National Security & Interoperability

choicesVol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 ISSN 0711-0677 www.irpp.org Force Structure or Forced Structure? The 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s

Sean M. Maloney ounded in 1972, the Institute for Research on Public Policy is an independent, national, F nonprofit organization. IRPP seeks to improve public policy in Canada by generating research, providing insight and sparking debate that will contribute to the public policy decision-making process and strengthen the quality of the public policy decisions made by Canadian governments, citizens, institutions and organizations. Sean M. Maloney is the strategic studies advisor IRPP's independence is assured by an endowment to the Canadian Defence Academy and teaches in fund, to which federal and provincial governments the Department of War Studies at the Royal and the private sector have contributed. Military College. He served in Germany as the historian for the Canadian Army’s NATO forces and is the author of several books, including Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means 1945-1970 (2002) and Operation ondé en 1972, l’Institut de recherche en KINETIC: The Canadians in Kosovo 1999-2000 politiques publiques (IRPP) est un organisme (forthcoming). He has conducted extensive field F canadien, indépendant et sans but lucratif. research on Canadian and coalition military operations throughout the Balkans, the Middle L’IRPP cherche à améliorer les politiques publiques East and South West Asia. canadiennes en encourageant la recherche, en mettant This publication was produced under the de l’avant de nouvelles perspectives et en suscitant des direction of Hugh Segal, President, IRPP. The débats qui contribueront au processus décisionnel en manuscript was copy-edited by Jane Broderick, matière de politiques publiques et qui rehausseront la proofreading was by Francesca Worrall, production and art direction was by Schumacher qualité des décisions que prennent les gouvernements, Design, and printing was Impressions Graphiques. les citoyens, les institutions et les organismes canadiens. Copyright belongs to IRPP. To order or request permission to reprint, contact: L’indépendance de l’IRPP est assurée par un fonds de dotation, auquel ont souscrit le gouvernement fédéral, IRPP 1470 Peel Street, Suite 200 les gouvernements provinciaux et le secteur privé. Montreal, Quebec H3A 1T1 Telephone: 514-985-2461 Fax: 514-985-2559 E-mail: [email protected]

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To cite this document:

Maloney, Sean M. 2004. “Force Structure or Forced Structure? The 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s.” Choices 10, no. 5. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of IRPP or its Board of Directors. National Security & Interoperability / Sécurité nationale et interopérabilité

Research Director / Directeur de recherche Hugh Segal

t a time when one decade-long administration has been replaced by A the early days of another and a full foreign and defence policy review is pend- ing, this research program reflects on core operating premises since the 1994 White Paper on Defence. What are the national security priorities Canada’s new policy framework should be addressing? How do our options and challenges with respect to interoperability — with our American and our other allies — relate to these priorities? Table of Contents Part of the Canada and the World research thematic, the working papers, symposia and 3 The 1994 White Paper on Defence studies in this series reflect on these and related issues going forward. 6 Force Structuring and the 1994 White Paper 7 The Canadian Forces 1990–94 lors que nous venons d’assister à un 10 Canadian Forces’ Overseas Commitments and Operations to changement d’administration à 1994 Ottawa, et alors qu’une révision en A 11 Canadian Forces’ Domestic Operations to 1994 profondeur de la politique de défense et 11 Was There a Commitment-Capability Gap by 1993–94? étrangère du pays s’annonce, ce programme de recherche examine les principes 14 An Alternative Force Structure directeurs qui ont guidé la politique cana- 21 Back to the Real World: What Happened after 1994 dienne en ce domaine depuis le Livre blanc 23 Conclusion sur la défense de 1994. Quelles priorités 25 Notes devra établir notre nouvelle politique-cadre en matière de sécurité nationale ? Comment 26 References les possibilités qu’ouvre l’interopérabilité avec les États-Unis et nos autres alliés, et comment les défis que cela pose, s’articu- lent-ils à ces priorités ? Les documents, études et colloques issus de ce programme de recherche examinent ces questions et les enjeux qui en découlent pour l’avenir du pays. Ils font partie d’une thématique plus large portant sur la place du Canada dans le monde.

1 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 1990s Canadian Forcesinthe on Defence The Forced Structure? Force Structureor Sean M.Maloney 1994 WhitePaper and the resources will be wasted.Ad hocresponses toglobal guidance, interservicerivalry willescalateandscarce tinue tobeapatchworkproject and,withoutclear twenty-first century. Equipmentacquisitionwillcon- period 1992–93willremain policywellintothe fundamental premisesthatwere establishedinthe not formulated,thenthe1994WhitePaper andits change inforcestructure.Ifanewdefencepolicyis formulated, itwillinalllikelihood requiresome “mid-course guidance.”Ifanewdefencepolicyis Guideline statementsandotherexamplesofstructural incrementally rationalizeitwithDefencePlanning continues tobeformalpolicy, despiteattemptsto remains tobeseen.Thatsaid,the1994WhitePaper Whether thesethreeobjectivesareinfactachievable force structuringtoimplementthesepolicies. new foreignpolicyandamorerationalapproachto lyst forchangeinthreeareas:anewdefencepolicy, a security policyapparatuswill,somehope,beacata- and theimpendingchangestoCanada’snational tomatic oftheproblem. of theStryker gun-over-armour vehicleareallsymp- Sea KingEH-101 helicopterdebacleandtheadoption capabilities ofthe20-year-oldIltisjeep,infamous adequacy or“burnout”ofthearmy, theprotective policy. Indeed,currentdebatesinthemediaover quately dealtwithafterthe1994WhitePaper became structuring andequipmentissuesthatwerenotade- personnel are,however, stillstrugglingwithforce makers, thepunditocracyandprofessionalmilitary campaigns ofthe1990sbehind.Canadianpolicy- 2001, theal-QaedaWar, leavingthestabilization tive. We haveenteredanewerasinceSeptember11, world, the1994WhitePaper isgeneralizedandtenta- policy duringthefirstyearsofpost-ColdWar T The accessionofPaul Martinasprimeminister policy, isadecadeold.Designedasaninterim only existingformalmanifestationofdefence he 1994 WhitePaper onDefence, 2 Canada’s crises that affect Canadian interests will continue, bringing stability. The apparent American acquiescence with increased prospect for unnecessary risk, cata- to UN legalities over the Gulf War of 1990–91 and its strophic failure and national humiliation. It is critical support of UN endeavours in Somalia were seen as that we discuss in frank terms the basis for future indicators that the United Nations was perhaps the way force structure. If we do not, future Canadian govern- of the future. The United Nations’ authorship of An ments will be continuously saddled with geometrically Agenda for Peace and conceptual development of a expanding limitations on their ability to project number of tools for peace (peacemaking, peace build- Canadian military power. ing, peace enforcement) also gave it a perceived Similarly, the recognition, by those commenting authority in this area. In Canada, some saw this as a on national security issues, of the need for an inter- means to develop what they viewed as an independent est-based national security policy and the means for policy by which to pursue their utopian aims and use its formulation has emerged in the past few years.1 the United Nations as a counterbalance to the Such a process is dependent upon a clear understand- American “hyperpower.”3 ing of past performance. This study is intended to The new defence policy debate in Canada was contribute to that understanding. instantly politicized. In broad terms, the utopian A caveat: the projected force structure described in internationalist faction asserted that the Canadian this study takes into account what was known about the forces should limit its capabilities to peacekeeping world and about the existing Canadian forces structure operations and eschew “warfighting.” “Warfighting,” in the period 1993–94. It does not take into account the argument went, was a Cold War construct that technological, doctrinal or organizational developments was expensive—a capability that should not be that occurred in the late 1990s subsequent to the tabling retained or improved upon, and that could be safely of the 1994 White Paper or the change in the strategic disposed of since “peacekeeping” and arms control environment after the events of September 11, 2001. could solve all of Canada’s overseas security prob- lems. Another faction, led by pragmatic realists, argued that the future was uncertain and that a The 1994 White Paper on Defence spectrum of capabilities, including “warfighting,” had to be retained (Gray 1993). Background The process that produced the 1994 White Paper was he 1994 White Paper on Defence (hereafter similar to that which influenced the 1964 White Paper. “1994 White Paper”) was conceived during a A broad array of public opinion was canvassed: hear- T period when the world order was extremely ings were held and specialists from both factions pre- unsettled. A variety of possible world models were sented their best arguments. The newly formed proposed, mostly by American academic theorists— Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Samuel Huntington, Joseph Nye and Francis (DFAIT) ensured that the views of a new faction of Fukayama were three, while the Israeli academic utopian internationalists were put forward. The

Martin Van Creveld took the lead in attempting to Department of National Defence (DND) and DFAIT Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney formulate controversial “post-Clauswitzean” military bureaucracies then set to work softening all the hard theory. Media commentators like Thomas Friedman edges. During this process, detailed force structuring explored the new economic terrain that appeared was eliminated from the draft documents. The result after the collapse of communism, while the Internet was the 1994 White Paper. emerged to alter life as we had known it a decade before.2 The withdrawal of Communist power and the Premises retreat from the Cold War front lines left extremely Cold War-era defence White Papers released in 1964, violent regions in areas of Africa, Asia and even 1970 and 1987 (and the 1989 corollary of the 1987 Europe. Theorists and commentators attempted to White Paper) established that there were four areas explain what they saw as bursts of ethnic conflict through which Canadian defence activity was and determined that the nation-state was on its last expressed:4 legs. At the same time, utopian internationalists continental defence focused on the United Nations as the primary vehicle NATO capable of driving through all of this mayhem and UN peacekeeping domestic operations

3 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 manifestations ofCanadiandefenceactivitywere: War-era periodicre-ordering ofpriorities?Itsprimary fully fundedandimplemented(Bland1997). undermined byinternationaleventsbeforeitcouldbe the early1980s.The1987WhitePaper wasultimately American andBritishdefencepoliciesestablishedin three yearsearlier),whichputitoutofphasewith production (itwassupposedtobereleasedtwoor optimal. The1987WhitePaper wasdelayedinits NATO Areawithaforcestructurethatwassub- forced tointerveneoverseasanddeterattacksonthe world events,andonseveraloccasionsCanadawas by theTrudeaugovernmentwerenotrecognized on peripheralintervention.Theprioritiesestablished and overseasforces,littleemphasiswasplaced tions: drasticcutsweremadetocontinentaldefence 1970 WhitePaper shiftedpriority todomesticopera- icy coordinationbythePearson government.The structure wascurtailedinkey areasduetopoorpol- generally achievedinthe1960s,thoughforces North AmericaandEurope.Theseobjectiveswere the sametimemaintainingastrongdeterrentforcein Atlantic TreatyOrganization(NATO) Areawhileat able tointerveneinareasperipheraltheNorth acute, particularlyduringthe1970s. debate overhowtoimplementtheprioritiesmore the declineinoverallresourcesmadeinternal paid andcertaincapabilitiesretained,butinallcases cation ofresources.Insomecases,lipservicewas defence WhitePapers wastobereflectedintheallo- Canadian forcesthattheorderoffourareasin an implicitunderstandingwithinDNDandthe ing fordefence,startinginthemid-1960s.Therewas There was,overtheyears,aconstantdeclineinfund- and theproclivitiesofincumbentgovernment. four itemsaccordingtothecircumstancesofday Was the1994WhitePaper adeparturefromtheCold The 1964WhitePaper emphasizedtheneedtobe Essentially, eachWhitePaper re-prioritizedthese UN andNATO operations continental defence domestic operations In “ColdWar speak,”thisamounted to: participation ininternationalsecurity Canada-United Statesdefencecooperation protection ofCanada neous needto maintainagoodqualityof life in main constraint wasthefederaldebtand the simulta- Paper) waspartoftheproblem, apparently, butthe “Globalization” (neverdefined inthe1994White could notbespentonthearmed forces. were advancedtoexplainwhy Canadianmoney broadest possiblerangeof“threats,”severalreasons authors claimingthatitwasimpossibletodoso. and shiedawayfromprojectingintothefuture,its The 1994WhitePaper providedthebarestofbones applied todealwiththosethreatsshoulddominate. threats tothoseinterestsevaluatedandresources theory, someprocessbywhich interestsareidentified, document fromaforcestructuringperspective.In area. Thisisimportantwhenoneexaminingthe threat, the1994WhitePaper wasinadequateinthis to take theplaceofanestimateColdWar drivers ofinstability. Ifthese“concerns” weremeant weapons ofmassdestruction,wereseenasthemain “resurgence ofoldhatreds”andtheproliferation mental degradation,resourcedepletion,the ing refugees,failedstates,overpopulation,environ- according totheauthors.“GlobalPressures,”includ- peace processhasalsoyieldedprogress.” nated byanodynestatementslike “TheMiddleEast Conflict Resolution,”withthediscussionbeingdomi- self-congratulatory tonewasappliedto“Regional efforts duringtheColdWar hadpaidoff.Thesame who wantedtobelievethatCanadianarmscontrol efforts: thiswasobviouslyintendedtomollifythose Co-operation inEuropeandvariousarmscontrol space discussingtheOrganizationforSecurityand War wasoverandusedaninordinateamountof the futureallocationofdefenceresources. direction andinfluencesofthenewworlddisorderon attempted todefine,ingeneralterms,thetentative influencing them.Indeedthe1994WhitePaper negligence onthepartofpolicy-makers andthose bility of“BosniainCanada”wouldhavebeensheer cussed inArmstrong1995),andtoignorethepossi- in Quebecweredominanteventsoftheday(asdis- throughout 1990 reserves ofAkwesasne,Kanesatake andKahnawake is notsurprising:theproblemsatMohawk problems athome,thenwithoverseas.This detect adefensiveposture:wewilldealfirstwith areas inthe1994WhitePaper. However, itiseasyto Indeed, afterthecursoryexaminationof “International SecurityConcerns”werelegion, First, thedocumentacknowledgedthatCold Note thatthereisnoexplicitprioritizationofthese 4 5 and theresurgenceofnationalism Canada. Buried in this section of the document are threats to Canadian sovereignty amongst the native the following lines: peoples and in Quebec: Canada must be prepared to The Department and the Canadian Forces intervene with military force to ensure that the federal have absorbed past reductions in a variety of government is able to maintain control of the country ways. Canadian defence commitments have been revised, personnel levels cut back, oper- in the face of any armed threat. Other government ations and maintenance budgets shrunk, departments do not have the equipment, basing or defence infrastructure reduced, and capital programs cancelled or delayed…cuts will be training to handle the natural disasters that occur from deeper, and there will be more reductions, time to time; therefore the Canadian forces will have to cancellations, and delays. In some areas, pick up the slack. [DND and the CF] will do less [and] operate more efficiently to deliver elements of the policy outlined in this paper.6 Canada-United States Defence Co-operation This is all cunningly coded language: not all areas Arms control is our primary means of ensuring a in which Canada used its military force could or reduction in the nuclear threat to North America, not would be funded. After identifying those areas, the the allocation of resources to military functions like authors offered no explicit prioritization. Flexibility ballistic missile defence. At the same time, we have to was the main principle, which meant that there really find a way to demonstrate that we can participate in could be no long-term policy derived from the 1994 some fashion. If Canada does not collaborate with the White Paper, and that therefore no realistic and com- United States on continental defence initiatives our prehensive force structuring could occur to adapt to sovereignty will be lost, since the Americans will do this new era. In theory, there should have been what they want regardless. Interoperability with another analysis and tabling of defence policy within American forces is key and will provide Canada with five years, and some form of incremental annual benefits elsewhere. If we do not help defend North evaluation should have been undertaken immediately America we will be unable to rely on American space in 1994. In time, Defence Planning Guidance docu- power, which we need for overseas operations. ments were developed as a means of fulfilling this function, but they were no substitute for clearly Participation in International Security expressed political guidance and leadership.7 The United Nations will be Canada’s predominant We must confront the possibility that the govern- expression of international concern for increased ment of the day did not value clearly expressed polit- global stability. The United Nations is not a perfect ical guidance. In general, the political mindset seeks institution. We wish it could be as effective as NATO in to retain as much flexibility as possible in order to military operations and will try to make it so. NATO is stay in power. Making firm decisions on long-term a necessary evil and should be harnessed to support the policies in the face of possible opposition may be United Nations, so we will contribute to UN and NATO anathema to some personalities. A defence White operations but only in some areas—deterrence, peace- Paper that says a variety of things to a variety of keeping—and will not fight wars unless the United

people is ideal — except to those who have to find a Nations gives its approval or unless there is an outright Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney means to implement such “policies.” attack on a NATO member. If a “force structurer” were to pick up the 1994 Our hypothetical “force structurer” would be able to White Paper and scan it for information in carrying conclude, with no ambiguity whatsoever, that the out his or her job, what would he or she find? By Canadian government of the day was unwilling to pay for decoding the language, he or she might be able to a force structure to do all of this and had to make compro- derive the following information from the three “pri- mises without expressly stating so in order to avoid politi- ority” sections. cal embarrassment with our allies and the Canadian people. To be fair and balanced, however, we would do Protection of Canada well to recognize that the post-Cold War economic order Canada is big and rugged: we cannot afford to defend altered the very basis of Canadian financial security. all of it. Resource protection is related to economic Without a stable budgetary situation, the federal govern- livelihood; therefore military forces must play a role ment would be hard pressed to spend any money at all. alongside other government departments in protect- Indeed, there is an argument to be made that Canada’s ing poachers from grabbing our natural resources and national debt was increasingly funded by potentially unre- damaging our economy. There are also internal liable sources in the early 1990s. If enough of those credi-

5 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 able Canadianarmedforcesirrelevant. Such acatastrophewouldhavemadegloballydeploy- economic crisisrivallingtheoneitenduredin1930s. Canada couldconceivablyhavebeenplungedintoan that proppedupCanadiangovernmentalspending, erwise generatedturbulenceintheeconomicstructure situation vis-à-vistheMohawksand/orQuebec),oroth- tors collapsed(perhapsduetotheunreliabledomestic White Paper Force Structuringandthe1994 Canada-United StatesDefenceCooperation operations forces. manpower. Anti-terrorismfunctions demandspecial which havethecommandandcontrolapparatus Power missionswouldbebesthandledbylandunits, land andsea,whiledisasterreliefAidtotheCivil and rescuewouldrequireairtransportcapabilityover would benecessaryforthefirsttwopoints.Search addition tomannedandunmannedsensorsystems, three dimensions(air, surfaceandsubsurface),in on allthreecoasts(Pacific, AtlanticandArctic)inall Protection ofCanada core capabilitiesexistedforeach. D ballistic missile warning contribute totheacquisition anddisseminationof American airspace co-operate inthesurveillance andcontrolofNorth contribute tothedefenceof NorthAmerica and landforcessothattheCanadian forcescan maintain interoperabilitywithAmericanair, sea Naval andmaritimeairforcescapableofoperating the provinces respond toAidtheCivilPower requestsfrom respond toterroristincidents conduct nationalsearchandrescueoperations conduct disasterrelief protection fisheries, counter-drugeffortsandenvironmental assist othergovernmentdepartmentsinprotecting airspace andmaritimeareasofjurisdiction controlling capabilitieswithinCanada’sterritory, demonstrate, onaregularbasis,monitoringand could easilyhaveconcludedthatanumberof missions foreachsection,aforcestructurer rawing onthegeneralizedpotentialrolesand 8 and NATO headquarterspersonnel. Warning andControlSystem(AWACS) component and aircrewsweretoservewithNATO’s Airborne and anothertoStandingNavalForceMediterranean, mitted oneshiptotheStandingNavalForceAtlantic immediately available.In“peacetime,”Canadacom- by battaliongroupforUNorNATO dutywastobe to beavailableinthreemonths.Inaddition,astand- deployable withinthreeweeksandfullcapabilitywas transport aircraft.Portions ofeachtheseweretobe group, awingoffighteraircraft,andsquadron maritime airsupport,threebattlegroupsorabrigade combatants andoperationalsupportship(AOR) and task forceheadquarters,anavalgroupoffour following forcesreadyforglobaloperations:ajoint ments. Inessence,Canadacommittedtohavingthe security includedadetailedlistofforcecommit- Participation inInternationalSecurity American sovereignty. establish alodgmentorotherwisechallengeNorth land forcestoconfrontanyintrudersattempting dispatching hostileaircraft;andair-orsea-portable missile attacks;airforcescapableofidentifyingand anti-submarine forcestohandlesubmarine-launched capable ofmonitoringmissileandbomberattacks; airborne, space-based,andsurface-basedsensors Unlike theothertwosections,thatoninternational ments support theverificationofarmscontrolagree- and civil-militaryrelations dealing withpeacekeeping, confidence building expand relationshipswithavarietyofpartners NATO member the worldunderUNauspicesorindefenceofa participate inmultilateraloperationsanywhere ation operations assist DFAIT inconductingnon-combatantevacu- Forces fortheseendeavourswouldhaveincluded 6 The Canadian Forces 1990-94 mented before 1989: these included the TOW Under Armour anti-tank vehicle (a tracked anti-tank missile vehicle based on an M-113A2 hull) and the ADATS (Air What did the Canadian forces look like in 1994? Defence Anti-Tank System) with the missile system The Army mounted on a tracked M-113A2 hull (Last 1988). In the early 1990s the two brigades that made up 1st he Cold War-era brigade groups had dissimilar Canadian Division focused on mid- to high-intensity equipment and were slotted for different roles. warfare for NATO operations in Europe. The SSF han- The 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade and 5e T dled rapidly deployable commitments like NATO’s Brigade Mechanisé du Canada (BMC) formed 1st Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force (Land) and Canadian Division. In this role, these two brigades the UN Standby Battalion role. No. 1 Canadian Brigade were equipped with Leopard C-1 main battle tanks, Group was in transition: some units were slated to M-113A2 armoured personnel carriers and M-109 become divisional troops for 1st Canadian Division. In self-propelled guns, all fully tracked vehicles. Flyover 1990, Canada’s overseas commitments involving com- sets of equipment were starting to be pre-positioned bat troops outside of NATO Europe consisted of a bat- in West Germany for this role. In effect, each brigade talion or regiment committed to UN duty in Cyprus group was to consist of a reconnaissance (recce) every six months. squadron, a tank regiment, a self-propelled (SP) gun By 1994–95 the Army had changed drastically. The regiment, two mechanized infantry battalions and a 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group was by this service battalion. The 1 Canadian Brigade Group, time disbanded in the newly united Germany. The based in western Canada, was mostly equipped with Canadian Airborne Battle Group was disbanded and the light armoured vehicles of the Armoured Vehicle SSF was converted to 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade General Purpose (AVGP) series plus the M-109A2 SP Group. The 1 CBG became 1 Canadian Mechanized gun. The AVGPs were wheeled training vehicles and Brigade Group, with 5e Groupement Brigade Mechanisé were not designed to be used for combat in a mid- to du Canada established from 5e BMC. The post-Cold high-intensity war. The 5 Brigade had the AVGP vehi- War brigade groups were standardized as much as pos- cles in Canada but was being retrained to handle sible. The three armoured regiments each had a tank mechanized equipment. A fourth brigade group, squadron plus two AVGP squadrons and a recce called the Special Service Force, or SSF, was based in squadron. Some infantry companies were equipped Ontario. It consisted of a mixed brigade that included with AVGP Grizzlies, while others had M-113A2 APCs. the Canadian Airborne Regiment (a parachute light The artillery regiments all had tracked M-109A2 SP infantry battalion), a mechanized infantry battalion guns. There were two types of infantry battalion: with AVGP, an armoured regiment with AVGP and mechanized and light. Each brigade had two mecha- Lynx recce vehicles, a mixed artillery regiment with nized infantry battalions and one light infantry battal- M-109A2 SP guns and a battery of air-droppable ion. One company of each light infantry battalion was towed 105mm guns, and a service battalion. The air- 9 a parachute-trained company. Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney borne artillery battery, plus an airborne recce troop and the Airborne Regiment, when combined, formed Maritime Forces the Canadian Airborne Battle Group (Fox 1988; Last By 1994 the transition from the Cold War-era 1988; O’Connor 1988). Mackenzie-class anti-submarine warfare destroyers It should be noted that a series of equipment pro- (DDEs) and St. Laurent-class helicopter-carrying grams was initiated in the 1980s in response to the destroyers (DDHs) to the City-class Canadian Patrol 1987 White Paper. The entire Canadian Army was suf- Frigates (FFHs) was well underway. By 1995 all 12 fering from “rust-out” since the Trudeau government FFHs would be operational. The New Shipboard had not provided enough money to replace aging Helicopter program to replace the 30-year-old Sea equipment. The 1980s equipment projects were estab- Kings had been aborted by the Chrétien government in lished for a new main battle tank, an armoured recce 1993. The four existing DDH-280-class destroyers were vehicle, a mechanized infantry combat vehicle and in the process of being altered to include superior anti- upgrades to self-propelled artillery. All of these proj- aircraft and command and control capabilities (the ects were cancelled, delayed or “rationalized” after TRUMP upgrade). Three 30-year-old O-class hunter- 1989. Some equipment projects, however, were imple- killer submarines were still in service but were nearing

7 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 Air Forces (Numbers drawnfromJockel 1999,chap.3.) each atleast30yearsold,werestillinservice. of battle.Threeoperationalsupportvessels,again Tracker MPA fleethadbeenremovedfromtheorder were alsounderprocurement.BythistimetheC2SF Arcturus MPAs, essentiallyemasculatedAuroras, Patrol Aircraft(MPA) werealsoinservice:three were inservice.EighteenCP-140AuroraMaritime and wasbeingbuilt.Twominecountermeasuresships Maritime CoastalDefenceVessel, hadbeendesigned the endoftheirservicelife.Anewclassship, Air CommandbasesinCanada. handled utilityandlocalsearch andrescuetasksat forces andfour“CombatSupport”squadronsthat there werefiveGriffonsquadronssupportingground squadrons equippedwithKiowas.Intheneworder, Iroquois/Kiowa squadrons,plusanumberofreserve were oneChinooksquadronandfivemixed copter basedonacivilianexecutive transport.There replaced withonetype,theCH-146Griffon,aheli- were acquiredinthe1970s. In1994–95allwere light reccehelicopterunits:allthreemachinetypes Iroquois tacticaltransportsquadronsandtheKiowa eliminate theChinookheavy-lifthelicopters, search andrescueduty(Jockel 1999,chap.4). Buffalo turbo-proptacticaltransportsconvertedto copters continuedon,accompaniedbyadozenorso Twelve 30-year-oldLabradorsearchandrescueheli- acquired intheearly1960s,remainedservice. some 32CC-130Hercules,ofwhichwere airliners replacedtheaging707 fleetin1992,while was four. Intermsofairlift,fiveCC-150Polaris jet 1994–95 thenumberofoperationalCF-18squadrons Germany-based squadronsreturnedtoCanada.By squadrons replacedthatcommitmentandthe CF-5s wereputintostorageorsold.NoCF-18 commitment endedsometimebefore1994andthe ACE MobileForce(Air)duringtheColdWar, butthis 5 FreedomFighteraircraftwerecommittedtoNATO’s Canada’s NORADcommitment.TwosquadronsofCF- West GermanyandfourtoNorthAmericaaspartof early 1980s.Twoofthesesquadronsweredeployedto craft, orapproximately sixsquadronsworth,inthe Air Commandacquired122CF-18Hornetfighterair- machine tooktime. were deployedin1994–95: the transitiontonew As fortacticalaviation,thegovernmentchoseto 10 Not alloftheseunits Domestic operations sions between1990and1994: augmentees tonumerousdomesticandglobalmis- Operationally, reservistswereemployedasindividual missions ofCanada’sreserveforceswereinquestion. operations inEurope.By1994thefuturerolesand Augmentation FlightmissionsthatsupportedNATO its KiowareccehelicoptersandAirReserve naval controlofshipping,whiletheAirReservelost mobilization missionsrelatedtoseawarddefenceand groups. NavalreserveforcesweregearedtoColdWar equipment oractualorganization)fivebrigade Militia Areasthatapproximated (innumbers,not (land forcereserve)unitsweregroupedintofour (Gervais 1992;Thompson1992).AtthattimeMilitia erated bythe1987WhitePaper wasputonhold By 1990theintendedexpansionofreservesgen- Reserve Forces required. Since therewasnocoalitionoralliance that someform ofexpeditionarycapability was ments withintheCanadianforces leadershiprealized arrangements. Itwasonlyin thelate1980sthatele- in NorthAmerica,navaland airforceshadsimilar for operationsinNATO’s CentralRegion.Atseaand reported totwootherNATO headquartersresponsible NATO’s CentralArmyGroup(CENTAG), whichinturn example, 4CanadianMechanizedBrigadewaspartof service ratherthanjoint(twoormoreservices).For command functions;theseheadquartersweresingle operations thathadcoalitionheadquartersforhigher- Canadian forcesunitswerecommittedtoalliance trol structurewasinflux.Priortothe1990s, In 1994–95theCanadianforcescommandandcon- Command andControl Global operations 1990 Operation SALON (Kanesatake andKahnawake) Operation FEATHER (Akwesasne)1990 1993–94 Operation DELIVERANCE(UNITAF Somalia) 1992–95 Operation HARMONY(UNPROFORICroatia) 1992–95 Operation CAVALIER (UNPROFORIIBosnia) Operation MATCH (ONUSAL ElSalvador)1991–94 Operation SULTAN (ONUCANicaragua)1989–91 Operation MARQUIS(UNTAC Cambodia)1991–93 Operation CALUMET(MFOSinai)entireperiod 8 11 headquarters for non-combatant evacuation opera- and flights by AWACS radar and control aircraft. tions, for instance, Canada needed an operational- Greater reliance on American space-based systems, level joint headquarters to control operations which were developed in the 1970s and 1980s, was the involving more than one element. Operation BANDIT, norm. Some of the sigint activities were shut down, a planned non-combatant evacuation operation con- reducing the amount of high-grade intelligence that ducted off Haiti in 1988; Operation VAGABOND, the Canada brought to the Canada-United Kingdom-United United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group; States (CANUKUS) intelligence-sharing “table.” and Operation MATADOR, the Canadian contingent for the United Nations Transition Assistance Group Basing (UNTAG) in Namibia, demonstrated the need for joint During the 1980s the Canadian forces had substantial operations control in expeditionary operations. In infrastructure in North America and overseas to sup- addition, on several occasions in the 1980s National port its operations. There were pre-positioned depots in Defence Headquarters was unable to control joint Norway to support the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable operations: it had become too reliant on coalition (CAST) Brigade commitment until this was withdrawn command structures overseas, structures to which in 1987. In West Germany, there were two large air Canadian officers were posted within a coalition fields (Baden Soellingen and Lahr). These facilities sup- framework but did not command. When National ported Canadian global operations on the other side of Defence Headquarters was confronted with two the world: Baden and Lahr handled air traffic and other simultaneous crises in 1990, Operation SALON in logistic matters for the Canadian UN contingents Quebec (the Mohawk standoffs) and Operations FRIC- throughout the Middle East. Some of the forces TION and SCIMITAR in the Persian Gulf, the need for deployed to fight in the 1990 Gulf War originated from a higher level of strategic joint command became evi- units in West Germany and received substantial logistic dent. The resultant structure, J-Staff, was formed on support from Cold War stocks. By 1994 all Canadian an ad hoc basis in 1990 and then retained after both facilities in Europe were closed and infrastructure in crises subsided (Maloney 2002–03). In 1994 J-Staff Canada was significantly reduced. Army units were remained in existence and 1st Canadian Division progressively centralized into “superbases,” one for functioned as an interim joint force headquarters each brigade group. The Navy retained Halifax and while a more permanent solution was researched. Esquimalt, while Air Command retained its primary There was no deployable joint force headquarters as Cold War air bases with the exception of Summerside, such, though elements of the divisional headquarters Prince Edward Island.12 supported by the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters and Signals Regiment and a Strategic Special Operations Forces Communications Regiment could act in this capacity The Canadian forces took on the direct action coun- on an interim basis (Garnett 2002–03). terterrorism role from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Special Emergency Response Teams

Strategic Sensor Systems (SERT) organization in 1993. The new special opera- Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney During the Cold War, Canada deployed a number of tions unit, JTF-2, was in the process of being manned strategic sensor systems geared to provide early while the 1994 White Paper was being formulated. The warning in the event of a Soviet attack on North role of special operations forces within Canadian America. These included the Distant Early Warning national security policy was also under development at (DEW) Line, Mid-Canada Line and Pine Tree Line that time. radar stations; NORAD-committed Canada-US AWACS and their crews; and the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). A ring of signals intelligence (sigint) stations in British Columbia, the Canadian Arctic, Newfoundland and Bermuda were the first line of defence. On the whole, these sensor systems were not structured for sovereignty surveillance operations in support of other government departments. By 1994 the only systems left were the DEW Line, which was being replaced with the Northern Warning System,

9 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 W 1994 Commitments andOperationsto Canadian Forces’Overseas known wasOperation DELIVERANCE,the Canadian efforts wereaccompaniedby combattroops.Thebest non-permissive environments, humanitarianaid humanitarian interventionemerged. Conductedin 1990s: following humanitarianoperationsintheearly support element.TheCanadianforcesundertookthe CC-130 transportaircraftora707 plus agroundcrew 1950s. Thesemissionsusuallyemployedoneortwo Canadian forces,whichhadconductedthemsincethe capability. Thesemissionswere: ful ofmilitaryobserversandsometimestransport some oftheseareas.Canadausuallyprovidedahand- missions wereestablishedtoeasethetransitionin the formerYugoslavia. AnumberofUNobserver tumultuous areasintheCaucasus,CentralAsiaand southern AfricaandAsia.Retreatfromempireleft War confrontation.TheseincludedCentralAmerica, ums inareasthathadbeenthesiteoffront-lineCold and theUSSR’sretreatfromempireleftpowervacu- supported Communistpowerprojectioninfrastructure War commitments.ThecollapseoftheSoviet- pattern generallydidnotresemblethatofitsCold In theearly1990s,however, anewformofarmed United States(hurricane)1993 Sudan (famine)1993 Russia (famine)1992–94 Ethiopia (famine)1991 Montserrat andNevis(volcano)1991 Humanitarian operationswerenotnewtothe UNTAC lastedfrom1992to1993. and alogisticscompany. Canada’scommitmentto tary observers:itincludedacombatengineertroop larger Canadiancontributioninadditiontomili- post-Cold War disengagementmissionsbuthada Authority inCambodia(UNTAC), waspartofthese Operation MARQUIS,theUNTransitional 1993–94 Operation CONSONANCE(ONUMOZ,Mozambique) Operation MATCH (ONUSAL, ElSalvador)1992–95 1991–94 Operation PYTHON(MINURSO, West Sahara) Operation SULTAN (ONUCA,Nicaragua)1989–92 on aseriesofnewcommitmentswhose developed, theCanadianforcesembarked hile the1994WhitePaper wasbeing 13 14 the UNSecurity Council.OperationFRICTION, the Kuwait in1990–91 andcomplywiththedemands of paign designedtoforcethe Hussein regimeoutof Canada committedtothefirst twophasesofacam- commitment inthe1990swas inthePersian Gulf. and Haydon1998). STABLE) andthenwithdrawn(seeGriffiths, Gimblett, 1995 and1997(OperationsPIVOT, STANDARD and force wasannuallyreducedinstrengthbetween battalion groupsupportedwithhelicopters.This deployed. Canadacontributeda1,200-maninfantry the UnitedNationsMissioninHaiti(UNMIH),was RESTORE DEMOCRACY), aUNstabilizationforce, American interventionin1994–95(Operation (Operation FORWARD ACTION) in1993–94.Afteran destroyers andanoperationalsupportship tributed substantialnavalforces,includingtwo Nations-sanctioned blockadeimposed.Canadacon- DIALOGUE) waspeacefullyrebuffedandaUnited and Americantroops(OperationsCAULDRON a combinedhumanitarianeffortinvolvingCanadian Cedras regimeintosharingpowerfailed:soonafter, 1993, aCanadian-Americanattempttopressurethe tion, BANDIT wasdeployed in1988.From1990to lated. Aplannednon-combatantevacuationopera- period whenthe1994WhitePaper wasbeingformu- even intothetwenty-firstcentury. would remainactivewellintothelate1990sand operations intheearly1990s.Twoofthesetheatres longer-term missionsinthreeprimarytheatresof Canadian forces,however, wascommittedtoseveral ments usingmostlylogisticsandsupportunits.The ian assistancewereallrelativelyshort-termcommit- the AirborneRegiment. a logisticsunitandprotectiveelementprovidedby operations includedamedicalunit,anengineer relief effortafterthegenocideinRwanda.These three missionsweretheCanadiancomponentsof LANCE, PASSAGE andSCOTCH(1994–95).These 2001; Pupetz1994).Theotheroperationswere since OperationBANDIT offHaitiin1988(Oliviero tions inSomalia,thefirsttimethishadbeendone Regiment BattleGroupwasputtogetherforopera- tionary forcebasedontheCanadianAirborne sions there.Inthiscase,ajointCanadianexpedi- support oftheUNOSOMIandIIUNmis- (UNITAF), whichconductedoperationsinSomalia component oftheAmerican-ledUnifiedTask Force Next totheBalkans,Canada’s longestmilitary Canada’s involvementinHaitiranthroughthe Peace Observation,disengagementandhumanitar- 10 15 deployment of a naval task group (two destroyers and enforcing sanctions: a Canadian destroyer or frigate an AOR plus embarked helicopters) to join the rotated every six months from 1992 to 1995, while two American-led Multinational Interception Force (MIF) CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft joined that effort in 1990, was followed up with two squadrons of CF- (Operation SHARP GUARD) (Maloney 1996, 1997a; 18 fighters and an infantry company (Operation Maloney and Llambias 2002). SCIMITAR). A field hospital and an infantry company to guard it were also deployed (Operation SCALPAL). After Iraqi forces were ejected from Kuwait and the Canadian Forces’ Domestic Operation FRICTION, SCIMITAR and SCALPAL forces Operations to 1994 went home, a series of operations was implemented to stabilize the situation. One of these was the 1991 ngoing search and rescue and maritime surveil- multinational Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in lance operations continued throughout the peri- southern Turkey, which included a Canadian medical od. Naval forces assisted with RCMP unit and transports (Operation ASSIST). A UN stabi- O counter-drug operations on occasion (Operations lization force, UNIKOM, was deployed to establish a HOGAN and JAGGY in 1993), while a hunter-killer buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait: Canada con- submarine was involved in covert surveillance of illegal tributed an engineer regiment on two rotations in scallopers in 1993 in support of the Department of 1991–92 and military observers from 1991 to 1999. Fisheries and Oceans (Operation AMBUSCADE). The Canada also contributed to coalition containment two largest domestic operations were both conducted in operations: Canadian forces specialist personnel were 1990. Operation FEATHER was the deployment of an part of the UNSCOM weapons of mass destruction infantry battalion to Akwesasne when armed violence search and destroy operation (Operation FORUM), and broke out amongst Mohawk factions. Later that year Canadian forces AWACS personnel monitored the no- the entire 5e BMC was deployed south of Montreal to fly zones (Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN contain armed insurrectionists at Oka and Châteauguay WATCH) (Maloney 2002a). (Operation SALON). A CP-140 Aurora MPA and a naval The largest series of Canadian forces operations patrol vessel were involved in surveillance operations between 1991 and 1994 was in the Balkans. If the during Operation SALON. Compared to the overseas Persian Gulf was one primary theatre of Canadian operational tempo, the domestic operational tempo was operations, the Balkans was the other. In the period low from 1991 to 1994.16 1991–94 the Canadian forces deployed military observers with the European Community Monitor Mission (Operation BOLSTER), led by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to all of the Was There a Commitment- former Yugoslavian republics. The inability of the Capability Gap by 1993-94? European Community to develop a peacekeeping force Overseas Operations in Croatia led to Operation HARMONY, the deploy- Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney ment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPRO- he pattern of deployments and the types of forces FOR): in 1992 Canada deployed a mechanized infantry deployed in a cumulative sense gives an indica- battalion and an armoured engineer regiment from its T tion of the high operational tempo in the period NATO forces based in Lahr, Germany. As the situation 1990 to 1994. From 1990 to 1992 a mechanized in Bosnia deteriorated, Canada offered a mechanized brigade group was deployed to Europe. During the battalion group (replaced with a light armoured regi- 1990–91 Gulf War the Canadian contribution consisted ment) to serve with UNPROFOR II from late 1992 mostly of CF-18 squadrons and a naval task group. The (Operation CAVALIER). A logistics battalion was also period 1992 to 1994, however, saw the deployment, at deployed to support both, while Canada also sent in a any one time, of three infantry battalions, one light number of UN military observers for the duration. armoured regiment, two tactical helicopter units, an Rotations of all three units occurred every six months. engineer regiment, a logistics battalion (plus), three As the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo worsened, destroyers, two patrol aircraft and two operational sup- Canada allocated one specially equipped CC-130 to port ships. Other UN commitments, like the long- the resupply effort (Operation AIR BRIDGE: from 1992 standing UNDOF commitment on the Golan Heights on). At sea, Canada joined NATO naval forces in (1974 to the present), took the better part of a logistics

11 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 Canadian forces: deployment withtheavailableunitsinadownsizing battalion everysixmonths.Comparethislevelof have beenrequired: the 1992to1994period,followingforceswould wished tosustaintheoverseasoperationaltempoof nario. Therefore,hadtheCanadiangovernment forces outsideofamid-tohigh-intensitywarsce- perhaps fourtimesthenumberarerequiredforland stress andpost-traumaticproblems.Indeed, and personnelarenotmentallybreakingdownwith ments—assuming nocasualtiesarebeinggenerated wishes todeployareneededsustaincommit- that atleastthreetimesthenumberofforcesanation commitments. to pre-1970 levelsorreduced thenumberofoverseas downwards, butinsteadwould haveincreasedthem reduced thesizeofarmed forcesfrom1990levels imposed onitsarmedforces, itwouldnothave ment wishedtosustaintheoperational tempoit ation type.Inotherwords,hadtheCanadiangovern- therefore donotfigureinthecalculationduetooper- during thisperiod,norwereartilleryregiments,and squadrons, obviously, werenotdeployedoverseas would havebeenaimportantaddition.Fighter tempo, thoughanadditionaloperationalsupportship capable ofhandlingthestrainoperational time forcestructurehadenoughplatformsandwas brigade groups(Maloney1997b).Notethatthemari- 1958 to1970: thatis,fourcomplete,fullymanned approximately totheColdWar forcestructurecirca The needforrest,refitandtrainingusuallymeans 2/3 tacticalhelicoptersquadrons 1/3 fieldambulances 1.5/3 engineerregiments 2/3 servicebattalions 3/7 infantrybattalions 1/3 Armouredregiments 2/18 maritimepatrolaircraft 3/16 destroyers/frigates 2/3 operationalsupportship For thelandforces,thesenumberscorrespond 18 maritimepatrolaircraft 3 operationalsupportships 16 destroyers/frigates 4 tacticalhelicoptersquadrons 4 fieldambulances 4 engineerregiments 4 servicebattalions 4 armouredregiments 12 infantrybattalions 17 2002–03). incapable oftransportingvehicles (Maloney pable ofoperatingfromunimproved airstripsand strategic role.The707s thatwereonhandinca- CC-130 Herculestacticaltransportspressedintoa were acquired:AirCommandwascontenttorelyon cise, BRAVE LION,in1986.Nostrategicairliftaircraft tracted fortheonlyfull-scaleCASTdeploymentexer- Norwegian RollOn-RollOff(RO-RO)shipswerecon- Canadian sealiftshipping.Asacost-savingmeasure, the 1970s shouldhavegenerated theacquisitionof the CASTbrigadegroupcommitmenttoNorwayin ducted inapermissiveenvironment.Thetakingonof peacekeeping forcesandthedeploymentwascon- deployed after1970, theywerelightinterpositionary in West Germany. WhenCanadianUNmissionswere Cold War forcestructurewasgenerallyforward-based lift vehiclesagedandwerenotreplaced.Canada’s 1970s thiscapabilitywasdrasticallyreducedasthe sealift andairlift(Maloney2002c,chaps.4,8).Bythe Canada’s forcescouldself-deployusingexisting was thelackofstrategiclift.In1950sand1960s “Dieppes” or“HongKongs”ofthemind. personnel constitute,insomecases,individual term effectsoftheseoperationsonCanadianforces a parwithHongKongorDieppe.Indeedthelong- nate nottobeconfrontedwithamilitarydisasteron even adiscernibleUNmandate,thiscountryisfortu- clear justificationintermsofthenationalinterestor graphically complexenvironments,usuallywithno dumped servicepersonnelintopoliticallyandgeo- out largenumbersofmenandwomen.Having ments, theCanadiangovernmentessentiallyburned forces andatthesametimeimposingthesecommit- tempo. Byfailingtoincreasethesizeofarmed measure thehumancostofsuchahighoperational looks atnumbers.Itdoesnotexamineandcannot component. creative meansofburdensharingwithitsreserve The Army, particularly, didnotexamineordevelop sionally employed,butsub-unitsorunitswerenot. ceding 30years.Individualaugmenteeswereocca- strong intheearly1990sastheyhadbeenpre- components oftheCanadianforcesremainedas ural barriersbetweenthereserveandregular ment inoperationsaddressedatthistime.Thecult- There wereotherdeficiencies.Theprincipalone It mustbepointedoutthatthisanalysismerely Neither wasthethornyissueofreserveemploy- 12 In the early 1990s the strategic lift problem was Continental Defence and Domestic Operations not obvious. The peace observation missions were Measuring a commitment-capability gap for continen- small in number and did not require anything beyond tal and domestic operations in the 1990–94 period is the Polaris airliners. UNPROFOR I and II relied ini- more difficult than an equivalent analysis for overseas tially on forces and equipment deployed from Lahr. operations. The types of domestic scenario envisioned When additional armoured vehicles were deployed, by the 1994 White Paper did not demand unique they were brought in using a chartered RO-RO ship forces: existing forces geared for overseas operations that landed in a permissive environment. UNTAC’s were adequate, as demonstrated during Operations logistics vehicles could be flown in by CC-130, while FEATHER and SALON (on land) and Operation AMBUS- the Griffon helicopters slated for UNMIH in Haiti CADE (at sea). There was always the possibility, howev- could self-deploy through the United States and the er, that a situation requiring a brigade group to contain infantry battalion could fly into a permissive envi- armed native unrest would occur while the bulk of the ronment. Forces assigned to operations in the Persian army was committed overseas. The Army’s response to Gulf (UNIKOM, UNSCOM and the AWACS flight the Front de Libération du Québec crisis in 1970 did not crews) could piggyback onto US Air Force airlift. detract from the readiness of forward-deployed forces The cracks started to show with Operation DELIV- in West Germany. During Operation SALON, however, ERANCE in Somalia. A Canadian AOR was used in 5e BMC was committed to NATO in Europe as part of addition to CC-130s, but the force’s Grizzly, Cougar SACEUR’s strategic reserve (Maloney 1997b, 442–445). and Bison armoured vehicles had to be brought in by Could the Army have handled all of the 1993–94 com- US Air Force C-5 Galaxy transports. What capability mitments in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Haiti, existed to evacuate the Canadian DELIVERANCE Rwanda and Somalia while simultaneously conducting force if the situation became untenable? The United a SALON-like operation in Canada? We are perhaps Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and fortunate that such a situation did not present itself. its collapse should have been a wake-up call. What As for continental defence, the existing CF-18 force happens if the Canadian contingent of a UN mission was more than capable of handling any NORAD com- in a remote, dangerous area requires immediate rein- mitments in addition to deploying an expeditionary forcement to prevent a genocide, or requires extrac- fighter squadron or two (demonstrated during tion to prevent its demise? The Polaris had no Operation SCIMITAR in 1990), while the CP-140 Aurora defensive capability in the face of surface-to-air mis- MPA squadrons were in a similar position when it came siles or anti-aircraft artillery; it is essentially an air- to maritime surveillance and control missions (again, liner. A small number of CC-130 Hercules had demonstrated by the fact that CP-140s were deployed defensive equipment (armour, flares, chaff), but they as part of Operation SHARP GUARD). Canada’s naval were assigned to Operation AIR BRIDGE in Sarajevo. forces were in a strong position to deal with continen- In terms of heavy lift, the Polaris cannot carry vehi- tal defence threats while retaining forward-deployed cles, and the CC-130s can carry only one light forces for sanctions-enforcement missions off Haiti, in armoured vehicle at a time and nothing else. the Adriatic and in the Persian Gulf/Red Sea maritime Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney At sea, the three operational support vessels were interception operation (MIO). The main deficiency was multi-role and could carry a limited number of troops the over-tasked operational support vessels and perhaps and light vehicles. The operational support vessels, the aging Oberon-class submarines. The Sea King issue however, had other tasks such as refuelling the ships was, naturally, a problem. These aircraft should have deployed off Haiti and the former Yugoslavia and been replaced with the EH-101 as scheduled, but politi- serving with the MIF. If Canada had wanted to land cal decisions by the Chrétien government prevented the or extract a force from a port in Africa, Europe, the acquisition of a New Shipboard Aircraft and needlessly Caribbean or the Middle East it would have had to put the lives of the crews at risk. The same applied to borrow or rent RO-RO shipping from another country. the ancient Labrador search and rescue helicopters and If an extraction were required under non-permissive their crews. conditions, would the civilian crew of a rented ship (or aircraft) have been prepared to go in and pull Canadians out?

13 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 change wouldhavebeentheorderofday. would havebeennexttoimpossible.Incremental accept radicalchangeinsuchashorttime,however, Defence Headquartersandthethreearmedservicesto servative institutionslike the bureaucraciesofNational shape acoherentnationalsecurityvision.Forcingcon- but wouldhaverequiredclearstrategicobjectivesto straints ofCanada’sdebtsituationwasinfactpossible, protect Canadianinterestswithinthebudgetarycon- ance fordetailedforcestructuring? how coulditpossiblyhavebeenusedaspolicyguid- Canadian interestsandthethreatstothoseinterests, tentative, vagueandunspecificintermsofexpressing This isatrickquestion.Giventhatthedocument implement thepremisesof1994WhitePaper? W An AlternativeForceStructure Paper iscorrect instatingthat the territorywedefineasCanada. The1994White continues toexistandherpeople continuetooccupy since the1800s,norwillitchange aslongCanada North America.Thishasnot fundamentallychanged trol beforetheyhaveanadverseeffectathomein security problemsoverseasfromgettingoutofcon- strategic traditionisbasedonForwardSecurity:stop Canada, itsinstitutionsandpeople.TheCanadian always beenthephysicalandeconomicprotectionof In themostessentialterms,Canadianinterestshave Canadian InterestsintheEarly1990s accuracy. form similarexercises allthe timewithsomedegreeof move: RoyalDutchShellanalyticaldepartmentsper- that wecannotpredictthefuturewasnotreallybest possible. fication ofCanadianinterestsinthiscontextwasfact been developedinthe1994WhitePaper. Cleareridenti- 1995 and2001), abettercontextualsectioncouldhave (as opposedtowhatwenowknowhappenedbetween written in1993–94aboutthechangedglobalsituation accommodate anything. argue thatthepolicyguidancewasvagueenoughto would betodecideonaforcestructureandthen then baseaforcestructureonthatanalysis;another to discernthebureaucracy’ssubtextualmeaningand be todelvebeneaththecodedlanguageandattempt Given whatknowledgeableanalystsknewandhad 19 20 Throwing one’shandsintheairanddeclaring Consequently, developingaforcestructureto 1994 hadthegovernmentchosentofully Canadian forceshavelooked like after hat wouldtheforcestructureof 18 One waywould in CentralAmerica; mediation inNicaragua,ElSalvador andGuatemala Angola) forcesinAngola;the acceptanceofUN (Union NacionalPor LaIndependenceTotale Do the associatedwithdrawalofsupportforUNITA include SouthAfrica’swithdrawalfromNamibiaand process ofdisengagementasearly1989:examples itself inthefaceofnewrealities. the Communistefforttherecouldnolongersustain had beencolonizedinthe1920s.AsforCambodia, Tito collapsedintoitsconstituentelements,which micro level:theCommunistempireformallyledby Soviet decolonizationdramawasplayedoutatthe is thebestexample.IncaseofYugoslavia, the states forindependence:theviolenceinCaucasus not preparemanyofitsformercoloniesorclient Unlike theBritish,however, theSovietleadershipdid decolonization exercises of the 1950sand1960s. many ways,similartotheBritish,BelgianandFrench World. TheSovietwithdrawalfromempirewas,in its affiliatesinwhatusedtobecalledtheThird the withdrawalofSovietCommunistempireand world systemintheearly1990srelatedprimarilyto ment intheseareasifnecessary. on otherareasandbepreparedformilitaryinvolve- regions withcaveatsthatCanadashouldkeep aneye could havechosenlanguagethatpointedtospecific bally atanytimeforawholerangeofreasons.It Canada hadtheabilitytointerveneanywhereglo- broadest ofterms,theWhitePaper suggeststhat were specificcauses.Bycastingthe“concerns” inthe Canadian interestswereinspecificareas,andthere specific geography:theconflictareasthreatening in 1993–94.Forexample,thereisnodiscussionof replace specificthreatswastoobroadandvagueeven “resurgence ofoldhatreds”and“proliferation”to terms “globalpressures,”“refugees,”“failedstates,” word thatisnotstrongenough.Indeed,useofthe examination ofthreats.Itlabelsthese“concerns,” a forces fromAfghanistan. Soviet Forces Germany; andthewithdrawal ofSoviet and theprogressivewithdrawal oftheGroup Cold War proxy-war frontlineswereinthe As wehaveseen,themainissuesconfronting The 1994WhitePaper, however, straysinits with othernations. future dependsonitsabilitytotradefreely security, especiallysinceCanada’seconomic interest indoingitsparttoensureglobal democracy, Canadacontinuestohaveavital tional alliancestodefendfreedomand done muchwithinthecontextofinterna- As anationthatthroughoutitshistoryhas 14 22 the reunificationofGermany 21 Withdrawal from power produces, no matter how leader in Belgrade, Slobodan Milosevic, and the contin- temporarily, a power vacuum. In many cases the vac- ued interference by his regime in the affairs of adjacent uum was filled by individual leaders and groups states was recognized early on (see Ash 1999). The using ethnic animosity as a vehicle to achieve and complicating factor was the existence of other totalitar- retain power. Unfortunately most analysts of the day ians in the region such as Franjo Tudjman in Croatia: ascribed violence in the Balkans, the Caucasus and everybody is bad, so who do the “good guys” back? elsewhere to “ethnic conflict” that had existed for Keep in mind the proximity of Yugoslavia to NATO’s decades/centuries/millennia and was unleashed when European members: Croatia is an eight-hour drive from the Cold War system was suddenly removed. Instead Lahr in Germany. Having several wars going on in the of identifying these individuals and groups as totali- NATO Area with attendant spin-off problems like tarian and anti-democratic, the authors of the 1994 refugee flow into Italy and Greece and consequent eco- White Paper concentrated on trying to “understand” nomic and social pressures, in addition to the dramatic them, identifying and addressing the “root causes.” increase in organized crime that accompanies instabili- The key to this cipher should have been Saddam ty, was, in a word, destabilizing. This state of affairs Hussein and his behaviour after the 1990–91 Gulf was deliberately generated by men who made choices: War. Here was a national socialist totalitarian it was not an act of fate (Glenny 1992; Silber and Little repressing his population and generating instability 1995). The 1994 White Paper would have us believe in an economic area vital to the Western, now global, that only the spin-off issues should be addressed, not economic system. the source of the problem. The authors of the 1994 White Paper asserted that the four horsemen of the apocalypse were riding Middle East and Persian Gulf around the globe as if famine, pestilence, environ- The first post-Cold War crisis in which Canada was mental damage and population growth were new to involved was the aggressive behaviour of the Hussein history. This litany can be found in the thinking of regime in Iraq. The brutal occupation of Kuwait, the academics of the 1960s and 1970s. Why were these pursuit of weapons of mass destruction programs and considered new problems? Why, exactly, did a the invasion of Saudi Arabia at Khafji generated threats Canadian defence White Paper need to address them? to Canadian interests on several levels. First, the oil- It should have been obvious to analysts that there bearing region of the Persian Gulf supplied the were two major threats to Canadian interests in the economies of Japan and Europe, which were Canada’s early 1990s. These threats should have been clearly two largest trading areas outside of the United States. stated and prioritized over all other global problems. Damage to the oil delivery process in the Persian Gulf would send shock waves throughout the fragile post- Eastern Europe and the Former Yugoslavia Cold War global economy, which would ultimately There is an assumption that the collapse of the Berlin affect the Canadian economy. Second, the acquisition Wall in 1989 meant that Communism was dead in of weapons of mass destruction by the Hussein regime

1989. But Russia, for example, did not withdraw her would contribute to the increased vulnerability of the Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney armed forces from East Germany until 1993. The end oil delivery process (as discussed in Pollack 2002); of the Soviet Union in 1991 generated a dangerous when delivery systems with enough range were situation, particularly with regard to the security of acquired, the Hussein regime would have the ability to its weapons of mass destruction, in addition to its target Israel with nuclear weapons. The small territory arsenal of high-technology conventional weapons. of Israel would be unable to absorb even one nuclear The coup attempt in August 1991 indicated that, in weapon. Consequently, the probability was high that the event of miscalculation, the situation in Eastern Israel would strike first if the Hussein regime appeared Europe could have deteriorated into a war (Cockburn capable of building and deploying nuclear weapons and Cockburn 1997; Pry 1999). The collapse of (Cohen 1998). Canada has no interest in a regional Yugoslavia and the multiple wars that emerged there nuclear war in the Middle East and, despite tensions could have caused instability within adjacent former between successive Canadian governments and Israel, it members of the Warsaw Pact. It is conceivable that if is not in Canada’s interest to see Israel destroyed by a the situation in the former Yugoslavia was not Baathist totalitarian state with many political views not contained, it could have spread into the newly freed dissimilar to those of Germany’s national socialists in Captive Nations. The emergence of a totalitarian the 1930s and 1940s.

15 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 lead andletCanadadecidewhethertocommit. vious onesandthatothernationsshouldtake the flicts ofthe1990swerelessermagnitudethanpre- aggressive behaviour. Somemayarguethatthecon- Milosevic regimesintermsofrepressivemethodsand difference betweenthesestatesandtheHussein Soviet Union,CommunistChina;thereislittleorno Nazi Germany, FascistItaly, ImperialJapan,the totalitarian statesthatthreatenCanadianinterests: regions. Canada’sstrategictraditionliesincountering Canadian interestsintwospecificgeographical diately aftertheendofColdWar tothreaten idealistic, while othersmaybemotivated by thepres- work onthatcontinent whentheywereyoung and possibly engenderedbytheir reliefandassistance Canadian policymakers haveasoftspotforAfrica, in theSovietdecolonization process. issues aswellanalysisofpotentialproblemareas have facilitatedinformationsharingonproliferation descent. Closercommercialandmilitarytieswould substantial populationsofPolish andUkrainian Canadian interests.Asforopportunities,Canadahas transfers oftechnologywerealsothreatsto and inthePersian Gulfbyillicitorevenovert potential threatstotheneworderinEasternEurope from facilitiesnolongerundercentralcontrol.The logical andchemicalweaponsnotbedistributed It wasinCanada’sbestintereststhatnuclear, bio- White Paper mentions“proliferation”asa“concern.” host ofopportunitiesaswellthreats.The1994 The turmoilintheformerSovietUnionproduceda this time,andhowdiditaffectCanadianinterests? interpreted asaffectingCanadianinterests. American interests,whichinturncouldhavebeen Trouillot 1990).TheHaitianrefugeeflowaffected aggressive astheMilosevicregime(Dupuy1997; itarian as,say, theHusseinregimeorasoutwardly anti-democratic andodious,ifnotasefficientlytotal- that itwasunrecognizable. buried suchanalysisundersomuchcodedlanguage values, yettheyfailedtodoso—oratleast were totalitarianthreatstoCanadianinterestsand Paper hadthreeorfouryearstofigureoutthatthere values andinterests.Contributorstothe1994White tatives, ascitizensofasovereignstatewithitsown independent-thinking Canadiansandtheirrepresen- a pathofleastresistanceisorshouldbeanathemato In bothcrises,totalitarianentitiesemergedimme- There is,ofcourse,thematter ofAfrica.Numerous What elsewashappeningaroundtheglobeat Haiti wasaspecialcase.TheCedrasregime 23 Such (Ayittey 1998). Belgian colonialadministrationsofdaysgoneby which itselfwasaholdoverfromcorruptFrenchand coupled withcorruptionatalllevelsofgovernment, African leadersinthe1960sduringdecolonization, and inefficientsocialisticmodelsabsorbedby the failureofnationaleconomiesbasedonobsolete did notexistinAfrica.WhatexistedAfricawas that existedintheBalkansandPersian Gulf view, thecombinationofthreatstoCanadianinterests “white racism”guilt-tripstick.Inacold,hardrealist sures broughttobearbyinterestgroupswieldingthe in thosegeographical environments. and thetypesofforcesneeded tooperateeffectively Canadian interestswherethose threatsaremanifest, should bedictatedbythemagnitude ofthreatsto both. Ontheexpeditionary side, prioritization one streamortheother. Itmusthaveforcesfor constitute another. Canadacannothaveforcesfor out expeditionaryandNorthAmericanmissions ority “stream,”whilethedeployableforcestocarry veillance andcontrolofCanadaconstituteonepri- Arctic. Therefore,theforcesnecessaryforsur- armoured regimentsshouldnotpolicetheCanadian Warning Systemradarscannot deploytoBosniaand missions andviceversa.However, Northern missions canalsobeusedforglobalexpeditionary abroad. Insomecases,forcesforNorthAmerican structure toconductexpeditionaryoperations domestic andcontinentaloperationsaforce ues toneedbothaforcestructurethatcanhandle national securitypolicy. Canadaneededandcontin- structure bestsuitedtoimplementingCanadian been done.Thismighthavepropelledtheforce been presented,someprioritizationshouldhave threats toCanadianinterestsifaproperanalysishad thing wewantittodo,andgiventherealitiesof not enoughmoneyforanarmedforcestodoevery- Given the1994WhitePaper’s premisethatthereis Priorities interests to“fix”Africa? caused bythesepowers?Was itinCanada’sbest Was itinCanada’sbestintereststosweepupthemess Canada’s bestintereststointerveneandstopthem? possibly nefarious,purposes(Dallaire2003).Was itin remained heavilyinvolvedfortheirownobscure, Rwanda particularly, theformercolonialplayers tion” andgovernancetemplates.Inmanycases, environmentally unsuitableWestern “democractiza- 16 24 This situationwasexacerbatedby Based on the above analysis, a geographical prior- Yugoslavia/Somalia: This model represents a sit- itization of threats to Canadian interests outside of uation in which a force intervenes to facilitate North America would have looked like this in 1994: the delivery of humanitarian assistance and/or 1. Eastern Europe impose a ceasefire or settlement. An agreement 2. Persian Gulf/Middle East may or may not exist and the intervention may 3. Western Hemisphere require a degree of force or coercion. 4. Asia Persian Gulf: At the high end of the spectrum 5. Africa is the Gulf War model in which a force is put What operations types should Canada have been in place to impose a settlement. prepared to conduct in these regions, keeping in mind The terminology for these operations types would Canadian national security priorities and budgetary not emerge until the late 1990s. Even in the mid- constraints? Again, this is a bit of a trick question and 1990s there was a tendency to call them all “peace- must be heavily qualified. The types of military opera- keeping” but to differentiate between “Chapter 6” and tions conducted during the Cold War did not necessar- “Chapter 7” missions (based on the UN Charter), where ily apply to the post-Cold War environment. During Chapter 6 was conducted with acquiescence of the the early 1990s the terminology to describe what belligerents and Chapter 7 was conducted in a less Canada did, was supposed to be doing or had done permissive environment. was in flux: it should have been clarified in the 1994 Note that Canadian defence policy, as established White Paper. For example, let us examine the term during the Cold War and in the 1994 White Paper, does “peacekeeping.” Peacekeeping during the Cold War not formally recognize several other means by which was not a static concept. What we refer to as “peace Canada has used her military forces to attain national observation” and “peacekeeping” today was called objectives. This is a result of the dogged determination “peacekeeping” in the 1950s. By the 1960s the use of of policy-makers to make all Canadian military activity military forces to impose order in a non-linear situa- fit a legalistic straitjacket provided by the United tion involving entities that are not necessarily nations Nations. For example, Canada conducted what is tradi- (what we refer to as “stabilization” today) was also tionally called “gunboat diplomacy” on numerous called “peacekeeping” (Maloney 2002c, chap. 1). occasions from the 1930s to well into the 1990s. If one looks at the 1987 White Paper, one can Canada has conducted several non-combatant evacua- extract several Cold War-era operations types: tion operations in permissive and non-permissive envi- maintenance of strategic deterrence ronments since the 1960s. It also conducted global conventional defence in the NATO Area, which strategic intelligence gathering operations during the includes North America Cold War and in the 1990s.25 protection of Canadian sovereignty Perhaps it would not be wise to present the full peaceful settlement of international disputes spectrum of Canadian military operations in a defence (“peacekeeping”) policy White Paper. However, if one is to derive a force

arms control structure capable of implementing policy the details are Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney Aid to the civil power (the use of armed force in important. It is critical for us to understand that opera- Canada) tions conducted by UNPROFOR I and II or UNITAF are foreign disaster and humanitarian relief not “peacekeeping” but something else. assistance to civilian authorities (the use of mili- The analysis conducted by the Operational Research tary forces in Canada without resort to arms) Division in 1998, based in part on the language of the In 1992, tentative moves had been made to estab- 1994 White Paper (Maloney 2002b), could easily have lish or differentiate new operations types for the new been conducted five years earlier. It is likely that the era. A provisional differentiation in DND consisted of operations types developed after 1998, or variants (Maloney 2002a): thereof, could have been established in 1993–94. In Cyprus: This model represents a situation in any case, these types of operation would have been which a force is put in place to monitor an applicable to any force structure exercise: existing agreement. search and rescue Cambodia: This model is taken to represent a sit- domestic disaster relief uation in which a major civic action-type pro- international humanitarian assistance (permissive gram is required to create a semblance of order. environment)

17 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 alliance orcoalition members,Canadausually pro- ensure thatCanadian forcesarenotmisused bylarger and humanitarianaiddelivery, forexample.To exceptions: non-combatant evacuationoperations tions outsidetheWestern Hemisphere.Thereare coalition andwillnotundertake independentopera- terms, Canadawilloperateaspartofanallianceor as, say, thoseprovidedbythe Americans.Ingeneral Canadian forcesemployedwillneverbeassizeable Warfare; OperationalInfluence; andSaliency. The concepts ofForwardSecurity, AllianceandCoalition Canada’s nationalsecurityneeds. are necessary. Noonedimension canserveallof Third, forcesforallthreedimensions(air, sea,land) tional supportshipsareoneexampleofthisproblem. small numbersofanavailablecapability;theopera- forms caninfactbeuneconomicalwhenthereare also recognizethattoomuchfocusonmulti-roleplat- types canbeusedforseveralroles.We must,however, ereignty. Second,wemustrecognizethatsomeforce Canadian interestsanddoesnotprotectsov- exclusion ofallothersispointless;itdoesnotserve Concentrating Canadianforcesinoneareatothe would havetooperateacrossthespectrumofconflict. certain basiccharacteristics.First,Canadianforces structure tocarryouttheseoperationswouldhave supposedly hadprimacy. the newworldorder, inwhichtheUnitedNations belief thattherewasnolegalbasisforsuchactionin unfathomable butprobablyrelatestothemisguided intervention asapossibilityforCanada’sforcesis example. Whytheauthorsdidnotconsidermilitary Somalia withUNITAF wasanintervention,for of suchoperationseventhoughthemissionin mulating the1994WhitePaper refusedtoconceive Afghanistan (2001). Atthetime,however, thosefor- 1990: thePersian Gulf(1990–91), Kosovo(1999)and intervened withcombatforcesthreetimessince vention withcombatforces.NotethatCanadahas Note thatCanadianstrategictraditionincludesthe As withtheColdWar defencepolicies,aforce What doesnotappearonthelistisoutrightinter- stabilization operations interpositional peacekeeping peace observationandarmscontrolverification collective defenceinaNATO context defence ofCanada-USterritory national sovereigntyenforcement aid tothecivilpower evacuation ofCanadiansoverseas surveillance andcontrolofCanadianterritory interests? based onthetypesofproblemaffectingCanadian operations typeswouldhavefittedintotheregions of violenceisreal. but itisastateofcontinualtensionwherethethreat sity andmaybeakintotheColdWar insomeways, not resembletheFirstorSecondWorld War ininten- tially “at war”allthetime.Thistypeofconflictdoes of violence,wemustrecognizethatCanadaisessen- and canaffectCanadianinterestswithvaryinglevels that arenotrecognizednation-statesoperating globalized worldinwhichaplethoraofinfluencers ally adeclaredlegalstatebetweennation-states.In many waysobsoletebytheearly1990s.“War” isusu- and “peace”inthetwentieth-centurysensewere tion efforts(Maloney2002d). provide symboliccontributionstoallianceorcoali- tively bydiplomaticpersonnel.Itisnotenoughto strategic influenceinthecoalitionifhandledeffec- Influence). Intheory, thistranslatesintosomeformof alliance orcoalitioncommandstructures(Operational vides salientandeffectiveforcestoensureaccess Eastern Europe: Coming backtoourregionalprioritylist,what We shouldrecognizethattheconceptsof“war” environment) international humanitarian assistance (permissive Africa: peace observationandarms controlverification evacuation ofCanadiansoverseas environment) international humanitarianassistance(permissive Asia: intervention peace observationandarmscontrolverification evacuation ofCanadiansoverseas international humanitarianassistance defence ofCanada-USterritory stabilization operations Western Hemisphere: intervention peace observationandarmscontrolverification stabilization operations evacuation ofCanadiansoverseas Persian Gulf/MiddleEast: intervention stabilization operations peace observationandarmscontrolverification international humanitarianassistance collective defenceinaNATO context 18 evacuation of Canadians overseas Evacuation of Canadians overseas peace observation and arms control verification Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are What if the operations types for the priority geo- short-duration rescue operations. They usually involve graphical areas (Eastern Europe, Persian Gulf/Middle a small number of transport aircraft, a warship, or East, Western Hemisphere) are combined? These mis- both, plus special operations forces and intelligence sions cover a broad band on the spectrum of conflict, personnel. NEO assets are under national control. from lower to higher intensity, and involve all three Canadian-led NEOs are not frequent, but over-reliance dimensions: on our allies in their area calls into question Canadian international humanitarian assistance (permissive sovereignty when embassies and diplomatic independ- environment) ence are involved (Maloney 2002b). peace observation and arms control verification Stabilization, intervention and conventional defence evacuation of Canadians overseas operations are a breed apart in all areas, particularly in stabilization operations intensity, duration and risk. The forces required for intervention them are more complex, as are the lift and command collective defence in a NATO context and control requirements. There is substantial scope defence of Canada-US territory when selecting the types of forces to deploy, and that There are essentially two groupings of missions: the will be related to alliance or coalition objectives, first three on the list are not manpower intensive and Canadian national objectives, the threat, and the level are generally temporary or of short duration. These are of force necessary to achieve the objective. In all three short-notice contingency operations that can be mount- of the priority geographical areas, a pattern emerged in ed in all five geographical regions without the same the 1990s. Stabilization forces were introduced, some- level of preparation and duration as the second group. times with the consent of the belligerents; economic pressure using maritime forces to implement sanctions International humanitarian assistance was applied to coerce a belligerent to accept interna- (permissive environment) tional efforts; ground and air intervention forces were The forces necessary for the delivery of humanitarian readied in case the situation deteriorated, which aug- aid in a permissive environment include an Air mented the pressure tactics; and then the intervention Logistics Control Element and between one and three force was employed if necessary to compel the belliger- transport aircraft like the CC-130 Hercules. Canada ent forces to comply with international demands. has conducted these operations types since the 1960s In the early 1990s, however, there was some dis- and this level of effort has remained constant. In any agreement on the weight of the stabilization forces. one year there has been at least one such operation. Some suggested that stabilization forces be lightly In terms of duration, the humanitarian aid delivery armed and not equipped for combat operations, which element has deployed for weeks, as opposed to in turn would generate confidence amongst the bel- months or years. Consequently, the effort is usually ligerent factions. Unfortunately this permitted better- temporary and uses nationally controlled forces armed belligerent forces to coerce the stabilization Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney diverted from other missions (Maloney 2002b). forces, which rendered their efforts ineffective. Others suggested that forces equipped, trained and logistically Peace observation and arms control verification supported to conduct combat operations were more The average number of Canadian military observers capable of performing stabilization missions. As for deployed on a peace observation or arms control ver- conventional defence missions, the same types of forces ification mission is 15. The observers are usually used for intervention and heavy stabilization missions deployed in a permissive environment. At any time, could handle these other tasks. Canada has had between one and five arms control There is no generic force structure for stabilization, and peace observation missions ongoing, with per- intervention or conventional defence operations. The sonnel “subcontracted” and under the command of exact makeup of each mission will depend on the ter- coalitions or alliances established for the particular rain, how the belligerent forces are equipped and the task. The effort in these cases can be protracted, level of force deemed necessary to deal with the situa- sometimes over years, but the numbers of personnel tion. For example, armoured units and mechanized so employed are low and virtually no major equip- infantry supported with self-propelled artillery were ment is used (Maloney 2002b). part of an alliance operation to deter an enemy mecha-

19 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 components: the emergentforcestructureshouldhavehadseveral ests hadbeenconductedforthe1994WhitePaper, well asurbanterrain. lapsed Cedrasregimeinmountainousjungleareasas mobile operationsagainsttheremnantsofcol- with helicoptersconductedquickreactionforceair- launch systems.InHaiti,lightinfantrysupported forces usedmainlybattletanksandmultiplerocket- terrain inanenvironmentwherethebelligerent anti-tank systemsstabilizedthelinesinmountainous mechanized infantrybattalionequippedwithTOW were conductedinadesertenvironment.InCroatia, interfering withtheseactivities.Theseoperations organizations andtodisarmbelligerentfactions provide armedprotectiontohumanitariandelivery light armouredforcesweredeployedtoSomalia and rollingterrainrivers;lightinfantry nized attackinNATO’s CentralRegionwithitsopen Europe orSouth West Asia.ACF-18squadron Canada orwith itsequipmentpre-positioned in each force,withthebalance ofeachbrigadeheldin mandatory. Onebrigadegroupwould beallocatedto tions. Flyovertrainingineach regionwouldbe or pre-positionedforintervention ordefenceopera- deployed eitheronoperationsinastabilizationrole Force wouldeachhaveabattlegroupforward- to movethecombatequipmentneededforeffort. gic sealiftandstrategicairtransportforcesearmarked be positionedandreadiedforaction,withthestrate- Bosnia, thanabrigadegroupandairsupportwould was beingreadiedtoaugmentastabilizationforcein frigate wouldbeassigned.Ifaninterventionforce mechanized battlegroupandahelicopter-carrying was beingappliedbysanctionsenforcement,thena bilization forcewasprotectingKuwaitandpressure made toaugmentthateffortwhenrequired.Ifasta- erted bytheallianceattime,withpreparations ment woulddependonthelevelofeffortbeingex- alliance efforts.ThescaleoftheCanadiandeploy- would besalientandmilitarilyeffectivewithinthe alliance effortsinthesetworegions.Theseforces Persian GulfForcewouldhaveforcesassignedtothe these fourcommands.TheBalkansForceandthe If aprioritizationexercise basedonnationalinter- In essence,theBalkansForceandPersian Gulf The threeserviceswouldactasforcegeneratorsof Continental andHemisphericDefenceForce Contingency DeploymentForce Persian GulfForce Balkans Force and thestrategic sealiftwouldhavebeen required. As plan, thoughsome rationalizationvis-à-vis theAORs ber andqualitytoimplement thisforcestructure King helicopters,wouldhave beenadequateinnum- as theyexistedin1994,with theexception oftheSea would alsohavebeenrequired. Themaritimeforces tions forceandintelligence-gatheringcapability deployable headquarters.Anexpandedspecialopera- sealift. Structurally, theCDF wouldhaveneededa Paper wouldhavebeenstrategicairliftand such aforcestructureafterreleaseofthe1994White to interoperabilitymattersandcontinentaldefence. also betherepositoryofcorporateknowledgerelated assistance withcivilauthoritytasks.TheCHDFwould reporting totheCHDFforaidcivilpowerand would beassignedtoabrigadegroupheadquarters Persian GulfForceandnotassignedtotheCDF not deployedaspartoftheBalkansForceor Canadian sovereignty. LandforcesbasedinCanada lance assetsnecessarytoobserveandprotect tems andinterceptor, anti-submarine,andsurveil- (CHDF) wouldincludeallofthestrategicsensorsys- Maritime Commandonacase-by-casebasis. capability. Navalforceswouldbeassignedby would haveitsownliftandstrategiccommunications joint forceheadquarterswouldcommandtheeffort:it infantry andspecialoperationsforces.Adeployable missions innon-prioritygeographicalareaswithlight capability toconductlimited-durationintervention observer personnel.TheCDFwouldalsohavethe culturally awarepoolofexperiencedandmature operations forces,lightinfantrybrigadegroup,and missions, withitsstrategictransportaircraft,special humanitarian aiddelivery, andpeaceobservation prepare fornon-combatantevacuationoperations, tribute totheallianceeffort. gency planningtouseitsassignedforcescon- responsible forintelligencecollectionandcontin- the NATO Area,thentheBalkansForcewouldbe if forceswererequiredforconventionaldefencein adjacent totheprimaryoperatingarea.Forexample, alliance orcoalitioneffortsinareasimmediately Note thateachforcewouldbeabletocontribute force incrementwouldalsobeassignedtoeachforce. the activetheatrewhenrequired.Aspecialoperations be forward-basedinGermanytogetheranddeployto ery wouldalsobeassignedtoeachforce:theycould equipped forprecision-guidedmunition(PGM)deliv- The primaryequipmentdeficienciestoimplement The ContinentalandHemisphericDefenceForce The ContingencyDeploymentForce(CDF)would 20 for air power, four CF-18 squadrons, two of them ingly lawless world where non-state entities violently fully equipped and trained for PGM delivery, would made hash of formal treaties and diplomatic arrange- have sufficed, with additional aircraft held in reserve ments. Weapons of mass destruction remained a serious in case battle losses required their use. issue, but, with the exception of its participation in The land forces certainly would have required UNSCOM, the Canadian forces had no real role to play expansion. The three light infantry battalions would in countering proliferation. Humanitarian assistance have needed to be brought up to strength, and some missions as anticipated by the 1994 White Paper were creative means to employ reserve units, at the sub- not conducted on a sustained basis by the Canadian unit level at least, would have been necessary. The forces: it is difficult to conclude that Canadian efforts raising of three other infantry battalions would have in this area were able to stem the tide of refugee flows been called for, as would the return to the order of generated by the unrest gripping Africa, though the battle of the fourth armoured regiment. The M-113A2 stabilization of Haiti was a useful exercise. The armoured personnel carrier would have needed Canadian forces shone, however, when they were pre- replacement with a more capable mechanized pared to go to war, and they used salient and effective infantry combat vehicle. The Lynx recce vehicle “warfighting” forces in stabilization and combat opera- would have needed to be replaced. The Leopard C-1 tions: Bosnia during the Implementation Force (IFOR) would have required upgrading or replacement with and Stabilization Force (SFOR) periods; Kosovo and cascaded (and therefore cheap and more effective) Afghanistan are the best examples. Dutch Leopard 2 or even American M-1 Abrams The burnout of the Canadian forces was eventually, tanks. The M-109A2 could have received an upgrade. by 1997, recognized as a problem within DND (Young Expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles would 1997). Instead of increasing the size of the forces, par- have been useful, building on existing Canadian ticularly the Army, the government continued to com- technology. mit military forces overseas. The four new peace The cumulative effect of these upgrades would observation missions, in the Central African republic, have been to position Canada for the next genera- Sierra Leone, Guatemala and the Congo, were not man- tional evolution of fighting technology instead of power or equipment intensive. On average, however, now having to make the leap from 1970s Cold War there were two infantry battalions, an armoured recce kit, which in any case would have limited Canada’s squadron, and a tactical helicopter squadron deployed military effectiveness in any coalition or alliance at any one time to Bosnia and Haiti from 1995 to 1997, effort. It is unfortunate for the Canadian forces and both commitments rotating every six months. From for Canadian taxpayers that this was not deemed 1998 to 2000–01 there were two infantry battalion affordable by the government of the day. groups, two recce squadrons, and a tactical helicopter squadron deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo, both com- mitments rotating every six months, plus two inde- Back to the Real World: What pendent infantry company groups deployed to Happened after 1994 locations as disparate as East Timor and Ethiopia- Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney Eritrea (Maloney 2002b). The exact Canadian interests at stake in these last two locations is unclear and the he premises of the 1994 White Paper did not scale of effort in both locations was virtually token, generally hold after 1995. The optimism over especially in East Timor. the place of the United Nations in global securi- T Air operations conducted during Operation ALLIED ty collapsed after the setbacks in Rwanda, Croatia, FORCE over Serbia included a Canadian component. A Bosnia and Somalia. NATO- and ABCA-led26 coali- CF-18 squadron was incrementally deployed, but its tions took on the stabilization tasks, as they were operations were adversely affected in that insufficient more efficient in their command and control relation- PGM delivery equipment, munitions or trained pilots ships, could bring coercive firepower to bear and were immediately available. Indeed, the force had to be were comparatively unencumbered by the legalistic cannibalized from all four existing CF-18 squadrons, in demands of the unwieldy UN bureaucracy. terms of both equipment and personnel.27 “Warfighting,” in fact, was necessary, as the events in In terms of domestic operations, however, a policy Kosovo and Afghanistan demonstrated. was implemented whereby the Canadian forces would “Peacekeeping” was held up to derision in an increas- be the “force of last resort” in any aid to the civil

21 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 to theeventsof 1994inRwandawasthe offing.This it appearedas though agenocideofsimilar proportions attempted toleadamultinational forceintoZairewhen ciencies, however, emergedafter1994.In1996,Canada the Canadianforces’existing resources.Seriousdefi- (Maloney 2002a). TION, includedafrigateandtwotanker aircraft The Canadiancomponent,OperationDETERMINA- tion issue,acoalitionwasestablishedtocoerceIraq. lack ofcomplianceontheweaponsmassdestruc- Jordan in1998.WiththeHusseinregime’scontinued forces startedmovinginthedirectionsofKuwaitand regime reacheddangerousproportionswhenIraqi tion. ThecatandmousegamewiththeHussein tion capabilityregardingweaponsofmassdestruc- Canadian UNSCOMpersonnelhunteddownproduc- no-fly zonesalongsidetheirAmericancomradesand Canadian AWACS personnelcontinuedtomonitorthe basis withanAmericancarrierbattlegroup,while Persian Gulf.Onefrigatewasdeployedonaregular ation in1998isanotherexample(Maloney2002b). The SwissAirMAJAID(MajorAircraftDisaster)oper- Winnipeg floodof1997andtheicestorm1998. they coulddoso.Twoprimeexamplesarethe departments andtheprovincesoncetheyrealized forces wasusedmoreandbyothergovernment 1998 andTurkey in1999. CC-130 airlift.ItdeployedbrieflytoHondurasin with asmallprotectiveforce,allusingexisting secondarily tasked medicalandengineersub-units modest organization,theDART wasagroupingof was formedin1997(Young 1997).Adeliberately DFAIT. ADisasterAssistanceResponseTeam (DART) tional disasterreliefbusinessattheinsistenceof “Gunboat Diplomacy”1995). illegal scallopingoperations(seeMaloney2002b; while asubmarinewasdeployedtocovertlyobserve force deploymenttoconfrontSpanishoverfishing, produced amulti-shipandpatrolaircraftmaritime tection increased:theso-calledTurbotWar of1995 events of1990.Deploymentsrelatedtoresourcepro- MAPLE), butdidnotdeployunitsasithadduringthe Lake (OperationWALLABY) andIpperwash(Operation deployments againstarmednativegroups,Gustavsen unrest. TheCanadianforcessupportedtwopolice and regionalpolicingorganizationstodealwithcivil power operation.ThisplacedtheonusonRCMP Most oftheseoperationswere manageablewithin A Canadianpresencewasmaintainedinthe In termsofdomesticdisasterrelief,theCanadian The Canadianforcesgotinvolvedintheinterna- tarian objective(Hennessy2001). expeditionary operation,eveninpursuitofahumani- demonstrably incapableofconductingaself-sustaining Australia, FranceortheUnitedKingdom,Canadawas thing fromtheUnitedStatesorotherallies.Unlike region ofAfrica.Itwasnotenoughtoborrowevery- necessary toconducteffectiveoperationsinthisremote strategic communicationsandintelligencecapabilities effort, OperationASSURANCE,lacked thestrategiclift, these. ation inBosnia,rotatingeverysixmonths,isoneof squadrons atanygiventime.TheongoingSFORoper- two infantrybattalionsandarmouredrecce support Operation ENDURINGFREEDOM. ship (downfrom sixinthefallof2001), continueto including twoCP-140patrol aircraftandatleastone Assistance Force2003).Canadian maritimeforces, (CNN.com/world 2003;International Security ple weresucked out whiletheaircraftwasinflight an reliefintheCongolostitsreardoorand140peo- ASD (notCanadian)transportconductinghumanitari- aircraft crashedinTurkey in2003.Inanothercasean Spanish ISAF contingentwaskilledwhentheirASD however, remainsadangerousundertaking: theentire get theOperationATHENA forcetoKabul. ASDairlift, 2003. ASDstrategicsea-andairliftwasemployedto NATO-led International SecurityAssistanceForcein squadron, weredeployedtoKabulservewiththe mixed light-mediumbattalion,plusanarmouredrecce summer of2002,anotherinfantrybattalion,thisonea lift). Whenthiscommitmentwaswithdrawninthe the forcewasdeliveredusingAmericanstrategicair- troops tofightintheal-QaedaWar (thoughmostof brought alightinfantrybattalionandarmouredrecce Operation ENDURINGFREEDOMinAfghanistan, retrieve theshipandrecoverequipment. group, OperationMEGAPHONE,wasdeployedto Canada’s armouredvehiclesaboard.Anavaltask around theNorthAtlanticwith20percentof ship ownersholdingCanadahostage:thedrifted return trip,adisputeoverthecontractresultedin ment whentheoperationwascompleted.On during theKosovoWar, andthenretrievetheequip- gent’s vehiclesandequipmentfromCanadatoGreece to delivertheCanadianKosovoForce(KFOR)contin- this case,astrategicliftRO-ROvesselwascontracted would becontractedtohandlesomedefencetasks.In Service Delivery(ASD),wherebyciviliancorporations money, DNDembarked onaprogramcalledAlternate The secondeventwastheGTS Canada continuestogloballydeploy, onaverage, 29 Operation APOLLO, Canada’scommitmentto 22 Katie affair. To save 28 On a more positive note, it is now recognized, Policy-makers should be mindful of Canadian strate- after the successful deployment of JTF-2 to fight in gic traditions and how they affect national security Afghanistan with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, policy and the development of the force structure to that special operations forces are and will be integral carry out that policy. The principles of Saliency, to Canadian expeditionary operations. The serendipi- Operational Influence and Forward Security will tous development of the Coyote surveillance vehicle always be at work in the background, no matter and the acceptance of ISTAR (Intelligence, what terminology is employed to describe Canada’s Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) military operations. as an integral part of operations are significant. The human factor is critical when the balance of Developments in neither area were anticipated in the commitments, rotations and deployment capability 1994 White Paper process, or, apparently, by those is considered. An over-reliance on quantitative involved in force structure exercises early in the analysis overlooks this, which in turn will have 1990s. The close-out of the old divisional headquar- negative effects on recruitment, retention and ters structure and its replacement with a proper Joint morale. To ignore force burnout is not only morally Force Headquarters, Joint Operations Group and Joint wrong but criminally negligent. Such behaviour Signals Regiment by the late 1990s (Young 1997) are will, over time, increase the costs of defence other significant developments toward the achieve- beyond the apparent short-term “savings” accrued ment of an efficient and effective deployable com- through the introduction of too much “efficiency” mand and control structure. Canada continues, into the system. however, to be deficient in its use of unmanned aerial Policy-makers must educate themselves on the prob- vehicles. lems of weapons and platform procurement and resist the temptation to inject political expediency into those processes for short-term gain. The Sea Conclusion King-New Shipboard Aircraft program is a case in point. At the same time, the Canadian forces must his exercise was conducted to answer a ques- stop second-guessing what the policy makers want tion posed by the Institute for Research on and instead present them with a professional view as T Public Policy: In order to implement the 1994 to what equipment is required. The onus should be White Paper, what force structure should have been on the policy makers, not on the Canadian forces. developed? Some may argue that the answer is a The problems with Main Battle Tank acquisition moot point—an exercise in alternative history—or that since 1970 are a case in point. The equipment pro- such an exercise is superficial. An examination of the curement process needs to be expedited, perhaps 1994 White Paper in light of subsequent events, how- with the elimination of assistant deputy minister ever, illuminates several areas that should apply in (ADM [Material]) and the re-formation, outside of any future defence policy process: DND, of the Department of Defence Production.

Future defence policy must be based on a realistic Policy-makers are being encouraged by recent Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney vision of Canadian interests, how they may be research to think more strategically about their threatened and what military forces are needed to national security interests and objectives. They counter such threats. Use of vague language may must ensure that the same attention and care is be acceptable politically, but it smacks of decep- directed toward operational and force structure tion, indecision and lack of leadership. considerations. The Canadian forces must be able to function In the end, any examination of alternative force across the spectrum of conflict in order to protect structuring and the 1994 White Paper tells a cautionary Canadian interests. Selecting one band in the spec- tale. Many will argue that there was no miscalculation, trum and confining the force structure to that that Canada “got it just right,” that the Canadian gov- band does not serve national interests. Canada can ernment pulled off a balancing act in the face of severe and does fight wars; it is not merely a “peacekeep- fiscal constraints. This is not the case, as many soldiers ing” nation. Obsolete concepts of “peace” and in the field would attest. In pursuing efficiency above “war” must be jettisoned. They are products of the all else, some of the nation’s representatives may well nineteenth century, not the twenty-first. have sacrificed the country’s self-respect. Why is it, for example, that Canada, a G-8 power, can sustain only

23 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 5, May 2004 security policy. onate inanyfutureevolutionofCanadiannational subordinates? dard inferiortotheonetheyholdupfortheir sible fornationalsecuritypolicybeheldtoastan- learn fromtheirmistakes. Whyshouldthoserespon- leaders areexpectedtotake responsibilityforand excuse” whenitcomestotheirfailings.Thesejunior School, juniorofficersaretaughtthatthereis“no abhorrent. AttheCanadianForcesOfficerCandidate of thementalandphysicalhealthitssoldiersis continual bowingtotheefficiencygodatexpense Canadian forces.Atthesametime,government’s of thefailurecreativeproblemsolvingwithin to dealwithsystemicculturalproblemsisanexample own.” Theinabilityoftheregularandreserveforces correctly putit,“quantityhasaqualityallofits American one?Qualitydoesmatter, but,asStalin a CanadiansoldierversusDutch,Nigerianor perhaps toosmuginourestimationofthe“worth” our armyanofbattalioncommanders?Arewe forces, thatwedonotenvisageotherpossibilities?Is gents, becauseofculturalfactorswithinthearmed we becomesousedtosmall,nearlytactical,contin- has moreoverseasdeploymentsthanCanada?Have rhetoric, toUNoperations?WhyisitthatUruguay larger forcesthanCanada,forallofitspeacekeeping areas? WhyisitthatBangladeshandNigeriadeploy brigades, andevendivisions,tostabilizecritical United Kingdomareabletodeployself-contained such asFrance,Germany, Italy, Poland andthe personnel each,overseaswhileotherNATO nations one ortwobattlegroups,offewerthanathousand The lessonsofthe1994WhitePaper shouldres- 24 Notes 1 The interest-based approach, and the need for an 18 This study recognizes that detailed force structure plan- established national security policy framework based ning did occur in the 1994 White Paper process and that on it, was advocated in parallel by Macnamara and the original drafts were less vague. The fact that these FitzGerald (2002) and Maloney (2001a,b). Subsequent were discarded or not published means that we have to national security commentators have picked up the work with what was made available to the public. The mantle, including Delvoie (2001–02) and the authors exact process that produced the 1994 White Paper of the CDFAI report In the National Interest: Canadian requires more thorough historical study than is provided Foreign Policy in an Insecure World found at here. http://www.cdfai.org/index2.htm 19 Like that provided by Gray (1993). 2 For an entertaining and interesting take on the 1990s 20 DND eventually paid for Dr. Mike Hennessy at the Royal attempts to project into the future, see Directorate of Military College to attend GBN seminars in scenario Land Strategic Concept, The Future Security analysis. Dr. Scot Robertson and the author worked with Environment (annex A), “Long Term Environment,” Dr. Hennessy in the creation of several scenarios for the Department of National Defence. government of Canada after the 9/11 attacks. The author 3 For example, Lloyd Axworthy was a proponent of was also involved in scenario/force structure develop- these views, which are represented, in a somewhat ment, a process initiated after the 1998 auditor general’s modified form, in Axworthy (2003). report stated that there was “a poor link between Defence 4 The various White Papers have been collected in Bland Policy and the planning and management of the (1997). Canadian Forces capabilities.” Consequently, a Strategic 5 The media event that Canadians saw on television and Capability Planning Process was established within that the CBC called “Oka” was actually the continua- DGSP, which used operations and scenarios to illuminate tion of what was essentially a Mohawk civil war begun certain critical areas related to force structuring. in the spring of 1990. See Hornung (1991). 21 1994 White Paper on Defence, p. 3. 6 1994 White Paper on Defence, p. 10. 22 These operations are covered in two volumes edited by 7 Confidential interview. William J. Durch (1993, 1996). 8 See Friedman (1999) for a primer on post-Cold War 23 Indeed, one reviewer of this paper suggests that Canada economic developments, crises and changes; see also should only have followed the American or European Tremblay (1996). lead and policy in both areas and goes on to state that 9 The draw-down of the army and the disbanding of the since neither the Milosevic nor the Hussein regimes were Airborne Regiment after the Somalia affair combined out for global domination, they were not really Canadian to produce three light infantry battalions that each had problems. This is manifest Cold War-era thinking and two infantry companies without mechanized vehicles does not take into account the globalized economy that and a parachute company. The original three battal- Canada was a part of in the 1990s and is today. The two ions, 3 RCR, 3 PPCLI and 3 R22eR, were reduced on regimes in question were odious, dangerous and abhor- the order of battle after the close out of the Germany- rent. They threatened Canadian interests in Europe and based units in 1992–93. Initially the light infantry bat- in the Persian Gulf basin. “Strategic” and “regional” talions were “10/90” battalions, where the bulk of the threats are one and the same in the post-Cold War era. battalion was supposed to be made up of militia per- 24 For some personal observations overlooked by the sonnel, then the para companies were added and African apologist crowd, see Klitgaard (1990); Richburg slowly they worked their way back into the order of (1998). battle as regular battalions. 25 These cases are examined in Griffiths, Gimblett, and 10 These data are derived from a wall chart circa 1999, Haydon (1998). supplied by Air Command, listing bases, squadrons 26 ABCA: American-British-Canadian-Australian and and aircraft types. sometimes New Zealand. The armed forces of these Force Structure or Forced by Sean M. Maloney 11 Sean M. Maloney, lecture to 70 Communications countries have extensive connections at the military Group, “The Operational Employment of the Reserves, level related to interoperability, command and control, 1945–2003,” November 21, 2003. and doctrine. An analysis of post-1995 stabilization 12 DND backgrounder, February 2004, “Facilities Closures operations indicates that most are led by ABCA nations and Reductions.” and almost all four ABCA nations contribute forces to 13 The data in this section are drawn from Maloney those operations, whether they are conducted under the (2002b). auspices of NATO, the United Nations or other coalitions. 14 Access to Information, DND (August 24, 1993); brief- 27 Bob Bergan brought these deficiencies to light in his ing note to DM/CDS, “UNTAC.” paper “Balkan Rats and Balkan Bats” presented at the 15 Access to Information, DND (October 12, 1993); memo CDAI Students Conference held at the RMC in Kingston, to DM/CDS, “Canadian Forces Participation in the Ontario, October 25, 2003. United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 28 Department of National Defence (August 3, 2000), (UNAMIR)”; (February 22, 1995); briefing note, “HMCS Athabaskan Carries Out Boarding of GTS Katie”; “Situation Update: Rwanda.” fact sheet, “Operation MEGAPHONE: Retrieval of CF 16 The data in this section are drawn from Maloney Equipment onboard GTS Katie.” (2002b). 29 Department of National Defence (January 1999) 17 At this point three other infantry battalions were 10/90 “Canada’s Participation in the NATO-led Stabilization battalions, mixed regular/reserve light battalions and Force in the Balkans.” not considered deployable by FMC HQ.

25 IRPP Choices, Vol. 10, no. 4, May 2004 Cohen, Avner. 1998. Cockburn, Andrew, andLeslieCockburn.1997. CNN.com/world. 2003.“SurvivorsReliveJetDoorHorror.” May Bland, DouglasL.,ed.1997. Friedman, ThomasL.1999. Fox, J.1988.“TheRestructuringoftheCanadianArmy.” ———. 1996. Durch, WilliamJ.1993. Dupuy, Alex.1997. Delvoie, Louis.2001–02. “A NotSoBenignNewCentury: Dallaire, Romeo.2003. Ayittey, GeorgeB.N. 1998. Axworthy, Lloyd.2003. Garnett, G.L.2002–03.“TheEvolutionoftheCanadian Ash, TimothyGarton.1999. Armstrong, JoeC.W. 1995. References Klitgaard, Robert. 1990. Jockel, JosephT. 1999. International SecurityAssistanceForce.2003. Hornung, Rick.1991. “Gunboat Diplomacy.” 1995. Griffiths, AnnL.,RichardGimblett,andPeter Haydon,eds. Gray, ColinS.1993. Glenny, Misha.1992. Gervais, J.C.1992.“MovingSLOWLY Towards Total Force.” New York: Doubleday. http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/05/11/congo.jet/ 11. Policy Studies. National Defence. Martin’s Press. NATO’s SixteenNations Wars ofthe1990s. 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New York: BasicBooks. Ottawa: DepartmentofNational Kingston: QCIRMartelloPaper 24. Westport, CT:Praeger. A CountryHeldHostage:Howthe The HindranceofMilitaryOperations Out ofAmerica:ABlackMan War Scare: RussiaandAmericaon St. Catharines,ON:Vanwell. Report tothePrimeMinister: The ThreateningStorm:Casefor Halifax: CentreforForeignPolicy Toronto: McGraw-HillRyerson. Ottawa: OperationalResearch 22, no.10 (December). Haiti: StateAgainstNation. 22, no11 (January–February). (fall). (fall): 9–31. Toronto: Stoddart. Yugoslavia: Deathofa Policy Matters 5, no.4(winter): Chances for Toronto: Forging a Canadian 3, no.10 The Forum New St. choices National Security & Interoperability Sécurité nationale et intéroperabilité

Other Studies Published / Autres études publiées

“A Vigilant Parliament: Building Competence for Effective “The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: Parliamentary Oversight” The Issues” Douglas L. Bland, Roy Rempel Danford Middlemiss, Denis Stairs Policy Matters, February 2004 Policy Matters, June 2002

“Military and Postconflict Security: Implications for “Sailing in Concert: The Politics and Strategy of Canada-US American, British and other Allied Force Planning and for Naval Interoperability” Postconflict Iraq” Joel Sokolsky Ann M. Fitz-Gerald Choices, April 2002 Choices, April 2003 “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with “A National Security Framework for Canada” Whom?” W.D. Macnamara, Ann Fitz-Gerald Douglas Bland Policy Matters, October 2002 Policy Matters, February 2002

“Multinational Land Force Interoperability: Meeting the Challenge of Different Cultural Backgrounds in Chapter VI Peace Support Operations” Ann M. Fitz-Gerald Choices, August 2002

Force Structure or Forced Structure? The 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s Résumé by Sean M. Maloney

ean M. Maloney soutient dans cette étude que le Livre blanc sur la défense de 1994 constituait un S document politique imprécis qui pouvait donner lieu à de multiples interprétations. Fondé sur une analyse à la fois douteuse et superficielle, qui omettait de détailler la structure des forces armées dont nous avions besoin pour mener à bien les objectifs annoncés, ce document pouvait très bien servir à justifier le statu quo, au lieu de Les décideurs devraient garder à l’esprit les traditions favoriser l’introduction des changements nécessaires pour stratégiques canadiennes et évaluer leur impact sur s’adapter à la situation d’après-guerre froide des années notre politique de sécurité et la structure militaire per- 1990. L’approche excessivement prudente qui le carac- mettant de la mettre en œuvre. Les principes d’influ- térise traduit en fait un consensus bureaucratique; elle ence opérationnelle, de force de frappe et de sécurité n’offre pas de vision claire ni de leadership politique. avancée seront toujours en toile de fonds, quelle que À quoi ressembleraient aujourd’hui les forces cana- soit la terminologie servant à décrire nos opérations diennes si nos stratèges avaient été contraints de révéler militaires. ce dont elles avaient besoin pour qu’elles puissent mener Le facteur humain est d’une importance capitale pour à bien la politique de défense officielle ? Comment déterminer l’équilibre souhaité entre engagements, adapter la structure aux différents rôles, missions et poli- rotations et capacité de déploiement. Toute analyse tiques que nous désirons confier à nos forces armées ? axée sur la seule quantité omet ce facteur et influe Les réponses à ces questions pourraient éclairer les négativement sur le recrutement, le maintien et le décideurs chargés en 2004 de repenser notre politique de moral des troupes. Refuser de reconnaître l’épuisement défense et étrangère. des soldats relève non seulement de la négligence Quatre éléments clés se dégagent de l’étude de Sean morale mais de la négligence criminelle. À terme, cela M. Maloney : gonflera les coûts de défense bien au-delà des Notre future politique de défense doit reposer sur une « économies » immédiates que la « rentabilisation » du vision réaliste des intérêts canadiens, des menaces qui système est censée produire. pèsent sur eux et des efforts militaires nécessaires pour Trop d’analystes croient que la Canada « avait tout les conjurer. L’emploi de formulations vagues peut bien » dans les années 1990. Maloney estime pour sa part sembler politiquement avantageux mais il produit à que notre tendance à la médiocrité en matière militaire terme désillusion, indécision et absence de leadership. ne doit pas être reconduite au siècle présent. En recon- Les forces armées canadiennes doivent pouvoir servir naissant et en corrigeant ses erreurs, le Canada saura dans tous les types de conflits pour protéger les mieux définir les orientations nécessaires à sa sécurité et intérêts du pays. Le fait d’en choisir un seul et d’y sub- à sa prospérité. ordonner la structure de l’armée dessert ces intérêts. Le Canada est en mesure de combattre et s’engage d’ailleurs dans des conflits. Il n’est donc pas qu’un simple « gardien de la paix ». Produits du XIXe siècle et non du XXIe, les concepts désuets de « guerre » et de « paix » doivent être abandonnés.

29 Force Structure or Forced Structure? The 1994 White Paper on Defence Summary and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s by Sean M. Maloney

n this article Sean M. Maloney maintains that the 1994 White Paper on Defence was a vague policy I document open to multiple interpretations. Based on a superficial and dubious analysis of the world situation of the day, and without detailed force structure to guide it, the 1994 White Paper was, according to the author, so flexible that it could be used as a basis to maintain Policy-makers should be mindful of Canadian strategic the status quo rather than bring about dynamic or even traditions and how they affect national security policy transformational change in line with the new, post-Cold and the development of the force structure necessary War era that began in the 1990s. The overly cautious to carry out that policy. The principles of Saliency, approach of this White Paper tends to reflect bureau- Operational Influence and Forward Security will cratic consensus rather than offer clear policy guidance always be at work in the background, no matter what and leadership. What would Canada’s force structure terminology is employed to describe Canada’s military look like today, asks Maloney, had national security pol- operations. icy-makers been forced to reveal to the Canadian public The human factor is critical when the balance of com- what it would take to maintain an armed forces capable mitments, rotations and deployment capability is con- of implementing the declared defence policy? How sidered. An over-reliance on quantitative analysis should Canada’s force structure relate to roles, missions overlooks this, which will have negative effects on and policy? The answers to these questions, the author recruitment, retention and morale. Failure to acknowl- believes, could inform policy-makers as they consider a edge force burnout is not only morally but also crimi- defence and foreign policy review in 2004. nally negligent and will, over time, increase the costs The following four key points emerge from this of defence beyond the apparent short-term “savings” study: accrued through the introduction of “efficiency” into the system. Future defence policy must be based on a realistic vision of Canadian interests, the threats to those Too many analysts believe that Canada “just got it interests and the military forces needed to counter right” in the 1990s, says the author. Maloney believes the threats. Use of vague language may be acceptable that Canada’s cultural tendency toward mediocrity need politically, but it smacks of deception, indecision and not be reflected in its foreign and defence policy, given lack of leadership. what is at stake for us in the dangerous world of the twenty-first century. By confronting and addressing its The Canadian forces must be able to operate across the spectrum of conflict in order to protect Canadian mistakes, he concludes, Canada will gain better insight interests. Selecting one band in the spectrum and into the directions it must take in order to remain secure confining the force structure to that band does not and economically prosperous. serve national interests. Canada can and does fight wars; it is not merely a “peacekeeping” nation. Obsolete concepts of “peace” and “war” must be jetti- soned. They are products of the nineteenth century, not the twenty-first.

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