for Securityfor Applications Development Advanced Strategic Study Workshop Series Advanced Development for Security Applications Addressing the Requirements for May 2017 Workshop Final Report Final Workshop 2017 May Different Stakeholders in Transportation Security ADSA16 ADSA16 May 2017 Workshop ALERT 2017 Publication ALERT Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Award Number 2013-ST-061-ED0001. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Advanced Development Final Report for Security Applications May 2017 Workshop Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 3 2. Disclaimers 4 3. Introduction 5 4. Discussion 6 5. Acknowledgements 12 6. Workshop Planning and Support 13 7. Appendix: Notes 14 8. Appendix: Agenda 15 9. Appendix: Previous Workshops 19 10. Appendix: List of Participants 20 11. Appendix: Presenter Biographies 26 12. Appendix: Questionnaire 45 13. Appendix: Questionnaire Responses 46 14. Appendix: Acronyms 67 15. Appendix: Minutes 75 16. Appendix: Presentations 137 1 Advanced Development Final Report for Security Applications May 2017 Workshop ADSA16 WORKSHOP Addressing the Requirements for Different Stakeholders in Transportaon Security Hosted by ALERT: Awareness and Localizaon of Explosives-Related Threats a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence May 2 - 3, 2017 17th Floor, East Village, Northeastern University 2 Advanced Development Final Report for Security Applications May 2017 Workshop 1. Executive Summary A workshop entitled “Addressing the Requirements for Different Stakehold- ers in Transportation Security” was held at Northeastern University (NEU) in Boston on May 2-3, 2017. This workshop was the sixteenth in a series dealing with advanced development for security applications (ADSA16). The theme of this workshop was chosen in order to support the U.S. Depart- ment of Homeland Security’s (DHS) objective of improving the performance of existing technologies as well as improving the passenger experience at checkpoints. Another goal of the workshop was to support DHS’s objective to increase the participation of third parties, such as researchers from academia, national labs, and industry other than the incumbent vendors, in algorithm and system development for security applications. The workshop addressed the requirements for the following stakeholders: • TSA • Airlines • Passengers • Vendors • Terrorists The key indings from the workshop on what can be done to improve the ex- perience for stakeholders at the checkpoint, per the editors of this report, are as follows: • Developing a single technology that can satisfy TSA’s future requirements may by improbable or impossible. This solution is also denoted as a silver bullet. • TSA should consider allocating funds to support augmenting existing technologies using the following methods: o Developing technologies that can be fused with existing technologies; and o Acquiring additional information to change how technologies are ap- plied to passengers and divested items. This information may be used to perform the following tasks: • Reduce screening resources on minimum risk passengers; and • Provide statistical information on the contents of divested items. • Acquire best practices from the protection of non-aviation venues, such as malls and sports stadiums. 3 Advanced Development Final Report for Security Applications May 2017 Workshop 2. Disclaimers This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Northeastern University nor any of their employees makes any warranty, ex- pressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the ac- curacy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any speciic commercial product, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States government or Northeastern University. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or relect those of the United States government or Northeastern University, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. This document summarizes a workshop at which a number of people partic- ipated in discussions and/or gave presentations. The views in this summary are those of ALERT and do not necessarily relect the views of all the partici- pants. All errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of ALERT. This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Home- land Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Ofice of University Pro- grams, under Grant Award Number 2013-ST-061-ED0001. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the oficial policies, either ex- pressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 4 Advanced Development Final Report for Security Applications May 2017 Workshop 3. Introduction The Explosive Division (EXD) of the DHS Science & Technology Director- ate (S&T), in coordination with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have the objectives for improving the performance of existing technol- ogies, developing new technologies, and improving the passenger experience at checkpoints. One tactic that DHS is pursuing to achieve these objectives is to create an environment in which the capabilities and capacities of the estab- lished vendors can be augmented or complemented by third-party algorithm and hardware developments. A third-party developer, in this context, refers to academia, national labs, and companies other than the incumbent vendors. DHS is particularly interested in adopting the model that has been used by the medical imaging industry, in which university researchers and small compa- nies develop technologies that are eventually deployed in commercial imag- ing equipment. A tactic that DHS is using to stimulate third-party algorithm and hardware development is to sponsor a series of workshops addressing the research op- portunities that may enable the development of next-generation technologies for homeland security applications. The series of workshops are entitled “Ad- vanced Development for Security Applications (ADSA).” The workshops are convened by Professor Michael B. Silevitch as part of the DHS Center of Ex- cellence (COE) for Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats (ALERT) at NEU. ADSA16 was held on May 2-3, 2017 at NEU. The workshop was entitled “Ad- dressing the Requirements for Different Stakeholders in Transportation Se- curity.” This report discusses what transpired at the workshop and details a summary of the indings and recommendations. 5 Advanced Development Final Report for Security Applications May 2017 Workshop 4. Discussion 4.1 Objectives of the Workshop The workshop addressed the requirements for the following stakeholders: • TSA • Airlines • Passengers • Vendors • Terrorists The purpose of this section is to summarize the discussion and recommen- dations in response to these objectives, as well as related questions that sur- faced during the workshop. 4.2 What Did We Hear? We heard about the following topics: • Dialogue about the relationship between manufacturers and TSA: We need additional methods to incentivize development of advanced tech- nologies. • Silver bullet: It may exist in emerging technologies; however, it may be improbable. • ADSA brings stakeholders together: Alternative funding may be required if ALERT’s funding ends. • The amount of risk TSA is willing to take: More discussion is required on the meaning of “risk.” • International markets for global aviation security: We need to align U.S. and foreign requirements. • Systems engineering and technology development process: We need to balance TSA speciications and opportunities for innovation. • Cyber security: We heard TSA requirements but need to have discussion on what it takes to achieve those requirements. • Predicting terrorist’s targets: Strong leaders do not want to attack civilian targets. Can a history of events be used to affect the performance of detec- tion systems? • Macro security: Assuming that there is no silver bullets, we can get more out of existing technologies, in part, by using additional data on passen- 6 Advanced Development Final Report for Security Applications May 2017 Workshop gers and their divested items. • Requirements-based design: The security ield may need different back- ground in leadership. • Former insider looking back on the security ield: o Insider view • We lost track of the mission, and only low-risk development was allowed. • Diminishing returns occur when more time is spent doing lab test- ing. We have to get equipment into the airports early. Until then, you don’t really know how well it’s going to work. o Outsider view • For industries not selling to TSA • OEMs invest massively in remote connectivity, data gathering and analysis, etc., which increases risk. • We can run secondary software in the background for R&D then DT&E, and get into the ield early