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No. 222 18 June 2018 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html www.laender-analysen.de NORTH CAUCASUS ■■ANALYSIS Ethnicity and Elite Mobility in the North Caucasus: From the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation 2 By Kathleen Gergely, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ■■ANALYSIS Outsiders and Locals: The Kremlin’s Policy of Appointing Governors in the North Caucasus 5 By Sufian Zhemukhov, University of Maryland ■■ANALYSIS The Year of a Strongman: Ramzan Kadyrov in 2017 10 By Huseyn Aliyev ■■BOOK ANNOUNCEMENT A New Publication on the History of the North Caucasus: From Conquest to Deportation: The North Caucasus under Russian Rule, by Jeronim Perović 13 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies Security Studies Eastern European Studies East European Studies The George Washington University University of Bremen ETH Zurich University of Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 222, 18 June 2018 2 ANALYSIS Ethnicity and Elite Mobility in the North Caucasus: From the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation By Kathleen Gergely, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000271418 Abstract This article examines the relationship between ethnicity and elite mobility in the North Caucasus from 1956 until the present. It shows that the upward mobility of non-Russian regional heads is greater within the Rus- sian Federation than it was in the Soviet Union, but remains limited. Governance in the North Caucasus were regarded as a trusted nationality, their status within The North Caucasus has long imperiled the territo- the Soviet political system was improved after 1944, rial integrity of Russia. Yet there has been no systemic because they were never victims of the deportations. scholarly analysis of governance within the North Cau- Finally, in Kabardino-Balkaria, two Kabardins and casus that spans the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. This one Balkar served as regional first secretaries. Though article represents the beginning of such an analysis. It the accusations against the Balkars and other deported examines Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Osse- nationalities were not withdrawn until April 1991, in tia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and September 1990, B.M. Zumakulov, a Balkar, became Stavropol Krai, analyzing the relationship between eth- regional party first secretary after protests forced the nicity and elite mobility through the career trajectories resignation of V.M. Kokov. This appointment was per- of regional party first secretaries from 1956 to 1991 and haps intended to undercut Balkar secessionism, which regional executives from 1991 to the present. It employs gained traction at the end of the 1980s. Clark’s (1989) model of elite mobility, which focuses on Did these non-Russian elites possess the same career one-to-one position transfers that are defined as either experiences as their Russian counterparts? Willerton upward, lateral, or downward. The article relies primarily (1992) posits that experience within organizational on biographical data drawn from dictionaries, online party-work departments increased mobility within the databases, and newspapers, but also refers to scholarly Soviet political system. In the North Caucasus, seventeen analyses of elites in the Soviet Union and the Russian of the regional first secretaries worked within regional Federation under Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev. organizational party-work departments. The majority of these served in Checheno-Ingushetia or Karachaevo- The Soviet Union Cherkessia. They were predominantly Russian; while fif- From 1956 until 1991, thirty-four regional party first teen of the twenty-three Russian regional first secretaries secretaries served in the regions of the North Caucasus possessed work experience within an organizational analyzed here: four served in Dagestan, seven in Che- party-work department, only one of the non-Russians cheno-Ingushetia, four in Kabardino-Balkaria, seven possessed that experience—M.G. Aliev of Dagestan. in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, five in North Ossetia, and Though only nine of the regional first secretaries in the seven in Stavropol krai. Though the North Caucasus North Caucasus served in the military, this experience is majority non-Russian, only eleven of the thirty-four displays similar bifurcation. Seven of the regional first regional party first secretaries who served were non- secretaries who served in the military were in office in Russians. The majority of these served in three regions: ethnically-divided Kabardino-Balkaria or Karachaevo- Dagestan, North Ossetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. In Cherkessia. Again, only one non-Russian possessed that Checheno-Ingushetia, only one regional first secretary, experience—T.K. Malbakhov of Kabardino-Balkaria. D.G. Zavgaev, was a non-Russian, while in Stavropol Whereas these experiences improved the mobility of Rus- Krai and its autonomous oblast, Karachaevo-Cherkes- sians more than non-Russians, higher education within sia, no non-Russians served in this post. Only in Dage- the fields of agriculture or industry, especially natu- stan were all regional first secretaries non-Russians. Here, ral-resource extraction, improved the mobility of both the regional first secretaries were drawn from two of the Russians and non-Russians within the North Caucasus. dominant nationalities within the republic, demonstrat- Perhaps a more important distinction between the ing the strength of local networks; three were Avars and Russians and non-Russians serving in the North Cauca- one was a Dargin. In North Ossetia, three Ossetians sus is the relative likelihood that they would have exten- served as regional first secretaries. Though Ossetians sive work experience in a single region. Only twelve RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 222, 18 June 2018 3 regional first secretaries worked in their region immedi- dominant nationalities—Avars, Dargins, and Kumyks— ately prior to their appointment; of these eight were non- controlled political life, a continuation from the Soviet era. Russians. Notably, all regional first secretaries of Dage- Examining the Russian Federation generally, Mawds- stan worked in the republic prior to their appointment ley and White (2000) conclude that the Russian elite of the as the regional first secretary, again demonstrating the 1990s was a reproduction of the late Soviet elite. Excluding strength and stability of local networks there. Of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Ingushetia because no Kara- twenty-four regional first secretaries for whom a posi- chai or Ingush served as regional party first secretary, four tion after the regional first secretaryship could be found, of the remaining eight regional executives in the North only five remained within the same region. Three of these Caucasus previously served as regional party first secretary. were the regional first secretaries of Dagestan. Yet, in D.G. Zavgaev led the shadow government in Chechnya, spite of their relative lack of geographical limitations, the while V.M. Kokov, A.K. Galazov, and A.S. Dzasokhov political mobility of the Russian elites serving within regained or maintained prominence in Kabardino-Bal- this region was not greater. Rigby (1990) argues that karia and North Ossetia respectively. Yet the regional exec- appointment to either a Central Committee secretary utives—whether or not they previously served as regional spot or deputy chairmanship of the USSR Council of party first secretaries—were operating within a new insti- Ministers would constitute promotions from the regional tutional environment. Willerton posits that parliamen- party first secretary position; appointment as a minister tary posts would become increasingly influential over elite would constitute a lateral transition, while appointment mobility within the contested political sphere of the Rus- to a deputy minister post would constitute a demotion. sian Federation. Indeed, six of the eleven regional exec- By this argument, only Gorbachev and his protégé, V.S. utives served as representatives within local, regional, or Murakhovskii, were promoted following their first secre- national legislatures immediately prior to their appoint- taryships in Stavropol krai. The remaining twenty-two ment. Tenure within the new State Duma or Federation regional first secretaries—whether or not they remained Council undermined the limitations placed on the careers within the same region—were appointed to posts that of non-Russians during the Soviet era. Non-Russians like represented either lateral transitions or demotions. A.S. Dzasokhov of North Ossetia and A.S. Aushev of Ingushetia, both of whom became senators, could now The Russian Federation under Yeltsin construct personal power bases in Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the RSFSR became the independent Russian Federa- The Russian Federation under Putin and tion. Regional party first secretaries were replaced by Medvedev regional executives—called governors in the adminis- Vladimir Putin became president after Boris Yeltsin tratively-defined majority-Russian regions, and pres- abruptly resigned on December 31, 1999. He has piloted idents or heads in the semi-autonomous ethnic republics. Russia through the majority of her post-Soviet life, serv- Eleven officials served in this office in the North Cauca- ing as president from 2000 to 2008 and again from 2012 sus from 1992 through 1999; one served in Dagestan, one
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