Notes

Preface 1. Reported in Joe Sexton, “How a Rabbi’s Rhetoric Did, or Didn’t, Jus- tify Assassination,” The New York Times, December, 3, 1995, Section 1, Page 51, Column 2. 2. The term the Jewish state is often relied on when referring to Israel, although with over 20 percent of the population Muslim, this is less than accurate. Still, my reference to the phrase as a synonym for Israel is in keeping with common usage. 3. Hemda Ben-Yehuda, “Attitude Changes and Policy Transformation: Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestinian Question, 1967–1995,” in Efraim Karsh, ed., From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel’s Troubled Agenda (Lon- don: Frank Cass, 1997), 203–34. 4. Michael G. Kort, Yitzhak Rabin: Israel’s Soldier and Statesman (Brook- field, CT: Millbrook Press, 1996), 144. 5. The Fall and Rise of Political Leaders: Olof Palme, Olusegun Obasanjo, Indira Gandhi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and Political Restoration in the Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 6. The religious metaphor is derived from Talleyrand’s aphorism: “Sol- diers die only once. Politicians die only to rise again.”

Chapter 1 1. The dialogue comes from an ABC News documentary, “Rabin: Action Biography,” April 15, 1975, and is cited by Robert Slater, Rabin of Israel: A Biography of the Embattled Prime Minister (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 2. Slater, Rabin, 31–32; David Horovitz, ed., Shalom Friend: The Life and Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin (London: Peter Halban, 1996), 27; Yehu- dit Auerbach, “Yitzhak Rabin: Portrait of a Leader,” in D. J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., Israel at the Polls, 1992 (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 288. Rabin was never to show great sympathy for religious settlers in territories later occupied by Israel. 3. Goodman cited in Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, ix. 186 Notes

4. Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 37. Libby Hughes, Yitzhak Rabin: From Soldier to Peacemaker (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2001), 29. 5. Cited by Colin Shindler, A History of Modern Israel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 39– 40. 6. Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs: Expanded Edition (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1996), 383– 84. At the same cabinet meeting that blocked a return of the Palestinian refugees, Ben-Gurion described the towns as “two thorns” (Shindler, A History, 47). Whether these expul- sions were exceptional events or not is debated by post-Zionist Israeli historians. See the discussion in Daniel Gutwein, “Left and Right Post- Zionism and the Privatization of Israeli Collective Memory,” in Anita Shapira and Derek J. Penslar, eds., Israeli Historical Revisionism: From Left to Right (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 9–42. 7. David Makovsky, “Why I Still Miss Yitzhak Rabin,” FP (Foreign Policy), November 3, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy .com/ articles/ 2010/ 11/03. 8. Slater, Rabin, 51– 52; Michael Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres: The Biography (New York: Random House, 2007), 296. 9. Linda Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin: The Battle for Peace (London: Haus Books, 2005), 33–35. 10. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), 36, 39. 11. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 46. 12. Dan Kurzman, Ben-Gurion: Prophet of Fire (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 309, 340. 13. Robert Slater, Warrior Statesman: The Life of Moshe Dayan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 139; Slater, Rabin, 92; Bar-Zohar, Shi- mon Peres, 297. However loyal he was to Palmach, Rabin realized the need to move on. This can be attributed to his serious and analytical mind and perhaps also to Ben-Gurion’s inspiration, which prevented him from crediting Palmach as the unit that won the 1948 war. I am indebted to Professor Michael Keren’s email to me for this view. 14. This phrase is taken from the title of Conor Cruise O’Brien’s The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986). 15. Milton Viorst, Sands of Sorrow: Israel’s Journey from Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 84. 16. Ibid., 84– 85. In another conversation with Viorst, Rabin said that “the purpose of the military strength of Israel was, first, to make sure that we stayed alive and, second, to shift the struggle from the battlefield. Our orders were to defend the country from attack, to destroy the attacking force, and then to acquire as much land as possible, to create conditions to shift the Arab-Israeli conflict to the negotiation table” (95). 17. Ibid., 85. 18. Ibid. 19. Guy Laron, “‘Logic Dictates That They May Attack When They Feel They Can Win.’ The 1955 Czech Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Notes 187

Israel Intelligence,” The Middle East Journal 63, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 69– 70, 74, 79. 20. Ibid., 79. 21. Ibid., 79, 84. For the highly critical view that Israel, from its founding to the present, embraced a martial culture of “Sparta representing itself as Athens”—that is, holding “an ideology of state militarism with the objective of expanding borders and exploiting the weaknesses of the Arabs”—see Patrick Tyler, Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Mili- tary Elite Who Run the Country and Why They Can’t Make Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), book jacket. 22. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 77– 78, 80, 84. 23. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 297. 24. Ibid., 34, 38, 49, 70–73, 83. 25. Rabin, Memoirs, 64. 26. Dayan quoted by Michael Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), cited by Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 273. 27. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 87, 89–90. 28. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 297; Efraim Infar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1999), 14. 29. An example of the “miscalculation or error” thesis may be found in Judt, Reappraisals, 273– 74. 30. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 93, 94, 96. 31. This is the argument advanced by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona,” Israel Studies 11, no. 2 (2006): 89– 130, and Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2007). It is supported and amplified by Aronson and Oren. The quotation is that of Shlomo Aronson, “1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East, and: Foxbats over Dimona—The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (review),” Israel Studies 13, no. 2 (Summer 1908): 177. 32. Aronson, “1967,” 178. 33. Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, 89. 34. Aronson, “1967,” 180. 35. Aronson, “1967,”181.

Chapter 2 1. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 104, 195, 108. 2. Golda Meir, My Life (New York: Dell, 1975), 358. Curiously, in nei- ther edition of his own memoirs does Eban cite these words that Meir attributes to de Gaulle. 3. Slater, Warrior Statesman, 248– 49. 188 Notes

4. Le Monde, February 28, 1968. 5. Rabin, Memoirs, 75. 6. Ibid., 75–76; Kurzman, Ben-Gurion, 451. 7. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life: An Autobiography (New York: Warner Books, 1976), 297. 8. Rabin, Memoirs, 80– 81, 83. 9. Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, His Legacy (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1997), 107–8; Geoffrey Aronson, review of Rabin: Our Life, His Leg- acy, by Leah Rabin, Journal of Palestinian Studies 27 (Winter 1998): 104; Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel through My Eyes (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1992), 364. 10. Slater, Rabin, 133– 34. 11. Shlomo Nakdimon, Zero Hour (published in Hebrew; Tel Aviv, Israel: Ramdor Publ. Co., 1968), 243, cited in Amos Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987), 287. 12. Slater, Rabin, 151. 13. Slater, Warrior Statesman, 280– 83. 14. David Horovitz, ed., Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier of Peace (London: Peter Halban, 1996), x. 15. Nir Hafez and Gadi Bloom, Ariel Sharon: A Life (New York: Random House, 2006), 179– 81; Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 306; Ariel Sharon, Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 164, 189, 341, 347. 16. Perlmutter, Life and Times, 290– 91. 17. Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle Books/New York Times Books, 1976), 70–71. 18. Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 99. 19. Thomas Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), 333. 20. Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 103. 21. Rabin, Memoirs, 119, 121. 22. Shlomo Gazit, translated from the Hebrew as Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories (London: Frank Cass, 2003), cited in Amnon Barzilai, “A Brief History of the Misled Opportunity,” Ha’aretz, June 5, 2002.

Chapter 3 1. Eban, Personal Witness, 478– 79. The Mapai Party, that of Ben-Gurion in 1968, together with other left-of-center bodies became the Israel Labor Party in January 1968. Rabin anticipated Eban’s reluctance (“he’s no fan of mine”) and later commented, “As is well known, dialogues with Eban have a way of turning into soliloquies, and it was very difficult for Notes 189

me to sound him out on ideas of my own.” Rabin, Memoirs, 122, cited in Yehuda Avner, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (New Milford, CT: Toby Press, 2010), 182. 2. O’Brien, The Siege, 379. 3. Ibid., 379; Abba Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography (Jerusalem: Steimatzky’s Agency, 1977), 173. 4. Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1999), 34–35. 5. Rabin, Memoirs, 64. Rabin was not the first Israeli head of government to request US military aid. Ben-Gurion sought American arms after President Eisenhower sent a force to Lebanon in 1958. As foreign minister in 1963 Meir wanted the United States to be become Israel’s chief arms supplier, and President Johnson sold weapons to Israel as part of an effort to halt construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor. Tyler, Fortress Israel, 112, 142, 152. 6. Matti Golan, The Road to Peace: A Biography of Shimon Peres (New York: Warner Books, 1989), 1–4; Inbar, Rabin, 36. 7. Rabin, Memoirs, 123, 124. It was Rabin’s failure to understand the “intricacies” of the American political system that led him to overes- timate the powers of the presidency and underestimate those of Con- gress to check those powers. Auerbach, “Yitzhak Rabin,” 304. 8. Avner, The Prime Ministers, 182, 183. 9. Yeminah Rosenthal, ed., Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel: A Selection of Documents from His Life (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2005), cited in Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 152; Ha’aretz Supplement, June 12, 1972, cited in Shlomo Shamir, “Review of the Press,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 2 (Autumn 1972): 146. 10. Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East, translated from the Hebrew (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 544. 11. Shamir, “Review of the Press,” 146. 12. Clearly, Golan wrote, Eban had “few illusions left about Golda Meir’s appreciation of him.” Golan, Secret Conversations, 35. 13. Rabin, Memoirs, 220– 21; Inbar, Rabin, 57. 14. Rabin, Memoirs, 133. 15. Inbar, Rabin, 38; Horovitz, Yitzhak Rabin, 62. 16. Rabin cited by Yoram Peri in the latter’s afterword to Rabin’s Memoirs, 344– 45. 17. Shamir, “Review of the Press,” 145–46. 18. Auerbach, “Yitzhak Rabin,” 292. 19. Inbar, Rabin, 45. 20. Slater, Rabin, 159, 160. 21. Rabin, Memoirs, 134; Slater, Rabin, 162. 22. Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 124. 23. O’Brien, The Siege, 494. 190 Notes

24. Rabin, Memoirs, 154. 25. Gideon Rafael, Destination Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicol- son, 1981), 209, cited in O’Brien, The Siege, 497. Rabin later related regarding on one occasion when he went to Kissinger in the White House to ask that the next shipment of bombs be accelerated, “I got it like that,” he said, snapping his fingers (O’Brien, The Siege). Another time, when talking to Nixon, Rabin was shocked by the president’s suggestion that Israel might consider attacking Soviet SAM (surface to air missiles) installations in Egypt. Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 127, 129. 26. O’Brien, The Siege, 497. 27. Eban, Personal Witness, 483– 84, 487, 490. 28. O’Brien, The Siege, 498; Rabin, Memoirs, 197. 29. Rabin, Memoirs, 157– 58. The defense expert was Inbar, Rabin, 40– 41; Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 131. 30. Ibid., 192–93. 31. Shamir, “Review of the Press,” 146; Slater, Rabin, 189. 32. Rabin, Memoirs, 197– 98. 33. Inbar, Rabin, 41– 42; Eric Silver, Begin: The Haunted Prophet (New York: Random House, 1984), 138, 140. 34. Inbar, Rabin, 42; Shamir, “Review of the Press,” 146; Slater, Rabin, 189. 35. Cited in Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 70. 36. Ibid., 71, 73. 37. Don Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin, 1922– 1995 (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 277; Jonathan Rynhold, “Labour, Likud, the ‘Special Relationship’ and the Peace Process,” in Efraim Karsh, ed., From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel’s Troubled Agenda (Lon- don: Frank Cass, 1977), 239– 40. The “special relationship” between the United States and Israel antedated the Nixon presidency. Israel’s “nuclear ambiguity” had persuaded President Kennedy to pave the way for the “special alliance” between the two countries by providing weapons. In the summer of 1962 he decided to supply the Jewish state with ground-to-air Hawk missiles in hopes of lessening her reliance on the nuclear option. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 93. 38. Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, 135.

Chapter 4 1. Like most Palmach officers, Rabin’s name was linked to the left- ist Ahdut Ha’avoda Party, one of the factions of the Mapam Party (formed in 1948). The Mapam was Marxist oriented and pro-Soviet until disillusioned by the Soviet-sponsored Prague Trials in 1953. It favored coexistence with the Arabs and initially favored the right of the Palestinian refugees to return. In 1965 Ahdut Ha’avoda joined with Mapai, and these two parties, together with the Rafi Party, in 1968 Notes 191

formed the Labor Party. While in the army Rabin had shunned political activity, and his lack of any clear political identification with any one of the factions comprising Labor was a strong point in his favor when he sought the party leadership in 1974. Slater, Rabin, 90, 108. 2. Auerbach, “Yitzhak Rabin,” 304. In her history of Israel, Anita Shapira titles the chapter covering the years 1967– 72 “An Age of Euphoria.” Anita Shapira, Israel: A History (Waltham, MA: Brandeis Univ. Press, 2012). 3. Slater, Warrior Statesman, 335. 4. Eban, Autobiography, 488– 89, 495; Eban, Personal Witness, 516; Ben- Ami, Scars of War, 120, 122. 5. Eban, Personal Witness, 518. 6. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 145. Conor Cruise O’Brien posited an inter- esting variation on the causes of the Yom Kippur War. After Dayan’s Masada speech in April 1973, in which he affirmed that Israel regarded the Suez Canal as its southern border, Sadat could either accept the loss of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip or go to war. Citing the Egyptian presi- dent’s national security adviser, Mohamed Heikel, Henry Kissinger, then the US national security adviser (and in September secretary of state) implicitly encouraged Sadat to go to war. According to Heikel, Sadat learned that Kissinger “would not want the [Nixon] administra- tion to get more directly involved in the Middle East’s problems as long as these were more or less dormant. But if the area began to show signs of hotting [sic] up, that would be a different matter” (Mohamed Heikal, Autumn Fury: The Assassination of Sadat [New York: Random House, 1984], 49– 50, 63). This was borne out by Sadat himself in his memoirs. Sadat mentions a meeting between his representative, Hafiz Ismail, and Kissinger: “The drift of what Kissinger said to Ismail,” Sadat wrote, “was that the United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we were the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority” (Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography [London: Collins and Fontana, 1978], 218). In his own memoir, Kissinger wrote that he hadn’t called on Sadat to “change the military situation” but had in fact pointed out that Israel “will again defeat you.” Whatever Kissinger’s intent, Sadat inferred that only by going to war could he induce the United States to put enough pressure on Israel to secure the return of the territories lost in the previous (Six-Day) war. It was “the boldness of Sadat’s strategy,” according to Kissinger, that explained Washington’s (and Israel’s) fail- ure to anticipate the sudden Egyptian invasion of the Sinai. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 277, 460; O’Brien, The Siege, 513, 518. 7. Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), book jacket. 192 Notes

8. Admittedly, similar predictions of Egyptian encirclement had proved overly optimistic. Kissinger, however, took the threat seriously: “As we saw it,” he later wrote, “keeping [Egypt’s] Third Army from being destroyed was the minimum prerequisite for any peace process—which no country needed more than Israel . . . A refusal by Israel to make concessions,” he told Prime Minister Meir, risked a superpower cri- sis. “The Arabs would have little incentive to deal with us; it would become impossible to split Egypt from the Soviets; there would be no moderate alternative to Arab radicalism.” Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 621– 22; Golan, Secret Conversations, 66– 67. Golan’s book was initially censored by a government commission. 9. Golan, Secret Conversations, 77–78, 83, 84, 103–4. Golan states that Kissinger wanted “more give” by the Israelis to protect his (Kissing- er’s) investment in Sadat, who could prevent Soviet domination of the Middle East. Only later was it learned that Kissinger had promised the Egyptian president that his (Sadat’s) Third Army would not be encircled. 10. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 186. This comment was deleted from the later edition of the memoirs, which was used for all other citations. Slater, Warrior Statesman, 256, 279. 11. O’Brien, The Siege, 536. 12. Jacob Abadi, Israel’s Leadership: From Utopia to Crisis (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 127. 13. Rabin, Memoirs, 241. Peres was born in Poland in 1921, became a Zionist as a boy, and with his family emigrated to Israel ten years later. As Ben-Gurion’s protégé, he climbed higher in Labor Party ranks, reaching that of director general of the Defense Ministry. He helped secure arms from France, including aid in building the Dimona nuclear reactor, and would hold several cabinet posts after the Six-Day War. 14. Eban, Personal Witness, 565– 69. Yehudit Auerbach has argued that Rabin’s political “apprenticeship” was too short and that consequently his “poor understanding” of political and party mechanisms combined with a tendency to mistrust people led him to distinguish “good guys” from “bad guys.” The former included those who had served in the Palmach and IDF as well as those opponents (like Menachem Begin) “not suspected of intrigue” and capable of rising above “petty party politics”—in sharp contrast to Shimon Peres. Auerbach, “Yitzhak Rabin,” 304– 5. 15. Shlomo Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), 258. 16. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 307–10; Eban, Personal Witness, 583; Tyler, Fortress Israel, 252. 17. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 89–90. It was the annexation of the Old City of Jerusalem after the Six-Day War by Ben-Gurion’s Labor government Notes 193

(and subsequent annexations of captured territory by Labor prime ministers Eshkol, Meir, and Rabin, supported by their ministers Allon and Peres), and not Likud, that set the precedent for biblically inspired settlements. Friedman, From Beirut, 260. 18. Auerbach, “Yitzhak Rabin,” 310. 19. In another account describing another Rabin compromise in 1977, Meir Harnoy wrote, “Here, at this place and at this hour, the first stake of the revolution in the perception of settlement was driven in.” It was also the first stake for the political change that took place when Likud came to power later in that year. Harnoy, The Settlers (published in Hebrew; Or Yehuda: Sifriyat Ma’ariv, 1994), 51, 101, 104, cited in Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967– 2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 51, 53. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 151. 20. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 151. 21. Slater, Rabin, 226– 28; Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 79–80. 22. Slater, Rabin, 80. 23. Yael S. Arnoff, “When and Why Do Hard Liners Become Soft? An Examination of Israel’s Prime Ministers, Shamir, Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu,” in Ofer Feldman and Linda Valenty, eds., Profiling Politi- cal Leaders: Cross Cultural Studies of Personality and Behavior (West- port, CT: Praeger Publ., 2001), 194. 24. Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (New York: Knopf, 1981), cited in O’Brien, The Siege, 545. 25. Golan, Secret Conversations, 218. Kissinger vehemently denied he was delaying arms shipments. 26. Ibid., 25. 27. Ibid., 224–25. 28. Cited in Golan, Secret Conversations, 225. 29. Slater, Rabin, 235. Rabin’s and Israel’s hostility to Arafat and the PLO was shared by the United States. When serving in the Ford administra- tion, Kissinger pledged that Washington would not deal with the PLO until it renounced terrorism. The State Department banned diplomatic meetings with the PLO, and enforcement of the ban by President Carter in August 1979 led him to fire Andrew Young, his UN ambas- sador, for talking with Arafat’s representative. Tyler, Fortress Israel, 527, n.34. 30. Golan, Secret Conversations, 228. 31. “Interview with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,” Ha’aretz, December 3, 1974, reprinted in MERIP (Middle East Research and Information Project) Reports 35 (February 1975): 31– 32. 32. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 134– 35. 33. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1108. 34. Golan, Secret Conversations, 232, 233. 194 Notes

35. Ibid. 36. Cited in Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 85. 37. Rabin, Memoirs, 267. 38. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977– 1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 113, cited in O’Brien, The Siege, 549. 39. Golan, Secret Conversations, 246, 247. 40. Inbar, Rabin, 43. 41. Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 206; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 152– 53. 42. Ma’ariv, January 16, 1975, cited in Abadi, Israel’s Leadership, 93. 43. Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 213. 44. Inbar, Rabin, 52– 53. 45. Golan, The Road to Peace, 132. 46. Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, Warrior: An Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 346–47, cited in Tyler, Fortress Israel, 253; Rabin cited in Gideon Samt, “From the Hebrew Press: Kissinger’s Failure,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 4 (Summer 1975): 124. 47. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 311– 12; Golan, The Road to Peace, 137– 38. 48. Golan, The Road to Peace, 138– 39. 49. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 298. 50. Eban, Autobiography, 583– 84. 51. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 307. 52. Rabin, Memoirs, 271. 53. Argentina’s chief supplier was the Federal Republic of (West) Germany (33 percent), followed by the United States (17 percent) and France (14 percent). Bishara Bahbah, “Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 15 (1986), and Hernán Dobry, “Operación Israel: La dictadura argentina y la compra de armas,” (unpub. ms., Buenos Aires, 2009), both cited in Raanan Rein and Efraim Davidi, “Exile of the World: Israeli Perceptions of Jacobo Timmerman,” Jewish Social Studies 16 (Spring/Summer 2010): note 17. 54. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Rela- tionship with Apartheid South Africa (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 3, 4, 10. The military component of the alliance (to which Meir was never reconciled) would be sealed in 1980 but remained secret until an African National Congress government opened South Africa’s archives. Thus far, Israel has refused to do so. 55. Eban, Autobiography, 587– 88. 56. Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace (New York: Random House, 1995), 152. 57. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 316, 319, 322; Golan, The Road to Peace, 144. 58. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 324; Rabin, Memoirs, 288. 59. Peres, Entebbe Diary, cited by Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 319. Notes 195

60. Golan, The Road to Peace, 157, 159. 61. Peres, Battling, 155– 56; Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 338–39; Rabin, Memoirs, 289.

Chapter 5 1. Rabin, Memoirs, 291–92. Rabin denied such “Machiavellian” motives as seeking an early election and preventing Peres from picking up Labor support. The NRP, founded in 1956, and the orthodox Mizrahi movement out of which it had emerged had been a part of every Israeli government (it later joined Rabin’s) since the founding of the state. 2. The two years of Peres’s leadership of a unity government between 1986 and 1988 would provide an exception. 3. Rabin, Memoirs, 378, 309– 10; Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 306. 4. Perlmutter, Life and Times, 314; Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 92– 93. 5. Rabin, Memoirs, 307. 6. Slater, Rabin, 265– 66; Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 94. 7. Silver, Begin, 151– 52. 8. Rabin, Memoirs, 299. 9. Rabin, Memoirs, 295– 96; Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, 167. Rabin committed a monumental social gaffe, as recorded by Zbigniew Brzez- inski in his autobiography: “Carter tried to engage him as a human being; by inviting Rabin, after the State Dinner, to look in on Carter’s special pride and joy, his daughter Amy, asleep in her White House bedroom. Rabin declined the offer with a curt, ‘No, thank you,’ thereby ending his chance of establishing a personal rapport with a proud father.” Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 258; O’Brien, The Siege, 710, n.44. 10. O’Brien, The Siege, 557. 11. Rabin, Memoirs, 295. 12. Cited in Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 96. 13. Slater, Rabin, 273– 76. 14. Rabin, Memoirs, 312. 15. Slater, Rabin, 283. 16. Slater, Rabin, 290. 17. Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, 171; Marie Brenner, “The Very Strange Life of the Yitzhak Rabins,” New York Magazine 11, no. 7 (Febru- ary 13, 1978), 54. 18. Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 99. 19. Slater, Rabin, 295. 20. Abadi, Israel’s Leadership, 129. 21. Eban, Personal Witness, 585. 22. Shlomo Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 256; O’Brien, The Siege, 540. 196 Notes

23. Perlmutter, Life and Times, 316, 317. It is difficult not to think of another social-democratic party in another small country and also gov- erning for decades that was similarly pushed out of office by the voters in the late 1970s, Sweden’s Social Democratic Party. 24. Rabin, Memoirs, 301; Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 3, 78. 25. Shindler, A History, 145. 26. Eban, Personal Witness, 580. 27. Shindler, A History, 146. Although the income tax was reduced in July 1975, such exemptions as cost of living increases and car allowances fell subject to taxation. Moreover, indirect taxation underwent reform the following year. Sales taxes were reduced, but a value added tax was added. Taxation as a percentage of GDP rose from 41 percent in 1970 to nearly 60 percent in 1977. The Arab oil embargo crisis and the costs of war were held accountable for the tripling of the inflation rate. Moshe Silver, ed., Economic and Social Policy in Israel: The First Generation (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1991), 91, 16.

Chapter 6 1. Rabin, Memoirs, 314; Peres, Battling, cited in Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 99; Slater, Rabin, 306. 2. Slater, Rabin, 298–99. 3. Dan Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin (New York: HarperCollins), 364. 4. Slater, Rabin, 299. 5. Brenner, “Very Strange Life,” 51, 53, 55. 6. Kurzman interview with Haber in Kurzman, Soldier, 365. 7. Slater, Rabin, 299. 8. Brenner, “Very Strange Life,” 54. 9. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 346, 350. 10. Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 97. 11. Kurzman, Soldier, 366. 12. Brenner, “Very Strange Life,” 55. 13. Eban, Personal Witness, 595; Rabin, Memoirs, 317. 14. O’Brien, The Siege, 566. 15. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 167; Rabin, Memoirs, 321–22; Viorst, Sands of Sorrow, 139– 41. 16. Rabin, Memoirs, 321. 17. Ibid., 316, 321, 323. 18. Ibid., 322–24. 19. Sadat, In Search of Identity, 364, cited in O’Brien, The Siege, 574. 20. Kurzman, Soldier, 367– 68. 21. Rabin, Memoirs, 329. 22. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 104. See also Rabin, Memoirs, 329– 30; Perl- mutter, Life and Times, 342. Notes 197

23. Perlmutter, Life and Times, 349. 24. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 167. 25. Slater, Rabin, 304– 5; Rabin, Memoirs, 329– 30. 26. Kurzman, Soldier, 373. 27. Kurzman, Soldier, 374. 28. Rabin, Memoirs, 123. 29. Peres never volunteered, pointing to his work with Ben-Gurion and Eshkol at the ministry of defense, but admitted that the army hadn’t interested him. As noted, he ultimately acknowledged that not fighting in the War of Independence and so joining the veterans who had was, in the words of his biographer, “one of the worst mistakes in his life.” Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 34, 72–73. 30. Rabin, Memoirs, 271. 31. Peres, Battling, 144. 32. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 73. 33. Peres, Battling, 145– 46, 5, 309. 34. Ibid., 149–51. 35. Cited in Kurzman, Soldier, 375. 36. Golan, The Road to Peace, 193. 37. Slater, Rabin, 311. 38. Jerusalem Post, October 26, 1979, cited in Slater, Rabin, 313– 14. 39. Michael Keren, “National Icons and Personal Identities in Three Israeli Autobiographies,” Biography 27, no. 2 (2004): 379. 40. Ibid., 380. 41. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 107; Kurzman, Soldier, 376, 377. 42. Kurzman interview with Lanir in Kurzman, Soldier, 377. 43. Abba Eban, “Which Way with Labor?” Journal of Palestinian Studies 10 (Autumn 1980): 19. 44. Carrie Rosefsky, “Yitzhak Rabin: Toward a Two-State Solution–A Genuine Offer,” Harvard International Review 5, no. 1 (September- October 1982): 9, 10.

Chapter 7 1. Slater, Rabin, 315. 2. Kurzman, Soldier, 378, 379. 3. Slater, Rabin, 317. 4. Silver, Begin, 216, 217. 5. Perlmutter, Life and Times, 372. 6. Eban, Personal Witness, 612; Silver, Begin, 225. 7. Peri, afterword to Rabin, Memoirs, 322. Thomas Friedman insists that like most Israelis Rabin initially shared Sharon’s view of the Lebanese invasion and that he and other Labor leaders claimed they were misled only when the war started to go sour. Friedman, From Beirut, 130–31. 8. Perlmutter, Life and Times, 380. 198 Notes

9. Friedman, From Beirut, 148– 49; Golan, The Road to Peace, 24. 10. Slater, Rabin, 320. A commission of inquiry found that Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eytan had moved Phalangists into the refugee camp with the mission of clearing out fedayeen fighters imbedded there. The defense minister, the chief of staff, and two senior officers were charged with indirect responsibility for the killings. Sharon initially refused to resign, and Begin did not want to fire him. Finally, Sharon left his post but remained in the government as minister without portfolio. O’Brien, The Siege, 630–31. Red Cross officials estimated the total death toll between eight hundred and one thousand. Friedman, From Beirut, 163. 11. Abadi, Israel’s Leadership, 147. 12. Meron Benvenisti, “The Last Revisionist Zionist: History Left Yitzhak Shamir Behind,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January–February 1995): 172. 13. Meridor cited in Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 417. 14. Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, 190. 15. Inbar, Rabin, 100. 16. Rabin cited in Inbar, Rabin, 130. 17. Rabin cited in Friedman, From Beirut, 518. 18. For the view that Rabin’s evolution toward a policy of reconciliation began with the Intifada, see Slater, Rabin, 341–43. For the view that it solidified during the Six-Day War, see Kurzman, Soldier, 14, 168. Rabin himself attached major importance in this regard to the Inti- fada (Slater, Rabin, 340–41). It was Rabin’s school, according to the defense analysts Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada: The Palestin- ian Uprising—Israel’s Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 138. Peri, in the afterword to the 1992 edition of Rabin’s memoirs, also argues that Rabin began to seek an accord with the Palestinians only after the show of determination in the Intifada. So does Patrick Tyler (who nevertheless argues that throughout its his- tory Israel was and remains a militaristic state). He subtitles his chapter on the Oslo peace process “The New Yitzhak.” Tyler, Fortress Israel, 334, 349. 19. Kurzman, Soldier, 16. 20. Abadi, Israel’s Leadership, 158. To keep Sharon from the defense min- istry, Shamir named Moshe Arens, seen as somewhat more moderate. 21. Inbar, Rabin, 74, 83; Golan, The Road to Peace, 236. 22. Friedman, From Beirut, 355– 56. 23. Inbar, Rabin, 83, 114–15. 24. Kurzman, Soldier, 297, 400. 25. Unidentified author, “Justifying Hijacking a Civilian Airline,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 15 (Spring 1986): 152. 26. Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance, 132, 156– 57, 193. 27. Ibid., 196. 28. Rynhold, “Labour,” 243. Notes 199

29. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 114– 15. 30. Yehuda Litani, “Settlements: To Build or Not to Build,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 14 (Summer 1985): 182–83.

Chapter 8 1. Slater, Rabin, 329– 30. The exact date was December 7. The previ- ous day an Israeli was stabbed to death shopping in Gaza, and other sources have marked this date as the start of the Intifada; still others, even earlier events. 2. Anita Vitullo, “Yitzhak Rabin and Israel’s Death Squads,” Middle East Report 178 (September– October 1992): 42. The Jewish Virtual Library places the number of Palestinian deaths during the four years of the (first) Intifada at approximately 1,100; Israelis, at 162. See The Jewish Virtual Library, http:// www.jewishvirtuallibrary .org/ jsource/ History/intifada .html. Most other sources I have say “over 1000” and “over 100,” adding that Palestinian militants killed over 250 Palestin- ians for “collaborating” with occupation authorities. 3. Inbar, “Israel and National Security,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 555 (January 1998): 69. 4. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 119; Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 116– 17. 5. Inbar, Rabin, 130. 6. Slater, Rabin, 337. 7. Inbar, Rabin, 104. 8. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 120. 9. Rabin cited in Michael Karpin and Ina Friedman, Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998), 55; Slater, Rabin, 341. 10. Eban, Personal Witness, 623– 24. 11. Shindler, A History, 208. 12. Vitullo, “Yitzhak Rabin,” 41–42. 13. Ibid. 14. Inbar, Rabin, 11. 15. Robert O. Freedman, Israel under Rabin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 394. 16. Schiff cited in Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 111–12. 17. Peri, afterword to the revised edition of The Rabin Memoirs, especially 369. Certainly it marked an evolution from Rabin’s initial analysis of the enemy as the Arab states and not the Palestinians. Whether Rabin had to evolve from the notion of trading land for peace is quite another matter. This account points to a belief that was long-standing. 18. Rabin took many of these ideas from a 1988 report submitted by the head of military intelligence. Thirty-two conservatives in the Knesset, led by Netanyahu, opposed the plan as leading to the creation of a 200 Notes

Palestinian state and insisted there be no negotiations until the Intifada came to an end. Shindler, A History, 208, 214. 19. Karpin and Friedman, Murder, 53. 20. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 121. 21. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 193. 22. Friedman, From Beirut, 389. Palestinian refugees, especially those in Lebanon, desperate for a state of their own and willing to consider any pragmatic solution, also imposed pressure. Friedman also points to a more “mellowed” Arab world ready to “tolerate” recognition of Israel’s existence. 23. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 121–23. It is an irony of history that perhaps the friendliest of American presidents to Israel, Ronald Reagan, was the one who extended recognition to the PLO and so gave legitimacy to an organization that the Israelis perceived as their archenemy. 24. Benvenisti, “The Last Revisionist Zionist,” 172. Patrick Tyler, how- ever critical of Shamir, argues that by keeping Rabin at Defense, he prevented Sharon and other right-wing generals in the Knesset from pushing through “reckless schemes of Arab expulsion.” Tyler, Fortress Israel, 337. 25. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 422. 26. Rynhold, “Labour,” 244, 245–47.

Chapter 9 1. Inbar, Rabin, 133. 2. Kurzman, Soldier, 412; Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 122– 23. 3. Darawshe interview with Kurzman. Kurzman, Soldier, 412– 13. 4. Slater, Rabin, 413. 5. Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Mid- dle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2002), 300; Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 128. 6. I am grateful to Professor Marianne Sanua for expanding on this dis- tinction between Rabin and the Likud leaders. 7. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 419. 8. Later Rabin went to them to basically apologize and show that Labor had changed its attitude toward them and was willing to accept them as equal political partners. I thank Professor Sanua for sharing her insight about the Mizrahim. 9. Kurzman, Soldier, 428. Another electoral change approved in 1992 would result in direct election of the prime minister for the fourteenth Knesset in the next scheduled election (in 1996). The successful candi- date would require 50 percent plus one in the first or second rounds. 10. Susan Rolef, “Israel’s Policy toward the PLO: From Rejection to Rec- ognition,” in Avraham Sela and Moslhe Ma’oz, eds., The PLO and Notes 201

Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution 1964– 1994 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1697), 263, cited in Shindler, A History, 203. 11. Gerald M. Steinberg, “A Nation That Dwells Alone? Foreign Policy in the 1992 Elections,” in Elazar and Sandler, Israel at the Polls, 187. 12. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 199. 13. Shapira, Israel, 457. 14. Bernard Reich, “Playing Politics in Moscow and Jerusalem: Soviet Jewish Immigrants and the 1992 Knesset Election,” in D. J. Elazar and Samuel Rabin, eds., Israel at the Polls, 1992 (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 132, 142. In a Public Opinion Research Poll only 1.7 percent of the immigrants identified themselves as a “practic- ing religious believer.” Ibid., 129. To assuage their fears of socialist big government, the Labor Party even abandoned its traditional red color, adopting the blue and white of the Israeli flag and the Likud colors. It also campaigned in Likud strongholds and displayed photos of Likud converts to Labor. Efraim Inbar, “Labor’s Return to Power,” in Elazar and Sandler, Israel at the Polls, 35, 36. 15. Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 132; Slater, Rabin, 384, 402. 16. Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 130. 17. Slater, Rabin, 399– 400. 18. Rabin cited in Slater, Rabin, 402. 19. Mordechai Nisan, “The Likud: The Delusion of Power,” in Elazar and Sandler, Israel at the Polls, 50. Nisan also points to Likud’s 15 years in power and the fact that “long-term electoral success contains within it the germ of ultimate defeat,” 55. 20. Peres, Battling, 272. 21. Abadi, Israel’s Leadership, 130. 22. Cited by Slater, Rabin, 406. 23. Arnoff, “When and Why Do Hard Liners Become Soft?,” in Ofer Feldman and Linda Valenty, eds., Profiling Political Leaders: Cross Cul- tural Studies of Personality and Behavior (Westport, CT: Praeger Publ., 2001), 191. 24. Slater, Rabin, 408. Yet a majority of Israeli Jews had voted for Likud and other right-wing parties. Labor and Meretz counted for 55 seats, 5 short of a blocking majority in the Knesset and so required Shas’s 6 seats. Shindler, A History, 230. 25. Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, “Change and Continuity in Israeli Politics: The Political Behavior of the Rabin-Peres Government,” in Elazar and Sandler, Israel at the Polls, 331– 32. 26. Peres, Battling, 415. 27. The minister was Haim Ramon, who was close to Rabin. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 436. 28. Inbar, “Labor’s Return to Power,” 39, 41. There are about a dozen political parties in Israel, and, as noted earlier, to have a majority in the Knesset, the largest party must negotiate with others. The small parties 202 Notes

demand concessions and tie the hands of the prime minister, as is usu- ally the case in a multi-party system. Abadi, Israel’s Leadership, 171. 29. Peri, afterword to Rabin, Memoirs, 343; Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, 177. 30. Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, 177.

Chapter 10 1. Inbar, Rabin, 136– 37. 2. Rynhold, “Labour,” 245. 3. Ibid., 256. 4. Slater, Rabin, 417. 5. Cited in Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 134– 35. 6. Inbar, Rabin, 135. 7. Shibley Telhami, “From Camp David to Wye: Changing Assumptions in Arab-Israeli Negotiations,” Middle East Journal 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 383. 8. Shindler, A History, 232. 9. Ahron Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 4–5. 10. A detailed account of these negotiations may be found in Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), esp. 126. Rabin even- tually conceded on the border issue and accepted the June 4, 1967 (pre– Six-Day War) line as not constituting any security threat to Israel. Ross, The Missing Peace, 147. 11. Itamar Rabinovitch, The Brink of Peace: The Israel Syrian Negotia- tions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998). A controversy ensued whether Rabin intended to withdraw from the Golon or on the Golon. When TV journalist Charles Enderlin learned of the Syr- ian talks initiated by the Labor government, he asked the Americans if Israel intended to return all of the Golan Heights and was assured that the promise to do so remained “on deposit” with President Clinton. Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002 (New York: Other Press, 2002), xiv. 12. Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, “Peace-Making with the Palestinians: Change and Legitimacy,” in Efraim Karsh, ed., From Rabin to Netanyahu: Isra- el’s Troubled Agenda (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 173. 13. That Israel supported Iran in the conflict may be explained by the dic- tum “The enemy of my enemy is my friend,” and Iraq was seen as the more immediate threat. There was also a large number of Jews in Iran, and Israel worked to get them out of the country. 14. Shindler, A History, 252– 53. 15. Shindler, A History, 232; Kurzman, Soldier, 437, 443. 16. Karpin and Friedman, Murder, 60. Notes 203

17. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 329, cited in Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 83– 84. 18. Jerusalem Report, September 10, 1992, cited in Shindler, A History, 195; Slater, Rabin, 420, 428–29. Rabin (and others) may have exag- gerated AIPAC’s power. As Christopher Hitchens pointed out, Jewish power in Washington is “overstated.” “If it is Israel that decides on the deployment of American force,” he finds it odd that the first President Bush had to order them to stay out of the coalition to free Kuwait, even more odd there has been no attack of Iran, as Israeli hawks have been urging, and that it lost the argument over removing Saddam Hussein in 1991. Christopher Hitchens, “Overstating Jewish Power,” Slate (March 27, 2006), reproduced in his anthology, Arguably: Essays (New York: Twelve, 2011), 569–72. 19. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 14, 20. 20. Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 138– 40. 21. Oslo would bring no end to settlers and settlements. Between 1992 and 1996 the Jewish population grew by 48 percent on the West Bank and 62 percent in Gaza. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 216, cited in Shindler, A History, 278. Oslo said nothing on the settlements, but Rabin refused to support twenty of them straddling the Green Line (Israel’s 1948 frontier) and cancelled ten road and tunnel projects connecting Jerusalem to West Bank settlements. Shindler, A History, 269. 22. Rabin cited in Kurzman, Soldier, 465. 23. Uri Savir, The Process: 1100 Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1998), 26. 24. Makovsky, Making Peace, 37; Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 430. 25. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 435, 437. 26. Telhami, “From Camp David to Wye,” 391. 27. Gerald M. Steinberg, “Yossi Beilin, Touching Peace,” Foreign Policy 109 (Winter 1997–98): 156. 28. Myron Aronoff, “Labor in the Second Rabin Era: The First Year of Leadership,” in Robert O. Freedman, ed., Israel under Rabin (Boul- der, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 133– 34; Makovsky, Making Peace, 38. 29. I am grateful to Professor Marianne Sanua for the “Time Bomb” refer- ence and its significance. 30. Makovsky, Making Peace, 45, 113– 14. 31. Ibid., 51, 69. 32. Eban, Personal Witness, 643. 33. Helena Cobban, “Israel and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond,” in Robert O. Freedman, ed., Israel under Rabin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 77, 107. 34. Noa Ben Artzi-Pelossof, In the Name of Sorrow and Hope (New York: Knopf, 1996), 173. 204 Notes

35. Rabin cited in Makovsky, Making Peace, 107. 36. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 221. 37. Daniel Lieberfeld, “Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (November 2000): 584– 85. 38. Peres, Battling, 285; Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 141– 42. 39. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 138. 40. Inbar, Rabin, 25–25. King Hussein maintained warm relations with Rabin in contrast to most other Arab leaders. 41. Inbar, Rabin, 27, 28, 30. 42. George E. Gruen, “American Jewish Attitudes toward Israel . . . ,” in Ofer Feldman and Linda Valenty, eds., Profiling Political Leaders: Cross Cultural Studies of Personality and Behavior (Westport, CT: Praeger Publ., 2001), 56, 57. 43. Arnoff, “When and Why Do Hard Liners Become Soft?,” 191. 44. Ibid., 195; Inbar, Rabin, 162– 63; Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 209. Rabin may have been too harsh in his criticism of Israeli fears. His country- men were used to wars fought on several fronts, but with population centers relatively secure. Now they were subject to not only terror attacks on the streets but missiles raining down on them. Friedman, From Beirut, 543. 45. Yehudit Auerbach and Charles W. Greenbaum, “Assessing Leader Credibility during a Peace Process: Rabin’s Private Polls,” Journal of Peace Research 37 (January 2000): 32. The deportation of four hun- dred Palestinians followed the murder of three soldiers and a police- man by Hamas militants and was ordered by IDF chief of staff Ehud Barak. Rabin’s defenders argued he had little choice but to support the action. Tyler, Fortress Israel, 357– 58. 46. Peres, Battling, 291. 47. Shapira, Israel, 431. 48. Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 144, 146. 49. Ian Bickerton and Carla Klausner, “Rabin Statement at Signing of Accord,” in I. Bickerton and C. Klausner, eds., A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), cited in Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 146. 50. Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 144.

Chapter 11 1. Auerbach and Greenbaum, “Assessing Leader Credibility during a Peace Process,” 32, 40, 48. 2. Peres, Battling, 291. Rabin’s envoy to Damascus in 1993, Itamar Rabinovitch, in his book, The Brink of Peace, regretted that Rabin’s commitment to President Clinton to yield the Golan Heights was not followed up. Rabinovitch acknowledged Syrian President Hafez Notes 205

al-Assad’s lack of a response and Rabin’s decision to pursue the Oslo track instead but still calls the episode “a missed opportunity” to achieve peace. Interview with Rabinovitch by journalist Amos Harel in Ha’aretz, November 3, 2012. 3. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 451. 4. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 210. Arafat’s closed-door speech is in Raphael Israeli, “From Oslo to Bethlehem: Arafat’s Islamic Message,” Journal of Church and State 43 (Summer 2001): 423. 5. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 212, 214. 6. Ross, The Missing Peace, 208. 7. Ross, The Missing Peace, 736, 757. 8. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 431. 9. Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 145, 148. 10. Ross, The Missing Peace, 169. 11. Ross, The Missing Peace, 734, 735. 12. Ha’aretz, March 7, 1994, cited in Ehud Sprinzak, Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israel from the Altalena to the Rabin Assassination (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 263; Shindler, A History, 263. 13. Harnoy, The Settlers, 121, cited in Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 307. This was the explanation for not taking steps against the Hebron settlers that Rabin gave to Yoram Peri. Cited in Peri’s interview with Linda Benedikt, in Benedikt, Yitzhak Rabin, 149. 14. Harnoy, The Settlers, 123, cited in Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 307. Harnoy is also frequently cited in Zertal and Eldar, Lords of the Land. This book offers a history of Gush Emunim, 186–87. 15. Friedman, From Beirut, 570. 16. Ehud Sprinzak, “Israel’s Radical Right and the Countdown to the Rabin Assassination,” in Yoram Peri, ed., The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000), 100, 103, 106. 17. Makovsky in the Jerusalem Post, International ed., July 17, 1999; Rob- ert O. Freedman, Israel under Rabin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 137– 38, 183. 18. Bar-Simon-Tov, “Peace-Making with the Palestinians,” 177. 19. Peres found it strange “that we Israelis are now granting the Palestin- ians what the British had granted us more than seventy years ago, ‘a homeland in Palestine,’” but he couldn’t acknowledge that the entity created might one day become a sovereign and independent state. Peres, Battling, 409, cited in Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 444– 45. 20. Karpin and Friedman, Murder, 137, 138, 183. 21. Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 149; Tyler, Fortress Israel, 368– 69. 22. Arab writing on Israel, in the view of an Arab political scientist, is not objective. Many were in self-denial. “Israelism,” the style of writing on the Jewish state, by and large failed to make use of Israeli sources, resulting in an inherent bias and the suffering of Arab scholarship. See 206 Notes

the discussion in Hassan A. Barari, Arab Scholarship on Israel: A Critical Assessment (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2009). The PLO Covenant (in 1968 the term was changed to “Charter”) was never formally revised despite Arafat’s September 9, 1993, letter to Rabin promising that the offending clauses denying Israel’s right to exist would be amended. On April 23, 1996, the organization voted to set up a committee to redraft the charter, but the date to do so was not specified. In a January 1998 letter to President Clinton, Arafat claimed that the clauses had been nullified, and that December the PLO reaffirmed the cancellation. Yet a copy of the charter cannot be found on the PLO’s own official website (which itself is no longer available—only its National Affairs Depart- ment is). Israeli sources and the Zionist Organization of America deny that any changes took place. See the following two web sites for more information on the charter: “The Palestinian National Charter: July 1– 17, 1968,” MidEast Web Historical Documents, accessed January 23, 2013, http:// www .mideastweb.org/ plocha .html; “The Infamous PLO Covenant,” by M. Zimmerman, International Wall of Prayer, accessed Jan- uary 23, 2013, http://www .internationalwallofprayer.org/ A -077-The -Infamous-PLO -Covenant.html. 23. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 233. 24. Sprinzak, Brother against Brother, 253, 254. 25. Karpin and Friedman, Murder, 105– 6, 108, 111. 26. Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 169–71; Kurzman, Soldier, 482. The econ- omy had always taken second place (behind defense) in Israel, and most members of the Knesset were less interested in it. Rabin, despite his efforts, lacked expertise. 27. Elazar and Sandler, “Change and Continuity,” 323. 28. Aronoff, “Labor” and Howard Rosen, “Economic Relations between Israel and the United States,” both in Robert O. Freedman, Israel under Rabin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 211–13; Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 136. Rabin benefitted by inheriting an economy on the upswing. The number of immigrants had fallen (although 77,000 had arrived in 1992), and integration was well under way. The economy, measured in gross domestic product, nearly doubled from the previous year, rising to 6.6 percent in 1992, the highest of any industrialized nation. Inflation in 1992 fell to under 10 percent for the first time since the 1970s. 29. Peter Beinart, The Crisis of Zionism (New York: Times Books, 2012), 16– 17, 25. 30. Shindler, A History, 326. 31. Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 231– 32. 32. Yoram Peri, “Introduction: The Writing on the Wall,” in Yoram Peri, ed., The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000), 5–6. Notes 207

33. Eliezer Schweid, “Beyond All That—Modernism, Zionism, Judaism,” Israel Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 242. 34. This is the thesis of Christopher Barder’s Oslo’s Gift of “Peace”: The Destruction of Israel’s Security (Sha’arei Tikvah: ACPR Publ., 2001). 35. Leah Rabin, Rabin: Our Life, 8, 36. 36. Beinart, Crisis, 117–18. The bill calling for the embassy move to Jeru- salem passed with veto-proof majorities and became law without Presi- dent Clinton’s signature. But because the terms of the Oslo Accord were never met by either party, the embassy was not moved. President Obama doesn’t oppose the change, but, consistent with US policies to date, the move would be made only in conjunction with a final-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. “Should US Embassy in Israel Be in Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem?,” by Pierre Tristam, About.com Middle East Issues, accessed August 17, 2012, http:// middleeast .about .com/ od/ usmideastpolicy/f/ me081005f .htm. 37. Ha’aretz, October 6, 1995,.cited by Bar-Simon-Tov, “Peace-Making with the Palestinians,” and Shindler, A History, 261. 38. Gadi Taub, “Israel’s Labor’s Sad Decline and Uncertain Future,” Dis- sent 56, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 34. 39. Sprinzak, “Israel’s Radical Right,” 116–17. 40. Ibid., 121. 41. Horovitz, Yitzhak Rabin, 245; Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 156, 160. Dur- ing Amir’s trial, attempts to sanction the murder in terms of religious authority were rejected. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in solitary confinement. Beginning in October 2006, conjugal visits were permitted, and in July 2012, despite objections by Rabin’s daughter, he was released from solitary confinement and allowed to serve in the general prison population. Ha’aretz, October 14, 2006, July 5, November 18, 2012.

Epilogue 1. Kort, Yitzhak Rabin, 161. 2. Ibid., 162. 3. Yoram Peri, “The Media and the Rabin Myth: Reconstruction of the Israeli Collective Identity,” in Yoram Peri, ed., The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000), 185. 4. Ibid., 186–87. 5. Karpin and Friedman, Murder, 189. Leah Rabin blamed Netanyahu for driving up anti-Rabin passions and refused to shake his hand during her husband’s funeral. 6. Yossi Sarid, Ha’aretz, November 1, 2006, cited in Shindler, A History, 266. 7. Naomi Segal, “Holder of Slain Spouse’s Torch: Peace Advocate Leah Rabin Dies,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 17, 2000, cited in 208 Notes

Tyler, Fortress Israel, 283; John D. Rayner, A Jewish Understanding of the World (Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 1998), 85. 8. Bar-Zohar, Shimon Peres, 465– 66. 9. Peri, “The Writing on the Wall,” 6–8; Shabak, the acronym for the Israeli Security Agency (for counter-intelligence and internal security), is the current name. Yet Shin Bet, as it was known earlier, is still widely used. Mosad is the agency for overseas intelligence. 10. These and other theories are referred to by Barry Chamish, Who Mur- dered Yitzhak Rabin? (Cambridge, MA: Brookline Books, 2000). See also the discussion of conspiracy theories and their refutation in Karpin and Friedman, Murder, 208– 9. 11. Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, “Commemorating a Difficult Past: Yitzhak Rabin’s Memorials,” American Sociological Review 6 (February 2002): 30. Eliezer Witztum and Ruth Malkinson, “The Cultural and Social Reconstruction of Mourning Patterns,” in Yoram Peri, ed., The Assas- sination of Yitzhak Rabin (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000), 249. 12. Barak accessed at http://www .Ynetnews .com/ articles/ 0,7340/,L -4300840,00.html (link discontinued). 13. Raphael Ahren, The Times of Israel, December 31, 2012. 14. Jerusalem Post, October 21, 2010. These and similar statements were frequently cited by Benjamin Netanyahu and other opponents of an independent Palestinian state. Efraim Inbar cites Rabin referring to a Palestinian state as “a focus of hostility,” “a cancer in the heart of the Middle East,” and “a time bomb,” although he realized that the crea- tion of a Palestinian authority could potentially lead to a Palestinian state. Inbar, Rabin, 29. Whether Rabin would have come around to another stand remains a matter of speculation. 15. Cited in Julian O’Halloran, “Blood on the Path to Peace: How Mr. ‘Peace’ Became Mr. ‘Security,’” The World Today 52, no. 11 (November 1996): 273. 16. Karpin and Friedman, Murder, 198. 17. Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, xiv. 18. O’Halloran, “Blood on the Path,” 272–73. At the Camp David meet- ing in July, 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and President Clinton offered the PLO a capital in Arab Jerusalem (not just the nearby Abu Dis), 97 percent of the West Bank with a safe passage linking the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, ultimately the entire Jordan Valley, the right of return of Palestinian refugees to “historical Palestine” (but no explicit return to the state of Israel), and a multi-billion-dollar fund to cover the costs and provide compensation. Prime Minister Barak accepted: PLO leader Arafat eventually did also but with numerous reservations (particularly over water rights and proposed Israeli annexation of terri- tory extending from Jerusalem to the sea that he claimed would divide the new Palestinian state) that vitiated the terms. His “yes” amounted to Notes 209

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Abadi, Jacob, 46 speech to UN, 55 Abbas, Mahoud (Abu Mazzen), 108 willingness to negotiate, 111 African National Congress, 63– 64 See also Palestine Liberation al-Assad, Hafez, 146–47, 180 Organization (PLO) Allon, Yigal Arens, Moshe, 134 death of, 82, 96 Aronoff, Myron, 139 as foreign minister, 47, 52 Aronson, Shlomo, 14, 48, 77 and Palmach, 2, 3 Avineri, Shlomo, 148 plan for West Bank, 62 Avner, Yehuda, 29 preferred by Labor MKs, 21 resignation from army, 6 Baker, James, 154 Altalena, 4 Baruk, Ehud, 147, 180 American Israel Public Affairs Begin, Menachem Committee (AIPAC), 56, and Camp David Accords, 89 125, 144, 149 early life, 58 Amir, Yigal, 175, 176 and Irgun, 4 Arab Israelis, 172, 182 life contrasted with Rabin’s, 129 Arabs, 7 named prime minister, 75 Arab states, 21, 23, 53, 171 names Jerusalem as capital and Arafat, Yasser annexes Golan Heights, 91 accepts UN resolutions and peace as orator, 75– 76 talks, 123–24 rejects Sinai withdrawal, 37 and corruption, 173 rejects UN resolutions, 38, 58 and Hamas, 169 resignation, 105 named chairman of PLO, 23 resigns from Meir government, and Oslo talks, 151–63 39 rejects international conference, and Six- Day War, 21 120 Beilin, Yossi, 113, 152 relocates to Lebanon, 102 Beinart, Peter, 172 relocates to Tunis, 104 Ben- Ami, Shlomo, 5, 9, 17, 123, 170 as seen by Israeli prime ministers, Ben-Gurion, David 145, 148 and Begin, 5 220 Index

Ben-Gurion, David (continued) explains Rabin’s election victory, and Dimona nuclear reactor, 11 47 foreign policy of, 27 and fedayeen raids, 28 and 1956 campaign, 7, 8 and Israel’s response to intifada, proclaims Israeli independence, 3 119 and Six-Day War, 14– 15, 17, 19 on Labor Party loss, 76 Ben-Yehuda, Hemda, viii and Rabin’s appointment as Brezhnev, Leonid, 104 ambassador, 27 Bush, George H. W., 125, 128, sees Palestinians as chief Israeli 129, 148 problem, 77 and the Six-Day War, 20 Camp David Accords, ix Eisenhower, Dwight D., 9, 27 See also Begin, Menachem Entebbe raid, 64–65 Carter, Jimmy, 70, 86, 89 Eshkol, Levi Clinton, Bill, 145–46, 149, 150, appoints Rabin as ambassador, 183 27, 30 and defense of Israeli borders, Dan, Uri, 59 23– 24 Dayan, Moshe promotes Rabin, 10 anticipates Arab initiative, 49 and Six-Day War, 14, 17, 20 credited with victory, 22 criticism of Rabin, 51 Ford, Gerald, 52, 54 death of, 109 France, 8, 28 as Likud foreign minister, 76 Friedman, Tom, 24 and 1956 campaign, 8, 9 and Palmach, 2 Gavish, Yeshayahu, 21 personal traits, 12–13 Gazit, Shlomo, 24–25 questions US aid, 34 Ginor, Isabella, 14 reinstated as defense minister, 45 Golan, Malli, 55 relationship with Rabin, 1, 19–20 Golan Heights, 127, 135, 146, and Six-Day War, 21 161– 62, 170 De Gaulle, Charles, 17–18, 27 Goldstein, Baruch, 165 Deir Yassin, 5 Goldstein, Dov, 68, 82, 91 Dimona nuclear reactor. See Peres, Goodman, Hirsh, 2, 22 Shimon: and Dimona nuclear Gur, Mordechai (Motta), 23, 48, 65 reactor Gush Emunim, 62, 69, 168 Dole, Robert, 174 See also Settler Movement; Rabin, Dulles, John Foster, 27 Yitzhak: and settlements

Eban, Abba Haber, Eitan, 84, 108, 181 critical of Peres, 85 Haganah, 1, 2 criticism of Rabin, 20, 34, 35, 36, Hamas, 147, 149–50, 161, 165–66, 39, 61, 64, 77 168– 69, 175 dissents from Israeli mood of self- Hart, Parker, 32 confidence, 42 Hecht, Abraham, vii, 171 Index 221

Herut Party, 21, 75, 105 Kissinger, Henry See also Likud Party pressure for Second Sinai, 52 Herzog, Chaim, 22 relationship with Rabin, 32, 35, Hezbollah, 108, 147 38, 56 Hussein, Sadam, 132, 147 relationship with Sadat, 55 Hussein bin Talal, King, 39, 52, and shuttle diplomacy, 45– 46 113, 122, 123 visit to Israel, 62 See also Jordan and War of Attrition, 35 Husseini, Faisal, 148 and withdrawal from Sinai, 57 and Yom Kippur War, 44, 191n6, Inbar, Efraim, 128, 141 192n8 Intifada (first), 115–26 Kurzman, Dan, 108 Intifada (second), 178 Islamic Jihad, 151, 161 Labor Party (Alignment), 47 Israel adopts primary system, 131 education in, 172 creation, 85 emigration from, 173– 74 and electoral victories, 134, 138– and former leaders, 84 39, 140 growth of conservative sentiment Lanir, Nina, 97 in, 78 Laron, Guy, 9 and 1956 campaign, 7–8 Likud Party and nuclear option, 9 and American Jewish community, opposition to Oslo talks, 161 125 population changes in, 135 creation, 45 power of ministers in, 77 electoral victory, 102– 3 reaction to Rabin assassination, and Oslo talks, 157 177– 78 and Russian immigrants, 135 relations with South Africa, 63– and settlements, 136 64, 112 (see also Vorster, and settlers, 83 Balthazzar Johannes) supporters, 75 restoration of diplomatic relations with, 129 Madrid Conference, 128, 132, 149 and second Sinai, 57 Makovsky, David, 152, 153, 167 self-confidence after 1967, 41–42 Mapai Party, 6, 11, 85 and settlements, 31 Mapam Party, 6 and Six-Day War, 13, 21– 22 Margolit, Dan, 72, 81 War of Independence, 3, 4, 5 Meir, Golda Israel Defense Force (IDF), 3, 6, 105 contacts with Ambassador Rabin, 31 Jerusalem Embassy, 174– 75 discredited by Yom Kippur War, Jews (Russian), 155 44 Johnson, Lyndon B., 14, 20 as foreign minister, 18 Jordan, 15 goals as prime minister, 32 insistence on keeping territorial Keren, Michale, 95, 96 gains, 43 222 Index

Meir, Golda (continued) and continued terrorism, 163 opposes Sinai pullout, 36 corruption in, 164 rejects a Palestinian state, 145 Covenant of, 205–6n22 resigns as prime minister, 46 creation, 13 and War of Attrition, 36 goal of independent Palestinian Meretz Party, 138, 140, 141 state, 168 Meridor, Dan, 106 opposes UN resolution, 242 Mubarek, Hosni, 123, 148 promises recognition of Israel, 127, 159 Narkiss, Uzi, 21 suspends Oslo Declaration of Nasser, Abdel Gamal Principles, 165 death of, 37 threat posed by Hamas and and 1956 campaign, 7, 8 Islamic Jihad, 151 seeks Soviet arms, 36 Palestinians and Six-Day War, 13– 14, 18, 23 expulsion of, 3, 5 and War of Attrition, 34 Palmach, 2, 6 National Religious Party (NPR), 61, Peres, Shimon 67, 68, 69 accepts idea of joint US-Soviet Netanyahu, Benjamin (Bibi) force in Sinai, 56 and American Jews, 125 contrasted with Rabin, 29 becomes prime minister, 182 defeats Rabin for party leadership, and protests against Rabin, 174, 101 175 defends self against Rabin’s and South Africa policy, 63, 113 charges, 93 Nixon, Richard and Dimona nuclear reactor, 10, assures Israeli security, 38 28 favored by Rabin, 39 early life, 11 relationship with Rabin, 31, 32 electoral defeat, 129 and US aid to Israel, 34 and Entebbe raid, 65, 66 and US airlift to Israel, 43 establishes contact with PLO, 111 as foreign affairs minister, 140– 41 O’Brien, Conor Cruise, 27– 28, 35, heads national unity government, 86, 191n6 106, 109 Ofer, Abraham, 69 and military procurement, 6 O’Neill, James Edward (Tip), 71 as minister of defense, 47, 68 Oslo Accord, 143–60 as minister of information, 45 Declaration of Principles, 143 and Oslo talks, 151 deterioration of, 161–62, 163– and Rabin’s promotion, 10 64, 165, 168–69 as Rabin’s successor, 181– 82 Oslo II, 169, 175 reconciliation with Rabin, 178–79 response to intifada, 125–26 Palestine and settlement policy, 49 partition of, 3 shows greater moderation Palestine Liberation Organization towards Palestinians, 85, 163 (PLO) and talks with PLO, 133 Index 223

Peres-Rabin rivalry, 65, 68, 69, 67, contrasted with European- born 70, 81 Israeli leaders, 129 Peri, Yoram, 141 critical of President Ford, 53 Phalangist militia, 102 criticism by Begin, 59, 68 Pollard case, 111 criticism of Likud, 86 criticized by doves, 112 Rabat conference, 53, 54 and “death squads,” 120–21 Rabin, Dalia, 6 defends Leah in bank account Rabin, Leah scandal (see Rabin, Leah) and bank account affair, 39, 71–72, as defense minister (before 73, 74 intifada), 101–14 condemnation of Netanyahu, 178 denies Israeli “mafia” charge, 74 and International Year of the and Dimona nuclear reactor, 10, Women’s Conference, 84 110, 148 marries Rabin, 4 and diplomacy, 5 perception of Rabin, 70, 85, 141 early life of, 1, 2, 3 on Rabin as defense minister, 106 early negotiations with PLO, 111 and Rabin’s breakdown, 20 early willingness to compromise, rejects charges of Rabin as ix alcoholic, 137 economic views, 12, 49, 64, 78– Rabin, Nehemiah, 2 79, 82, 171–72 Rabin, Rosa, 2 as electoral campaigner, 102, 133, Rabin, Yitzhak 134, 136, 137, 138 accepts Oslo talks, 151–53, 154–55, electoral platform, 135– 36, 138, 156, 157, 158–59, 169 140, 141 admiration of Kissinger, 32, 36, 92 endorses Palestinian elections, 122 as ambassador, 27– 40, 96 and Entebbe, 64, 65 and American Jews, 31, 39 and eviction of Palestinians, 6, 95 animosity toward Peres, 11 (see evolution of, 198n19, 199n17 also Peres-Rabin rivalry) failure to articulate policies, 167 and antiterrorism, 150, 167, 169, and (first) Intifada, 115–19, 121 173 funeral of, 177, 178 and Ariel Sharon, 22– 23, 59 goals as ambassador, 29 assassination analyses, 179 and Gush Emunim (see Gush assassination of, 176 Emunim) attitude toward diplomats, 30– 31 handshake with Arafat, 159 biographical treatment of, viii, x and his critics, viii–ix celebrates Israeli security, 41– 42, inaugural speech to Knesset, 46 144– 45 characteristics and personality of, and Israeli foreign policy, 32, 49, 10, 29, 85, 133, 178 (see also 54, 61, 64, 78, 144, 148 Rabin, Leah: perception of and Jordanian option, 48, 50, 51, Rabin) 119, 121 condemned by orthodox rabbis, and Lebanese War, 102, 104, 171, 175, 176 105, 107 224 Index

Rabin, Yitzhak (continued) and “Second Sinai,” 55, 56, 57 as lecturer, 39, 84, 90 seeks political solution to and Memoirs, 91– 96 Palestinian question, 123, 127 memorialized, 180 and settlements, 48, 50, 62, 113, as MK (member of Knesset), 40, 114, 132, 162, 164, 168– 69, 44– 45, 77, 81– 82, 86 170 and negotiating with terrorists, signs chemical weapons 107 (see also Entebbe raid) convention and nuclear test nervous breakdown, 18– 19, 137 ban treaty, 148 and Nixon, 84 signs peace treaty with Jordan, and NPR (see National Religious 155– 56 Party) and Sinai campaign, 7, 8 opposes Rogers Plan, 38 and Sinai withdrawal, 36, 37–38 opposition to Meir, 38 Six- Day War, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, and a Palestinian state, 24, 29, 22 30, 50, 128, 156– 57, 163, and South Africa, 63 181 speech to AIPAC, 174 and Palmach, 3, 6, 95 states support of a two-state and peace campaign, 108 solution, 97–99 and the PLO, ix support of Republican Party, 39 and President Carter, 86 and Syrian overture, 146– 47 pride in ambassadorship, 39–40 and troop training, 6 and primary system, 85 and US aid to Israel, 10, 29 as prime minister (first term), view of Arab states, 11 41– 65 view of Arafat, 53 promoted to chief of staff, 10 view of Camp David Accords, 83 protests against, 161, 165, 167, view of Sadat initiative, 87–88, 168, 170, 173, 175 89, 90 and public opinion polls, 158 view of United States, 28, 31, 40, questions annexation of Arab 54, 58, 59 land, 24 and War of Attrition, 34, 35, 37 recognizes intifada as popular and War of Independence, 3, 4, 5 uprising, 122–23 Rabin, Yuval, 6 regains party leadership, 96–97, Rabinovich, Abraham, 43 129, 130, 132–33 Rabinovitch, Itmar, 146 reined in by Israeli judiciary, 121 Rabin- Peres rivalry, 46, 48–49, 51, resignation as prime minister, 59, 60, 61, 92–93, 130 67– 79 See also Rabin, Yitzhak: and resigns Labor Party leadership, Memoirs 90, 91 Rafael, Gideon, 36 return as prime minister and Reagan, Ronald, 98, 120 defense minister, 127– 41, Remez, Gideon, 14, 15 138– 40 Rogers, William, 34, 36, 38 rivalry with Peres (see Peres-Rabin Ross, Dennis, 146 rivalry) Russia, 155 Index 225

Sadat, Anwar Sinai (first) withdrawal, 46 and Camp David Accords, 79 Slater, Robert, 22 first peace initiative (1971), 37 Socialist International, 85, 150 legacy of, 123, 124 Soviet Union preference for United States over aid to Egypt, 34 Soviets, 54, 86–87 collapse of, 155 separate peace with Israel, 87–88 Jewish emigration from, 128, 172 Sapir, Pinhas, 46 and the Six-Day War, 13, 15 Savir, Uri, 151 Syria Schneerson, Menachem, 129 rejection of Rabin’s overtures, Schweid, Eliezer, 173 146– 47 Settler Movement, 61 and the Six-Day War, 12, 15 See also Gush Emunim See also al-Assad, Hafez Shamir, Yitzhak compares Arafat to Hitler, 145 Tower Committee, 110 endorses Palestinian elections, 122 United Nations (UN) loss of popularity, 132 and Resolution 242, 38, 39 and Madrid Conference, 149 United States and 1992 election, 137 and embassy in Jerusalem, 144, promotes settlements, 128 207n36 rejects land for peace, 128, 154 and the Gulf War, 121–22 rejects negotiations with PLO, and Israel, 8, 28 111– 12 and the PLO, 57 rejects plan for international pressure for Sinai withdrawal, 57, conference, 120 58 (see also Bush, George succeeds Begin as prime minister, H. W.; Carter, Jimmy; 105– 6 Clinton, Bill) Shapira, Moshe, 20 and the Six-Day War, 14 Sharansky, Natan, 135 USSR. See Soviet Union Sharon, Ariel (Arik) crosses Suez Canal, 43–44 Viorst, Milton, 7, 59 as housing minister, 108 Vorster, Balthazar Johannes, 62–63 and intifada, 121 and Lebanese War, 103– 4 War of Attrition, 34 and Phalangist massacre, 105 see also Rabin, Yitzhak and Rabin, 22–23 Weizman, Ezer, 20, 47, 76, 169, 170 as Rabin’s advisor, 59– 60 Shas Party, 141, 144 Yadlin, Asher, 69 Shin Bet, 109, 180 Yishuv, 1, 2, 6 Shultz, George, 120 Yom Kippur War, 42–44