LouisTinnin, M.D., is Associate Professorin the Department THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS of Behavioral Medicine and Psychiatry at West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia. ormal consciousness has its origin in the development of the "triune brain" (MacLean, 1973). This brain is a For reprints write to Louis Tinnin, M.D., WVU Department hierarchical organization of three different mentalities, a ofBehavioral Medicine and Psychiatry, ChestnutRidge Hos­ result of the evolutionary development of the human brain pital, 930 Chestnut Ridge Road, Morgantown, WV 26505. which preserved the ancestral brain components ofreptiles, early mammals, and late mammals. The oldest component, ABSTRACT the reptilian, contributes the brainstem and much of the reticularsystem. Thenextlevel, the paleomammalian, consists This model for understanding altered states of consciousness and of the limbic system and the midbrain and is largely re­ dissociation is based on the hypothesis that normal consciousness sponsible for emotion. The upper level ofthe triune brain is depends on an illusion ofmentalunitygenerated by certain dynamic the neomammalian, orthe neocortex,which MacLean (1973) brain processes. When these processes are altered and the illusion of believes to be the matrix for intellectual function, including mental unity is lost, the individual experiences an altered state of consciousness. consciousness inwhich normalconsciousness is latent or "dissociated. " Consciousness developed afterthe neomammalian brain Mental organizationsformed during an altered state will, in turn, expanded laterally into large dual cerebral hemispheres become dissociated when the altered state is terminated and mental connected by a bridge offibers, the corpus callosum, which unity returns. In some cases, recurrent altered states may lead to first emergedin the placentalmammals (Levy, 1985). Follow­ multipledissociated mentalsystems orstates. Therapeutic resolution ing this expansion, "cerebral laterality" developed, which is ofdissociation requires that the individualgain access to the memory, the specializing of the hemispheres for different functions. transcend the obligatory illusion ofunity, and consciously avow the The most dramatic specialization occurred when language ego stateformed during the traumatic altered state ofconsciousness. was acquired. Since then, spoken and written assertions have arisen from neural activity in certain anatomical regions of This article describes an admittedly speculative model the left hemisphere, save for exceptional cases ofanomalous for understanding altered states ofconsciousness and disso­ dominance. ciation in terms ofthe brain processes ofnormal conscious­ The right hemisphere of the modern human brain is ness and cerebral dominance. It is based upon the following silent and obedient to the vocal left even though the right line of reasoning: hemisphere is capable of holding opinions of its own that differ from those of the left. This phenomenon is demon­ 1. The subjective sense of mental unity is generated by a strated by the split-brain studies of Gazzaniga and others governing mental system in the language area of the (Gazzaniga & Volpe, 1981). However, Eccles and Popper dominant hemisphere and is maintained by the process (Eccles, 1965; Popper& Eccles, 1985) challenge the existence of cerebral dominance. of a latent cognitive system in the right hemisphere that might differ from the dominant left and explain, instead, 2. Under certain circumstances, the governing mental that a second cognition is simply an artificial consequence of system will relinquish dominance and convert to a la­ the surgical separation of the hemispheres. They assume tent, dissociated mental system, losing the sense of that the human mind is unitary and that it transcends the mental unity. This will result in an altered state of localized organization ofbrain function. consciousness. The model under consideration here contends that, first, the human mind is not un-itary, and that consciousness 3. A new mental system or mental state may be organized is biologically generated by a specific language area of the during the altered state and that mental organization dominant hemisphere; second, that the sense of mental will become dissociated when the altered state is termi­ unity is a universal and obligatory human illusion (Tinnin, nated. 1989); and, third, that the illusion ofmental unity obscures the fact that, in addition to consciousness, a vast nonverbal 4 This process may result in the formation of multiple mindwith differentproperties and differentmental process­ latent or dissociated mental organizations. es occupies the bulk of the triune brain.

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~------~-'------_...... - THE ILLUSION qF MENTAL UNITY a linearlyorderedmental representation oftheworld (Jaynes's "mind-space"). Consequently, what the individual compre­ The dominant language area of the left hemisphere hendsoftheworld is a creation ofthe mindwhich is censored orchestrates the mental activity of both hemispheres and according to the requirements of mental unity. Thus the asserts authorship of all volition and cognition (Tinnin, conscious psychic reality of the individual is the product of 1989). This assertion provides a false sense ofmental unity. this verbally organized "secondary process" thinking (Arieti, This is known to be an illusion, not only because of the 1976). everyday clinical evidence of unconscious cognition, but because cerebral laterality studies reveal a modular mind PREMATURE GOVERNING MENTAL SYSTEM containing multiple mental systems competing for output (GMS) FORMATION (Gazzaniga & Volpe, 1981) while the verbal module of the left hemisphere interprets the brain's mental activity and In normal development, the maturation of the corpus regulates its output (Gazzaniga, 1985). callosum at age three initiates the developmentofa GMS that The childhood development of the individual brain establishes the normal pattern of cerebral dominance. recapitulates the evolutionary course of a divided brain However, under unusual conditions GMS development may coming under the governance of a unitary mental agency. occur before the callosum matures, while the child still has Every child begins life with a dual brain until the corpus functionally unconnected hemispheres. Psychic trauma is callosum is sufficiently developed, usually at age three, to one such condition. In psychic trauma the stimulus barrier connect and begin transmitting information directly from is breached to the extent that the child may be launched into one hemisphere to another (Tinnin, 1989). premature psychic independenceand self-governance, which At birth the hemispheres begin to differ mentally with might stimulate the development ofa GMS prior to matura­ the left becoming increasingly specialized for language tion ofthe corpus callosum. Premature GMS formation may functions and the right becoming adept at nonverbal per­ also occur simply with precocious maturation of the hemi­ ception and thought. Sometime in the third year, when the spheres or, perhaps, with delayed maturation of the corpus corpus callosum connects the hemispheres, the left hemi­ callosum. Ifa GMS is formed prematurelyinonehemisphere, sphere becomes the speaking self, generating the child's then, because of the functional plasticity of both hemi­ verbal output. However, from birth to age three, in the spheres, one would likely be formed in the other. The result normal development ofcerebral laterality, the hemispheres would be two GMSs poised to assume cerebral dominance maintain a cooperative partnership. when the corpus callosum bridges the hemispheres. This partnership ofequals comes to an end at age three One of the two GMSs must yield when the callosum when the corpus callosum matures sufficiently to functional­ matures. Mental unity demands that only one mental agency ly connect the two hemispheres. This development heralds exercise volition and consciousness. Therefore, one be­ the onset of cerebral dominance and the "psychological comes dominant and the other becomes latent. If the right birth ofthe human infant" (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) GMS becomes dominant then the person will probably be­ when the child takes full possession of the self. At the come left-handed. physiological level, a governing mental system (GMS) acting The latent mental system (LMS) retains its integrity as a through the primary language area in the left temporal lobe system and its capacity for awareness but loses the executive emerges and assumes dominance over both hemispheres functions ofmaintaining mental unity, volition, verbal sym­ (Tinnin, 1989). Psychologically, this dominance establishes bolization, and mental representation over time. The LMS the life-long conviction ofmental unity and the ascendance takes its place outside ofconsciousness where it is, perhaps, ofconsciousness. only one of many such mental modules (Gazzaniga, 1985).

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS THE ALTERED STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness is different from simple awareness. It is According to Bourguignon (1979), "Altered states of different from thinking, learning, judging, or generalizing, consciousness are conditions in which sensations, percep­ all of which primates can do. Consciousness is the mental tions, cognition, and emotions are altered. They are charac­ image, over time, ofthe unitary selfin the world; or, accord­ terized by changes in sensing, perceiving, thinking, and ing to Jaynes, consciousness is the metaphorical analog, or feeling. They modify the relation of the individual to self, "map," of the world laid out on an imaginary "mind-space" body, sense ofidentity, and the environment oftime, space, (Jaynes, 1976). Presumably, it is this capacity of the "mind's or other people. They are induced by modifying sensory eye" to reflect on mental images ofthe selfas represented in input, eitherdirectlybyincreasingor decreasing stimulation the past, present, and future, that differentiates us from or alertness, or indirectly by affecting the pathways of the other mammals. sensoryinputby somatopsychological factors. As a result, the Generated by the primary language area of the domi­ rules ofperception and cognition thatcross-cultural psychol­ nant hemisphere, consciousness depends on the linguistic ogy has been investigating ... do not necessarily apply to processes of the mind. It is based on unitary identity and these states" (p. 236). unitary volition. What one perceives in the world with one's The nature ofconsciousness is determined by the basic senses undergoes verbal symbolization and projection onto qualities of the GMS, which provide a benchmark against

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which altered states of consciousness may be measured: REPRESSION,AND DISSOCIATION mental unity, volition, verbal symbolization, time percep­ tion, reality perception, and body image (Tinnin, 1989). Amnesia mayoccurfor the experience duringan altered Those qualities are altered for the LMS which is free of state for two reasons. One is that the GMS is motivated to the constraints ofmental unity. In the unconscious the LMS segregate (repress) a painful memory to avoid distress. The may be aware of the multiplicity ofmind and the capacities other is that the GMS is obliged to disavow (dissociate) an for nonlinear, nonsequential thought and imagery. The organized mental state that was formed during the altered experience of the LMS in that nonverbal realm may be best state in order to maintain the illusion of unity. Dissociated characterized as an alteration of the basic qualities of con­ mental contents are latent mental organizations that would sciousness: contradict the person's illusion ofmental unity if they were remembered. 1. Identity is neither unitary nor essential. Not only the self The degree of organization necessary to threaten the but objects and others may be conceived ofaccording to individual's illusion ofunitymayvarywith the individual, but the law of "pars pro toto" (Arieti, 1976) in which the it lies somewhere along a continuum involving the universal whole may be represented by the part. properties ofconsciousness: identity, volition,verbal symbol­ ization, sequential time, reality perception, and body image. 2. Volition is replaced by fantasy. There is no responsibility For example, the GMS might respond to the stimulation or concern about ownership of the body's actions. of an intense emotional situation by relinquishing domi­ nance,whichwouldresultinan altered state ofconsciousness. 3. Symbolization is not verbal. Images may replace words. If the individual's experience during the altered state was entirely passive, without assertion of unitary identity, act of 4. Time may be inconstant and have nonlinear and simul­ volition, use of language, sequential ordering (time), or taneous dimensions. censorship by mental representation (realityperception and body image), then later amnesia for the experience during 5. Reality perception may involve an epistemology entirely the altered state would probably be due to repression. If, different from that of consciousness. The criteria of instead, the person acted with will (volition) during the perceptual Gestalts maybe according to primaryprocess altered state, then the experience would be dissociated logic, or paleologic (Arieti, 1976) such that perceived because the actor-theegostateresponsible forthevolition­ wholes may consist of elements disparate by conscious would be disavowed by the GMS to maintain the illusion that logic but associated through some incidental quality the conscious self is the actor. (such as color, shape, texture, etc.). The distinction In the case ofrepression, the amnesia avoids anxiety. In between animate and inanimate may be lost. the case of dissociation, amnesia preserves the illusion of unity. The dissociated mental organization might be called 6. Body image may have no significance and the bodily self a latent mental state or system (my terms), a fixed idea or might be represented by a part, such as a hand. psychological automatism (Janet, 1898, 1889), or an ego state (Federn, 1952; Watkins & Watkins, 1979). In any event, This description of an altered state of consciousness is itis a mental organization,whereas repressed mental content consistent with Bourguignon's (with the exception that she is memory ofelements that may have no organization, such includes alterations in emotions). as impulses or wishes. When dissociated material becomes exposed to consciousness, an organized mental state is ex­ RELINQUISlllNG OF DOMINANCE perienced.

This model contends that the transition ofthe conscious LATENT MENTAL SYSTEMS self from a governing mental state to a latent mental state with the attendant loss of the sense of mental unity is the Continuing psychic trauma during infancy, prior to cerebral mechanism of altered states of consciousness. An callosal maturation, may result in the formation ofmultiple altered state ofconsciousness may occurin a normal individ­ latent mental systems as well as the capacity to form new ual. The typical case would involve a person with a GMS in the mental systems atwill. The infantwho is subjected to physical left hemisphere without any LMS (since normal develop­ or sexual abuse may experience premature GMS formation ment involves the emergence ofa single GMS at the time of and recurrent altered states to escape trauma. Efforts to cope callosal maturation). When this individual experiences a with the attack duringan altered state resultin the formation trance in hypnosis, for example, the GMS relinquishes ofnew GMSs, which subsequently relinquish dominance and dominance and becomes latent. There is a loss ofexecutive become dissociated, leading to the formation of multiple control by the previously governing selfwhile an expanded LMSs. Each of these mental systems is equivalent in its awareness of other dimensions of mental experience is potential for self-hood and personality development after gained.Mterwards,when the GMS resumes dominance, there callosal maturation, depending upon the amount of time will be no memory of any experience that contradicts the and experience as a GMS. If the personalities that develop illusion of mental unity. then compete for dominance, the condition is termed mul­ tiple personality disorder.

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IATENT MENTAL S:rATES state to be the basic phenomenon ofhysteria, or, in present terms, dissociative disorders, and believed that the subjective I believe that psychic trauma first occurring as an isolat­ experience during a hypnoid state was subsequently split off ed event after callosal maturation and the establishment of from consciousness, dividing the mind into parts separated cerebral dominance is not likely to result in the formation of by an amnesticbarrier. Theydistinguishedbetween repression a latent personality because ofthe limited opportunity for a and dissociation (1955, p. 10-11) in much the same way that newly formed mental system to exist long enough as a GMS. this model has done. They believed that in the case of If the trauma is, instead, repeated again and again, such as dissociation it is not the contentofthe memories that makes when a child whose corpus callosum has matured is sexually tl1em unavailable to consciousness but, rather, the psycho­ abused by a family member, there may be ample opportuni­ logical state ofthe person at the time ofthe traumatic event. ty. The child might react to the predictable stress by relin­ Later, Freud changed his mind and disavowed dissociation quishing dominance to a progressively developing alter self entirely in favor of repression. who might not feel so utterly helpless or victimized and who One might argue that the current model assumes a eventually, after many abuses, becomes an established per­ normal dissociation between theverbal and nonverbal minds sonality. and thattraumatic dissociation mightbesimplya modification Otherwise, episodic childhood trauma is more likely to of the already existing amnestic barrier. This argument result in the formation of dissociated mental complexes would assume that the dissociative process accounts for all (Jung, 1935) or states (Watkins & Watkins, 1979) that may amnesia and that all unconscious mental content is dissoci­ achieve considerable organization shortofpersonalitydevel­ ated. Repression would be considered a form ofdissociation. opment. For example, the post-callosal child in an altered There have been two theories based on variations ofthis state due to an catastrophic traumatic assault may initiate theme. Boris Sidis (1911) and Frederick Myers (1903) both some attempt at self-protection. Later, after termination of believed that every person has two selves, although their the altered state, the mental organization held to be respon­ concepts of the nature of these selves differed. This model sible for the volition and therefore disavowed by the GMS does not assume that the nonverbal mind is another self, in might be the state of mind of the struggling, traumatized this sense, because normally there is no separate identity or child during the altered state. This mental state would then will. Both identity and will may come to exist as part of a be latent and dissociated. It would be an organized mental traumatically dissociated LMS, however, and this LMS may representation ofthe child's selfas experienced during the compete with the conscious personal selffor dominance. alteredstate, butnota personalityorselfas experienced over Morton Prince (1907) replaced Janet's term "subcon­ extended time. scious" with "coconscious" to emphasize the simultaneous activity oftwo ormore systems ofawareness in oneindividual. DISCUSSION He reserved the term "unconscious" for mental processes devoid ofthe attributes ofawareness. He did not insist on an The process ofdissociation involves the formation ofan individual sense of mental unity and, therefore, had no altered state of consciousness during which an alternate difficulty accounting for clinical cases in which the individu­ mental system or ego state emerges, which then becomes a al is aware ofmultiple personalities and does not experience latent mental organization when the altered state is termi­ amnestic barriers. Other theories, including the current nated. Latent mental states or latent mental systems are said one, must invoke some explanationfor these seemingexcep­ to be dissociated. tions to the rule ofsubjective mentalunity, suchas a delusional This model is compatible with the original concept of belief of separate existence of the alter personalities as dissociation proposed byJanet (1907), except that his con­ persons. In this case the delusion ofselfboundariesmaintains cept of "fixed ideas" included dissociated "elements" (as the illusion ofmental unity. opposed to this model's requirement for "organizations") John Beahrs (1982, 1986, 1990) describes a modern which tended to combine with other such phenomena to version ofthe coconscious mind as consisting ofcoconscious form more complex states, systems, and even personalities. compartments which are changeable and adaptive to envi­ He attributed mental unity to a dynamic influence ofassoci­ ronmental context. There is an organizingforce thatorches­ ation; and he attributed dissociation partially to a weakness trates the compartments, much asJanet'sforce ofassociation of that force. does. Beahrs postulates a sense ofmental unitywhich seems This model does not include dissociative elements be­ to representthe sum total ofthe componentsin equilibrium. cause it limits the use of the term dissociation to organized He considers dissociation to be an abnormal rigidification of mental states that would threaten the illusion of unity. It the boundaries between compartments. considers segregated "elements," as opposed to "mental In comparison, this model consists of enduring mental organizations," to be repressed. The dynamic influence structures in a hierarchical organization that is determined maintaining mental unity is the neurophysiological process by the anatomical hierarchyofthe triune brain. The organiz­ ofcerebral dominance rather than "association." ing force of the brain and mind is understood as cerebral A better comparison for this model is provided by Breu­ dominance in physiological terms and as mental unity in er and Freud's theory, first published in 1893, in which they psychological terms. Dissociation is an obligatory self-decep­ used the term "hypnoidstates"for alteredstates ofconscious­ tion supporting the conscious sense of mental unity in the ness (Breuer & Freud, 1955). They considered the hypnoid presence of a competing source ofidentity and volition.

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CarlJung held that the ego is the source ofmental unity (Tinnin, 1990). In practice, this therapeutic operation is and that dissociated mental complexes may come to possess preceded by two others: a subject, a sort of ego, that may compete with the real ego (Jung, 1935, p. 73). His idea of the complex as a cohesive 1. First, the memory must be accessed. This can sometimes unity, ranging from an organized fragment to a personality, be done in a normal state of consciousness by inquiry is consistent with this model's demand that dissociated into intrusive symptoms, dreams, or flashbacks. Often, complexes be mental organizations. however, an altered state of consciousness is required, Hilgard (1977, p. 18) listed four criteria of dissociated and this may be produced by hypnosis or narcosis behavior: (amobarbital or pentobarbital interviews). The altered state removes the major barriers to full recall of the 1. The dissociated system has "some degree of internal memory because the obligatory illusion ofmental unity organization" with lasting "identifYing characteristics," applies only to unaltered consciousness. In an altered such as preferences, skills, and memories. state ofconsciousness there is no obligatoryresistance to the acknowledgementofa second locus ofinitiative and 2. There is some amnestic barrier which may be one­ volition. directional wherein system B may be aware ofsystem A, but not vice versa. The memory recalled in the altered state must also be recalled and processed in the conscious state. The individual 3. The rule of amnesia may not apply to cases of "posses­ must gain conscious access to the memory, transcend the sion" by an alien personality. obligatory illusion of unity, and consciously avow the ego state formed during the traumatic ASC to resolve dissocia­ 4. In the case of "minor dissociations" such as automa­ tion. tisms, compulsive behaviors, obsessive thoughts, or conversion reactions, the assumed dissociated system 2. Second, the content of the memory is processed in a may be difficult to delimit and will be betrayed only by manner that avoids retraumatizing when the events are the involuntary nature of the phenomena. recalled. The person reviews the memory in the obseroer mode, visualizing the scenes to include an image of the It is instructive to restate these criteria in terms of the self. The actual techniques may be adapted from Janet current modeL I omit #4 because it seems to include phe­ (1889) and Grove and Panzer (1989). For example, the nomena ofrepression and would violate #1. scenes may be visualized as if running a film strip or video, stopping the action attimes, runningit backwards, 1. The dissociated mental content has sufficient internal attending to incidental details, changing perspective, organization that it would threaten the conscious and manipulating the scenes in various ways to gain a obligatory illusion of mental unity. feeling of mastery.

2. The obligatory illusion ofmental unity holds only for a 3. The third operation processes the ego state that was conscious mental system and does not apply to latent experienced while the patient was in an altered state of mental systems. Therefore, LMS B may be aware ofGMS consciousness at the time of the trauma. The patient A, but not vice versa. reviews the memory in an experiential mode in which the scenes are experienced through the eyes and senses of 3. The delusion of separateness provides a self-contained the self as perceived at the time while simultaneously conviction of mental unity in cases of multiple person­ perceiving and avowing the subjective state of mind ality disorder without amnestic barriers. extant during that time. This includes tracing the entire temporal course of that state of mind in all of its symp­ KIuft's Four-Factor Theory of the Etiology of Multiple tomatic recurrences and intrusions into consciousness. Personality Disorder (KIuft, 1984) encompasses a broader range ofphenomena than this modeL In addition to psychic This thirdstep usuallyinvolves a relivingofthe traumatic trauma (factor II), he addresses genetic propensity (factor experience with all ofits affect. Under such circumstances it I), psychodynamic influences (factor III), and nurture (fac­ is generally referred to as "abreaction." When this follows tor IV). The current and more narrow model would be step two, however, the person is able to retain some "observer" compatible as one of the elements in factor II. status while objectively avowing the ego state and thereby modulating the affect. Ifthe affect remains too intense there IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT is the option to return to step two to achieve more capacity for objectivity and mastery in dealing with the memory. A dissociated traumatic memory involves a latent ego The patient will experience an obligatory resistance to state which would threaten the individual's sense ofpsychic any insight that threatens the sense ofmental unity (Tinnin, unity ifit were remembered. Consequently, the therapeutic 1990). The resistance to conscious avowal ofthe dissociated resolution of dissociation requires that the individual avow ego state is automatic and involuntary. The initial processing that ego state in spite of the obligatory resistance to insight of the memory in an altered state produced by hypnosis or

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narcosis is useful because the illusion ofunity can be avoided Hilgard, E. (1977). Divided consciousness: Multiple controls in human since it is demanded only by the conscious ego and the thought and action. New York: John Wiley & Sons. obligatory resistance is therefore bypassed. That resistance Janet, P. (1898). Neuroses et idees fixes (Vol. 1), Paris: Felix Alcan. returnsagainwhen the memoryis processed in consciousness butitisattenuatedbecause the memorynowcomesreworked, Janet, P. (1889). L'automatisl11£psychologique. Paris: Felix Alcan. verbally symbolized, and, therefore, more easily owned by consciousness. Janet, P. (1907). The major symptoms ofhysteria (2nd edition) London & New York: MacMillan.

CONCLUSION Jaynes,]. (1976). The origin of consciousness in the lJreakdown of the bicameral mind. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. The dominant verbal mental system generates con­ sciousness, which maintains an illusion ofmental unity, with Jung, c. (1935). TavistockLectures. In collected works ofG. G.jung, (BolI­ disavowal of any volition, or will, not generated by the ingen Series, Vol. 18). Princeton, ew Jersey: Princeton University conscious mind. Ifthe mentalsystemrelinquishes dominance Press. and becomes latent, as, for example, in a trance state, the KJuft, R. (1984). Treatment ofmultiple personality disorder: A study illusion of unity is lost and an altered state of consciousness of 33 cases. Psychiatric Clinics ofNorth America, 7, 9-29. ensues. Any mental organization that acts in the place of consciousness during the altered state will become latent Levy,]. (1985). Interhemispheric collaboration: Single-mindedness and will be disavowed when the altered state is terminated in the asymmetrical brain. In C. Best (Ed.), Hemispheric functions and and normal consciousness resumes. collaboration in the child. New York: Academic Press. A latent ego state is said to be dissociated. Ifit contains MacLean, P. (1973). A triuneconeept ofthe lJrain and behavior. Toronto: the memory of a traumatic event and requires treatment, University ofToronto Press. then, to resolve the dissociation, the individual must gain conscious access to the memory, transcend the obligatory Mahler, M., Pine, F., & Bergman,A. (1975). Thepsychological birth ofthe illusion ofunity, and consciously avow the ego state formed human infant: Symbiosis and individuation. New York: Basic Books. during the traumatic altered state. • Myers, F. (1903). HumanpeTSonality and its suroival ofbodily death (Vols 1 & 2). London: Longmans, Green and Company.

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159 D1SS0CIATIO:\'. YoI.lII. !\o. 3: September 1990