Indonesia's Great Power Aspirations: a Critical View
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bs_bs_bannerbs_bs_banner Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 92–100 doi: 10.1002/app5.122 Special Issue Indonesia’s ‘Great Power’ Aspirations: A Critical View Greg Fealy and Hugh White* Abstract Key words: Indonesia, President Joko Widodo, foreign policy, defence policy, Asian Indonesia is readying itself for a return to a Regional Order diplomatic assertiveness not seen since the early 1960s. Partly, this reflects the approach of 0050 resident Joko Widodo and his govern- 1. Evoking Past Glories ment, but it also reflects growing aspirations among the wider circles of Indonesia’selites Indonesia is readying itself for a return to a dip- for their country to act as, and be acknowl- lomatic assertiveness not seen since the early ’ edged as a ‘big country’–negara besar. This 1960s. Joko Widodo s Government, and indeed constitutes a significant shift from the tradi- much of the political elite, is increasingly given tions of low-key diplomacy of the New Order to assertions that Indonesia is already a major and Reformasi eras. Several factors are power in world affairs. This was symbolised in ’ pushing this shift. Indonesia’s growing eco- Jokowi s insistence at the November 2014 nomic weight will, over time, provide more APEC Summit in Beijing that he sit beside of the foundations of national power than it presidents Obama, Putin and Xi in the mid- has had hitherto. The changing regional dle of the table at a formal dinner and not strategic and political order will make it at the end, as requested by summit orga- harder for Indonesia to take its place in Asia nisers. In relating this story to the press, ‘ ’ for granted and to assume that its inten- Jokowi said he was a big nation (negara tional interests can be protected primarily besar) and that he, as its president, should through ASEAN. And domestically the trend be placed with the leaders of other important to rising nationalism will provide political countries and not marginalised (Kompas incentives to greater assertiveness. On the 2015a). Jokowi has also made it known that other hand, Indonesia still has big hurdles when he visits the United States of America to overcome before it can act as an effective later this year, he should be invited to address ‘ ’ major power in Asia. Its economic trajectory Congress, just as other leaders of great nations remains uncertain, its military is weak, its had carried out. This declaratory and entitled ’ diplomatic capacities are underdeveloped, tone to Indonesia s recent diplomacy marks a and it lacks a clearly articulated set of policy departure from that of preceding governments. ’ objectives to pursue. So, it remains to be Indonesia s international personality has been seen whether Indonesia’s aspirations to broadly consistent for the past 50 years, during ’ – major power status will be realised. both Soeharto s New Order (1966 1998) and the Reformasi era (1998 till present). Over this * Fealy: Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, time, Indonesia has rarely sought overt leader- ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, Canberra, ship roles, either globally or regionally, and Australia; White: Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific when it has performed so, it has seldom played Affairs, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, Canberra, an agenda-setting role. It has been willing to Australia. Corresponding author: White, email punch below its weight, defining its interna- <[email protected]>. tional posture primarily through ASEAN. It © 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial andnomodifications or adaptations are made. Fealy and White: Indonesia’s ‘Great Power’ Aspirations 93 accepted a position as one among equals in player, even as a middle power, to becoming a ASEAN’s membership and exercised such lead- major regional power. ership as it has sought only indirectly and The first is its growing economy. Remarkably, covertly. steady growth since the late 1990s has already This has contrasted strongly with Indonesia’s seen Indonesia rise quite swiftly up the world posture under President Sukarno in the 1950s economic rankings. For example, according to and early 1960s. He asserted a leading role for one recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers Indonesia globally, particularly among newly basedonIMFfigures, Indonesia’s GDP already independent nations. He hosted the 1955 in2014ranked9thintheworldinpurchasing Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, the first power parity terms, which is arguably the best such meeting of ‘developing’ nations (The measure for comparing strategic weight 60th anniversary of this event was marked (PwC 2015). That places it just behind Brazil in lavish fashion by the Jokowi Government and France, and ahead of the UK, Mexico in late April of this year, as if to celebrate and Italy – and well over double Australia. Indonesia’s previous international leadership.). But even more strikingly, the PwC study es- Sukarno later cast himself as a leader of what timates that by 2030 – just 15 years from he termed the ‘New Emerging Forces’ and now – Indonesia will have the world’s fifth was a co-founder of the Non-aligned Movement biggest economy, lying just behind Japan. in 1961. He asserted a clear leadership role for And by 2050, it will have overtaken Japan Indonesia regionally, for example through his to become number four, behind only China, support for the MaPhilIndo concept of a Greater America and India. On these estimates, its Malay Confederation, and launched a military economy will then be 50 per cent larger than confrontation against the British-sponsored Japan’s, almost twice the size of Germany’s, formation of Malaysia in 1963. We can see the and more than four times Australia’s. Nor is understated New Order-early Reformasi posture this just a result of the purchasing power parity as a reaction against this assertiveness. measurement methodology. PwC estimates One key question for Indonesia and its that even measured in market exchange rates neighbours is whether, how far and in what terms Indonesia’s GDP will still be the world’s directions Indonesia’s international posture is fourth biggest in 2050. moving away from the modesty of the past Of course long-term predictions like this are 50 years. It is important to recognise that this far from infallible. But it is striking that the need not by any means suggest a return to the PwC estimates are based on rather conserva- swashbuckling style of Sukarno. But much of tive projections of Indonesia’s economic the political elite in Indonesia see their country growth at an average of 5.7 per cent in market as on the cusp of becoming an Asian ‘Great exchange rates terms out to 2050, which is well Power’, and a number of critical new factors behind the study’s estimates for many other in Indonesia’s situation suggests that there emerging economies. This conservatism is jus- will be both opportunities and imperatives tified by the immense challenges that Indonesia for Indonesia to start taking a bigger and has yet to overcome if it is to realise its eco- more assertive role, if not as a classic ‘Great nomic potential, including chronic infrastruc- Power’ then at least as a major regional ture problems, weak regulatory institutions and power. We will critically evaluate the prospects still-rampant corruption. The so-far disappoint- for this. ing performance of the new Jokowi administra- tion is a timely reminder of just how hard it is 2. Forces for Change for Indonesia’s political system to create gov- ernments capable of sustained and effective Three sets of factors suggest that Indonesia’s efforts to deliver the reforms that Indonesia international posture over coming decades could needs. Moreover, it is hard to see how Indonesia become much more active as it evolves from could maintain 5.7 per cent real growth unless at being a self-effacing and under-performing least some of these reforms are undertaken, and © 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 94 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 that cannot be taken for granted. Its growth is strategic environment. During both the New currently 4.7per cent, and many economists pre- Order and Reformasi eras, Indonesia’sap- dict this will fall further this year to well below proach to international affairs was strongly the government’s 5.4 per cent target for 2015 influenced by the specific strategic circum- (The Economist 2015). So, we cannot take it stances of its region. From the mid-1960s for granted that PwC’s forecast will prove cor- Southeast Asia emerged from the turbulence rect. But neither can we take it for granted that of the immediate post-war decades, it will be overly optimistic. It can be all too easy characterised by intense rivalry within the to dismiss projections that suggest a future region by major powers from outside it – world which is very different from the one we especially China on the one hand, and the now know: after all, until recently very few took USA and UK on the other. By 1972, this seriously projections that China’seconomy period was over with China accepting US would overtake America’s, and yet here we primacy as the basis for regional order. This are. So, any prudent consideration of transformed the entire Southeast Asian stra- Indonesia’s future international posture has tegic system, reducing both major power take into account of the clear possibility that rivalry from outside the region and the risks it will become, in the not too distant future, a of conflict within it.