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KYK-13 Operation

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KYK-13 Operation KYK-13 Homepage Crypto KYK-13 Index Electronic Transfer Device - Wanted item Enigma The KYK-13 is a small electronic transfer device used by the military for the distribution of cryptographic material, commonly refererred to as Transmission Encryption Keys (TEK). It was developed by the US Hagelin National Security Agency (NSA) and uses the DS-102 protocol for key transfer. TheKYK-13 is also Fialka known by its National Stock Number NSN 5810-01-026-9618. Siemens The KYK-13 was very popular because of its KYK-13 key loader simplicity, small size and ease of use. A total of 6 Philips TEK variables can be stored in the internal memory Nema of the KYK-13, making it suitable for a variety of crypto devices, such as the KY-57 (Vinson), KY-99, Racal some SINCGARS radios, KG-84, BID/250 STK (Lamberton) and even the latest KIV-7. Transvertex It was also used with the STU-II/B, KY-68, Spendex-40, Spendex-50 (DBT) and some other Gretag crypto phones. In normal use, the device itself is Telsy filled with cryptographic material from of a key management system (KMS) or another KYK-13. Tadiran There has been some debate in the past as to the maximum length of the keys that can be stored inside USA the KYK-13. In some publications it is stated that it is only suitable for 90-bit keys and that later devices USSR (e.g. the CYZ-10) had to be used for the modern 128-bit keys [1]. This can not be true however, as all crypto phones above use the 128-bit key based SAVILLE algorithm. UK Voice The KYK-13 was first built in the 1980s and has been in service for over 30 years now. It was succeeded by a number of newer key fillers, such as the CYZ-10, the PYQ-10 and the Secure DTD2000 Hand System (SDS), but they all missed the simplicity of the KYK-13. In 2009, the US Army announced the KIK-30 RASKL (Really Simple Key Loader) which is called the modern KYK-13 replacement by its Mixers manufacturer [2]. Despite that, the KYK-13 is still used widely today (2012). The only real drawback is Phones that it only supports DS-102 and not the later DS-101 protocol. Spy sets Burst encoders Intercept Covert Radio Operation PC The KYK-13 is very easy to operate and has only a few controls. There are two rotary switches (mode Telex and address) with a recessed push button in between them (transfer). The device has two U-229 type connectors for connection to a crypto device: a male type (J1) and a female type (P1). These connectors are electrically identical and can also be used for cloning two KYK-13 devices. Donate Kits Shop At the right is the ON/OFF switch (MODE). At the left is the selector for the required crypto key compartment (1-6). The button at the center (Transfer) is used to initiate a transfer. Any activity is News indicated by the red LED. The unit can be ZEROIZED (i.e. all keys destroyed) by setting the key Events compartment selector to Z ALL (ZEROIZE ALL) and turning the MODE switch to Z (ZEROIZE). Wanted The KYK-13 is powered by a single internal 6.5V http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kyk13/index.htm[29/08/2012 12:03:35] KYK-13 6.5V battery inside the KYK-13 battery that is installed in a small compartment at Contact the rear of the unit. A small aluminium panel with Links two screws gives access to the battery and allows it to be replaced within minutes. The image on the right shows the KYK-13 after the panel has been removed. Initially, the KYK-13 was used with the Mercury- based BA-1372/U battery, which has now been superceeded by the better BA-5372/U Lithium Manganese Dioxide battery. This battery is still available for a variety of sources. The design of the KYK-13 is similar to the MX-18290 Transmission Security Key Fill Device, featuring a similar case, similar controls and identical connectors. The KYK-13 however, is much smaller and can be used for cryptographic keys, whilst the MX-18290 is only suitable for transferring Frequency Hopping tables, also known as Transmission Security Keys (TSK). In use Although the KYK-13 can be connected to any DS-102 compatible device by means of a so-called fill cable, it is constructed in such a way that it can be fitted directly to the FILL connector of most crypto devices. As it has both a male-type and a female-type connector, one will always fit. KY-68 Using the KYK-13 on a KY-68 crypto phone Just as an example, the KYK-13 is shown here on top of the KY-68 military crypto phone that was used in the US Army during the 1990s. It is connected directly to the FILL connector of the KY- 68, and was used for transferring various types of keys. More about the KY-68 Spendex 40 The KYK-13 was also a popular device outside the US Army. The image on the right shows a KYK-13 unit connected to a Philips Spendex-40 military- grade crypto phone. It is used here to load the Traffic Encryption Keys (TEK) into the secure telephone. More about Spendex 40 Over the years, the KYK-13 has arguably become the most popular fill device of all times. In fact it was so popular that it was always in short supply. It is used all over the world with a variety of devices, ranging from crypto phones and other cipher machines, to frequency hopping radios (FH) and GPS http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kyk13/index.htm[29/08/2012 12:03:35] KYK-13 devices. It is the standard by which all later key fillers are referenced. Interior The KYK-13 is a powerful yet rather simple device. It could be serviced at the depot and can be opened by removing the four bolts at the corners of the front panel. After removing the front panel, the interior becomes visible, revealing the solder side of the main Printed Circuit Board. The Printed Circuit Board (PCB) is held in place by The main PCB removed from the KYK-13 four small cross-head bolts and contains a connector (at the other side) that slots directly into another PCB that contains the controls. After removing the bolts, the PCB and easily be lifted off the lower PCB. The image on the rights shows the main PCB aside the KYK-13, with its component side facing upwards. The double-sided PCB is relatively simple and contains only a handful of components. At the lower half is the black sockets for the lower PCB. The rest of the PCB contains only two critical components: the main controller (ON512432) and a static RAM memory chip (ON202178). Both chips are custom made (OEM) by Harris. The main controller is probably a custom-designed Application Specific Integrated Circuit or ASIC. Judging from the date codes on both chips, the device shown here was made in 1986. Please note that neither the KYK-13 nor its documentation is classified or otherwise restricted. Only when the device is loaded with a valid key, it becomes classified to the level of the key. KYK-13 is approved by the NSA for the distribution of Type-1 cryptographic keys. References 1. Kathleen Hickey, DID modernizes cryptographic device Defense Systems website, 12 November 2009. Retrieved May 2012. 2. Sypris Electronics, RASKL KIK-30 Retrieved May 2012. 3. Enhanced Online News, Sypris Electronics Awarded Multi-Year $200 Million Contract... 11 November 2009. Retrieved May 2012. Further information KYK-13 on Wikipedia KYK-13 on Jerry Proc's website The similar looking MX-18290 fill device Other transfer devices Other American crypto devices http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kyk13/index.htm[29/08/2012 12:03:35] KYK-13 Main crypto page Any links shown in red are currently unavailable. If you like this website, why not make a donation? © Copyright 2009-2012, Paul Reuvers & Marc Simons. Last changed: Sat,16 Jun 2012.17:20:05 http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/kyk13/index.htm[29/08/2012 12:03:35].
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