02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 17 Service American University, Washington DC, were serving as Institute research assistant in the summer of 2016, when this paper paper this 2016, of when summer the in was prepared. assistant research Institute East Middle as serving were DC, Washington University, International of American School the at Service candidate amaster’s Youhana, Rose and College, Middlebury at senior arising Preston, Katherine Studies. 3 2 1 al-Nusra until recently associated with al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat and Islamistopposition extremists brigades, at least among government secular non-extremist forces, fight intoa multi-sided degenerated has war The years. 45 than more for governed now has which regime, Assad to the end an demanding insurgents and protesters peaceful both with out, broken had revolution lent 2011, of fall the By aspirations. Syrians’ a with vio ture, even while President Assadclaimed empathy tor and arrests crackdown, aviolent with sponded transition to democracy. The Syrian government re a and oppression to government end an wanted 2011. in early in Mubarak protesters The in Hosni Ali and Ben Zine Presidents down brought that Spring Arab the of spirit the with infected people by young conducted largely ment, move resistance apeaceful as started conflict The years. five than more for at war been has Syria Washington DC School ofInternationalService American University, YouhanaRose Middlebury College Preston Katherine Studies,DC Washington Johns HopkinsSchool of Advanced International Director oftheConflictManagementProgram Daniel Serwer of the Conflict in Syria Internal Politics and the Evolution Syria andthe of East Regional Quagmire the Middle ActionGroupforSyria.pdf Jabhat al-Nusra has announced a split from al Qaeda, but it is not yet clear what that really means. really that what clear yet not is it but Qaeda, al from asplit announced has al-Nusra Jabhat Daniel Serwer is a professor and director of the conflict management programme at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International International Advanced of School Hopkins Johns the at programme management conflict the of director and aprofessor is Serwer Daniel Action Group for Syria Final communiqué 30.06.2012. Accessed July 29, 2016. 29, July Accessed 30.06.2012. communiqué Final Syria for Group Action 2 , other extremists associated with the Is the with associated extremists , other 1 - - - - - ecutive powers. ecutive governing forcalled a bodywith “transitional full ex 2012 that aJune of basis the communiqué UN on continues Mistura, de Staffan official UN veteran by led now effort, The ceasefire. enduring even an or solution apolitical about to bring voys have failed en special UN high-level of efforts Repeated tion. This is an extraordinarily complex and situa difficult government. Syrian the not al-Nusra), Jabhat extremists (especially the Islamic State but also against is fight main the particular in US the for But to extremists. to also go appears backing Gulf some what they though rebels, regard as non-extremist backing are states Turkey Gulf US, some The and support. financial as well as forces army to Syrian 2015, of autumn the support since air and, advisors provide also Russians The fighters. Shi’ite Iraqi and Guard advisors and as commanders well Hezbollah Revolutionary oil, provide Iranians The government. Syrian the backing are Russia and Iran ernment. with opposition and Arabs sometimes with the gov lamic State, and Kurdish forces sometimes allied ernance and political situations and political ernance on the ground in gov current the have into account to take will gress pro in now wars Syrian many the from emerges ever governing transitional eventually arrangement what met, be not may or may deadline that While 2016. by 1August, transition the manage and body transitional this to create aplan to produce posed sup is Turkey Arabia, Saudi Iran, and Russia, US, the others, among includes, which (ISSG), Group www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommunique 3 The International Syria Support TheInternational Syria Support ------

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IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 18 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys healthcare, and education. Devaluation of the Syri the of Devaluation education. and healthcare, fuel, bread, subsidized of providers primary the still are agencies State level. at a minimal to function ues Governance in government-controlled contin areas ernments answer to Damascus. under centralized control. gov Provincial and local entirely to be appear longer no forces the of some agenciessecurity are directed by loyalists, though The members. family and associates close of ber num asmall among office President’s the in trated the-sustainability-of-syrias-war/. 14 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 prise approximately 20% of its territory reside in government-controlled which com areas, country the in remaining Syrians of two-thirds About Areas Government-Controlled cated political circumstances. compli and varied very those of English, in sources secondary on mainly based asnapshot, to provide intended is paper This country. the of parts various July 29, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=58941. 2015. www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/22/he-didnt-have-die/indiscriminate-attacks-opposition-groups-syria 2015. January 30, 2015. Accessed July 29, 2016. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=58875. carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59215. estimates as many as 500,000. as many as estimates (SOHR) Rights Human for Observatory Syrian the while (SNHR), Rights Human for Network Syrian the 117,000 at least thousands; of dreds to according hun the in to number thought are prisoners Political limits. narrow within operate do parties other Some 2012since nominally pluralism. introduced political evenal-Assad, though the constitution in force Bashar President of Party Baath by the controlled ernment-controlled and is areas largely rudimentary gov most in mobilization Political stamp. rubber and 2016, April in shop atalk is elected Parliament, The autocracy. centralized ahighly still is Syria areas, July 2016. July https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/1176 at: Available 2056-3175. 37-72, p. 2015.3, ISSN June Ibid. K K www.syriahr.com/en/2016/06/16/47627 M L F K “The Sustainability of Syria’s War.” The Soufan Group. 23 September, 2015. Accessed 8 July, 2016. http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief- 8July, 2015. Accessed September, 23 Group. Soufan War.” The Syria’s of Sustainability “The K L und haddour haddour artinez a und haddour ha k ih l , Aron. “The Political Geography of Syria’s War: An Interview With Fabrice Balanche.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Peace. International for Endowment Carnegie Balanche.” Fabrice With Interview An War: Syria’s of Geography Political “The , Aron. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2 March, 2015. Accessed 6 July, 2016. http:// 6July, 2015. Accessed 2March, Peace. International for Endowment Carnegie Militias?, Pro-Assad the Are Who , Aron. af , Lama and Ole Ole and , Lama Governance Without Government in Syria: Civil Society and State Building During Conflict During Building State and Society Civil Syria: in Government Without Governance , Rana. , Jose Ciro, and and Ciro, , Jose , 2015. , Endowment Carnegie for International Peace. State. Syrian the on Hold Regime’s Assad 2015. The , Kheder. , 2015. S o l B vang rent . Eng. “Assad’s Bread Problem.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. February 3, 2015. Accessed 2015. 3, Accessed February Peace. International for Endowment Carnegie Problem.” Bread “Assad’s Eng. Human Rights Watch. March March Watch. Rights Human Syria. in Groups Opposition by Attacks Indiscriminate Die” to Have Didn’t He 5 Power is concen 4 . In these these . In ------military targets weremilitary present. known no where areas and areas civilian populated into heavily- launched rockets unguided and attacks, car bomb attacks, improvised explosive device (IED) indiscriminate of cases numerous reported (HRW) 2012January and April 2014. Human Rights Watch plaguedrity government-controlled between areas ernment also relies heavily on military support from from support ernment alsoheavily relies on military gence bodies. and air force intelli including military forces, security by state protected heavily are offices administrative Syrian control. government steady or constant under have been that regions in especially improved, has and fuel. bread of prices the increased sharply has pound an support. popular and security maintains still it where areas in vices. The government concentrates these services with the government or its allies. allies. its or government the with affiliated by or supported either forces security ous by vari provided is institutions state-run for Security and legitimacy. respect of degree some to maintain government ister property and travel outside of the country. the of outside travel and property ister reg to marry, necessary documents legal with ians been co-located with security forces to provide Syr sion of minimal services. minimal of sion mainly due to its maintenance and of provi security is controls it areas within legitimacy government’s eas outside of the government’s control. government’s the of outside eas ar all from off cut been have effectively that services to access to get and reasons safety for move both evenviolence, of supporters the opposition, who fleeing Syrians for havens safe have become control 8 6 State-run administrative officers have officers administrative State-run Subsidized bread nevertheless helps the the helps nevertheless bread Subsidized 13 7 The same holds true for other ser other for true holds same The Territories under the government’s 10 Date accessed: 27 July, 2016. 27 July, accessed: Date 12 . Syria Studies, [S.l.], v. 7, n. [S.l.], Studies, . Syria Security since then then since Security 11 Sporadic insecu Sporadic . Date accessed: 8 accessed: . Date 14 The gov The 9 The The ------09/09/2016 11:38:05 02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 19 bled institutions. bled themselves financially, weakening enfee already to sustain order in corruption toward ministrators Field%20Commanders_0.pdf reform.net/sites/default/files/The%20Power%20and%20Political%20Future%20of%20the%20Syrian%20Opposition%E2%80%99s%20 files/1425551004pdf1SyriaLAC.pdf pace. kept 2016. Accessed July 26, 2016. 26, https://tcf.org/content/commentary/fistful-dollars-dwindling-value-syrian-state-salaries July 2016. Accessed 25 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 and militarization of the Syrian opposition. or Committees, Popular have formed who militias local and Peace Reporting, 2014. https://iwpr.net/sites/default/files/download/publication/iwpr_syria_local_councils_report_web.pdf Reporting, Peace and groups have produced what may become the key the become may what have produced groups armed The to time. time from and to place place varies from civilian councilsgroups, and courts and education. water electricity, food, health, justice, security, ing for providing minimal government includ- services, that civilian councils and responsibility share courts local manned, Syrian) generally (and locally many groups, armed involves generally It uniform. from far is areas opposition-controlled in Governance Areas Opposition-Controlled tribal groups to Alawite militias. and Christian Arab Sunni from ranging membership in diverse most the perhaps is which (NDF), Forces Defense government militias organizes under the National The most well-known and largestnetwork of pro- the Iraqi Badr Brigade. Badr Iraqi the ment, including the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah and also include foreign the militias govern that support these day no more than $28. than more no day 2011 in $383 approximately to but pounds, Syrian to 18,000 amounts salary monthly average dier’s a sol effort: war government’s the on mark their have left devaluation accompanying and Inflation L L L L L Mahmoud, A K K L “Local Councils“Local in Syria A Sovereignty Crisis in Liberated Areas.” Menapolis. September 2013. http://menapolis.net/publications/ und und und und und und shabihas, ha l ha jundi l l , 2015. , , Aron. “A Fistful of Dollars: The Dwindling Value of Syrian State Salaries - The Century Foundation.” The Century Foundation. May 13, May Foundation. Century The Foundation.” Century -The Salaries State Syrian of Value Dwindling The Dollars: of “A Fistful , Aron. , 2015 , 2016 , 2015 af af , 2016 shabihas , 2016. , 2016 Washington, DC. The Institute for War War for Institute The DC. Washington, Recommendations. and Opportunities, Challenges, Syria: Inside Governance Local , Ghias. R 19 . u This has forced Syrian soldiers and ad and soldiers Syrian forced has This . in an attempt to mirror the mobilization mobilization the to mirror attempt an in s to are largely made up of Syrians they m 21 . 20 The Power and Political Future of the Syrian Opposition’s Field Commanders Field Opposition’s Syrian the of Future Political and Power The The relative power of the armed armed the of power relative The

16 18

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- - - - - authority where they operate. sole the as them recognizes often and areas trolled tablishment of throughout LACs opposition-con represents them and instead answers to the interna to the answers instead and them represents it that think not do Syrians Many however shaky. ment. sistance, despite near-constant aerial bombard respond to heightened demand for humanitarian as to and administration and forces regime departed by the left gap the to is fill councils these of pose pur The province). (Aleppo Bab Al and Marea in and province) (Idlib Saraqib in LACs other of ment considered the first LAC. first the considered is what established Zabadani Al of neighbourhood 2012 Damascene the January as when early as back dates areas opposition-controlled in (LACs) councils administrative local of emergence The education and healthcare, providers of subsidized fuel, bread, agencies still are the primary function at aminimal level. State controlled continues areas to Governance in government- and Opposition Forces ( Forces and Opposition led to revolution and the subsequent civil wars. civil subsequent the and to revolution led profound of that understanding the circumstances have a often also they operate, they where areas the in Popular commanders. field and military local State: Syrian the of rebuilding post-war the in actors 24 The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution Revolution Syrian of Coalition National The . Arab Reform Initiative, 2016. www.arab- Initiative, Reform . Arab Etilaf 23 This led to the establish to the led This 25 ) has overseen the es the overseen ) has

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’s legitimacy is is ’s legitimacy 22

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IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 20 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys where they operate. areas the in illegal them by declaring actors ety soci civil and LACs of work the to marginalize them to paid deference the on draw courts Sharia Some by providing humanitarian aid and other services. LACs of role the to usurping disputes civil local ing besieged towns. to services and aid providing of task difficult ready al the exacerbates which aproblem limitations, cial net/global-voices/syria-sharia-courts-impose-justice-rebel-held-idlib. gime-controlled areas and neighbouring countries. and neighbouring areas gime-controlled re safer towns, to neighbouring exodus causing governanceimpaired areas, in opposition-controlled severely has LACs, by civilian run even those towns, ing and ofneighbourhoods opposition-controlled government’s continuous shelling bomb and barrel The difficult. exceedingly is security regular or atic system of degree any maintaining to LACs, groups sad actors, from moderate armed groups to Islamist 2016. https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/1176 at: Available 2056-3175. 37-72,p. 2015. ISSN June 35 35 34 28 27 26 services. ensure life-preserving to is objective primary their because communities local from legitimacy of level high aparticularly enjoy 33 33 32 31 30 29 eas. ar opposition-controlled in actors all for task difficult The maintenance of hasproven security the most LACs. porting, sup and through, aid 2012 delivering been has and December in established was (ACU) Unit dination Coor The Assistance it. tional that donors support based courts depends heavily on the cities where where cities the on heavily depends courts based al-Nusra. Islamist groups like Jaish and al-Mujahedeen Jabhat by run often courts and Sharia-based through marily Justice in opposition-controlled operates areas pri councils. local and society civil to target known been have who al-Nusra, Jabhat like groups by Islamist also stems Insecurity controlled from areas. threats placed from their mostly homes, from opposition- dis now is population country’s the half than More K K www.acu-sy.org/en/about-acu/ Ibid. A M K Ibid Ibid. K ha ha haddour ha l enapo - H 29 l l l azzaa af af af Because these house Because areas various anti-As , 2015 2015 Governance Without Government in Syria: Civil Society and State Building During Conflict During Building State and Society Civil Syria: in Government Without Governance , Rana. l i s 31 , 2015. , Hazzaa Adnan. “Syria: Sharia Courts Impose Justice in Rebel-Held Idlib.” 26 March, 2014. Accessed 8 July, 2016. https://iwpr. 8July, 2014. Accessed March, 26 Idlib.” Rebel-Held in Justice Impose Courts Sharia “Syria: Adnan. , Hazzaa , 2013. Their responsibilities range from resolv . . 26 LACs today deal with severe finan severe with deal today LACs 27 Despite this shortcoming, LACs LACs shortcoming, this Despite 32 The work of these Sharia- these of work The

28 30 ------

in accordance with a strict interpretation of Sharia Sharia of interpretation astrict with accordance in to govern seeks and ideology jihadi to aSalafist heres ad who Baghdadi, al Bakr by Abu led theocracy ic autocrat 2014. in centralized, Syria and ahighly is IS Iraq in controls it territory the on acaliphate clared de Daesh, or ISIL) or (ISIS Levant the or Syria and (IS), State aka Islamic The Areas State-Controlled Islamic en to the undermine LACs. opposition-affiliated threat resources limited and war ongoing The vices. ser other and security to provide ability on pends Legitimacy groups. opposition throughout Syria de armed and courts Sharia with competition as well as they today face serious obstacles: parlous security But Syria. post-war in bodies governing legitimate the as to act well-poised are LACs civilian that tend humanSome rights groups and civil con society al-Assad, not of Syrian law.” Syrian of not al-Assad, of overthrow the for is uprising “This court, local the ans. ways among recognized secular Syri particular al not is legitimacy their operate, they where cities the in authority judicial only the be sometimes can jurisprudence.Islamic While these Sharia courts punishments fromcorresponding various texts on and rulings its derived but bylaws, or charter any Front. Islamic the with allied brigade, al-Sham Suqur the Army, and Syrian Free the with allied Brigade, Haq al- Fursan by the controlled area an in time at that coexisted province), which (Idlib Nabel Kafr in court Sharia the of work the detailed (IWPR) Reporting 2014, Peace War March for and In Institute see. the to over choose they cases of types the and coexist, they whom with actors governing the operate, they 34 33 One Kafr Nabel resident shared her views on on views her shared resident Nabel Kafr One This particular court did not operate under under operate not did court particular This the Islamic State in Iraq Iraq in State Islamic the 35 . Syria Studies, [S.l.], v. 7, 3, n. [S.l.], Studies, . Syria

. Date accessed: 8 July 8July accessed: . Date ------09/09/2016 11:38:06 02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 21 IS rivals in the area. the in rivals IS on gathering intelligence for ahub as acting and tion popula local the with rapport building of purposes invitation). da’wah a to is open governance establishing in step first its area, into anew moves State Islamic the When Baghdadi the declared caliphate from in Mosul Iraq. though Raqqa, is Syria in capital Its controls. it tory February, 2016. 2016. February, an area where IS is merely present). merely is IS where area an Wilayat areas other in but defends, and Wilayat Raqqa and 2014: 15, accessed 1 June, 2016. 1June, 2014: 15, accessed tions with local tribes. Throughout 2013 in Raqqa, IS 2013 IS Throughout Raqqa, in tribes. local with tions negotia coercive and groups armed rival targeted cil suicide that bombings groups, and civil society coun local the of members of kidnapping and nating assassi involved this Raqqa, In opposition. potential via town the in apresence establishing After brand. IS the strengthen and locals with rapport to build media provisionand service are widely publicized on social Contract, governance-of-isis-in-syria/ 31 2016. May, www.e-ir.info/2015/01/07/beyond-arms-and-beards-local- 2015, accessed 7January, published: Relations, E-International 47 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 da’wah Syria, and Iraq 21,000 in fighters 19,000- between numbering forces, law. fighting Its accessed 1 June, 2016. 1June, accessed derived in large part from ‘zakat’ from part large in derived revenue, its has as sharply, to have declined thought also is capacity year. recruiting Its past over the (20%) Syria and holdings) (47%Iraq maximum its of both in territory of deal agood lost has State Islamic The 100 than countries. more from coming Syrian, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/03/07-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-mecham-mccants lam. ly comprised of proselytizing IS’ interpretation of- Is most are but outreach, or work charitable of kind any Ibid, 14. Ibid, Ibid. al- Josh Josh K Ibid. Ibid. C Christoph Aymenn Charles C. C. Charles See: Rana Rana See: ha ari T da’wah 39 a l m s af E In 2014, IS claimed to have eleven separate 2014, In separate to have eleven claimed IS and and i m arne office (outreach office or literally translated as as translated literally or office (outreach office offices just in its its in just offices ” Foreign Affairs , Rana. , Rana. i . a

l 37 R R - T K s C , begins systematically IS eliminating all euter eyno a t ha

ari , m Da’wah Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest Josh Secretary Press by Briefing Press i l m s af i l and Samuel Samuel and . “The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence” Perspectives on Terrorism Evidence” Documentary The Administration: State Islamic in Evolution . “The . “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State,” Der Spiegel State,” Islamic of Structure the Reveal Files Secret Strategist: Terror . “The d Caliphate and Caliphate Islamic Politics Global in Beards,” and Arms “Beyond s , 22. , 22. refers to territory that IS controls controls IS that to territory refers , 10 January, 2016, accessed 1 June, 2016 www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-01-10/isis-social-contract 1June, 2016, accessed , 10 January, 38 offices initially serve the dual dual the serve initially offices ; Quinn ; Quinn

Da’wah Da’wah Wilayat R eyno M e c ha l d activities can involve extorted on the terri the on extorted Aleppo s m 22, 22, Report Security East Middle War of Study the for Institute The Syria”, in Governance , “ISIS 36 Experts Weigh in Weigh Experts Governance?” at Good ISIS 5): Is (part in Weigh . “Experts 41 are mostly non-

Da’wah 40 can refer to to refer can (in Aleppo events events , 2/4/2016, presentation, White House Press Secretary, Washington, DC, 4 DC, Washington, Secretary, Press House White , 2/4/2016, presentation, ------seen as the least bad alternative. bad least the as seen In terms of government isIS effectiveness, often services. essential other and ter lima ( Services Public for fice cion “extends to the forcible collection of taxes, sei taxes, of collection forcible to the “extends cion provides subsidies on necessities like bread; the perceived local costs of resisting IS. – coercion indirect as serve also infamous IS have made that executions public The coercion. groups orarmed constitute prominent locals direct other against threats violent and violence of Acts governed. the of compliance to ensure strategy ance govern other any than more coercion on depends IS some of Syria’s civilian population. of view the in evil alesser as IS have left civilians of and ineffectiveness and the Syrian regime’s targeting moment. at the Syria in unparalleled is areas these of many in effectiveness IS areas. poor very often are what delivers substantial amounts of humanitarian aid in lines, power lines, and electrical power stations existing public – infrastructure Relations and Tribal also incorporated IS Outreach. addition, IS established new diwans In courts. Sharia and forces police Islamic offices, existing governance IS structures, such asda’wah called institutions 14 at least ministry-like established IS 2014, June in acaliphate of declaration its Following families. their and members its against violence of ‘reforming’ through acts Council the or Local threats after services public of provision over the took slowly ) which oversees the delivery of electricity, wa electricity, of delivery the oversees ) which diwans. 46 The opposition’s reputation for corruption , Timothy , Timothy 42 These diwans These P oir diwan al-khadamat al-mus al-khadamat diwan s on , 18 April, 2015. , 18 April, and Robert L. L. Robert and ; Mara ; Mara

for the Of instance, 43 often incorporated IS repairs sewage repairs IS R , ev such as Public Public as such , Brookings, 2016, , Brookings, k O 9, no. 4, 2015, 4, no. 9, in “ISIS’ Social Social “ISIS’ pri 47 IS coer IS sk o raising raising 45 , (eds.), , (eds.), and 44

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IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 22 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys reprieve from the chaos of the war. the of chaos the from reprieve for looting giving and corruption, a civilians welcome the force police cracks down on groups responsible Initially, IS. for alegitimacy is police local the Islam, of view IS into the buy not do that locals for problems ing and commerce during prayer times. ing violation alleged ofdrink as public morality–such 2016. www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE24/063/2013/en/2016. and investigating crime. cluding manning checkpoints, writing tickets, traffic promoting internal and daily governance, security in with tasked is Force Police Islamic The court. Islamic to ahigher referred are blasphemy as such olations semblance of due process. due of semblance any or crime alleged their of knowledge no with tres, tortured, and imprisoned for extended periods cen detention to hidden brought frequently are nals that International crimi common reports Amnesty Assad government.Assad the or opposition the of courts secular the than rupt cor less to be seen are courts the because Syria, legitimacyenjoy from across civilians considerable 23, (2016):23, 25. 50 50 49 48 mediation.’ to ‘informal given is priority but system, court Sharia IS to the cases send then may who jurist, independent byated an 58 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 Rather than soften its hardline as stances ideological law. Islamic of interpretations extremist support not public execution or disappearance, most Syrians do of threat daily under living of terror sheer the Beyond through Police itssecurity Force Islamic provides IS Raqqa, in group armed remaining only the As area. the in violence on amonopoly tablished es firmly and Raqqa in opposition possible all moved re brutally IS Syria. in environments stable most the of one created has security with obsession IS oil.” as such resources of control and zure of manipulation houses, of livelihood sources morals police, or or police, morals p 34-35. www.brookings.edu/research/profiling-jabhat-al-nusra/. Ibid. K Ibid. Ibid. A Ibid. Ibid. Mara Mara Charles Charles C Ibid. K Mara Mara anan ha m ari ne l s af s R R and and Makiya’s book. Makiya’s ty . ev ev L

I k k i nternationa s in in R ter eyno . The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper Paper Analysis World Islamic the with Relations U.S. on Project Brookings The State” Islamic the of foundations legal , “The No. 24, 2016, 24, No. Paper, Analysis World Islamic the with Relations U.S. on Project Brookings The al-Nusra,” Jabhat , “Profiling l d s hisba , 18. l . 55

Syria: Rule of Fear: ISIS Abuses in Detention in Northern Syria Northern in Detention in Abuses ISIS Fear: of Rule Syria: hisba . The 51 All cases are initially evalu initially are cases All 54 52 Despite this, IS courts courts IS this, Despite While the the While focuses on rectify 53

48 50 hisba hisba Serious vi 49 and the cause cause ------70% Syrian and 30% foreigners. 30% and 70% Syrian were forces JN estimates 2016, Lister early Charles In organization. the within Syrians of role the sized empha always has JN fighters, foreign from benefit does JN While organization. aSyrian as itself portray to lengths to great goes JN courthouse. the in and throughopposition on cooperation the battlefield Syrian into the JN to integrate tried has al-Julani mad Moham Abu leader JN supporters. Sunni potential application of strict Sharia law and violence against swift 2007 to in ISI’s (ISI) Iraq in State Islamic the of forces coalition by US-led defeat the attributed who Zawahiri, al Ayman leader al-Qaeda’s of doctrine the to adheres now. not instead but It emirate, an tablish 2011. of autumn the in ing to es intends JN IS, Like Syria across its since andinfluence authority found its expanded slowly has (JN) al-Nusra Jabhat filiate af 2013, since al-Qaeda attention academic and dia me Western dominated has State Islamic the While Nusra Controlled Areas tion or tax payments. tax or tion in thetioned allegiance form conscrip of either military unques for exchange in services public and security rights, individual limited very provides it Revkin, to Mara According clear. is Syrians for contract’ ‘social IS The to Syria. contained not are aims its and foreign mostly is force fighting its that hurdle additional the has IS severity. its despite legitimate, as rule IS support da’wah and campaigns media IS populace. its of minds the to change seeks IS done, has al-Nusra Jabhat sein’s Hus to Saddam parallel The impossible. is opinion public of measure honest any territories, its in created is all too obvious. all is Fear of Republic office activities office aim to persuade Syrians to , published 19 December, 2013, accesses 13 June, 13 June, 2013, accesses 19 December, , published 56 In the culture of fear that IS has has IS that fear of culture the In 58 57 ------09/09/2016 11:38:06 02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 23 al-qaeda-is-winning-in-syria/ 3(2016): 19. Qaeda Al and ISIS Destroying Nusra in Syria.” sophistication. lines – and electricity is trolled areas report many of the same inadequa same the of many report areas trolled platforms. media social different of avariety on actions JN advertises their public and charitable services org/report/jabhat-al-nusra-syria 69 69 68 67 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 access to basic services. have not permanent do people control JN under places many in that indicate accounts several deed In off. is camera the when provided regularly are services these that to verify impossible nearly is It to change the minds of its populace seeks done, IS has Jabhat al-Nusra as hardline stances ideological law.of Islamic Rather than soften its interpretations extremist not support most Syrians do or disappearance, under daily threat of public execution Beyond the terror sheer of living to to into the community institutions lasting designed linkages its develops JN events charity one-off with da’wah its through IS, with as starts, governance JN Damascus. rural and Deraa, forcesopposition throughout western Aleppo, andindependent joint governance projects with territory in province Idlib and is heavily involved in of swathes wide controlling in succeeded has JN firmly established, JN also sewage repairs firmly established, systems Borzou Borzou A Yasir Yasir C C Ibid. Charles Charles L Jennifer See the founding of the Aleppo Sharia Commission that competed with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council of Aleppo in “Jabhat al- “Jabhat in Aleppo of Council Shura Brotherhood’s Muslim the with competed that Commission Sharia Aleppo the of founding the See Jennifer provide essential services. i bb s afare afare ter a s A , 2016 , . bb ll ll D C L C aragahi a a a i afare s et al, “Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS: Sources of Strength,” 19. Strength,” of Sources ISIS: and al-Nusra “Jabhat al, et afare , “Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria,” 37. Syria,” in al-Nusra , “Jabhat s ter War on the Rocks the on War Syria” in Winning is al-Qaeda “How London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2015 Ltd., &Co. Hurst C. London: Jihad, Syrian , The ll ll 60 , “Syria’s Al-Qaeda Branch Now Wants To Rule Like ISIS” Buzzfeed, last modified 24 March, 2016, accessed 27 July 2016 27 July 2016, accessed 24 March, modified last Buzzfeed, ISIS” Like To Wants Rule Now Branch Al-Qaeda , “Syria’s a a , “Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria” , Harleen , Harleen Similarly to other armed groups, groups, armed to other Similarly

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tasks involvingtasks technical a mb 61 hir Activists in JN-con Activists , and Katherine Katherine , and 59 office. Beginning office. In areas where it where areas In Middle East Security Report Z i mm er m an - - - U.S. Grand Strategy: Strategy: Grand U.S. Strength” of Sources ISIS: and al-Nusra . “Jabhat , last modified 10 2016, May, http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/how- modified last trolled by FSA factions. by FSA trolled con formerly areas some in bread of prices the andbution halved Aleppo, in opposition-controlled distri and production flour of control assumed JN 2012, December In benefits. the reaps and counts sion JN aside, can sometimes deliver when it each village or neighbourhood. of context local the to fit courts its tailors JN Idlib. especially and Damascus, az-Zour, Deraa, Deir po, courts increased legitimacy. increased courts but opposition lends participation these the courts, Well-respected JN religious dominate scholars Qada’a al Dar called bodies, judiciary larger its in manifests also factions rebel other with tegration strategy. governing its of backbone the form which own, or founds existingeither courts its sponsors Sharia JN community, local the in afoothold finding After area. the in factions lished a boost to compared in popularity more estab Northern Syria. Northern in duties customs and collections tax meagre inindividuals Kuwait to and Qatar its supplement JN is dependent on external funding from private Now revenue. to IS) organization (the predecessor Iraq’s in State Islamic the of 50% and az-Zour Deir funding challenges. same the of many faces which opposition, the plague that governance JN in excesses and cies aged aged District Administrations)District to itsextend in influence er with local groups, join existing governance structures and pow share will it itself, to establish starting is JN where places stitutions more favourable to its interests in governing competitive and parallel up setting JN 25, 2014: 15, accessed 7 May, 2016, 7May, www.understandingwar. 2014: 25, 15, accessed Idarat al-Manateq al-Muharara 65 JN has founded and run courts in Alep in courts run and founded has JN 63 Comprehensive service provi Comprehensive service 62 67 JN once relied on oil fields in fields oil on relied once JN though there of are cases 64 JN subsequently JN enjoyed 69 JN has also lever also has JN 66 Most often, in in often, Most (Liberated 68 JN’s in JN’s ------. 09/09/2016 11:38:06

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 23 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys 02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 24

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 24 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys ate “after a lengthy process of consultation.” of process alengthy ate “after emir an establish only would it that ate opposition moder the of members assured JN strategy, Syrian wider to their parcel and Part emirate. Islamic an to establish part JN’s on attempt any resist will but government, Assad the against war the in a partner as JN have accepted oppositions Islamist and erate esty and a lack of corruption.” of alack and esty “hon for reputation its on based is legitimacy JN’s “executive security force to enforce its rulings,” its to enforce force security “executive have an example, for courts, Sharia Its change. real sition JN’s groups, governing institutions affect can fired intofired demonstrations peaceful and attacked Di JN After force. with responded they that enough 13, threatened felt JN Division brigade, FSA cal lo of support in and regime the against streets the to took al-Nu’man Maraat in people When weakest. at its was JN hostilities of cessation the during aresult as and capabilities, military its is strength of source greatest JN’s support. military for them on dependent to be continue will and is opposition the that knows JN partners, opposition moderate more its and JN between gap ideological the Despite 76 76 75 74 73 72 71 70 78 78 77 and Jisr al-Shughour.Ariha as such areas in groups armed other of dependent sition partners becomesition uncomfortable. partners oppo JN’s emerge, East Middle wider the and Syria Whenever resistance. JN’s jihadist ambitions for popular with met be likely will blasphemy) for cifixion cru or stealing for off ahand cutting as such ments hudud notorious the and Sharia of tionship with the opposition. But full implementation rela acooperative it earned and time it bought has to IS, relative Sharia, enforcing in pragmatism JN’s alternatives. to opposition is compared more robustery areas, in JN-controlled deliv service that to believe reason is there courts, tation for being ineffective. have arepu areas opposition in courts other while edited by Mohammed MA MA Mohammed by edited Kurds, L L KurdWatch Offices,” Several Vacate Workers State “Amudah: Ibid. A L Ibid. “Afrin: PYD controls water and supply,” electricity A i i i bb lls s s s ter ter ter a opp s The Syrian Jihad Syrian , The The Syrian Jihad Syrian , The , Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra . , Harriet The Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the the and Changes Geopolitical Spring: Kurdish The in Reactions,” and Challenges Syria: in Bid Autonomy Kurdish . “The , 244. , 244. , 102. A , 30. , 30. h 70 73 m ed

In addition to better to better addition In 71 and Michael M. M. Michael and Unlike many oppo (strict punish - 74 KurdWatch The mod G 75 unter

, 28 July, 2012. July, http://kurdwatch.org/?aid=2595&z=en, 28 , 27 July, 2012., 27 July, http://kurdwatch.org/?aid=2593&z=en , 72 p ------. 226, 2013. . 226,

and these claims have been substantiated by con substantiated have been claims these and government, Syrian the and PYD the between ration collabo potential of questions raised change gime tunity arose. arose. tunity oppor the when people to mobilize able few actors of one was 2003) September in (founded PYD new trol of government facilities con took Units) (People’s Protection YPG the wing armed its and PYD the bloodshed, little With areas. Kurdish from forces civilian and armed its of majority the 2012 withdrew July In government Syrian the support dependent on them for military opposition isand will continue to be knows JN that the partners, and itsJN more moderate opposition Despite between the gap ideological with the people they represented. touch lost parties political traditional 1990s, the the in starting but politics, Kurdish defined ties par political of amultitude Assad, Hafez ty). Under Par Union Democratic (the Kurdish PYD the of rise The Syrian uprising has enabled the unprecedented Kurdish-Controlled Areas popular of support a moderate Syrian opposition. al-Nu’man, demostrating that there is still hope for consecutive demonstrations against in JN Maraat 100 than of days more were There JN. against time – again streets to took the 13, people vision government services. 78 The relative peacefully re peacefully relative The 77 and began providing

76

The relatively this this ------09/09/2016 11:38:06 02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 25 points. rum for the PYD to exert its influence. its to exert PYD the for rum fo another became it but towns, Kurdish minister prised of a president, two deputies, and 22 minis and deputies, two a president, of prised com Council Executive Council; Legislative own zeera 93 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 ia. Syr northern in regions autonomous three of tion crea 2014 the 21On January, announced PYD the cooperation. tinued and security economic Want?” KurdWatch, Want?” tive offices, administra other councils, local of control assumed Units), (People’s Protection YPG the wing, armed its and expandauthority into governance. and The PYD political its to consolidate PYD the allowed rivals its politics. Kurdish in voice independent their lost and coopted quickly were They uprising. Qamishli 2004 the in 2011, in protests Kurdish the led groups had they as 2015, www.mei.edu/content/at/kurdish-pyd-and-challenge-rebuilding-syrian-state 2015, tics/2013/08/syria-kurds-join-national-coalition.html er of the KNC. the of er pow potential the to check PYD away the for came be likewise this but Kurds, the of behalf on sition for responsible negotiatingbecame with the oppo (KSC). Committee Supreme Kurdish the of creation interveneddent Barzani and Massoud enabled the 2012 Presi July in Kurdistan’s high time Iraqi when all at an were KNC and PYD the between sions Ten (KNC). Council National Kurdish the as ing 2011 October in forces joining unit and even after scene, political PYD-dominated the in voice their Traditional have Kurdish parties to struggled find power. from Arab) and Kurdish (both rivals political its remove forcibly and Kurdish YPG fighters oversee security of the regime’s oil pipelines in al-Hasakah as described in “What Does the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition Opposition Syrian-Kurdish the Does “What in described as al-Hasakah in pipelines oil regime’s the of security oversee fighters YPG Kurdish A A Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. “Al-Qamishli: PYD controls cross-border smuggling,” KurdWatch Ibid, 19. Ibid, A “Al-Qamishli: PYD controls cross-border smuggling” KurdWatch “What Does the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition Want?”, p.5. F “What Does the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition Want?” Robert S. S. Robert Ibrahim 89 ord lls lls lls The three cantons – cantons three The opp opp opp and and – are decentralized. Each canton contains its its contains canton Each decentralized. – are 83 86 80 , 239-240. , 239-240. , p. 236. 236. , p. , 236. , 236. The PYD is known to assault, known is PYD The The committee was designed to jointly ad to jointly designed was committee The H Y Factionalism and indecisiveness among and Factionalism indecisiveness F e a ord m 81 ss eidi Kurdish schools ir and Ali El El Ali and . , “Syria’s Kurds Formally Join Opposition Coalition,” Al-Monitor 88 9 July 2013. 9July Y a ss ir , The Kurdish PYD & the Challenge of Rebuilding a Syrian State aSyrian Rebuilding of Challenge &the PYD Kurdish The Afrin, Kobani, and Ja and Kobani, Afrin, 82 andcheck security 87

84 The KSC KSC The kidnap 79 Youth 85 ------, 3 July, 2012., 3July, www.kurdwatch.org/?aid=2572&z=en

, 3 July, 2012, 3July, www.kurdwatch.org/?aid=2572&z=en mission. and an com election Court Constitutional Supreme aseven-member with Council aJudicial and ters; tributed, dis and baked is bread and normal as run nesses Children attend school, necessities. busi basic to access to ensure continued has PYD the south, at its State Islamic the and east, to the (KRG) ment a temperamentalnorth, Kurdistan Regional Govern Turkey by hostile to the surrounded being Despite the Turkish border, on operating smugglers taxes PYD The resources. to extract ability to its part in due counterparts, tion opposi its than effectively more governs PYD The areas. opposition in life defines that bombardment maintain “some semblance of normal daily life.” to able have been areas Kurdish-controlled The forces. opposition Syrian with at times fought also has it though State, Islamic the against mainly activities military its focused has YPG the support, Russian and US With areas. PYD tack at not does force air Syrian The areas. controlled Kurdish- in remain that centres administrative and forces government few Syrian the attack not does facto to a de part in due to maintain, have managed forces the relatively environment stable security its security of aresult is governance in effectiveness PYD’s The ment hasopposed in the past. Turkish border; something that the Turkish govern the along territory its all to connect aims PYD The allies. Arab its and YPG by the attack under now is which pocket,’ ‘Manbij the as known territory trolled State-con by Islamic separated are Kobani and truce with the Syrian government. The YPG YPG The government. Syrian the with truce

90 92 Kobani and Jazeera are contiguous. Afrin Afrin contiguous. are Jazeera and Kobani , 28 August, 2013. www.al-monitor.com/pulse/poli August, , 28 all without the fear of constant aerial aerial constant of fear the without all 93 has imposed duties on goods goods on duties imposed has , The Middle East Institute, 25 August, August, 25 Institute, East Middle , The

91 ------09/09/2016 11:38:06

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 25 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys 02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 26

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 26 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys education. pointed judges have only completed elementary ap some that given appointments, judicial in factor determining biggest the to be appears PYD to the ty Loyal motivated. politically are cases extreme these often very but system, court to aKurdish referred are businesses. eas. The Asayî The eas. maintain law and order within Kurdish controlled ar 101 101 100 99 98 94 Jahbat al-Nusra. ble, especially when confronting the Islamic State of trou of times in YPG the behind rally parties political toability hostile protect Kurdish Generally civilians. YPG’s the from benefits PYD The opponents. litical po attacking and kidnapping threatening, of PYD the itarian. The and KNC other political activists accuse author Syria actors are increasingly litical in northern po other vis-a-vis power maintaining of methods its PYD claims to be committed to democratic pluralism, despiteSyria, obvious Despite challenges. what the itself the as legitimate governing in authority northern to represent effort a concerted making is PYD The Syrian politics for along time to come the five past years will condition fragmentation during war caused has War ispolitics by other The means. 97 96 95 Syria of rest the from coming rate internal security force, Asayî force, security internal rate sepa PYD’s The (SDF). Forces Democratic Syrian the within allies Arab its and YPG by the secured possible without its security apparatus. are Borders im be would governance in effectiveness PYD’s The earning high rents. high earning the Syrian Government’s oil fields in Rumaylan, to mediate on the community level. community the on to mediate of to itsmajority cases assemblies neighbourhood Bulletin 7 December, 2014 http://kurdwatch.org/?aid=3290&z=en 7December, KurdWatch, goods,” Syrian on duties imposes PYD “Al-Qamishli: “What Does the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition Want?”, 13. “Ra “What Does the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition Want?”, 13. “Tall Tamr: PYD kidnaps leading members of the Yekîtî,” KurdWatch Yekîtî,” the of members leading kidnaps PYD Tamr: “Tall Cemgil, Cemgil, KurdWatch KurdWatch IS” the from captured areas the in rule PYD and YPG of Characteristics Tall Abyad? in cleansing “Ethnic in: examples many See Ford and Yassir. Yassir. and Ford ʾ s al- 47, no. 3, p.65, 2016. 47, p.65, 3, no. ʿ C Ayn: Fighting again between FSA an YPG” KurdWatch YPG” an FSA between again Fighting Ayn: an 98 , and Clemens Clemens , and 95

The YPG also oversees security for for security oversees also YPG The ş 99 are a volunteer force that reports a a reports that force avolunteer are 96

H off m ann 94 and likely taxes local local taxes likely and . “The ‘Rojava Revolution’ in Syrian Kurdistan: A Model of Development for the Middle East?” East?” Middle the for Development of A Model Kurdistan: Syrian in Revolution’ ‘Rojava . “The ş , have been able to able , have been 97 Extreme cases cases Extreme ------, 26 January, 2013. http://kurdwatch.org/?aid=2742&z=en January, , 26 , 13 April, 2014, 13 http://kurdwatch.org/?aid=3068&z=en April, ants from strategic areas. inhabit remove or assets valuable of control take to afront as State Islamic the with collusion leged al using forces YPG of instances many have been There authorities. Kurdish trusting about ervations have res Arabs many time, same At the minorities. other and Arabs for reserved are positions ernment Whenever the Cessation of Hostilities has calmed calmed has Hostilities of Cessation the Whenever fragmented and Syrians unwilling to under. knuckle be still will governance comes peace when that likely more seems it But state. oppressive and centralized ahighly to re-impose try and triumph end the in will – elements tocratic au more the of one that possible is It operating. are they where population the even from allegiance ing multiple governing structures have won overwhelm the of None outcome. the to predict impossible is It war. ferocious and multi-sided its from emerges ia Syr whatever in factors be all will have enjoyed areas the decentralized governance opposition-controlled control, they areas in policing and into justice duced have intro JN and IS Islamization the areas, trolled and continuity of institutions in government-con foraspirations self-governance, the relative stability Kurdish to come. time along for politics Syrian tion condi will years five past the during caused has war fragmentation The means. by other War politics is Conclusions intentions. Kurdish of distrustful is and Syria, in sion divi of type any opposes strongly opposition Arab and have stood in recent elections. recent in have stood and Arabs and Syriac Christians have political parties governments. new their in groups religious and nic eth other to include lengths to great gone has PYD The others. Turkmen and Assyrians, Arabs, of ber num alarge for governance oversees now PYD The areas. majority non-Kurdish of control have taken Kurds westward, have expanded forces SDF As State Islamic the or regime the 101 In addition, most of the the of most addition, In 100 Certain gov Certain

11, (2016). 11, IDS IDS – – ------09/09/2016 11:38:06 02 KEYS_ANUARI_2016_EN.indd 27 situation. Even in the best of all possible worlds, the the worlds, possible all of best the Even in situation. post-war achaotic be necessarily will what in power for jockeying be will perspectives different These freedom. religious and rights equal on based one state, democratic pluralist, an, lar Syrian opposition is committed to a non-sectari- secu more The police. Islamic and courts Sharia up to want give not will Islamists opposition other tarily, mili defeated are al-Nusra Jabhat and State lamic Is the Even if arms. its or autonomy its surrender to want not will it integrity, territorial and sovereignty Syrian accepts nominally cantons Kurdish the rules that PYD the While Damascus. in charge in up ends whoever for challenge enormous an be will state gle Reweaving Syria’s governance fragments into a sin without much international help and circumstances catastrophic to govern themselves, but under truly Syrians someday may get their wish: accepted. and enforced widely still was 2011, before was it than livelier autocracy the when Dissent in regime-controlledal-Nusra. is areas often Jabhat or regime the against out break often strations the demon situation areas, in opposition-controlled - - - - - will have to proceed. have to proceed. will they which on basis the of part at least be will gles governancewartime strug structures and political and withoutstances much international help. Their themselves, but under truly catastrophic circum to wish: govern their get may someday Syrians vourable to foreign aid. unfa are which constraints, political domestic own will by betheir highly constrained generosity their but burden, the to carry expected be may US the institutions,tional the financial Union European and interna the outcome, anegotiated is war. there If the to win were government the if burden the carry to unable be will allies Russian and Iranian regime’s the that mean prices oil Lowered heavens. the from lization are unlikely and reconstruction to descend stabi for needed dollars of billions of hundreds The them. welcome Syrians most would Nor available. not simply are Syria of size the acountry for quired hundreds of thousands of peacekeeping troops re machina ex deus international no be will There returns. peace as vital be will war during necessity of out created tions indigenous governing structures and political rela The economy. the to revive begin and disputes erty prop urgent settle killing, revenge to prevent der, try or and law of asemblance restore homes, to their to back go want who people displaced and ugees ref to accommodate need will government post-war . The . The ------09/09/2016 11:38:07

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 27 Syria and the Regional Quagmire of the Middle East Keys