The Death of Kim Jong-il John Peterson 23 December 2011 The world’s attention is once again focused on North Korea. This is not due to a new nuclear test, imperialist saber-rattling, or a military clash with South Korea along the world’s most militarized border. This time, the reason is potentially even more explosive: the death of Kim Jong-il. The North Korean dictator had been in-ill health since suffering a stroke in 2008. Serious preparations for a transition of power were begun shortly thereafter, a process that was to be completed in 2012. But on December 19, North Korean state media reported that Kim had died at 8:30 am on December 17, at the age of 69. The cause of death given was a heart attack suffered while traveling on a train, brought on by fatigue—for “working too hard for the North Korean people.” The delay in making the announcement would indicate that there are divisions within the regime on how to move forward. Given the experience of the past, this comes as no surprise. When Kim Jong-il’s father, Kim-Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, died in 1994, there were three years of internal chaos and uncertainty as rival factions in the bureaucracy fought one another for control. This, despite the fact that Kim had been groomed by his father for 20 years to succeed him. However, a series of external factors compounded the transition. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to a steep economic decline and a period of nightmarish austerity in North Korea. This was followed by flooding of “biblical proportions” in 1995, which wiped out reserves of grain and destroyed vast swathes of arable land. Out of a population of 22 million, it is estimated that between 900,000 and 3.5 million may have perished in the famine of the early to mid-1990s. A repetition had to be avoided at all costs. A smooth transition was to be prepared in advance. But things are never so straight forward, especially in a bureaucracy as monstrous as the North Korean. Afraid of allowing one of his sons to build up a power base against him before he was ready to step aside, Kim Jong-il held off on naming a successor for nearly two years after his stroke. It was only in September 2010 that his then-27-year-old son Kim Jong-un was designated as “The Great Successor.” However, Un has no military experience, despite being made a four-star general and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers Party of Korea. In a country dominated by the military bureaucracy, will the army fall in line behind someone as untested as Un? Will Un be able to secure the reins of power without the regime imploding? In the words of Mike Chinoy, of the U.S. China Institute, “How does somebody who's not yet 30 win the loyalty and respect and command authority over the entrenched party apparatus, the entrenched military bureaucracy, and the senior party officials who may have been in their positions for a long time?” The geopolitical analysts at Straftor put forward the following possibility: “Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Jang Song Thaek, wi ll rule behind the scenes as Kim Jong -un trains on the job. Like the transition from Kim-Il Sung to Kim Jong -il, it is likely that North Korea will focus internally over the next few years as the country’s elite adjust to a new balance of power. In any tra nsition, there are those who will gain and those who are likely to be disenfranchised, and this competition can lead to internal conflicts.” Capitalist restoration? Capitalism has succeeded in prying open nearly the entire world. In an epoch of economic crisis and dog-eat-dog competition, every possible inch of market real estate will be fought over like hungry jackals over a bone. North Korea, despite the many complications, is one of the “last frontiers” for capitalism, and all the big players in the region—the U.S., China, Japan, and South Korea—are scrambling to stake their claim if and when the regime falls apart. They all want “their” capitalism to get the upper hand. Due to the extreme secrecy of the North Korean state, it is hard to form a clear picture of the situation in the country. It is difficult, for example, to know how deep the inroads of capitalism have gone. As explained in previous articles, the gradual restoration of capitalist property relations has been proceeding in “Hermit Kingdom” for some time—via China. A September 2010 article titled Chinese Capitalism Floods North Korea, published in the Duluth Tribune News, had this interesting commentary from a reporter on the ground: “While domestic acceptance of a possible Kim Jong Un regency appears unclear, much more open is North Korea’s growing embrace of Chinese tutelage and investment. The Chinese Communist Party has been steadfast in its support of North Korean economic liberalization, not merely to avoid a North Korean collapse, but because China can make money in the process. Leaders in Beijing are continually dispatching trade and tourism delegations to the North, dumping tons of industrial waste in North Korea, and helping Chinese firms to snaffle up lucrative contracts in the mining industry. Having surveyed nearly the entirety of the 800+ mile length of the North Korean border with China over the past several years, I can state with confidence that no amount of American prodding is going to move China into the US camp in opposition to North Korea, or bring China to support vigorous sanctions against its neighbor. The Chinese model is gradually winning in North Korea, and a class of North Korean entrepreneurs has developed along the border. Moreover, China’s own local needs mean that developing the border region takes priority over punitive steps which might slow North Korea’s nuclear development.” One thing is certain: there are tremendous interests at stake, whatever the outcome of the transition may be. The ruling bureaucracy has everything to lose if the country implodes. There are surely those who wish to keep the status quo, in order to continue benefiting from the state- owned sector of the economy. Others are clearly interested in adopting the “Chinese road”—with direct help from the Chinese capitalists themselves. This is a process that appears to have been accelerating in the recent period. Another layer may even be tempted by a rapprochement or even reunification with the South, hoping to become the beneficiaries of the selling-off of the state assets and the opening of the country to South Korean and American capital. For a period in the 2000s, relations between the North and South had thawed, as the “sunshine policy” was adopted by the capitalist South. Combined with food aid programs, President Roh Moo- hyun’s conciliatory policy was the “carrot” approach to bringing the North “in from the cold.” But the current President, Lee Myung-bak, has proceeded with a hard-line towards the North; the “stick” approach. Nonetheless, some North Korea observers see the recent renewal of discussions with the U.S. over the country’s nuclear program as an attempt to reach out to the West in order to lessen dependence on China, or at the very least, an attempt to gain leverage vis-à-vis the Chinese bureaucracy. The role of the masses It goes without saying that the regime in North Korea has nothing to do with genuine communism. It is a horrific, deformed caricature of the early years of the Soviet Union just after the 1917 revolution, which was the most democratic and representative government in the history of humanity. The Kim family’s dynasty picked up where Stalin left off, with a stifling, totalitarian bureaucracy, and the virtual enslavement of the mass of the population. A political revolution by the workers of the North to overthrow the bureaucracy, in conjunction with a social revolution by the workers of the South, in order to combine resources and establish the basis for a socialist economy, is the only real solution. Unfortunately, that is not a likely scenario in the period that lies ahead. Decades of the most unbelievable internal propaganda and regimentation of daily life will have clearly had an effect. Nonetheless, the heroic, revolutionary traditions of the Korean workers in both the North and the South are part of the region’s collective memory. In the aftermath of World War II, there was a tremendous revolutionary wave on the Korean peninsula. To cut across this, the country was partitioned in criminal fashion by U.S. imperialism and Russian Stalinism. Despite the indoctrination, it still remains to be seen how the North Korean masses will respond to Kim Jong-il’s death, and above all to the transition. Reports have emerged that indicate that their instinct to struggle has not been completely snuffed out. Here is what AsiaNews reported in February of this year: “The wave of protests that began in the Mideast appears to have reached even North Korea. For the first time in the history of the Stalinist regime, groups of ordinary citizens have protested in three cities demanding food and electricity, sources say. The event is exceptional and confirms the economic difficulties, especially concerning food supplies, people have to face under the Communist government. “According to South Korea’s Chosun-Ilbo newspaper, citing a North Korean source, demonstrations broke out on 14 February, two days before Kim Jong -il’s birthday, in the cities of Jongju, Yongchon and Sonchon, not far from the border of China.