3. The Text and Avidya

How can the identity between Brahman and Atman be known? It is through the Upanisadic texts. This chapter deals with Sankara’s making of the text, i.e. the Upanisads, with which the role of avidya is examined in its methodological usage. Indian orthodox system, especially the

Advaita Vedanta, cannot be studied precisely unless the textual foundation is elucidated in the light of “revelation”. In the case of

Sankara it is an inevitable task to place the Upanisads to be authoritative since the Upanisadic texts are always his exegetic basis for which he makes much effort to establish as the textual authority. For the sake of this, Sankara employs the logic of avidya that is nothing but the methodological usage in the process of the making of the text.

The first section asks the origin of the term “Upanisad” and its special implication in Sankara’s philosophy under the title of The

Implication of the Text. The authorless character of the Upanisadic texts requires itself to prove the authority in its internal structure, and therefore the texts are to be considered self-valid truth. However, when

Sankara admits the neutral position of the text, a certain external device should be adopted to support the chosen text, or the Upanisads. The second section. Intervention of Avidyd, is connected with that device, viz. the method of avidyd. So far as Sankara’s main opponents are

MJmdmsakas, he has to devaluate their texts by means of avidyd. This intervention of avidyd is in fact the backing of the text from outside the text, and it works together with the logic of jndna or vidyd by which the text is backed from inside the text. The logic of Jndna for the textual authority is a main topic of the third section, Jnana, Avidyd, and the

Text, and the distinction between pramdna and pramd is also made there in order to make out the position of the text in Sankara.

1. The Implication of the Text

One of the most unique features of Indian Philosophy is the postulation of verbal testimony {sabdaY as a valid means of knowledge

(pramdna). Except Cdrvdkas, Buddhists and Vaisesikas almost all philosophical systems accept sabda-pramdna for the independent source of knowledge nonetheless their different numbers of pramdna.^ However, it can be said that the verbal testimony of Mlmdmsakas and Veddntins

*The word sabda actually means a “ sound” , but as a pramdna it means “words”, which stand for “testimony” . Sabda-pramdna is therefore scriptures in general and the Vedas in particular. ^Perception, inference and authority are common to them. The Nyaya further takes analogy, and Prabhakara school of the M im am sa presumption as pramdna. Bhatta school of the M imamsa and the Advaita Vedanta recognize six pramdnas, viz. perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumdna), authority {sabda), analogy (upamdna), presumption (arthdpatti), and negation (abhdva) or non-apprehension (anupalabdhi).

71 has a special position compared to other pramanas, since their systems are closely adhered to the Vedas. The Mimarnsa and the Advaita Vedanta subscribe to the intrinsic validity of cognitions, and eternity of words, i.e. the Vedas that is not composed by one human being {apauruseyata).

Furthermore, both systems believe that such supersensual things as dharma and Brahman are revealed only through the Vedas respectively.

However, it is on these two different emphases, dharma and Brahman, that the gulf between two systems originates from two parts of the Vedas.

While the Mimarnsa secures the superiority of karma-kdnda of the Vedas over jndna-kdnda, the Vedanta systems secure jfidna-kdnda over karma- kdnda. The jndna-kdnda, i.e. the Upanisads, is for Advaitins the ultimate source of valid knowledge, and especially for Sankara it is not merely the basis or ground from which his philosophical exegeses are started but also the authority by which his interpretations are supported. In order to know what is implied in the texts or the Upanisads, we will begin to discuss the meaning and implication of the word ‘‘'Upanisad" elucidated by Sankara.

It is an obvious fact that Sankara is well acquainted with the

Upanisadic literatures. According to Paul Deussen’s examination, quotations of the Upanisads in BSB are incomparably frequent than those of other Vedic and non-Vedic scriptures.^ It is again confirmed in the case of the Upadesa-sdhasrl through Sengaku Mayeda’s investigation, according to which quotations of the Upanisads are the

Cf. Paul Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, pp. 29-35.

72 main current. The fact that a little quotation of the literatures preceding and following the Upanisads presents Sankara’s constructive interest in the Upanisadic texts. Though the Upanisads, the

Bhagavadgltd and the Brahmasutra consist of the three basic texts

(prasthdnatrayi) of the Vedanta systems, the Upanisads are in the real sense the most basic texts because of their special position and role.

Sankara never says that he creates an entirely novel doctrine, and accordingly, it is an obvious fact that he simply exposes the Vedantic views that are already established in the Upanisads. Without reference to the problem of whether Sankara was a traditional follower of the

Upanisads or a new systematic formulator, it is easy to find out how much weight Sankara has given to the Upanisadic texts throughout all his commentaries and independent work as well.

Generally the word Upanisad is known as the combination of the terms, i.e., upa (near), ni (down), and sad (sit), and thus, it means, “sit down near (some one)”. In the commentary on the Katha Upanisad it is said that the word Upanisad is derived by adding upa (near) and ni (with certainty) as prefixes and kvip^ as a suffix to the root sad, meaning to split up (destroy), go (reach, attain), or loosen.® As a consequence the

“*Cf. Sengaku Mayeda, “The Authenticity of the Upadesasahasrl ascribed to Sankara” , Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 85. 2. p. 188. Mayeda specially takes notice of the most frequent quotations of two Upanisads, Brhadaranyaka and Chandogya, in B S B and US, from which he identifies the author of U S with that of B S B . ^Kvip means krt affix zero, added to the roots sad, su, dvis, and others with a preceding word as upapada or with a prefix or sometimes even without any word ••• cf. K. V. Abhyankar, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, p. 135. ‘Cf. K a B 1.1.intro., p. 2, lines 8-9; Gambhira, p. 99: saderdhatorvisarana- gatyavasadandrthasyopanipurvasya kvippratyaydntasya rupamupanisaditi. see USII 1.26, p. 156; Mayeda, p. 105: saderupanipQrvasya kvipi copanisadbhavet, mandlkaranabhdvdcca garbhddeh sdtandttathd-, “And the word "Upanisad' may be

73 word is analyzed as;

(1) It (viz. knowledge) “splits up”, “injures”, or “destroys” the seeds of worldly existence such as ignorance etc., ••• (2) it makes the seekers after emancipation, who are possessed of the qualities already mentioned, “attain” the supreme Brahman, (3) it “weakens” or “loosens” such multitude of miseries as living in the womb, birth, old age, etc., P

f Similar expressions are clearly turned up in Sankara’s commentary on the Mundaka Upanisad:

This is called an Upanisad, because it mitigates (nisdtayati) such numerous evils as birth in a womb, old age, disease, etc., for those who approach this knowledge of Brahman with loving eagerness that is preceded by faith and devotion; or it is called so, since it leads to the supreme Brahman, and completely weakens or destroys (avasddayati) the ignorance etc. that are the causes of the world; for traditionally, the meaning of the root sad, preceded by upa and ni, is shown to be so.^

Therefore, the word Upanisad denotes the disciple’s sitting down near

derived from the verbal root ‘sad' preceded by the prefix ‘upa-' and 'ni-' and followed by the suffix 'kvip', since it diminishes and destroys birth and the like.” ; Also, see BrB 1.1.intro., p. 2, line 29: upanipurvasya sadestadarthatvdt. And also, BrB 2.1.20, p. 286, lines 13-14: ••• upanisadupa samipam nigamayati ■■■. Here, upa means takes one near to Brahman. ^KaB 1.1.intro., pp. 2-4; Gambhira, pp. 99-100: (1) tesdmavidyddeh sam- sdrr’Ajasya visarandddhimsanddvindsanddityanendrthayogena vidyopanisadityu- cyate. (2) piirvoktavisesandnmumuksunvd param brahma gamayatlti brahmagama- yitrtvena yogddbrahmavidyopanisat. (3) ••• garbhavdsajanmajarddyupadravavrn- dasya pravrttasydvasddayitrtvena saithilydpddanena apyupanisadityucyate. *M uB 1.1.intro., p. 4, lines 2-5; Gambhira, p. 75: ya imam brahmavidyd- mupayantydtmabhdvena sraddhdbhaktipurahsardh santastesdm garbhajanmajardro- gddyanarthapugam nisdtayati param vd brahma gamayatyavidydsamsdrakdranam cdtyantamavasddayati vindsayatityupanisat. upanipurvasya saderevamarthasma- randt.

74 his teacher for the purpose of receiving the knowledge of Brahman by which he can loosen miseries and evils, and destroy ignorance completely, and finally attain the supreme Brahman. In this regard, it is the knowledge of Brahman that makes such three kinds of results.

Sankara says that this knowledge of Brahman is called Upanisad, and yet books are also called Upanisads as they have the same end in view.^

Therefore, it can be said that with regard to knowledge the word

Upanisad is used in its primary sense; while with regard to a book it is used in a secondary sense.Sankara further proves, for the denotation of the word Upanisad, the more significance of the “knowledge of

Brahman” than the “books” in the light of the higher and the lower knowledge. Sankara holds the view that:

What is primarily meant in this context by the term ‘higher knowledge’, is that knowledge of the Imperishable {aksara) which is imparted only by the Upanisads (i.e. revealed knowledge), and not merely the assemblage of words found in the (books called) Upanisads.

The higher knowledge is immediate knowledge of the reality to be known from the Upanisads, and it is in this sense that the term “higher knowledge” is used primarily. On the other hand, the books called

Upanisads can be the “higher knowledge” only figuratively, since they

’Cf. BrB 1.1.intro., p. 2, lines 28-30; Madhava, p. 1: seyam brahmavidyopani- sacchabdavdcya tatparanam sahetoh samsdrasydtyantavasddandt. tddarthydd- grantho ’pyupanisaducyate. '®Cf. K a B 1.1.intro., p. 4, lines 17-18; Gambhira, p. 101: tasmddvidydydm mukhyayd vrttyopanisacchabdo vartate granthe tu bhaktyeti. ‘'M u B 1.1.5, p. 7, lines 9-10; Gambhira, p. 81: upatiisadvedydksaravisayam hi vijndnamiha para vidyeti prddhdnyena vivaksitam nopanisacchabdard^ih.

75 propound the nature of that knowledge. These facts are intimately related to the implication of the text in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, and will be talked over at the end again.

Another clue for knowing the implication of the text is concerned with the scope or realm of the Vedas. Sankara, so far as his philosophy

is based on the knowledge of Brahman in the Upanisads, is decisive to say that one cannot surmise the possibility of perceiving supersensuous things (atindriya artha) without the help of the Vedas, for there is no ground for this.'^ His assertion seems to be carried to the extreme when

we come across his another statement:

For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result ‘want of release’, viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge.'^

In these passages Sankara is of the opinion that the supersensual thing

‘^Cf. BSB 2.1.1, p. 181, lines 5-7; Gambhira, p. 302: na cdtindriydn- arthdnsrutimantarena kascidupalabhata iti sakyam sambhavayitum, nimittdbhdvdt. For atlndriydrtha, see B S B 2.1.27, p. 213, lines 14-15; 2.3.1, p. 262, lines 17-18. For atindriyavisaya, see TaB 2.6.1, p. 77, lines 10-11. ‘^BSB 2.1.11, p. 193, lines 20-24; ThibautI, p.316: yadyapi kvacidvisaye tarkasya pratistitatvamupalaksyate, tathdpi prakrte tdvadvisaye prasajyata evapratistitatvadosadanirmoksastarkasya, na hldamatigambhlram bhdvaydthdtmyam muktinibandhanamdgamamantarenotpreksitumapi sakyam. rupddyabhdvdddhi ndyam- arthah pratyaksagocarah, lingddyabhdvdcca ndnumdnddindmiti cdvocdma.

76 like Brahman, which is the cause of the world and on which the final

liberation is dependent, cannot even be conjectured without the help of

scripture (dgama). Thus Brahman that is formless is not the object of

perception, inference and the like. Each and every valid means of

knowledge has its own legitimate scope, and the scope of the scripture,

or the Upanisads, is limited only to the supersensual thing, i.e. Brahman

or Atman. Sankara says that one means of knowledge does not contradict

another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot be known by

any other means.In other words, it is so, “for the means of knowledge

are powerful in their respective spheres, like the ear etc.”*^ Each organ

of our body has a different phase of function; similarly each means of

knowledge works for its own sphere without any contradiction to others.

The scriptures, or the Vedas, or especially the Upanisads,^^ according to

Sankara, reveal an unknown and supersensual thing that does not belong

to the scope of other means of knowledge like perception, inference, etc.,

and therefore, it is from the texts that the nature of Brahman and the

realization of Brahman are known and attained. Sankara’s dependence of

authority on the Vedas {Upanisads) is found consistently in many ways

and many places of his own works, especially BSB where the ground of

'‘‘Cf. BrB 2.1.20, p. 296, lines 7-8; Madhava, p. 209: na ca pramanam pramdndntarena virudhyate. pramdndntardvisayameva hi pramdndntaram jfidpayati. Sankara in the same place says that scriptures do not tell us the contradictory facts such as “ fire is cold” or “the sun does not give heat” , for those facts are already known by another means of knowledge, i.e. perception etc. '^Ibid., p. 308, lines 5-6; Madhava, p. 217: svavisayasurdni hi pramdndni irotrddivat. '*What Sankara means by the Vedas should be read according to the contexts, namely, sometimes it means the whole Vedas and sometimes the Upanisads alone. The words such as sdstra, dgama and sruti are also under the same circumstances. However, as far as the context is related to Brahman, Sankara’s intention is always to the Upanisads alone.

77 proof of his contention is thoroughly the Upanisads. Further, there are some expressions that the Vedic texts or the Upanisads are the only means of knowledge, or that the idea of Brahman is known by the scriptures only.*^ Moreover, it is described that there is no other source of knowledge except the Vedas, or no other authority except them.'* The authority of sruti is self-evident, since the Vedas issue without any effort like a man’s breath and they are not like other books.'’ Elsewhere

Sankara compares the authority of the Vedas to the sun:

Therefore, the authority of the Vedas being inviolable, a Vedic passage must be taken exactly in the sense it is tested to bear, and not according to the ingenuity of the human mind. The sun does not cease to reveal objects because of the ingenuity of the human mind; similarly Vedic passages cannot be made to give up their meaning.^”

Man’s ideas or opinions are always relative, and therefore are not true for all times, on the other hand, sruti that is the authoritative source of knowledge in supersensuous matters, is eternal and valid like the sun, and is entirely not connected with the human mind.

’’See B S B 1.1.4, p. 11, lines 6-7; ibid., lines 16-18; 2.1.11, p. 194, lines 10-13; 2.1.14, p. 199, lines 17-18. BrB 4.3.intro., p. 543, lines 7-11. U SII 17.8, p. 201. *®See B S B 1.1.2, p. 7, lines 25-26; 2.1.1, p. 182, lines 10-11; 2.1.11, p. 193, lines 20-24. BrB 2.3.6, p. 331, lines 17-18. ‘*Cf. BrB 2.4.10, p. 350, lines 14-16; Madhava, p. 252: tena vedasyd- prdmanyamasahkyate tadasahkanivrtyarthamidamuktam purusanisvdsavadaprayat- notthitatvatpramdnam vedo na yathd'nyo grantha iti. ^®BrB 3.3.intro., p. 434, lines 24-26; Madhava, p. 319: tasmddvedaprdmdnya- sydvyabhicdrdttddarthye sati vdkyasya tathdtvam sydt. na tu purusamatikausalam nahi purusamatikausaldtsavitd rupam na prakdsayati. tathd veddvdkydnyapi ndnydrthdni bhavanti. Also, B S B 2.1.1, p. 182, lines 10-11: vedasya hi nirapeksam svdrthe prdmanyam raveriva rupavisaye. Similar expression as to sruti can never have recourse to man is found BrB 4.4.7, p. 670, lines 20-21: sarvamapyetadasat- purusasyeva pramdnabhutdydh srutervydjdnupapatteh.

78 The authority of the Vedas or sruti has been discussed by modern scholars with reference to the problem of reasoning in Sankara’s Advaita

Vedanta. As a matter of fact, it is a general agreement of opinion that reasoning (tarka ox yukti) of Sankara is said to be groundless unless it is dependent on the Vedas. The direct example of this opinion is seen in

BSB 2.1.11:

In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation.^*

These passages lead to a view that reason is subordinate to the scriptures held by those scholars like K. S. Murty,^^ T. R. V. Murti,^^ H. Nakamura and so on. For instance, H. Nakamura argues that Sankara admits the value and significance of reason only insofar as it is helpful for understanding the thought of the scriptures and laying a theoretical foundation for it.^'* On the other hand, W. Halbfass displays not only the conflict of revelation and reason but also the concordance of the both:

^‘BS B 2.1.11, p. 192, lines 23-25; Thibautl, p. 314: itasca ndgamagamye'rthe kevalena tarkena pratyavasthdtavyam. yasmdnnirdgamdh purusotpreksdmdtraniban- dhandstarkd apratistitd bhavanti, utpreksdydnirahkusatvdt. Also, see BSB 2.1.1, p. 182, lines 11-12. ^^Cf. K. S. Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Veddnta, pp. 158-165. R. V. Murti remarks: “But Vedanta says that the intuitions of the real are given to us by sruti, whereas reason will help us to understand sruti properly and assimilate what is given to us.” cf. T. R. V. Murti, “Revelation and Reason in Vedanta”, Edited by Harold G. Coward, Studies in Indian Thought, p. 71. ^^Cf. Hajime Nakamura, “ Conflict between Traditionalism and Rationalism: A Problem with Samkara” , Philosophy East and West, vol. 12, pp. 154-155.

79 ‘Reason’ and ‘scripture’ appear side by side, often in dvandva compounds, such as sdstrayukti, sastranydya, Mstrdnumdna, sdstratarka, dgamopapatti, srutiyukti, tarkdgama, srutyupapatti or, with the addition of smrti, in srutismrtinydya. etc.2^

Through this enumeration we can easily recognize two related terms of revelation and reason: on one side there are sdstra, dgama, sruti, and on the other side yukti, nydya, anumdna, tarka, upapatti. The juxtaposition of those two distinguished terms suggests the agreement of both sides; in other words, the identical function of both terms in Sankara. For example: “For when the knowledge that the one non-dual Self is beyond phenomenal existence is generated by the scriptures and reasoning, there cannot exist side by side with it a knowledge contrary to it.”^® It seems as though reason is not subordinate to revelation but concordant or even coordinated to it. However, the concordant position of reason with revelation can be maintained only when we look into it in relation to interpretative or exegetic problem in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta. Above all, it may be proposed that taken from the viewpoint of exegesis the f role of reason in Sankara is supplementary to revelation, and yet from the viewpoint of the Self-realization or Brahma-vidyd, there is no such place for reason. The inevitable task of Sankara is to exclude other systems and to protect his own tradition by means of exegetic

“ W. Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection, p. 145. For the pair of scripture and reasoning, see B S B 1.1.4, p. 14, line 3; 1.4.1, p. 145, lines 15-16. BrB 2.3.6, p. 329, lines 11-12; 4.4.22, p. 697, line 15; 5.1.1, p. 733, line 25. TaB 3.10.4, p. 113, line 3. USI 1.43, p. 129. USII 15.54, p. 189; 16.44, p. 195; 16.65, p. 198; 18.14, p. 213; 18.43, p. 216; 18.88, p. 222; 19.17, p. 244, etc. ^*US1 1.44, p. 129, Jagada, p. 32: na hyekasminnatmanyasamsaritvabuddhau sastranydyotpdditdydm tadviparita buddhirbhavati.

80 confutation, which has to rely on reason. So long as Sankara is involved

in the situation of “text and interpretation”, or “tradition and

systematization”, he cannot avoid the help of reason. Even the

Upanisadic passages accept reasoning as a help, according to Sankara:

Such Vedanta passages dealing with the cause of the creation etc. of the transitory world being there (for that purpose), inference also, which is not antagonistic (to such passages) and furnishes a means of right knowledge, for the strengthening of the understanding of the meaning of these passages, is not rejected, because the Scriptures themselves accept the aid of Logic as an auxiliary.

When Sankara says that: “the hearing (srotavya) is from the scriptures

(and teachers) alone, the reflection (mantavya) through reasoning”,^* he

means a situation of the text (in terms of revelation) and interpretation

(in terms of reason) in the Upanisads themselves. Thus the

confrontation of the exegetic reason with the Upanisadic revelation is a

natural and indispensable phenomenon in Sankara’s own system and in

^’B S B 1.1.2, p. 7, line 26- p. 8, line 3; Apte, p. 11: satsu tu vedantavdkyesu jagato janmddikdranavadisu tadarthagrahanaddrdhydydnumdnamapi veddntavdkyd- virodhi pramdnam bhavanna nivdryate, srutyaiva ca sahdyatvena tarkasydbhyu- petatvdt. In connection with this passage W . Halbfass’ writing is suggestive; “It (the Veda) is not only the source of those supreme teachings themselves, but also of the human possibilities of understanding and clarifying them, of legitimately reasoning and arguing about them. It speaks not only the language of authoritative testimony and instruction, but also of explication, persuasion, and reasoning.” W . Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection, p. 136. ^*BrB 4.5.6, p. 709, lines 9-10: sravanam tvdgamamdtrena mata upapattya pascddvijndta Similar expression is seen in the commentary on Yajfiavalkya Maitreyi dialogue of BrU 2.4.5, p. 206. cf. BrB 2.4.5, p. 344, lines 15-17. ^The role of reason and its relation to revelation in the Veddnta-vdkya has been researched centering around the problem of “anvaya-vyatireka" led by P. Hacker, J. A. B. van Buitenen, S. Mayeda, G. Cardona, W. Halbfass and M. Comans. W e do not discuss this issue here because our main point is concerned with revelation alone as a sort of the text, and neither with its relation to reason nor with reason itself.

81 the Upanisadic philosophy as well. However, this reasoning should be,

at any rate, in accordance with revelation for its effective function, and

further, it should be noted that reason does not have any direct relation

with the final liberation.

Now we have to return to the initial question, and answer what the

text or the Upanisads means in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta by the

assistance of examinations up to now. As a matter of fact, the text for

Sankara does not include smrti as far as it is at best a source of

knowledge with the dependence on sruti, but it means only sruti, or

more precisely, the Upanisads. Regardless of the controversy of

Sankara’s genuine works, or the traditional importance of his three basic

texts of the Vedanta or prasthanatrayJ, we consider the Upanisads as the

very text on which Sankara is fundamentally dependent. As we have

already found, the Upanisads are not simple texts like other smrti texts,

but they are the texts by which their authority is of itself established,

and in which the truth is in itself embodied. In this regard the Upanisads

are called sruti in contrast to smrti in Sankara’s phraseology. Sruti is

therefore not “revelation” in the religious and Western sense of the word,

but it is the fruit of direct inspiration, so that it is in its own right that it

holds its authority.Its own authority of sruti is indirectly seen in

Sankara’s own explanation of the word Upanisad, according to which it

means in its primary sense the knowledge of Brahman. Brahman as the

ultimate reality does not have any recourse for its existence; similarly

^°Cf. Rene Guenon, Man and His Becoming according to the Vedanta, p. 6. In consequence the authority of smrti is derived from other than itself, viz. from sruti.

82 sruti does not require any other source for its authority. The Upanisadic

text, which contains the final truth of Brahman, need not be supported

by any other texts.

The independence of the Upanisadic text is essentially associated

with the authorlessness of the text and its eternity.^' However, the

authorlessness of the text does not assure the authority of the text, since

it is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for the authority. It

may at best provide the fact that revelation is infallible, and this

infallibility can be defended only if there is no author in the revelatory

text.^^ Excluding all the external factors, the authority of the text should

be dependent on the text itself by which it is firmly established. By the

same logical necessity, that the text is a creation of God does not solve

the problem of authority of the text. Sankara explains in BSB 2.2.38 on

the doubt that the authority of the scripture is equally available to

anybody through his own scripture:

No, for that will lead to arguing in a circle, omniscience being proved from the knowledge of the authority of the scriptures and the (authority of the) scriptures being proved from the knowledge of the omniscience of the author. Therefore the ideas about God held by the Sdmkhyas and Yogins are

^‘Gf. BSB 1.3.29, p. 127, line 23: svatantrasya karturasmaranadibhih sthite vedasya nityatve •••. The traditional Veddntins think that the Vedas are authorless, without beginning and without end, and that Isvara reveals them in the beginning of each new cycle of the universe. About the eternity of the Vedas in the Advaita Vedanta, Y. V. Athalye writes that the Vedas are eternal as to substance {artha), but non-eternal as to form {anupurvi). cf. Y. V. Athalye, Tarka-Samgraha of Annambhatta, p. 346. ^^Cf. E. Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenen, A Source Book of Advaita Vedanta, p. 5.

83 illogical.

Sankara seems to think that other schools cannot keep up their position when they undergo this sort of paradox that God is known from the

scripture and the scripture is based on God’s omniscience.^'* There is no

direct solution by Sankara to remove this paradox of scripture, and yet it can be inferred that the paradox does not bother Sankara’s position because the relation between God and scripture is set forth from the empirical or worldly point of view in his system. The scriptural paradox

is again seen in BSB 1.1.3 where Sankara interprets the sutra

“sdstrayonitvdt” in two different manners: first, “{Brahman is

omniscient) because of (Its) being the source of the scriptures”, and

second, “{Brahman is not known from any other source), since the

scriptures are the valid means of Its knowledge”.Sankara just shows

two kinds of possible interpretations on the siitra, and does not make

any final statement to solve the paradoxical problem. Thus it may be

suggested that though Sankara is aware of this paradox, he considers it

to be a speculative or unfruitful problem. God and scripture, and even

their relationship, are in fact not problematic after the true knowledge of

^^BSB 2.2.38, p. 257, lines 19-20; Gambhira, p. 436: na, itaretardsrayatva- prasahgdt—agamapratyaydtsarvajnatvasiddhih sarvajnapratyayaccdgamasiddhiriti. tasmddanupapannd sdmkhyayogavddindmisvarakalpand. ^‘‘S. Biderman discusses “ the paradox of scripture” in the MTmamsa particularly and in Hinduism generally in detail. He has a positive attitude against the scriptural paradox by saying that the existence of a paradox can testify to the existence of a critical problem within a tradition.(p. 94) cf. S. Biderman, “Escaping the Paradox of Scripture: The M Tmamsa Solution” , Edited by R. C. Dwivedi, Studies in Mimdmsd, pp. 87-103. ^’Cf. B S B 1.1.3; Gambhira, pp. 18-20. Generally it is accepted that the first interpretation treats “sdstrayoni" as Sasthltatpurusa compound, and the second as Bahuvrihi compound.

84 Brahman is attained.^® The authority of the text is therefore only intrinsic, since it cannot be fully guaranteed either by the authorless characteristic of the text or by God’s creation of the text.

The meaning and the authority of the text in Sankara’s Advaita

Vedanta have to be found in its internal structure. Sankara’s text is not an ordinary kind but a very special kind whether it is called the Vedas, the Upanisads, sruti, or agama. If the revelatory text can be authoritative intrinsically, it has to be more than a book. The text is of the nature of the truth for which the book is an external organization, for the truth is preceded by the book and not vice versa. This is why

Sankara says that the word Upanisad signifies the knowledge of

Brahman or the truth in its primary sense, and the book in its secondary sense. The topic of the text too provides an inkling of the internal authority of the text. If the text is concerned with what it reveals to bring about independent authority,^’ and with those matters that are beyond perception, inference, etc., then the authority of the text cannot be searched by external standards of relativity and limitation belonging to human reasoning. It may be said that in terms of Sankara’s terminology the text is vastutantra (dependent on the thing itself) and reason is purusavydpdratantra (dependent on the human action).

^^Sahkara says that “ ••• but in the state of non-duality of the Self, apart from the Self there can be no compiler of the scriptures, nor anyone else.” cf. PrB 6.3, p. 69, lines 4-7; Gambhira, p. 495. ^’Cf. B S B 2.1.1, p .182, lines 10-11; vedasya hi nirapeksam svarthe pramdnyam raveriva rupavisaye. ^*See vastutantra: B S B 1.1.2, p. 8, lines 15, 17-18, 18, 19; 1.1.4, p. 16, line 9; ibid., p. 18, line 17, 22; 2.1.11, p. 194, line 1. apurusatantra: BSB 2.1.27, p. 213, line 22. purusz{vydpdra)tantra\ B S B 1.1.1, p. 4, lines 23-24; ibid., p. 4, line 24- p. 5, line 1; 1.1.4, p. 16, line 8; ibid., p. 18, line 15, 18, 21, 22; 2.1.27, p. 213, line 20.

85 Therefore, the text of Sankara must be designated by the metaphysical truth of the text itself. This metaphysical truth is nothing but the identity of Brahman and Atman, which can be realized only by direct knowledge or immediate experience (anubhava). Sankara’s texts or the

Upanisads are embodiment of the truth that is self-luminous and self- valid, and there cannot be other possibilities.

However, it is not an easy task for Sankara to verify the authority of his text by his interpretative reasoning, since any text can be claimed to be authoritative when the textual authority is based on the internal structure. As an example we can find a tension between the text and the choice of the text elsewhere in the Brhaddranyakopanisad-bhasya. e Sankara says:

People have innumerable desires and various defects, such as attachment. Therefore they are lured by the attachment etc. to external objects, and the scriptures are powerless to hold them back; nor can they persuade those who are naturally averse to external objects to go after them.^^

In the context Sankara seems to weigh two kinds of the text, namely, the

ritualistic scriptures and the Vedanta scriptures by describing people’s

mutual exclusive tendency. The point is that the scriptures neither hinder

vastuvisaya and purusatantra: BrB 5.1.1, p. 732, lines 18-20. The term vastutantra is a kind of epistemological principle of Sankara, according to which the valid knowledge should be corresponded to the thing itself {vastu). ^’BrB 2.1.20, p. 307, lines 1-4; Madhava, pp. 216-217: anekd hi purusanam- icchd rdgddayasca dosd vicitrdstatasca bdhyavisayardgddyapahrtacetaso na sdstram nivartayitum saktam. ndpi svabhdvato bdhyavisayaviraktacetaso visayesu pravartayitum saktam.

86 nor direct a person by force, as if he were a slave.Sankara goes on to say;

In this matter people themselves adopt particular means according to their tastes, and the scriptures simply remain neutral, like the sun, for instance, or a lamp. Similarly somebody may think the highest goal to be not worth striving after. One chooses one’s goal according to one’s knowledge, and wants to adopt corresponding means. ••• Therefore the Vedanta texts that teach the unity of Brahman are not antagonistic to the ritualistic scriptures. Nor are the latter thereby deprived of their scope. Neither do the ritualistic scriptures, which uphold differences such as the factors of an action, take away the authority of the Upanisads as regards the unity of Brahman. For the means of knowledge are powerful in their respective spheres, like the ear etc.'**

There must be two scopes of the scripture, according to Sankara, which deal with somehow different topics respectively, and yet both scopes do not touch each other. One can choose one’s goal of life according to one’s choice of the scripture and adopt corresponding means that are mentioned in that scripture. It is in these passages that Sankara’s tension between the textual authority and the choice of the text is potentially expressed in brief. Accordingly, Sankara has to defend his own text, i.e.

^Cf. ibid., line 6; ibid, p. 217; na tu sdstram bhrtydniva balannivartayati niyojayati vd. ^ BrB 2.1.20, p. 307, line 14- p. 308, line 6; ibid.: tatra purusdh svayameva yathdruci sddhanavisesesu pravartante sastram tu savitrpradlpddivaduddsta eva. tathd kasyacitparo’pi purusdrtho'purusdrthavadavabhdsate yasya yathd’vabhdsah sa tathdrupam purusdrtham pasyati tadanurupdni sddhandnyupdditsate. ■■■ tasmdnna brahmaikatvam jndpayisyanto veddntd vidhisdstrasya bddhakdh. na ca vidhisdstrametdvata nirvisayam sydt. ndpyuktakdrakddibhedam vidhisdstramupa- nisaddm brahmaikatvam prati prdmdnyam nivartayati. svavisayasurdni hi pramdndni srotrddivat.

87 the Upanisads against other competing texts at any rate by means of some special methods.

Sankara’s texts or the Upanisads are the embodied truth, and are self-evident by nature in regard to what they reveal. But the authority of the text is not taken for granted insofar as the textual interpretation is concerned. Though the text rules out the operation of reason, the interpretation is impossible without the help of reason. Sankara has to do something to preserve the text, or even the truth, in order that the originality and purity of the text are not damaged by any external factors.

That the text is internally perfect does not satisfy all the people who can choose the text according to their own tastes. In consequence Sankara tries to make other texts except the Upanisads to be under the realm of avidyd. The verification of the textual authority by the logic of avidyd, is after all to differentiate the Vedanta system from the Mimamsa in the process of the establishment of the text.

2. Intervention of Avidyd

Ganganatha Jha says that as regards the Mimarnsa and the Vedanta, there has never been any justification for regarding them as two distinct

“systems of philosophy”; they have always been, and continue to be, known as “Purva” (preliminary) Mimamsa and “Uttara” (final)

Mimainsa. Particularly on the evidence of the authority and interpretation of the Vedic texts, the Uttara Mimamsa or the Vedanta has

^^Cf. G. Jha, Purva-Mlmamsa in its Sources, p. 4.

88 no option but to rely on the techniques and doctrines of the sister system or the Purva Mimamsa. In Sankara’s case it goes without saying that his being in debt with the Mimamsa is too vast to be ignored for all that there are several basic different points. Sankara’s attitude toward the

Mimamsa is found, for example, in BSB 3.3.53 where he calls this system '"sdstrapramukha” (beginning of the scripture) and “prathama tantra” (the preliminary investigation), and two MImamsas

''krtsnasdstra" (the whole philosophy). Although it is an unquestionable fact that Sankara criticizes the Mimamsa in many ways and many places, on the other hand, he procures a privileged position for that system.

The influence of the Mimamsa on Sankara is pointed out numerically by S. G. Moghe in respect of the text and its interpretation.

He says that Sankara in BSB has employed about 28 popular maxims, about 12 Mimamsa maxims, and about 30 Mimamsa technical terms in the course of his discussion. ^ Has Sankara simply followed the interpretative paradigm of the MImarnsa to establish his own commentarial norms? Moghe goes on to say:

But when the Purva-paksin advances any view point setting aside the decision given by Jaimini, it is Sankaracarya who tries to criticize the same by relying upon some definite and cogent MImarnsa rule of interpretation framed by Jaimini.

‘‘^Cf. ibid., p. 6. see sdstrapramukha: BSB 3.3.53, p. 423, line 24. prathama tantra: ibid., p. 424, line 2. krtsnasdstra: ibid., line 4. ^Cf. S. G. Moghe, Studies in the Purva Mtmarnsd, pp. 1-5. ‘‘^Ibid., p. 11. Also, see p. 8. Clooney states a similar opinion: “ • •• if it (Advaita) introduces some concepts and practices incompatible with M im am sa and

89 Ironically Sankara’s independence from the Mimamsa is deeply founded on the Mimamsa to the limit that the state of “text-interpretation” is concerned. However, this adoption of Mlmdmsaka methods by Sankara does not mean that Sankara’s articulation of theory and doctrine is within the boundary of the Mimamsa. In substance even Sankara’s starting point, i.e. the establishment of the text is ready for the separation from the way of the Mimamsa. We will discuss this point concretely in the following, and moreover, how does avidya intervene in

Sankara’s textual formation.

According to the Mimamsa, the Vedas are traditionally classified into injunctions (vidhi), prohibitions {pratisedha or nisedha), incantations {mantra), names (ndma), and explaining passages

{arthavdda). As they give great importance to the Brdhmana portion of the Vedas, vidhi and arthavada can be said to be the main kinds of the

Vedic texts.For Mlmdmsakas, while they justify definite injunctions which are of the nature of actions and are mainly related to duty

(dharma) by the performance of the rites, they do not take much interest in the Upanisadic portions, which are considered by them to be explaining passages. Sankara expresses Mlmdmsakas' a typical attitude to the texts in brief:

Therefore the scriptures become meaningful by either

claims also to supersede it, even these claims are made according to the norms of M im am sa thinking.” cf. Francis X. Clooney, S. J., Theology after Vedanta, p. 25. ^It is said that pratisedha is a kind of negative injunction to abstain from actions. Arthavada is generally a vada (explanation) of artha (meaning) of mantra or vidhi in the Brdhmana texts. Its functions are mostly praise (stuti) and censure (nindd) which are respectively connected with vidhi and pratisedha.

90 persuading a person to act for a particular object or dissuading him from action for some other; other sentences (e.g. Arthavdda) have their usefulness as forming parts of these. And since the Upanisadic texts have a similarity with those Vedic texts, they should be purposeful in that way alone.

The Mlmdmsakas regard the Upanisads as either vidhi or arthavdda, and as having only auxiliary meaning compared to the main Vedic injunctions, which are so-called codand (compelling, or sacred commandment) or dharma. The Upanisadic topic, or the knowledge of the Self, since the individual self cannot avoid to be a performer of religious acts, must be a part of the rites, and the result of that knowledge must be by way of eulogy (arthavdda). Against these opinions of the Mimamsa Sankara takes a firm stand: “because the soul

ipurusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else.”'**

Sankara’s position on the Mimatnsa is more distinctly exposed when we compare two different subject matters of the Vedas, namely, rites and knowledge. Sankara does believe that from the point of view of the result rites and knowledge have respective purposefulness at any rate.

Of course, it does not mean that both sides produce the same result, but each of them has its own right in its own scope. Sankara says: “The

efficacy of a rite consists in its being able to fulfil its own purpose.

‘‘’B S B 1.1.4, p. 12, lines 12-14; Gambhira, p. 24: atah purusam kvacidvisaya- visese pravartayatkutascidvisayavisesannivartayaccarthavacchdstram. tacchesatayd cdnyadupayuktam. tatsdmanyddveddntandmapi tathaivdrthavattvam syat. ^®Ibid., p. 19, line 21; ThibautI, p. 36: aupanisadasya purusasydnanya^esatvdt. ^’BSB 4.1.18, p. 478, line 1; Gambhira, p. 845: karmanasca vlryavattvam tat. yatsvaprayojanasddhanaprasahatvam. Also, see B S B 4.1.18, p. 476, line 23- p. All,

91 Another remarkable point is that Sankara accepts the validity of injunctions only before the realization of the oneness of the Self.^° The main difference between rites and knowledge in the Vedas is, therefore, that the former does not result in the realization of the Self, or liberation whereas the latter does. However, although the rites or injunctions have validity in their own scopes, Sankara at times remarks that they are also useful for the higher knowledge or the knowledge of Brahman. For instance:

All works of permanent obligation, such as the Agnihotra— whether joined with or devoid of knowledge— which have been performed before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous of release with a view to release; all such works act, according to their several capacities, as means of the extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment, subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devotion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman.^^

It is only when the rites have purified them, that people, with their minds clean, can easily know the Self that is revealed by the Upanisads.^^

line 1. BrB 4.4.22, p. 685, lines 20-23; ibid., p. 690, line 29. ChB 8.15.1, p. 513, lines 16-18. ^See B S E 1.1.4, p. 23, lines 19-20; 2.1.14, p. 199, line 26- p. 200, line 1. ^‘BS B 4.1.18, p. 478, lines 1-6; Thibautll, p. 362: tasmadvidyasamyuktam nit- yamagnihotradi vidydvihinam cobhayamapi mumuksund moksaprayojanoddeseneha janmani janmdntare ca prdgjndnotpatteh krtam yat, tadyathasdmarthyam brahmd- dhigamapratibandhakdranopdttaduritaksayahetutvadv arena brahmddhigamakdrana- tvam pratipadyamdnam sravanamananasraddhdtdtparyddyantarahgakdrandpeksam brahmavidyayd sahaikakdryam bhavatlti sthitam. ^^BrB 4.4.22, p. 689, lines 22-23; Madhava, p. 523: karmabhih samskrtd hi

92 The rites are a means to purification for those who desire to know the

Self, even though the ceremonial portion of the Vedas does not speak of the supreme Self. As a matter of fact, all the Vedas except the rites that have the material ends can be directly or indirectly applicable to the subject of the Self. In other words, sacrifice, etc. are also helpful in the rise of knowledge and are needed on the strength of the Upanisadic text itself,^^ with the understanding that they are performed without any motive for fruits.^'* Thus the rites or the duties are means for the emergence of knowledge as long as they are practiced without any motive (nirabhisandhi) and without any separate result

{kdrydntardbhdva). However, it is worth noticing that the rites or the duties are useful “not for the fruition of the result of knowledge (i.e. liberation), but for the emergence of knowledge itself.”^^ The rites can at best be a means of the rise of knowledge ijndnahetu), but not that of liberation (moksahetu), which is attainable only through knowledge.

If we observe analytically Sankara’s statements on the Vedas, it may be inferred that he gives his mind to a hierarchical structure of the Vedas.

When Sankara asserts that the rites are the means of knowledge, some

visuddhatmanah saknuvantydtmdnabhupanisatprakdsitamapratibandhena veditum. ’^Cf. B S B 3.4.35, p. 450, lines 13-14; 3.4.27, p. 446, lines 6-9. *^Cf. B S B 3.4.27, p. 446, lines 19-22; 4.1.16, p. 476, lines 10-11; 4.1.17, p. 476, lines 19-20. W . Halbfass says that Sankara’s criticisms against the Mimarnsa are on their conceptions of result-oriented activities and goal-oriented methods, cf. W . Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection, p. 143. ” B S B 3.4.26, p. 445, lines 26-27; Gambhira, p. 784: evamdsramakarmdni vidyayd phalasiddhau ndpeksyante, utpattau cdpeksyanta iti. It is generally said that karma is jfidnahetu (the cause of knowledge), but not moksahetu (the cause of liberation). In traditional terminology, karma, i.e. morality is not jfidnahetu as well as moksahetu, but vividisd (a true desire to know) or drddupakdraka (a remote or mediating cause) of moksa. cf. M . Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, pp. 170-171.

93 auxiliary conditions of the rites are presupposed for that knowledge. No matter how much help the rites can provide to the emergence of knowledge of the Self, they never lead the performers of the rites to liberation, for they are based on actions that are regarded as belonging to the realm of the lower knowledge {apard vidyd). If the Brdhmana texts cannot fulfill the final aim of Sankara, or liberation, they have to be discarded or at least delimited in certain ways. Sankara, as an orthodox scholar, cannot completely give up the sacred texts and the

Vedic traditions {yeda-mulatva), and yet he tries to fix the limit of the

Brdhmana texts through the hierarchical structure of knowledge or the texts. Sankara even says in the reverse of the Mimamsa that the

Brdhmana texts are presented for the eulogy of the Upanisadic texts:

••• it follows that the knowledge of karma, comprised in the Rg-Veda etc., is presented at the commencement of the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of eulogizing the latter. And after decrying the lower knowledge it is said that those alone have the competence for the higher knowledge who turn back from the former.^®

This turning back from the knowledge of karma to that of the Self is in fact from the Brdhmana texts to the Upanisadic texts. The hierarchical structure finally means a textual hierarchy in which the Brdhmana texts are conceived to be lower and the Upanisadic texts higher. Thus it is by

^^BSB 1.2.21, p. 84, lines 5-9; Gambhira, pp. 141-142: aparargvedddilaksana karmavidya brahmavidyopakrama upanyasyate brahmavidydprasamsdyai. ■■■ ninda- tvd cdpardm vidydm tato viraktasya paravidyddhikdram darsayati

94 an angle-shifting from the former to the latter®^ that Sankara can start his discourse about Brahman or moksa which is revealed by the

Upanisads, viz. his real and genuine texts.

The separation from the Mimamsa in Sankara’s making of the text is set about in earnest by the intervention of avidya. As is commonly known, the rites or duties (codand or dharma) of the Mimatnsa should be performed according to the injunctions of the Vedas, and this is why the system is also called the Karma Mimatnsa. The final aim of the

Mimamsa is the fulfillment of dharma by means of karma (action), while that of Sankara is attainment of moksa by means of jfidna

(knowledge). Sankara’s main criticism on the Mimamsa is therefore invariably with reference to karma that is opposite or contradictory to jfidna.^^ Then, how does Sankara understand the concept of karma for the sake of his criticism on it? He says that the cause of karma is kdma

(desire),and that karma is also the creation of avidyd.^ Again, kdma is created by avidyd\ in other words, the root of the desire is ignorance.

Therefore, it can be concluded that avidya, kdma and karma (kriyd, kdrya) have the successive causal relationship.^^ The causal chain from avidyd through kdma to karma is perfectly seen in the

” Cf. Natalia Isayeva, Shankara and Indian Philosophy, p. 211. ^*Cf. M u B 1.1.intro., p. 3, line 3: vidyakarmavirodhdcca. Also, see MuB 1.2.12 p. 18, line 13: ••• karmdtmajndnayorvirodhdt. ’’Cf. TaB 1.1.intro., p. 2, lines 16-17: karmahetuh kdmah sydt. Also, see BrB 1.1.intro., p. 12, line 12: ••• nisargata eva sarvakarmandm kdmyatvam •••. “ Cf. BrB 2.1.20, p. 305, lines 26-27: ••• avidydpratyupasthdpitasya kriyd- kdrakaphalasya Also, see USII 11.15, p. 169: • • karmano'jndnahetutah, ■■■. *‘Cf. BrB 1.4.15, p. 189, line 16: avidydjanitakdma •••. Similar statements are seen in BrB 1.4.17, p. 197, lines 5-7; ibid., p .199, lines 10-13. ®^For the occurrences of the causal chain of these three terms, see Chapter 2, fn. 116.

95 Brhaddranyakopanisad-bhdsya 4.3.20:

Hence the nature of ignorance proves to be this, that it represents that which is infinite as finite, presents things other than the self that are non-existent, and makes the self appear as limited. Thence arises the desire for that from which he is separated; desire prompts him to action, which produces results.

This leads to the fact that karma as the effect of avidyd produces finite things other than the Self, and so it does not have any relation to moksa, which is nothing but the realization of the infinite Self. Moksa is devoid of the characteristics of action, its factors and results that are all creations of avidyd, for moksa is eternal whereas karma is short-lived or liable to destruction.

It is a matter of common knowledge that injunctions and prohibitions, which are of the nature of action, are possible with the association of the agentship (kartr). Since for Sankara the reality or the

Self has no agentship, body, etc. intrinsically, this agentship that is a kind of upddhi must be treated as the creation of avidyd. The agentship is the result of superimposition or avidyd', in other words, action arises from the conception of agentship etc. which is

®^BrB 4.3.20, p. 604, lines 14-16; Madhava, p. 459: dtmano’nyadvastvantara- mavidydmanam pratyupasthdpayati. dtmdnamasarvamdpddayati. tatastadvisayah kdmo bhavati. yato bhidyate kdmatah kriydmupddatte. tata phalam. *^Cf. Yuvraj Krishan, The Doctrine of Karma, p. 154. see USII 17.8, p. 201: karmakdryastvanityah syddavidydkdmakdrana, •••. ®^See B S B 2.3.40, p. 293, lines 23-24; ibid., p. 294, line 1: avidydkrtam kartrtvam. The agentship itself is upddhi because upddhi is any adventitious object resulted from superimposition, i.e. avidyd.

96 superimposed on the actionless Self.^^ Thus actions are enjoined for the unenlightened man, but not for the aspirant after liberation. In this manner Sankara says:

••• because rites are enjoined for a person who naturally has the notions of being an agent and the enjoyer, and who is possessed of the defects of attraction for and repulsion against results of such rites. ••• Therefore rites are enjoined only for those who have such defects as ignorance etc. but not for one who is possessed of non-dual Knowledge.

All injunctions and prohibitions, which consist of the Vedic rites, belong to the scope of avidyd,^^ and have nothing to do with knowledge for liberation. Therefore, karma of the Mimamsa and jfidna of Sankara’s

Advaita Vedanta are as contradictory as darkness to light. The contradiction is consequently between avidyd and vidyd (jfidna)'.

They do not also know the contradiction, involving incongruity, between the attainment of knowledge, which obliterates all action with its factors and results, and ignorance together with its effects. ••• The contradiction rests on the opposite trends of the nature of rites and that of knowledge, which partake respectively of ignorance and illumination.®^

^San kara says in the Adhydsabhdsya of B S B that the knowing agent (jndnakartr) is also superimposed on the Self. However, knowledge itself is not related to the agentship, while the means of knowledge is related to. *’ C h B 1.1.intro., p. 4, lines 23-27; Gambhira, pp. 4-5: kartrbhoktrsva- bhdvavijndnanavatajjanitakarmaphalardgadvesddidosavatasca karmavidhdndt. tasmddavidyddidosavata eva karmdni vidhiyante. nddvaitajndnavatah. “ Louis Renou remarks: “For us the essential in the Vedic message would be relegated by the Sankarians to the field of error and ignorance.” cf. L. Renou, The Destiny of the Veda in India, p. 37. BrB 2.4.1, p. 338, lines 27-30; Madhava, p. 242: sarvakriydkdrakaphalo- pamardasvarUpdydm ca vidydydm satydm saha kdryendvidydyd anupapattilaksa-

97 There is contradiction between the nature of rites and knowledge, and accordingly, also between avidyd and vidyd. The Self that is revealed by knowledge has absolutely no relation to any kind of action that is generated by ignorance. All action, its factors and results are within the category of avidyd,^^ and are associated with things other than the Self, which is neither the means nor the results of actions by Its nature.

In order to prove the intervention of avidyd in Sankara’s establishment of the text, we should make clear the relationship between karma and avidyd, for this relationship is actually a key to the question of the karma-kdnda text being under the range of avidyd. We have found so far that karma is of the nature of avidyd, and therefore the Vedic rites or duties are, though they are helpful for the purification of mind, etc., enjoined for those who are subject to avidyd. However, the heart of the question is that the authority of the text depends not on its contents but on the fruitful results of those contents. Sankara clarifies: “The test of the authority or otherwise of a passage is not whether it states a fact or an action, but its capacity to generate certain and fruitful knowledge.

The portion of karma cannot be authoritative because it does not generate fruitful knowledge for liberation. To put it in another way, action cannot give rise to knowledge, nor can it remove ignorance, for it is in itself of the nature of ignorance. Sankara emphasizes;

nasca virodhastairna vijfidto . karmavidyasvarupayorvidydvidyatmakayoh pra- tikulavartanam virodhah. ™See BrB 3.5.1, p. 459, lines 3-4. ’'BrB 1.4.7, p. 138, lines 13-15; Madhava, p. 92: na vdkyasya vastvanvdkhyd- nam kriydnvdkhydnam vd prdmdnydprdmdnyakdranam kim tarhi niscitaphalavad- vijndnotpddakatvam.

98 for knowledge dispels ignorance. Because knowledge removes the obstruction of ignorance, liberation is metaphorically said to be the effect of knowledge; but work cannot dispel ignorance. And we cannot imagine any other obstruction to liberation but ignorance that can be removed by work, for it is eternal and identical with the self of the aspirant.

Ignorance and knowledge are opposites, but ignorance and action are not.

Ignorance is removable by knowledge, but it cannot be dispelled by action.’^ Karma and avidyd are not contradictory to each other; rather the former is the result of the latter. Again, the result of action is always perishable by contrast with that of knowledge. If the result of action is any one of the functions of production {utpddyam), attainment (apyam), modification (vikdryam), and purification {samskdryam),^^ then action should be abandoned because liberation is not possible by any one of those functions. Thus the karma portion of the Vedas has no authority when it is viewed from the result of action. It is the Upanisadic text, which deals with a fact or the thing itself that generates fruitful knowledge for liberation. Karma, which is the main factor of the world process, has its own scope in the empirical level alone, which is nothing but the realm of avidyd. Karma owes its very existence to

’^BrB 3.3.intro., p. 424, lines 27-31; Madhava, p. 313: ••• ajndnanivartaka- tvajjnanasya. ajfianavyavadhdnaniyartakatvdjjnanasya mokso jndnakdryamityupa- caryate. na tu karmand nivartayitavyamajndnam. na cdjndnavyatirekena moksasya vyavadhdndntaram kalpayitum sakyam. nityatvdnmoksasya sddhakasvarupdvyatire- kdcca. yatkarmand nivartyeta. ’^The removal of avidyd is only possible by Jfidna but not by karma, which itself is of the nature of avidyd. This doctrine of Sankara is supported by a simile that darkness {avidyd) is not removed by darkness {karma) itself, see B G B 18.66, p. 269, lines 7-8. ’^See BrB 3.3.intro, p. 422, lines 7-8; ibid., p. 427, lines 24-25. M u B 1.2.12, p. 18, lines 5-6. USII 17.50, p. 206.

99 superimposition, or to that avidya which is the root cause of karmic involvement.^^

While Sankara rejects the role of karma for the attainment of moksa, the same rejection is applied to upasana (religious meditation or worship) as well. Upasana is a mental activity, and is enjoined by accepting the agentship, etc. It should be treated either as a form of injunctions or subsidiary portion of injunctions, though it occupies the contents of the Vedas to some extent.^® Sankara’s defines upasana as follows: T 7 5 ^ 3 g - f

Meditation is mentally approaching the form of the deity or the like as it is presented by the eulogistic portions of the Vedas relating to the objects of meditation, and concentrating on it, excluding conventional notions, till one is as completely identified with it as with one’s body, conventionally regarded as one’s self.’^

But meditation means establishing a continuous flow of similar modifications of the mind in relation to some object as presented by the scriptures, (and) uninterrupted by any foreign idea.^*

In both these passages Sankara mentions that upasana is a mental

’^Cf. W. Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection, pp. 327-328. ’*Some scholars classify the Vedas into three parts, viz., karma-kdnda of the Mantras and Brdhmanas, updsand-kanda of the Aranyakas, and jndna-kdnda of the Upanisads. cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism, p. 30. ^^BrB 1.3.9, p. 69, lines 25-28; Madhava, p. 45: updsanarn ndmopasydrthavdde yathd devatddisvarHpam srutyd jndpyate tathd manasopagamyd”sanam cintanam laukikapratyaydvyavadhdnena ydvattaddevatddisvarHpdtmabhimdndbhivyaktiriti lau- kikdtmdbhimdnavat. ™ChB 1.1.intro., p. 6, lines 1-3; Gambhira, p. 6: updsanarn tu yathdsdstra- samarthitarn kirnciddlambanamupdddya tasminsamdnacittavrttisarntdnakaranarn tad- vilaksanapratyaydnantaritam

100 operation of the concentrating object with the exclusion of foreign notions. He regards updsand as a sort of arthavdda (eulogy), and gives the inkling that it is associated only with one’s body superimposed on the real Self. Sankara deals with the topic of updsand for the most part in the third adhydya of BSB pertaining to its different and identical aspects. Furthermore, he refers to updsand sometimes with kramamukti

(gradual liberation) and sometimes with purification of the mind, and yet he does not give it such an important role as the means of direct realization of the Self. Once the direct understanding {avagati, avagama) of the identity between Brahman and Atman is reached, there is no more aim of human life (purusdrtha) to pursue, since the idea of identity destroys that of duality, which follows the idea that Brahman is subject to karma and updsand?^ The object of meditation is, according

f QA to Sankara, invariably superimposed on the idea of Brahman that is devoid of subject-object duality. As long as updsand is a mental activity unlike knowledge, and is possible through superimposition, its subject- object duality, namely, meditator and the object of meditation cannot be freed from belonging to the category of avidyd.

The portions of karma and updsand in the Vedas are subsidiary to the Upanisads, and lead to the purification of mind in order that knowledge dawns for liberation. Sankara mainly criticizes the portion of karma, which has a bearing on the Vedic rites and duties enjoined by injunctions and prohibitions, to reinforce the fact that only the

™Cf. B S B 1.1.4, p. 11, lines 16-24. *“See BSB 3.3.50, p. 421, line 22- p. 422, line 9; 4.1.5, pp. 466-467.

101 Upanisads fall under the authoritative texts. The following passages may convey his decisive message:

Into blinding darkness, i.e. darkness that obstructs one’s vision, or ignorance that leads to transmigration, enter those who worship, i.e. follow ignorance, the opposite of knowledge, i.e. work consisting of ends and means, in other words, those who practise rites. Into greater darkness, as it were, than even that enter those who are devoted, or attached, to knowledge, that portion of the Vedas which deals with things that are the outcome of ignorance, i.e. the ritualistic portion, in other words, those who disregard the teachings of the Upanisads, saying that that portion alone which deals with the injunctions and prohibitions is the Vedas, and there is none other.^'

Those who follow the ritualistic portions and do not pay attention to the

Upanisadic texts undergo the transmigratory state, for the subject matters of the ritualistic portions are surely the outcomes of avidyd.

Sankara’s exclusion of karma-kanda (and updsand-kdnda) of the Vedas for the purpose of making the authoritative texts is therefore made by

*'BrB 4.4.10, p. 676, lines 12-17; Madhava, pp. 511-512: andhamadar- sandtmakam tamah samsdraniydmakam pravisanti gratipadyante. ke. ye'vidydm vidyato’nydm sddhyasddhanalaksandmupdsate karmdnuvartanta ityarthah. tatasta- smddapi bhuya iva bahutaramiva tamah pravisanti. ke. ya u vidydydmavidyd- vastupratipddikdydm karmdrthdydm trayydmeva vidydydm ratd abhiratdh. vidhipratisedhapara eva vedo ndnyo'stUyupanisadarthdnapeksina ityarthah. BrU 4.4.10 and I^U 9 are exactly same. But the former might be original because B rU is generally treated to be older than IsU in the chronological order. The Upanisadic passage runs: andharn tamah pravisanti ye'vidydmupdsate, tato bhuya iva te tamo ya u vidhydydm ratdh. There is a word “vidyd” (knowledge) in twelve Upanisads and the Veddntasutra, but it does not mean knowledge with which Sankara identifies as a means of liberation. This term should be taken up for various kinds of meditation and for the antecedent to the perfect knowledge. Some vidyd-s, usually in the form of dhydna and updsand, produce direct or indirect knowledge, and therefore it deserves to be called vidyd. cf. K. N. Aiyar, The Thirty-Two Vidyds, pp. 1-2. Sankara himself says that the root “vjW” meant literally “to know” and the root “upas” meant literally “to sit near” or “to meditate” are seen to be interchangeably used in the Upanisads. cf. B S B 4.1.1, p. 460, lines 16-17: vi pdstyosca veddntesvavyatirekena prayogo drsyate.

102 the criticism on karma itself (and updsand), which is the result of avidyd, as well as on its unfruitful result, which is solely transmigration or bondage. In the philosophy of Sankara the scope of karma and that of avidyd are similar, and avidyd particularly functions as a very important role in the hierarchical classification of the Vedas and exegesis of the authoritative text. However, the matter of the intervention of avidyd, by which the texts are classified into the domains of avidyd and vidyd (or apard vidyd and pard vidyd), is still confined to the lower level of truth, i.e. vyavahdra}^ Though the making of the text by the logic of avidyd is the making of the text that contains vidyd, this method can still belong to the empirical level in the realm of avidyd from the point of view of the ultimate truth.

3. Jitdna, Avidyd, and the Text

The identity of Brahman and Atman in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is known by the Upanisadic texts in which knowledge itself is self­ revealed and self-manifested. The jfidna-kdnda of the Upanisads is said to be authoritative through the criticism on a counterpart, i.e. the karma- kdnda of the Brdhmanas by the intervention of avidyd. As a result, the text and the textual foundation are established by means not merely of the logic of avidyd but also of the self-validity of knowledge or revelation. Then, in what context can we understand the relationship between avidyd {ajitdna) and vidyd (Jfidna) coupled with the formation

*^Cf. W . Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection, p. 327.

103 of the text, or, between the rejected text through the logic avidyd and the accepted text through the logic of jndna‘1 In order to draw the discussion up to that point we will examine the nature of jnana and its relation to avidyd and the text, as a part of tracing out the very core of a subject in

Sankara’s making of the text.

Considering the Advaita Vedanta in general and Sankara’s philosophy in particular, it is hardly possible to distinguish epistemology from ontology, for their first principle or Brahman is in its essential definition (svarupalaksana) considered to be of the nature of knowledge.*^ On the famous passage of the Taittirlya Upanisad 2.1,

“satyam jndnamanantam Brahma", Sankara explains that the three adjectives, i.e. truth, knowledge and infinite, are used by way of definition of Brahman or the ultimate reality. Brahman is designated by jnana or knowledge, but the word jfidna does not imply the agent of knowing. If Brahman is a knower (jndnakartrtva). It undergoes the change and consequently Brahman cannot be pure existence {satyatd), or,

It is delimited by the knowable (jneya) and knowledge (Jfidna) and consequently It cannot be Infinite. Again, Brahman as jfidna stands for consciousness (vijfidna), for the cause should be distinguished from its modifications which are insentient and non-conscious. Sankara’s exposition goes:

Brahman, though intrinsically identical with knowledge, is well known to be eternal. Thus, since this knowledge is not a

, 83'Cf. N. K. Devaraja, An Introduction to Sankara’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 88.

104 form of action, it does not also bear the root meaning of the verb. Hence, too. Brahman is not the agent of cognition. And because of this, again. It cannot even be denoted by the word jnana (knowledge). Still Brahman is indicated, but not denoted, by the word knowledge which really stands for a verisimilitude of Consciousness as referring to an attribute of the intellect; ... 84

Since Brahman is not the knower or the agent of cognition, it cannot be defined by the root meaning of the word jfidna, which implies a form of action. The word jfidna presupposes the knower and the knowable, but while that sense of knowledge cannot denote Brahman, yet it can indicate Brahman. This definition of Brahman as jndna is to distinguish

Brahman from others which are not of the nature of Knowledge or

Consciousness, and the word jfidna in the defining sense can indicate the

very distinguished nature of Brahman. Again, when Sankara defines

Brahman as jfidna, he does not use the word jfidna in the sense of knowledge that leads to liberation as a means. The distinction lies in the

two different usages of knowledge, namely, knowledge as the nature of

Brahman and knowledge about Brahman, or Brahma-vidyd. These two kinds of knowledge are by connotation one and the same, but by

denotation, one is used to define the reality and the other, the means of

attainment of that reality. Thus knowledge as the means of liberation

signifies the “knowledge about the nature of Brahman as Knowledge” as

is seen in the Upanisads that “knowing Brahman” is the same as

* ^ a B 2.1, p. 52, li nes 15-19; Gambhira, pp. 314-315: ••• brahmano jndnasva- rupatve’pi nityatvaprasiddhirato naiva dhdtvarthastadakriydrupatvdt. ata eva ca nci jnanakartr. tasmddeva ca na jhdnasabdavdcyamapi tadbrahma. tathd'pi taddbhdsa- vdcakena buddhidharmavisayena jndnasabdena tallaksyate na tucyate.

105 “becoming Brahman". This is why Sankara says that liberation is the removal of avidyd by jndna, that is the same as the state of Brahman}^

The epistemological perfect or true knowledge transforms the cognition of ontological status from the individuality to the supreme, and further generates the axiological beatitude and the soteriological goal. It is in this apprehension of knowledge that we may propose Sankara’s non­ distinction between epistemology and ontology. However, it must be noted that the definition of Brahman is yet governed by the empirical level {yyavahdra visaya), for it is given with a view to realizing the Self and is an ascription with regard to the transcendental Brahman that is beyond all conditions.*^

Sankara’s assertion that knowledge is of the nature of Brahman is compatible with his “substance theory” of knowledge. He criticizes the

“quality theory” and the “action theory” of knowledge, and advocates the substance theory in his commentaries here and there. The quality theory of knowledge is generally subscribed to by Naiydyikas, and

Sankara mentions their theory: “the knowledge of pot and the rest arises and gets destroyed as a temporary phenomenon on the eternal Self which imparts consciousness.” According to them, consciousness is accidental to the nature of the self, and cognition, which involves this

*^Cf. Chapter 5, fn. 11-15. *®Cf. TaB 2.8.5, p. 94, lines 28-31: tasmdtsatyam jndnamanatam brahmeti yathoktalaksandtmapratipattyarthameva bahubhavanasargapravesarasaldbhdbhaya- samkramanddi parikalpyate brahmani sarvavyavahdravisaye na tu paramdrthato nir- vikalpe brahmani kascidapi vikalpa upapadyate. *’PrB 6.2, p. 56, lines 15-16; Gambhira, p. 482: ghatddiyisayam caitanyam cetayiturnityasyd"tmano’nityam jdyate vinasyatityapare. It is Sankara’s statement of the Naiydyikas theory of consciousness out of four theories he mentions, viz., Vijndnavddins', Sdnyavddins', Naiydyikas' and Lokdyatikas’.

106 consciousness is said to be a quality of the self. Sankara rejects the quality theory by saying that the vision itself is the nature of the self like the heat of fire,^* and that if inseparableness means want of incompatibility of natures, then substance and quality can have no difference in essence.®^ Thus a quality is always understood in identity with the substance like light and the sun. Sankara also criticizes the action theory of knowledge with a view that knowledge is not dependent on human action just as Brahman is not dependent on human effort

(j>urusavydpdratantra). The Bhatta school of Piirva Mlmamsa emphasizes the action theory according to which cognition is a process or an activity to be enjoined in regard to the nature of the object. As we have already pointed out, for Sankara, knowledge and action are contradictory, and knowledge even puts a stop to all activity. Knowledge

on is not something to be done, not done, or done other wise, but it is dependent on and determined by the thing itself {v as tut antra). Further, the Self is called knower, or the agent (kartr) of knowledge on account of Its proximate existence to things known, but is not the agent in the real sense.Therefore, knowledge that is neither quality nor activity is

**Cf. BrB 1.4.10, p. 163, line 7: drstireva svarupamasydgnyausnyavat ■■■. Sankara often compares the nature of knowledge with light of the sun or lamp. As light does not require other light to be illumined, so knowledge does not need any other knowledge for its illumination. Just as light is of the nature of the sun, knowledge is the very nature of the Self, see USII 15.41, p. 188; 17.41, p. 205. *’Cf. BSB 2.2.17, p. 236, lines 23-24; Gambhira, p. 398: tathd’prthaksvabhd- vatve tvayutasiddhdtve na dravyagunayordtmabhedah sambhavati, •••. Sankara in the commentary on the same siitra remarks that all the five Vaisesika categories (guna, karma, sdmdnya, visesa, samavdya) are one with the substance (dravya). cf. ibid., lines 11-12. ’‘’Cf. B S B 1.1.4, p. 18, lines 16-17: ■ ■ ato Jndnam kartumakartumanayatha va kartumasakyam, •••. ’'Cf. U SII 15.45, p. 188: sattdmdtre prakdsasya kartddityddirisyate, ghatddi- vyaktito yadvattadvadbodhdtmanisyatdm.

107 taken to be self-revealed substance in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta.

Sankara and Advaita Veddntins maintain the self-validity of knowledge (svatah-prdmdnya-vdda), for the validity of knowledge is inherent in knowledge itself. In Sankara’s commentary on the Prasna

Upanisad 6.2, we can gather some of his ideas about knowledge:

••• for in so far as knowledge that reveals its objects is an illuminator of its object like a light,•••

In reality, knowledge is neither a non-existence, nor is it non- eternal.^^

••• for a logical distinction between all (knowledge and objects) is possible. On the admission that everything is knowable to some knowledge, that knowledge which is different from its content remains what it is for ever.^'*

The three passages tell us the fact that knowledge {pramd or jndna), which is existent and eternal, and the object of knowledge {prameya or

Jneya) are different from each other. Knowledge as an illuminator cannot be known by itself, since the object of knowledge or the knowable is forever the object of knowledge, and knowledge forever knowledge.

From the theory of the self-validity of knowledge we can infer two propositions: (1) the validity of knowledge is intrinsic (svatah-siddha).

’^PrB 6.2, p. 57, line 25; Gambhira, p. 483: Jneydvabhdsakasya jndnasyd"loka- vajjfieydbhivyanjakatvdt ■■■. ’^Ibid., p. 58, line 22; ibid., p. 484: ••• na paramdrthato’bhdvatvamanitya- tvatn ca jnanasya. ’^Ibid., p. 60, lines 11-12; ibid., p. 486: tadvibhdgopapatteh sarvasya. yadd hi sarvam jneyam kasyacittadd tadvyatiriktam jndnam jnanameveti

108 and (2) the validity of knowledge is self-evident (svatah-prakdsa).^^ As a result, such characteristics of knowledge as self-revealed, self-valid, and eternal, pave the way for the intimate relation between knowledge and the Upanisadic texts.

The Upanisads are valid means of knowledge in the sense that they reveal the things as they are, as valid knowledge is produced when it is corresponded to the thing itself. Just as knowledge does not create or change the thing, “texts cannot create things anew, since a text is not meant to reverse anything.As we have seen, knowledge only removes its incompatible counter-concept of avidyd', the text simply delivers information about things:

Nor can a scriptural statement impart any power to a thing. For it is an accepted principle that the scriptures are only informative, not creative.^*

••• for the Sruti is merely informative. The scriptures seek not to alter things but to supply information about things unknown, as they are.^^

’^Cf. Swam i Satprakashananda, Methods of Knowledge according to Advaita Vedanta, p. 112. All the orthodox systems except Nyaya-Vaisesika believe the self­ validity of knowledge. However, with regard to the validity and invalidity of knowledge, while the Sarnkhya-Yoga maintains intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity of knowledge, the MTmamsa and the Vedanta hold intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity. ’®^afikara uses same simile of light and the sun (or lamp) to characterize knowledge as well as the Upanisadic texts, see fn. 41 and fn. 92. ’^PrB 6.2, p. 62, lines 17-18; Gambhira, p. 488: vacanasydkarakatvat. na hi vacanam vastuto 'nyathdkarane vydpriyate. ’®BrB 1.4.10, p. 157, line 27- p. 158, line 1; Madhava, p. 106; na ca vacanam vastunah sdmarthyajanakam. Jndpakam hi sdstram na kdrakamiti sthitih. ’®BrB 2.1.20, p. 295, lines 11-12; Madhava, p. 209: sruterjHdpakatvdt. na sdstram paddrthdnanyathd kartum pravrttam. Sankara’s criticism on karma goes together with his statement on the nature of the Upanisadic text, for example, as is seen in B S B 3.2.21, where he sums up his own commentary carried out on B S 1.1.4 {tattu samanvaydt.) as follows: “ ••• how the texts about Brahman have only the

109 The Upanisadic text has unalterable contents and at the same time it does not alter the thing itself. Since it is only informative and not creative, it reveals the thing itself or Brahman as it is. In this connection the text is not merely the only means of valid knowledge ipramdna) of the supersensuous thing, i.e. Brahman, but also the valid

1 knowledge itself (pramd) from the empirical point of view, as the thing itself or Brahman Itself is embodied in the text. While the

Upanisad as the scripture that generates the knowledge of Brahman is pramdna, the Upanisad as the true knowledge of Brahman referred to by that scripture is pramd.^°^ What is revealed, and what is the foundation of all the discourses of knowledge, cannot only be the means of knowledge, but the knowledge itself as well, from the empirical point of view. On the other hand, without the dependence on the text, or pramdna the identity of Brahman and Atman is not known and nor is liberation.

That which is sublated at the moment of liberation is pramdna alone, but not pramd that is universally and eternally embodied in the text and is re-cognized through pramdna. As knowledge as Brahman and knowledge of Brahman should not be confused, so the text as pramd and the text as pramdna cannot be identical nor be confused. One and the same text has

knowledge of the (pre-existing) thing itself as their purport, but they are not meant for enjoining any action.” cf. B S B 3.2.21, p. 361, lines 14-17; Gambhira, 619-620. '“ The Western concept of knowledge stands for valid knowledge of which the equivalent Sanskrit term is pramd. However, the word jnanam is generally used in the sense of Western concept of knowledge, though it signifies both valid and invalid knowledge, cf. Swam! Satprakashananda, Methods of Knowledge according to Advaita Vedanta, pp. 112-113. Therefore, the word pramd is used to designate only a true cognition (yathdrtha-jndna) as distinct from a false one (mithyd-jndna). cf. D. M . Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, p. 19. *®*R. I. Ingalalli states that the Vedas as a pramdna is non-eternal the Vedas as pramd is eternal, cf. R. I. Ingalalli, Sabda Pramdna—An Epistemological Analysis, p. 91.

110 to be treated “pramdna for pramd” as well as “pramd for moksa" at the level of instruction, and without this distinction, Sankara’s textual establishment cannot be completed because there is no other way to prove the validity of the text as pramdna except by placing the text itself as pramd. In fact, the Upanisadic text as pramdna is what Sankara wants to establish for the textual authority on the basis of the text as pramd. Our concern on the making of the text is therefore about pramdna on which all Sankara’s discourses can be headed for pramd.

The final pramd is re-cognized when pramdna functions properly, and consequently liberation is reached by that pramd.

The Upanisadic text, which is the means of knowledge, can have the authority by means of itself in its intrinsic structure. The means of knowledge is dependent upon the valid knowledge, which is like an illuminator as a substance, but not vice versa. The textual authority comes not only from the intervention of avidyd but also from the nature of knowledge itself. Then, what is Sankara’s real intention to bring about the logic of avidyd in the establishment of the text? In fact, to make other texts under the domain of avidyd and to advocate the

Upanisadic texts by the logic of jndna or vidyd have the same result.

Sankara uses these two methods at the same time for the authority of the text, and yet he pays more attention to the former, i.e. the criticism on karma of the Mimamsa by means of avidyd. It is for a devaluation of the

Mimamsa text that Sankara regards karma as a creation of avidyd and insists the result of action to be perishable. He might be conscious of the counterattack of the opponents if he proves the textual authority only in

111 the intrinsic structure of the Upanisads. After all, it is the logic of

avidya that can be a weapon of his logical protection to place the

Upanisads at the top of the Vedic texts and other texts as well.

Accordingly, the epistemological concept of avidya gains its privilege,

and extends its scope to the methodology. Though Sankara has been

influenced by the MImamsa considerably, there is no such reconciliation

between the two Vedic texts, namely, karma-kdnda and jhdna-kdnda, in

his works, just as karma and jnana, or avidya and vidyd are

irreconcilable. Some reconciliation lies at best in the way that karma

and updsand can purify the mind and are helpful to the emergence of jitdna, but Sankara still places low value on the karma and updsand

portions of the Vedas in their hierarchical structure through the logic of

avidyd. Avidyd is therefore the best methodological device by which

Sankara can manage the problem of textual authority through his logical

clarity and subtlety.

Knowledge as the means of liberation has often been interpreted to

be a complementary concept of its counter-concept, avidyd. J. G.

Arapura understands avidyd (agnosis) and vidyd (gnosis) in the structure

of cosmology, and says that avidyd has assigned its own function by the

logos {Brahman), which is what expresses itself in the desire to know.'°^

The orientation to gnosis from the desire to know logos in the Advaita

Vedanta is prompted by agnosis, which is the seeking side of logos.

Because of avidyd that is the form of the desire to know, the reflection

'®^Cf. J. G. Arapura, Hermeneutical Essays on Veddntic Topics, p. 72.

112 of vidyd takes place in order to reveal logos.Arapura’s cosmological interpretation of avidya and vidyd is based on the proposition that logos itself grants the desire to know to avidya for itself. This interpretation of the relationship between avidya and vidyd, irrespective of his cosmological inclination to avidyd, gives a methodological hint that avidya can have a positive function to induce vidyd to be vidyd. At any rate, Arapura seems to agree that both concepts are not just opposite but complementary each other. Another example of interpretation on avidyd- vidyd relation is seen in D. P. Sen and R. De Smet. Both of them pay attention to the fact that avidyd in the end can be transformed into vidyd.

D. P. Sen insists that knowledge and ignorance are relative terms, different not in kind but in degree only, and that there is a progressive advancement from ignorance to knowledge, viz. from comparative ignorance to comparative knowledge.'®^ R. De Smet even says that avidyd is not exactly abolished but fulfilled by v i d y d . They seem to believe the gradual fulfillment of knowledge from avidyd to vidyd, that is, fulfillment of avidyd in vidyd. If it were so, is it possible that the cognition of the difference of the world is fulfilled by that of the unity of Brahmanl The difference, which is the subject matter of avidyd, cannot be fulfilled step by step by the unity of the Self, the subject

‘“^Cf. ibid., pp. 72-83. "” Cf. D. P. Sen, “Avidyd and Its Relation to Vidyd", Edited by R. C. Pandeya and S. R. Bhatt, Knowledge, Culture and Value, p. 91. Kirtikar writes that avidya is a preparation for acquiring the highest spiritual knowledge or para vidyd. cf. V. J. Kirtikar, Studies in Vedanta, p. 193. R. De Smet, “Chinks in the Armour of Avidyd", Knowledge, Culture and Value, pp. 77-84.

113 < f\li ___ matter of vidyd. There is no increase or decrease in the knowledge of

Brahman unlike in the ordinary knowledge, but there is a clear-cut

boundary between ignorance of Brahman and knowledge of It. As far as

Sankara’s vidyd or jndna as the means of moksa is about Brahman, and

is also perfect and higher knowledge, there cannot be comparative

knowledge or gradual fulfillment of knowledge in his epistemology.

Judging from the epistemological point of view, avidyd and vidyd

have antagonistic relationship, and both the concepts cannot coexist at

the same time. Avidyd stands for empirical {vyavahdra), lower (apara),

false (mithyd) and non-discriminative (aviveka) knowledge, vidyd or jndna transcendental (jjaramdrtha), higher {para), perfect (samyak), and

discriminative (viveka). They are diametrically opposed to each other,

and the gulf between them is apparently seen by the fact that avidyd is

the cause of transmigratory state or bondage, and vidyd brings it to an

end. Once knowledge dawns, ignorance disappears, just like the relation

of light and darkness. As liberation consists in the removal of avidyd or

the emergence of vidyd or jndna, so there is no compatibility between

avidyd and vidyd. Both are mutually exclusive and are complete counter­

concepts, and there is no progress from avidyd to vidyd

epistemologically but immediate transition alone.

However, though both terms are epistemologically opposite and

contradictory, they are still complementary in the methodology of

'“ For two different subject matters of avidyd and vidyd, see BrB 2.1.intro., p. 252, lines 10-12: ••• dtmatattvamekam vidydvisayah. yastu bhedadrstivisayah • • avidydvisayah. '®^See b 's B 1,2.8, p. 69, lines 9-10. BrB 3.5.1, p. 458, line 27- p. 459, line 1. KaB 1.2.4, p. 34, lines 12-14.

114 Sankara. He tries to build up the text by advocating the self-revealed characteristic of the text as well as by denying the authority of other texts. It is in two ways of “from inside” and “from outside” the text that

Sankara intends to form the Upanisadic text as the final source of knowledge. In the context of the making of the text these two ways exactly correspond to the logics of jndna and avidyd respectively. These two methods have to be operated simultaneously; otherwise the textual authority is damaged on account of its inconsistency. If the Upanisads are the only means of knowledge, other texts should be regarded as invalid, and vice versa. If avidyd and jndna do not function at the same time to organize the text, the possibility of different positions on the text cannot perfectly be dispelled. Implications and connotations of avidyd and jndna are different, and yet what the both contribute to the textual establishment is same. Avidyd and jndna are methodologically complementary in the sense that they logically lead to the establishment of the text in the exegesis of Sankara.

Sankara’s text is finally formalized by the distinction between action or avidyd and jndna, and between their scopes. The distinction is also based on the fruitful result, i.e. liberation, and therefore, it can be said that his formation of the text depends on the “liberation-oriented” conception. Although liberation is not a result of anything, it is a definite criterion of the authoritative text through which it is also known and reached.'®* The only means of liberation is knowledge; the only

‘“®It is a paradox that liberation can be known by the text and yet it can be reached through the text. The only solution of this paradox is, as far as we can tell.

115 means of knowledge is the text or the Upanisad. All the obstructions which do not lead to liberation is nothing but the creation or result of avidyd, and especially in the making of the text all the texts that do not contain and generate the procedure of ''pramana-pramd-moksa" pertaining to Brahman, comt under the realm of avidyd. In this sense it can be understood that avidyd passes over its original theoretical and epistemological sense, and becomes in a way a practical method. Once the end (liberation) and the means (knowledge) are fixed together with

the text, all the foreign things should be deprived of their privileges.

Avidyd as a method is charged with this task, and accordingly makes the

true text to be strengthened. By means of this logic of avidyd, Sankara’s

text as pramdna can have the right to be the gateway of knowledge of

the reality, and his text as pramd the criteria of internal proof as well as

interpretative method.

to prove the textual authority not in sruti or inside the text but in anubhava or outside the text, from the absolute level. W e deal with this paradox in brief in Chapter 5, Section 1, The Nature of Moksa, and as a whole in Chapter 6.

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