1984

Syria’sNew-foundStrength–SyriaExpelsArafat–SyriaOpposesthe US –Syria TorpedoesLebanon-IsraelAgreement–DefenceExpenditureStillPre-eminent

Within a year of Syria’s humiliation during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in sum- mer1982PresidentHafezal-Assadsucceededinmakingaremarkablerecoveryasa key actor on the regional political scene. InSeptember1982itseemedasifSyria’spositioninLebanonhadbeenper- manently weakened with the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organisa- tion (PLO) from Beirut and the election of Amin Gemayel as president following the assassination of his brother Béchir who had become president only a month earlier. The previous president, Elias Sarkis, had been Syria’s choice in 1976, but the Gemayel family founded and leads the Phalangist Party which has long demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Leba- non. With Amin Gemayel’s election the way seemed clear for the imposition of a US-sponsored agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Byautumn1983,however,PresidentAssadcouldcongratulatehimselfona string of political successes. The Soviet Union’s regional prestige had recov- ered from the disastrous performance of the Soviet-equipped Syrian forces duringtheIsraeliinvasioninwhichmorethan80MiG23swereshotdownin the first three weeks alone. The Soviet Union provedeager to mendthe dam- age and massively reinforced Syria’s military strength in the months follow- ing the invasion. This greatly bolstered Assad’s bargaining position in relation to the US.

Poweroverthe PLO Assad was able to use the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut and the regrouping of manyofitspoliticalandmilitaryleadersinSyriaandSyriancontrolledareasofLeb- anontoexerthisfullpoweroverthemovement–somethinghehadlongwishedto do. He succeeded in greatly undermining the authority of PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat,andinensuringthedeathoftheReaganplanthroughhisvehementopposi- tion to the negotiations on the plan between Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan. Syria was also able to use its new-found strength to undermine the Lebanon-Is- rael withdrawal accord of 17 May, and to show the US that Syria must be brought into any agreement on Lebanon and the Middle East. By September 1983 President Gemayel’s hold on Lebanon was precarious, fierce fighting having broken out

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/978900439�533_0�0 1984 103 again and the country trembling on the brink of all-out civil war. Syria had once again proved its capacity to determine the course of events in Lebanon, partly through its firm alliance with a number of groups opposed to the government. There were indeed signs that the US had realised its mistake in leaving Syria out of negotiations in Lebanon, and there appeared to be quiet moves to improve rela- tions between the two countries. At home, the opposition to Assad’s regime had entered a quiescent phase af- ter the siege of Hama in February 1982 which cost up to 30,000 civilian lives. But despite his successes in 1983, Assad faced continuing economic pressures and widespreadifpassivediscontentathome.

SovietUnionBolstersAssad’sPosition The boosting of Syria’s defences by the USSR (Soviet Union) accounted in large measure for Assad’s renewed confidence, and gave teeth to his stand on Lebanon and wider Middle Eastern issues. The question of SAM-5 missiles caused much con- sternationinIsraelandthe US inearly1983.The SAM-5missileshavearangeofupto 190 miles and thus cover all of Lebanon and much of Israel and Jordan. Sites for SAM-5s were set up at Dumeir near Damascus and at Shinshar near Homs. Western intelligence sources warned that the SAM-5s were a challenge to the NATO base at Incirlik in Turkey and to the US Sixth Fleet’s air power. They said the missiles could threaten planned US air bases in eastern Turkey which were to handle NATO fighter planes and possibly also the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The SAM-5s provided the core of a sophisticated air defence network stretching from the Jordanian border in the south up to Latakia in the north. Some sources spoke of 100 missile sites including SAM-6s and SAM-3s, and 30 early warning radar stations.ButtheSovietsalwaysregardtheirAraballieswithsomecaution,andthey seemed to be totally in control of the SAM-5 sites. As well as supplying missiles, the Soviet Union also delivered large numbers of MiG 23s, T-72 tanks and other equip- ment. There were disagreements within the US administration over what attitude should be taken towards Syria. The Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger took a typical cold-war line, describing Syria as ‘just another outpost of the Soviet Union’. Secretary of State George Shultz spoke in more measured tones, how- ever. When in January 1983 Israel revealed that the two sites for Soviet SAM-5s were being set up and made threatening noises, Shultz said the SAM-5s ‘don’t seriously threaten Israel’. Shultz has also recognised that Syria has ‘legitimate securityconcernswithrespecttoLebanon’. One reason for the concern over the Soviet missiles and the presence of perhaps 6,000 Soviet advisers was that if a Syria-Israel war broke out it would quickly drag