Korean Cabinet

Background Guide

CAHSMUN XVII

Letter from the Director

To my esteemed colleagues,

It is both my honour and distinct privilege to welcome you all to the Cheongwadae for the first meeting of this cabinet. On these hallowed grounds, the enormity of the task that confronts us matches the extraordinary historical significance of the place where we sit.

For the past half-century, the people of Korea have been wrought, humiliated, and exploited by foreign captors. The primacy of our nation’s interests have been cast aside for the injudicious priorities of our occupants, and the prestige of our country has been marred by the violence, turmoil, and upheaval that they have brought.

Our administration must stand at the forefront of a Korean rejuvenation; decades of unrest and instability end with us. It may appear that the tattered state of our nation is a fait accompli, something in our destiny, something unable to be wrested from the jaws of fate, but I have dogmatic faith in this Cabinet to leave an indelible impact on the citizenry of Korea.

It is here we shall herald a new era in Korean history.

Best Wishes,

Syngman Rhee | 이승만 President of the Republic of Korea | 대한민국 대통령

Committee Description

As the advisors and associates to one of the most consequential leaders in South Korean history, the Cabinet of Syngman Rhee is responsible for navigating and leading South Korea through some of the most tumultuous times in the country’s history. The committee is constituted by ministers who formed the first cabinet of the infant First Republic of Korea, either when the country was founded—on August 15, 1948—or shortly thereafter in the months that followed.1 Some ministers may have decades of experience in public administration, while others come from backgrounds as diverse as the military, academia, or even forestry. But no matter one’s background or history, in this committee, all will be tasked with addressing the most exigent issues confronting Korea—and ones which threaten the lasting health of the Rhee government. Whether it be crushing civil unrest or weeding out communist traitors, the dawn of a new Korea will test the fortitude and wherewithal of the Rhee administration, and on August 15, 1948, the Cabinet of Syngman Rhee will sit for the first time, coinciding with the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Committee Timeline

As a historical crisis, the Cabinet will be operating in a parallel universe. The history leading up to the start of the committee will be in line with our reality’s history; however, the events which transpire during the committee—and perhaps precipitate the crisis—will not reflect historical events. Therefore, it is imperative that all delegates are prepared with background knowledge of the events up until the official start date of committee: August 15, 1948. Referencing specific events or incidents after this start date (within the realm of real-world history) is strictly prohibited.

Cabinet will run on a linear timeline, represented by a scaled model of committee time. The crisis timeline will be set according to a three-day to two-minute ratio, approximately equating one month in the crisis timeline to 20 minutes of debate. Please note that this timeline is heavily subject to change under the discretion of the President (represented by committee dais) at any point, especially during important wartime events and situations of similar nature. Additionally, delegates should note that all directives will require a processing time, which will take a specific amount of time to execute, something to be determined at the dais’ discretion.

1 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-parliaments/southkorea.php

N.B. In real-world history, due to the chaotic nature of the ROK government’s establishment, a select few ministers in this committee may have taken office in the weeks and months shortly after the committee start date. However, for the purposes of this crisis, these ministers will have their term start dates amended and will take office to the official start date, August 15, 1948.

Memorandum from the President — August 15, 1948

To the colleagues of my cabinet,

On this day, we herald a new age in Korean history: one of rejuvenation, recovery, and prosperity. With the Republic of Korea’s establishment and the creation of this cabinet, we mark the beginning of a momentous and difficult journey, one in which we shall restore glory to our people, our country, and our identity.

I will be the first to admit to you that this will be a difficult struggle, for we assume government in a time when our society has never been more fragmented, more divided, and more polarized. Our nation has encountered great adversity since the end of the great Joseon dynasty, which governed Korea from the late 14th century to the early 20th. Since its fall, we have endured foreign occupation under many different flags, whether Japanese, Soviet, or American; we have emerged from the ashes of World War II divided and separated, broken by an arbitrary line set by a government that knows nothing of our nation; and we have tolerated governance by a foreign administration that sees us as nothing but a pawn in their plans to propagate democracy.

Today, the United States Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), having sowed chaos in their past three years of administration, leaves in its wake a slew of challenges for our government to confront and address. They, for many years, have supplanted our administration with their inefficient and poorly-executed policies and have continually enabled our worst oppressors—the Japanese colonial government. Their response to the communist threat has been too soft when a harsh response has been required, and too cruel when a simple and humane response has been necessary. Despite acknowledging that our Cabinet’s formation today rests squarely on the shoulders of the USAMGIK, we must also recognize their abject failure in governing our nation; there is a reason why widespread revolt and strikes have become the only answers for our people.2

2 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/70/mode/2up

Our government must restore our people’s faith in our institutions, bridge the many gaps and barriers created by the USAMGIK, and present a unified front to the world—if we wish to ever reclaim all of our great country. While the USAMGIK may no longer govern this nation, their lasting legacy of division remains; the border and the North still stand as barriers to Korean reunification. And, if we cannot achieve the creation of one unified Korean nation through diplomatic means, we must not hesitate to resort to our military before they do the same.

In any case, the initiative now rests in our hands. It is high time we seize the day and restore Korean greatness.

꿈을 꾸고 믿을 수 있다면 이룰 수도 있다!

Timeline

July 1392 - The Joseon dynasty is established under the rule of King Taejo. The Korean kingdom remains in power for the next five centuries.3

July 25, 1894 - The First Sino-Japanese War begins as the Qing Dynasty and Japan fight over control of Korea. Japan convincingly defeats the Qing, forcing it to formally recognize the sovereignty of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.4

September 5, 1905 - Japan emerges victorious from the Russo-Japanese War, firmly establishing a sphere of influence over Korea. The Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 is established, and Korea formally becomes a protectorate of Japan.5

August 29, 1910 - Japan annexes Korea under the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910. Korea remains under Japanese rule for the next 35 years, until Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II.6

3 https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/Korea-since-c-1400 4 https://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-62-supernova-in-the-east-i/ 5 https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/Korea-since-c-1400 6 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/08/29/editorials/the-annexation-of-korea/#.XTjAI-hKjt9

August 15, 1945 - Japan surrenders to the US, and Korea is once again recognized as an independent nation. The Soviet Union and the US agree to divide Korea along the 38th parallel, forming two postwar zones—one administered by the US, one by the USSR.7

August 1945 — With Japan’s surrender, Japanese colonial forces quickly retreat from the Korean peninsula, leaving the island with no government. The Korean People's Republic (KPR), a left-leaning Korean independence party—also claiming to be the Provisional Government of Korea—is formed by community leaders, who create municipal “People’s Committees” to administer the country.8

September 8, 1945 - American forces land on the shores of Incheon, taking control of Korea below the 38th parallel and establishing the USAMGIK.9

September 9, 1945 - Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of the American troops in Korea and head of the USAMGIK, refuses to work with the KPR. Instead, Hodge announces that colonial Japanese administrators will be retained in aiding the US administration in Korea. The move sparks condemnation both within and outside of Korea.10

December 12, 1945 - The USAMGIK pass highly restrictive labour laws, which include a total ban on worker strikes, in an effort to quell rising civil unrest.11

January 4, 1946 - The USAMGIK create legislation targeting the KPR, declaring the KPR’s operations as “illegal.” As a result, many KPR officials, still governing at the municipal level through the People’s Committees, lose their seats in the coming months.12

March 8, 1946 - The Joint United States-Soviet Union Commission is established. The administrators of both halves of Korea engage in talks to outline the formation of a unified interim Korean Government. However, talks would end up stalling, and the commission’s meetings would be adjourned over two months later.13

7 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/70/mode/2up 8 Ibid. 9 https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/Korea-since-c-1400 10 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/70/mode/2up 11 Ibid. 12 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/86/mode/2up 13 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d612

September 27, 1946 — Immensely frustrated with the repressive policies of the USAMGIK, and in open defiance to USAMGIK law, rail workers in Busan initiate a strike.14 Called the Daegu Uprising, the initial minor strike would trigger a snowball of protests throughout the country, involving tens of thousands of peasants.

May 21, 1947 — The Joint United States-Soviet Union Commission begins a second round of negotiations on the formation of a unified Korean Government. However, with growing political polarization between the two regions and the Cold War ramping up, the US and USSR’s irreconcilable ideological differences result in a deadlock. The commission is dissolved shortly thereafter.15

September 17, 1947 — A motion is moved by the US on the floor of the United Nations Security Council, calling for the UN to sponsor elections for the formation of a Korean legislature. The motion overwhelmingly passes, and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) is created.16

February 26, 1948 — The UNTCOK, unable to set up election operations in North Korea, is instructed by the UN to proceed with elections in all accessible areas of Korea.17

May 10, 1948 — Despite widespread (and largely bipartisan) opposition to the election, the UN pushes forward and the 1948 Korean Constitutional Assembly election is held. Out of 198 seats, 180 seats are won by Syngman Rhee’s party.18

July 12, 1948 — The National Assembly of South Korea adopts their Constitution and elects Syngman Rhee as their first President.19

August 15, 1948 — The Republic of Korea is established.

14 Ibid 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.

Historical Analysis

Joseon Dynasty As the longest ruling dynasty in Korea, the Joseon dynasty spanned more than five centuries.20 It lasted through the rise and fall of its neighbours, succeeding multiple times in consolidating rule over the entirety of Korea. However, over its rule, the dynasty was exposed to multiple invasions and wars, leaving its society crippled. In addition, being surrounded by military superpowers meant that Joseon remained a tributary state for much of its history in order to receive better protection from foreign invaders. In its last years and decades, the Joseon would be a tributary of the Qing dynasty, sending tributes—such as gold, silver, or women—to the Great Qing in exchange for continued protection.21

According to Joseon prophecies, the kingdom would end in its 500th year, in 1892.22 This prophecy was partially correct, as the events which would precipitate Joseon’s fall would begin in 1892, with the Donghak Peasant Rebellion. Seeing over a half-million rebels rising up against the government, the revolts would eventually lead to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.23 And with the Japanese consequently crushing the Qing, Korea was freed from their grasp. With the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Qing formally recognized Korea as an independent nation.24

Korean Empire

After the war, the Korean populace rose up after years of unrest and exiled Joseon King Gojong, citing his inability to make modern reforms. Eventually, King Gojong returned and announced his abdication and the establishment of the Korean Empire, ushering in the end of the Joseon dynasty after 503 years. With the Korean Empire’s establishment, a significant effort was placed upon extensive reform in all aspects of the country.25 Once described by western countries as a ‘hermit kingdom’ due to its vigorous policy of isolationism, Korea now pursued closer ties with the western world and adopted many aspects of western culture— from education to medicine.26

20 Ibid. 21 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/86/mode/2up 22 https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Donghak_Peasant_Revolution 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/The-Tonghak-Uprising-and-government-reform 26 Ibid.

However, while modernization and westernization remained priorities for the Korean Empire, Korea was increasingly eyed as a favourable colony for many powers. Russia also grew interested in Korea, seeing it as a fortress to gain influence within the region. Once again, Korea became a focus for superpowers satisfying their imperialistic impulses, culminating in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

Eventually, Japan gained the upper hand in the war and defeated the Russians. With all prominent regional opponents defeated by 1905, Japan streamlined its sphere of influence into Korea through the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905, which placed the Korean Empire under Imperial Japan as a protectorate.27 While Koreans were hesitant at best to accept the treaty, Japan threatened military action if a decision other than “yes” was made, effectively coercing Korea into becoming a protectorate.28 Yet, in reality, Korea’s status as a protectorate would only serve as a precursor to full colonization, with the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910 formalizing Korea’s status as a colony to Japan.

Imperial Japanese Rule

In full control of Korea in the first half of the 20th century, Japan took quick actions to tighten its grasp over Korea. The Japanese were well aware of their unwanted presence, and consequently, moved quickly to control all facets of Korean administration. Many Koreans became resistance fighters; nevertheless, their efforts would not be enough—a provisional Korean government would be set up in China but did not garner international recognition.29 Thus, with Japanese colonial rule firmly established in Korea, thousands of important Korean figures and Korean leaders were arrested, the media was reigned in, and decades of suppression and oppression ensued.30

Under Japanese colonial rule, a fierce policy of Japanization—a process by which Korea would become an overseas version of Japan—was applied to the nation. While beneficial to the colonialists, the policy was not in the best interests of the Korean people. Many Japanese merchants and businesspersons, propped up by grants and large loans provided by the Imperial Japanese army, immigrated to Korea in the months and years following annexation.31 Filling up the market, these merchants and businesspeople had large advantages over the

27 https://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-62-supernova-in-the-east-i/ 28 Ibid. 29 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/86/mode/2up 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

Koreans, leaving them unable to contend. In the following two years, Korea was flooded with almost 85,000 Japanese immigrants, with an estimated 200,000 settling in total.32

With Japan’s entrance into WWII and expansion into the Pacific theatre, the impact of Japan’s colonial policy only strained Koreans even more. As Japan conscripted a significant portion of its male population for the war effort, labour shortages became a critical problem in Japan. To remedy this, initially, officials were sent to Korea to conscript Koreans to work in Japan. As the war progressed and more Japanese men were shipped off to battle, the government became desperate for Korean labourers and coerced citizens into forced labour in Japan. In all, between 1939 and 1945, around a half-million Koreans were brought to work in Japan under treacherous and horrific living conditions.33 In the span of six years, over 60,000 Koreans died in Japanese labour camps.34 Furthermore, when the war began to turn against Japan, Korean men were conscripted into the Japanese Army in an act of desperation, with a large portion of the 110,000 Koreans drafted into the army not making it home after Japan’s unconditional surrender at the hands of the allies.35

Division of Korea

In the Cairo Conference of 1943, the allied superpowers of the United States, United Kingdom, and China laid out the technicalities in preparation for the end of WWII. Most importantly, they came to an agreement that all land conquered by Japan would be ceded back in the case of a Japanese surrender.36 With the war in the Pacific turning against Japan in mid- 1945 and Germany’s surrender, the Soviet Union formally entered the war against Japan and made amphibious landings in Korea. The United States, aware of Japan’s incoming surrender, took note of the swift advance through Korea by the USSR’s Red Army. They became increasingly concerned due to the Soviet presence within Korea and believed that Stalin had ambitions within the region after the war. Therefore, with fears of a Soviet presence sweeping across the peninsula, the United States wished to quickly come to a compromise with the USSR. An agreement to divide Korea into two postwar spheres of influence at the 38th Parallel was made, and both the US and the USSR agreed to a peaceful transfer of power from Japanese to Korean hands—at least, in theory.37

32 http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/korea/history/colonial_period.htm 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 https://www.jstor.org/stable/23720161?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 36 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/86/mode/2up 37 https://www.jstor.org/stable/3022068?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Soviet Influence in North Korea

With the war over, the Soviet Union quickly began to monopolize and deepen its control over North Korea.38 Instead of simply providing oversight on Korea’s rebuilding process, the Soviet Union took complete control of the Korean administration and set up their own ideologically aligned government in a time where most global powers advocated for the formation of a unified Korea. The USSR held its own elections for its portion of Korea, with voters given a list of candidates hand-picked by the Soviets. And in February 1946, the Provisional North Korean government was established under Kim Il-sung, who would become the first Premier of North Korea in two years. With his election, the beginning of long-term territorial disputes ensued between the North and the South.39 This election also formalized the political separation of Korea, as the South held its own elections. The North contended that a unified Korea would only function under the leadership of Kim Il-sung, who, to the west, represented a suspected communist sympathizer. Therefore, the United States was not in favour of a unified Korea under Il-sung’s rule and resorted to holding their own elections.

United States Influence in South Korea USAMGIK Makes Landfall, Immediate Problems Emerge (September 1945)

The United States, with South Korea in its sphere of influence, landed in Korea and established the United States of America Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in September 1945.40 The purpose of the USAMGIK was to administer and oversee the establishment of a formal Korean government, with hopes to keep Korea a unified country. However, apart from the aforementioned problem in establishing a North Korean government, domestic problems for the USAMGIK also emerged within days of establishing control.

Initially, the Korean Provisional Government (KPG), operating out of Shanghai during Korea’s occupation, attempted to reestablish control from the USAMGIK, even sending diplomats to the mainland.41 However, the newly established USAMGIK refused to meet with the KPG and would reject the prospect of handing over power, believing that the provisional government’s leaders were too nationalistic and would not serve the interests of the US.42 Further, the other prominent Korean party, the Korean People’s Republic (KPR), was also

38 https://www.nknews.org/2018/11/how-kim-il-sung-became-north-koreas-great-leader/ 39 https://www.korea-dpr.com/founding_dprk.html 40 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/86/mode/2up 41 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d465 42 Ibid.

viewed by the USAMGIK to be too unstable and unsympathetic to the US cause due to their left-leaning stances, despite being extremely popular with the Korean populace. Thus, in their stead, the USAMGIK decided to quietly retain many Japanese politicians and generals—the very same men who had oppressed and exploited Koreans under colonial rule—as ‘advisors’ to their government, something which would lead to a significant outcry among the population.43

This series of events, playing out in the late months of 1945, served as a critical turning point for US administration in Korea. The political climate within South Korea soon soured considerably for the ruling USAMGIK. By nature of the US partnering with Japan to govern South Korea, their government quickly lost favour, and soon, many Koreans began calling for the total withdrawal of the USAMGIK.44 The continued US collaboration with Japanese officials also served to further legitimize the KPR and its associated committees, with the KPR gaining widespread support from many large organizations, such as the National Council of Korean Labour Unions (NCKLU), the National League of Peasant Unions, and the Women’s League.45 In turn, for the USAMGIK, it soon became clear their situation would become untenable without immediate action to crush the rising KPR.

Attacks on the KPR, Rise of the KDP, Rumblings of Rebellion (October 1945-October 1946)

The US, although highly unpopular, was not without its support within Korea; there certainly was a portion of the population—largely in the Korean elite—that welcomed their administration, even if it came with cooperation with Japanese officials. With the KPR’s growing influence and threat, USAMGIK supporters were encouraged to form their own party as a counterbalance to the KPR, leading to the creation of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) in mid-1945.46 To build the KDP’s legitimacy as an alternative to the KPR, the USAMGIK first appointed KDP leaders to many important positions in their government, such as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or even head of the Korean National Police (KNP). Next, they brought back a trustworthy figure to become the face of the party, Syngman Rhee, who had been chased off to the US in the 1920s for embezzling Korean funds. However, despite such a background, crucially for the USAMGIK, Rhee spoke fluent English, was a vociferous anti-communist, and a staunch anti-Japanese. As such, the US knew that Rhee would never bend to any communist threat, and given his firm anti-Japanese positions, knew that he wouldn’t immediately attract the ire of the Korean populace. As the USAMGIK saw it,

43 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/70/mode/2up 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

in the eyes of the public, their administration’s reputation had become inextricably linked with disgraceful Japanese cooperation, and Rhee’s position on Japan would serve as the very antithesis to such a fact.47

On October 20th, 1945, Rhee delivered his first remarks as the leader of the KDP, using the moment to condemn both the KPR and the USSR. However, for the USAMGIK, it would take several months for the KDP to gain its footing, leaving the US occupation force to deal with the rising threat of the KPR alone for the time being. Thus, the USAMGIK, in the coming months, would pass an assortment of KPR-targeted legislation, aimed at undermining the left- leaning party’s most powerful institution—their People’s Committees.48 These committees, established in the time between Japan’s surrender of Korea and the US’ occupation, were governed by community leaders in Korean towns and were mostly disorganized on a national level; however, they bore extreme influence on the municipal level, as governance from the USAMGIK was highly unpopular. Thus, between late 1945 and early 1946, the USAMGIK passed highly restrictive labour laws, which included a total ban on worker strikes in an effort to quell rising civil unrest, and further created legislation declaring the KPR’s operations as “illegal,” in effect forcing the KPR to shut down their powerful municipal People’s Committees.49 As one might imagine, living as an impoverished worker in this era became extremely difficult under such oppressive USAMGIK policies, and sooner rather than later, anger would manifest in the form of rebellion.

In 1946, the Daegu October Incident took place as thousands of labourers and peasants rose up against the USAMGIK. Immensely frustrated with the repressive policies of the USAMGIK, and in open defiance to USAMGIK law, what started as a minor strike by rail workers in Busan soon became a national protest. Workers from all over Korea demanded that the USAMGIK restore the KPR’s People’s Committees and that workers be compensated with better wages, improved working conditions, and the right to assemble.50 The USAMGIK would attempt to restore order by sending in the Korean National Police (KNP); however, their presence only served to exacerbate the situation, as the KNP would end up killing several innocent workers, further enraging the populace. Had it not been for the protests’ general disorganization, which saw each town have its own disjointed revolt, the peasants may have very well succeeded in restoring the KPR to power. However, with martial law declared by the

47 Ibid. 48 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/70/mode/2up 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.

USAMGIK on October 6 and with US troops and tanks sent in, the US administration was able to put down the revolts.51

In the aftermath of the revolts, the operational abilities of the KPR would be significantly diminished, with their People’s Committees and supporting organizations, such as the NCKLU, seeing a significant drop in membership in the face of potential USAMGIK retribution. Rather conveniently for the USAMGIK, shortly after the end of the revolts, many prominent left-wing leaders of the KPR would mysteriously disappear, never to be seen again.52

US-Soviet Negotiations, the UNTCOK Elections (March 1946-August 1948)

Having administered and governed their respective sides of Korea for six months, March 1946 marked the creation of the US-Soviet Joint Commission, where both countries would jointly iron out details pertaining to a transfer of power back into Korean hands.53 Yet disagreements in the commission’s methodology would impede progress from the very beginning, especially in determining the composition of an interim Korean government. The US demanded their representatives be weighted more heavily as they represented a larger portion of the population, while the USSR said that only parties which recognized the legitimacy of the commission would be allowed to be consulted. With both sides disagreeing with each others’ proposals, the first round of negotiations for the formation of a unified Korean government ground to a halt, as tensions in the Cold War ramped up.54

In May 1947, the commission tried once to negotiate a unified, peaceful transfer of power, with the commission jointly consulting political parties to form an interim Korean government. However, as was with the first round, differences soon emerged; the USAMGIK had endorsed the creation of over 400 right-wing parties which aligned with the US administration. Each party demanded their right to be consulted—and as fast as discussions for reunification began, talks stalled and became deadlocked.55 To the USAMGIK, it was clear that ideological barriers would force the creation of two independent and politically polar governments. Thus, as the preeminent nation within the UN, the US appealed to the

51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/70/mode/2up 54 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d612 55 Ibid.

intergovernmental organization to see if they could carve a solution that would keep Korea unified.56

On September 17, 1947, the Korean issue was brought up by American delegates at the United Nations General Assembly, pinning the commission’s lack of progress on Soviet intransigence.57 Subsequently, a motion was moved by the US on the floor of the United Nations Security Council, calling for the UN to sponsor elections for the formation of a Korean legislature, in turn, determining the next Korean President. Passing overwhelmingly within the UNSC, largely due to the US’ influence, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was created to oversee a peninsula-wide election. Formed by a coalition of delegates from eight UN nations, the UNTCOK arrived in Seoul in January 1948, with a mandate to execute the election. However, as the UNTCOK attempted to set up operations within Soviet-occupied Korea, they were denied access to cross the border, jeopardizing the possibility of a Korea-wide election. Yet, the UN, steered largely by US dominion, would push on with the election, ordering the UNTCOK on February 26, 1948, to “proceed with the observance of all elections in all Korea, and if that is impossible, in as much of Korea as is accessible to it.”58

The supermajority of Koreans called for the postponement of this election, knowing that if it was held, and a president elected, the division between the two Koreas would likely be permanent. As a result, a strong opposition soon emerged between Southern and Northern political leaders, who subsequently unified into the North-South Political Leaders’ Coalition to try and prevent the UN from administering the election.59 Despite receiving an outpour of support from the citizenry of both north and south, their efforts would ultimately fail. With only candidates loyal to the USAMGIK participating, the election of South Korea’s government took place on May 10, 1948, and two months later, on July 12, the National Assembly of South Korea would adopt their Constitution and elect Syngman Rhee as their first President. The Republic of Korea is officially established today, on August 15, 1948.60

An Alienated and Disillusioned Korean Populace under Rhee

The USAMGIK leaves in its wake a highly discontent and angered South Koren populace. For the three years of their administration between 1945 and 1948, the USAMGIK seemed to

56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/84/mode/2up 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid.

anger the populace with their every move and every policy. Today, this sentiment still very much lingers in the air. While Korea may be under a new government, its presence is very much a product of the USAMGIK’s lasting legacy, and the problems caused under the old government are still very much relevant today.

The hatred primarily revolves around the USAMGIK’s lack of willingness to accede to the popular will of the Korean people. In the eyes of many Koreans, the US has only served their own interests in their administration of Korea, actively dividing and using Korea as a pawn to advance their righteous and noble dreams of democracy and freedom in the face of communism. Many Koreans point to three main examples of this: one, in the US’ continued enabling of Korea’s Japanese oppressors; two, in their blatant neglect of public opinion in proceeding with an election—an extremely unpopular one, both in the north and the south; and three, in continually working to undermine and sabotage the success of the peoples’ preferred government, the Korean People’s Republic.

Firstly, to many Koreans, it seemed that the USAMGIK was never cognizant enough about the historical background of Korea and their families’ long histories of oppression and exploitation under Japanese colonial rule. Their active collaboration and continued effort to retain Japanese colonial administrators meant that many heinous characters were both being legitimized by the US and flouting justice. Notably, this meant that living conditions in US- occupied Korea were barely equal, if not considerably worse, than under colonial rule. The USAMGIK, on top of retaining much of the colonial administrative system, also was tasked with aiding the recovery of a war-torn country, broken from decades of inefficient and oppressive colonial governance as well as a decade of war. Therefore, with the USAMGIK administration neglecting economic reform and maintaining the Japanese colonial shackles, many peasants and factory workers found it difficult to procure and find access to the basic necessities of life, fueling much public outrage. Even under the new administration, such a problem is still of great concern and is still a large factor in driving unrest.

Secondly, even under different governments, Koreans across the peninsula have been largely united in their desire to remain as one Korea, vigorously opposing any prospect of dividing the peninsula. Thus, even as the peninsula’s citizenry lived through the occupation from two different military juggernauts, Koreans were still able to support their foreign governments under the pretense that they were working to build a unified Korean government. Thus, when it became clear the USAMGIK and the UN were working to force through an election which the north refused to even participate in, to the Korean people, it was a violation of Koreans’ trust vested in their foreign governments and a sign that Korea would be permanently

divided. Today, with a new government that only governs the south, Rhee’s administration is a symbol of division within many Koreans’ eyes, an institution impeding any chance for Korean reunification.

Thirdly, the USAMGIK’s continual sabotaging and undermining of KPR operations has been detrimental to their popularity (and this present government’s) in the minds of the populace. The KPR, having governed the country in the short interim between Japanese departure and American/Soviet occupation—spearheaded by charismatic, personable, and well-known statesmen—captured the country’s attention for much of the USAMGIK administration. The party’s operations, much of which provided the only form of government at a municipal level in Korea (through their People’s Committees), were forcibly dismantled by USAMGIK policy—something which greatly infuriated the public. Further, with the USAMGIK forcing news outlets to either censor their content or denounce the KPR, many have come to believe that a leftist-crackdown is taking place within Korea right now. The disappearance of prominent leftist KPR leaders, in particular, has had a catalyzing effect in infuriating the populace.61

Current Situation

Civil Unrest and Communist Insurgency All this anger has ultimately manifested in widespread demonstrations and revolts from the Korean populace. In turn, these revolts have forced the USAMGIK to respond with an equally devastating response. In recent months, the island of Jeju in South Korea, which was not involved in the Daegu Uprising of 1946 due to its isolation, has seen its own surge in protests which have often turned violent.

Beginning on March 1st of this year, shortly after it became clear that an election was going to be held, it became apparent the USAMGIK would depart with a permanently divided Korea. Tens of thousands of Jejuans took to the streets in protest, ultimately resulting in the arrests of several thousand demonstrators.62 The demonstrations would, however, continue into the next month, and on April 3rd, the left-wing and possibly communist Workers’ Party of South Korea (SKLP) began encouraging its members to attack the USAMGIK-affiliated Korean National Police (KNP) as well as an associated right-wing paramilitary group.63 The SKLP also happened to form the majority of Jeju’s people’s committee, and thus, hold much influence

61 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/84/mode/2up 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.

over the island. But what started out as demonstrations soon turned to violent and terroristic acts, with hundreds of SKLP guerrillas and thousands of sympathizers showing up and targeting KNP stations and known Japanese collaborators. On just the first day of the revolts, on April 3rd, 30 KNP policemen were killed, and to this day, Jejuan guerillas have continued to fight the KNP forces on the island. Thus far, an estimated 20,000 combined civilians and insurgents have been killed, and according to KNP intelligence services, insurgents have been backed by the North.64

The response of the departing USAMGIK, emblematic of the US administration’s general approach, has been to respond with brutal force. On top of the 20,000 civilians and combatants that have been killed on Jeju, reports have surfaced around KNP-allied militias indiscriminately killing suspected communists.

In the larger scope of the USAMGIK administration, as it pertains to this new government, the main policy taken towards communists and political radicalists on the left has been to either kill any suspected communists, as displayed in the ongoing case of Jeju Island, or to simply arrest them and take them prisoner. From the USAMGIK’s first year of administration, in 1945, to just two years later, in 1947, the number of political prisoners within the south rose from 17,000 to 21,000. Today, it is projected to number over 30,000.65 Yet, the effect of such harsh crackdowns and arrests has only further stoked anger within the populace, and further fuel demonstrations, riots, and acts of leftist terrorism.

For the incoming government, the status quo is largely akin to a political tinderbox; they will have to find a way to prevent widespread unrest from spreading, without having to resort to violent crackdowns, which itself could further inflame tensions and worsen unrest. The road forward is especially difficult considering the nation’s new leader, Syngman Rhee, who, as an ardent anti-communist, sees it only fit to arrest and purge leftists—whether with jail or with death, these acts can only further fuel unrest. Thus, this Cabinet will have a difficult choice to make: whether to accede to some of the populace’s demands—and potentially risk the rise of a leftist/communist KPR coalition—or continue down the authoritarian path to governing.

Border Skirmishes and Conflict with the North

Last year, both the USAMGIK and Soviet administrators departed their respective regions, granting the South and the North full autonomy in governance. Since then, tensions between the two states and their respective leaders have grown. Both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-sung

64 Ibid. 65 https://archive.org/details/korea00mart/page/84/mode/2up

have constantly reiterated their intentions of unifying Korea under their own regimes, with Rhee even going as far as to proclaim a “march north.”66 He and Il-sung have constantly threatened to invade each other’s territory, adding credence to the possibility of war.67 Rhee, for one, has certainly attempted to fulfill his comments and has initiated widespread border skirmishes on multiple occasions.68 However, in the status quo, Rhee does not have enough resources to properly initiate an invasion, nor does he have adequate backing from the South Korean people.69

With his hands full and South Korea preoccupied with internal affairs, Rhee’s intentions to continually wage these border clashes may eventually spell disaster for South Korea. For several months now, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and the northern Korean People’s Army (KPA) have been engaging in continuous border skirmishes, effectively waging an undeclared war.70 These skirmishes have gradually increased in size and scale, and today constitute a limited border war, going so far as to even involve divisional engagements from both armies. To the date which committee begins, as a direct result of the skirmishing, casualties of ROKA personnel are estimated to be in the thousands and civilian casualties on both sides in the tens of thousands.71 Thus, as skirmishes increase and armed conflict crystallizes on the border, it seems likely that North Korea is gaining its footing, with continued sparring potentially resulting in a North Korean invasion. This potential invasion could spell complete disaster for Rhee; not only is the South Korean army vastly unprepared to deal with an invasion, but South Koreans are also at odds with each other, which would make a united defence very difficult.

66 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/1000000-people-died-during-the-korean-war-the-forgotten 67 Ibid. 68 https://www.americanheritage.com/wrong-turns-korea# 69 Ibid. 70 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/18in-rgt.htm 71 https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War

The State of the Nation, in Numbers

As shown in the figure above, this is the Cabinet’s starting point with regards to three critical metrics: public approval, unemployment, and exchange rate. The Cabinet is highly unpopular with the general population, as they are seen as a new—and significant—obstacle to Korean reunification. Unemployment is at extremely high levels, owing to several decades of foreign administration as well as the lingering effects of World War II. The Won, which was introduced in 1945 and pegged at a standard rate of 15 Won to 1 US Dollar, has now inflated to almost 30 times the original standard, due to a combination of increased money supply, and intense postwar demand for goods and services.

Without significant efforts to alter the increasing course of these metrics, the committee will be confronted by civil unrest and other challenges of increasing frequency and magnitude. Thus, delegates will have to take targeted, decisive action.

Initiating Crisis

It is August 15, 1948. The Republic of Korea has just been established, and the Cabinet of Syngman Rhee sits for the first time. Rhee’s cabinet inherits a particularly challenging situation.

In recent months, revolts and rebellions have been taking place with increasing frequency across the country. This, as hypothesized by KNP intelligence, has been due to two primary drivers: one, widespread discontent among the general civilian population; and two, communist insurgents and militias sponsored by the North. While the reasons for the former

have been clearly outlined at the end of the historical analysis, the Cabinet’s understanding of the latter factor is considerably more unclear, with many questions remaining: are these operatives sent across the border? Are they coordinated with South Korean communists and leftists? How widespread are their operations? And most importantly, how might our police forces tell the two apart?72

Today, perhaps some light will be shed on the questions at hand: South Korean border guards, patrolling the highly-mountainous far eastern section of the border, near Mt. Kumgang, engaged in a shootout with a large group of suspected North Korean operatives. South Korean border guards, navigating treacherous granite cliffs and difficult terrain, eventually gained the upper hand and forced the invading group to surrender. Five South Korean guards were killed, while an estimated 75 suspected North Korean operatives met the same fate. Over 75 suspected operatives were then apprehended and brought into South Korean custody, but it is believed that several hundred more are still out in the mountains.

Portfolio Powers

이승만, Syngman Rhee — President

Represented by the committee dais, Syngman Rhee is the President of the Republic of Korea. He holds absolute power over all committee decisions and has the power to veto any directive or other form of legislation. Rhee is staunchly anti-communist, anti-Japanese, and pro- American, and believes that oppressive and authoritarian action is sometimes necessary to execute his agenda. His most fervent wish is to reunite the Korean peninsula under his rule, and if not possible through diplomatic means, he will do it through brute force.

이시영, Yi Si-Yeong — Vice President A career politician, Yi Si-yeong served as a bureaucrat for the Korean Empire and the Korean Provisional Government before his ascension to the vice presidency. Today, he serves as President Syngman Rhee’s right-hand man and the chief statesman of the Korean Cabinet. He is responsible for translating Rhee’s vision into cold, hard policy, working closely with Prime Minister Lee Beom-seok to rebuild a Korea tattered by four decades of foreign occupation. To accurately simulate the power of the vice presidency, Si-yeong’s vote counts as two when voting on all public directives.

72 Ibid.

이범석, Lee Beom-seok — Prime Minister As a career politician and independence activist, Lee Beom-seok is best known for founding the highly influential Korean National Youth Association (KNYA). In his role as the Prime Minister, he primarily works alongside Vice-President Yi Si-yeong to execute President Rhee’s agenda. Beom-seok, in particular, has the ability to leverage the KNYA, which aligns itself ideologically with Rhee. With over 1.15 million members, it maintains a group of 20,000 elite soldier-trainees, which Beom-seok has at his disposal to conduct operations. To accurately simulate the Prime Minister’s power, Beom-seok’s vote counts as two when voting on non- war-related public directives.

윤치영, Yun Chi-young — Minister of Home Affairs An old associate and collaborator of Syngman Rhee, Yi Yun-yong studied and taught in the United States prior to becoming the Minister of Home Affairs. He, like Rhee, is an anti- communist and fiercely anti-Japanese, likely owing to the time he served in prison during the Japanese occupation of Korea, where he was tortured and starved. As the Minister of Home Affairs, Chi-young has jurisdiction over all of Korea’s localized police forces and is tasked with managing the nation’s various governmental services. To this end, alongside Lee Beom- seok’s KNYA, Chi-young’s forces are largely responsible for conducting Rhee’s campaign of weeding out leftists and suppressing suspected communists.

장택상, Jang Taek-sang — Minister of Foreign Affairs Most well known as the former Chief of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, Jang Taek- sang has a fearsome reputation as an anti-communist enforcer. Having arrested and jailed several prominent leftist politicians during his tenure, among Korean communists, Taek-sang is a despised figure who has survived multiple assassination attempts. Thus, he comes into office as a controversial figure, and as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is responsible for representing Korea on the international stage and in all diplomatic engagements. He also has the unique power to request a meeting with any country with which Korea has established diplomatic relations.

장면, Chang Myon — Ambassador to the United States Prior to his career as a politician, Chang Myon was a teacher and school administrator. Today, he occupies the seat of the most powerful overseas ambassadorship, as envoy to the United States. In this capacity, Myon is responsible for conducting formal relations with the United States government and is the first point of contact for intergovernmental negotiations, trade pacts, and other business. His main goal, at present, is to gain the country official recognition.

신성모, Shin Sung-mo — Minister of Defence Despite being the foremost authority on the nation’s military operations, Shin Sung-mo has only limited experience serving in an army. Prior to his current role, Sung-mo was the captain of a ferry between Britain and India, and was only appointed as a military commissioner for Provisional Korea in the last few years of World War II. In his capacity as the Minister of Defence, though Sung-mo cannot directly order military movements, he works closely with all three branches to coordinate operations, and additionally, is in charge of enacting military policy, such as conscription. His approval is also needed for all new military projects and investments.

채병덕, Chae Byong-duk — Chief of Staff of the Army An experienced soldier who served as an artillery officer for the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II, General Chae Byong-duk today is the head of the Korean Army. In this capacity, he is responsible for commissioning new weaponry, integrating new technologies, and executing infantry and artillery operations during wartime. He also works closely with the two other branches of the military to coordinate military offensives, and reports to the Minister of Defence, Shin Sung-mo, when requesting making military requests unassociated with actual military operations.

손원일, Sohn Won-yil — Chief of Naval Operations As an experienced naval officer who has served both the Chinese and Korean navies, Admiral Sohn Won-yil today serves as the head of the Korean Navy. In this capacity, he is responsible for commissioning new ships, integrating new naval technologies, and executing naval operations during wartime. He also works closely with the two other branches of the military to coordinate military offensives, and reports to the Minister of Defence, Shin Sung-mo, when requesting making military requests unassociated with actual military operations.

김정렬, Kim Jeong-ryul — Chief of Staff of the Air Force A decorated pilot who served in the Imperial Japanese Air Corps and later returned as a founding pilot of the Korean Air Force, Colonel Kim Jeong-ryul today serves as the Chief of Staff of the Korean Air Force. In this capacity, he is responsible for the commissioning of new aircraft, the adoption of new aerospace technologies, and determining plans for the Air Force during times of war. He also works closely with his counterparts in the Navy and Army to coordinate military operations, and reports to the Minister of Defence, Shin Sung-mo, when requesting making military requests unassociated with actual military operations.

김도연, Kim Do-yeon — Minister of Finance An economist and professor, Kim Do-yeon is a supporter of a united Korea under Syngman Rhee. During the USAMGIK withdrawal from South Korea, Do-yeon played an important role in negotiating economic trade agreements between the two countries. As the Minister of Finance, Do-yeon is responsible for managing all finances of the country, whether it be regulating the Won, managing inflation, or setting tax rates. His fiscal policy aims to mitigate significant government spending and reduce national deficits. Although he does not control most government expenditures, his opinion as it relates to the nation’s finances when it comes to spending should be heavily valued.

임영신, Im Yeong-sin — Minister of Commerce and Industry A staunch supporter of President Rhee and a vociferously anti-Japanese, Im Yeong-sin was a teacher prior to her appointment as the Minister of Commerce. In her position, she is in charge of affairs related to the country’s trade, energy, and natural resources. With regards to trade, she has the ability to alter South Korea’s trade agreements and renegotiate them (through a Minister with diplomatic meeting powers); in terms of energy, she is responsible for the upkeep of the nation’s electricity grid; and in terms of resources, she primarily presides over the country’s mining sectors, which are of critical importance in supplying metals and coal during wartime.

허정, Heo Jeong — Minister of Transportation Like fellow minister Yun Chi-young, Heo Jeong is an old collaborator of President Syngman Rhee whom he met while working in the United States. As the Minister of Transportation, Jeong is charged with rebuilding the nation’s crippled transport infrastructure, whether major highways, town roads, or rail lines. His main goal, at present, is to repair critical highway and transport networks and railways, assets especially important to coordinate a wartime effort.

안호상, Ahn Ho-sang — Minister of Education An academic, philosopher, and professor by trade, Ahn Ho-sang, like the President, is an ardent anti-communist who serves as the republic’s Minister of Education. In this capacity, he is responsible for setting the curricula of the nation’s schools and developing the country’s educational ideology. With the ability to dictate school programming, Ho-sang is also able to use his powers for propaganda. Currently, he is working to eradicate leftists from the nation’s public schools.

조봉암, Cho Bong-am — Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Despite the perhaps dull appearance of a Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Cho Bong- am’s career has been anything but that. For over two decades under Japanese occupation, Bong-am served as an organizer and operative for the Korean Communist Party, even maintaining close ties to the Soviet Union. However, he would break from the party in 1946, publicly denouncing the party. In recent years, he has played a major role in North-South negotiations and in domestic politics by trying to bridge a highly polarized left and right. He is widely accused of being a communist by outsiders. In his capacity as the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Bong-am is responsible for farmland allocation and other facets of agricultural development. The former responsibility is critically important for the Cabinet’s popularity, as the incoming government must break up colonial-era Japanese farming monopolies and redistribute them back to Korean farmers.

이윤영, Yi Yun-yong — Minister without Portfolio A Christian Methodist pastor turned independence activist, Yi Yun-yong remains a dedicated advocate for the integration of Christianity in Korea. Currently, he serves as the Minister without Portfolio on Rhee’s cabinet, effectively responsible for the tasks unfulfilled by other ministers. When necessary, he will be appointed by the President to a ministry.

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