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4.5

Democratic Republic of Congo

The year 2012 closed with an escalating unresolved many of the underlying causes of crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo the conflict. MONUC was eventually author- (DRC). The fragile political environment in ized at a strength of 22,016 uniformed mili- the wake of the November 2011 presidential tary and police personnel, making it the largest and legislative elections and the subsequent UN peacekeeping mission. In its eleven years outbreak of violence in eastern DRC stem- of existence, the mission developed its focus ming from the mutiny of the March 23 move- according to the changing circumstances on ment in April 2012 are only the most recent the ground, from supporting implementation manifestation of chronic problems in the re- of the cease-fire agreement to assisting the gion, including the authoritarian drift of the political transition process. state and a mix of domestic and regional con- In 2009, in keeping with its reinforced flict drivers unresolved since the Second mandate, MONUC focused largely on the un- Congo War formally ended in 1999. While finished business of the stabilization of east- the international community suffers from a ern DRC. A series of joint military operations severe case of “Congo fatigue” and is frus- with the Congolese national armed forces trated at the slow pace of political reform, against armed groups in the east, while yield- donors continue to support programs in the ing important results, also came under heavy face of recurrent setbacks to stability and development in the country rather than risk a total breakdown. The UN Security Council has 6287+68'$16287+ 68'$1 struggled to map out the position of the UN '(02&5$7,& Organization Stabilization Mission in the 5(38%/,&2)7+( (48$7(85 &21*2 3529,1&( Dem ocratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), 25,(17$/( Bunia which was unable to stop rebel groups from Kampala capturing the strategic city of in eastern Libreville Mbandaka 125' .,98 Congo in late November. Goma RWA .$6$, Bandundu Bujumbura Kindu 68' Background Brazzaville 25,(17$/ .,98 BURUNDI Kinshasa .$6$, 0$1,(0$ BAS-CONGO BANDUNDU 2&&,'(17$/ The UN Security Council first authorized the Mbuji-Mayi deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, Kananga 0 300 km the UN Organization Mission in the Demo- 0 200 mi cratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), in 1999 KATANGA in response to a regional request following $1*2/$ =$0%,$ 0$/$:, two wars in the DRC that engulfed much of Lubumbashi * In addition to its Kinshasa headquarters, MONUSCO maintains the region, and the subsequent signing of liaison offices in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Bujumbura (Burundi), Harare (Zimbabwe), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (), the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. While the Lusaka (Zambia), and Windhoek (Namibia). agreement formally ended hostilities, it left

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92 • MISSION NOTES

were met with quick and overwhelming force UN Organization Stabilization Mission by state security forces, while Etienne Tshise - in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) kedi, the leader of the opposition, was kept under house arrest by state authorities and • Authorization Date 28 May 2010 (UNSC Res. 1925 [as pressured by the international community not MONUSCO succeeding MONUC]) • Start Date 1 July 2010 to take to the streets in order to avoid what • SRSG Roger Meece (United States) many feared would be widespread violence. • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Chander Prakash The fragmented nature of the Congolese (India) opposition and the lack of persistent, coordi- • Police Commissioner Abdallah Wafy (Niger) nated pressure from the international com - • Budget $1,347.5 million (1 July 2012– munity to address the many irregularities of 30 June 2013) the elections—due partly to an ambivalence • Strength as of Troops: 16,966 among international diplomats toward Tshise - 31 October 2012 Military Observers: 688 kedi as a viable alternative to Kabila—allowed Police: 1,401 the Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle International Civilian Staff: 977 (AMP), President Kabila’s fraying majority, National Civilian Staff: 2,895 to weather the immediate unrest. However, UN Volunteers: 543 the crisis deepened throughout 2012, and the For detailed mission information see p. 270 president’s legitimacy eroded in the eyes of the Congolese people.

criticism for lapses in protecting civilians. These operations, conducted with the national Key Developments army, known for human rights abuses, ex- posed the operational tensions in the mis- Escalating Violence and sion’s mandated activities. Calls for a Regional Force On 28 May 2010, the UN Security Council The political crisis spurred by the 2011 elec- adopted Resolution 1925, substantially recon- tions coincided with a dramatic deterioration figuring the mission, reframing it as a stabiliza- of security in eastern DRC in early 2012 as tion mission, and renaming it MONUSCO. former members of the Congrès National pour Resolution 1925, which came on the heels of la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) defected from efforts by the Congolese government to see a the Forces Armées de la République Démocra- substantial reduction in the UN’s presence, tique du Congo (FARDC) and began launch- authorized the withdrawal of up to 2,000 troops ing coordinated attacks on national forces. from the country while maintaining the previ- Since 2009, CNDP rebels, formerly sup- ously authorized ceiling, further concentrated ported by the government of Rwanda, who the mission’s attention on civilian protection were integrated into the national army as part and military operations in the east, and estab- of the 2002 Kinshasa-Kigali peace deal, have lished a reserve force that can react, in princi- dominated local economies in . ple, to incidents throughout the country. Their integration greatly benefited the CNDP as it solidified and legitimized its control Elections in 2011 over the “petit nord” area of North Kivu. On 20 December 2011, President Joseph Ka- These former CNDP contingents refused to bila was sworn in for a second five-year term deploy outside of North Kivu, and maintained in office, following elections in November that a parallel chain of command that continued to were widely denounced by international ob- control economic networks tied to Rwanda servers as lacking credibility and that spurred based on illicit mineral extraction. violent incidents in some parts of the country. During the 2011 elections, these former Attempts to protest election results publicly CNDP elements allied themselves with Kabila 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 93

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO • 93

and carried out a campaign of intimidation to force voters in North Kivu to cast their votes for the incumbent president. This dominance and intimidation was so deeply resented by Kivutian populations that it cost Kabila his popularity and the vote in North Kivu, de- spite this having been his power base in the 2006 elections. Efforts by Kabila following the November 2011 elections to regain some control over the Kivus by threatening CNDP commander Bosco Ntanganda with arrest and by trying to dismantle CNDP networks, led to the mutiny and the emergence of a new rebel- lion in eastern DRC. In May 2012 the defected soldiers named themselves the (M23)1 and rapidly gained ground. The M23 does not pose the only security AFP photo/Phil Moore problem in the Kivus. Several smaller armed An Indian UN peacekeeper walks past trucks of Congolese M23 rebels groups are being mobilized as a reaction to the as they withdraw from the city of Goma in the east of the Democratic M23, some of them composed of ex–Forces Republic of Congo, 1 December 2012. Hundreds of Congolese M23 rebels began the withdrawal from Goma as promised under a regionally Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda brokered deal, after a twelve-day occupation of the city. Around 300 (FDLR) fighters, motivated by anti-Tutsi, anti- rebels, army mutineers who seized Goma on 20 November in a lightning Rwanda, and nationalistic sentiments. These advance, were seen by an AFP reporter driving in a convoy of looted trucks north of the main town in DRC’s mineral-rich east. Mayi-Mayi groups, although weakly organ- ized and difficult to track, are growing in numbers. Intimidation and fear-mongering by some logistical support, but financing and the M23 and its CNDP predecessor are also further logistics support remain unaddressed. fueling ethnically charged self-protection ac- There are also questions about the modalities tivities among local populations. These vari- of how this so-called neutral force would re- ous smaller groups are believed to be follow- late to MONUSCO, including whether this ing the same pattern of abuse and repression would be a hybrid force, a regional force sup- of local populations that has been carried out ported by the UN, or a troop enhancement of by the M23, and have the potential to control the existing UN operation. parts of the territory of North and , Amid discussions about military action, thus posing a growing security threat. the deteriorating security situation in the Regional confidence in the capacity of Kivus underscored the urgency for a revived, MONUSCO to quell the activities of armed sustained political process in the region. groups was low during 2012. On 15 July the There is growing recognition that without African Union announced that it was “pre- sustained international pressure on the M23 pared to contribute to the establishment of a and its supporters and a comprehensive polit- regional force to put an end to the activities ical process to accompany any military re- of armed groups” in the DRC.2 The neutral sponse, the security and humanitarian situa- force initiative of the International Confer- tion in the region risks further deterioration, ence on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), as military power-sharing, the dominant para- while initially a welcome expression of re- digm of past attempts to end the violence in gional interest to end the violence, has since the DRC, has repeatedly failed to yield sus- stalled. Zimbabwe has offered troops, Tanza- tainable results. nia has also offered troops as well as a force A high-level UN meeting on eastern commander, and has offered DRC, convened by UN Secretary-General Ban 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 94

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HIV/AIDS and UN Peace Operations

Recognizing for the first time the devas- in all peacekeeping operations. The UN peace operations in fulfilling the Security tating impact that the HIV/AIDS pan- has eight HIV/AIDS units and nine focal Council’s mandates. Financial, logistic, demic can have on global security, the points in its sixteen peacekeeping mis- and other constraints, such as limited Security Council in July 2000 passed sions, ensuring the implementation of human resources, affect the ability of landmark Resolution 1308. The resolu- programs to reduce the risk of mission HIV/AIDS units and focal points to mo- tion mandated the Secretary-General and personnel contracting and transmitting bilize full HIV/AIDS training, ser vices, the Department of Peacekeeping Opera- HIV. HIV/AIDS officers also provide ad- and programs. The lack of HIV/AIDS tions to take relevant steps to curb the vice to heads of missions on HIV/AIDS– resources is particularly pressing for UN risks posed by the unchecked spread of related issues in the context of mission- political missions, which could benefit the HIV/AIDS pandemic, noting espe- specific mandates, and coordinate with from support for staff in the form of cially the disproportionate effect that it relevant local partners. awareness and prevention programs and has on women and children. On an operational level, peacekeeping services. As of November 2012, only two In June 2011, building on the gains missions strive to incorporate HIV/AIDS political missions, the UN Office in in mitigating the risks posed by HIV/ awareness in their work, including in post- Burundi (BNUB) and the UN Assistance AIDS over the past decade, the Security conflict demobilization, disarmament, and Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), had focal Council adopted Resolution 1983, rec- reintegration pro cesses and in security points deployed to provide HIV/AIDS– ognizing the important role that peace- sector reform. The UN Organiza tion Sta- related assistance. None of the fifteen keepers play in awareness and preven- bilization Mission in the Democratic Re- field-based political missions maintain tion in missions abroad and in their public of Congo (MONUSCO), for ex - HIV/AIDS officers or dedicated HIV home countries. The resolution further ample, integrated HIV/AIDS sensitivity in focal points. Plans to extend HIV/AIDS requested that the Secretary-General en- training national military personnel, while awareness to the other political missions sure the implementation of HIV/AIDS the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti may further strain already limited awareness and prevention programs for (MINUSTAH) assisted national authorities resources. all UN missions. to address HIV/AIDS in Haiti’s prisons. Following these resolutions, the UN Increasing budgetary constraints, now has integrated HIV/AIDS programs however, severely impede the efforts of

Ki-moon in New York on 27 September 2012 in heavy clashes near the town of Kibumba. in the margins of the UN General Assembly, The town eventually fell to the rebel move- suggested that the deployment of a high-level ment, which soon advanced to the edge of effort could provide the impetus to launch a Goma. The M23 gave the government a political process to end the violence. How- twenty-four-hour ultimatum for peace talks, a ever, while there are calls for a high-level UN proposal rejected by Kinshasa, before advanc- envoy to the region, negotiations between the ing on the regional capital. On 20 November, Kinshasa government and the M23 rebels M23 forces occupied the city of Goma, meet- have been driven by the ICGLR. This has been ing limited resistance from the FARDC, who called into question, as the ICGLR is chaired fled in advance of the attack, and MONUSCO by Uganda, an alleged source of support for peacekeepers. While the M23 withdrew from M23. Goma eleven days later following an agree- ment with the ICGLR that set the stage for ne- The Fall of Goma gotiations, the group has maintained positions The rapidly escalating violence in the Kivus nearby, posing a continuing threat to the city. between the FARDC and the M23 throughout MONUSCO came under heavy criticism the year further destabilized the already frag- for its inability to stop the fall of the most ile, war-torn region. On 16 November, sol- strategic city in the east, despite the deploy- diers from the FARDC and the M23 engaged ment of attack helicopters to slow the rebels’ 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 95

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advance. The mission evacuated out of Goma Security Sector Reform and a number of senior Congolese officials, in- Stabilization: Stalled Processes cluding nearly two dozen magistrates who The stabilization and peace consolidation ef- were targeted by M23. The rebels used forts under the DRC government’s Stabiliza- advanced weapons and more sophisticated tion and Reconstruction (STAREC) program operations than expected. The UN Under- have stalled, though one can point to some Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Hervé modest successes. For example, the successful Ladsous, argued that the mission was man- conduct of a census of the army; recent im- dated to assist the FARDC in protecting civil- provements in the justice sector such as the ians in the area rather than engage directly new mobile courts systems, widely considered with the rebels, an impossible task after na- a success at making justice more accessible tional forces fled.3 In December, Ladsous in rural areas; progress in police training and presented several options to the Security sensitization through MONUSCO and the EU Council in response to the fall of Goma, in- Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of cluding deploying a regional force as pro- Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) training; and the posed by the ICGLR, providing additional reopening of the military academy. However, force enablers for MONUSCO, and support- the absence of a political pro cess and strategy ing an expanded version of the joint verifica- for security sector reform by Kin shasa has tion mechanism of the ICGLR,4 which was made those efforts piecemeal and unsustain- launched in September in an effort to address able. Other institutional reforms, like the de- the continued conflict in eastern DRC. centralization project, are either stagnant or The UN Group of Experts on the DRC, in progressing extremely slowly, as the crisis in its final report, issued on 21 November 2012, the east and the tensions with Rwanda domi- documented evidence of Rwandan and, to a nate international attention in the region. lesser extent, Ugandan logistical, financial, On 7 November 2012 the EU Advisory and recruitment support for M23, highlighting and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the total breakdown of the earlier rapproche- the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC ment between the DRC and Rwanda.5 The RD Congo) signed a new action program with findings of the final report were similar to the Congolese authorities to continue with its those of the group’s interim report, released in mandate to help develop a FARDC reform June 2012. The November final report also plan that will reinforce administrative capaci- recommended placing several M23 leaders on ties in the human resource and budget do- the UN sanctions list. Following this recom- mains, support and continue to engage in train- mendation, in December the Security Council ing, and revitalize the logistical component of imposed an arms embargo on M23 as well as travel and asset sanctions on the M23’s presi- dent and one of its top commanders. While the Group of Experts’ report and EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo the experts themselves have been loudly de- (EUPOL RD Congo) nounced by Kigali, Western donors, including • Authorization Date 12 June 2007 (EU Council Joint Action the United States and United Kingdom, have 2007/405/CFSP) since suspended aid to Rwanda in reaction • Start Date July 2007 to its support of the M23 rebellion. Uganda • Head of Mission Commissioner Jean Paul Rikir (Belgium) also denounced the charges of the Group of • Budget $9.27 million (1 October 2011– Ex perts and briefly threatened to pull its troops 30 September 2012) out of all peacekeeping missions, including • Strength as of Civilian Police: 16 the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), for 30 September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 21 which Uganda is the top troop-contributing National Civilian Staff: 19 country. 2012_CIC_4_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:33 PM Page 96

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EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform Conclusion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) On 28 December 2012, two MONUSCO util- ity helicopters came under fire by M23 ele- • Authorization Date 2 May 2005 (EU Council Joint Action ments, the second time that month that the 2005/355/CFSP) mission’s helicopters had been targeted. • Start Date June 2005 These events underscore calls for the UN to • Head of Mission Antonio Martins (Portugal) • Budget $17.65 million (1 October 2011– regain the initiative on the political front in 30 June 2012) the DRC, as there is growing awareness that • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 50.5a the UN and MONUSCO cannot play a purely 30 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 41 support role and that there is a need Note: a. EUSEC RD Congo has 50 full-time and 1 part-time international for a political process to streamline and focus civilian staff. efforts to resolve both the short-term crisis in the east and the long-term challenge of the role of neighboring countries and national re- form. Toward this end, the UN is conducting the FARDC. Throughout the year, EUSEC a strategic review on MONUSCO, and in De- conducted several workshops with civil soci- cember the Secretary-General engaged in dis- ety and military leaders in order to enhance cussions with regional powers on developing civil-military cooperation, conducted training a political framework for addressing the cri- workshops on sexual violence and the protec- sis. This objective is likely to become even tion of children, and piloted a biometric sys- more complicated once Rwanda takes its tem of payments for a regiment in North two-year seat on the UN Security Council in Kivu. In July 2012 the mission recommended January 2013. a yearlong extension of the EUSEC mandate, to be followed by a twelve-month final tran- sition phase.

Notes 1. The movement is named after a 23 March 2009 peace deal with the government under which the rebel group was to change into a political party, but that the rebels say has not been implemented. 2. “AU Ready to Send Peacekeepers to DR Congo,” Agence France-Presse, 15 July 2012. 3. “UN Defends Failed Attempt to Halt Capture of Congo’s Goma,” Reuters, 21 November 2012. 4. “DR Congo: UN Peacekeeping Chief Presents Security Council with Options After M23 With- drawal from Goma,” UN News Service, 7 December 2012. 5. For the report and its addenda, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml.