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Yasukuni: Behind the Torii: from Government-Run Shrine for War Heroes to Bone of Contention

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Volume 3 | Issue 7 | Article ID 1967 | Jul 06, 2005 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Yasukuni: Behind the Torii: From government-run shrine for war heroes to bone of contention Yomiuri Shimbun Yasukuni: Behind the Torii: Fromcontroversies surrounding the shrine. government-run shrine for war heroes to bone of contention The first of the articles concerns the history of enshrined spirits of both common soldiers and By The Yomiuri Shimbun of Class-A war criminals (installed within the shrine in 1978). The second and third articles examine whether it is possible to relocate these problematic spirits to a new, secular war memorial. The fourth piece focuses on official [Introduction and private visits to the shrine by a succession of Japanese prime ministers, with a focus on Few institutions in Japan are as contested, Koizumi's visits during a time of great regional controversial, and complex as Yasukuni Shrine. political tension. Finally, there is a rare According to a recent editorial (June 6, 2005) in discussion about the Chidorigafuchi National the Asahi Shimbun and published in Japan Cemetery, completed in 1959 to hold the Focus, "Yasukuni Shrine... in the past served unidentified or unclaimed ashes of Japanese the purpose of providing a site to publicly soldiers killed in the war, as a possible (though manifest both grief and admiration for those still problematic) site for a more secular and who perished in conflict. In this sense, it inclusive memorial. The series presents the functioned to enhance the will to fight and religious, doctrinal and constitutional case for mobilize the populace for war." maintaining the shrine as the repository for the souls of the dead against the proposal to As the 60th anniversary of the end of the establish a site that would separately enshrine Pacific War draws closer, on June 11 to 15, the Class-A war criminals and, according to its 2005, the Yomiuri Shimbun published a four- proponents, reduce international conflicts over part series that served both to educate its 10.3 Prime Ministerial visits. million daily readers about the Shinto shrine and subtly advance an editorial policyAt present, the shrine, as the repository of the consistent with the paper's conservative vision. souls of the 2.46 million war dead, plays an important symbolic role in fueling a resurgent The series, which spans the history of the nationalism in Japan that galls Chinese, shrine from its origins in the Meiji era and its Korean, and some domestic sensibilities, close association with war and emperor, notably each time that the Prime Minister pays through its near abolition during thetribute to the shrine's war dead. occupation to the present, is introduced as simply a look "at the history and current Taken together, the Yomiuri series provides situation surrounding the shrine as well as readers of Japan Focus access to an influential issues relating to Koizumi's visits." Itperspective on the nature and substance of one references (but provides little analysis of) key of the most divisive topics in contemporary 1 3 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF Japan and East Asia. Other recent discussions of Yasukuni shrine, the monarchy, and the conflicts surrounding Prime Ministerial visits include Herbert Bix, Emperor, Shinto, Democracy: Japan's Unresolved Questions of Hitorical Consciousness; Yomiuri and Asahi,Yasukuni Shrine, Natinalism and Japan's International Relations; and John Breen,Yasukuni Shrine: ritual and memory. John Nelson] Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visits to Yasukuni Shrine have caused controversy inside and outside the nation. China and South Prior to World War II, shrines were usually Korea have strongly opposed Koizumi's visits to managed by the Interior Ministry. But Yasukuni the shrine, where Class-A war criminals along Shrine was categorized as a special with the war dead are enshrined. At home, a government shrine and operated by the army number of religious groups have also expressed and the navy ministries. opposition to the visits. This mounting criticism has renewed calls for the separateThe deities enshrined at the shrine are not enshrinement of these Class-A war criminals mythical or historical figures, but the war dead and the construction of a secular, state-run who gave their lives for the nation. Yasukuni is memorial for the war dead. This series looks at different from a tomb in that it contains neither the history and current situation surrounding the remains of the dead nor memorial tablets the shrine as well as issues relating tofor them. Koizumi's visits. The first installment focuses on the role the shrine played before and after The collective enshrinement of the war dead World War II. was informally approved by the army and navy, and then given formal approval by the emperor. Part 1. Not only military personnel and civilians serving with the military are enshrined at The origin of Yasukuni Shrine dates back to the Yasukuni, but also bureaucrats, civilians and Meiji Restoration. In June 1869, a month after cadets. the end of the Boshin Civil War--a series of battles that led to the overthrow of the At the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Tokugawa shogunate and the restoration of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the Japan- Imperial rule--Emperor Meiji built Tokyo China War (1937-45) and World War II Shokonsha to honor pro-government troops (1939-45), a ceremony was held to enshrine the who fell in battle. Located in what is now war dead, and bereaved families were invited Kudan-kita, Chiyoda Ward, it was renamed to the ceremony. The shrine thus became a Yasukuni Shrine 10 years later. The Emperor place to honor the memory of the war dead. took the name Yasukuni from a phrase in "Chunqiu Zuoshi Zhuan" (Shunju Sashiden) a Kamikaze pilots reportedly placed a Yasukuni Chinese classic, meaning "bringing peace to a amulet under their headbands and pledged to nation." meet again at Yasukuni Shrine. One sent a 2 3 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF letter to his young daughter saying, "Come to Bereaved Families Association then lobbied to Kudan whenever you want to see me after have prime ministers pay official visits to the you're grown up." shrine. Since then, a private group with ties to the shrine--Eirei-ni Kotaeru-kai (Association to Following Japan's defeat in World War II, GHQ Acknowledge the Divine Spirits of the Dead) as issued the Shinto Directive in 1945, abolishing well as a number of bereaved families have state sponsorship of Shintoism. Some GHQ pushed for official prime ministerial visits to officials suggested that Yasukuni Shrine be the shrine on Aug. 15, the anniversary of the burned to the ground. However, this did not end of World War II. happen, and in 1946 it was designated an ordinary religious corporation under a state June 11, 2005. ordinance. Part 2. In 1952, the year sovereignty was restored to the nation, a campaign for the collective Japan's Class-A war criminals were the enshrinement of the war dead was spearheaded political, diplomatic and military leaders found by bereaved families. There were about 2 guilty by the International Military Tribunal for million war dead who had yet to be enshrined the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Tribunal, at the time. of crimes against peace and other wartime atrocities in the planning and execution of wars In 1956, the Health and Welfare Ministry's of aggression. Twenty-eight Japanese wartime bureau for aiding repatriation issued a notice leaders were indicted as Class-A war criminals, on collective enshrinement at the shrine to all including Prime Minister Tojo Hideki. prefectures. The notice said that those who were acknowledged as having died in the line Seven of these war criminals received the of duty would be enshrined at Yasukuni. A list death sentence, 16 were sentenced to life of names of these war dead was compiled and imprisonment and two were imprisoned. But sent by the ministry to the shrine and was before the rulings were handed down in subsequently enshrined. The acknowledgement was made under the law on pension and the November 1948, two of the defendants had law on assistance to bereaved families of those died and one was acquitted due to reasons of who were injured or killed in the war. insanity. At the same time, demands increased that the One of the seven war criminals executed on shrine be placed under state management. In Dec. 23, 1948, was Tojo. He was the general in 1969, the Liberal Democratic Party submitted a charge of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria at bill to the Diet to place the shrine under state the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in control. But the bill was withdrawn amid fierce 1937. This clash between Japanese and Chinese confrontation between conservative andtroops, which took place southeast of Beijing, progressive forces in the Diet. was the fuse that ignited the Sino-Japanese War, which lasted until 1945. When Tojo was Similar bills were submitted to the Diet five army minister under the administration of times through 1973. But all of them failed. Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, he pushed for a tripartite pact with Germany and Italy and In 1975, Prime Minister Miki Takeo visited the supported the war against Britain and the shrine, saying he was doing so in a private United States. As prime minister, Tojo led the capacity. Groups such as the Japan War- nation into the Pacific War in 1941. 3 3 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF Other Class-A war criminals included Itagaki independence. Seishiro, who was a general in the Kwantung Army at the time of the 1931 Manchurian Under this clause, any decision based on Incident, and Doihara Kenji, who was in Japan's recommendation to pardon or parole military intelligence in Manchuria at the time Class-A criminals and commute their sentences of the same event.
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