The Indian Parliament As an Institution of Accountability
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The Indian Parliament as an Institution of Accountability Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta Democracy, Governance and Human Rights United Nations Programme Paper Number 23 Research Institute January 2006 for Social Development This United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Programme Paper has been produced with the support of UNRISD core funds. UNRISD thanks the governments of Denmark, Finland, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom for their core funding. Copyright © UNRISD. Short extracts from this publication may be reproduced unaltered without authorization on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to UNRISD, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. UNRISD welcomes such applications. 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ISSN 1020-8186 Contents Acronyms ii Summary/Résumé/Resumen iii Summary iii Résumé iv Resumen v Introduction 1 Historical Overview 2 Basic structure of the Indian Parliament 3 Parliament and changing voter preferences 4 The Lok Sabha (House of the People): Some general trends 5 Mechanisms of Accountability 8 No-confidence motions 9 The opposition 10 Parliamentary committees 11 Assurances and accountability 15 Legislation and Accountability 15 Private members’ bills 16 Understanding Parliament’s Weakness as an Institution of Accountability 16 The declining reputation of Parliament 16 Legislators and constituencies 19 Some Implications of Parliament’s Weakness as an Institution of Accountability 22 Role of Parliament in economic reform 22 Parliament and financial accountability 24 Ordinances and circumventing Parliament 25 International treaties and the diminishing power of Parliament 26 Conclusion 29 Bibliography 33 UNRISD Programme Papers on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights 35 Figures Figure 1a: Educational levels of the first Lok Sabha (1952–1957) 7 Figure 1b: Educational levels of the sixth Lok Sabha (1977–1979) 7 Figure 1c: Educational levels of the twelfth Lok Sabha (1998–1999) 7 Figure 2: Ages of the members of Lok Sabhas since independence 8 Tables Table 1: Government turnover in India 5 Table 2: First-time MPs: Seventh and eighth Lok Sabhas versus the twelfth and thirteenth Lok Sabhas 6 Table 3: Distribution of the number of terms served by MPs, first to thirteenth Lok Sabhas 6 Table 4: Percentage of assurances implemented, 1985–2002 15 Table 5: Number of bills passed by Parliament 16 Table 6: Number of sittings of Parliament, 1952–2003 18 Table 7: Ordinances promulgated by the president, 1952–1999 26 Acronyms BJP Bharatiya Janata Party CAG Comptroller and Auditor General DRSC departmentally related standing committee GDP gross domestic product MP member of Parliament MPLADS Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights WTO World Trade Organization ii Summary/Résumé/Resumen Summary This paper examines the institutional challenges facing the Indian Parliament. It argues that over the years there has been a decline in the effectiveness of Parliament as an institution of accountability and oversight. It shows that the instruments that Parliament can use for accountability—motions on the floor, oversight powers, the committee system—are increas- ingly being rendered dysfunctional. The fact that the Indian economy is globalizing has also eroded the power of Parliament in two respects. Much of economic decision making is now increasingly governed by international treaties, and the Indian Parliament is one of the few parliaments in the world that does not have a system of effective treaty oversight in place. These treaties are a fait accompli by the time they come to Parliament. Second, the Indian state, like many other states, is restructuring its regulatory framework with more powers being delegated to non-elected institutions. This process of delegation can increase transparency and accountability, but parliamentary oversight of these institutions remains very weak. The weakness of the Indian Parliament has often slowed down legislation. But it has also given the executive more powers. The authors argue that these are manifest in the increasing number of ordinances that have been used as a substitute for legislation and weak financial oversight. After years of wrangling, the Parliament finally passed the Fiscal Budget Responsibility and Management Act as a means of putting financial discipline on the government. But day-to-day parliamentary scrutiny of the executive in financial matters remains weak. In 2002, when the Indian Parliament celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, Indian commentators rued the palpable decline of what Jawaharlal Nehru had termed as the “majesty” of Parliament. With much of Parliament’s time wasted on rowdiness and disorder, and theatrics replacing debate, there are serious concerns about whether Parliament has become dysfunctional. While “unparliamentary” behaviour by members of Parliament (MPs) has undoubtedly robbed Parliament of the mystique that often underpins authority, the weakness of Parliament as an institution of accountability stems from many factors, both within and outside the institution. While India’s public institutions need wide-ranging reform, Parliament faces a daunting challenge. First, it is increasingly becoming ineffective in providing surveillance of the executive branch of government. The oversight function of the legislative branch of government is always likely to be highly politicized. Parliament is, after all, a political body, which represents constituent interests, brokers deals, and advocates views in a partisan manner. Nonetheless, even relative to these limited expectations, one would expect the oversight function to be stronger in an era where there is widespread disenchantment with government and resource scarcity is acute—rather than the converse. Second, there is an ever-growing gap between the complex demands that modern legislation places upon MPs on the one hand, and their capacity and inclination for attending to that legislation on the other. Third, the profusion of political parties in Parliament, most of which are institutionally weak, has substantially increased the barriers to collective action. But if this paper has any implications for these issues, it is to emphasize that, to a large degree, Parliament’s inability to come to terms with these challenges is as much of its own making as the product of any general structural changes in Indian politics, or the economy. Rather, the Indian Parliament has self-abdicated many of its functions. For example, the authors find no reason whatsoever, other than indifference, to explain why the committee oversight system is so weak. They assert that Indian politics has become a lot more fractious and fragmented. In such an environment, the imperatives of electoral and party politics give politicians great incentives to delay important legislation just for the sake of delay. The delay in legislation does not mean that there is better qualitative improvement in legislation. It simply means that Parliament is more an oppositional space rather than a forum for genuine debate. There is also a growing sense that for individual MPs, doing good work in Parliament is not linked to any political iii rewards, either in their constituencies or within their political parties. This reduces the incentives for good parliamentary performance. While it is true that legislation is becoming increasingly complex and demands a set of technical skills few parliamentarians possess, much of the inattention to legislative matters is due to Parliament’s own predilections and incentive structures. Parliament is becoming a less effective voice on fiscal management, on the economy, on social policy and on the terms on which India is integrating into the global economy, because of self-abdication and not because of uncontrollable exogenous factors. According to the authors, however, in so far as structural changes in Indian politics have led to an adverse self-selection in who enters politics, and thereby the calibre of persons likely to enter Parliament, one cannot be too optimistic about the capacity of Parliament to rejuvenate itself. More important than the changes in the professional background of MPs is that those charged with making laws may be law breakers themselves. This does not augur well for the credibility of the Indian Parliament. Devesh Kapur is Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University, United States, and Pratap Bhanu Mehta is Professor of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Résumé Cette étude porte sur les défis institutionnels du parlement indien. Les auteurs font valoir qu’au fil des années le parlement comme institution de contrôle a perdu de son efficacité. Ils montrent que les instruments dont le parlement peut se servir à cette fin—motions de parlementaires, pouvoirs de contrôle, commissions—ont été peu à peu rendus disfonctionnels. Le processus de mondialisation de l’économie indienne a aussi grignoté