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Home , Eliminative materialism, Qualia

Introduction to Spring 2015 Test 3 Answers

1. According to Descartes, … a. what I really am is a body, but I also possess a . b. and bodies cannot causally interact with one another. c. thoughts are really just activities in the . d. conscious states always have physical causes, but never have physical effects. e. what I really am is a mind, but I also possess a body.

2. Which of the following would Descartes agree with? a. We can conceive of existing without a body. b. We can conceive of existing without a mind. c. We can conceive of existing without either a mind or a body. d. We can’t can’t conceive of existing without a body. e. We can’t conceive of material substance.

3. Substance dualism is the view that … a. there are two kinds of minds. b. there are two kinds of “basic stuff” in the world. c. there are two kinds of physics. d. there are two kinds of people in the world, those who break the world into two kinds of people, and those that don’t. e. material substance comes in two forms, and energy.

4. We call a “accidental” (as opposed to “essential”) when ... a. it is the result of an car crash. b. it follows from a thing’s very . c. it is a property a thing can’t lose without ceasing to exist. d. it is a property a thing can lose without ceasing to exist. e. it is a property only a thinking thing could have.

5. According to Descartes, material things are ... a. extended, but non-thinking. b. thinking, but non-extended. c. both thinking and extended. d. neither thinking nor extended. e. things that exist only in our minds.

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6. Descartes argues that minds and bodies cannot be identical because ... a. minds are divisible but bodies are not. b. minds occupy space but bodies do not. c. bodies are divisible but minds are not. d. bodies are conscious but minds are not. e. bodies have but minds do not.

7. One problem with mind/body dualism is that … a. it apparently cannot explain how minds and bodies could interact causally. b. it apparently cannot explain how bodies could interact causally with each other. c. it apparently cannot explain how minds could interact causally with each other. d. it denies that bodies occupy space. e. it denies the of brain states.

8. (as discussed in the last chapter) … a. is a variety of substance dualism. b. urges us to have high moral standards. c. is a variety of substance . d. is a variety of . e. none of the above.

9. in life after death is apparently incompatible with … a. the view that mental states are identical to brain states. b. idealism. c. theism. d. the view that minds and bodies constitute two different kinds of basic substance. e. substance monism.

10. (as described by Jackson) claims/implies that … a. everything that exists is made of matter. b. everything can (in ) be explained by physical or material laws and . c. there is only one kind of basic stuff in the world. d. there is no immaterial mind or . e. all of the above.

3 11. … a. claims that mental states are identical to brain states. b. denies the existence of brain states. c. is a variety substance dualism. d. denies the existence of subjective . e. none of the above.

12. Which of the following is not a variety of substance monism? a. . b. Eliminative materialism. c. The . d. Idealism. e. None of the above—i.e., all of the above are varieties of substance monism.

13. Which of the following is not a variety of materialism? a. The identity theory. b. Substance dualism. c. Eliminative materialism. d. Epiphenomenalism. e. None of the above—i.e., all of the above are varieties of materialism.

14. According to the identity theory… a. a person’s true identity resides in his/her immaterial soul. b. no two blades of grass are completely identical. c. minds are identical to . d. all minds are identical. e. mental states are identical to brain states.

15. According to Leibniz’ Law, if “A” and “B” are identical, .... a. they must have all the same properties. b. they must be twins. c. they cannot have all the same properties. d. their essential properties must be the same, but their accidental properties might be different. e. their accidental properties must be the same, but their essential properties might be different.

4 16. Carruthers argues for the identity theory because at least some mental states apparently … a. don’t really exist. b. cause physical events. c. are identical to other mental states. d. are immaterial. e. can exist in Turing complete computers.

17. Carruthers that … a. all mental states are really brain states. b. only some mental states are really brain states. c. no mental states are really brain states. d. mental states don’t really exist. e. the existence of qualia is incompatible with epiphenomenalism.

18. Carruthers discusses an argument against the Identity Theory known as the Argument from . According to that argument (NOT his rebuttal of it) … a. some brain states are . b. some after images are green. c. all brain states are green. d. we can’t be certain whether or not we ever really see after images. e. no qualia are green.

19. In his rebuttal of the Argument from Color, Carruthers argues that … a. some after-images are literally green. b. no after-images are literally green. c. some brain states are literally green. d. none of the above. e. exactly two of the above.

20. If the identity theory is true, then … a. life after bodily death is impossible. b. nothing without a brain can think. c. is some kind of neurological event. d. all of the above. e. none of the above.

5 21. According to the identity theory… a. there simply are no such things as mental states. b. mental events are real, but causally impotent. c. mental states are non-physical states that have physical causes and physical effects. d. mental states are states of an immaterial soul. e. mental states really are brain states, the way that lightening bolts really are electrical discharges.

22. Epiphenomenalism is (or includes) the view that … a. qualia are caused by physical events, but do not themselves cause physical events. b. some (but not all) physical events are caused by mental events. c. all physical events are caused by mental events. d. there simply are no such things as qualia (or other mental events). e. qualia cause physical events, but are not themselves caused by physical events.

23. According to Jackson, given that qualia are real, ... a. physicalism must be true. b. materialism must be false. c. epiphenomenalism must be false. d. they (qualia) must cause physical events. e. epiphenomenalism is the only alternative to dualism.

24. Given the way that Jackson (and others) uses the term, which of the following are not “qualia?” a. the itchiness of itches. b. the biological causes of . c. the hurtfulness of pains. d. the of a lemon. e. the smell of a rose.

25. The problem that (the existence of) qualia apparently poses for physicalism is that … a. qualia cannot be directly experienced, but can only be inferred. b. qualia cannot, in principle, be described by any purely mentalistic theory or description. c. qualia cannot, in principle, be described by any purely physical theory or description. d. qualia are too small to be detected by current scientific instrumentation. e. qualia must be immaterial.

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26. According to Jackson, a “qualia freak” is one who … a. likes to eat small poultry for dinner. b. is obsessed with a former United States Vice President. c. believes that all () is ultimately information (truth) about physical things. d. believes that all information (truth) is ultimately information (truth) about qualia. e. none of the above.

27. Qualia, given the way Jackson uses this term, are … a. physical things, explainable in terms of the laws of physics. b. proof of substance dualism. c. necessarily subjective, and so cannot be fully described by any objective description. d. non-existent, i.e., nobody actually has any. e. necessarily objective, and so cannot be fully described by any subjective description.

28. According to Jackson, “physicalism” implies that everything that exists is physical and that … a. everything can, in principle, be explained by mentalistic . b. most, but not all things, can, in principle, be explained by physical theories. c. nothing can, in principle, be explained by physical theories. d. everything can, in principle, be explained by physical theories. e. quale are really quite tasty.

29. Jackson believes that one could know everything there is to know about color and still not know what looks like. From this he infers that … a. there really isn’t anything that red looks like. b. there are facts that cannot be explained by philosophy. c. there are facts that cannot be explained by . d. there are facts that cannot be explained by physics. e. facts are causally impotent.

30. Jackson thinks the existence of qualia is … a. directly known by first-person . b. proof of eliminative materialism. c. directly observed in the of others. d. highly doubtful, but not impossible. e. evidence that computers can think.

7 31. According to Jackson, knowing everything about the physical stuff that makes up the universe … a. is knowing everything there is to know. b. is not logically possible. c. is required to pass this test. d. would allow us to have of other people’s qualia, but not our own. e. would still not entail knowledge of what a rose smells like.

32. When Jackson says that “qualia are an excrescence,” what he means is that … a. they are excreted by quails. b. they do not exist. c. they are unknowable. d. they are illusory. e. we don’t understand why we have them.

33. According to Jackson, epiphenomenalism … a. could account for the truth of physicalism. b. could account for the existence of qualia without implying substance dualism. c. is compatible with the truth of idealism. d. establishes the truth of substance dualism. e. could account for the existence of qualia without implying materialism.

34. Turing believes that ... a. mental states are identical to brain states. b. only human beings can think. c. only beings that can pass this test can think. d. only things that can pass the Turning test can think. e. none of the above.

35. The determines that a computer can think when … a. its responses to questions are indistinguishable from the responses a human would give. b. it does something it was not programmed to do. c. the electronic signals of the computer processor are identical to those inside a human brain. d. its responses are indistinguishable from the responses a pet dog could give. e. it performs math problems better than a human being can.

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36. In what way(s) does Turing believe that his test is fair? a. It only asks questions a computer could answer. b. It does not discriminate based on the appearance or physical abilities of the thing being tested. c. The test relies only upon direct access to "inner states of consciousness." d. All of the above. e. None of the above.

37. What is the "objection from consciousness" to Turing's test? a. Testing consciousness is circular because one must be conscious to evaluate the test from consciousness. b. Only conscious things think. Computers are not conscious. So, computers cannot think. c. has shown that some animals that do not exhibit any linguistic behavior are conscious. d. Each of us has knowledge only of our own consciousness, so we can be sure only that we ourselves think. e. In order to be conscious, a thing must be created by God, not programmed by a human being.

38. Turing's response to the "objection from consciousness" is that it leads to … a. dualism. b. epiphenomenalism. c. denying that the existence of qualia. d. . e. denying that computers can think.

39. According to Turing, the interesting thing in thinking about computers is that … a. it forces us to look at how we can tell that something other than ourselves have conscious mental states. b. it forces us to think about gates. c. it helps us understand why immaterial souls could never have conscious mental states. d. it helps us understand that computers can never have souls. e. it forces us to look at how we can tell that we ourselves have conscious mental states.

40. If you are glad this test and this chapter are finally over, … a. you must not have any mental states. b. you must not have any brain states. c. your mental states must really be messed up. d. your brain must be under the influence of some mood-altering chemical. e. you have learned by now that “e.” is always the correct answer to the last question on the test.