[31] THE RATIONALITY OF THE REAL: PROCLUS AND HEGEL

Introduction

Although system-building in philosophy has fallen into disrepute in this century, it is not because the perennial temptation to systematise has been  nally overcome by something de nitive like Gödel’s incompleteness proof in mathematics. On the contrary, it is usually when some attempt to construct a system has failed that philosophers become temporarily disenchanted with the whole systematic approach, only later to resume their eforts from a new direction.1 In view of this historical pattern, I think it is legitimate to wonder about the philosophical attraction of systems. Thus, taking Proclus and Hegel as ancient and modern systematisers respectively, I want to consider some questions about their motivation for constructing systems. For instance, why does Proclus systematise the metaphysical tradition stemming from Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, given that these were aporetic rather than systematic thinkers.2 Arguably, his concept of system is drawn from mathematics, as evidenced by his Commentary on Euclid and by his Elements of Theology, so perhaps he wished to construct a de nitive science based on this Greek model. But I want to suggest that religion was also a motivating factor, since we know from the Life written by his follower Marinus that Proclus zealously practised cult worship and theurgy. Thus, he may be completing the Iamblichean project of justifying pagan theology against the Christian faith, or he may be constructing a systematic science of theology as his own unique project.

1 For instance, one could take the Vienna Circle to be reacting against Hegelian system- atising, though one of the goals of their ‘unity of science’ project was to assemble a uni ed encyclopaedia of the sciences. 2 Despite persistent attempts to reconstruct Plato’s ‘unwritten doctrine’, it is clear that his extant dialogues are unsystematic in the sense that each constitutes its own dialogical space which is not systematically related to other dialogues. Although Aristotle does develop a body of doctrine in his own name, he cannot be said to have constructed a philosophical system in any modern sense, because he sharply diferentiates the sciences from each other and adopts an aporetic approach in all of his inquiries. While one could reconstruct some kind of Neoplatonic system from the writings of Plotinus, his so-called Enneads are unsystematic in that they were written in response to speci c questions rather than as a means of setting out any systematic doctrine. 544 history of philosophy

From the philosophical point of view, however, he seems to be searching [32] for some ultimate ungrounded hypothesis from which to deduce all of reality in a consistent fashion. Although Proclus represents his work as the completion of a Platonic project, it seems that he is pushing too far Plato’s search for some adequate hypothesis grounded in language. Not even in the Parmenides, which was taken by Neoplatonists to exemplify dialectical theology, does Plato construct the sort of demonstrative science that Proclus presents in his Elements of Theology. So we must raise a question about what philosophical problems are being resolved through the construction of such a systematic science. But perhaps we should also entertain the possibility that Proclus had lost sight of the traditional problems of metaphysics, since his system seems to contain petri ed answers to the old problems about the one and the many, cause and efect, prior and posterior. Thus, if one wishes to rehabilitate Proclus as an original thinker, one must show how he contributed to the Neoplatonic tradition by systematising it.3 There are some clear parallels with Hegel, who resurrected systematic philosophy in the nineteenth century after the scepticism of Hume and the critical philosophy of Kant seemed to have buried it forever. In the Introduction to his Encyclopaedia, for instance, he suggests that system satis es the desire of reason for completeness through the progression from and return to  rst principles as a genuine ground. According to him, philosophy cannot be a scienti c production without being systematic in such a way as to include all particular principles of the empirical sciences.4 Like Plato before him, Hegel criticises these special sciences for their lack of self-reection and, on the basis of this critique, he makes rather sweeping claims for the superiority of reason. But Hegel’s critique of Newton in his Dissertation on the planets also tells us something about his own conception of Nature as an objective embodiment of Absolute Spirit.5 His major criticism is that such notions as gravity and inertia had not been properly deduced in a systematic way, so that they appear to be accidental rather than essential characteristics of natural bodies. Perhaps this critique is also motivated by Hegel’s desire to justify metaphysics as a science, in view

3 The typical view about Proclus’ lack of originality is to be found in A.C. Lloyd’s contribution to the Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, where he claims (311) that generally the concepts and hypostases of Proclus are not original but are derived from predecessors like Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syrianus. For spirited defences of Proclus as an original thinker one should consult W. Beierwaltes 1965, and J.M.P. Lowry 1980. 4 G.W.F. Hegel 1971a: 24. 5 G.W.F. Hegel 1986.