, because three movie companies have tried to make a movie out of it. The first one, we became lifelong friends, the producers in Hollywood and so on. Wonderful folks, very close, they came across the country with their wives just to hear me speak somewhere. They ran out of money because

Warner Brothers had a flop and took their money back, so we didn’t make the movie. But they did make a documentary about it working with me, and were part of a little business selling it, which is nothing, I never got any money, and they didn’t either. Because they’re just not that popular now. And then a director called me up and wanted complete control of the book, and being a very responsible guy, and not wanting any harm to come to my division, I knew what he might do! I knew he might have cute little girls with helmets on in the foxholes, tantalizing the infantry! So I said no sir, can’t do it.

RM: Out of curiosity was the director someone pretty well known?

BF: The director was not that well known, in fact was an associate. He was the son of one of the producers who was doing good work, and wanted to do that movie; he had been part of the crew that came to one of our reunions to get background for the documentary. The final one was a group of people who had done a movie for their father in my division, and they had won a prize.

Fairly well done, honest, and they wanted to do one for my book. So this is not a big-name

group, and they just ran out of time or money or whatever, they couldn’t get it together and we just drifted apart. Which is ok, because I didn’t like them at all (Laughs). Extremely, extremely conservative, without any ideas that they should wear brown shirts or that they were mimicking

1934, what Germany was doing with brown shirts, and making little false armies, like they are doing here in Texas with our local governor, if you look into that. So there’s no movie, maybe there will be someday, because of the artist-riflemen type of thing, you know. I think I’m off track again.

RM: Well I hope you do find someone who respects the book and keeps it as it was originally written when they make the movie, I hope they make a movie of it.

BF: I think that’s always difficult, because they take into consideration my limited knowledge of movie making is the scene that I write, because I thought about it even while I was writing it,

“Wow, this could be a movie!” I’m an illustrator; I see those things. But I’m not a moviemaker; and sometimes you have to do things. And of course movies are very dishonest in the way that to fill the screen they bunch up 500 soldiers, which you would never do in combat. We were very careful about that, we really were; you can see in my book how careful Captain Griffin was about us bunching up. One shell could wipe out a whole bunch of people, so when you march along a road, you’re spread out; but not in the movies! In the movies, and that includes Private

Ryan, which was an excellent film, but so much more could have been desired for real honesty.

1:21:17 RM: I was going to ask, were there any movies that you have seen that you felt accurately depicted your time in the war?

BF: If you want to see great war movies, and I’m not changed the subject—(Phone ringing) Go to Rus—(Phone Ringing) Russian war movies are fantastic. Don’t forget that! (Phone Ringing)

This is a political call, which I don’t answer (Ringing) I contribute, but I don’t answer stuff.

(Very loud ringing) Am I answering that right?

RM: I think that’s fine, yeah. Now was there anything that you wanted to talk about, specifically, that I didn’t ask about?

BF: Politically? (Laughs) I’m just joking.

RM: Anything that you think might be interesting to people at my school, or anything that you wanted to talk about that we didn’t get to.

BF: It’s a pleasure to be asked that! Yes, but in the spur of the moment I’m not sure I can come up with it… …I gave up Catholicism… One dramatic night of trying to pray, I became almost..

Distantly related to some of these people during my personal spiritual experience. I hope this is ok with you. I fought to keep my religion after the war. I prayed pretty hard during the war because I had nothing else. That was my conditioning, or if you like—brainwashing. Growing up in Catholic schools and so on. Which was an excellent education and very nice people, unfortunately it was not my way of doing things. As a result I was praying very heavily every night when I came out of the army and was living with my parents. And trying to finish high school before going to art school. I was probably about… I was 20 when I came out of the

service, so I was probably about 22. One night, I didn’t get into the extreme two-hour prayers that I was now in. I just knelt by my bed for a long time that hot summer night. Just looking out the window; never understanding that this was my first meditation of a spontaneous nature. But after an hour, it was like a window opened up on one side of my head and another window on another; it was a sort of psychic breeze. Like a warm summer breeze came through and took out all of the crap that had been pushed into my head; I was free, it was gone. I was amazed, and at total peace; I had never felt that way before. I got up, climbed into bed, and said, “I’ll never pray again.” Then I slept beautifully. Then began the search to find out what this was all about; I was

22, and it wasn’t until the age of 36, after putting myself through all kinds of adventures, especially in Mexico. All kinds of high-risk things that I did. With my trips to the jungle and desert. Looking at all kinds of things, getting inspiration for painting, and eating whatever seemed to be the thing to eat. I carried some rice with me; I would share it with the people I would find in strange places in the desert. It was a great experience; it’s too much to go into right now, but the point is that at 36, I had enough. I took of to New York City to see a friend of mine that I had met in Mexico. He put me up in his little apartment. I stayed there for some months, and I noticed a change in him almost immediately and asked him, “David, what’s happened to you? What’s this change, why are you so peaceful?” He said that now that I had asked him, he would be able to answer; but he wouldn’t be able to volunteer it. He had joined a group, perhaps a year before that, which had come out of Indonesia. Some individual, which had become enlightened, which has nothing to do with born-again Christians, although apparently born-again people relate to this. But many perhaps do not understand it. I went to a meeting with him, and met people. And was very conscious of the quality of people involved; the two leaders were television people quite famous; Joe Bolton had a TV show dressed like a policeman for kids. The

name’s got to come to me or I’m going to have to phone you with it. But the other guy had I think the tonight show; he was very famous as a comedian. They tested me; found out in their own particular way that I was close to being ready. After several meetings with them where you received instruction on meditation. On a Sunday afternoon, I was opened to this. It was simply going to this room; women practiced separately, children under 18 were not allowed in the building. The idea being that in meditation you can throw off some of the stuff with proper meditation going into depth; not just playing the way that most people play with it. Going into depth with it to really start a purification process. You throw stuff off that is negative, and it is real, and can affect, to some degree, people. The first meditation was Bolton, and the other gentleman whose name I cannot recall. And it lasted one half hour, where you stand in this room with wonderful thick rubs, in case you might lie down or walk around during your meditation; it’s a different kind of meditation than most. And in that half hour, something happened to me.

When they said, “Open”, which begins it, I closed my eyes and I stand. Their eyes are closed and they are standing a short distance away. Later in my studies of the spiritual, I learned to understand what the kundalini is, and the rising of the spiritual nature of it, when it is finally prodded awake. When it gets to this point, which is why it has never caught on, because you cannot explain it. It is beyond the mind; it’s not like religion where you can talk about it. What happens is beyond your intelligence, which is the area of your center, which is connected to everything that is. And it was a purification process that I was involved in, that had—Well, the meditation was over with. I had opened my eyes but I could not move, and I could not stop staring, and they came over to shake my hand, smiled, and then left the room. And after a while,

I looked around the room, looking for why I had raised up and down several times. And of course I hadn’t, but something in me had begun, which is beyond explanation for the

intelligence. What medical doctor will tell you about this. As a result, and realizing there was a subway under the building, and it wasn’t that, and couldn’t have been, I walked downstairs and

Bolton and the other guy were there, and some other people, and David. And they said that they had been meditating on me, and that… …very quickly, I’ll go back a moment. But the reason, which I hesitate to admit, is that I was, in a sense, on the lamb from Mexico, because I had gotten into some political things with little people in the south of Mexico, and helped organize them into a resistance against some bad people. Then I left them because they overreacted, and I lost control of them, and I just walked away over the desert. I never went back. And I knew I had covered myself well. I didn’t think anybody would know who I was; they didn’t know who I was. I was careful in the beginning. But nevertheless I decided to go to New York City, and

David took me, understanding my problem, that I was hiding out. I couldn’t get a job, I had no money. And so Joe Bolton and our very famous friend told me that that day I would find a job, I had been looking everywhere for a job using a false name, David gave me a false name. But I had no ID; I couldn’t get a job. I’d do anything! When I left the building, they told me nothing would disturb me anymore. That I am centered. I’m walking down 5th avenue later, in a whole new state of mind, a whole new light, beautiful state, of great confidence and happiness. 5th avenue, crowds of people, Sunday afternoon. There’s a very tall man walking through the crowd, and I recognize him as the art director of the art school I went to, a very good friend. Graduated me with honors, stuff like that. It was a great meeting; we had not seen each other since I was in art school. I was 36 now; I had been 25 when I graduated from art school. He and I went to get coffee together, and he offered me a job. I told him the problem, and he said, “we’ll take the false name. I’ll pay you in cash.” In fact, that’s what Joe Bolton said. “He will pay you in cash.”

How do you figure this stuff? Ok, so that’s what he did. I worked there for several months.

Gould Holst, Holst was his name. Wonderful man, and he ran the art school. He had a business now, of working for Klein’s department store in New York City, and they were going to branch out into New Jersey. They saw that big expansion that stores were going through. He designed everything that the customer sees. The racks, the floors, everything. And he had several people working for him, so he put me to work. He tripled my salary in the first week. We did pretty good together, then I got some money and figured I was making too much money from him anyway, and went back to Mexico. Everything was fine down there, and always has been. So I covered my political self in that way. I’m a very liberal person, always will be, and I’m delighted to be that. It takes a lot of guts living in this Texas, which really should be a country onto itself when they get their head together (Laughs) I had to say it! So my history is a bit different from most veterans I would think. I never settled down into the usual thing, but illustration suited me beautifully. I was always my own boss; I can walk into a place with a portfolio of the photographs of the work I had done, which I am very proud of. Murals, illustrations, whatever— walk into a room of designers and not say anything except good morning. Open it up, and let each one who had their own portfolio of work to see if somebody could use some work. Had many wonderful experiences and many wonderful friendships, and I’ve been my own boss. Even when I worked for museum arts, I also managed to be my own boss because I was on a sort of freelance basis, and I could paint murals there; and even the mural I painted for my division, which is in the Massachusetts state house—I had to give it to Mitt Romney by the way, I had to give a speech and give it to him.

(Small talk)

In the sense with the meditation, I continued doing this ever since I was 36 without stopping. In

Mexico, I practiced my meditation 2 hours a day for 9 years in a reclining chair. My children then—I had married a Portuguese-Spanish woman at that time, my second wife, my first was an

American girl, and after that second marriage, brought my children to Mexico and gave practically all my money to my second wife, because she had a brain operation at the birth of my son, who was retarded for a period of time, many years. He is now in his 50s, but because he was with me, he is now out of this; he is no longer retarded because I know how to do that. To retrain his brain. He is a janitor in the Dallas school system, and for many years now has been doing very, very well. Finally got to the point where he could live by himself and not with me, and he’s married now. He’s doing very well. I’m proud of him and proud of myself. My daughter is just a brain, and has great success with anything she does. In New Jersey. The meditation went on as I say, for 9 years, in the most subtle, the easiest, and yet most difficult spiritual non-struggle of my life. Because struggle is in the three-dimensional plane of mind and does not exist when you are centered. There is only that intimate relationship between self and all that is; that basic spirit that produces growth. That to me is what god would be; nothing else. At the end of the 9th year of meditation, not the end perhaps but just one day, finally had been building every day, building, building, in the most beautiful way of moving through some sort of a fine mist of transparent veils, always hinting at what beauty lies behind the next one. And then I broke through, and was established. No exaggeration of these words; it’s the ultimate—no, I’m not at the ultimate. I’m still working on this. I’m not enlightened. But I broke through to a state of bliss….

I’ve had Christian leaders try to get through to me, why I’m not one of their brethren in their church, and I’ve gone to the meetings to be kind. And finally when I’ve had enough, I ask them this question: “What is the definition of bliss?” They always give me something out of the

cataclysm or something else, and I say it’s not that. I would always say that it is perfect self- confidence. But in such bliss, the bliss goes with it. The bliss tells you you have arrived at that point. I’m still working on the rest of it. And I follow no religion. Buddhism is not a religion, although there are those who say that there are religions in Buddhism. But it is what the Buddha lived for 90 some years and left behind him that I follow. Those precepts—I follow that. That’s all I have to say—I don’t know if I’ve touched anybody with this or not, but this is my way, and

I don’t push it on anybody else. I’m simply relating what I can on the physical plane of communicating verbal stuff. And it does not get you anywhere near the truth that I feel but cannot say.

1:43:21 RM: I understand

BF: Good! I’ve done it! I’ve said something.

RM: Thanks for sharing that.

BF: Great! Wonderful! I hope this has met something of your expectations.

RM: That went way beyond my expectations, thank you for talking so freely about all this.

BF: Remember this: never have expectations of anything. That’s Buddhist. You accept what comes along. And deal with it.

Interview Analysis

While recounting his experiences fighting in World War Two, veteran Bill Foley explained: “We had… survived something, where we were brought up to the highest point where men could stand or to the lowest point where men could stand and survived. I never wanted to see them again in suits, I never wanted to see them again in ties; do you understand? That was a major thing. If we could be… be the same. And meet. I’d love it. But that was all gone, we were different, we were changed.” War changes people; after months of fighting in Europe, Bill Foley was no longer the 18-year-old kid who eagerly volunteered for the infantry. Mr. Foley’s unique perspective on his combat experience in the war and the artist that he became after its end highlights the importance of oral history. Oral history allows for an understanding of the perspective of those who may not otherwise receive a chance to share their stories. Too often, history textbooks are written from a top-down perspective of battles and campaigns, with no focus on the individuals, the people, making up the events. This is where the real value of oral history lies; it gives an understanding from a participant in an event that gives credence or contradicts what historians have written. Ultimately, Bill Foley supports the writing of Stephen

Ambrose on both what he saw as the wasteful reinforcement system and on the role of American officers during the war.

The interview opened up with Mr. Foley discussing his childhood. He grew up in

Teaneck, New Jersey, and enlisted in the U.S. army at the age of 18. While growing up, Mr.

Foley suffered trauma resulting in a fear of fireworks and explosions, which he overcame at boot camp. He arrived in Europe, and had his first combat experience attacking the town of Sinz, where his unit took 60% casualties. Mr. Foley expressed his beliefs on the United States’

replacement system, and stated, “there was no loyalty to a particular company” but men would form bonds with the soldiers they shared foxholes with. He crossed the Saar River, falling in during the crossing. While historians such as Stephen Ambrose criticize Patton’s decision to make the crossing during daytime, Mr. Foley said, “his methods very often caused less combat casualties than other generals” in defense of Patton. However, Mr. Foley agreed that U.S. commanders oftentimes lacked understanding of what the front was like, and conceded, “They really should have done their own looking.” Mr. Foley discussed being rewarded with medals, asking, “why do they give you medals… for something really ugly?” He deserved a bronze star for a patrol he conducted, but never received the medal; later after the war, he found out that the government had changed it’s rules towards bronze stars and was now sending them to most veterans, where he finally received one. He noticed that during the war, German soldiers would often drink during combat, and believes that this caused them to make mistakes and slowed them down; he personally never drank until after the war. He talked about taking trophies from dead soldiers. He had to cut off their fingers to take their SS rings because their fingers would swell after their deaths, and then talked about a situation he encountered while acting as squad leader.

He shot a German officer responsible for killing his own men, saying, “I punished him. I am the observer of the crime. I am the judge, jury, and executioner.” He has lived with what he did ever since, but knows that if not for him, the officer would have gotten away with his crime. He aided with the rescue of French prisoners while stationed across the Rhine, and served in the army of occupation for a year in Czechoslovakia. After the war, he lived in Mexico, going on long survival trips in the desert and painting. Later on he discovered meditation, which helped him recover from his experiences during the war.

One major debate surrounding Allied tactics during the final months of World War Two was the United States replacement system; critics of the system, such as Stephen Ambrose, declared that U.S. commanders were directly responsible for the deaths of U.S. servicemen by sending inexperienced and relatively untrained soldiers to their deaths. During the Siegfried Line campaign, U.S. armies took heavy casualties and required a constant flow of new soldiers to fill in the gabs. Ambrose wrote, “The replacement system… was paying lives and getting no return.

It was just pure waste and the commanders should have done something about it.” (Ambrose

263) Interviewee Bill Foley had firsthand experience with the replacement system, as both a fresh replacement himself and later as acting squad leader of a group of replacements. When asked about his opinion on the debate, Mr. Foley stated, “Absolutely true, absolutely true. We noticed that. One of the great difficulties; those of us that would question the system, and most of us do, some perhaps a bit more sophisticated than others, a bit more understanding, is that there was no loyalty to a particular company” (Foley 6). Through these two quotes, a clear agreement can be seen between Mr. Foley and Stephen Ambrose on the subject. From this, it is clear that

U.S. commanders did not have the best interests of their men in mind; they were more concerned with keeping a steady flow on soldiers rather than the safety of their men.

Other disagreements between historians about the final months of World War Two revolve around the involvement of American officers, or lack thereof. Some historians maintain that there was a detachment between the officers and the soldiers, which resulted in a lack of understanding between the two, resulting in casualties. Stephen Ambrose wrote on the subject,

“in general the American officers handing down the orders to attack and assigning the objective had no idea what it was like at the front.” (Ambrose 265) When asked what his opinion about the quote was, Mr. Foley’s response was clear; although he maintained that it varied upon the

individual officer, and that the captain of his G Company was a good leader, he said, “Certainly it’s accurate. It has to be, because whether it’s war, or business, or anything else, the voting public, a group of people, there’s a small percentage of truly centered, confident, perhaps brave individuals that lead the rest who don’t quite know what to do, and they follow the leader”

(Foley 12). It makes sense that an infantryman would share the same opinion about leadership as

Stephen Ambrose, as Ambrose gathered most of his information through interviews he conducted with soldiers. These two quotes both show the problems facing the United States during the war; leaders oftentimes were disconnected from the battlefield, resulting in a lack of understanding of the current situation. This combined with the constant need for replacements ended up dragging out the war.

I think that Mr. Foley’s narrative is an incredibly valuable contribution to the Oral

History Project because his story helps to shed light major issues facing the U.S. during and after

World War Two. Personally, I had little to no knowledge about the campaign that Mr. Foley fought about. I believe that it is too often written off because it was during the final months of the war in Europe, and because of this there is a lack of understanding for what soldiers like Mr.

Foley went through. Before working on this project, I considered myself to be fairly knowledgeable about World War Two, and yet had no idea what faced the average soldier during the Siegfried Line campaign. It is important for us as a nation to learn more about this time in our history, when U.S. generals with little knowledge of the battlefield sent in fresh reinforcements only to die.

Appendix

Map of the Siegfried Line Campaign; the thick red line denotes the location of the Siegfried line.

Photo showing the bluffs along the Saar River

“Dragons Teeth” Anti-Tank fortifications along the Siegfried Line

General Patton, commander of the Third Army during the Siegfried Line Campaign

Works Consulted

• Ambrose, Stephen E. The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II.

New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Print.

• Delcea, Isabelle. "A Long March: Understanding the Push for the Siegfried Line ::

American Century Project - St. Andrew's Episcopal School." A Long March:

Understanding the Push for the Siegfried Line :: American Century Project - St.

Andrew's Episcopal School. N.p., n.d. Web. 03 Dec. 2015.

• Foley, William A. Visions from a Foxhole: A Rifleman in Patton's Ghost Corps. New

York: Ballantine, 2003. Print.

• Hurd, Volney D. "Vaunted Siegfried Wall Found No Match For Allied Offesnive." The

Christian Science Monitor 3 Mar. 1945: 6. Print.

• MacDonald, Charles B. The Siegfried Line Campaign. Washington, D.C.: Office of the

Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1963. Print.

• "90% of Siegfried Line Eradicated by Yanks." The Washington Post 15 Mar. 1945: 2.

Print.

• Stone, Norman. World War One: A Short History. London: Allen Lane, 2007. Print.

• Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.

• Foley, William A., Jr. Jumping Off. Digital image. Visions From A Foxhole. N.p., n.d.

Web. 2 Feb. 2016.

• MacDonald, Charles B. Pursuit to the German Border. Digital image. The Siegfried Line

Campaign. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 Feb. 2016.

• Saar Bridgehead. Digital image. Destruction of the Switch. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 Feb. 2016.

• Munzingen Ridge. Digital image. Destruction of the Switch. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 Feb. 2016.

• General Patton. Digital image. Lead Like Patton at Bastogne. Forbes, n.d. Web. 9 Feb.

2016.