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Resolute Agency in Confucian Role Ethics

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Resolute Agency in Confucian Role Ethics Resolute Agency in Confucian Role Ethics Joseph Harroff Department of Philosophy University of University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa Ph.D. Thesis Submitted on April 30th, 2018 Abstract: This dissertation philosophically reconstructs a Si-Meng lineage (思孟學派) of Confucian role ethics and engages in intercultural explorations of non- foundational and resolute agency in ameliorating ethical and political discourse. A family-centric, focus-field dynamic of persons is presupposed in historical and philosophical reconstruction of this living tradition of Confucian role ethics. The guiding idea of "resolute agency" (shendu 慎獨) is explored in a metaethical conceptual constellation within a qi 氣-based correlative cosmology and relational ontology of persons, understood as role-encumbered becomings, rather than discrete metaphysical entities or foundational subjects of ethical-political discourse. Drawing upon recent developments in pragmatism, hermeneutic phenomenology, and other philosophical movements that attempt to think through creative agency, without positing foundational, discrete subjects, this dissertation situates a reconstructed Si-Meng conception of "resolute agency" within larger intercultural comparative philosophical conversations in order to expand the interpretive horizons available to co-creative participants in an intergenerational communicating community of "tian commanding" (tianming 天命) exemplary ethical inquirers striving to realize provisional and disclosive moral truths in experience. Key Words: Agency, Ars Contextualis, Axiology, Becoming, Confucianism, Correlative Thinking, dao 道, de 德, Disclosive Theory of Truth, shendu 慎獨, Somaesthetics, Relational Conception of Persons, Role Ethics, ming 命, tian 天, xin 心, xing 性, zhen 真, zhi 知. Resolute Agency in Confucian Role Ethics: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Si-Meng (思孟) Thinking Introduction (pp. iii-xxix) I. Reconstructing Si-Meng Confucian Role Ethics: Thinking Through Ethical Agency Beyond Foundational Individualism i) The Need for Philosophical Translation as Ars Contextualis (pp.1-8) ii.) Reconstructing a Si-Meng (思孟) lineage of Confucian Role Ethics (pp.8-12) iii.) John Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy (pp.12-20) iv.) Relational Internalism (pp.20-26) v.) Embodied Ethical Agency (pp.27-32) vi.) Relational Ontology of Persons and Transactional Affect (pp.33-37) vii.) Musical Flourishing Beyond Ethical Perfectionism (pp.37-45) II. "Waymaking Begins with Feeling" (dao shi yu qing)道始於情—The Role of Affect in Si-Meng Moral Theory i.) Confucian Metaethics and Pragmatic Moral Realism (pp.46-51) ii) Qing 情 as Embodied Moral Feeling (pp.51-80) iii) Pragmatism and Affect Theory (pp.80-85) iv) Confucian Affect and Moral Sentiment Theory (pp.85-90) v) Si-Meng Ethical Feelings in the "Nature Emerges from Commanding Situations" (Xingzimingchu 性自命出) (pp.91-105) III. "Resolute Becoming" (shendu 慎獨) as a Non-Foundational Ground for Agential Realism in Confucian Role Ethics i) Commanding Vital Energies in Si-Meng Thinking (pp.106-118) ii) Moral Beauty, Virtuosic Conduct, and Si-Meng Moral Physiognomy (pp.119-126) iii) Ethical Agency, Wordless Teaching, and Caring for Relational Potential (pp. 126- 135) iv) Agential Realism and Non-Foundational Si-Meng Moral Agency (pp.135-150) IV. Comparative Philosophy, Phenomenology and Hermeneutics: A Methodological Interlude i) Phenomenology and Hermeneutics (pp.151-152) ii) Departing from Foundationalist Phenomenology with the Myth of the Given (pp.153-166) iii) Paul Ricouer's Hermeneutics of Traditional Belonging: Navigating Suspicion and Faith (pp.166-169) iv) Reconstructing Si-Meng Daotong 道統 in a Horizon of Inter-Cultural Comparative Philosophy (pp.170-197) i V. The Contemporary Significance of "Resolute Agency" Shendu and the Recovery of its "True" Meaning in Si-Meng Horizonal Hermeneutics i) Received Glosses of shendu 慎獨 and the hermeneutical challenges of excavated texts: Rereading "Focusing the Familiar" and "Expansive Learning" after Guodian (pp.198-209) ii) Creative Agency without Metaphysical Foundations (pp.209-218) iii) Xunzi and Zhuangzi on "True-ing" (shen 慎) and "Singular Transforming" (du 獨) (pp.218-226) iv) Rhythmanalysis and a cheng 誠 disclosive theory of 'truth' (pp.226-249) v) William James' Stream of Consciousness and a Focus-Fringe Model of Selective Attention (pp.250-253) vi) A Dynamic Focus-Field Model of Confucian Role Ethical Agency: "Resolute Becoming" (shendu 慎獨) and "Creative Integrity" (cheng 誠) as ends-in-view (pp.254-261) Conclusion (pp.262-264) Bibliography (265-275) ii Introduction The writing of this dissertation has been a real adventure. The decision to embark upon this particular project of reconstructing a Si-Meng lineage (思孟學派) of Confucian role ethical thinking for intervening critically in present ethical and metaethical discourse was not made from any autonomous position of liberal choice. Rather this topic has been slowly but surely coming into focus for me as a result of being a unique participant in the University of Hawaii's historically distinctive philosophy department and as an emergent contributor to an ongoing intergenerational conversation of comparative philosophy. All of the esteemed teachers, fellow students, and friendly colleagues I've come to know during the course of my PhD program have been instrumental (in a deeply Deweyan sense) in helping me to think through the vital importance of ethically concerning oneself with the various levels of "selving"—that is, processes of becoming a distinctive self in a relational field of unique embodiment. As I reflect upon my experience as a graduate student and teacher, happening alongside of many other family commitments and social associations, living as a unique member of multiple interpretive communities, I find no way of making sense of my particular narrative or how I became interested in the particular subject-matter of this dissertation without appealing directly to a felt transactional sense of my embodied aspiration for integrity or ethical self-in-the-making. Often feeling like I might be in a similar boat with David Hume especially when he speaks about turning inward to seek a true self, but could find nothing other than a series of fleeting impressions, I would differ however insofar as my felt impressions are never just atomized sense data iii given to a solipsistic theatre of the mind, but are always alive with richly emotional content and relationally-constituted narrative meanings that preclude the possibility of understanding anything that 'I' think, say, or do as being somehow the product of an autonomous, rational, subjective consciousness or some metaphysically given faculty of discrete will power. Perhaps then these sorts of philosophical reflections on my own narrative becoming are an integral part of the reasons that have drawn me to exploring the Si- Meng lineage conceptual cluster of thinking about persons as role-focused becomings or as ritual vessels of qi 氣 embodiment. My personal philosophical inclinations towards pragmatism, agential realism, and Confucian philosophy— striving to be sinologically informed especially with ongoing developments in archaeological excavations and intertextual interpretations—obviously has brought me to this particular constellation of themes and working arguments in this dissertation. But it has truly been a process of "focusing the familiar" (zhongyong 中 庸) for me as I've patiently and methodically worked to realize theoretical insights through my embodied personal experience. I think the emerging picture of a Si- Meng lineage of early Confucian role ethics is the most apt to describe a fully relational conception of persons while still articulating a richly "internal" language of creative agency. The idea of critical amelioration and "individually" located moral agency can be articulated without appealing to some transcendent or metaphysically vacuous conception of persons that appeals to supernatural or non- relational phenomenon in conceiving of creativity, agency, and persons in the world. A richly realist and vibrantly materialist conception of persons is presupposed iv throughout my philosophical reconstruction of Si-Meng Confucian role ethics and I see nothing in any of the texts I work with to challenge this basic theoretical orientation. I'm now convinced that my unique narrative selving process has brought me to this very juncture of a transactionally realized potential—the past, present, and future are all open for revisionary readings and imaginative reconstructions here— and I will invite the reader to the conclusion of this dissertation to see where this all might lead going forward. In what follows, I will briefly outline each section and provide some synoptical comments to help guide the reader through this work and hopefully begin to provoke some imaginative responses for making better use of this text. Chapter One "Reconstructing Si-Meng Confucian Role Ethics: Thinking Through Ethical Agency Beyond Foundational Individualism" sets the stage for the major themes and theoretical stances of this dissertation. The main focus in this chapter initially is to simply introduce this particular historical-philosophical lineage of Si-Meng Confucianism. And then next to begin to offer some interwoven bits of convincing evidence for thinking that this tradition still has much to offer us in advancing contemporary inter-cultural philosophical discursive formations, especially regarding reconstructing a non-foundational, yet pragmatically realist conception of embodied
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